Bureaucracies at War: Organizing for Strategic Success in Afghanistan

Abstract

The collapse of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 led to the challenges of creating and then maintaining a stable, safe, and secure environment for the people of that nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) failure to organize and establish the unity of command and unity of purpose needed to implement under an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has resulted in the ISAFs inability to gain and maintain security, prevent a resurgence of the Taliban, and develop an effective infrastructure development plan. This strategy research paper (SRP) examines how poor administration and organization of the political and military effort in Afghanistan has resulted in a lack of unity of command and unity of purpose, which has created an unstable political and military environment and an ineffective Afghan government. This SRP concludes with eleven recommendations to better organize NATOs political and military effort in order for the NATO mission to succeed in Afghanistan.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Nov 13, 2008
Accession Number
ADA500796

Entities

People

  • Donald C. Bolduc

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • C4I
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • International Organizations
  • International Relations
  • International Security
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • National Governments
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Organizational Structure
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Strategic Security Studies