



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ALIGNED INCENTIVES: COULD THE ARMY'S AWARD
SYSTEM INADVERTENTLY BE HINDERING
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS?**

by

Brent Alan Clemmer

June 2009

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Anna Simons
Erik Jansen

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2009	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Aligned Incentives: Could the Army's Award System Inadvertently be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Brent Alan Clemmer				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The United States Army has struggled to institutionalize counterinsurgency operations in the Global War on Terror. The Army's reward system, which drives individual motivation and reflects corporate values, plays a much overlooked role in this struggle. Within the Army, indeed within most organizations, pay, promotion, and awards form the tripod of extrinsic motivation, and represent tools the organization can use to reward specific behavior. Today and for the foreseeable future, both pay and promotion will have limited effects promoting counterinsurgency behavior. The Army's award system, which proudly traces its history to George Washington, was not developed as a complete system until World War I and, in many respects, ceased development after World War II. The current 'Pyramid of Honor,' which focuses on valorous acts, is deeply engrained in Army culture. At the same time significant work and thought have gone into revising the Army's 'capstone' manuals, FM-1 and FM-3.0. These documents, along with a separate manual on counterinsurgency, all revised or created since 9/11, attempt to move the Army in a new direction. This thesis explains the paradox that results. The Army has reached a point where it is telling its soldiers to do one type of action: work by, with, and through the host nation. Yet, it disproportionately delivers awards to those who conduct a separate type of action: engaging and killing the enemy.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Awards, Counterinsurgency, Reward Systems, Department of Defense Hall of Heroes, Army Stories of Valor, Army Silver Star Recipients			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 161	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**ALIGNED INCENTIVES: COULD THE ARMY'S AWARD SYSTEM
INADVERTENTLY BE HINDERING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS?**

Brent Alan Clemmer
Major, United States Army
B.A., San Diego State University, 1998

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2009**

Author: Brent Alan Clemmer

Approved by: Anna Simons
Thesis Co-Advisor

Erik Jansen
Thesis Co-Advisor

Gordon H. McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

The United States Army has struggled to institutionalize counterinsurgency operations in the Global War on Terror. The Army's reward system, which drives individual motivation and reflects corporate values, plays a much overlooked role in this struggle. Within the Army, indeed within most organizations, pay, promotion, and awards form the tripod of extrinsic motivation, and represent tools the organization can use to reward specific behavior. Today and for the foreseeable future, both pay and promotion will have limited effects promoting counterinsurgency behavior. The Army's award system, which proudly traces its history to George Washington, was not developed as a complete system until World War I and, in many respects, ceased development after World War II. The current 'Pyramid of Honor,' which focuses on valorous acts, is deeply engrained in Army culture. At the same time significant work and thought have gone into revising the Army's 'capstone' manuals, FM-1 and FM-3.0. These documents, along with a separate manual on counterinsurgency, all revised or created since 9/11, attempt to move the Army in a new direction.

This thesis explains the paradox that results. The Army has reached a point where it is telling its soldiers to do one type of action: work by, with, and through the host nation. Yet, it disproportionally delivers awards to those who conduct a separate type of action: engaging and killing the enemy.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	ON INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC REWARDS	5
A.	THE ARMY PAY SYSTEM.....	7
B.	PROMOTION TO A HIGHER RANK	8
C.	AWARDS.....	12
D.	THE CONNECTION BETWEEN AWARDS AND ENLISTED PROMOTION.....	13
III.	AWARDS.....	15
A.	WHAT IS THE BIG DEAL ABOUT AWARDS?	15
B.	HISTORY OF AWARDS.....	17
1.	Early History	17
2.	Creation of Awards in the U.S. Army	17
3.	American Revolution to WWI	18
4.	Creation of the Modern System WWI through WWII	19
5.	WWII to Present Day	20
C.	THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DECORATIONS, ENTITLEMENTS, AND BADGES	21
D.	SOME GREATER CONTEXT ON AWARDS	23
1.	Trends in Iraq	23
2.	Comparison to Previous Conflicts.....	23
3.	Are More or Fewer Awards being Given Today than in the Past?	24
E.	THE EMBEDDED NATURE OF AWARDS IN THE ORGANIZATION	25
1.	Chain of Command Wall.....	25
2.	Study of Senior Leaders	26
3.	Award Ceremonies.....	27
IV.	WHAT PRACTICES OR ACTIONS SHOULD BE REWARDED?	29
A.	COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY AND ‘BEST PRACTICES’	30
1.	T. E. Lawrence	30
2.	David Galula.....	31
3.	David Kilcullen.....	32
B.	ARMY DOCTRINE.....	33
1.	FM 1	34
2.	FM 3-0.....	34
3.	FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency	35
4.	FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency	36
C.	POLICY STATEMENTS FROM THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION	37
1.	New Strategy for Iraq.....	37

2.	New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan	38
3.	The Defense Budget	39
D.	THE NEW WAY OF WAR	39
E.	CONFLICTING REALITY ON THE GROUND	40
F.	SUMMARY	40
V.	WHAT TYPES OF ACTIONS ARE BEING REWARDED IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN?	43
A.	WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT THE AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR?	43
B.	WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT INCLUSION ON THE ARMY'S WEBSITE?	46
C.	WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT INCLUSION ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WEBSITE?	48
D.	DO SOLDIERS THINK THAT COIN 'BEST PRACTICES' MERIT AN AWARD?	50
VI.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	53
A.	AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY	55
1.	What did Veterans of Past Counterinsurgency/Guerrilla Conflicts Want?	55
B.	SOME WORDS OF CAUTION	56
C.	FINAL THOUGHTS	57
APPENDIX A.		59
APPENDIX B.		61
APPENDIX C.		63
APPENDIX D.		65
APPENDIX E.		67
APPENDIX F.		69
APPENDIX G.		73
APPENDIX H.		77
APPENDIX I.		79
APPENDIX J.		81
APPENDIX K.		83
APPENDIX L.		85
APPENDIX M.		87
APPENDIX N.		89
APPENDIX O.		91
APPENDIX P.		93

APPENDIX Q.....	95
APPENDIX R.....	97
APPENDIX S.....	101
APPENDIX T.....	109
APPENDIX U.....	111
APPENDIX V.....	117
APPENDIX W.....	119
APPENDIX X.....	129
APPENDIX Y.....	131
APPENDIX Z.....	135
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	137
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	143

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	The Intrinsic Motivation Pedestal and Three Extrinsic Motivation Guy-Wires	6
Figure 2.	FY 2007 Shortages of Officers by Year Group	9
Figure 3.	Promotion Rates for Armor Officers	11
Figure 4.	Decorations for Valor or Merit (Excluding those DoD Awards Created after the Vietnam War)	20
Figure 5.	Service Awards Authorized since their Creation in 1907	21
Figure 6.	Showing the Similar Ratio of Awards between Iraq and Vietnam	25
Figure 7.	Average Number of Each Individual Award per General Officer in the 28 Person Sample	27
Figure 8.	Award Ceremony in Afghanistan	28
Figure 9.	Divergence between Interstate and Internal Conflict	30
Figure 10.	The Spectrum of Conflict Depicted in FM 3-0	41
Figure 11.	Number of Silver Star Records in Home of Heroes Database by Year	45
Figure 12.	Number of Records by Year in Army ‘Stories of Valor’ Site	47
Figure 13.	Number of Awards by Year in DoD Heroes Site	49
Figure 14.	The Opposing Push and Pull between Doctrine and Awards Policy	54
Figure 15.	Mr. Nance with his World War II Decorations	58

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Pay Explanation: The Year Indicates the Time a Soldier Serve in Each Rank before a Cap on Pay is Established.....	7
Table 2.	Additional Pay per Month Earned in Iraq or Afghanistan.....	8
Table 3.	Promotion Opportunity: First Time Considered.....	10
Table 4.	Points Awarded for Promotion Based on Awards	14
Table 5.	Breakdown of Army Valor Awards Updated by Military Awards Branch, 22 April 2009	23
Table 6.	Comparisons between OIF and Historical Conflicts	24
Table 7.	Variables Used in Analyzing the Silver Star Database.....	44
Table 8.	Percent of Silver Star Recipients Who Partnered or Advised.....	45
Table 9.	Variables Used in Analyzing the ‘Army Stories of Valor’ Database	46
Table 10.	Percent of Recipients in ‘Stories of Valor’ Who Partnered or Advised	47
Table 11.	Variables Used in Analyzing the Department of Defense ‘Heroes’ Database.....	48
Table 12.	Percent of Award Recipients Who Partnered or Advised in the Department of Defense Database	49
Table 13.	Percentage of Partner/Advising Awards by Service	50

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my wife Joelle who always supported my late nights in the library and made sure the porch light was on to guide me home. My son Julian, while too young to know what dad was doing at school, kept me motivated by his sheer joy of life. Without their support, patience, and understanding, this thesis would never have been completed.

Graduate school does not happen in a vacuum. The long conversations, discussions and arguments with Josh Kennedy, Dennis Heaney, and Cory Brunkow, all moderated by Professor Simons were the highlight of this experience and have made me look at the world differently today than I did in the past.

The research for this project allowed me, at least on paper, to meet hundreds of American service members who have distinguished themselves in Iraq and Afghanistan. To borrow a quote, ‘Where do we get such men?’ They are a national treasure and meeting them was an enlightening experience.

To the Officers, Noncommissioned Officers, and Soldiers of Charger Company, 2nd Battalion 3rd Infantry Regiment--when working by, with, and through our Iraqi Security Forces brothers in Mosul you did it all, with little thanks. Yet, when called upon to risk your lives for fallen comrades whose names were unknown to you, each willingly stepped into the breach. Greater love hath no man.

My advisors, Professors Anna Simons and Erik Jansen provided constructive advice, insight, and critiques that dramatically improved the quality of this work. Thank you.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

Whether dealing with monkeys, rats or humans, it is hardly controversial to state that most organisms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded, but neither operant nor expectancy theorists would quarrel with the essence of this notion.

Nevertheless, numerous examples exist of reward systems that are fouled up in that the types of behavior rewarded are those which the rewarder is trying to discourage, while the behavior desired is not being rewarded at all.¹

Virgil begins his poem, *The Aeneid* with, “I sing of arms and a man.”² It would seem that the greatest honor a soldier fighting in some of humanities’ earliest recorded battles could receive was to be remembered and immortalized in song.

Modern soldiers are recognized and rewarded for their achievements, not by song or poem, but by a more formalized system of small medals and ribbons. For members of the United States Army, indeed for members of most modern professional armies, these symbols are worn on the uniform over one’s chest and display an individual’s success as a soldier. Each ribbon or medal speaks to an episode or chapter in the individual’s service record. Although the colorful collage on a uniform may have little meaning to most civilians, to members of the Army and others in the uniformed services, the significance of awards are profound, tracing their heritage all the way back to George Washington and the early Continental Army.

The Army officially describes its awards program as follows: “The goal of the total Army awards program is to foster mission accomplishment by recognizing excellence of both military and civilian members of the force and motivating them to

¹ Steven Kerr, “On the Folly of Rewarding A, while Hoping for B,” *Academy of Management Executive* 9, no. 1 (1995): 7.

² Publius M. Vergilius, *The Aeneid*, trans., J. W. Mackail (New York: Random House, 1950), 1.

high levels of performance and service.”³ As described, awards serve as a motivational tool for soldiers. These tools are organized into a ‘Pyramid of Honor’ that was developed and refined during the United States’ involvement in WWI and WWII. Although new awards have been added since WWII, the basic structure into which they fit has remained unchanged. This system of awards, which was successful in rewarding the actions needed in high intensity, state-on-state warfare, may not be suitable for the current conflicts or those to come.

Since shortly after September 11, 2001, the Army has been actively fighting in Afghanistan, adding another front in Iraq in 2003. These conflicts have been given various labels, from the Global War on Terror to the Long War and, more recently, Overseas Contingency Operations. Regardless of what these conflicts are called, and one reason no one knows exactly *what* to call them, is that they comprise something vastly different from the large-scale, interstate, conventional wars for which the Defense Department has prepared. As LTC Paul Yingling stated in a recent speech, “The world has changed a great deal in the last fifty years, but the Department of Defense has not. Despite some remarkable accomplishments by those parts of DoD closest to the battlefield, especially those in Iraq, the institutional military has proven incapable of internal reform on the scale necessary to provide for our security.”⁴

This thesis, which focuses specifically on the Army Awards system, seeks to answer the following questions: Could the Army’s Awards system inadvertently be hindering counterinsurgency operations? In other words, are soldiers who are supposed to do B, namely engage in counterinsurgency best practices, receiving commensurate awards? Or does the focus remain on A, the actions needed to succeed in large-scale state-on-state warfare?

To answer these questions, the thesis is divided into the following sections.

³ Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, “Army Regulation 600-8-2,” *Military Awards* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 11, 2007), 1.

⁴ Paul Yingling, Speech to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 2, 2009.

Chapter II provides an overview of the reward system, to include a brief review of the relevant literature. The chapter differentiates between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. It also discusses the two other types of rewards soldiers earn: money and promotion to a higher rank, and it briefly examines some of the challenges that monetary and promotional rewards pose in the current environment.

Chapter III's focus is the Army's Awards system. This system, with ancient roots, traces its beginnings to the United States Army in 1782, when General George Washington devised two badges of distinction for enlisted men and noncommissioned officers. These early awards were barely used and quickly forgotten, and in the early years and wars of the U.S., the system was seldom needed. Instead, promotions on the field were the reward a soldier might expect for a display of valor.

This changed with U.S. involvement in World War I. The number of decorations went from two, as the 'Great War' began, to the current number, which, counting skill badges, is over 100. Chapter III pays special attention to the Bronze Star, Silver Star, and Distinguished Service Cross, which are the 4th, 3rd and 2nd highest combat awards behind the Medal of Honor. Also examined are award trends, with particular focus on Iraq through five years of war. Several examples are given of how ingrained awards are in the Army's daily life.

Chapter IV explores both the academic and doctrinal literature, describing the 'best practices' for conducting counterinsurgency (COIN). It also analyzes the changes in policy the Obama administration has initiated toward Iraq and Afghanistan, along with a brief description of the budgetary changes introduced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Chapter V focuses on analyzing three databases and responses from a convenience sample of NPS students. I examined citations of Silver Star recipients and the descriptions of the recipients' action as presented by the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense public web pages. Both of these forums have a 'heroes' section which highlights individuals, the award they earned, and describes the circumstances involved. Examining who is awarded which medal for what type of action

can be taken to reflect what is the Department of the Army's and Department of Defense's conception of the 'ideal'. The question I pose in using this data is does this 'ideal' match the type of actions desired in COIN?

Chapter VI contains conclusions, recommendations, and areas for further study. The appendices include a multitude of further details.

A few notes on methods: There is ample data available from Army sources on the number and type of awards received in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Information on exactly when the award was earned is a little less clear. Sometimes the best guess that can be made is only within a 4-month period. As to *why* the award was given, this is something that is impossible to tease out using just official Army figures. To answer that question, I read hundreds of different citations and descriptions of the events surrounding the incident, and then coded these into a database. Examples of the type of data I drew from are contained in Appendices P, Q, and R.

A final note: this thesis is not being written out of any sense of personal grievance towards the Army Awards system. Nothing is further from the truth. In January 2007, while serving as a company commander, my unit was involved in a vicious battle with a Shiite cult north of the city of Najaf. As a result of the actions that occurred that day, I was awarded the Silver Star, and the men under my command earned over 70 valor decorations. Only when I began to study Irregular Warfare as a graduate student was I struck by the contrasting messages between what policy and doctrine want soldiers to do and what soldiers are rewarded for doing. This drove me to ask the questions that form the basis for this thesis.

II. ON INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC REWARDS

A cursory look inside most organizations reveals an array of tools used to elicit and to direct desired behavior. Carol Sansone writes, “Unarguably, our age is the age of rewards. The regulation of behavior by consciously constructed and socially imposed reward contingencies, whether blatant or subtle, is ubiquitous within contemporary Western oriented societies.”⁵ What makes people behave in certain ways, and how organizations can modify and control this behavior, are subjects of long standing interest.⁶

The U.S. Army, a very large organization, depends on its soldiers to have the drive or motivation to accomplish goals important to the entity as a whole. Generally, motivation is divided into two parts: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation is defined as, “Occurring when an activity satisfies basic human needs for competence and control which makes the activity interesting and likely to be performed for its own sake rather than as a means to an end.”⁷

This sort of motivation is decisive to the military, where intrinsic motivation is based on military service and is embodied in the core value of ‘selfless service.’⁸ Some of this motivation is captured by members of the Spencer family, five brothers all serving in the U.S. military: “I can remember going to a Fourth of July parade growing up and seeing the local color guard march by. I felt it was the neatest thing in the world and I

⁵ Carol Sansone and Judith M. Harackiewicz, *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation* (San Diego: Academic Press, 2000), 15.

⁶ From Skinner’s Box to Dr. Steven Kerr, there has long been academic interest in why people (and animals) act in certain ways.

⁷ Sansone and Harackiewicz, *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation*, 444. This is arguably moving beyond intrinsic task motivation to normative affective motivation. My point here is not to delve deeply into different types of intrinsic motivation, just to note it exists and is a strong force.

⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 1 The Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005), 1-16. It is further defined: Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own.

wanted to be a part of it,” “We always had the drive to serve our country,” “I didn’t do it because my brothers did it. It was more for a love of country and to just do my part.”⁹

The other side of the motivation coin is extrinsic motivation, defined as motivation “based on something external to the activity or external to the person.”¹⁰ Within the Army, the main external motivations appear to be pay, promotion and awards.¹¹ These three rewards then become the tools that the Army can use to modify behavior. Figure 1 graphically depicts the relationship between the main, intrinsic motivation for service, along with extrinsic motivation that can pull the individual in specific directions.




Figure 1. The Intrinsic Motivation Pedestal and Three Extrinsic Motivation Guy-Wires

⁹ Jason Watkins, “Why We Serve, 5 Spencer Brothers Serve across 3 Military Branches,” *Army Times* (May 4, 2009): 8.

¹⁰ Carol Sansone and Judith M. Harackiewicz, *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation* (San Diego: Academic Press, 2000), 445.

¹¹ There are certainly other extrinsic awards: educational benefits, access to health care, a defined pension plan and access to housing, to name a few. This study, however, focuses on the ‘Big Three.’

As Erik Jansen explains:

The reward system functions to create goal congruence between the individual and the organization. Individuals selected into organizations have different values and valences for rewards and outcomes. The reward system functions to induce diverse individuals to contribute to the organization through the management of rewarding and aversive consequences. It functions to motivate individual and collaborative performances.¹²

A. THE ARMY PAY SYSTEM

The amount of dollars spent on pay for soldiers by the Army is huge. According to *How the Army Runs*, “Over one third of the Army’s total obligation authority relates to compensation and only through controlling the cost drivers can the Army manage the dollars appropriated by the Congress.”¹³ Appendix A depicts the basic pay chart for 2009. A glance at Table 1 shows that a soldier receives monetary compensation based upon first, rank, and then the time served. There is a monetary incentive to continue to be promoted. However, after a certain amount of time in any rank, there ceases to be any additional pay for longevity of service.

Enlisted		Officer	
Grade	Year	Grade	Year
E-1	2	O-1	3
E-2	2	O-2	6
E-3	3	O-3	14
E-4	6	O-4	18
E-5	12	O-5	22
E-6	18	O-6	26
E-7	26		
E-8	30		
E-9	38		

Table 1. Pay Explanation: The Year Indicates the Time a Soldier Serve in Each Rank before a Cap on Pay is Established

¹² Erik Jansen, *Toward a Strategic Reward System Perspective* (PhD diss., University of Southern California, Unpublished, 1986), 20.

¹³ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2007-2008*, 26th ed. (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2007), 303.

Within the base pay, there is no relationship to how well or poorly a task is completed. Nor does the base pay reflect any special skills a soldier may possess.¹⁴ The point to be made is that pay is *not* directly related to performance.

While serving in an area like Iraq or Afghanistan, a Service Member is entitled to a variety of different types of pay in addition to base pay. Table 2 shows the types and amount of these pays. Again, as with base pay, there is no linkage between performance and pay. For instance, a soldier who constantly moves in and interacts with the local population would earn no more money than another who never leaves a base.

Family Separation Allowance (if married)	\$250
Hardship Duty Pay	\$100
Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay	\$225
TDY	\$105
Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (No federal income tax taken from pay)	varies

Table 2. Additional Pay per Month Earned in Iraq or Afghanistan

In sum, the Army (indeed the entire Department of Defense) has a well-established pay system that provides motivation to service members. Service in a combat zone, which is recognized to be a more challenging environment, is rewarded with at least \$670 additional dollars a month. However, the pay system is inflexible in the sense that it does not reward actions that are *specifically* desired and identified by the organization with additional pay.¹⁵

B. PROMOTION TO A HIGHER RANK

Promotion to a higher rank is another guy-wire of external motivation. The Army operates a closed system. To reach a higher rank in the organization, one must have served at a lower rank. For example, if a sudden need for more Majors arises, there is no mechanism to import them from outside the system. Figure 2 shows the shortages in

¹⁴ There is special incentive pay for medical specialties. See Appendix C for additional details.

¹⁵ There is a detailed discussion in Chapter III on what is desirable in a counterinsurgency operation.

Captains and Majors in FY 2007. Any gap between the vertical bars and the solid line indicates a shortfall between expected strength of a year group and the requirements expected to be filled by that year group.¹⁶ One of the effects of this gap is that a promotion system that, in the past, was competitive has ceased to be so.




Figure 2. FY 2007 Shortages of Officers by Year Group¹⁷

¹⁶ There are numerous studies and papers describing why there is a shortage: e.g., not enough accessions during the drawdown of forces, attrition because of the war, and expansion of the force structure, etc. For the purposes of this thesis, I am concerned about the effects this shortage has on the force, not its causes.

¹⁷ Charles A. Henning, *Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress* (CRS, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 6.

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) mandates a goal for Captain through Colonel. As Table 3 indicates, the Army was promoting slightly above its goals in 2001. Comparing 2005 to 2001, the jump in promotion rates is considerable, particularly through the rank of LTC.

Promotion to Rank of:	DOPMA Goal	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005
Captain	95%	99.0%	98.2%	98.9%	92.3%	98.4%
Major	80%	83.0%	89.5%	93.8%	96.9%	97.7%
Lieutenant Colonel*	70%	75.7%	77.3%	79.6%	79.0%	88.7%
Colonel*	50%	55.9%	53.5%	52.6%	53.2%	59.7%

* Operations Career Field Only

Table 3. Promotion Opportunity: First Time Considered¹⁸

Table 3 concerns itself with a broad population. In contrast, Figure 3 looks at one particular combat arms branch: Armor. This figure, which was included in a late 2008 update by the branch to the field, displays even higher promotion rates. Particularly noteworthy is that an exceptional 100% of those eligible for promotion to LTC were selected.¹⁹

¹⁸ Henning, *Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress*, 9.

¹⁹ The author suspects the promotion rates for Armor officers are representative of the other combat arms branches.

Armor Officer Career Pyramid




Figure 3. Promotion Rates for Armor Officers²⁰

Consider what effect these promotion rates and this pyramid might have on a young or mid-career officer. In the past, promotion, especially to the rank of LTC, was most assuredly *not* a sure thing. Taking the jobs that were perceived to be the hardest and then excelling at them was the path that many young officers thought they needed to take in order to be promoted. Clearly, with promotion rates at or near 100%, the perception shifts from, “only the ‘best and brightest’ get promoted” to “I’ll be promoted so long as I pass the mirror test.”²¹

Compounding the messages these promotion statistics convey is the feeling that senior officers did not even have to be particularly capable in the discharge of their duties

²⁰ Armor Branch, U.S. Army, “Armor Branch Update October 2008,” *U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Officer Personnel Management Directorate*, October 2008, [https://www.hrc.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/Armor_Webpage_2009/New_ArmorHomepage\(09\).htm](https://www.hrc.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/Armor_Webpage_2009/New_ArmorHomepage(09).htm) (accessed January 15, 2009), slide 17.

²¹ This is a somewhat morbid expression that proposes that as long as you are alive and breathing (thus able to fog up the mirror) you will be promoted.

to succeed in the system. According to Eliot Cohen (quoted in *The Gamble*), “Not all generals are up to the task...not a single general has been removed for ineffectiveness during the course of this war. The current promotion system does not take into account actual effectiveness in counterinsurgency. We need not great guys but *effective* guys. Routine promotion and assignment systems for generals in wartime is a disaster.”²²

The Army has identified advising Iraqi forces as a key task in paving the way to the successful withdrawal of U.S. forces. The next chapter discusses how advising and working ‘by, with, and through’ the host nation is critical to success in a counterinsurgency. Appendix B contains a copy of an email sent by the Army Chief of Staff to senior leaders stressing the importance of filling advisory (Military Transition Teams or MiTT) positions with quality officers. One imagines that, in the past, a soldier might have been motivated to seek this type of assignment by the prospect of promotion. But it now appears he will be promoted regardless of whether he takes the hard, vitally needed job or not, in which case what incentive is there for signing up for the more challenging and dangerous jobs?

For policy makers thinking about rewarding Army officers, the question must be asked: if everyone is assured of being promoted, can promotion be used as a tool to reward specific behavior?

C. AWARDS

Pay and promotion are important in civilian and military organizations alike. However, the current methods of allocating pay and promotion in the military lessen their effects given the current environment. Consequently, awards may be the best tool the military has to reward the behavior it is seeking.

In many regards, awards can be considered visible status symbols. Further chapters discuss awards in greater detail. Here it is important simply to recognize the

²² Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 99-100. For an excellent article critiquing the senior leadership in Iraq, please see Paul Yingling, “A Failure in Generalship,” *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2007), <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198> (accessed January 20, 2009).

power this ‘third guy-wire’ has on individuals. Although the following passage was written several decades ago, it captures the power of status symbols such as awards:

Again, there are facilities such as access to staff status and dining room facilities, payment by cheque, special uniform and markings on the uniform, admission to the membership of professional bodies, apprenticeship schemes, and the like. The author remembers a lad working very hard indeed, not for money but for a brass star in his cub’s hat, because that is what he valued at the time.²³

D. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN AWARDS AND ENLISTED PROMOTION

The previous section reviewed officer promotions. Next, I want to discuss one set of connections between awards and promotions as they relate to junior enlisted and non-commissioned officers.

There are nine different enlisted ranks in the Army: E-1 (Private) through E-9 (Sergeants Major). Promotion to E-2 through E-4 is based on time of service and time in grade. For example, promotion to E-2 takes place no sooner than six months into an individual’s time in service; to E-3 requires 12 months time of service and four months service as an E-2.²⁴ However, promotion to E-5, the entry-level position of the NCO corps, (as well as to E-6) is controlled by a semi-centralized system. Soldiers have to complete a promotion point worksheet, which results in a point total. A points list is released monthly. If a soldier’s point total is higher than that listed, he is promoted.²⁵ The promotion point worksheet allocates points in three different areas: total performance and military training; administrative points; and board points.²⁶ In the administrative points section, values are assigned to different awards as seen in Table 4.

²³ E. W. Hughes, *Human Relations in Management* (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1970), 43.

²⁴ Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, *Army Regulation 600-8-19* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions), 12.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁶ For an example of the worksheet, see Appendix D.

Awards		Badges	
Soldier's Medal or higher award	35	Combat Infantry Badge	15
Bronze Star Medal	30	Combat Field Medical Badge	15
Purple Heart	30	Combat Action Badge	15
Defense Meritorious Medal	25	Expert Infantry Badge	10
Meritorious Service Medal	20	Expert Field Medical Badge	10
Air Medal	20	Ranger Tab	10
Joint service Commendation Medal	20	SF Tab	10
Army Commendation Medal	20	Parachutist Badge	5
Joint Service Achievement Medal	15	Air Assault Badge	5
Army Achievement Medal	15		
Good Conduct Medal	10		

Table 4. Points Awarded for Promotion Based on Awards

Eight hundred points are possible on the promotion worksheet; up to 100 of these points can be earned by awards. These award points represent a maximum of 12.5% of the total. However, because the criteria are well defined and known, there is potential for a clever young soldier to game the system. It is not beyond reason that a soldier in Iraq or Afghanistan would consider action resulting in an award so as to improve his point total faster.²⁷

This linkage between awards and promotion provides a powerful incentive for a soldier, especially at the E-5 level, to seek action that, given the current point system, rewards combat over 'meritorious service'.²⁸ The resulting promotion points not only benefit the soldier in the short term, but his promotion signals to others what they should be doing. In other words, a point system, whose potential flaws have negligible impact in peacetime, can have a dramatic effect in times of conflict.

²⁷ Chapter III goes into greater detail about how specific awards and entitlements can be earned.

²⁸ Chapter IV discusses the best practices in counterinsurgency.

III. AWARDS

I challenge anyone to show me a republic, ancient or modern, in which there have not been decorations. Some people call them baubles. Well it is by means of baubles that one leads men.

—Napoleon Bonaparte

A. WHAT IS THE BIG DEAL ABOUT AWARDS?

Peering into an organization as large as the Department of Defense and attempting to gain insight on a single topic is a daunting task. What makes awards important to members of the military? Within the Army, which has manuals for everything, only one Army Regulation of 188 pages is dedicated to military awards. In the previous chapter, the point was made that military awards are the ultimate status symbols within the community. The late Col. David Hackworth, a highly decorated Army Officer, describes awards this way:

Soldiers and sailors, airmen and Marines prize awards for heroism even more than Olympic competitors cherish their gold medals...They are sacred, the ultimate symbol. They say you've been there, you've stood tall. At a glance, warriors can look at one another and determine exactly where and how well they have done their duty and how much they've bled. Medals are the military's DNA chart. They command instant recognition and respect. Men and women die for valor awards.²⁹

The seemingly esoteric nature of military awards, and the ability of those within the service to know and distinguish what all the 'symbols' mean, is captured by Sidney Freedberg, a reporter for the National Journal:

To a civilian, the 'ribbon rack' on a dress uniform is at once impressive and unintelligible, like poetry in a foreign language. To the discerning military eye, however, those decorations spell out a coded message with the wordless precision of signal flags. 'You can have someone walk into a room in uniform and to a civilian he looks like Idi Amin, festooned with "fruit salad" everywhere,' said Bruce Gundmundsson, a retired Marine major who is a military historian. 'But the cognoscenti look at that and

²⁹ David H. Hackworth, *Hazardous Duty* (New York: Perennial, 2001), 285-6.

say, “Aha, this guy has never seen a shot fired in anger.” Another guy might be wearing only a couple of decorations, but you look at those and go “Wow.”³⁰

Another way to measure the importance awards hold is to observe what has happened to individuals whose qualifications to wear certain awards have been called into question by others. The Navy’s highest ranking officer, for instance, responded by committing suicide: “Admiral Boorda, the Chief of Naval Operations, shot himself outside his home in Washington in May 1996 only hours before he was to be interviewed by reporters from Newsweek investigating whether he had earned the right to wear two tiny brass ‘V’ pins, which signify valor for having earned the medals in combat.”³¹

The significance of military awards is also protected by law. Federal code provides for a penalty of up to one year in jail and/or a fine for unauthorized wearing of awards or making false statements about receiving them. A public official from southern California recently discovered this law the hard way:

A subdued Xavier Alvarez, 50, who sits on the board of directors for the Three Valleys Municipal Water District in Claremont, admitted to violating the Stolen Valor Act, a recently enacted federal law that makes it a crime for a person to falsely claim he or she was awarded medals for service in the U.S. armed forces. Last fall, Alvarez became the first person to be charged for making this type of verbal misrepresentation. “We have to guard the honor of our nation’s military heroes, and this prosecution was a small attempt to do that,” said Assistant U.S. Atty. Craig Missakian.³²

Clearly, military awards are sufficiently important to those in the military (and those who have retired from the military) that they be protected from abuse by society. Some history is needed to better understand precisely what awards mean to those who serve.

³⁰ Sydney J. Freedberg, “The Other Three Thousand,” *www.nationaljournal.com*, January 12, 2007, http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20070113_4.php (accessed October 1, 2008), 4.

³¹ Steven Lee Myers, “Admiral, a Suicide, Wins Some Vindication on Combat Awards,” *New York Times*, June 25, 1998, Late edition (East Coast) ed.: A15.

³² Scott Glover, “Man Pleads Guilty to Lying about Medal,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 6, 2008: B10.

B. HISTORY OF AWARDS

1. Early History

Napoleon, for instance, knew his history. The Roman Legions had a well-defined system of awards--from minor valor awards like the Torques, Amillae, or Phalerae given to the rank and file, to a series of crowns for significant achievements. In Caesar's day, "A successful soldier was able to display spectacular decorations. These included collars or necklaces, arm-bands and round discs worn in a leather harness strung over the corselet...Open to all ranks, too, was the glorious Civic Crown, a wreath of oak-leaves awarded for saving the life of a fellow citizen."³³

2. Creation of Awards in the U.S. Army

In the U.S. Army, decorations date back to the end of the Revolutionary War.³⁴ It was not until August 1782, almost a year after the victory at Yorktown, that Washington issued an order that read in part:

The General, ever desirous to cherish a virtuous ambition in his soldiers, as well as to foster and encourage every species of military merit, directs that, whenever any singularly meritorious action is performed, the author of it shall be permitted to wear on his facings, over his left breast, the figure of a heart in purple cloth or silk, edged with narrow lace or binding. Not only instances of unusual gallantry, but also of extraordinary fidelity and essential service in any way, shall meet with a due reward...the road to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus opened to all. This order is also to have retrospect to the earliest days of the war, and to be considered a permanent one."³⁵

³³ Michael Grant, *The Army of the Caesars* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), xxii.

³⁴ The Continental Congress did award several gold medals to key leaders for their actions: Washington for service driving the British out of Boston, Gates for Saratoga, and Jones after the taking of the *Serapis*. Congress also awarded the Andre Medal to the three soldiers who captured Major John Andre with West Point's defensive plans, given to him by Benedict Arnold.

³⁵ Frank Foster and Lawrence Borts, *A Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals* (Fountain Inn: MOA Press, 2005), 5.

Existing records still show that this first award went to three non-commissioned officers. In all likelihood, there were others, but the British destroyed the records detailing their names when they burned Washington D.C. during the war of 1812. The Purple Heart and Honorary Badge of Distinction thereafter fell into disuse.³⁶

3. American Revolution to WWI³⁷

Despite two major conflicts prior to the Civil War, the Army's Awards system was not reestablished. Not until after the Civil War had started, was a new award, the Medal of Honor, brought into creation.³⁸ President Lincoln approved the award on July 12, 1862.³⁹ During the Civil War, 1,198 Army Medals of Honor were awarded.⁴⁰

For years, the Medal of Honor was the only American military medal that the U.S. had.⁴¹ Once Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901, he initiated legislation to create medals to honor those who had served in previous conflicts. From this came a new category of American service Awards. By 1909, campaign medals had been developed to retroactively recognize veterans of the Civil War, Indian Wars, War with Spain, Philippine Insurrection and China Relief Expedition of 1900-1. With the creation of these medals began the tradition of wearing them on the tunic or jacket, which continues to this day.⁴²

As war clouds loomed in 1916, the Secretary of War established a panel of five Generals to review all 2,625 Medals of Honor presented by the Army up to that time. The result was that 911 medals, most awarded during the Civil War, were revoked. By

³⁶ John White, "The Award No One Wants," *The New American* (October 29, 2007): 34-38.

³⁷ For a listing of Decorations and Service Awards from the Revolution to WWI, see Appendix E.

³⁸ To be technically correct, there are three types of the Medal of Honor. The Army, Navy and Air Force each have their own unique physical version of the Medal.

³⁹ John E. Strandberg and Roger J. Bender, *The Call of Duty: Military Awards and Decorations of the United States of America* (San Jose: James Bender Publishing, 1994), 17.

⁴⁰ U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch, "Statistics by Region, Conflict or Incident," www.hrc.army.mil. April 22, 2009, https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Jan_07_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Operation%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed April 22, 2009), 1.

⁴¹ The Certificate of Merit existed, but was just that, a paper certificate.

⁴² Foster and Lawrence, *A Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals*, 6.

revoking these awards, many given for petty reasons, and by establishing much tougher criteria, the panel created a new problem—how to recognize the heroism and outstanding performance of military personnel who performed at levels somewhat below those that would justify being awarded the MOH.⁴³

4. Creation of the Modern System WWI through WWII⁴⁴

Little doubt exists that the two World Wars had a defining influence on the Army's award system, especially with respect to decorations for valor, merit, and service. Consider that a soldier on the eve of WWI could earn the Medal of Honor, or nothing. In contrast, a soldier riding a liberty ship home from the Pacific theater in late 1945 could have earned a multitude of valor awards.

Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the World Wars on the Army's award system. Not counting the decorations created by the Department of Defense after the Vietnam War, the near stagnation in the Army awards *system* should also be apparent.⁴⁵ The two Army decorations added since WWII are the Meritorious Service Medal and the Army Achievement Medal, neither of which can be awarded for combat operations.⁴⁶

⁴³ For instance, a large number of Medals of Honor were given to soldiers who re-enlisted, while some 20 were given the honor guard that accompanied President Lincoln's body to its burial site; Peter Collier, *Medal of Honor: Portraits of Valor beyond the Call of Duty* (New York: Artisan, 2003), 238.

⁴⁴ For a listing of the Decorations and Service awards created from WWI through WWII, see Appendix F.

⁴⁵ The Department of Defense and Joint Service awards are excluded because they mirror existing Army awards. I excluded them because their purpose is to give the DoD and Joint Staff commanders the ability to present awards for merit without having to go through each service for approval. See Appendix I for more information.

⁴⁶ The MSM was established in 1969. This is not a combat decoration, but is the medal of choice for end of tour and retirement awards for field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers.




Figure 4. Decorations for Valor or Merit (Excluding those DoD Awards Created after the Vietnam War)

5. WWII to Present Day⁴⁷

While the number of decorations has remained static since WWII, the number of awards given for service has continued to rise, as seen in Figure 5. The contrast to the number of decorations is striking both in real terms and in terms of change over time.

⁴⁷ Please see Appendix G for a list of Awards and Decorations created since WWII.




Figure 5. Service Awards Authorized since their Creation in 1907

C. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DECORATIONS, ENTITLEMENTS, AND BADGES⁴⁸

While the awards system has been called the ‘Pyramid of Honor,’ some degree of explanation is needed to fully understand its idiosyncrasies. There are, in effect, three smaller pyramids. One award pyramid (and the one that is most recognized) is for valor; a second is for merit and service; and the third consists of entitlements and badges. This can be confusing because some awards, such as the Bronze Star, can be earned for both valor and merit in combat. The V device distinguishes them, as soldiers learn to recognize.⁴⁹

Before Sgt. Stone earned one of each kind, he recalled, ‘I didn’t know there were two different types of Bronze Stars.’...But in Stone’s company of 140 troops, only two others were awarded the Bronze Star with V...‘We know the difference,’ said Army 1st Sgt. Gerald Wolford, a Silver Star Recipient. ‘If we see a Bronze Star and there’s no V on it, we’re like

⁴⁸ Please see Appendix H for a list of major badges and the dates they were created.

⁴⁹ Appendix J depicts these three pyramids.

OK, it doesn't mean you did anything. Go home, tell your story, get your Bronze Star license plate, but just realize that my private who did not get anything, did more than you did.'⁵⁰

Entitlements and badges are given automatically to anyone who meets certain criteria. For example, the Purple Heart, awarded to wounded soldiers, is actually an entitlement. Consequently, a soldier who serves a year in Iraq may end up with several different awards.

- A valor award like the Bronze Star Medal with V for a discreet action is given for being distinguished for heroic achievement and must have been recommended by the chain of command on a DA 638. Oftentimes, additional supporting documentation, such as sworn statements, must be provided. Approval authority in Iraq is usually the first Division level (Major General, O-8) commander.⁵¹
- A service award, like the Army Commendation Medal, recognizes what the individual did throughout a deployment and must be recommended by the chain of command on a DA 638. Approval authority in Iraq for an ARCOM is usually the first Brigade level (Colonel O-6) commander.
- A unit award, such as the Meritorious Unit Citation, does not reflect individual actions. The battalion or brigade staff writes up this type of award. No individual orders are cut if it is approved. Eventually, a blanket order is published authorizing any individual assigned to the unit during the specified dates to wear the award.
- A service award, like the Iraq Campaign Medal, only requires that an individual show that he was assigned in-theater during qualifying periods to wear it.
- An entitlement like the Combat Infantryman Badge or Combat Action Badge typically requires a sworn statement that must be provided to the approval authority (Brigade or Division level).

⁵⁰ Sydney J. Freedberg, "The Other Three Thousand," *www.nationaljournal.com*, January 12, 2007, http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20070113_4.php (accessed October 1, 2008), 5.

⁵¹ Quick approval of posthumous awards was stopped after the debacle concerning Cpl. Pat Tillman's Silver Star, which was awarded before the public revelation that he was killed by his own platoon. Added to AR 600-8-22 was "Posthumous valor awards must always reflect accurately the actual events and circumstances for which the award is being presented. Prior to taking any action on a posthumous valor award recommendation, the award approval authority must review the completed AR 15-6 collateral investigation, to ensure the accuracy of the award process. The approval authority must also indicate in block 26i, DA form 638 that the completed AR 15-6 investigation was reviewed."

The takeaway from this is that the award system is fully invested in the conflict. Most soldiers who complete their first deployment will end up with at least an end of tour service award, like the ARCOM and an Iraq Campaign medal.

D. SOME GREATER CONTEXT ON AWARDS

1. Trends in Iraq

A significant number of awards are being earned in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking specifically at valor awards, over 12,000 have been awarded for actions in both theaters. Table 5 shows the breakdown of total awards.⁵²

Global War on Terrorism Valor Awards			
Award	Afghanistan	Iraq	Total
Medal of Honor	0	2	2
Distinguished Service Cross	3	16	19
Silver Star	151	398	549
Distinguished Flying Cross	90	102	192
Soldier's Medal	28	104	132
Bronze Star for Valor	1098	2167	3265
Air Medal for Valor	673	609	1282
ARCOM for Valor	2015	4788	6803

Table 5. Breakdown of Army Valor Awards Updated by Military Awards Branch, 22 April 2009⁵³

2. Comparison to Previous Conflicts

To place the number of 12,000 in perspective, Table 6 compares the top three valor awards earned during five conflicts prior to the war in Iraq. There is no perfect way to make these comparisons. The DSC numbers from the World Wars are high because the Silver Star had not yet been introduced. A good way to compare the different levels of

⁵² For a breakdown of valor awards in Iraq over time, see Appendix L.

⁵³ U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch, "Statistics by Region, Conflict or Incident," www.hrc.army.mil, April 22, 2009, https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Jan_07_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Operation%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed April 22, 2009), 2-3.

intensity of conflict between WWII and Iraq is by looking at the 3ID numbers vice the numbers for the entire Army in Iraq. That division alone suffered over twice as many KIA in almost half the number of days in combat as the entire Army in Iraq. The number of awards received is also significantly higher.

	Entire Army in WW I	3ID in WWII	Entire Army WWII	Entire Army Korea	Entire Army Vietnam	Entire Army Gulf War	Entire Army OIF (23 March 03 to 30 July 08)
Days of Combat Operations	600	907	1855	1129	3650	206	1956
Number of KIA	50510	6240	234874	33741	30957	224	2962
Wounded	193663	24,793	565861	103284	96802	354	30,634
Missing		3,191			118		1
Number Serving	4057101		8300000	2834000	4368000	2225000	
Total Number of MOH	96	39	301	78	155	0	2
Number of Distinguished Service Cross	6430	133	4434	723	846	0	11
Number of Silver Stars	N/A	2972	73,651	10,061	21630	75	390
Number of BSM/V					170626	891	1986

Table 6. Comparisons between OIF and Historical Conflicts

3. Are More or Fewer Awards being Given Today than in the Past?

The argument has been made in the editorial section of ‘trade’ papers, like *The Army Times*, that not enough top-level awards are being earned in Iraq. In Figure 6, we see the ratios between the top four valor awards for Vietnam and Iraq. There seems to be considerable (even remarkable) consistency. While 153 more Medals of Honor were awarded in Vietnam, the number of lesser awards earned is, proportionally, quite similar.




Figure 6. Showing the Similar Ratio of Awards between Iraq and Vietnam

Awards add up to far more than just footnotes to an individual or units' history; they help socialize the next generation. Awards create a sense of legacy, and they silently but powerfully establish models of what is considered exemplary behavior within the organization.

E. THE EMBEDDED NATURE OF AWARDS IN THE ORGANIZATION

1. Chain of Command Wall

Enter any Army company or higher headquarters and there is always a wall with the officer and non-commissioned officer chain of command on display. This display, usually done in 8¹/₂ x 11 glossy photos, allows every soldier to trace his chain of command from his immediate commander all the way up to the President of the United States.

Such displays are not just found in the Army, but in all of the services. It is also customary for the senior officers to be wearing Class A uniforms that display all of their awards. Thus, even though most soldiers in a rifle company will never meet a superior

higher than their battalion commander, they can see (and study) what awards their superiors have earned. In effect, they can ‘read’ their superiors’ full biography at a glance.⁵⁴

2. Study of Senior Leaders

Appendix K represents a brief look at 28 U.S. Army general officers. Included are the seven previous Army Chiefs of Staff, three recent notables, eight current senior leaders working at positions above the division level, and ten Generals in divisional leadership positions. The significance of an award for valor or merit in wartime can clearly be inferred. Of the 28, 26, or almost 93%, have earned the Bronze Star for valor or merit. One of the two who lacks a Bronze Star, LTG Austin, (commander of the 18th Airborne Corps) earned a higher award, the Silver Star.

In effect, it appears the Bronze Star is the minimum standard for general officers in senior leader positions. Perhaps a look at combat support or combat service support general officers may have yielded different results. However, the senior leadership positions in the Army’s operational formations are filled exclusively with combat arms officers. These formations execute policy, and these leaders are the mentors and role models for the soldiers engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Figure 7, we see a graphical representation of the average awards per general officer.

⁵⁴ Appendix M presents an example of this type of command wall, with an additional example of how this depiction of leaders extends beyond the operational force.




Figure 7. Average Number of Each Individual Award per General Officer in the 28 Person Sample

3. Award Ceremonies

The importance of awards is also symbolized by the ceremonies that take place when they are presented to recipients. Much care is given to ensure maximum participation from all the soldiers in the unit.⁵⁵ Typically, the unit commander draws up the men into formation, and then has those soldiers receiving awards post themselves in front of their peers. Most often, the battalion or brigade commander makes the presentation. Figure 8 depicts an award ceremony.

The senior commander present usually describes how proud he is of the individuals who have earned the decorations about to be presented. He often lauds them for being “what right looks like” and the standard to which everyone should strive. Then, while their peers stand at attention in anonymous ranks, the awardees, positioned in front of everyone, have the medals clipped onto their uniforms.

⁵⁵ I have personally witnessed ceremonies in Iraq where two of the three line companies in a battalion will surge to cover a given battlespace to allow all the soldiers from the third company to participate in an award ceremony. The other event that merits this type of effort is a memorial service.

These occasions have a powerful effect on both those receiving an award and those witnessing it. As Air Force LTC Raymond Powell describes his feelings on receiving his first award: “Proud and excited, I knew I’d accomplished something truly special. With my friends and family in attendance, I felt 10 feet tall. The occasion was a tremendous motivator.”⁵⁶



Figure 8. Award Ceremony in Afghanistan⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Raymond M. Powell, “Medals for Mediocrity: How to Restore Meaning to Air Force Decorations,” www.airpower.au.af.mil, March 1, 2009, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj09/spr09/powell.html> (accessed March 4, 2009).

⁵⁷ Picture is of Company A, 2-108th IN, 27th BDE New York Army National Guard, September 19, 2008 in Afghanistan, www.dmna.state.ny.arng/27bct/stories/awards.html. No credit was given for the picture.

IV. WHAT PRACTICES OR ACTIONS SHOULD BE REWARDED?

The previous chapter described the Army's award system. This chapter focuses on the type of conflict the Army is involved in today and the ways soldiers are being told they should execute it.

The Army defined its purpose between June 2001 and June 2005, as "The Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win our Nation's wars."⁵⁸ Significant here is that the statement affirms commitment to win our wars, not necessarily the wars of other countries.

Figure 9 marks the gap between 'traditional' interstate conflict and internal conflict. Internal conflicts have become more prevalent and, if this trend continues, appear to have a higher likelihood of occurring in the future. These 'small' or insurgent/counterinsurgent wars are not recent developments; there is a significant body of literature already devoted to them. Discussed below are some of the theories and 'best practices' for how to wage these types of conflicts.

⁵⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 1 The Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), 21.




Figure 9. Divergence between Interstate and Internal Conflict⁵⁹

A. COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY AND ‘BEST PRACTICES’

There is a persistent impression that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represent some new type of war. However, this is far from the truth. The kind of hubris that exists today was also evident at the turn of the last century as captured in a quote from a movie about the Second Boer War: “This is a new kind of war for a new century, George. I suppose this is the first time our enemies have not worn uniforms. Some are children, and some...are missionaries.”⁶⁰ This statement itself ignores centuries worth of prior small wars. At least since the British experience in South Africa at the start of the 20th century, much has been written describing the theory behind insurgent/counterinsurgent warfare.

1. T. E. Lawrence

T. E. Lawrence was a junior officer in the British Army in the Middle East during WWI. An unusual combination of archaeologist, philosopher, diplomat, and soldier, he had a profound effect on the results of the campaign. His ability to work across the

⁵⁹ J. Joseph Hewitt, Johnathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, “Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive Summary,” *Center for International Development and Conflict Management*, 2008, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/executive_summary/pc_es_20070613.pdf (accessed March 12, 2009), 12.

⁶⁰ *Breaker Morant*, Directed by Bruce Beresford, Performed by Edward Woodward, 1980.

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war has seldom been equaled. He wrote a 400,000-word book about his experiences and his *27 Articles*, from which the following ideas come, is still prominently posted by American headquarters in Iraq.⁶¹

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them. Actually also under the odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.⁶²

The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, but there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these inner reasons (they will be denied, but are none the less in operation) before shaping your arguments for one course or others.⁶³

...Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain shall be saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would undo the work of weeks.⁶⁴

2. David Galula

David Galula was a French Army Officer who wrote *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, published in 1964. In it he draws on his experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria.

Invoking what a Chinese communist general said, “A revolutionary war is twenty percent military action and eighty percent political,” Galula credits this with being a

⁶¹ T. E. Lawrence, *Revolt in the Desert* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926), v-x.

⁶² T.E. Lawrence, “The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence from the Arab Bulletin #60,” *mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil*, August 20, 1917, <http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/docs/The27ArticlesofT.E.Lawrence.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2009).

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

formula that reflects the truth.”⁶⁵ When describing the importance of civil authority, he adds, “The inescapable conclusion is that the over-all responsibility should stay with the civilian power at every possible level.”⁶⁶

A further passage, worth quoting at length, seems prescient in describing what did *not* happen during the 2003 American effort in Iraq:

At some point in the counterinsurgency process, the static units that took part initially in large-scale military operations in their area will find themselves confronted with a huge variety of nonmilitary tasks which have to be performed in order to get the support of the population, and which can be performed only by military personnel, because of the shortage of reliable civilian political and administrative personnel...implementing the various economic and social reforms, etc.—all these will become their primary activity. They will have to be organized and supported accordingly. Thus a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun, a soldier trained as a pediatrician more important than a mortar expert, cement more than barbed wire...

To summarize Galula, the preponderance of action should *not* involve military force; however, the military must be prepared to execute non-traditional tasks if a civilian force is unavailable.

3. David Kilcullen

Dr. David Kilcullen, a former Australian Army officer, is perhaps the most well known of the ‘current’ experts on guerilla warfare. He advised General David Petraeus, while he commanded Multinational Force Iraq in 2007, and Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State in 2008. Involved in shaping U.S. policy in both Iraq and Afghanistan,

⁶⁵ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 89.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 94.

he has since published a book, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, in 2009.⁶⁷ According to Kilcullen, ““The more we focus on the enemy, the harder it is to actually get anything done with the population.””⁶⁸

In addition, of course, winning the population’s support is the key prize. Yet:

Even within the armed forces, there is a substantial mismatch between the capabilities needed for the current international security environment and those actually present in the U.S. military inventory. This is starkest in terms of the lack of capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and for counterinsurgency or FID (Foreign Internal Defense).⁶⁹

B. ARMY DOCTRINE

Since shortly after the Iraq invasion the U.S. Army and the U.S. military as a whole have attempted to capture these lessons about counterinsurgency, of which the examples above are just a small sampling.

Army doctrine represents a body of thought about how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force. Essentially, doctrine establishes how the Army views the nature of operations.⁷⁰ This ‘body of thought’ began to change with the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, three revisions have been made to both of the Army’s capstone field manuals, FM 1 *The Army* and FM 3-0 *Operations*. These revisions, as will be shown through examples below, seek to adjust the Army to a world where the strategic environment is much different from the one in which it had been operating since WWII. The shift in these doctrinal instruments, combined with the creation of specific counterinsurgency manuals, give evidence of the shifting way the Army is viewing its operational mission.

⁶⁷ Center for a New American Security, “Dr. David Kilcullen,” www.cnas.org, March 1, 2009, <http://www.cnas.org/node/539> (accessed March 1, 2009).

⁶⁸ Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 6.

⁶⁹ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 26.

⁷⁰ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-0 Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), D-1.

1. FM 1⁷¹

Entitled *The Army*, FM 1, outlines in the broadest sense how the Army defines itself and its purpose. A ‘transformational’ shift had already begun, as seen in the June 2001 version. This transformation was by and large derailed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. A revised version of FM 1 published in 2005 better captures the realities of an Army at war than the manual released just four years previously.

Gone are the days when the Army could focus training only on major combat operations. Today the Army must train soldiers and units to fight insurgents and other irregular threats while executing multiple operations worldwide.⁷²

During and after major combat operations, Army forces contribute to joint, interagency, and multinational efforts to exploit the opportunities military victory provides and provide strategic permanence to the otherwise temporary effects of combat.⁷³

Another way to see how much FM 1 has changed in a short period of time is to look at the pictures that accompany the text. These can be seen in Appendix N. ‘Traditional war’ imagery is much reduced in the new manual.

2. FM 3-0

The 2008 version of FM 3-0, *Operations* describes itself as a “revolutionary departure from past doctrine.” This is a perhaps overstated acknowledgment that the ongoing counterinsurgent struggle within Iraq has had a profound effect on the Army as an institution. The first of the two passages below is notable because earlier doctrine espoused that land power was the *sin qua non* of any campaign.

⁷¹ As an example of how tradition bound the Army is, this capstone document is traditionally released on June 14, the U.S. Army’s birthday (dating back to 1776).

⁷² Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 1 The Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005), 1-20.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 3-8.

This edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex period of prolonged conflicts and opportunities. The doctrine recognizes that current conflicts defy solution by military means alone and that land power, while critical, is only part of each campaign.⁷⁴

Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. They often face the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other until combat erupts. Killing or capturing the enemy in proximity to noncombatants complicates land operations exponentially. Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success.⁷⁵

3. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency

Published in 2006, the counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) field manual was the product of then Lieutenant General David Petraeus while he commanded the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. FM 3-24 is not the first field manual to address counterinsurgency or guerrilla operations. However, its predecessor, FM 90-8 *Counter guerrilla Operations*, appeared in 1986 and never truly evolved or gained acceptance by the force. The new manual, released while the conflict was still underway, under the auspices of a general with ‘star power,’ received wide acceptance. Some of the passages most relevant to the argument here are:

Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend.⁷⁶

Throughout its history, the U.S. Military has had to relearn the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN) while conducting operations against adaptive insurgent enemies. It is time to institutionalize Army and Marine Corps knowledge of this longstanding form of combat.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-0 Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), vii.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), vii.

⁷⁷ Ibid., ix.

Ironically, the nature of counterinsurgency prevents challenges to traditional lessons-learned systems; many nonmilitary aspects of COIN do not lend themselves to rapid tactical learning...performing many nonmilitary tasks in COIN requires knowledge of many diverse, complex subjects...Progress can be hard to measure and the enemy may appear to have many advantages.⁷⁸

As a fellow infantry company commander said to me in 2007, “Trying to figure out if you are winning (in COIN) is like trying to figure out if your cornfield is growing by staring at it for an hour.”

4. FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency

The most recent of the field manuals, FMI 3-24.2 (Tactics in COIN), was released in 2009. This FM is significant because it transforms the more theoretical aspects from the FMs mentioned above into COIN tactics, techniques, and procedures executable by the lowest levels of the force. Its target audience is the sharp end of the stick: “commanders, staff, and Soldiers of U.S. Army units up to brigade level.”⁷⁹

COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels.⁸⁰

As the US Army continues its lengthy battles against insurgency around the world, tactical units must continue to focus on securing the support of the population, achieving unity of effort and learning and adapting faster than the insurgents do.⁸¹

Also worth noting is that the recognition of the importance of working with foreign partners is not just codified in the manuals, but is being reinforced throughout the Army. Recently, LTC Yingling speaking to the student body at the Command and General Staff College stated, “The most important task for military forces in the 21st

⁷⁸ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* x.

⁷⁹ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), viii.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, ix.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

century will be to assist partner states in exercising sovereignty in accordance with international norms, including denying sanctuary and support to terrorist organizations.”⁸²

All of the above examples convey the progression of Army thought. From the capstone documents that provide the overview and framework to those that outline more detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures, an incredible amount of intellectual thought and energy has been invested in helping the force learn how to operate more effectively in a counterinsurgency.

Policy makers at high levels in and above the Department of Defense seem keen for the military to execute this doctrine.

C. POLICY STATEMENTS FROM THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

1. New Strategy for Iraq

Shortly after his inauguration, President Obama announced his strategy for Iraq:

This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe-haven to terrorists.⁸³

After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country. As I have long said, we will retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security forces as long as they remain non-

⁸² Paul Yingling, “Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership,” *smallwarsjournal.com*, April 2, 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/208-yingling.pdf> (accessed April 5, 2009).

⁸³ White House Press Office, “Remarks of President Barrack Obama--Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Friday, February 27, 2009,” *whitehouse.gov*, February 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/ (accessed March 3, 2009), 1.

sectarian; conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35-50,000 U.S. troops.⁸⁴

This does not represent a radical departure from where the previous administration had been headed. The President's emphasis is also clearly consistent with published counterinsurgency doctrine.

2. New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Less than a month after announcing its Iraq strategy, the Obama administration announced its new strategy for Afghanistan. Significantly, it linked Afghanistan and Pakistan together, recognizing that the insurgency there clearly straddles borders. Again, it is significant to note the President's emphasis on training and advising over any mention of state-on-state conflict:

I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future...At the same time we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country. That's how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our own troops home...And later this spring we will deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan security forces...That's why my budget includes indispensable investments in our State Department and foreign assistance programs. These investments relieve the burden on our troops. They make the American people safer. And they save us an enormous amount of money in the long run—because it's far cheaper to train a policeman to secure his or her own village—or to help a farmer seed a crop than it is to send our troops to fight tour after tour of duty with no transition to Afghan responsibility.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ White House Press Office, "Remarks of President Barrack Obama-Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Friday, February 27, 2009," 3.

⁸⁵ White House Press Office, "Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," *The Briefing Room*, March 29, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed March 30, 2009), 2.

3. The Defense Budget

On April 6, 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates held a press conference to talk about his Fiscal Year 2010 budget. This was a notable event, held before the budget request had been presented to Congress and just after Congress had recessed for its spring break. The timing allowed the Secretary to highlight that the budget supported the President's new policies for both wars, without any immediate backlash from Congress over the proposed cuts. Gates' comments also reflected his alignment with the military's counterinsurgency doctrine and the challenges he recognized they present to the status quo:

As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the Defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences and reward structures of America's Defense establishment—a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern navies, armies and air forces. Programs to directly support, protect and care for the man and woman at the front have been developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget.⁸⁶

D. THE NEW WAY OF WAR

From big picture doctrine to specific tactics, the U.S. Army has, in words at least, remade itself. The President has announced policy that is not focused on direct force and is consistent with the Army's new doctrine. Unfortunately, however, the Army is a large organization and change is hard; implementation of any new doctrine is always a challenge.

⁸⁶ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon," *DefenseLink News Transcript*, April 6, 2009, www.defenselink.mil/transcriptss/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396 (accessed April 7, 2009).

E. CONFLICTING REALITY ON THE GROUND

There is plenty of evidence that adapting to less kinetic, population-centric warfare, as well as working with host nation militaries and police, is a challenge given the culture of the Army. Recently an embedded reporter described the feelings of some combat arms soldiers in Iraq:

It's no surprise here that quite a few soldiers would prefer to be in Afghanistan. Infantrymen aren't, for the most part, conducting missions that end in firefights too often. And many soldiers don't make it off Joint Base Balad. But there is one way to see some action without leaving the friendly—or air-conditioned—confines of the office: video games...Countless soldiers dig these games. As one of them told me last week, "Hey, I'm trained as an infantryman. And I'm not doing infantry stuff. This is as close as I can get for now."⁸⁷

Challenges are not limited to junior soldiers wanting to fight the enemy. Senior leaders have made decisions and statements that run contrary to the idea they should use as little force as possible. In the following case, U.S. soldiers killed an Iraqi in custody. The Brigade Commander was later relieved.

Several soldiers have said in sworn statements or testimony at the hearing that senior officers, including the Third Brigade commander, Michael Steele, told them in a gathering the night before the raid to kill any military-age male they encountered on the island, where 20 fighters loyal to Al-Qaeda were thought to be.⁸⁸

F. SUMMARY

In the previous chapter, I described the U.S. Army award system in some detail and suggested that this system, which embodied the actions the Army sought to reward during the inter-state wars of the 20th century appears to be at odds with what are

⁸⁷ Scott Fontaine, "Seeing Some Quality Bang-Bang," *www.thenewstribune.com*, February 22, 2009, http://blogs.thenewstribune.com/military/2009/02/22/seeing_some_quality_bang_bang (accessed February 25, 2009).

⁸⁸ Paul Von. Zielbauer, "4 G.I.'s Tell of How Iraqi Raid Went Wrong," *nytimes.com*, August 7, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07mission.html> (accessed March 25, 2009).

considered ‘best practices,’ as described above. Current Army doctrine embraces counterinsurgency, which it places just to the left hand side of ‘General War’ on the ‘Spectrum of Conflict’. Figure 10 depicts this spectrum.



Figure 10. The Spectrum of Conflict Depicted in FM 3-0

Yet, one problem with placing counterinsurgency to the left of ‘General War’ is that it gives the impression that the dial just needs to be turned down a bit on all the things important in a conventional war. In reality however, when it comes to counterinsurgency, a soldier needs to do the diametric opposite. David Galula captures this dichotomy well:

“No Politics” is an ingrained reaction for the conventional soldier, whose job is solely to defeat the enemy; yet in counterinsurgency warfare, the soldier’s job is to help win the support of the population, and in so doing, he has to engage in practical politics. A system of military awards and promotion, such as that in conventional warfare which would encourage soldiers to kill or capture the largest number of enemies, and thus induce him to increase the scope and the frequency of his military operations, may well be disastrous in counterinsurgency warfare.⁸⁹

As to what types of actions have been rewarded in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear that there have been, and will continue to be, situations where American service members must close with and destroy the enemy. The current awards system is perfectly designed to reward these types of actions. An individual who risks death or great injury, and distinguishes himself in the face of the enemy, ought to be acknowledged. This type of valor truly transcends and cuts across time and space. Valor is as close to a universally respected quality as there is.

⁸⁹ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 99.

During his budget brief, Secretary Gates explained that counterinsurgency would not and should not usurp conventional capabilities:

So this is not about irregular warfare putting the conventional capabilities in the shade. Quite the contrary: this is just a matter—for me at least—of having the irregular-war constituency have a – have a seat at the table for the first time when it comes to the base budget.⁹⁰

We need to extend this analogy of a seat at the table into the realm of awards. The top of the award pyramid is not, and should not, be displaced by irregular war. However, if the Army truly wants to institutionalize its counterinsurgency capabilities, it must incentivize the proper execution of *counterinsurgency* somehow.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, unilateral operations ought to be more the exception than the rule, especially this many years into both campaigns. Even if pitched fights do occur, it could be assumed from U.S. doctrine and counterinsurgency theory that the battle would be some type of joint, team affair with the host nation and American forces fighting together against the insurgents. Working ‘by, with, and through’ the host nation government and its security forces, as the Special Forces parlance puts it, is one of the most important ‘best practices’ the American military can employ.

In the next chapter, I explore the effect to which service members are earning awards for COIN ‘best practices.’

⁹⁰ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon,” *DefenseLink News Transcript*, April 6, 2009, www.defenselink.mil/transcriptss/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396 (accessed April 7, 2009).

V. WHAT TYPES OF ACTIONS ARE BEING REWARDED IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN?

The current award system has been described, and the evolution of U.S. policy and Army doctrine for counterinsurgency is clear. Chapter II and the appendices provide statistics regarding the numbers and types of awards earned by soldiers. These statistics are interesting in their own right, but it is important and enlightening to look not just at the numbers and types of awards issued, but the reasons and circumstances for an award being earned. Is the Army rewarding acts that are consistent with its doctrine?

A. WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT THE AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR?

I use the Silver Star to examine the types of actions that have been rewarded. As of April 22, 2009, the Army had awarded 549 Silver Stars for actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹¹ The Silver Star is the highest-level award to be presented to soldiers in significant numbers.⁹² Additionally, it is the highest award that can be approved ‘in theater’ by the Corps commander who directs the day-to-day operations.⁹³

The website *Hall of Heroes* has a database that contains synopses along with certificates and citations of the awards earned by American service members. The section that covers Silver Stars for the Global War on Terror contains data on 265 of the 549

⁹¹ U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch, “Statistics by Region, Conflict or Incident,” www.hrc.army.mil, April 22, 2009, https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Jan_07_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Operation%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed April 22, 2009), 2.

⁹² The Silver Star is the third highest valor award. Only two Medals of Honor have been awarded to soldiers since 9/11, SFC Paul Smith and PFC Ross McGinnis, both posthumously. Only 19 Distinguished Service Crosses, the second highest medal, have been awarded.

⁹³ See Appendix O for an example of the Silver Star Approval Authority. Appendix P shows an example of the type of information contained in each record. Appendix S displays the coded dataset. Both the Distinguished Service Cross and Medal of Honor require approval through the Department of the Army level, making it an incredibly lengthy process.

Silver Stars awarded in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹⁴ I analyzed these records according to several different variables, shown in Table 7. Most of these variables are straightforward and self-explanatory. However, for “Was the service member advising or partnering?” I often had to make a judgment call. I defined advising and partnering as broadly as possible, thus creating a conservative test of the “hypothesis” that these types of actions are under-recognized and under-rewarded. Where the recipient is a member of a Military Transition Team the designation is clear. In other cases, if there was any mention of host nation forces participating in the action in any way, I coded this as advising or partnering.

Table 7. Variables Used in Analyzing the Silver Star Database

Rank	Enlisted, Officer, Warrant
Gender	Male or Female
What Theater?	Iraq or Afghanistan
When did the event occur?	Date, at least to the month
Was the recipient killed?	Yes or No
Was the recipient wounded?	Yes or No
Was the recipient advising or partnering?	Yes or No
Was the recipient a member of Special Forces?	Yes or No

To ensure that the records reflect actions that took place across the duration of both conflicts thus far, I broke down the awards by year of the event. Shown in Figure 11, the data set is spread across the time horizon for the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Over half of the citation events date from, or after, 2005 when FM 3-24 was published.

⁹⁴ The owner of this site has compiled the citations and narratives of Silver Star recipients from open sources and by direct requests to the recipients. It is an ongoing project. The sample used here, some 48% of the total Silver Stars awarded, is most likely a fair representation of Silver Star awardees. It is possible, but unlikely that, for whatever reason, the 52% of Silver Star recipients not included in this database reflect a higher level of partnering/advising.




Figure 11. Number of Silver Star Records in Home of Heroes Database by Year⁹⁵

Given the degree to which Army doctrine has embraced and codified counterinsurgency, I would have expected that the percentage of Silver Stars reflecting the key best practice of counterinsurgency—partnering with or advising the host nation—would at least be close to half. That, however, is not the case.

Table 8. Percent of Silver Star Recipients Who Partnered or Advised

Percent of Silver Star Recipients who Partnered or Advised	19.25%
--	--------

Appendix T offers additional statistical information from the Silver Star database. Of note is the significant over-representation of Special Operations Force (SOF) soldiers. Slightly over 20% of the awardees are SOF. Although an actual number is unavailable, this is greatly out of proportion to their relative size compared to conventional forces in both theaters.⁹⁶ A SOF soldier who received a Silver Star had over a 50% chance of doing so while partnering or advising, 30 percentage points higher than a conventional force soldier. This sizable difference does beg the question: should the force within the Army that is *specifically* designed to work with indigenous forces not have an even higher percentage?

⁹⁵ As of April 9, 2009, 10 records did not have dates associated with them.

⁹⁶ Discussing the issue with Special Forces officers at the Naval Postgraduate School, the consensus was that Army SOF comprised, at the absolute most, 2% of the total force in Iraq.

B. WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT INCLUSION ON THE ARMY'S WEBSITE?

The Silver Star database is somewhat constrained as it lists soldiers who have won a relatively senior award. The official U.S. Army webpage has a section entitled 'Stories of Valor.' Here is how the site describes itself: "Soldiers in combat are facing danger every day and there are many untold stories of valor that deserve recognition. The stories on this page capture some of those that have displayed heroic courage through their actions in the face of a lethal enemy."⁹⁷

I took 74 records from this site.⁹⁸ This site officially singles out those individuals (and actions) the Army holds in the highest regard. The site managers (representing the 'corporate' army) have the ability to pick and post whichever individual records they choose. I have broken these records down according to 11 different variables, shown in Table 9. As with the Silver Star dataset, advising or partnering was coded in the broadest possible way.

Table 9. Variables Used in Analyzing the 'Army Stories of Valor' Database

Rank	Enlisted, Officer, Warrant
Gender	Male or Female
What component was the recipient?	Regular Army, Reserve, National Guard
What Theater?	Iraq or Afghanistan
What award was earned?	varies from skill badge to Medal of Honor
Was category does the award fall into?	Valor or Service
When did the event occur	Date, at least to the month
Was the recipient killed?	Yes or No
Was the recipient wounded?	Yes or No
Was the recipient advising or partnering?	Yes or No
Was the recipient a member of Special Forces?	Yes or No

⁹⁷ For an example of the U.S. Army homepage, and the information contained in a record, see Appendix Q. The coded dataset is contained in Appendix U.

⁹⁸ There were additional records for awards given to soldiers for previous conflicts listed on the webpage. For example, several stories about MSG Woodrow Keeble, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for actions in the Korean War, appeared. Since this thesis focuses on the present counterinsurgency conflicts, these types of records were omitted.

The ‘Army Stories of Valor’ was also checked to ensure that the records reflect actions that took place across the duration of the conflict; the awards are also broken down by year of the event. Shown in Figure 12, the data set is generally spread across the time horizon for the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. However, we see a much greater representation of more recent (2007-8) events.




Figure 12. Number of Records by Year in Army ‘Stories of Valor’ Site

Since the ‘Stories of Valor’ site can be selective and the majority of citations are for events in or after 2007, several years after the release of FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, I would have expected the percentage of records involving the ‘best practice’ of partnering and advising to be higher than we saw with the Silver Star database. Again, COIN-specific activity appeared to be under-rewarded and, surprisingly, the number is lower than for the Silver Star dataset.

Table 10. Percent of Recipients in ‘Stories of Valor’ Who Partnered or Advised

Percent of Recipients in Stories of Valor who partnered or advised	17.81%
--	--------

The ‘Stories of Valor’ statistics, shown fully in Appendix V, are interesting in several other ways. The percentage of SOF who also partnered/advised is even higher than in the Silver Star dataset, with over 72% of SOF awardees working with the host nation. Also notable is the very low percentage of female awardees, at just four percent.

C. WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT INCLUSION ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WEBSITE?

The U.S. Army is by no means fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan on its own. Just as the Army has its public domain website that documents actions by soldiers, the Department of Defense also has a site. This site, linked off the main Department of Defense website, describes itself this way: “Since September 2006, the Department of Defense has highlighted the military men and women who have gone above and beyond the call of duty in the Global War on Terror. These are our American Heroes' stories.”⁹⁹ This database contains records of awards, from the ARCOM level through the Medal of Honor, earned by members of all the armed services (including the Coast Guard) in the current conflicts. I was able to extract 186 records from this database.¹⁰⁰ These records are broken down using the variables shown in Table 11.

Table 11. Variables Used in Analyzing the Department of Defense ‘Heroes’ Database

Branch of Service	Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard
Rank	Enlisted, Officer, Warrant
Gender	Male or Female
What component was the recipient?	Active Force or Reserve/Guard
What Theater?	Iraq or Afghanistan
What award was earned?	varies from skill badge to Medal of Honor
Was category does the award fall into?	Valor or Service
When did the event occur	Date, at least to the month
Was the recipient killed?	Yes or No
Was the recipient wounded?	Yes or No
Was the recipient advising or partnering?	Yes or No
Was the recipient a member of Special Forces?	Yes or No

⁹⁹ For an example of the Department of Defense webpage, the way each record is presented and the type of information contained in each record, see Appendix R. Appendix W contains the coded dataset.

¹⁰⁰ Unlike the Army ‘Stories of Valor,’ all records were of individuals involved in the GWOT. On October 14, there were 188 records. When I rechecked the records in April 2009, two records present in October had been removed. Therefore, I removed those two records from my dataset.

As with the other two datasets, the number of awards over time was plotted to ensure that the records do not reflect a bias toward the beginning of the campaigns. Again, most awards were earned during or after 2005.




Figure 13. Number of Awards by Year in DoD Heroes Site¹⁰¹

One might think the Department of Defense, being the umbrella organization over the individual services, and with the resources to produce a higher quality finished product, would display more records on its webpage consistent with the best practices of counterinsurgency. I certainly expected the percentage of award recipients who partnered or advised to be higher than we saw with the Army site and the Silver Star dataset since the DoD could compensate for any service bias. Again, there appears to be limited recognition of COIN best practices.

Table 12. Percent of Award Recipients Who Partnered or Advised in the Department of Defense Database

Percent of Award Recipients who partnered or advised in DoD Database	20.43%
--	--------

The number here is only slightly more than one percent higher than with the Silver Star dataset. Full statistics appear in Appendix S. The percentage of female service

¹⁰¹ The number of records on the DoD Heroes website as of October 28, 2008.

members was slightly higher than on the Army site, at seven percent. Within this DoD dataset, comparisons can be made between services. Interestingly, the Marine Corps, which is the second most represented service in number of rewards (behind the Army), has the fewest number of award recipients who partnered/advised. Table 13 lists the percentage of partner/advising awards by branch of service.

Table 13. Percentage of Partner/Advising Awards by Service

Army	24.24%
Air Force	20.00%
Navy	21.05%
Marines	11.11%

Looking at these three different datasets, it is clear that actions involving partnering with or advising host nation forces are recognized significantly less frequently than are successful, unilateral kinetic operations. Thus, by an overwhelming percentage, the Army and Department of Defense official websites project as the standard, individuals whose actions—while valorous—are contrary to established COIN doctrine. This leads to the question: how do junior and mid-level leaders who have been involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan feel about counterinsurgency? Do they think counterinsurgency ‘best practices’—or counterinsurgency *as* a best practice—should be rewarded?

D. DO SOLDIERS THINK THAT COIN ‘BEST PRACTICES’ MERIT AN AWARD?

To answer these questions, I consulted a number of my peers in the Naval Postgraduate School’s Defense Analysis department, along with several other officers I served with in Iraq. While this sample size may seem small, it represents a high level of total military experience and time spent in combat—from a minimum of six months to a maximum of 25 months. Branches represented include Infantry, Special Forces, Armor, Aviation, Field Artillery, and Civil Affairs.

Not one of the 28 people I interviewed responded that counterinsurgency-specific achievements should *not* be recognized.¹⁰² The fact that 100% of my sample agreed that these types of achievements should be recognized indicates that, to at least some extent, this group recognizes and understands the basics of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine. This is probably not surprising based on their level of combat experience.

Where there was disagreement, however, was over how exactly those achievements should be recognized. For instance, fewer than half felt that the current system was working and should not be changed.¹⁰³

We have more types of awards in our toolkit than we need. Adding more just focused on COIN would be a mistake.

The specific award (i.e., ARCOM etc.) can still be used in a COIN environment, but it requires the writer (and more importantly, the approver) to understand what to write.

More than half of those interviewed felt that the current system can be adapted to better reward COIN best practices. For instance:

I don't think you can use current awards to reward COIN achievements; you need something new, because in the approval process the leadership will compare apples to oranges and downgrade COIN achievements in the face of conventional combat actions / achievements.

Other officers talked about the creation of a new decoration altogether, or the creation of a device that can be worn on an existing service award such as the Iraqi or Afghanistan Campaign Medal: "I think the device to be worn on the ICM or ACM would be feasible, and give recognition in addition to singular achievement and tour awards currently in the system."

¹⁰² Please see Appendix Z for examples of what individuals in this convenience sample said were counterinsurgency-specific achievements.

¹⁰³ The comments shown here have been edited for clarity and are the result of interviews conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School and by electronic means in March-April 2009. Appendix Y lists unedited comments.

Finally, some talked about being allowed to wear host nation awards. For example, “If the host nation award is selected it should be specific to COIN and not general to all Soldiers participating in the conflict.”

A small portion in each camp expressed frustration with leaders who, because they are the gatekeepers of the award system, wield tremendous influence over how the system works.

The solution in my opinion lies with the intermediate and approval authorities (all Commanders) – they have to understand that significant achievements in COIN can be just as effective as storming an enemy pillbox.

It’s on the commander to make the right decisions in the awards process. I believe that across the Army there needs to be a greater understanding of COIN and the difficulty in executing it properly.

Volumes have been written about leadership. How the Army leadership should best exercise its authority and discretion through the award system could fill volumes more. When speaking with my peers and reflecting on my experiences there seems to be agreement that a ‘good’ leader can take a flawed system and make it work, while a ‘bad’ leader can take the same flawed system and turn it into an unmitigated disaster.

One thing that should be clear from this convenience sample is that no matter how the Army decides to effect realignment between what it asks for and what it rewards, it will find no shortage of opinions among officers about the award system as a whole.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Army is an institution steeped in tradition, strongly cognizant of where it has been. It has not always been quite so decisive about where it is headed.

The Army's culture has its roots in its traditions and history. The Army cherishes its past and nourishes its institutional memory through ceremonies and a tradition...The Army's rich and honorable history of service to the Nation reminds Soldiers of who they are, the cause they serve, and their ties to those who have gone before them.¹⁰⁴

The General Officer in charge of the Infantry Branch releases a quarterly newsletter. Highlighted below are portions of his most recent comments discussing culture:

The culture of the United States Army Infantryman is alive and flourishing. It carries a rich tradition that reaches back for almost 234 years. As Infantry leaders we have the responsibility to perpetuate the culture of service, sacrifice, and esprit de corps so commonly associated with our chosen branch...**I remind all Infantrymen that Soldiers will remember the standard that is enforced, not the standard that is discussed.**¹⁰⁵

Speaking from experience, he is right when he says the standard enforced, not the one discussed, is what soldiers remember.

With this in mind, what effect do websites like the DoD Heroes and Army Stories of Valor have on the soldiers who look at them? If 80% of the individuals highlighted on these websites are performing actions, which, while clearly valorous, are contrary to the doctrine and best practices for counterinsurgency, are the needs of the Army and the national strategy it executes being as well served as they could be?

¹⁰⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 1 The Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005), 1-15.

¹⁰⁵ Michael D. Barbero, "Infantry Senior Leader Newsletter," *The United States Army Infantry Center and School*, May 5, 2009, <https://www.benning.army.mil/OIP/content/Infantry%20Newsletter/newsletter.htm> (accessed May 5, 2009). The added emphasis is mine.

I began this study with a quote from Steven Kerr, discussing the “folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B.” It seems clear that, in a broad sense, the Army is rewarding its members in the same manner, for the same actions, as it did in WWII. Most Sergeants and Specialists who interact daily with the people of Iraq and Afghanistan will probably never read the Field Manuals describing counterinsurgency doctrine. However, they will notice who around them is receiving awards, and they will know and remember what those individuals did to earn them. It is indeed folly to think that soldiers will consistently perform the actions necessary to execute counterinsurgency successfully when they see those around them being rewarded for something else.

The Army is being pulled in two different directions. Figure 15 offers a rendition of this dilemma. The Army’s corporate identity is still influenced by the world wars. The way the pyramid of honor was designed, and the extent to which it has remained unchanged, is one indication of how stable or static this corporate identity is.




Figure 14. The Opposing Push and Pull between Doctrine and Awards Policy¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ The spectrum of conflict bar is taken from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-0 Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 2-1.

A. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. What did Veterans of Past Counterinsurgency/Guerrilla Conflicts Want?

Col. Ben Malcom served as an advisor to a guerrilla force during the Korean War. Year later, he sought to be awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge for recognition of his direct combat experience. Malcom captures some of the frustration he felt struggling for acknowledgment of his actions in his memoir, *White Tigers*:

The army bureaucracy's efforts to downplay what those who served in special operations and unconventional warfare jobs in Korea had done was apparent in the manner with which it dealt with the issue of who was authorized to wear the Combat Infantryman Badge.

Some of my colleagues found the ruling just another item on a long list of frustrations that went with the job of working with the partisans.¹⁰⁷

Some recommended areas that warrant further study are:

- More detailed survey work on perceptions soldiers have of the award system.
- More detailed surveys on the type of reward(s) desired by soldiers on the 'cutting edge' of COIN. Do soldiers who are a part of small ad hoc MiTTs have different needs than members of an SF team or an entire Army brigade that has been 're-tasked' as an advising brigade?
- Surveys must be done over time so that veterans, with the benefit of hindsight, can be asked whether the awards they received during the conflict have the same value to them after the passage of time.
- Surveys should be done of officers who have written awards, or those who are approval authorities for awards, especially at Division and Corps levels where a committee often recommends approval or disapproval to the commander. One question worth asking is whether that committee synced with what the commander thought was an appropriate award.
- Some attention needs to be paid not just to the number of awards, but the narrative accompanying them. This thesis is certainly preliminary in suggesting what might be done with more time and resources to collect

¹⁰⁷ Ben S. Malcom, *White Tigers* (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 1996), 211.

data on *why* a certain award was given. This is a potential azimuth check for higher headquarters, including DoD, so that the Army (and DoD) can see exactly what types of actions are being rewarded.

- There needs to be clear consistent communication from leaders, specifically at Battalion and Brigade level, about what types of actions they think are important in counterinsurgency.

B. SOME WORDS OF CAUTION

This thesis is not arguing that by creating a new award the Army will magically become better at counterinsurgency. Any award needs to be *earned* to have value. This perception not only applies to the person who receives the awards, but to the members of the organization as a whole. For instance, here is how Col. Hackworth describes his attitude during the Korean War:

For field-grade officers and above, it seemed as if the awards system had become little more than a giveaway program...I concluded then and there that a valor decoration awarded to anyone above the rank of captain, unless accompanied by a Purple Heart, was an unearned one.¹⁰⁸

Vietnam also had its problems with the award system. In the following example, a relatively senior officer earned 27 awards during his tour. Such a system is irresponsible and cannot help but cause resentment:

Colonel John Donaldson's Vietnam career is illustrative. In 1968 he was given command of the Americal Division's 11th Brigade, which a few months earlier had sent Lieutenant Calley's Platoon into My Lai. The Colonel replaced Colonel Oran Henderson, who would be acquitted of the charge of a My Lai cover-up. In his first six months of command, Colonel Donaldson 'earned' an 'average of about one medal a week: two Distinguished Flying Crosses, two Silver Stars, a Bronze Star Medal for Valor, twenty Air Medals, a Soldier's Medal, and a Combat Infantryman Badge. He was soon promoted to brigadier general and won nine additional Air Medals and two legions of Merit, and transferred to the Pentagon as a strategist.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ David H. Hackworth, *About Face* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 256-7.

¹⁰⁹ Loren Baritz, *Backfire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 301.

An inflated awards system is not healthy for the Army or the soldiers who serve. However, what is equally counterproductive is to not specifically recognize the types of actions that some of the sharpest minds, both inside and outside the Army, think are vital for success in counterinsurgency.

C. FINAL THOUGHTS

Valor awards recognize an action that has universal and cross-cultural merit. They are a timelessly unimpeachable proof of courage. The types of dynamic, kinetic actions that warrant a place on the pyramid of honor have been ingrained in the consciousness of the Army through the state-on-state wars of the 20th century. Yet, nearly a decade into the 21st century, very different types of actions are required for success in a counterinsurgency environment. This is the environment we are in today and for the foreseeable future. Despite—or perhaps because of—the challenges with quantifying success in COIN, the awards system is the best way to incentivize the actions needed to prevail in *this* war, and then serve as proof for the veterans of this war about what helped them win.

Ray Nance, the last of the ‘Bedford boys,’ a group of soldiers from Bedford VA who suffered terrible casualties on D-Day June 6 1944, died in April 2009. Below is a picture of him with medals and bits of ribbon from almost 65 years ago. The Army Awards system served him and his brothers well, providing motivation in a challenging time. These awards were specifically created to fit the situation in which Nance was fighting. Their importance to him is clear in the photograph. The fact he kept these ‘baubles’ for over 60 years is another indication of their value.

What will the veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan be showing their grandchildren in 60 years? If it is the same awards for the same actions that Nance and his brothers conducted in WWII, our nation may be disappointed with the results achieved.



Figure 15. Mr. Nance with his World War II Decorations¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Associated Press, "Last D-Day 'Bedford Boy' Dies at 94," *www.armytimes.com*, April 21, 2009, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/04/ap_bedford_boy_dies_042009/ (accessed April 21, 2009).

APPENDIX A.

BASIC PAY—EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2009

Pay Grade	2 or less	Over 2	Over 3	Over 4	Over 5	Over 6	Over 8	Over 10	Over 12	Over 14	Over 16	Over 18	Over 20	Over 22	Over 24	Over 26	Over 28	Over 30	Over 32	Over 34	Over 36	Over 38
O-10 ¹																						
O-9																						
O-8	9,860.00	9,367.00	8,885.00	8,410.00	7,940.00	7,480.00	7,030.00	6,590.00	6,160.00	5,740.00	5,330.00	4,930.00	4,540.00	4,160.00	3,790.00	3,430.00	3,080.00	2,750.00	2,440.00	2,150.00	1,880.00	1,630.00
O-7	7,855.00	7,404.00	6,960.00	6,530.00	6,110.00	5,700.00	5,300.00	4,910.00	4,530.00	4,160.00	3,800.00	3,450.00	3,110.00	2,780.00	2,460.00	2,160.00	1,880.00	1,630.00	1,400.00	1,190.00	1,000.00	830.00
O-6	5,995.00	5,630.00	5,270.00	4,920.00	4,580.00	4,250.00	3,930.00	3,620.00	3,320.00	3,030.00	2,750.00	2,480.00	2,230.00	1,990.00	1,770.00	1,570.00	1,390.00	1,230.00	1,090.00	970.00	870.00	790.00
O-5	4,665.00	4,350.00	4,040.00	3,740.00	3,450.00	3,170.00	2,900.00	2,640.00	2,390.00	2,150.00	1,930.00	1,730.00	1,550.00	1,390.00	1,250.00	1,130.00	1,030.00	940.00	860.00	790.00	730.00	680.00
O-4	4,025.00	3,760.00	3,500.00	3,250.00	3,010.00	2,780.00	2,560.00	2,350.00	2,150.00	1,960.00	1,790.00	1,630.00	1,480.00	1,340.00	1,210.00	1,100.00	1,000.00	910.00	830.00	770.00	720.00	680.00
O-3	3,540.00	3,310.00	3,090.00	2,880.00	2,680.00	2,490.00	2,310.00	2,140.00	1,980.00	1,830.00	1,690.00	1,560.00	1,440.00	1,330.00	1,230.00	1,140.00	1,060.00	980.00	910.00	850.00	800.00	760.00
O-2	3,065.00	2,860.00	2,660.00	2,470.00	2,290.00	2,120.00	1,960.00	1,810.00	1,670.00	1,540.00	1,420.00	1,310.00	1,210.00	1,120.00	1,040.00	970.00	910.00	850.00	800.00	750.00	710.00	680.00
O-1	2,665.00	2,480.00	2,310.00	2,150.00	2,000.00	1,860.00	1,730.00	1,610.00	1,500.00	1,400.00	1,310.00	1,230.00	1,160.00	1,100.00	1,040.00	990.00	940.00	890.00	850.00	810.00	780.00	750.00
O-3 ²																						
O-2 ³																						
O-1 ³																						
W-5																						
W-4	3,665.00	3,465.00	3,270.00	3,080.00	2,900.00	2,730.00	2,570.00	2,420.00	2,280.00	2,150.00	2,030.00	1,920.00	1,820.00	1,730.00	1,650.00	1,580.00	1,520.00	1,460.00	1,410.00	1,370.00	1,330.00	1,300.00
W-3	3,340.00	3,160.00	2,990.00	2,820.00	2,660.00	2,510.00	2,370.00	2,240.00	2,120.00	2,010.00	1,910.00	1,820.00	1,740.00	1,660.00	1,590.00	1,530.00	1,480.00	1,440.00	1,400.00	1,370.00	1,340.00	1,310.00
W-2	2,865.00	2,700.00	2,540.00	2,390.00	2,250.00	2,120.00	2,000.00	1,890.00	1,790.00	1,700.00	1,620.00	1,550.00	1,490.00	1,440.00	1,390.00	1,350.00	1,310.00	1,280.00	1,250.00	1,230.00	1,210.00	1,190.00
W-1	2,595.00	2,440.00	2,290.00	2,150.00	2,020.00	1,900.00	1,790.00	1,690.00	1,600.00	1,520.00	1,450.00	1,390.00	1,340.00	1,290.00	1,250.00	1,210.00	1,180.00	1,150.00	1,130.00	1,110.00	1,090.00	1,080.00
E-9 ⁴																						
E-8																						
E-7	2,515.00	2,360.00	2,210.00	2,070.00	1,940.00	1,820.00	1,710.00	1,610.00	1,520.00	1,440.00	1,370.00	1,310.00	1,260.00	1,210.00	1,170.00	1,130.00	1,100.00	1,070.00	1,050.00	1,030.00	1,010.00	1,000.00
E-6	2,175.00	2,040.00	1,910.00	1,790.00	1,680.00	1,580.00	1,490.00	1,410.00	1,330.00	1,260.00	1,200.00	1,150.00	1,100.00	1,060.00	1,020.00	990.00	960.00	940.00	920.00	900.00	880.00	870.00
E-5	1,895.00	1,770.00	1,650.00	1,540.00	1,440.00	1,350.00	1,270.00	1,190.00	1,120.00	1,060.00	1,010.00	970.00	930.00	900.00	870.00	850.00	830.00	810.00	790.00	770.00	760.00	750.00
E-4	1,625.00	1,510.00	1,400.00	1,300.00	1,210.00	1,130.00	1,060.00	1,000.00	950.00	910.00	870.00	840.00	810.00	790.00	770.00	750.00	730.00	710.00	690.00	670.00	660.00	650.00
E-3	1,440.00	1,330.00	1,230.00	1,140.00	1,060.00	990.00	930.00	880.00	840.00	800.00	770.00	740.00	720.00	700.00	680.00	660.00	640.00	620.00	600.00	590.00	580.00	570.00
E-2	1,365.00	1,260.00	1,170.00	1,090.00	1,020.00	960.00	910.00	870.00	830.00	800.00	770.00	750.00	730.00	710.00	690.00	670.00	650.00	630.00	610.00	600.00	590.00	580.00
E-1 ⁵	1,360.00																					

Notes:

- Basic pay for an O-7 to O-10 is limited by Level II of the Executive Schedule which is \$14,750.10. Basic pay for O-5 and below is limited by Level V of the Executive Schedule which is \$11,958.30.
- While serving as Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff/Vice Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, Chief of Navy Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Army/Air Force Chief of Staff, Commander of a unified or specified combatant command, basic pay is \$19,325.60. (See note 1 above.)
- Applicable to O-1 to O-3 with at least 4 years and 1 day of active duty or more than 1460 points as a warrant and/or enlisted member. See Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations for more detailed explanation on who is eligible for this special basic pay rate.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX B.

From: GOMO

Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 2:32 PM

Subject: CSA Sends - Transition Team Commanders (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: NONE

CSA SENDS

Soldiers that serve on our Transition Teams (TTs) and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are developing exactly the type of knowledge, skills and abilities that are vital for our Army to be effective in an era of persistent conflict. These are tough, demanding positions and the members of these teams are required to influence indigenous or surrogate forces as they execute missions that are of vital interest to this Nation. The tasks associated with Transition Teams, from direct combat to stability operations, will be a major part of full spectrum engagement in theaters of interest now and for the foreseeable future. I want to ensure that the officers that lead these teams are recognized and given the credit they deserve.

I am directing that the Major's positions on these teams be immediately designated and codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any officer holding one of these positions will be considered "KD" for his or her branch as a Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc). Our promotion board guidance already stresses the importance of these positions and this additional information will be added to all upcoming board instructions. Additionally, because the success of these teams requires our best leaders, I have directed HRC to award Centralized Selection List (CSL) Credit for LTCs serving specifically in the TT Commander positions that have direct leadership responsibility for a training/transition team.

Therefore, we are creating a new CSL sub-category called "Combat Arms Operations". It will be open to all eligible officers in the Maneuver, Fires and Effects (MFE) branches and to Foreign Area Officers (FAO). It will fall under the Operations category and will be effective on the FY 10 CSL board which meets this September.

As a bridging strategy, for FY09 we will activate officers for these command positions from the alternate lists of all four major MFE command categories - Operations, Strategic Support, Training, and Installation. Officers accepting and who serve will be awarded CSL credit in the Operations category for serving as a Transition Team Commander. Additionally, if selected by the FY 10 CSL board, the officer may opt to command in the

category they are selected after completion of their TT Command. Those that do command will receive credit for a second CSL command. If chosen, and they opt not to command, they will still receive credit for their TT command.

Our ability to train and operate effectively with indigenous forces will be a key element of 21st century land power. We need our best involved.¹¹¹


¹¹¹ George Casey, "CSA Sends-Transition Team Commanders," *SmallWarsJournal.com*. June 18, 2008, <http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5593&highlight=Mitt> (accessed February 3, 2009).

APPENDIX C.

SPECIAL PAYS FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS									
Variable Special Pay (Medical Officers)									
Pay Grade	Under 3	3 But Less Than 6	6 But Less Than 8	8 But Less Than 10	10 But Less Than 12	12 But Less Than 14	14 But Less Than 18	18 But Less Than 22	22 and Over
Intern	100.00								
Thru O-6		416.66	1,000.00	958.33	916.66	833.33	750.00	666.66	583.33
Above O-6	583.33	For specific requirements for the pay cited in this table, go to the web at: http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fmr/07a/index.html							
Variable Special Pay (VSP) (Dental Officers)									
Pay Grade	Under 3	3 But Less Than 6	6 But Less Than 8	8 But Less Than 12	12 But Less Than 14	14 But Less Than 18	18 & Over		
Intern	250.00								
Thru O-6		583.33	583.33	1,000.00	833.33	750.00	666.67		
Above O-6	583.33								
Board Certified Pay Special Pay (Medical and Dental Officers)					Additional Special Pay (ASP) (Dental Officers) (effective April 24, 2008)				
Pay Grade	Under 10	10 But Less Than 12	12 But Less Than 14	14 But Less Than 18	18 & Over	Pay Grade	Under 3	3 But Less Than 10	10 & Over
All Grades	208.33	291.66	333.33	416.66	500.00	All Grades	10,000.00	12,000.00	15,000.00
Incentive Special Pay (Medical Officers)									
Specialty	Annual Amt	Specialty	Annual Amt	Specialty	Annual Amt	Specialty	Annual Amt		
Aerospace Med	\$20,000.00	General surgery	29,000.00	Otolaryngology	30,000.00	Subspecialty Category I	36,000.00		
Anesthesiology	36,000.00	Internal medicine	20,000.00	Pathology	20,000.00	Subspecialty Category II	28,000.00		
Cardiology	36,000.00	Neurology	20,000.00	Pediatrics	20,000.00	Subspecialty Category III	23,000.00		
Dermatology	20,000.00	Neurosurgery	36,000.00	Phys and Prev/Occ Med	20,000.00	Subspecialty Category IV	20,000.00		
Emergency Med	26,000.00	OB/GYN	31,000.00	Psychiatry	20,000.00	Subspecialty Category V	36,000.00		
Family practice	20,000.00	Ophthalmology	28,000.00	Pulmonary/IM-Critical Care	23,000.00	Urology	28,000.00		
Gastroenterology	26,000.00	Orthopedics	36,000.00	Radiology	36,000.00				
Multiyear Retention Bonus (Dental Officers)									
	Level 1		Level 2		Level 3		Level 4		
4 Year Agreement	50,000.00		40,000.00		35,000.00		25,000.00		
3 Year Agreement	38,000.00		30,000.00		27,000.00		19,000.00		
2 Year Agreement	25,000.00		20,000.00		18,000.00		13,000.00		

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX D.

PROMOTION POINT WORKSHEET				1. TYPE ☒ a. Initial ☐ b. Total Reevaluation		2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060412	
DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974							
AUTHORITY:		Title 5 USC, Section 301.					
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:		To determine eligibility for promotion.					
ROUTINE USES:		Reviewed to determine promotion eligibility and validity of points granted.					
DISCLOSURE:		The furnishing of fraudulent information may result in denial of promotion.					
3. NAME JONES, JOYCE M.				4. SSN 000-00-0000		5. RECOMMENDED GRADE SSG	
6. ORGANIZATION HHC 109TH MI BATTALION				7. PMOS 35F			
SECTION A - RECOMMENDATION							
1. MILITARY TRAINING (Maximum 100 Points)							
a. LATEST APFT DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060212		b. SCORES				c. POINTS AWARDED	
		PUSH-UPS 92	SIT-UPS 88	RUN 100	TOTAL 280	35	
d. LATEST WEAPONS QUALIFICATION DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20041118		e. DA FORM USED: DA 3595-R			f. TOTAL HITS 38	g. POINTS AWARDED 48	
h. TOTAL POINTS AWARDED						83	
2. DUTY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (Maximum 150 Points Award 1-30 Points For Each Category)							
CATEGORY						POINTS AWARDED	
a. COMPETENCE: Proficient, Knowledgeable, Communicates Effectively						30	
b. MILITARY BEARING: Role Model, Appearance, Confidence						28	
c. LEADERSHIP: Motivates Soldiers, Sets Standards, Mission, Concern						30	
d. TRAINING: Individual and Team, Shares Knowledge and Experience, Teaching						29	
e. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: Equipment, Facilities, Safety, Conservation						29	
f. TOTAL POINTS AWARDED						146	
I certify that the above APFT and weapons qualification scores shown have been extracted from appropriate records and the latest valid scores are in accordance with Army Training Regulations and Army Field Manuals.							
3. SIGNATURE OF COMMANDER 			4. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND GRADE GILBERT MORALES, CPT			5. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060412	
SECTION B - ADMINISTRATIVE POINTS							
1. AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (Maximum 100 Points. List all awards individually. Include award number (i.e. 3rd OLC) and the order number.)							
ARCOM, 03-023	20						
AAM (1OLC), 02-111	15						
AAM, 01-212	15						
CAB, 05-132	15						
Div Level Sldr of Qtr, 20011010	15						
TOTAL POINTS AWARDED						80	

NAME JONES, JOYCE M.				SSN 000-00-0000			
SECTION B - ADMINISTRATIVE POINTS (Continued)							
2. MILITARY EDUCATION (Maximum 200 Points. List all military education.)							
BNCOC	40	ACCP 120 CH	24				
WLC	16						
Airborne	12						
Air Assault	8						
COT - Cbt Lifesaver	4						
COT - Drv Tng	4						
TOTAL POINTS AWARDED				108			
3. CIVILIAN EDUCATION (Maximum 100 Points. List all civilian education.)							
CTC	6						
U of MD	66						
Degree Completion	10						
CLEP 12 CH	18						
TOTAL POINTS AWARDED				100			
I certify that the above administrative points shown have been accurately extracted from appropriate records and that the promotion points indicated are correct.							
4. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL SHARON GREEN, SSG		5. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060421		6. SIGNATURE OF RECOMMENDED INDIVIDUAL (Required) <i>Joyce M. Jones</i>		7. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060505	
SECTION C - TOTALS							
Only whole numbers will be used in awarding promotion points for all sections (drop fractions). Only initial and total reevaluations require submission of DA Form 3355. Administrative reevaluations and adjustments are submitted on DA Form 4187 and annotated in the Eval/Adj column.							
1. POINTS GRANTED							
ITEM	INITIAL (Date) 20060505	EVAL/ADJ (Date)	EVAL/ADJ (Date)	EVAL/ADJ (Date)	EVAL/ADJ (Date)	EVAL/ADJ (Date)	EVAL/ADJ (Date)
a. TOTAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND MILITARY TRAINING POINTS - SECTION A (Maximum 250 points)	229						
b. TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE POINTS - SECTION B (Maximum 400 points)	288						
c. TOTAL BOARD POINTS (Maximum 150 points)	147						
d. TOTAL PROMOTION POINTS (Maximum 800 points)	664						
2. INITIALS OF RESPONSIBLE PSB OFFICIAL <i>SG</i>							
SECTION D - CERTIFICATION							
I certify that the above total points shown have been accurately extracted from appropriate records and promotion list points indicated are correct.							
1. RECOMMENDED BY BOARD ☒ YES ☐ NO				2. ATTAINED MINIMUM POINTS ☒ YES ☐ NO			
3. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF BOARD RECORDER ANTHONY WILLIAMS <i>Anthony Williams</i>				4. GRADE SGT		5. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060505	
I certify that the soldier has been recommended for promotion by a valid promotion board.							
6. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF PROMOTION AUTHORITY LISA A. ADCOCK, LTC				7. SIGNATURE <i>Lisa A. Adcock</i>		8. DATE PROCEEDINGS WERE APPROVED (YYYYMMDD) 20060505	
Counseling statement: I have been counseled on my promotion status and deficiencies. (Use only when recommendation is disapproved, when a soldier is not selected by a board, or when a soldier cannot be added to the recommended list due to not attaining the minimum required points).							
9. SIGNATURE OF SOLDIER		10. DATE (YYYYMMDD)		11. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF COUNSELOR			

APPENDIX E.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO WWI

Decoration	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Purple Heart	Army	1782	For Military Merit. Only known to be presented to three soldiers. Disappeared from use after the Revolutionary War
Honorary Badge of Distinction	Army	1782	Veteran NCO and soldiers who served more than three years. Disappeared immediately after the Revolutionary War
Certificate of Merit	Army	1847	For distinguishing oneself in battle, literally a paper certificate until 1905 when it was transferred into metallic form
Medal of Honor	Army	1861	For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of one's life, above and beyond the call of duty

Service Medal	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Spanish Campaign Medal	Army	1905	Service in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands in 1898
Philippine Campaign Medal	Army	1905	Service in the Philippines between 1899-1906
China Campaign Medal	Army	1905	Service in China with the Peking Relief Expedition 1900-1
Philippine Congressional Medal	Army	1906	Service in the Philippines between 1899-1902 and serving longer than discharge date
Civil War Campaign Medal	Army	1907	Service between 15 April 1861 and 9 April 1865
Indian Campaign Medal	Army	1907	Service in the Indian campaigns between 1865-1891
Army of Cuba Pacification Medal	Army	1909	Service in Cuba 1906-9
Army of Cuba Occupation Medal	Army	1915	Service in Cuba between 1898 and 1902
Spanish War Service Medal	Army	1918	Service between 1898-1899 for persons not eligible for the SCM
Army of Puerto Rico Occupation Medal	Army	1919	Service in Puerto Rico between 14 Aug-10 Dec 1898

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX F.

CREATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM WWI THROUGH WWII

Decoration	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Distinguished Service Cross	Army	1918	Extraordinary heroism not justifying the award of a Medal of Honor; while engaged in an action against an enemy of the U.S. or while serving with friendly foreign forces. The act or acts of heroism must have been so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from their comrades.
Distinguished Service Medal	Army	1918	Exceptionally meritorious service to the government in a duty of great responsibility. The performance must be such as to merit recognition for service which is clearly exceptional. Exceptional performance of normal duty will not alone justify an award of this decoration. For service not related to actual war, the term duty of great responsibility applies to a narrower range of positions than in time of war and requires evidence of conspicuously significant achievement.

Decoration	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Soldiers Medal	Army	1926	Heroism not involving actual conflict with an armed enemy of the United States. The performance must have involved personal hazard or danger and the voluntary risk of life.
Distinguished Flying Cross	All Services	1926 (retroactive to 1917)	Heroism or extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight
Silver Star	All Services	1932	Gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force. The required gallantry while of a lesser degree than that required for the Distinguished Service Cross, must nevertheless have been performed with marked distinction.
Purple Heart	All Services	1932 (retroactive to 1917)	Any member of the armed forces who has been wounded, killed or may die of wounds received from an opposing enemy force while in armed combat or as a result of international terrorism
Army Presidential Unit Citation	Army	1942	Army units for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy
Air Medal	All Services	1942 (retroactive to 1939)	Heroic actions or meritorious service while participating in aerial flight but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying cross.

Decoration	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Legion of Merit	All Services	1942 (retroactive to 1939)	Exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services and achievements. For service not related to actual war, the term 'key individuals' applies to a narrower range of positions than in a time of war and requires evidence of significant achievement.
Army Meritorious Unit Commendation	Army	1944	Army units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service
Bronze Star Medal	All Services	1944 retroactive to 1941	While serving in the United States Armed Forces in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement or by meritorious service not involving aerial flight. Awards may be made for acts of heroism which are of lesser degree than required for the award of the Silver Star
Army Commendation Medal	Army	1945 (retroactive to 1941)	Heroism, meritorious achievement or meritorious service. Acts of valor which are of lesser degree than required for award of the Bronze star medal
World War I Victory Medal	Army	1919	Service between 1917-1918 and in the Expeditionary Forces in Russia 1918-20
Army Good Conduct Medal	Army	1941	Exemplary conduct, efficiency and fidelity during three years of active enlisted service
American Defense Service Medal	All services	1941	12 months of active service between 1939-41

Decoration	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Army of Occupation of Germany Medal	Army	1941	Service in Austria-Hungary or Germany between 1918-1923
American Campaign Medal	All services	1942	Service outside the US in the American theater for 30 days or within the CONUS for one year
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal	All services	1942	Service in the Asiatic-Pacific theater for 30 days or upon receipt of any combat decoration
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal	All services	1942	Service in the European-African-Middle Eastern theater for 30 days or receipt of any combat decoration
Woman's Army Service Medal	Army	1943	Service with both the WAAC and WAC between 1942-1945
World War II Victory Medal	All services	1945	Service between 7 Dec 1941- 31 Dec 1946

APPENDIX G.

SINCE WWII

Decoration	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Army Valorous Unit Award	All Services	Jan-66	Awarded to U.S. Army units for outstanding heroism in armed combat against an opposing force
Meritorious Service Medal	Army	16-Jan-69	Outstanding noncombat meritorious achievement or service to the United States
Defense Distinguished Service Medal	All services	9-Jul-73	Exceptionally meritorious service to the United States while assigned to a Joint activity in a position of unique and great responsibility
Defense Superior Service Medal	All services	6-Feb-76	Superior meritorious service to the United States while assigned to a Joint Activity in a position of significant responsibility
Defense Meritorious Service Medal	All services	3-Nov-77	Noncombat meritorious achievement or service while assigned to a Joint Activity
Joint Meritorious Unit Award	All Services	Jun-81	Awarded to Joint Service units for superior meritorious achievement or service
Army Achievement Medal	Army	1-Aug-81	Awarded to members of the Armed Forces below the rank of colonel who, while serving in any capacity with the Army in an noncombat area, distinguish themselves by outstanding achievement or meritorious service, but not of a nature that would warrant the award of an Army Commendation Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal	All services	25-Jun-83	Meritorious service or achievement while assigned to a Joint Activity
Joint Service Achievement Medal	All services	3-Aug-83	Meritorious service or achievement while assigned to a Joint Activity
Army Superior Unit Award	All Services	Apr-85	Awarded to U.S. Army units for meritorious performance in difficult and challenging peacetime missions

Decoration	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Army of Occupation medal	All Services	1946	30 consecutive days of service in occupied territories of former enemies during the following period-1945-55 (Berlin 1945-90)
Medal for Humane Action	All Services	1949	120 days of service while participating in or providing support for the Berlin Airlift during the period June 26, 1948 to September 30 1949
Korean Service Medal	All Services	1950	Participation in military operations within the Korean area during 1950-54
National Defense Service Medal	All Services	1953	Any honorable active duty service during any of the prescribed periods (1950-4, 1961-74, 1990-95, 2001-TBD)
Antarctica Service Medal	All Services	1960	30 calendar days of service on the Antarctic Continent
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal	All Services	1961	Participation in military operations not covered by specific war medal
Vietnam Service Medal	All Services	1965	Service in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia or Thailand during between 1965-75
Humanitarian Service Medal	All Services	1977	Direct Participation in specific operations of a humanitarian nature, 1977-Present
N.C.O. Professional Development Ribbon	All Services	1981	Successful completion of designated NCO professional development courses
Army Service Ribbon	All Services	1981	Successful completion of initial entry basic training
Prisoner of War Medal	All Services	1985	Awarded to any member of the U.S. Armed Forces taken prisoner during any armed conflict dating from WWI
Southwest Asia Service Medal	All Services	1992	Active participation in, or support of, Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and/or subsequent follow on operations in Southwest Asia.
Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal	All Services	1993	Awarded for outstanding and sustained voluntary service to the civilian community, 1993-Present
Armed Forces Service Medal	All Services	1995	Participation in military operations not covered by a specific war medal or the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Kosovo Campaign Medal	All Services	2000	Active participation in, or direct support of, Kosovo operations

Decoration	Service	Date Instituted	Criteria
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal	All Services	2003	Active participation in, or support of, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and/or subsequent follow-on operations while deployed abroad for service in the Global War on Terrorism, 2001-TBD
Korea Defense Service Medal	All Services	2003	For Service in the Republic of Korea, or the waters adjacent thereto, for a qualifying period of time between 28 July, 1954 and a date TBD
Afghanistan Campaign Medal	All Services	2004	Active service in direct support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 2001-TBD
Iraq Campaign Medal	All Services	2004	Active service in direct support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-TBD
Global war on Terrorism Service Medal	All Services	2004	Active participation in, or service in support of Global War on Terrorism operations on or after 11 September, 2001, 2001-TBD

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX H.

Badge	Date Instituted	Criteria
Army Aviator Badge	1917	Completed prescribed training and tests and be designated as an aviator
Parachutist Badges	1941	Satisfactorily completed the prescribed proficiency tests or have participated in at least one combat jump
Driver and Mechanic Badge	1942	Be assigned as a driver for 12 months or have driven 8000 miles with no accidents
Combat Infantryman Badge	1943	1. Be an infantryman O-6 and below satisfactory performing infantry duties 2. Assigned to an infantry unit during such time as the unit is engaged in active ground combat 3. Actively participate in such ground combat
Expert Infantryman Badge	1943	Be in the MOS 11 or 18, meet all prerequisites and proficiency tests prescribed by the US Army Infantry Center
Pathfinder Badge	1944	Completion of the Pathfinder course conducted by the US Army Infantry School
Combat Medical Badge	1945	O-6 and below assigned or attached by orders to any ground combat unit Brigade or smaller who satisfactory perform medical duties while the unit is engaged in active ground combat, provided they are personally present and under fire.
Flight Surgeon Badges	1945	Be a medical service officer satisfactorily completes prescribed requirements
Aviation Badges	1947	Enlisted member on flying status for 12 months or 48 flight hours
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Badges	1950	Completion of conventional render safe qualifications as prescribed for the EOD course of instruction
Parachute Rigger Badge	1951	Complete Parachute Rigger Course
Diver Badges	1960	Meet the qualification requirements as prescribed in AR 611-75
Expert Field Medical Badge	1965	Be a medical career management field member (or 11D) and pass test as prescribed by the US Army Medical Department Center and School
Air Assault Badge	1978	Completion of the Air Assault training course
Military Free Fall Parachutist Badge	1994	Completed prescribed program of instruction or participate in a military free fall combat jump

Badge	Date Instituted	Criteria
Combat Action Badge	2005	1. May be awarded to any Soldier 2. Must be performing assigned duties in an area where hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay is authorized 3. Soldier must be personally present and actively engaging or being engaged by the enemy, and performing satisfactorily in accordance with the prescribed rules of engagement

APPENDIX I.

Department of Defense Awards are governed by their own regulation, DoD 1348.33-M September 1996, Incorporating change 1, September 18 2006. These awards were created, starting in 1963, to recognize service members assigned to joint activities who could only be recognized by an existing service decoration. The five Defense and Joint decorations listed in the table below complement, and are generally considered equal to, the noncombat Army decoration to the right. (The next higher spot on the order of precedence)

DoD	Army
Defense Distinguished Service Medal	Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal	Legion of Merit
Defense Meritorious Service Medal	Meritorious Service Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal	Army Commendation Medal
Joint Service Achievement Medal	Army Achievement Medal

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX J.

The Three Sub-Pyramids



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX K.


General Officer Survey¹¹²

		Distinguished Service Cross	Defense Distinguished Service Medal	Army Distinguished Service Medal	Silver Star	Defense Superior Service Medal	Legion Of Merit	Distinguished Flying Cross	Soldiers Medal	Bronze Star for Valor	Bronze Star for Service	Purple Heart	Defense Meritorious Service Medal	Meritorious Service Medal	ARCOM/V
Army Chief of Staff	General John Wickham		1		2		4			1		1			
	General Carl Vuono		1	3			1			1	6				
	General Gordon Sullivan		1			1	1				1	1		2	
	General Dennis Reimer		1	1			2	1			3	1			
	General Eric Shinseki		2	2			2			1	2	2	1	3	
	General Peter Schoomaker		3	2			3				2		2		
	General George Casey		2	2			3						1	1	
Recent Notables	General Colin Powell		4	2		1	2		1		1	1			
	General H Norman Schwarzkopf		1	3	3	1	1	1		1	2	1			1
	General Wesley Clark		5	2	1		4				2	1			

¹¹² Information for this chart was compiled using biographies from Army and DoD websites.

		Distinguished Service Cross	Defense Distinguished Service Medal	Army Distinguished Service Medal	Silver Star	Defense Superior Service Medal	Legion Of Merit	Distinguished Flying Cross	Soldiers Medal	Bronze Star for Valor	Bronze Star for Service	Purple Heart	Defense Meritorious Service Medal	Meritorious Service Medal	ARCOM/V
Sr Leadership	General David Petraeus CENTCOM		2	2		2	4			1			3	3	
	MG Jay Hood CENTCOM			1		3	2				1				
	General Raymond Odierno MNC-I			1		1	6				1		4	4	
	General Martin Demsey TRADOC		2	2		1	3			1	1		3	3	
	General Charles Campbell FORSCOM		1			1	4				1		6	6	
	General Walter Sharp USFK		1			1	1				1				
	LTG Joseph Peterson FORSCOM			1		1	3				1		5	5	
	LTG Lloyd Austin 18th ABN CORPS		1	1	1	1	2						1	5	
Current Div Leadership															
	MG Mark Hertling 1st AR DIV					1	4				4	1			1
	BG Perry Wiggins 1st INF DIV		1				1				1	1		1	1
	MG John Morgan III 2nd INF DIV					2	2				1			6	
	BG Walter Golden Jr 2nd INF DIV						2				1		1	6	
	BG James L Crighton 2nd INF DIV		1				1				1		1	6	
	BG Patrick Dohahue 3d INF DIV						3				4		4		
	MG Jeffery Hammond 4th INF DIV						1				2		1	6	
	MG Jeffery Schloesser 101 ABN DIV					2	1				1			2	
	BG Mark Milley 101 ABN DIV					2	2				3			6	
	BG James McConville 101 ABN Div						2				1		2	3	
	Sum	0	30	25	7	21	67	2	1	6	44	10	35	68	3
	28 Generals # awds per Gen	0	1.1	0.9	0.3	0.8	2.4	0.1	0	0.2	1.6	0.4	1.3	2.4	0.1

APPENDIX L.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX M.

Example of a Chain of Command board that would be in a Company Orderly Room

Battalion
Commander



Brigade
Commander



Division
Commander



Corps
Commander



MACOM
Commander



The practice extends beyond tactical units. These three pictures are part of the Chain of Command wall at the local Children's Developmental Center in Monterey. The individual in the middle picture is a civilian, thus no uniform.



APPENDIX N.



Yorktown, Virginia, 14 October 1781



Meuse-Argonne, 26 September–1 October 1918



(Used with permission of the artist, James Dietz)
Normandy, 6 June 1944—Working Together, Fighting Together



San Juan Hill, Santiago de Cuba, 1 July 1898

Four of the ‘traditional’ U.S. Army in Action pictures (descriptions of the action are included in the FM) in the 2001 version of FM 1. Only one, the Meuse-Argonne print, remained in the 2005 edition. Intentional or not, this signals a shift in emphasis and a notable change from 2001.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX O.

DA 638 for Silver Star, Note Corps Cdr is approval authority

PART IV - RECOMMENDATIONS/APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL			
22. I certify that this individual is eligible for an award in accordance with AR 600-8-22; and that the information contained in Part I is correct.		22a. SIGNATURE	
		22b. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20070906	
23. INTERMEDIATE AUTHORITY	a. TO CG, MND-B BAGHDAD, IRAQ, APO AE 09344	b. FROM CDR, 3-2 SBCT BAGHDAD, IRAQ, APO AE 09344	c. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 6 SEP 07
d. RECOMMEND: ☒ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL ☐ UPGRADE TO: ☐ DOWNGRADE TO:			
e. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) TOWNSEND, STEPHEN J.		f. RANK COL	
g. TITLE/POSITION BRIGADE COMMANDER		h. SIGNATURE	
i. COMMENTS: <i>IN RETROSPECT I BELIEVE I SHOULD HAVE RECOMMENDED THIS OFFICER FOR A SS FOR HIS LEADERSHIP IN WINNING THE LARGEST ENGAGEMENT IN JAW IN OVER 15 MONTHS. THIS ACTION ALSO LIKELY PREVENTED A SECTARIAN CATASTROPHE IF THE SOLDIERS OF HEAVEN HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. REQUEST WE RE-CONSIDER THIS AWARD AND CONFIDENTLY THE APPROVED BSM-V AS AN INTERIM AWARD. I GIVE MY STRONGEST ENDORSEMENT.</i>			
24. INTERMEDIATE AUTHORITY	a. TO CDR, MNC-I BAGHDAD, IRAQ APO AE 09342	b. FROM CDR, MND-B BAGHDAD, IRAQ APO AE 09344	c. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 9/07/06
d. RECOMMEND: ☒ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL ☐ UPGRADE TO: ☐ DOWNGRADE TO:			
e. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) FIL, JOSEPH F., JR.		f. RANK MG	
g. TITLE/POSITION MULTI-NATIONAL DIVISION COMMANDER		h. SIGNATURE	
i. COMMENTS: <i>Now understanding the full measure of courage demonstrated during this very important and fluid battle, I strongly recommend approval of the Silver Star Medal.</i>			
25. INTERMEDIATE AUTHORITY	a. TO	b. FROM	c. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
d. RECOMMEND: ☐ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL ☐ UPGRADE TO: ☐ DOWNGRADE TO:			
e. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		f. RANK	
g. TITLE/POSITION		h. SIGNATURE	
i. COMMENTS			
26. APPROVAL AUTHORITY	a. TO ORDERS ISSUING AUTHORITY	b. FROM CDR, MNC-I BAGHDAD, IRAQ, APO AE 09342	c. DATE (YYYYMMDD) []
d. ☒ APPROVED ☐ DISAPPROVED ☐ RECOMMEND UPGRADE TO: ☐ DOWNGRADE TO:			
e. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) ODIERNO, RAYMOND T.		f. RANK LTC	
g. TITLE/POSITION MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS COMMANDER		h. SIGNATURE	
i. COMMENTS			
PART V - ORDERS DATA			
27a. ORDERS ISSUING HQ HQ, MNC-I APO AE 09342		27b. PERMANENT ORDER NO. 	31. DISTRIBUTION SOLDIER (1) CMOP (1) MPRI (1) FILES (1)
28a. NAME OF ORDERS APPROVAL AUTHORITY WINSTON, TIA		28b. RANK CPT	
28c. TITLE/POSITION CHIEF, CJ1 PERSONNEL ACTIONS AND AWARDS		29. APPROVED AWARD SS	
28d. SIGNATURE		30. DATE (YYYYMMDD) []	

DA FORM 638, APR 2006

Page 2 of 2
APO 9342 981

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX P.

Silver Star Database example

BITTINGER, RAYMOND

Synopsis:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star Medal to Raymond Bittinger, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving with the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, 3d Brigade Combat Team (Attached to the 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery), 1st Infantry Division, during combat operations in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM at Baqubah, Iraq, on 9 April 2004, as his troops approached the small town of Behriz, Iraq. Military intelligence and a recent attack suggested insurgents were planning actions against U.S. forces in the area. Staff Sergeant Bittinger and his team found themselves in what appeared to be a ghost town: not an Iraqi in sight and no security visible. Suddenly, the men spotted movement in the palm groves; insurgents unleashed a torrent of RPG and small-arms fire. During the battle, as enemies directed their fire toward specific targets, Staff Sergeant Bittinger weaved in and out of the line of fire, protecting his comrades by drawing gunfire to his own vehicle. As they fought, Bittinger's gunner took a hit, and fell from his seat. Staff Sergeant Bittinger quickly removed his flak jacket, used it to pressure the wound, and then jumped behind the gun and kept firing. In the heat of battle, Staff Sergeant Bittinger knew that if his men stayed where they were, they'd be sitting ducks for the better-positioned insurgents. He had his driver move their Bradley between the enemy fire and the other soldiers, allowing them to move to a better tactical location. Eventually, Staff Sergeant Bittinger and his men subdued the enemies as they left the area. Later that night, 20 to 30 insurgents attacked Coalition forces in the heart of Baqubah. Staff Sergeant Bittinger rounded up a crew of volunteers and headed out to help. En route, his vehicle took out insurgents who were firing RPGs and using small arms. Before arriving at the scene, his vehicle was hit by an IED, but they continued forward. Before he reached Baqubah, Staff Sergeant Bittinger received orders to instead secure a bridge over the Diyala River. So his team took a turn and headed toward the river. On April 9th Staff Sergeant Bittinger and his soldiers killed at least 10 insurgents and wounded several others at Behriz; on their route to Baqubah, they killed five and wounded an additional four. Staff Sergeant Bittinger's actions are in keeping with the finest traditions of military heroism and reflect distinct credit upon himself, the 1st Infantry Division, and the United States Army.

Born: at Chicago, Illinois

Home Town: Chicago, Illinois




Example of synopsis of situation and events resulting in the awarding of the Silver Star from the Home of Heroes Silver Star Citation database.¹¹³

¹¹³ Home of Heroes, "U.S. Army Awards of the Silver Star 2001-Present," www.homeofheroes.com, March 10, 2009, http://www.homeofheroes.com/valor/08_WOT/ss_GWOT/citations_USA.html (accessed March 10, 2009).

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX Q.

Army Stories of Valor Example



Front page of the us.army.mil webpage 10/28/2009. Stories of Valor are available on the middle left and lower center.

Green Beret Awarded Silver Star for Action in Iraq

Jan 23, 2007

BY Karla Byrd

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office

FORT BRAGG, N.C. (Army News Service, Jan. 23, 2007) - A Special Forces Soldier, formerly of the 5th Special Forces Group based at Fort Campbell, Ky., was recognized for valorous actions in Iraq during a ceremony at the Heritage Auditorium here, Jan. 19.

Sgt. 1st Class Frederick Allen, a native of Ann Arbor, Mich., was awarded the Silver Star for his actions Aug. 12, 2004, in An Najaf, Iraq.

Allen, the other members of Operational Detachment - Alpha 512, along with 51 Iraqi National Guardsmen, engaged approximately 15-20 Mahdi Militiamen embedded inside a school.

The detachment, with the Iraqi National Guard in the lead, advanced toward their objective and came under immediate and intense enemy fire from inside the school. Allen, the gunner in the detachment's 2nd vehicle, and a staff sergeant at the time, ordered his GMV forward, placing himself in the direct line of fire to allow the Iraqi National Guard elements to re-group and reorganize after sustaining several casualties.

His courage did not end there. Multiple times in the fight, Allen selflessly stayed in the line of fire battling the enemy, so that others could make it back to cover.



Lt. Gen. Robert W. Wagner, commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, awards the Silver Star to Sgt. 1st Class Frederick L. Allen, U.S. Army Special Forces, during a valor ceremony held at Fort Bragg, N.C., Jan. 19. Allen is being awarded the medal for actions during combat while serving with 5th Special Forces Group in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Photo by Gillian Albro

Example of information contained in Army's 'Stories of Valor' website. This record can be found at: <http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/01/23/1469-green-beret-awarded-silver-star-for-action-in-iraq/>

APPENDIX R.

DoD Heroes Example

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SEARCH GO **Threat Advisory ELEVATED**

Home Leaders Speeches News Press Multimedia/Photos Videos Publications Bloggers DoD Websites Employee Resources Contact Us

DefenseLINK®

Do Your Part VOTE

WARRIOR CARE

TOP LINKS

Secretary of Defense

- > Speeches
- > Travels
- > Messages
- > Biography
- > Other Top Leaders

Special Reports

- > Beirut Barracks Bombing
- > Travels with Mullen
- > Heroes
- > Archive

Subscribe

TOP NEWS

Gates: Nuclear Weapons Key To Deter U.S. Adversaries

Calling nuclear weapons one of the world's "messy realities," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said as long as other nations that could potentially use them against the U.S. possess or seek them, it's critical that the United States does as well. [Story](#)

82nd Airborne to Become Global Force

An 82nd Airborne Division combat team is training to re-assume its role in June as the U.S. global response force, a role it had to relinquish to the 101st Airborne Division last year when it deployed to Iraq as part of the troop surge. [Story](#)

Gates Reflects on Challenges, Rewards Serving as Wartime Defense Secretary

Less than three months before the next administration takes office, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said he'll leave his post satisfied he made a difference, especially for warfighters. [Story](#) | [Photos](#)

AFGHANISTAN NEWS

Elders See Water Problem, Progress

Officials from Parwan's provincial reconstruction team and the Mine Action Center on Bagram Airfield invited elders onto the base to see progress on the creek that

LATEST PHOTOS

ALL-OUT EFFORT - U.S. Air Force 1st Lt. Brian Dumm, normally stationed at Molesworth Air Force Base, England, finishes fifth overall in the 33rd Marine Corps Marathon Oct. 26 with a time of 2 hours, 25 minutes, 58 seconds. Dumm

[Hi-Res](#) | [Lead Photo Archive](#)

MILITARY NEWS

Coast Guard Gets Budget Boost for Fiscal 2009

The Coast Guard received a large budget increase for fiscal 2009 as part of the Consolidated Security Disaster Assistance and

Video powered by **The Pentagon Channel**

00:00 / 00:00

Wounded Warrior Care
www.warriorcare.mil

Hunting for Disabled Vets
Disabled veterans can now go hunting

Naturalization Ceremony
SECDEF Gates presides over event at Ft. Bragg

Page 1 of 3

PENTAGON CHANNEL LIVE

FACE OF DEFENSE

War Hero Inspires Soldier

A coalition soldier motivated by a World War II hero joined the exclusive company of soldiers who

Front page of the U.S. Department of Defense (defenselink.mil) 10/28/2009. Heroes section is located on the lower left.

[Home](#)[Heroes' Archive](#)

HEROES

[Medal Information](#)[Interviews](#)

Since September 2006, the Department of Defense has highlighted the military men and women who have gone above and beyond the call of duty in the Global War on Terror. These are our American Heroes' stories.

CLICK ON A HERO'S CARD TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THEM..



Example of the 'Baseball Card' style used in the Department of Defense Heroes website. This page can be found at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/heroes/>



017
First Edition
HEROES

www.dod.mil/heroes

Juan Ayala

On his third tour of duty in Iraq, Col. Ayala built up the 1st Division of the Iraqi Army. Formerly lacking soldiers, trained officers, and equipment, the Division improved its capabilities to the point where multiple brigades now operate independently of coalition assistance. Ayala developed measures to enhance intelligence, maintain accountability and increase the areas of responsibility of the Division.

Branch: Marine Corps

Unit: 1st Iraqi Army Division

Awarded: Legion of Merit

Hometown: El Paso, TX

The Story

A secure Iraq requires competent local police and national army. In Iraq, U.S. commanders have helped achieve stability in former hotbeds of violence by building up Iraqi Security Forces, thanks to the creative efforts of soldiers and Marines, such as Marine Corps Col. Juan Ayala. During his third tour in Iraq, from January 2006 to January 2007, Col. Ayala served as the Senior Advisor to the 1st Iraqi Army Division, based at Camp Habbaniyah. Numerous challenges faced Ayala and his 29-man team, as they operated daily in tandem with the Iraqis. The Division lacked soldiers, trained officers and equipment. The surrounding terrain proved hostile as well. In early 2006, Anbar province remained volatile, and the Iraqi Army often found itself engaged in battles with civilians allied with insurgents.

Over time, under Ayala's guidance, the Iraqis increased their areas of responsibility and gained credibility among the population. Specifically, Col. Ayala revamped the staff functions of the Division, drawing up missions that fit its skill set. He collaborated with local imams and sheiks to obtain approval for operations. As a result of the built-up trust, the flow of actionable intelligence to the Division increased, as did the number of formerly hostile Sunnis to the Division's ranks. So many ended up joining the Iraqi forces that they eventually gained a title: the "sons of Al Anbar."

Ayala helped plan and execute 52 direct action patrols in the area, which yielded 25 captured insurgents. Ayala's input resulted in the creation of a 24-hour joint Iraqi/Advisor Combat Operations Center, which helped obtain situational awareness on the ground. Other positive developments under Ayala's tenure included equipment improvements and the purging of hundreds of bogus soldiers from the Division's ranks. Under Ayala, the implementation of a Unit Tracking Program (UTP) was influential in maintaining accountability among the Iraqi soldiers in the Division.

Ayala often went on patrols, serving as a vehicle and convoy commander. He was hit twice by IEDs, but kept going out on missions to assess the Division's ability in the field. He led 17 teams and 225 advisors at different levels of command, to improve the capabilities of the Division. Today, two of the Division's Brigades, the 3rd and the 4th, function without coalition assistance.

For his efforts in building up the 1st Iraqi Army Division, Col. Ayala earned the Legion of Merit with Combat Distinguishing Device.

Example of the information contained in the DoD Heroes database. This record can be found at:
<http://www.defenselink.mil/heroes/profiles/ayalaJ.html>

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX S.

Silver Star Coded Database

Name	Enlisted Rank	W.O. Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	Advising or Partnering? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)
Adamec, Jeffrey - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Alicea, Benny - (OIF)	4			0		1			1	4
Allen, Frederick - (OIF)	7			0			1	1	1	4
Alvarez, Jose - (OIF)	4			0					1	6
Anderson, David S. - (OIF)	6			0					1	6
Anderson, Roderick C. - (OEF)	9			1			1	1	1	4
Ashby, Randall Lee - (OIF)			2	0					1	3
Baldwin, Brent R. - (OIF)	6			0				1	1	4
Ballard, Thomas - (OIF)	8			0		1			1	7
Barbieri, Thomas Joseph, II - (OIF)	4			0	1	1			1	6
Barrera, Michael L., Jr. - (OIF)	6			0					1	5
Becker, Shane - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	7
Bellavia, David - (OIF)	6			0		1			1	4
Bennett, Sean - (OIF)	7			0		1	1		1	7
Bernstein, David R. - (OIF)			2	0	1	1			1	3
Betten, Joshua D. - (OEF)	7			1					1	3
Bieger, Mark - (OIF)			4	0					1	4
Binney, Matthew - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	6
Bittinger, Raymond - (OIF)	6			0					1	4
Blaskowski, Matt - (OEF)	6			1		1			1	5
Borbonus, John G. - (OIF)	3			0	1	1			1	7
Brandon, Joshua - (OIF)			3	0			1		1	6
Brannon, Patrick - (OEF)	6			1					1	5
Branson, Charles E. - (OIF)			3	0					1	3
Braxton, Kenneth - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Brown, Jason D. - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Brown, Monica - (OEF)	3			0					0	7
Bryant, Christian - (OEF)	6			1					1	7
Buelow, Nathan J. - (OIF)		2		0			1	1	1	6
Burns, Kyle - (OEF)			2	1					1	6
Butler, Jacob Lee - (OIF)	5			0	1	1			1	3
Camacho, Eddie - (OEF)	4			1					1	3
Camacho, Javier - (OIF)	7			0					1	3

Name	Enlisted Rank	W.O. Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	Advising or Partnering? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)
Canon, Arin K. - (OEF)	6			1					1	2
Carter, Chris - (OIF)			3	0					1	3
Cashe, Alwyn C. - (OIF)	7			0	1	1			1	5
Caylor, Dennis - (OIF)	8			0					1	3
Cebreros, Gildardo - (OIF)	4			0					1	7
Chao, Cornell C. - (OIF)		3		0	1	1			1	7
Choay, Christopher - (OEF)	6			1					1	5
Church, Jeremiah - (OIF)	4			0			1		1	6
Church, Jeremy - (OIF)	3			0					1	4
Clemmer, Brent - (OIF)			3	0					1	7
Collier, Russell L. - (OIF)	5			0	1	1			1	4
Collins, Robert - (OIF)	8			0			1	1	1	5
Colucci, David G. - (OEF)	6			1					1	4
Conroy, Jason - (OIF)			3	0					1	3
Coomer, John - (OIF)	8			0					1	6
Cornford, Steven - (OIF)	4			0		1			1	7
Cowart, Daniel - (OIF)	5			0		1			1	7
Cremin, Colin - (OIF)			2	0					1	4
Dakos, Raymond - (OIF)	7			0					1	3
Davis, Jefferson Donald - (OEF)	8			1				1	1	1
Dean, Christopher P. - (OIF)			2	0					1	4
DeJesus, Angel - (OEF)		2		1				1	1	6
Dennis, Jerod R. - (OEF)	3			1	1	1			1	3
Deponai, Andrew T. - (OIF)			3	0					1	3
DePouli, Raymond M. - (OEF)	6			1					1	2
DesJardin, James - (OIF)			3	0					1	3
Diaz, Jason - (OIF)	6			0					1	
Dobbins, Stephen - (OIF)			3	0		1			1	6
Durbin, Jerry M., Jr. - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	6
Dwyer, Kenneth M. - (OEF)			3	1		1	1	1	1	6
Echols, Javier - (OIF)	6			0					1	5
Edgy, Gannon - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Edwards, David M. - (OIF)	6			0					1	5
Eldred, Jerad - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	
Espino, Erasmo, Jr. - (OEF)	6			1					1	6
Estes, Justin M. - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	7
Falkel, Christopher - (OEF)	4			1					1	5

Name	Enlisted Rank	W.O. Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	Advising or Partnering? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)
Felix, Bradley M. - (OEF)	6			1		1	1	1	1	4
Fernandez, Christopher - (OIF)	3			0					1	4
Fetty, Jason - (OEF)	6			1			1	1	1	3
Finn, Shane F. - (OIF)			3	0					1	
Ford, Sheffield F., III - (OEF)			3	1				1	1	6
Fowler, Paul A. - (OIF)			3	0					1	4
Franco, Kenneth R. - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Fuhrmann, Ray Michael, II - (OIF)	4			0			1		1	5
Gagne, Eric - (OIF)	8			0					1	7
Gant, James - (OIF)			4	0			1		1	6
Ghent, Richard - (OIF)	4			0		1			1	6
Goltry, Brennan S. - (OIF)			3	0		1			1	7
Good, Charles - (OIF)	6			0				1	1	3
Gregory, Karl - (OIF)			2	0		1			1	5
Grenz, Allen - (OEF)	5			1					1	3
Gross, Nicholas S. - (OEF)	6			0			1	1	1	5
Grover, Mark - (OIF)	6			0					1	7
Gruidl, Matthew T. - (OIF)	7			0					1	3
Hall, Danny R. - (OIF)	7			0			1	1	1	5
Hall, Rashe - (OEF)	6			1		1			1	6
Harkins, Jason - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	7
Harriman, Andrew Scott - (OIF)	4			0					1	7
Harriman, Stanley Lorn - (OEF)		2		1				1	1	2
Hernandez, Abram - (OEF)	7			1		1	1	1	1	6
Herring, James B. - (OIF)		3		0			1	1	1	6
Hester, Leigh Ann - (OIF)	5			0					0	5
Hibner, Dan - (OIF)			3	0					1	3
Hibner, Dave - (OIF)			3	0		1			1	3
Hilliard, Jon M. - (OIF)	6			0		1			1	7
Hobbs, Craig - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Holmes, Bruce - (OEF)	7			0			1	1	1	5
Holt, Wesley - (OIF)	6			0					1	4
Hope, Jason - (OEF)		1		1				1	1	5
Horton, Eric - (OEF)	7			1		1		1	1	6
Howard, Mark - (OEF)	7			1		1	1	1	1	6
Huber, Haldon H. - (OEF)	8			1				1	1	
Hurd, Daniel E. - (OIF)			3	0					1	

Name	Enlisted Rank	W.O. Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	Advising or Partnering? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)
Iban, Ismael - (OIF)	7			0					1	7
Inch, Norman - (OIF)	5			0					1	
Ingram, Jeff - (OIF)			5	0					1	3
Jacobsen, Petter - (OIF)	8			0		1	1		1	7
Johns, Stephan - (OEF)	7			1				1	1	4
Johnson, Allen C. - (OEF)	7			1	1	1		1	1	5
Johnson, Thomas H., Jr. - (OIF)			3	0					1	4
Jones, Benjamin - (OEF)	7			1				1	1	4
Jordan, Patrick - (OIF)	5			0					1	4
Joseph, Joshua V. - (OIF)	3			0					1	5
Julian, Matthew - (OEF)	7			1				1	1	5
Kay, Shannon - (OIF)	6			0		1			1	4
Kaylor, Jeffrey J. - (OIF)			2	0	1	1			1	3
Keefe, Matthew - (OEF)	6			1				1	1	5
Keil, Blake - (OIF)			3	0					1	
Keller, Gregory - (OIF)	6			0			1	1	1	7
Kirkwood, Sean - (OIF)	8			0			1	1	1	7
Kobes, Gerrit - (OIF)	4			0			1		1	4
Lacamera, Paul - (OEF)			5	1					1	2
LaFrenz, Matthew - (OEF)	5			1					1	2
Lamkin, Andrew J. A. - (OIF)	4			0					1	4
Lamoreaux, Cory L. - (OEF)	8			1					1	2
Lancey, Raymond - (OIF)	8			0			1	1	1	7
Lara, Peter - (OIF)	7			0					1	5
Lewis, Andrew - (OEF)	7			1				1	1	3
Logsdon, Keith - (OEF)	8			1			1	1	1	5
Lowe, David - (OEF)	7			1			1	1	1	5
Lundgren, Curtis - (OIF)	4			0		1			1	7
Lybert, Patrick - (OEF)	6			1	1	1			1	6
Maholic, Thomas D. - (OEF)	8			1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Mahon, Kelly - (OIF)	8			0				1	1	3
Maitre, Benjamin - (OEF)			3	1					1	2
Malmberg, Chad A. - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	7
Mangels, John E. - (OEF)	7			1		1			1	6
Marshall, John W. - (OIF)	7			0	1	1			1	3
Martin, Joseph - (OIF)	5			0					1	4
Matteson, James - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	4

Name	Enlisted Rank	W.O. Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	Advising or Partnering? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)
Mayfield, Kirk - (OIF)			3	0					1	4
McCarty, Michael - (OIF)			2	0					1	4
McGuire, Shawn - (OIF)	6			1					1	7
McInerney, Michael J. - (OEF)		1		1			1	1	1	3
McLaughlin, Michael E. - (OIF)			5	0	1	1	1		1	6
McMullen, Michael J. - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	5
McQuade, Sean P. - (OEF)			3	1			1		1	7
Meyer, Harrison J. - (OIF)	3			0	1	1			1	4
Mike, Jason L. - (OIF)	4			0					1	5
Miles, David - (OIF)	8			0				1	1	3
Miller, Joshua - (OIF)	4			0					1	4
Miller, Patrick - (OIF)	3			0					1	3
Millican, Jonathan - (OIF)	2			0	1	1	1		1	7
Miltenberger, Robert - (OIF)	6			0					1	4
Molino, Christopher A. - (OIF)			3	0					1	5
Moore, William Clint - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	7
Morales, Francisco - (OEF)	7			1					1	6
Mulligan, Terry - (OIF)	7			0					1	3
Nethery, Brian - (OIF)	6			0					1	7
Newell, Peter - (OIF)			5	0					1	4
Newlin, Mark - (OIF)	7			0					1	6
Newton, Casey H. - (OEF)			2	1					1	4
Nunez, Octavio - (OIF)	6			0					1	7
Olsen, Jeremiah C. - (OEF)	4			1					1	2
Palumbo, Christopher - (OEF)		3		1			1		1	5
Payne, William Thomas - (OIF)	6			0					1	4
Perkins, Andrew - (OIF)	5			0	1	1			1	7
Perkins, David G. - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Peters, Steven - (OIF)	5			0					1	7
Petithory, Daniel Henry - (OEF)	7			1	1	1		1	1	1
Pixler, Ross C. - (OIF)			2	0		1			1	7
Plush, David M. - (OIF)	6			0					1	7
Prakash, Neil - (OIF)			2	0			1		1	4
Prater, Terry William - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	4
Price, Bruce E. - (OEF)		2		1	1	1	1	1	1	4
Proctor, Joseph E. - (OIF)	5			0	1	1	1		1	6
Prosser, Robert - (OIF)	9			0					1	4

Name	Enlisted Rank	W.O. Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	Advising or Partnering? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)
Pryor, Anthony S. - (OEF)	8			1				1	1	2
Pugh, Robert Shane - (OIF)	5			0	1	1			1	5
Pushkin, Gregory - (OIF)	4			0					1	6
Quinn, Patrick M. - (OIF)	8			0			1	1	1	3
Ray, Grant - (OIF)	5			0		1			1	3
Ray, Jonathon - (OEF)	7			0					1	3
Reis, Larry - (OEF)	8			1			1		1	5
Remington, Kevin K. - (OIF)	8			0				1	1	3
Resh, Mark T. - (OIF)			3	0			1		1	7
Rich, Christopher - (OIF)	5			0					1	4
Rieman, Tommy - (OIF)	5			0					1	3
Riling, Ron - (OIF)	9			0					1	3
Ringgenberg, Dirk D. - (OEF)			3	1					1	5
Ritenour, Matthew - (OEF)	6			1		1			1	7
Rivas, Jose M. - (OEF)	5			1			1		1	7
Rodriguez, Jose R. - (OIF)	7			0					1	7
Rohrs, Peter David - (OEF)	6			1					1	7
Roundtree, Cliff - (OEF)	7			1			1	1	1	5
Rowell, Frederic L. - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Sanderlin, Robert - (OEF)	8			1		1		1	1	7
Sanders, Micheaux - (OIF)	4			0		1			1	4
Sar, Sarun - (OEF)	8			1		1		1	1	5
Sartin, Jerry D. - (OIF)		3		0					1	7
Scalise, Rodney A. - (OEF)	6			1			1	1	1	6
Schafer, Michael W. - (OEF)	6			1	1	1			1	5
Sebban, Benjamin L. - (OIF)	7			0	1	1			1	7
Self, Nathan E. - (OEF)			3	1		1			1	2
Setzer, John - (OEF)	7			1		1			1	3
Shanaberger, Wentz Jerome Henry, III - (OIF)	7			0	1	1			1	4
Sheetz, Brian M. - (OIF)	4			0		1			1	6
Sims, Sean P. - (OIF)			3	0	1	1			1	4
Small, Andrew R. - (OEF)	3			1	1	1			1	6
Smith, Peter L. - (OIF)	8			0					1	4
Stack, Michael Boyd - (OIF)	9			0	1	1		1	1	4
Stebner, Eric W. - (OEF)	5			1					1	2
Stephens, Chad M. - (OIF)	7			0					1	4

Name	Enlisted Rank	W.O. Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	Advising or Partnering? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)
Steuer, Robert A. - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	4
Strickland, Ronald Gregory - (OEF)	7			1					1	7
Strobino, Jay Christopher - (OIF)	4			0					1	7
Swope, Jerry - (OIF)	7			0			1		1	5
Szott, Joshua - (OIF)	5			0					1	3
Tabron, Donald - (OEF)		1		1					1	2
Tanish, Patrick Shannon - (OIF)	5			0	1	1			1	4
Tarlavsky, Michael Yury - (OIF)			3	0	1	1		1	1	4
Tate, John - (OIF)			3	0					1	6
Taylor, Jarrod - (OIF)	4			0		1			1	7
Thibeault, Victor - (OEF)	4			1		1			1	3
Thomas, Ken - (OIF)	5			0			1		1	7
Tiedeman, David - (OIF)			2	0					1	5
Tillman, Pat - (OEF)	4			1			1		1	4
Tomlin, William Charles - (OEF)	7			1					1	7
Totten-Lancaster, Aaron - (OEF)	4			1		1			1	2
Trattles, Patric L. - (OEF)	6			1					1	5
Turner, Dwayne - (OIF)	2			0					1	3
Turner, Kyle - (OIF)	3			0		1			1	3
Twitty, Stephen - (OIF)			5	0					1	3
Underwood, Larry - (OIF)	4			0					1	4
Vaccaro, Angelo J. - (OEF)	4			1					1	6
Vaccaro, Angelo J. - (OEF)	4			1	1	1			1	6
Vanlandingham, John - (OIF)			3	0			1		1	4
Velez, Jose "Freddy" - (OIF)	4			0	1	1			1	4
Viene, Justin - (OEF)	6			1					1	4
Villalobos, Gary - (OIF)	7			0			1		1	5
Vitagliano, Thomas E. - (OIF)	6			0	1	1			1	5
Volesky, Gary - (OIF)			5	0					1	4
Voss, Jude - (OEF)	6			1		1		1	1	
Walker, Joshua J. - (OEF)	5			1					1	2
Walters, Donald - (OIF)	5			0	1	1			1	3
Warrick, Clinton A. - (OIF)	4			0			1		1	6
Watts, Roger G. - (OIF)	7			0				1	1	4
Wells, Christopher B. - (OEF)			4	1			1	1	1	5
Wilmoth, Harper - (OEF)	6			1					1	2
Wilson, Brian D. - (OEF)	5			1					1	2

Name	Enlisted Rank	W.O. Rank	Officer Rank	IZ=0 AF=1	KIA 0=no 1=yes	WIA 0=no 1=yes	Advising or Partnering? 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=yes 0=no	Sex M=1 F=0	Year (200X)
Wilzcek, Jeremy - (OIF)	6			0					1	6
Witkowski, James - (OIF)	5			0	1	1			1	5
Wolford, Gerald Alex - (OIF)	6			0					1	3
Worrell, Matthew Wade - (OIF)			4	0					1	6
Worthan, Ryan L. - (OEF)			4	1					1	3
Yost, Anthony Ray - (OIF)	8			0	1	1	1	1	1	5
Young, Justin - (OIF)	5			0					1	7
Young, Terry Fuller - (OIF)	4			0			1		1	6
Zamarripa, John J. - (OIF)	6			0					1	7
Zedwick, Matthew - (OIF)	5			0					1	4
Zylstra, Brandon - (OIF)	6			0					1	6

APPENDIX T.

Silver Star Database Statistics

% of Awardees who are Male	99.25%	Percent of Awardees who Partnered or Advised		19.25%
% of Awardees who are Female	0.75%			
		% of Awardees from Afghanistan		32.08%
% of Awardees Enlisted	76.23%	% of Awardees from Iraq		67.92%
% of Awardees Warrant Officers	4.15%			
% of Awardees Officers	19.62%	% Wounded in the event	31.70%	
		% Given Posthumously	16.98%	
		% of Awardees who were SF	20.38%	
		% SF Awardees who were advising	51.85%	

Enlisted Breakdown			Officer Breakdown			Year	# SS Records
E-2	2	0.99%	O-2	12	23.08%	2001	2
E-3	10	4.95%	O-3	29	55.77%	2002	16
E-4	31	15.35%	O-4	5	9.62%	2003	52
E-5	27	13.37%	O-5	5	9.62%	2004	55
E-6	67	33.17%	O-6	6	11.54%	2005	41
E-7	38	18.81%				2006	41
E-8	23	11.39%				2007	50
E-9	4	1.98%				none indicated	8

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX U.

Army Stories of Valor Coded Database

Last Name	First Name	Enlisted Rank	Officer Rank	Warrant Rank	RA 1=Yes	AR 1=Yes	ANG 1=Yes	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	valor=1 service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes	Date of event	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=Yes 0=No	Posthumous 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=Yes 0=No
Goltry	Bernnan		3		1			1	SS	1	0	Feb-07	0	1	0	0
Mcginnis	Ross	4			1			1	MH	1	0	Dec-06	0	1	1	0
Brown	Monica	4			1			0	SS	1	0	Apr-07	1	0	0	0
Hibner	Dan		3		1			1	SS	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0	0
Hibner	Dave		3		1			1	SS	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0	0
Adamac	Jeffery	6			1			1	SS	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0	1
Prior	Anthony	8			1			1	SS	1	0	Jan-02	1	1	0	1
Ignrim	Jeffery		5		1			1	SS	1	0	Mar-03	0	0	0	0
Wolferd	Gerald	6			1			1	SS	1	0	Mar-03	0	1	0	0
Bittiger	Raymond	6			1			1	SS	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0	0
Fernadaz	Christopher	3			1			1	SS	1	0	May-04	0	0	0	0
Rieman	Tommy	5			1			1	SS	1	0	Dec-03	0	1	0	0
Dean	Christopher		2		1			1	SS	1	0	Apr-04	0	1	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Enlisted Rank	Officer Rank	Warrant Rank	RA 1=Yes	AR 1=Yes	ANG 1=Yes	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	valor=1 service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes	Date of event	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=Yes 0=No	Posthumous 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=Yes 0=No
Rilling	Ron	9			1			1	SS	1	0	Apr-04	0	0	0	0
Sanders	Imischeaux	4			1			1	SS	1	0	Apr-04	0	1	0	0
Prakash	Neal		2		1			1	SS	1	0	Jun-04	0	0	0	0
Church	Jermey	3				1		1	SS	1	0	Apr-04	0	0	0	0
Alica	Benny	5			1			1	SS	1	0	Nov-08	0	1	0	0
Szott	Joshua	5			1			1	SS	1	0	Sep-03	0	0	0	0
Hester	Leigh Ann	5					1	0	SS	1	0	Mar-05	0	0	0	0
Echols	Javier	6					1	1	SS	1	0	Mar-05	0	0	0	0
Valobous	Gary	7			1			1	SS	1	0	Jun-05	0	0	0	0
Palumbo	Christopher			3	1			1	SS	1	0	Apr-05	1	0	0	0
Sor	Sorun	8			1			1	SS	1	0	Feb-05	1	0	0	1
Richburg	Martin	6				1		1	Arcom	1	0	Mar-06	0	0	0	0
Winsky	Brain		5		1			1	Bsm	1	0	Sep-06	0	0	0	0
Galvan	Troy	6			1			1	Sm	0	0	Feb-06	Us	0	0	0
Anderson	David	6			1			1	SS	1	0	Sep-06	0	0	0	0
Nein	Timothy	6					1	1	DSC	1	0	Mar-05	0	0	0	0
Burra	Micheal	6			1			1	SS	1	0	Jul-06	0	0	0	0
Sanford	Steven	3			1			1	DSC	1	0	Mar-06	0	1	0	0
Wilsnick	Jermey	6			1			1	SS	1	0	Mar-06	0	0	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Enlisted Rank	Officer Rank	Warrant Rank	RA 1=Yes	AR 1=Yes	ANG 1=Yes	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	valor=1 service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes	Date of event	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=Yes 0=No	Posthumous 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=Yes 0=No
Warrick	Clinton	4			1			1	SS	1	0	Sep-06	0	0	0	0
Goltry	Bernnan		3		1			1	SS	1	0	Feb-07	0	1	0	0
Judd	Johny			4	1			1	Am	1	0	Jan-07	0	0	0	0
Sanjaureo	Marvin	6			1			1	Bsm	1	0	Nov-06	0	0	0	0
Schilling	Matthew	6			1			1	Bsm	1	0	Feb-07	0	0	0	0
Hansen	Tim	5			1			1	Arcom	1	0	May-07	0	0	0	0
Devia	Benjamin	4			1			1	Arcom	1	0		0	0	0	0
Burrows	Mark			2	1			1	Dfc	1	0	Jul-07	0	0	0	0
Zylstra	Brandon	6			1			1	SS	1	0		0	0	0	0
Malmburg	Chad	6					1	1	SS	1	0	Jan-07	0	0	0	0
Thomas	Ken	5			1			1	SS	1	0	Feb-07	0	0	0	0
Fetty	Jason	6				1		1	SS	1	0	Feb-07	1	0	0	0
Jackson	Walter		2		1			1	DSC	1	0	Sep-06	0	1	0	0
Ham	Elliot			1	1			1	Dfc	1	0	May-06	0	0	0	0
Willams	Gregory	5			1			1	DSC	1	0	Oct-06	0	1	0	0
Johnson	Zachary			3	1			1	Dfc	1	0	Jan-07	0	0	0	0
Claud	Charles	5			1			1	Bsm	1	0	Sep-07	0	1	0	0
Brown	Monica	3			1			0	SS	1	0	Mar-07	1	0	0	0
Smith	Paul	7			1			1	MH	1	0	Apr-03	0	1	1	0

Last Name	First Name	Enlisted Rank	Officer Rank	Warrant Rank	RA 1=Yes	AR 1=Yes	ANG 1=Yes	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	valor=1 service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes	Date of event	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=Yes 0=No	Posthumous 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=Yes 0=No
Waterbury	Forrest	4			1			1	Bsm	1	0	Mar-07	0	1	1	0
Elliott	Curtis	8			1			1	Sm	0	0	Aug-03	0	0	0	0
Inabnet	Ryan	5			1			1	Bsm	1	0	Jul-07	1	0	0	0
Martinette	Ryan	4			1			1	Bsm	1	0	Aug-06	0	1	0	0
Geressy	Eric	8			1			1	SS	1	0	Sep-07	0	0	0	0
Allden	Micheal	7			1			1	Sm	0	0	Feb-08	Ger	0	0	0
Philips	Erich	6			1			1	DSC	1	0	Aug-07	1	0	0	0
Ruske	Gregory	5				1		1	SS	1	0	Apr-08	1	0	0	0
Martinez	Moises	6			1			1	Sm	0	0	Nov-05	Us	0	0	0
Oconner	Brandon	8			1			1	DSC	1	1	Jun-06	1	0	0	1
Oconner	Brandon	8			1			1	DSC	1	1	Jun-06	1	0	0	1
Quinn	Pat	8				1		1	SS	1	1	Apr-03	0	0	0	1
Mictell	Mark		4			1		1	DSC	1	1	Nov-01	1	0	0	1
Proctor	Joesph	5					1	1	SS	1	1	May-06	0	1	1	0
Allen	Fredrick	7			1			1	SS	1	1	Aug-04	0	0	0	1
Brandon	Joshua		3		1			1	SS	1	1	Aug-06	0	0	0	0
Gant	Jim		4		1			1	SS	1	1	Dec-07	0	0	0	0
Vanlandenhan	John		3				1	1	SS	1	1	Nov-04	0	0	0	0
Maggard	Lloyd	7			1			1	Ph	0	1	Nov-05	0	1	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Enlisted Rank	Officer Rank	Warrant Rank	RA 1=Yes	AR 1=Yes	ANG 1=Yes	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	valor=1 service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes	Date of event	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=Yes 0=No	Posthumous 1=Yes 0=No	SF 1=Yes 0=No
Jensen	Tyler		2				1	1	SS	1	1	Jan-07	1	0	0	1
Kite	Chad	7			1			1	SS	1	1	Jun-07	0	0	0	1
Federmann	Christopher	6			1			1	SS	1	1	Jun-07	0	0	0	1

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX V.

Army Stories of Valor

% of Awardees in Regular Army	82.19%	Percent of Awardees who partnered or advised	17.81%	Enlisted Breakdown			Officer Breakdown		
% of Awardees in Army Reserve	8.22%			E-3	4	7.41%	O-2	4	28.57%
% of Awardees in Army National Guard	9.59%	% of Awardees from Afghanistan	17.81%	E-4	7	12.96%	O-3	6	42.86%
		% of Awardees from Iraq	82.19%	E-5	11	20.37%	O-4	2	14.29%
% of Awardees who are Male	95.89%			E-6	18	33.33%	O-5	2	14.29%
% of Awardees who are Female	4.11%	% Wounded in the event	24.66%	E-7	6	11.11%			
		% Given Posthumously	5.48%	E-8	7	12.96%			
% of Awardees Enlisted	73.97%			E-9	1	1.85%			
% of Awardees Warrant Officers	6.85%	% Given for Valor	93.15%						
% of Awardees Officers	19.18%	% Given for Service/Merit/Achievement	6.85%	Correlation Between Advising and SF?				72.73%	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX W.

DoD Heroes Coded Database

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
Abraharsom	Joshua		1				6			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Jun-06	0	0	0
Ackerman	Elliot				1				2	0	1	SS	1	0	Nov-04	0	0	0
Adams	Jarred				1		5			0	1	SS	1	0	Jan-05	0	1	0
Adlesperger	Christophe r				1		3			0	1	NC	1	0	Nov-04	0	0	0
Alcazar	Carlo	1					6			0	1	NC	1	0	Nov-07	1	0	0
Albietz	Edward		1				6			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Mar-07	0	0	0
Alvarez	Jose	1					4			0	1	SS	1	0	Mar-06	0	0	0
Amerine	Jason	1							4	0	1	Bsm	1	1	Nov-01	1	0	0
Archie	Paul				1		8			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Feb-07	0	0	0
Arellano	James	1					3			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Aug-06	0	1	1
Arends	Joel	1							3	1	1	Bsm	0	0	Apr-05	0	0	0
Axelson	Matthew			1			5			0	1	NC	1	0	Jun-05	1	1	1
Ayala	Juan				1				6	0	1	LOM	0	1	Jan-07	0	0	0
Baylosis	Benito			1					4	0	1	Bsm	0	0	Aug-06	0	0	0
Bennett	Johnathan		1						3	0	1	Bsm	0	1	Sep-05	0	0	0
Baughman	Nathaniel	1					4			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Jul-06	0	1	1

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
Betterton	Robert	1					5			1	1	Bsm	1	1	Apr-05	0	1	0
Bishop	Timothy		1				6			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Aug-05	0	0	0
Bittinger	Raymond	1					7			0	1	SS	1	0	Apr-04	0	0	0
Boada	Stephen				1				2	0	1	SS	1	0	Feb-06	1	0	0
Bodani	Jack	1					5			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Sep-08	1	1	0
Bogart	Daniel				1		6			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Mar-07	0	0	0
Bonaldo	Derek	1							4	1	1	Bsm	0	1	Feb-07	0	0	0
Boudreaux	Bryan			1					2	0	1	Bsm	0	0	Sep-05	0	0	0
Broadwell	Teresa	1					4			0	0	Bsm	1	0	Oct-03	0	0	0
Brookins	Dexter	1							4	0	1	Bsm	0	0	May-03	0	0	0
Bruckenthal	Nathaniel					1	4			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Apr-04	0	1	1
Buhain	Joseph	1					6			1	1	Bsm	0	1	Mar-05	1	0	0
Burkhart	Daniel	1							3	0	1	Bsm	0	1	Apr-08	1	0	0
Burnette	Richard	1					8			0	1	Bsm	0	0	May-05	0	1	0
Butler	Alfred				1				3	0	1	Bsm	1	0	Dec-04	0	0	0
Camp	Mark				1		4			1	1	SS	1	0	May-05	0	1	0
Campbell	Kim		1						4	0	0	DFC	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0
Cardenas	Moses				1		4			0	1	SS	1	0	Aug-07	0	1	0
Carmack	Gregory		1				7			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Jun-06	0	0	0
Carpenter	Kevin	1					7			1	1	Bsm	1	0	Oct-05	0	0	0
Carter	Lisa	1							4	0	0	Bsm	0	0	May-03	0	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
Chapman	John		1				6			0	1	AFC	1	0	Mar-02	1	1	1
Chavez	Ralph			1			8			0	1	Bsm	0	1	Feb-08	1	0	0
Chesarek	William				1				4	0	1	DFC	1	0	Jun-06	0	0	0
Chiarini	Joshua			1			4			0	1	SS	1	0	Feb-06	0	0	0
Chontosh	Brian				1				3	0	1	NC	1	0	Mar-03	0	0	0
Church	Jeremy	1					4			1	1	SS	1	0	Apr-04	0	0	0
Cissell	Brian			1			7			0	1	Bsm	0	1	Dec-06	0	0	0
Claude	Charles	1					5			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Sep-07	0	1	0
Clemens	Michael	1					8			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Nov-06	0	0	0
Clough	Justin				1		5			0	1	Mar of the Year	0	0	Dec-07	0	0	0
Coffman	James	1							6	0	1	DSC	1	1	Nov-04	0	1	0
Copeland	Willie				1		5			0	1	NC	1	0	Apr-04	0	0	0
Corbin	Todd				1		4			0	1	NC	1	0	May-05	0	0	0
Cousins	Matthew	1							3	1	1	Bsm	0	0	Mar-04	0	0	0
Covel	Earl		1				6			0	1	SS	1	1	Jun-04	0	0	0
Cunningham	Jason		1				3			0	1	AFC	1	0	Mar-02	1	1	1
Cutler	Tracy	1					8			0	1	Bsm	0	1	Oct-04	1	0	0
Davis	Cameron	1					5			0	1	Arcom	0	0	Apr-08	0	0	0
Dean	Reginald			1			8			0	1	Bsm	0	1	Jun-06	0	0	0
Dementer	Alan			1			5			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Mar-03	0	0	0
Desfrosseillier	Todd				1				5	0	1	SS	1	0	Dec-04	0	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
S																		
Deitz	Danny			1			5			0	1	NC	1	0	Jun-05	1	1	1
Diorio	Frank				1				4	0	1	Bsm	1	0	Apr-05	0	0	0
Dixon	Robert	1							4	0	1	Bsm	0	1	Jul-07	0	0	0
Doeherty	William	1					9			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Apr-05	0	1	0
Dollard	Ian				1		4			0	1	SS	1	0	Jun-07	0	1	0
Dunham	Jason				1		4			0	1	Mh	1	0	Apr-05	0	1	1
Espinoza	Armando				1				4	0	1	DFC	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0
Fetty	Jason	1					6			1	1	SS	1	0	Feb-07	1	1	0
Flores	Gerald				1		6			0	1	Bsm	0	1	Dec-07	0	0	0
Frady	Michael		1				5			1	1	Bsm	1	0	Apr-04	0	0	0
Freeman	Brian	1							3	1	1	Arcom	0	1	Jan-07	0	1	1
Ford	Sheffield	1							4	0	1	SS	1	1	Jun-06	1	0	0
Foust	Shawn		1				5			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Apr-08	0	0	0
Gagliano	Jason				1		5			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Jan-06	0	0	0
Gainey	Michael	1					7			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Oct-07	0	0	0
Gallucci	Ryan	1					5			0	1	Bsm	0	1	Sep-05	0	0	0
Glover	Matthew		1						4	0	1	DFC	1	0	Nov-04	0	0	0
Goltry	Brennan	1							3	0	1	SS	1	0	Feb-07	0	1	0
Good	Charles	1					7			0	1	SS	1	0	Oct-03	0	0	0
Gouak	Stephen				1		6			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Jul-07	0	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
Gratton	Matthew			1					3	0	1	Bsm	0	1	Sep-05	0	0	0
Hair	Justin	1					3			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Jun-05	0	0	0
Hamill	James			1			6			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Feb-07	1	0	0
Hamlin	Max	1					7			1	1	Bsm	0	0	Aug-03	0	0	0
Hannan	Karl	1						3		1	1	Bsm	0	0	Jan-05	0	0	0
Herring	James	1						3		1	1	SS	1	1	Dec-06	0	0	0
Hester	Leigh Ann	1					5			1	0	SS	1	0	Mar-05	0	0	0
Hill	Lori	1						3		0	0	DFC	1	0	Mar-06	0	1	0
Houtman	Pat		1						4	1	1	DFC	1	0	Nov-04	1	0	0
Hunter	Jeff				1		5			1	1	SS	1	0	May-05	0	0	0
Ivanov	Cheryl	1					4			1	0	Efmb	0	1	Jan-07	1	0	0
Jackson	Bryan	1							2	0	1	DSC	1	0	Sep-06	0	1	0
Johnson	Crystal	1					5			0	0	Arcom	1	0	Sep-06	0	1	0
Kane	Sean	1					6			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Aug-07	0	1	0
Kasal	Bradley				1		9			0	1	NC	1	0	Nov-04	0	1	0
Keehan	Michael		1				8			0	1	SS	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0
Ketterer	Clarence	1					6			1	1	Bsm	1	0	Oct-05	0	0	0
King	Philip		1				4			0	1	Bsm	1	1	Aug-06	1	0	0
Kimberling	Jason		1				6			0	1	Bsm	1	1	Aug-06	1	0	0
Kimmey	Drew	1					7			0	1	SS	1	0	Nov-07	1	1	0
Koele	Shane	1					6			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Mar-05	1	1	1

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
Kuge	Jessica		1				6			0	0	Bsm	0	0	Jan-07	0	0	0
Lemme	Kraig	1					4			0	1	Sm	1	0	Oct-04	0	0	0
Leoncio	Nathaniel			1			4			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Oct-05	0	1	0
Lindsey	Nathaniel	1					5			1	1	Bsm	0	1	Sep-06	1	1	1
Lomax	Brian		1						2	0	1	Bsm	0	0	Jan-09	0	0	0
Luttrell	Marcus			1			6			0	1	NC	1	0	Jun-05	1	1	0
Lynn	Kevin		1				9			0	1	Bsm	0	1	Jul-04	0	0	0
Malmberg	Chad	1					6			1	1	SS	1	0	Jan-07	0	0	0
Marshall	Benjamin	1					5			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Jul-06	0	0	0
Matson	Christopher	1							4	1	1	Bsm	0	1	May-07	0	0	0
McCarty	Michael	1							2	1	1	SS	1	0	Nov-04	0	0	0
McDade	Aubrey				1		5			0	1	NC	1	0	Nov-04	0	0	0
McLeese	Justin				1		3			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Sep-04	0	0	0
Merchant	Christopher	1					4			1	1	Bsm	0	0	Oct-05	0	1	0
Mike	Jason	1					5			1	1	SS	1	0	Mar-05	0	0	0
Miles	David	1					8			0	1	SS	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0
Miller	Luke				1		6			0	1	Bsm	1	0	May-05	0	0	0
Mitchell	Robert				1		4			0	1	NC	1	0	Nov-04	0	1	0
Mora	Ezequiel	1					5			0	1	Bsm	1	0	May-07	0	0	0
Moore	Marcus	1						2		1	1	DFC	1	0	Dec-06	0	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
Murphy	Michael			1					3	0	1	Mh	1	0	Jun-05	1	1	1
Nein	Timothy	1					6			1	1	DSC	1	0	Mar-05	0	0	0
O'Connor	Brendan	1					7			0	1	DSC	1	1	Jun-06	1	0	0
Padmore	Kent				1		6			0	1	NMccm	1	0	Jun-05	0	1	0
Payne	William	1					6			0	1	SS	1	0	Sep-04	0	0	0
Peterson	Timothy	1							2	0	1	Bsm	0	0	Sep-07	0	0	0
Pettus	Marion	1					4			0	1	Bsm	1	0	Feb-08	0	1	0
Pixler	Ross	1							2	0	1	SS	1	0	Oct-07	0	1	0
Prather	Craig		1						3	0	1	DFC	1	0	Nov-04	0	0	0
Proctor	Joseph	1					5			1	1	SS	1	1	May-06	0	1	1
Pryor	Anthony	1					8			0	1	SS	1	0	Jan-02	1	1	0
Pullen	Ashley	1					4			1	0	Bsm	1	0	Mar-05	0	0	0
Pushkin	Gregory	1					4			0	1	SS	1	0	Mar-06	0	0	0
Ramirez	Ignacio	1					4			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Aug-06	0	1	1
Richburg	Martin	1					6			1	1	Arcom	1	0	Mar-06	0	0	0
Rieman	Tommy	1					5			0	1	SS	1	0	Dec-03	0	1	0
Roller	Joshua	1					6			1	1	Bsm	0	1	Dec-06	1	0	0
Rowell	Frederick	1					7			0	1	SS	1	0	Apr-03	0	0	0
Row	Michael	1					5			1	1	Bsm	1	0	Mar-06	0	1	0
Rubio	Juan			1			5			0	1	SS	1	0	Jan-05	0	1	0
Russell	Brian				1				4	0	1	Bsm	0	1	Sep-07	0	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
Salo	Matthew	1							2	1	1	DFC	1	0	Dec-06	0	0	0
Sanders	Micheaux	1					5			0	1	SS	1	0	Apr-04	0	1	0
Sar	Sarun	1					8			0	1	SS	1	0	Mar-05	1	0	0
Sapp	Bradley			1			6			0	1	Bsm	1	0	May-06	0	0	0
Schauble	Jason				1				3	0	1	SS	1	0	Jan-05	0	0	0
Servais	Adam		1				3			0	1	Bsm	1	1	Aug-06	1	1	1
Shropshire	Michael		1				5			0	1	SS	1	0	Mar-03	0	0	0
Skubin	Brian			1					3	0	1	Bsm	0	0	Oct-06	0	0	0
Smette	Keith	1					5			1	1	Bsm	0	0	Apr-03	0	1	1
Smith	Paul	1					7			0	1	Mh	1	0	Mar-03	0	1	1
Solheim	Kent	1							3	0	1	SS	1	0	Jul-07	0	0	0
Sparrow	Scott	1							1	0	1	Bsm	0	0	Sep-07	0	0	0
Stacy	Robert	1						4		1	1	DFC	1	0	Dec-06	0	0	0
Stephens	Chad	1					7			1	1	SS	1	0	Jun-04	0	1	0
Stout	Michael	1							6	0	1	DssM	0	1	Apr-03	1	0	0
Stroisch	Henry		1				8			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Sep-04	0	0	0
Sudlow	Jeremy		1				5			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Feb-08	0	0	0
Taggart	Jason			1			8			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Mar-05	0	0	0
Taylor	Ryan	1					5			1	1	Bsm	1	0	Feb-06	1	0	0
Theriault	James			1			8			0	1	SS	1	0	Feb-05	0	0	0
Tiedman	David	1							2	1	1	SS	1	1	Apr-06	0	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
Tonasket	Anthoney	1					4			0	1	PH	0	0	Mar-06	0	1	0
Trahan	Randell	1					5			1	1	Bsm	2	0	Feb-05	0	1	1
Trueblood	Charity		1				3			0	0	Bsm	1	0	Dec-05	0	0	0
Turner	Jo	1					6			1	0	Efmb	0	1	Jan-07	1	0	0
Vanlandingham	John	1							3	1	1	SS	1	1	Nov-04	0	0	0
Vega	Sarah					1	5			0	0	CGCM	0	0	Feb-06	0	0	0
Veresko	Paul		1				8			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Dec-04	0	0	0
Viggiani	Anthony				1		6			0	1	NC	1	0	Jun-04	1	0	0
Ward	Stephen	1					7			0	1	Bsm	1	1	Nov-07	1	1	0
Warrick	Clinton	1					4			0	1	SS	1	1	Sep-06	0	1	0
Whalen	Kevin		1				6			1	1	SS	1	0	Jul-03	1	1	0
whitiker	leticia		1				8			1	0	Bsm	0	0	Jul-03	1	0	0
white	william	1						4		1	1	DFC	1	0	Dec-06	0	0	0
wilzcek	jermey	1					6			0	1	SS	1	0	Mar-06	0	0	0
winegar	chadwick				1		5			0	1	NAM	1	0	Nov-05	0	0	0
winski	brian	1							5	0	1	Bsm	1	0	Sep-06	0	0	0
witkowski	james	1					5			1	1	SS	1	0	Oct-05	0	1	1
wollick	keith		1						3	0	1	DFC	1	0	Jul-05	1	0	0
workman	jereiamh				1		5			0	1	NC	1	0	Dec-04	1	0	0
worthan	ryan	1							4	0	1	SS	1	0	Sep-03	1	0	0
wothingham	nicholas		1				3			0	1	Bsm	0	0	Jun-06	0	0	0

Last Name	First Name	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marine	Coast Guard	Enlisted Rank	Warrant Rank	Officer Rank	Activated Res or NG 1=yes 0=no	Sex F=0 M=1	Awd	For valor=1 for service=0	Partner or advisor? 1=yes 0=no	date of event or pin on	AF=1 IZ=0	Wounded in the event? 1=yes 0=no	Posthumous 1=yes 0=no
zanders	Michael	1						4		0	1	Bsm	0	0	Apr-06	0	0	0
zapien	Johnathan	1					6			0	1	German Medal	1	0	Sep-06	1	0	0
zedwick	Matthew	1					6			1	1	SS	1	0	Jun-04	0	0	0
zembic	douglass				1				4	0	1	SS	1	1	May-07	0	1	1

APPENDIX X.

DoD Heroes Database Statistics

% of Awardees in Army	53.23%	Percent of Awardees who partnered or advised	20.43%	Enlisted Breakdown			Officer Breakdown		
% of Awardees in Air Force	16.13%			E-3	8	6.15%	O-1	1	2.04%
% of Awardees in Navy	10.22%	% of Awardees from Afghanistan	21.51%	E-4	23	17.69%	O-2	10	20.41%
% of Awardees in Marines	19.35%	% of Awardees from Iraq	78.49%	E-5	36	27.69%	O-3	16	32.65%
% of Awardees in Coast Guard	1.08%			E-6	32	24.62%	O-4	17	34.69%
		% wounded in the event	29.57%	E-7	13	10.00%	O-5	2	4.08%
% of Awardees who are Male	93.01%	% Given Posthumously	10.75%	E-8	15	11.54%	O-6	3	6.12%
% of Awardees who are Female	6.99%			E-9	3	2.31%			
		% given for Valor (entire dataset)	69.35%	Correlation between Partner/Advising and Service					
% Awardees Enlisted	69.89%	% given for service/merit/achievement	30.65%						
% Awardees Warrant Officers	3.76%								
% Awardees Officers	26.34%	%Army Awards for Valor	69.70%						
		% Army Awards for service/merit/ach	30.30%						
		%Air Force Awards for Valor	63.33%						
		% Air Force Awards for service/merit/ach	36.67%						
		% Navy Awards for Valor	57.89%						
		% Navy Awards for service/merit/ach	42.11%						
		% Marine Awards for Valor	83.33%						
		% Marine Awards for service/merit/ach	16.67%						
				Army	24.24%				
				Air Force	20.00%				
				Navy	21.05%				
				Marines	11.11%				

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX Y.

Selected Verbatim Comments from Convenience Sample

Infantry Officer, four years of service: I like the idea of a host nation award, but I believe the key is the set requirements for awarding. The host nation award should be specific to COIN and not general to all Soldiers participating in the conflict.

Field Artillery Officer, twenty years of service: I like the “Combat Advisor” tab idea put forward by John Nagle’s article about the Advisor corps for the Center for a New American Security. Not sure that is the best idea but something like that could be in order.

Infantry Officer, four years of service: COIN operations are inherently more difficult to evaluate for they are not as easily quantifiable. For instance, is the security breakdown in Mosul in 2004 a reflection of poor COIN or simply insurgents moving from another AO. Even when successful, an effective COIN can not be easily evaluated against the counterfactual scenario i.e. what would have happened in the absence of these actions? Ultimately, COIN awards will be awarded on a qualitative basis. This is problematic for the current awards given are supposed to meet more stringent criteria yet are often processed based on the willingness of a commander to take the time to submit an award or to embellish certain facts in order to make sure his guys “get theirs”. Despite these difficulties, the “best practices” idea is probably the best way to recognize bright commanders. For more junior Soldiers, an ARCOM or a new award developed for this purpose would most likely suffice. Personally, I think the award system is more broken than functioning. There is a need for a centralized clearinghouse for awards to serve as effective arbiters of awards.

Special Forces Officer, 13 years of service: Our current awards system recognizes merit (or service), achievement, and valor, all of which our soldiers display in COIN. I personally do not feel that creating a COIN specific award, or altering the awarding system, would change the thoughts, beliefs, or procedures of the senior military leaders who approve the awards. It will still boil down to merit (service), achievement, and valor. These same criteria apply in peace and combat. I do think there should be a combat equivalent of the ARCOM. Currently the lowest combat specific award (it can only be earned in combat) for service or achievement is the Bronze Star. Many leaders rightfully believe that a BSM warrants a high degree of responsibility and service, therefore many junior soldiers receive ARCOMs for 12 month tours in a combat zone. An ARCOM is a respectable award, but we have all seen individuals receive that same award for hosting a commanders ball. This lessens the award of an ARCOM for combat service. The BSM is the MSM’s wartime equivalent, there needs to be a wartime equivalent to the ARCOM.

Infantry Officer, 12 years of service: I see two main obstacles for recognizing achievement/service for COIN operations – history and expectations. US history has been written primarily thru conventional wars. When a new Soldier arrives to his unit, he reads the citations of bravery and valor posted on the hallways of previous Medal of Honor Recipients - most fought during Vietnam, WW II, WW I, the Indian Wars, and most of these individuals killed a lot of bad guys. Since COIN is the exception to our history, we don't have much to compare today's accomplishments with. So the expectation is that you must kill a lot to get recognized – doesn't fit with COIN. When Commander's understand that you don't need to kill in order to win a COIN fight, and more emphasis is placed on IO /FID/Nation Building, then recognition should shift from a body count to other COIN types of accomplishments.

We have more types of awards in our toolkit than we need. Adding more just focused on COIN would be a mistake – we start looking like Mexican generals of old. The solution in my opinion lies with the intermediate and approval authorities (all Commanders) – they have to understand that significant achievements in COIN can be just as effective as storming an enemy pillbox.

Infantry Officer, 12 years of service: I don't think you can use current awards to reward COIN achievements because in the approval process leadership will compare apples to oranges and downgrade COIN achievements in the face of conventional combat actions / achievements.

Special Forces Officer, 18 years of service: Ideally a COIN award could be established, but I don't think it is feasible, seeing that the Army cannot come up with an award for retirees that falls between the MSM and the LOM. I think something campaign-related and COIN specific like the suggested award device would be a good incentive for soldiers of all ranks to recognize their COIN contribution, I think the device would be feasible, and give recognition in addition to singular achievement and tour awards currently in the system. A feedback mechanism that can be used to quantitatively (somewhat) measure COIN performance, is applying the ARTEP concept to training indigenous forces. The measures of performance provided by existing MTPs provide a good indicator of how indigenous forces are progressing through their training, and can even be applied to evaluating ops. I saw this used by the BATT ODAs training IZ Bns in northern IZ, and it was effective as a feedback mechanism. It can be used similarly for quantifying awards for the trainer/advisors. It is tough to use foreign awards because of the inconsistency of standards when depending on indig staffs and leaders to determine who gets the awards. Unit awards work better here I think, but I like the idea. I know how coveted foreign jump wings are, and if there is a way to apply it fairly, it would be a good incentive.

Armor Officer, 13 years if service: The specific award (i.e. ARCOM etc) can still be used in a COIN environment, but it requires the writer (and more importantly, the approver) to understand what to write. While we have traditionally focused on quantifiable actions, there is no reason the write up cannot say “for fostering a long-term relationship with the leaders of the xxx village, which assisted in reinstituting basic

services and increasing security in the area” This same concept can be applied to the end of tour award, which will have a longer-focus. (Also – do we NEED continual ‘atta-boy’ awards while deployed? Just because we give valor awards for extraordinary actions in combat doesn’t mean we need them for doing COIN)

Civil-Affairs Officer, 15 years of service: Re-educate our leadership to understand that rank does not equate to level of award, the act or acts alone should...With the current mindset in which we are operating I feel any new award would simply fall victim to the same stupid practices we see under the current one. A COIN award could, however, fill the void for those operations currently taking place that do not quite fall under war or peace as in Africa, South America, etc., but most certainly fall under COIN.

Special Forces Officer, 12 years of service: I am generally against the creation of new awards. What we already have will work if the “award culture” is correct. In SF we routinely include COIN achievements in awards- any of the bellow examples would be part of an award citation.

Special Forces Officer, 19 years of service: Soldiers serving in COIN environments (PI) are not always eligible for combat awards even though they receive combat pay and benefits. I saw more combat in the PI than I saw in AF. If at any time a soldier is in a hostile fire zone, combat awards should not be a question.

Armor Officer, 16 years: The irony in this is that an area of operations where COIN operations have been successful there will be limited to no major direct action or kinetic operations thus limiting the number of high level individual awards. Conversely, areas where COIN has been unsuccessful, there will likely be an increase in the number and scope of combat operations thus increasing the individual valorous or achievement awards. The problem set as I understand it then, is how to reward Soldiers and units in successful COIN operations that appear peaceful because limited or no combat operations have taken place. The onus remains on the commander, and higher level commands to recognize individual and unit achievements, to see ‘through’ the relative level of calm and peace in a COIN environment and recognize subordinates for their accomplishment, regardless of the lack of fireworks displayed. The concept of COIN specific awards is revolutionary, and perhaps not enduring. In full spectrum operations you may have a high intensity combat operation going on in one end of the city, while on the other half, the town is being pacified through expert application of the COIN principles. A single commander controlling both sectors would have a difficult time implementing a new system with the old. A new system of COIN specific awards would be difficult to work through and may have the unintended consequence of establishing an informal hierarchal awards structure that minimizes the importance of COIN awards (my BSM V is better than your COIN award because I got shot at) thus nullifying it’s intended effect-recognizing excellence. In this, the standard array of awards lend themselves well to the COIN environment. Again, it’s on the commander to make the right decisions in the awards process. But of course, I believe the across the Army there needs to be a greater understanding of COIN and the difficulty in executing it properly.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX Z.

Counterinsurgency Achievements—Examples

-Individual demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of the local population, by defusing a potential violent clash

-Individual, leader or staff officer, advisor, creates and maintains a comprehensive database capturing pertinent information concerning the area of operations to include population demographics, key indigenous personnel in the AO, partner forces level of training and proficiency (to include bio's of key leaders), enemy key personnel, TTPs, networks and ties to the population, and capabilities to facilitate continuity of new and replacement personnel.

-Individuals clear understanding of using Information Operations led to a 10% shift in favorable impressions of coalition forces within group X

-Leader successfully attacks an enemy strategy: if he tries to capture/recapture the favor of a certain segment of the population the unit is able to co-opt the segment against the enemy

-Individual does an exceptional job building, maintaining inter-agency operations within your AO

-Individual has shown a superior ability to work with host nation leaders, increasing the level of access and understanding US forces have of the AO.

-Host nation unit individual is working with demonstrates marked improvement in its capabilities

-Individual creates and maintains small, sustainable programs that are tailored to local conditions

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Adams, Thomas K. *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action*. New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998.
- Armor Branch. U.S. Army. "Armor Branch Update October 2008." *U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Officer Personnel Management Directorate*. October 2008. [https://www.hrc.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/Armor_Webpage_2009/New_ArmorHomepage\(09\).htm](https://www.hrc.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/Armor_Webpage_2009/New_ArmorHomepage(09).htm) (accessed January 15, 2009).
- Associated Press. "Last D-Day 'Bedford Boy' Dies at 94." *www.armytimes.com*. April 21, 2009. http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/04/ap_bedford_boy_dies_042009/ (accessed April 21, 2009).
- Barbero, Michael D. "Infantry Senior Leader Newsletter." *The United States Army Infantry Center and School*. May 5, 2009. <https://www.benning.army.mil/OIP/content/Infantry%20Newsletter/newsletter.htm> (accessed May 5, 2009).
- Baritz, Loren. *Backfire*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- Borch, Fred L., and William R. Westlake. *The Silver Star: A History of America's Third Highest Award for Combat Valor*. Tempe: Borch and Westlake Publishing, 2001.
- Breaker Morant*. Directed by Bruce Beresford. Performed by Edward Woodward. 1980.
- Cable, Larry E. *Conflict of Myths The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*. New York: New York University Press, 1986.
- Camden, Jim. "Army Eyeing Fake Diplomas in Wash." *www.armytimes.com*. May 16, 2009. http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/05/ap_fakediplomas_051609/ (accessed May 16, 2009).
- Casey, George. "CSA Sends-Transition Team Commanders." *SmallWarsJournal.com*. June 18, 2008. <http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5593&highlight=Mitt> (accessed February 3, 2009).
- Center for a New American Security. "Dr. David Kilcullen." *www.cnas.org*. March 1, 2009. <http://www.cnas.org/node/539> (accessed March 1, 2009).
- Clark, Wesley K. *Waging Modern War*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2001.
- Collier, Peter. *Medal of Honor: Portraits of Valor beyond the Call of Duty*. New York: Artisan, 2003.

- David, Birch, and Joseph Veroff. *Motivation: A Study of Action*. Belmont: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1966.
- Deputy Chief of Staff. G-1. *Army Regulation 600-8-19*. Headquarters Department of the Army, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions.
- _____. "Army Regulation 600-8-22." *Military Awards*. Headquarters Department of the Army, January 11, 2007.
- Foster, Frank, and Borts Lawrence. *A Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals*. Fountain Inn: MOA Press, 2005.
- Freedberg, Sydney J. "The Other Three Thousand." *www.nationaljournal.com*. January 12, 2007. http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20070113_4.php (accessed October 1, 2008).
- Galula, David. *Counter-Insurgency Warfare*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005.
- Glover, Scott. "Man Pleads Guilty to Lying about Medal." *Los Angeles Times*, May 6, 2008: B10.
- Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II*. New York: Random House, 2007.
- Grant, Michael. *The Army of the Caesars*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974.
- Hackworth, David H. *About Face*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.
- _____. *Hazardous Duty*. New York: Perennial, 2001.
- Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 1 The Army*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005.
- _____. *FM 1 The Army*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001.
- Henning, Charles A. *Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress*. CRS, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006.
- Hewitt, J. Joseph, Johnathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr. "Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive Summary." *Center for International Development and Conflict Management*. 2008.
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/executive_summary/pc_es_20070613.pdf
(accessed March 12, 2009).

- Home of Heros. "U.S. Army Awards of the Silver Star 2001-Present."
www.homeofheros.com. March 10, 2009.
http://www.homeofheroes.com/valor/08_WOT/ss_GWOT/citations_USA.html
 (accessed March 10, 2009).
- Hughes, E. W. *Human Relations in Management*. Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1970.
- Hughes, P. R. *A Study of Recognition of the Lesser Achievements of Low Ranking Enlisted Men*. MMAS thesis, Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.
- iCasualties. "U.S. Deaths by Service Branch." *iCasualties.org*. October 1, 2008.
<http://icasualties.org/Iraq/USDeathsByService.aspx> (accessed April 25, 2009).
- Jansen, Erik. *Toward a Strategic Reward System Perspective*. PhD diss., University of Southern California, Unpublished, 1986.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *Revolutionary Change*. 2nd Edition. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.
- Kerr, Steven. "On the Folly of Rewarding A, while Hoping for B." *Academy of Management Executive* 9, no. 1 (1995): 7-14.
- Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Lawrence, T. E. *Revolt in the Desert*. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926.
- _____. "The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence from the Arab Bulletin #60."
[mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil](http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil). August 20, 1917.
<http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/docs/The27ArticlesofT.E.Lawrence.pdf>
 (accessed March 20, 2009).
- Malcom, Ben S. *White Tigers*. Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 1996.
- Military Awards Branch. "Wartime Award Statistics Operation Iraqi Freedom." Military Awards Branch Updated on September 10, 2008.
- Myers, Steven Lee. "Admiral, a Suicide, Wins Some Vindication on Combat Awards."
New York Times, June 25, 1998, Late edition (East Coast) ed.: A15.
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). "DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon." *DefenseLink News Transcript*. April 6, 2009.
www.defenselink.mil/transcriptss/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396 (accessed April 7, 2009).

- Powell, Colin. *My American Journey*. New York: Random House, 1995.
- Powell, Raymond M. "Medals for Mediocrity: How to Restore Meaning to Air Force Decorations." *www.airpower.au.af.mi*. March 1, 2009.
<http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj09/spr09/powell.html> (accessed March 4, 2009).
- Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
- _____. *The Gamble*. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.
- Robinson, Linda. *Masters of Chaos The Secret History of the Special Forces*. Public Affairs, 2004.
- Sansone, Carol, and Judith M. Harackiewicz. *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation*. San Diego: Academic Press, 2000.
- Schmitt, Carl. *The Theory of the Partisan*. Catedra Palafox, Berlin: Duncker and Humbolt, 1963.
- Schwarzkopf, H. Norman. *It Doesn't Take a Hero*. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.
- Strandberg, John E., and Roger J. Bender. *The Call of Duty: Military Awards and Decorations of the United States of America*. San Jose: James Bender Publishing, 1994.
- Tucker, David, and Christopher J. Lamb. *United States Special Operations Forces*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch. "Statistics by Region, Conflict or Incident." *www.hrc.army.mil*. April 22, 2009.
https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Jan_07_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Operation%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed April 22, 2009).
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *FM 3-0 Operations*. Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008.
- _____. *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*. Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006.
- _____. *FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency*. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2009.
- U.S. Army War College. *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2007-2008*. 26th. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007.

- “U.S. Ground Forces End Strength.” *GlobalSecurity.org*.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_es.htm (accessed September 13, 2008).
- Vergilius, Publius M. *The Aeneid*. trans. J.W. Mackail. New York: Random House, 1950.
- Watkins, Jason. “Why We Serve, 5 Spencer Brothers Serve across 3 Military Branches.” *Army Times*, May 4, 2009, 8.
- White House Press Office. “Remarks by the Preisdent on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.” *The Briefing Room*. March 29, 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed March 30, 2009).
- . “Remarks of President Barrack Obama--Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Friday, Febuary 27, 2009.” *whitehouse.gov*. February 27, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/ (accessed March 3, 2009).
- White, John. “The Award No One Wants.” *The New American* (October 29, 2007): 34-38.
- Yingling, Paul. “A Failure in Generalship.” *Armed Forces Journal*. May 2007.
<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198> (accessed January 20, 2009).
- . “Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership.” *smallwarsjournal.com*. April 2, 2009. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/208-yingling.pdf> (accessed April 5, 2009).
- Zielbauer, Paul Von. “4 G.I.'s Tell of How Iraqi Raid Went Wrong.” *nytimes.com*. August 7, 2006.
<http://www.nytimes/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07mission.html> (accessed March 25, 2009).

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Professor Anna Simons
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Professor Erik Jansen
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
5. JSOU
Hurlburt Fld, Florida
6. ASD/SOLIC
Washington, DC
7. SOCOM J-7
MacDill AFB, Florida
8. HQ USSOCOM Library
MacDill AFB, Florida
9. Major Brent Clemmer
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California