Risk of Using Past to Predict Future: A Case Study of Jamming RCIEDs
Abstract
The radio controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) is one of the deadliest threats to military personnel supporting the global war on terrorism, and due to its success is expected to play a major role as a weapon of choice in future insurgencies. To mitigate the risk of a RCIED attack, electronic jamming devices are utilized to interrupt the communications between a remote control and the RCIED trigger. We consider two approaches to determine the optimal jamming strategy for the coalition force. First, we formulate a mixed integer program to find the optimal jamming strategy based on recent attack data of RCIEDs. Second, we formulate a two-person zero-sum game to determine the optimal mixed strategy for jamming. With a simulation study, we found that with the first approach the coalition force tends to be overly optimistic in predicting the outcome, and is likely to underperform. In addition, the first approach allows the possibility for smart insurgents to deploy RCIEDs to purposely mislead the coalition force on what they plan to do in the future. The second game-theoretic approach provides a robust jamming strategy no matter how Red chooses to deploy their RCIEDs.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA501124
Entities
People
- Jeffrey A. Dayton
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School