The PARTI Architecture Assurance

Abstract

Safety Critical Systems are those with the potential to cause death or injury as a result of accidents arising from unintended system behaviour. The arguments for safety, along with the body of supporting evidence, make up what is called the Safety Case. Requirements and guidance for Safety Cases are given in Def (Aust) 5679 Issue 2 [2]; in this standard the key stages of the Safety Case are: Hazard Analysis, Safety Architecture and Design Assurance. The process is driven by the identification of System Safety Requirements. The standard requires an argument be made that the Safety Architecture meets the System Safety Requirements. In the most serious cases, this argument is required to be made in a formal language and supported by formal reasoning tools. In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of such formal argument through the presentation of a formal verification argument for a simplified case study in Defence safety engineering.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 01, 2008
Accession Number
ADA500346

Entities

People

  • Brendan Mahony
  • Tony Cant

Organizations

  • Defence Science and Technology Group

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Human Systems
  • Sensors
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Australia
  • Case Studies
  • Classification
  • Command And Control
  • Engineering
  • Formal Languages
  • Guidance
  • Language
  • Laser Beams
  • Line Of Sight
  • Materials
  • Phased Array Radar
  • Phased Arrays
  • Radar
  • Radar Beams
  • Safety Engineering
  • Standards

Fields of Study

  • Computer science
  • Engineering

Readers

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Aviation Safety Risk Assessment.
  • Software Engineering