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THESIS

**SMALL NATION, BIG DIFFERENCE:
HOW THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES SHOULD
CONDUCT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

by

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June 2009

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COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis postulates the need for the Norwegian Armed Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations into the future and attempts to answer the question of how such operations should be conducted.

First, the fundamental dynamics of an insurgency and a counterinsurgency are described using a generic model. The following chapter then discusses the role and importance of information operations in such conflicts. Next, the process of nation-building is discussed with the aim of extracting implications for military forces. After having established a theoretical foundation through discussing insurgencies, information operations, and nation-building, the thesis turns to a discussion of the relevant capabilities under the control of the Norwegian government in order to elicit important possibilities and limitations. Finally, the thesis suggests both missions and important priorities for the Norwegian Armed Forces in a counterinsurgency operation based upon theoretical foundation and the means available. The thesis concludes that while the Norwegian Armed Forces should be considered to be suitable for counterinsurgency operations, there is a significant need for education and understanding of such conflicts.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
B.	PURPOSE AND SCOPE.....	4
C.	METHODOLOGY	8
II.	INSURGENCIES	11
A.	WHAT IS AN INSURGENCY?	11
1.	Causes of Insurgencies.....	13
2.	Types and Characteristics of Insurgencies.....	14
3.	An Insurgency is not a Low-Intensity Variant of a Conventional High-Intensity Conflict	17
B.	THE DIAMOND MODEL	19
1.	Underlying Principles	19
2.	The Actors in the Diamond Model	20
3.	Strategies and Options.....	21
a.	<i>The Population's Choices</i>	21
b.	<i>State Strategies</i>	23
c.	<i>Counter-state Strategies</i>	24
d.	<i>The Importance of International Actors</i>	24
e.	<i>Sequence of Strategies</i>	25
C.	CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCIES	26
1.	Characteristics of Contemporary Insurgencies	26
2.	Implications for Contemporary Counterinsurgency	28
3.	How Does Contemporary Counterinsurgency Relate to the Diamond Model?	30
D.	CONCLUSION	32
III.	INFORMATION OPERATIONS: MAKING SURE THAT THE GOOD GUYS FINISH FIRST	33
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	33
B.	THE ROLE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN INSURGENCY CONFLICTS	33
1.	The General Target Audiences for Information Operations in Insurgency Conflicts	36
2.	Information Operations: from the Perspective of the Insurgent...37	
3.	Information Operations: from the Perspective of the Counterinsurgent	40
a.	<i>Why Use Information Operations?</i>	42
C.	IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES	43
D.	INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES: MAJOR CHALLENGES	44

E.	INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT: GUIDELINES	45
1.	Information Operations: Integration, a Prerequisite for Success.....	46
2.	Information Operations: A Clear-Cut Aim and Purpose	46
3.	Information Operations: A Well-defined Target Audience.....	47
4.	Information Operations: A Credible Message.....	51
5.	Information Operations: Reliable Means of Communication	53
F.	SUMMARY	54
IV.	IMPLICATIONS OF NATION-BUILDING FOR COIN	57
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	57
B.	BALANCE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL FORCES AND HOST NATION FORCES	60
1.	Exploiting the Golden Hour.....	60
2.	The Importance of Using Local Security Forces.....	62
3.	Implications for Counterinsurgency	64
C.	BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES	66
1.	Numbers in Stability Operations.....	66
2.	The Paradox of Force	69
3.	Implications for Counterinsurgency	71
D.	BALANCE BETWEEN DIRECTED RECONSTRUCTION AND VOLUNTARY EFFORTS	73
1.	NGOs Must be Distinguished from the Counterinsurgent	73
2.	All Reconstruction Efforts Need to be Coordinated.....	74
3.	Implications for Counterinsurgency	76
E.	OTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY.....	78
F.	CONCLUSION	79
V.	NORWEGIAN CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS.....	81
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	81
B.	NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES	82
1.	Norwegian Military Operations Abroad 1951–2009	82
2.	Ground Force Elements of NAF	84
3.	The Norwegian Army 2009	85
4.	Potential Assets for COIN Operations in the Norwegian Navy, Air Force, and Home Guard.....	87
5.	Strategic and Operational Land Force Command and Control Elements within NAF.....	89
6.	Future Deployments of NAF Units to Land Operations Abroad ..	89
7.	NAF and Information Operations.....	91
C.	NON-MILITARY	92
1.	Coordination Mechanisms at the Various Levels	93
a.	Strategic Level.....	93
b.	Operational Level.....	94
c.	Tactical Level	96

2.	Use of Non-governmental Organizations.....	97
D.	CONCLUSION	99
VI.	THE NORWEGIAN MODEL	103
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	103
B.	NORWEGIAN ENDS.....	104
C.	OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL.....	107
D.	IMPLICATIONS FOR NAF.....	109
1.	Security	109
a.	<i>Static Security Forces</i>	111
b.	<i>Mobile Security Forces</i>	112
c.	<i>Use of Special Operation Forces (SOF)</i>	113
2.	Train and Assist Host Nation Security Forces	114
3.	Improve Governance	117
4.	Information Operations.....	120
5.	Unity of Purpose.....	124
6.	Summary and Recommendations.....	129
E.	CONCLUSION	132
	LIST OF REFERENCES	135
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	143

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Insurgencies in the Period 1956–2006 (After: Gompert et al.).....	12
Figure 2.	The Diamond Model (From: Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in guerrilla warfare,” lectures at the Naval Postgraduate School 2007).....	21
Figure 3.	The Population Constituencies in an Insurgency Conflict (After: Emery).....	48
Figure 4.	An Insurgent Organization’s Utility Function (From: CTC).....	51
Figure 5.	Desirable Development of Security Forces Over Time.....	80
Figure 6.	Capitals without Norwegian Embassy Presence (Blue Triangles) Over the Failed State Index Score (Color of Countries).....	95
Figure 7.	The Norwegian Model	107

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

The progress of globalization has created a new global security environment, which entails that geographical distance is no longer a determining factor for potential threats to the security of Norwegian interests, population, and territory.¹ This process, combined with the end of the Cold War with its predominantly bipolar global threat scenario, has brought along a transformation in the role and use of the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF). As a result of this new role, NAF have been undergoing a considerable organizational and structural transformation over the last decade. This transformation has been aimed at changing the Norwegian defense from a threat-based organizational structure developed during the Cold War to a capability-based structure that can meet diffusible challenges in the contemporary global security environment in an efficient manner.² Today, NAF are considered a vital instrument for the Norwegian authorities, not only in their effort to support and participate in countering threats against the security of the wider international community, but also to strengthen the credibility, influence, and political integrity of Norway as an international actor.³ This is depicted and formalized within the Norwegian principal national security policy objectives which state that within their area of responsibility and in concert with other national authorities, NAF must participate in “multinational peace operations and international defense cooperation to contribute to peace, stability, the enforcement of international law, and respect for human rights.”⁴

¹ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], *Norwegian Defence 2008*, 5–7, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Fakta2008_eng.pdf, (accessed April 25, 2009).

² Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St. prp. Nr. 48 (2007–2008) *Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* [The Ministry of Defense: The defence, guarding Norwegian security, interests, and values, Parliamentary Bill no. 48 (2007-2008)], 10–12, www.regjeringen.no/pages/2061722/PDFS/STP200720080048000DDDPDFS.pdf, (accessed July 25, 2008).

³ Ibid., 12.

⁴ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], *Norwegian Defence 2008*, 5–7, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Fakta2008_eng.pdf, (accessed April 25, 2009).

Nonetheless, the use of NAF outside the borders and immediate sphere of the political and geographic interest of Norway is by no means a new phenomenon. Norway has a history of contributing to international military operations, dating back to its participation in the missions by the United Nations (UN) in Korea in 1952. These operations have taken place in environments covering the whole spectrum of threats, from permissive to hostile, and against both conventional and irregular opponents. All operations have been conducted with NAF as part of a larger coalition of international forces.

Since the end of the Cold War, NAF have repeatedly faced irregular adversaries in insurgency conflicts, and along with the military forces of most other nations, experienced little success when applying the military strategies and tactics primarily developed to handle a conventional enemy in a Cold War setting. An important recognition in this context is the fact that the nature of international military interventions has transformed since the end of the Cold War. This transformation is a result of the demise of the Soviet Union, which has enabled the international community (IC) to “secure international mandates, assemble broad coalitions, and employ armed force to do more than simply freeze conflicts and police ceasefires.”⁵ The broadened scope of international military interventions has come to include “disarming combatants; demobilizing armies; building new military, police and judicial establishments; holding elections; and helping to rebuild economies”—effectively *nation-building* or parts thereof.⁶

This is currently the situation in Afghanistan, where NAF, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), appear to be facing monumental challenges, encompassing a growing insurgency movement (Taliban) and an increasingly

⁵ James F. Dobbins, “Nation-building and counterinsurgency after Iraq,” 4, www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/dobbinscopy.pdf, (accessed August 15, 2008).

⁶ Ibid., 5.

destabilized society almost seven years after the Taliban's ouster. The growing insurgency in Afghanistan obviously reflects a failure to stabilize the country and tackle the root causes of violence.⁷

The problem of effectively re-establishing peace in a country has been extensively studied, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Norway has played an active role in addressing the problem of peace building in international forums, like the Utstein study of 336 peace building projects.⁸ The Utstein study suggested that a strategic deficit and lack of overall coordination between both military and civilian efforts were the key reasons why a majority of international peace-building projects have failed in the past.⁹ Furthermore, a study conducted by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) concludes that there "is now broad consensus that today's security challenges can be most effectively addressed through an integrated approach" which entails a strict coordination and integration of both civilian and military means.¹⁰ The Norwegian Chief of Defense (CHOD) recognizes this and argues that civilian and military efforts are complementary parts of a required overall strategy, which is needed to assure success in

⁷ Crisis Group, "Security In Afghanistan," <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3071&l=1&gclid=CKbe-4uD3JQCFSgtagod9RcTQw>, (accessed July 25, 2008).

⁸ The Utstein study was the study of the peace building experience of four countries—Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK—that together constitute the so-called Utstein Group, a framework for cooperation between the four on peace building and development issues. The aim of the study was to produce policy-relevant conclusions in the form of guidelines for peace building derived from the experiences of the four governments.

⁹ Utenriksdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peace building: Getting their act together*, 15–43, www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2000/0265/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf, (accessed July 25, 2008).

¹⁰ Nils Nagelhus Schia and Ståle Ulriksen, "Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges," Norsk Utenriks Politisk Institutt (NUPI) [The Norwegian Institute for International Affairs], 8, www.nupi.no/publikasjoner/boeker_rapporter/2007/multidimensional_and_integrated_peace_operations_trends_and_challenges, (accessed May 21, 2009).

The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) is devoted to research and information on international relations, politics and economics, with a focus on areas of central relevance to Norwegian foreign policy.

international military interventions in general and in Afghanistan specifically. This suggests a new approach that entails strict coordination and the integration of both military and civilian means in international military interventions.¹¹

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

“Most of the wars since 1945, indeed almost all wars, fall within the general category of insurgency and counter-insurgency, whether they have been dubbed small wars at one end of the scale or peace-keeping operations at the other,”¹² and the Norwegian military tradition and experience gathered since 1952 form a sound basis for operating in these kinds of conflicts. At the same time, there is a growing acceptance and understanding within the NAF for the fact that fundamental changes in both strategy and operations on the ground have to occur in order to be successful in cases like Afghanistan. This is illustrated through statements made by the Norwegian Chief of Defense, as well as statements from the leadership in the Norwegian Department of Defense and the Department of Foreign Affairs. However, comprehensive studies and directives directly related to the role of the NAF and an overall strategy for such conflicts has yet to be produced and implemented.

Currently, NAF serve the dual purpose of defending Norwegian sovereignty as well as participating in international military operations when directed by the Norwegian government. The task of defending Norwegian sovereignty is thoroughly and systematically described in a vast amount of military doctrinal publications, directives, plans, and manuals that can be traced back to the times of the Cold War and general military theory of conventional warfare. Tasks related to the participation of NAF in insurgency-type conflicts, however, have yet to be properly and officially addressed by,

¹¹ S. Diesen, *Det vil ta tid* [It will take time], (Dagbladet) <http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2008/03/04/528785.html>, (accessed July 25, 2008). General Diesen is the Norwegian Chief of Defense.

¹² Hew Strachan, *British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq* (The RUSI Journal) 152:6.

and within, the NAF. As of today, official military directives that address the issue have been limited to a rather miniscule two-page description of a general strategy for fighting irregular forces in the Norwegian Defense Joint Operations Doctrine.¹³

As a result, the Norwegian approach to international military operations has been characterized by vague guidelines, limited time-horizons, and thus a very limited military agenda. However, the resources spent, the duration of the contributions, and the quality of the forces suggest that far more could be achieved with a proper long-term and systematic approach to the tasks at hand. Such an approach has the definite potential of facilitating a more cost-effective use of the Norwegian military and civilian resources, and thus enhances the impression of Norway as an important international actor. As such, Norway can make a big sociopolitical difference, even though it is a small country on a global scale. Military forces have a prominent role in international peace building projects and this study is aimed at being a theoretically informed policy advisory for the NAF. Thus, the general question the authors seek to answer is: how should the Norwegian Armed Forces conduct counterinsurgency operations?

The use of NAF in international military operations entails a set of important ramifications for how NAF should, and can, conduct counterinsurgency operations. In order to assess these ramifications, a number of important factors have to be considered.

First, Norway will for the most part be a small actor within a larger coalition or alliance. Norwegian security policy emphasizes multinational approaches and international solidarity.¹⁴ While the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are the cornerstones of national security policy,¹⁵ the near history shows that a coalition of the willing can also provide a framework for military missions outside Norway's borders. This means that for a counterinsurgency effort, the armed forces primarily need to be prepared to work inside coalition or alliance frameworks.

¹³ Forsvarsstaben [Norwegian Defense Staff], *Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine* [Defense Joint Operations Doctrine] (Oslo; Forsvarsstaben, 2007), 27–29.

¹⁴ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007-2008), 23.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Second, it seems fair to assume that in future conflicts, the theater of operations will require more forces than the interveners are willing to commit. Experience shows that a ratio of 10 to 20 military personnel for every 1,000 inhabitants can be necessary to stabilize a country.¹⁶ In a case like Afghanistan, this translates into as many as 640,000 troops in order for stability operations to succeed, which is a number that is much higher than any member of the ISAF sees as realistic. In other words, the number of military forces and other government agencies will in most cases be lower than what is needed to provide the security and reconstruction that is desired. Therefore, a factor in this study is that operational principles need to be based on a scarcity of military forces.

Third, Norway has held a leading role in the development of concepts for multidimensional and integrated peace operations within the UN.¹⁷ Currently, the UN's *integrated missions concept* is arguably the "most advanced and best tested approach to the management of multidimensional and integrated peace support operations."¹⁸ Both the European Union (EU) and NATO are developing similar concepts.¹⁹ Such an approach is also a key principle in the Norwegian foreign policy strategy for combating international terrorism.²⁰ This means that NAF to a larger extent have to coordinate their efforts with other parts of the government. When working in a multinational coalition, however, there is just as likely a need for coordinating with other governments' efforts on the civilian side. Thus, this factor necessitates a thorough understanding of counterinsurgency forces in general, and more specifically how NAF fit into such a framework of nation-building.

¹⁶ James T. Quinlivan, "Force requirements in stability operations," (Parameters) 25:4, 63.

¹⁷ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007-2008), 36.

¹⁸ Nils Nagelhus Shia and Ståle Ulrichsen, "Multidimensional and integrated peace operations," Norsk Utenriks Politisk Institutt [The Norwegian Institute for International Affairs], *Security in Practice* 6 (2007): 9.

¹⁹ Ibid., 11–12.

²⁰ Utenriksdepartementet [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], *Foreign policy strategy for combating international terrorism* (Ministry of Foreign affairs), 18, www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0124/ddd/pdfv/291587-terrorstrategi_eng.pdf, (accessed August 21, 2008).

Fourth, the presence and utility of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in almost all armed conflicts present armed forces with both leverage and challenges; leverage in the respect that NGOs support the local population and the process of nation-building, and challenge in the respect that they by their nature need to distinguish and separate themselves from the armed forces. In the case of Norway, the government funds a large number of NGO projects. The Norwegian NGOs “maintain that there is little pressure [from the government] to pursue goals other than their own” – and that the government influence is achieved through “mutual influence and adaption.”²¹ In an integrated approach, however, the potential for achieving coordination with NGOs should be thought through. This requires the governmental actors to approach the NGOs in a way that does not threaten their integrity and thereby safety.

To effectively encompass these factors, and also answer the overall topic of *how the NAF should conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations*, the authors have derived a set of questions that will be addressed in this study.

1. What is an insurgency and what are the principles for counterinsurgency?
2. How does the psychological domain influence the outcome of insurgency conflicts, and what are the implications for counterinsurgents with regards to the use of information operations?
3. What is the process of nation-building, and what are the roles of the different actors in such an effort in general, and the roles of the military actor specifically?
4. What are the capabilities and limitations of the NAF with regards to COIN operations, and how will Norwegian non-military means influence the way the NAF should conduct COIN?

²¹ Utenriksdepartementet [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. *New roles for non-governmental organisations in development cooperation*, 25, www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rapporter/2006/New-roles-for-non-governmental-organisations-in-development-cooperation/4.html?id=420467, (accessed April 14, 2009).

C. METHODOLOGY

The study is based on qualitative research of both empirical and conceptual literature on COIN and interrelated topics. In Chapter II the authors seek to describe what an insurgency is and what the principles for counterinsurgency are. This is done by illustrating the socio-political mechanisms and dynamics of an insurgency and how to efficiently counter an insurgency, thus establishing a generic framework of understanding for COIN. The framework will be based on Professor Gordon McCormick's "Diamond Model," which is a powerful heuristic tool to understand the characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency.²² To reveal the implications and practical ramifications of this model, the authors will utilize conceptual literature on COIN to add details and form the basis for understanding the tasks at hand. This will provide the reader with generic concepts of how to efficiently counter and limit the growth and effect of an insurgency in a short-term view.

Insurgency conflicts "are fought politically and psychologically, with the assistance of military capabilities."²³ Chapter III outlines how a counterinsurgent force should address the psychological aspects of insurgency conflicts by systematically influencing the perceptions and preferences of the actors of the conflict that were outlined in Chapter II. The ability to influence both adversarial and non-adversarial actors in a systematic and planned manner, or what is termed information operations (IO), is imperative to the success of a counterinsurgent.²⁴ It follows that the purpose of this chapter is to provide general guidelines for how COIN forces should implement

²² Professor Gordon McCormick is the Chairman of the Department of Defense Analysis at the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His model, "The Diamond," is a powerful heuristic tool which explains the socio-political mechanisms and principles of an insurgency and how to counter an insurgency. His model has yet to be published, but has provided the foundation for several articles and numerous student theses.

²³ Gen Richard G. Stillwell, "political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency", *Psychological Operations – Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley Jr., (Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1996), 319.

²⁴ Lt Col Norman E. Emery, Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities, and Effects, *Military Review*, November-December 2008, 27.

information operations (IO) in their overall efforts, and this will be done by discussing the crucial role IO plays in insurgency conflicts as well as the components and challenges of IO in COIN.

Chapter IV addresses the process of nation-building and the general roles of the different actors in establishing a legitimate government and thus effectively ensuring the long-term consensus of the population. To achieve success in this endeavor, a long-term overall strategy, encompassing kinetic and non-kinetic, military and civilian means, is of paramount importance. The authors will address challenges with regards to nation-building that NAF units are likely to face in a counterinsurgency environment.

Chapter V reviews the contemporary military and political limitations and possibilities of NAF in light of the counterinsurgency framework and theory described in Chapters II, III, and IV. The chapter will discuss the possibilities and limitations of Norwegian resources that can be utilized for counterinsurgency efforts based on empirical and conceptual literature related to the topic of the authors' discussion. Besides the capacity and capability of the armed forces, some important restrictions and possibilities in government procedures will be taken into account.

In Chapter VI, official goals for the use of NAF in counterinsurgency missions will be addressed. These goals will form an anchor point, together with the capabilities and limitations of NAF discussed in Chapter V, for the discussion of how NAF should conduct COIN. In addition, a generic Norwegian COIN model will be presented. This model is based on the framework and principles for COIN as described in Chapters II, III, and IV, as well as the contemporary military and political limitations and possibilities of Norwegian resources described in Chapter V. This model is then used to frame the discussion for how NAF should conduct COIN. Chapter VI is concluded with a set of recommendations that also are the overall policy recommendations of this study for NAF.

John Mackinlay argues that previous insurgencies were primarily monolithic or national in form and thus can be perceived as far less complex and sophisticated than the transnational jihadist insurgency of today.²⁵ Furthermore, almost all contemporary academic literature on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies advocates a transnational approach to what is in fact a transnational security problem. However, since the scope of this study is limited to how NAF should conduct counterinsurgency operations, the authors' discussion and recommendations are thus limited to generic monolithic insurgencies which have very specific local goals (like overthrowing a local government) and who derive most of their power from the local population.²⁶

Furthermore, this study is focused on how NAF should conduct COIN as part of a multinational coalition in a foreign country. It follows that the detailed structure and organization of NAF, as well as official Norwegian goals with regards to the use of NAF abroad, will not be the subject of any discussion in this study. These factors will be addressed with the sole purpose of framing the discussion of how NAF should conduct COIN based on general principles, and thus underpin the practicality and feasibility of the policy recommendations of this study.

Whereas the primary goal of the study is to arrive at a theoretically informed policy recommendation, there is a secondary aim to provide a comprehensive overview of COIN theory. This means that Chapters II through IV will cover the theory in greater detail than what is required for the conclusion itself. It is the authors' hope that this study can act as a stepping-stone towards a new Norwegian doctrine for low intensity conflicts and counterinsurgency operations or, at least, a more systematic approach to COIN. Lastly, conclusions and recommendations in this study are based on the personal perceptions, views, and analyses of the authors and do not represent any official policy or doctrine.

²⁵ John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, *Rethinking COIN*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.5.pdf, (accessed August 8, 2008).

²⁶ Ibid.

II. INSURGENCIES

On February 6, 1981, Yoweri Museveni led his Popular Resistance Army (PRA) of 35 men with 27 guns in an attack against the barracks of the Ugandan Army in Kabamba.²⁷ This attack was the first of many in the “people’s war” that Museveni and his friends decided to take on to overthrow the regime of Milton Obote. The PRA evolved into the National Resistance Army of Uganda (NRA) and this insurgency movement toppled the regime of President Obote and captured Kampala, the capital of Uganda, in January 1986.²⁸ Museveni was sworn in as the new president of Uganda on the January 29, 1986, barely five years after the initial and futile attacks of his minuscule PRA. In a more well-known case, Mao Tse-tung was one of 13 men who founded the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai. This marked the start of 28 years of struggle, which succeeded when Mao took power over China in 1949.

This chapter aims to provide a theoretical understanding of insurgencies. First, it provides an oversight of the causes and typology of insurgencies. Second, a model is introduced to explain the strategies of the struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Third, as this model is based on classical COIN theory, characteristics of contemporary insurgencies are discussed and then related to the model.

A. WHAT IS AN INSURGENCY?

The cases mentioned above are typical of successful insurgencies in several ways. First, all insurgencies “start from nothing and grow”²⁹ and second, insurgencies are not conventional conflicts between state actors but rather between a state actor and a resistance movement primarily originating from within the population basis of the state actor.

²⁷ Pascal Ngoga, *African Guerillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 95.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 91.

²⁹ Mao Tse-tung, *On guerrilla warfare*, 96, <http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Pages/Publications71.aspx>, (accessed September 14, 2007).

“Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself”³⁰ and only between 12 and 18 percent of all wars since 1945 have been conventional wars. In other words, most wars have thus been something else.³¹ Figure 1 shows the frequency and spread of such wars over the period 1956-2006.




Figure 1. Insurgencies in the Period 1956–2006 (After: Gompert et al.³²)

Professor Hew Strachan argues that of the wars in this period of time, “indeed almost all wars, fall within the general category of insurgency and counter-insurgency, whether they have been dubbed small wars at one end of the scale or peace-keeping

³⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), I–2.

³¹ Hew Strachan, “British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq”, *The RUSI Journal* 152 (2007): 11 Professor Hew Strachan is Chichele Professor of the History of War, University of Oxford, and Director of the Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War. He has previous experience as a professor at Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

³² David C. Gompert et al., *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, (Santa Monica, the RAND Corporation, 2008), 373–377, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf, (accessed February 11, 2008).

operations at the other.”³³ The British Army defines insurgency as “actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda, and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change.”³⁴ The U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual on the other hand defines an insurgency as an “organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” over the population.³⁵ Thus, the American definition of insurgencies not only identifies the politico-military aspect in insurgency conflicts, but also emphasizes the vital aspect of protraction. The political aspect and the likelihood of a protracted conflict accentuate that in addition to being a conflict between a state actor and a non-state actor, insurgencies cannot be won in swift and decisive campaigns by military means alone. General Sir Frank Kitson, one of the most influential British counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners, argues that there “can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”³⁶ As a result, today’s conventional military organizations, focused solely on military affairs, face great challenges in the predominant form of contemporary war, namely insurgencies.³⁷

1. Causes of Insurgencies

So why do insurgencies occur? As stated, insurgencies are as old as warfare itself³⁸ and Aristotle argued that

The universal and chief cause of ... revolutionary feeling [is] ... the desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more

³³ Strachan, “British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” 11.

³⁴ Cited in “British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” 10.

³⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, I-2.

³⁶ Cited in “British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” 11.

³⁷ Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation Of War*, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 20.

³⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, I-2.

than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors.³⁹

This implies that if a segment of a population feels that the rest of the population, and frequently the ruling elite, are not granting them the same fair treatment and opportunities as their perceived peers, there is likely to be a desire for societal change or what Aristotle refers to as “revolutionary feelings.” More importantly, when a segment of a population perceives themselves to be superior, while at the same time being treated as equals to the rest of the population, there is also, according to Aristotle, fertile ground for “revolutionary feelings.” Thus, revolutionary feelings occur when there is a disparity between how elements of a population perceive themselves and expect to be treated and how they in fact are perceived and treated by the rest of the population and most often ruling elites. This disparity is the “sine qua non” for insurgency movements, which is dependent on magnifying and capitalizing on social friction and discontent within a population to gain support for their cause.⁴⁰ Chalmers Johnson describes this disparity as a “social disequilibrium” and argues that this disequilibrium can, but not necessarily will, trigger a violent change of society in the form of an insurgency.⁴¹ Thus, the use of violent means and insurgencies to achieve societal change is only likely to be employed when nonviolent means and attempts have failed.⁴²

2. Types and Characteristics of Insurgencies

Bard O’Neill distinguishes between the following six different types of insurgency movements: “secessionist, revolutionary, restorational, reactionary, conservative and reformist.”⁴³

³⁹ Cited in “Revolutionary Change” by Chalmers Johnson, 2 ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 4.

⁴⁰ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf. Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1970), 152.

⁴¹ Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 61–82.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴³ Donald J. Alberts et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, ed. Bard E. O’Neill (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 2.

Secessionist insurgents “reject the existing political community of which they are formally a part” and seek to disengage from this community and establish a new autonomous political community based on political or religious belief or ethnical origin.⁴⁴ A historical example is the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), or the Kurdish Workers Party, which has been fighting both the Turkish government and the previous regime in Iraq with the aim of establishing a sovereign Kurdish state.

Revolutionary insurgents “seek to impose a new regime based on egalitarian values and centrally controlled structures” by mobilizing the masses within a population to “radically transform the social structure within an existing political community.”⁴⁵ Maoist insurgencies are prime examples of revolutionary insurgency movements and recent examples of such movements are the Sendero Luminoso (or Shining Path) movement in Peru and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN).

Restorational insurgents, like revolutionary insurgents, also seek to displace an existing regime, but the values and societal structures they champion are primarily identified with a recent political order.⁴⁶ Resistance movements in Europe during World War II are historical examples of restorational insurgencies. To some degree, the Taliban movement in Afghanistan is a contemporary example of a restorational insurgency movement.

However, the Taliban movement, along with their Al Qaeda counterparts, is also an example of reactionary insurgency movements, which seek to reconstitute a past political and societal order based on perceptions of an “idealized, golden age of the distant past in which religious values and authoritarian structures were predominant.”⁴⁷

Conservative insurgency movements are odd phenomena. They “seek to maintain the existing regime in the face of pressures on the authorities to change it.”⁴⁸ One rare

⁴⁴ Donald J. Alberts et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, ed. Bard E. O’Neill (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 2.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Alberts et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 3.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

example of a conservative insurgency movement was the unionist or loyalist movement in Northern Ireland and their violent offshoot, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA).

Finally, reformist insurgents seek “to obtain more political, social, and economic benefits without necessarily [totally] rejecting the political community, regime, or authorities” and their primary concern is politics that are perceived to be discriminatory.⁴⁹ Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare (UCK), or the Albanian National Liberation Army in Macedonia, was able to enforce political changes in the Republic of Macedonia within a few months in 2001, and is thus a recent example of a reformist insurgency movement.

Hence, different goals anchored in different types of perceived social disequilibrium provide the grounds for different types of insurgency movements. In addition, insurgency movements are also likely to employ different means to achieve their goals, depending on the following: the degree of initial popular support for their cause, the environment the insurgency takes place in, the level of external support for the insurgency, and the efficiency of the counterinsurgent.⁵⁰ However, a common denominator for all insurgency movements is that they are inferior, at least initially, in manpower and firepower to the counterinsurgent. Not only is a starting insurgency at a severe force disadvantage, it is also illegal, almost by definition.

Bowyer Bell suggests that the illegal nature of an insurgency movement forces its members to work within what he describes in somewhat fanciful terms as a “Dragonworld.”⁵¹ Due to governmental countermeasures, and the ensuing need for secrecy, potential insurgents must abandon a normal lifestyle and voluntarily withdraw from overt social networks and enter this Dragonworld, which is an illicit, covert, and dangerous environment.⁵² The need for secrecy also restrains insurgency movements from establishing robust and flexible organizational infrastructures. Combined with their

⁴⁹ Alberts et al., *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 3.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 5.

⁵¹ John Bowyer Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communication and the Rebel Ecosystem,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 3, no 1 (Spring 1989), 17.

⁵² Ibid.

inherent force disadvantage, such movements are thus likely to “emphasize staying power rather than firepower,” and “endurance and attrition rather than traditional victory.”⁵³ The so-called Dragonworld environment is “the badlands of revolution” and, because of its unfriendly characteristics, it is perceived as a temporary necessity in the insurgents’ quest to topple the government or state actor.⁵⁴

The obvious advantage of operating covertly is that it provides the insurgents with an *information advantage*; an insurgent can easily identify and observe government forces while not identifying himself as an insurgent. The counterinsurgent or state actor, on the other hand, is by definition forced to operate *overtly* to fulfill the expectations and demands for governmental structure and order within society. Thus, the insurgents have the advantage of easily identifying prime targets for their activities, and at the same time waiting safely for a favorable situation and then choosing their hour in a way that neutralizes inferiority in manpower and firepower.⁵⁵ However, in order to be successful the insurgency movement must also “grow from small to large; from weakness to strength, or else it will fail.”⁵⁶ This requires extraction of the necessary resources from the population.

3. An Insurgency is not a Low-Intensity Variant of a Conventional High-Intensity Conflict

Conventional military doctrine normally emphasizes the need to strike the opponent’s military capacities. Such doctrine assumes that the destruction of these capacities will ensure the downfall of the opponent and, ultimately, that this downfall will allow the attacker to take control over the opposing population and its resources. This paradigm creates serious problems when transferred to a counterinsurgency campaign.

The idea of going directly after the insurgency’s organization, weapons, and personnel fits with a conventional military paradigm and seems to offer a reasonable

⁵³ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 152.

⁵⁴ Bowyer Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld,” 17.

⁵⁵ David Galula, *Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory & Practice*, (New York: Fredrick A Praeger, 1968), 6.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

chance of success. However, experience indicates otherwise, as a study of counterinsurgency best practices concluded that this approach has historically led to failure.⁵⁷

First, such an approach does not deal with the insurgency's information advantage. In other words, what is visible of the insurgency is likely to be only the tip of an iceberg, and the state risks expending all its resources in destroying this tip. Second, proficient insurgents will make sure that the population suffers from the state's attempt to root out the insurgents, thus creating favorable conditions for the insurgency to grow.

The insurgency, on the other hand, is unlikely to make the mistake of choosing a strategy of attacking the state directly; it is self-evident that it is necessary to grow before an attempt to overthrow the state can be successful. It follows, therefore, that control over the population is the key to overcoming the opening disadvantages for both contestants. The insurgency needs the population to grow and the state needs the population to expose the insurgency.

The interaction between the insurgents and the population is not only related to the supplies they extract and the manpower they recruit, but also to the fact that the insurgents in the end are dependent upon support from the population to be victorious in the conflict with the counterinsurgent. The rationale is that if the insurgents "manage to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support... [they]... will win the...[conflict]... because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness."⁵⁸

The population consequently becomes a center of gravity for both actors. The net result is that the population becomes the battleground in insurgency conflicts as they provide the belligerents the only way to overcome their opening disadvantages—namely manpower and firepower in the case of the insurgents, and information in the case of the counterinsurgents.

⁵⁷ Kalev I. Sepp, "Best practices in counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, May/June 2005, 10.

⁵⁸ Galula, *Counter Insurgency Warfare*, (2006), 8.

This basic insight is also the basis for the following classical definition of an insurgency: “an insurgency/counterinsurgency is a two-dimensional zero-sum game for control over the population.”⁵⁹ The first dimension is the distribution of control. A higher degree of control in this dimension means that more people are under the influence of the insurgents/counterinsurgents. The second dimension is the degree of control of each individual. A higher degree of control in this dimension implies more and stronger means to influence the ones within reach.⁶⁰

B. THE DIAMOND MODEL

The Diamond Model was developed by Professor Gordon McCormick at the Naval Postgraduate School and is depicted in Figure 2. Since its inception in 1995, the Diamond Model has been refined and used as a conceptual framework for successful counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines. The model, as presented here, is based on Professor McCormick’s seminar in guerrilla warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School during the fall of 2007.

1. Underlying Principles

The model rests on a few underlying principles from classical counterinsurgency theory. In essence, and based on the assumption that the counterinsurgent opens with a force advantage, the model assumes that an insurgency cannot overthrow the state until it has grown to a capacity to do so through the use of power. In order to reach this critical capacity, an insurgency has to obtain the following three basic resources: people, guns, and money.

In guerrilla warfare, the primary source for these resources is the population. The insurgency needs to manage the insurgent system,⁶¹ and thereby over time grow to the

⁵⁹ Galula, *Counter Insurgency Warfare*, (2006), 8

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 32.

point where it can take power. It follows that the insurgency needs to control an increasing part of the population—both for obtaining resources, and in order to maintain its information advantage—until it is ready to take on the state directly.

2. The Actors in the Diamond Model

From the description above, it is clear that the basic struggle takes place between the following three principal actors: the state, the insurgents (also known as the counter-state) and the population. These actors are treated as “black boxes” in the model, meaning that they are represented as single entities without looking into the internal dynamics of each entity.

The state actor encompasses entities that seek to uphold the government or state apparatus. That includes civil administration, law enforcement organizations, and military forces, as well as support from international actors that are actively participating in the struggle. Examples could be an international police mission or military forces from the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Conversely, the counter-state actor encompasses entities that seek to overthrow the government, or replace or take over the state apparatus. The counter-state may be composed of several insurgent organizations, and they may not necessarily be working in concert with each other.

In addition to the fundamental triangle between state, counter-state, and the population, international actors may play a prominent role. Insurgents can receive support in the form of people, guns, and money from abroad and, perhaps more important, sanctuary or safe havens outside the boundaries of the state’s territory. Similarly, the state can enlist international support beyond direct involvement. Examples of this can be exchange of intelligence, border control, interdiction of resources flowing to the counter-state, etc. For these reasons, the model is not complete without representing these international actors. It is important to recognize, however, that the international actors can only reinforce what is going on among the other three actors, as an international actor does not substitute any of the other three.




Figure 2. The Diamond Model (From: Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in guerrilla warfare,” lectures at the Naval Postgraduate School 2007)

3. Strategies and Options

The Diamond Model outlines a number of principal strategies for the state and the counter-state. In addition to this set of strategies, the population also has important choices to make.

a. The Population’s Choices

The population’s choices are:

- Support the insurgency
- Support neither the counter-state nor the state

- Support the state
- Support both the state and the counter-state

It is worth noting that of the options above, the first two will serve the counter-state's cause, while the last two will benefit the state the most. The logic behind this is that the counter-state can enlist active support from a few key supporters while maintaining its information advantage, as long as the population is not supporting the state. T.E. Lawrence put this succinctly in 1920, when he wrote

It [a rebellion] must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.⁶²

In other words, not supporting the state equals passive support to the counter-state. Similarly, the state is not competing with the counter-state to grow and obtain resources. If the population chooses to give the state information about the counter-state, and at the same time provides people, guns, and money to the counter-state, this will take away the counter-state's information advantage and thus give the state the upper hand.

As an insurgency/counterinsurgency is a two-dimensional struggle, it is worth noting that while the state might have the *broadest* distribution in geographic terms, the counter-state is likely to be better represented in *depth* wherever it chooses to be. This representation is critical in influencing the population in their choices among the options above. Leites and Wolf argue that "attitudes, in the sense of preferences, affect behavior but are not identical with it; nor in most cases are they the primary influence on it."⁶³

Rather, they suggest it is the *assisted preference* that determines the population's behavior. Backing the insurgency can result in going to prison or being branded as a traitor if the state wins. Backing the state might induce violence or even death if the counter-state is successful. "In the population's calculations of the options

⁶² Thomas Edward Lawrence, "The evolution of a revolt," Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1990, 22.

⁶³ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 45.

available, *predictions* of the consequences of alternative actions may be crucial.”⁶⁴ A key point here is that a population is likely to choose “today’s safety at the cost of tomorrow’s welfare.”⁶⁵

The implications for counterinsurgency are profound. First of all, it is a question of credibility. An effective guerilla organization will follow up on its threats. Conversely, the state has to promise the population protection from the insurgency, while a growing insurgency is a sure sign of the state’s inability to do so in the first place. The competition for credibility, therefore, is tilted in favor of the counter-state. Second, it is a question of time. Even though a state may promise a better situation in the long-term, the short-term need to survive is likely to outweigh the value of long-term improvements. Again, this can be exploited by a counter-state that is willing to use violence and threats.

As a side note, it is worth mentioning that “hearts and minds” campaigns are directed towards the true preference, or what Leites and Wolf term attitudes. From the discussion above, it is clear that an effort to influence the true preference of the population is likely to have little impact as long as the counter-state is able to effectively threaten the population. As Galula puts it: “When a man’s life is at stake, it takes more than propaganda to budge him.”⁶⁶

b. State Strategies

- Strategy 1: Control the population; this normally means to establish the state’s presence to the degree that law and order can be enforced. A crucial aim for this strategy is to remove the counter-state’s ability to influence the population’s behavior through intimidation.
- Strategy 2: Degrade the counter-state’s interaction with the population and thereby deny the counter-state the resources it needs. The counter-state needs to have a distributed control-mechanism to enlist popular support, and it is this mechanism that is the target of this strategy.

⁶⁴ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 45.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 44.

⁶⁶ Galula, *Counter Insurgency Warfare*, (2006), 55.

- Strategy 3: Target the core of the counter-state organization; take away its resources and core personnel.
- Strategy 4: Interdict the counter-state's flow of resources from international actors.
- Strategy 5: Dissuade international actors from supporting the counter-state.

c. *Counter-state Strategies*

- Strategy 1: Control the population. The aim of this strategy is to ensure that the insurgency can grow through active support, while at the same time ensuring the passive support of the population and thereby maintaining the information advantage.
- Strategy 2: Sever the links between the government and the population. By displacing the government and reducing its relevance for the population, the population is less likely to see the state as the winner of the conflict and a guarantor of its promises.
- Strategy 3: Attack the state directly. To be successful, this strategy requires that the counter-state has grown to a point where the state no longer has a force advantage. By destroying the state, the counter-state can take power and implement its policies.
- Strategy 4: Just as the state can interdict international support to the counter-state, the counter-state can disrupt international support to the state.
- Strategy 5: The counter-state can also dissuade international actors from supporting the state actor. This can be done through making it more costly to support the state actor; either directly through attacking personnel and material, or indirectly by influencing popular opinion in the international actor's domestic audiences.

d. *The Importance of International Actors*

First, it seems clear that a counter-state supported by an international actor does not have to rely on active support by the population to the same degree that it would without that international support. Second, a sanctuary across an international border can be a very valuable asset for an insurgency. In such a safe haven, the limitations of the Dragonworld do not apply to the same degree, thereby enabling the counter-state to communicate, coordinate, and prepare for future operations with greater ease.

Arguably, such cross-border sanctuaries had great importance in the Vietnam War, in the Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s, and even in today's conflict in Afghanistan. Similarly, the much-referred-to successful counterinsurgency in Malaya was characterized by a lack of such cross-border sanctuaries. The French were able to deny the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) such a sanctuary by establishing a fence along the Algeria/Tunisia border.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the counter-state will still need to operate hidden from the state, which requires some degree of passive support from the population. Moreover, it is the basic relationship between the state, the population, and the counter-state that defines the problem; the international actors will not represent a problem unless there is a problem internally.

e. Sequence of Strategies

For these reasons, it seems clear that the state needs to start with strategy 1 in order to gain information about the counter-state's distributed control mechanism. By denying the counter-state's ability to threaten the population, such information is likely to be forthcoming. This information, of course, will expose the infrastructure of the counter-state, which can then be targeted effectively as part of strategy 2.

As strategy 2 is carried out and personnel from the counter-state's organization are either arrested or killed, this leads to exposure of the core of the counter-state organization. This core is then the focus of strategy 3.

At this time, it is worth noting that the state at any time can receive information that enables action against the counter-state core. Such information should, of course, be acted upon in order to degrade the efficiency of the counter-state. It is nevertheless important to recognize that this does not justify abandoning strategy 1, as strategy 1 will enable the state to conduct strategy 2, which in turn will enable strategy 3.

⁶⁷ Raymond Millen, "The political context behind successful revolutionary movements, three case studies: Vietnam (1955–63), Algeria (1945–62), and Nicaragua (1967–79),"32, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/, (accessed March 21, 2008).

As far as strategies 4 and 5 go, a similar logic applies. By interdicting support that flows across an international border, one can identify who the international supporters are, and thereby devise ways and means to influence them to stop providing support. Strategies 4 and 5 are not tied to the strategy sequence 1–2–3. In other words, strategy 4 can be initiated concurrently with strategies 1, 2, or 3.

C. CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCIES

1. Characteristics of Contemporary Insurgencies

Kilcullen sees the theory based on the “wars of liberation from 1944 to about 1982” as *classical counterinsurgency theory*.⁶⁸ The underpinnings of the Diamond Model are very much consistent with this set of theories.

Kilcullen argues that the insurgencies observed since 9/11 are different from the wars of liberation, and that these differences have an important impact on counterinsurgency theory as well. His argument is based on observations of the insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Thailand, and the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan.

The first set of observations is tied to the relationship between the state and the counter-state. A key tenet of classical counterinsurgency theory is that the counter-state initiates a conflict against a sitting regime. In several of the contemporary insurgencies, however, this has not been the case. In Chechnya, Somalia, and East Timor, insurgencies have followed state failure.⁶⁹ As such, they are not as much overthrowing the state as they are dismembering the state’s remnants. In other cases, like in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Chechnya, it is the state actor that has initiated a military campaign and insurgencies have emerged as a strategic reaction.⁷⁰ In the former cases, a counterinsurgency needed to include a heavy emphasis on nation-building in addition to

⁶⁸ David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,,” *Small Wars Journal*, 1, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf>, (accessed October 21, 2008).

⁶⁹ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” 2.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

fighting insurgents. In the latter cases, it is more difficult to generalize. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth noting that an insurgency that is reactionary may start with a greater legitimacy in the eyes of the population, and thereby grow faster.

It is perhaps in the view on *ends* that contemporary insurgencies differ the most from the classical insurgencies. The classical definition of insurgencies implies a struggle for power, but several of the contemporary insurgencies seem to be focused on undermining or destroying the state, rather than taking its place.⁷¹ Such groups can be seen as what O'Neill terms *restorational* or *reactive insurgencies*, rather than *revolutionary insurgencies*. This, in turn, does not require a united front or a central leadership, thus paving the way for a multitude of various, and often conflicting, agendas and organizations.

Such an orientation is also made possible and strengthened through religious motivation. In Kilcullen's words, an insurgent motivated by religion might not seek to achieve anything in particular, but "rather to be a *mujahid*, earning God's favor (and hope of ultimate victory through his intervention) through the act itself."⁷²

The role as a resistance group or a strategic spoiler also negates the need for carefully building a rural power base. Through the use of urban operations, contemporary insurgencies have succeeded in imposing significant limitations on the counterinsurgent's behavior. Urban terrain places one such limitation on the use of force and choice of weapons; conversely, it contains a risk of alienating larger portions of the population. Through the use of improvised explosive devices (IED), insurgents have not only been able to kill counterinsurgents more effectively (i.e., with less use of manpower), but the weapons also make the population afraid of being near counterinsurgent forces, effectively limiting the counterinsurgent intelligence as well as the ability to protect and reassure the population.⁷³

⁷¹ Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," 4.

⁷² Ibid., 5.

⁷³ Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," 5.

The second set of differences concerns the impact of globalization. Contemporary insurgents have access to a global audience and can use the Internet as a virtual sanctuary.⁷⁴ This virtual sanctuary can be used to raise funds, recruit, train, communicate, plan, and collect intelligence, and it is mostly beyond control of the counterinsurgent.⁷⁵ While this may be seen just as a modern version of international support to the counter-state, its true importance lies in the fact that it is extremely difficult to control.⁷⁶ The significance of this virtual sanctuary has become evident, as insurgents in Iraq are so well-funded that they do not depend on financial support from the Iraqi population. On the contrary, they can pay local citizens to carry out tasks. Hence, the classical approach of separating the insurgents from the population in order to deprive insurgents of resources is not necessarily effective where a virtual sanctuary is available.⁷⁷

Further, the high penetration of mass media ensures that activity at the lowest level might have a strategic impact, with the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal being a prime example.⁷⁸ Similarly, the insurgents exploit this media coverage to spread the impact of their actions far beyond the area of operations, with the objective being to erode the political will to continue the counterinsurgency struggle.

2. Implications for Contemporary Counterinsurgency

Kilcullen suggests seven characteristics for a new counterinsurgency paradigm. His first is to substitute the classical competition for legitimacy and control with a competition to mobilize. According to Kilcullen, the difference is that the counter-state's aim of establishing a government is relegated to a second priority, if existent at all. Instead, the counter-state can win if it succeeds in mobilizing local support as well as a global audience in order to create such big problems for the counterinsurgent that he has to give up. Similarly, the state actor needs to mobilize "home population, the host

⁷⁴ Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," 4.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 7.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 6.

country, the global audience, the populations of allied and neutral countries, and the military and government agencies involved,” thereby preventing the adversary from mobilizing.⁷⁹

Second, the counterinsurgent needs to broaden the geographic scope; the area of interest may need to “include all neighboring countries, and its area of interest may need to be global.”⁸⁰ The purpose of this is to counter the support that the counter-state is able to draw from around the world. Kilcullen suggests that this implies a “vastly increased role for diplomacy, global intelligence liaison and information operations.”⁸¹

Third, due to the increasing complexity of organizations and objectives, the role of the counterinsurgent is to “control a complex ecosystem” in order to impose order on an “unstable and chaotic environment.”⁸² The classical theory emphasizes the defeat of a single opponent, or at least a united front of opponents. Kilcullen suggests that contemporary insurgencies are characterized by fighting a multitude of conflicting entities as well as handling possible differing interests between various actors on the state’s side.

Fourth, the strong emphasis on unity of effort or unity of command in classical COIN theory is more incompatible with reality than ever. The media, religious leaders, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations are all critical components in the conflict, but cannot be controlled as part of the COIN organization. Kilcullen suggests that the counterinsurgent needs to secure critical support from such entities through facilitating a common understanding of the problem and providing enablers for collaboration.⁸³

Fifth, Kilcullen believes that all commanders—down to the lowest level—might need to “conceive of their task as a form of political warfare in which perception and

⁷⁹ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” 9.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid., 10.

⁸³ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” 10.

political outcomes matter more than battlefield success.”⁸⁴ This is also true in classical COIN theory, but Kilcullen suggests that it has become even more important than previously.

Sixth, the criteria for victory may need to be redefined to include permanent containment, as opposed to a total or near total defeat, of the terrorist risk.⁸⁵ This is a result of the fact that contemporary insurgency movements are capable of posing as a risk even without leadership or large membership numbers. Therefore, the counterinsurgent may have to live with remnants of a multitude of insurgent entities and instead aim to suppress their impact rather than defeating the opponent fully.

Finally, “secret intelligence may matter less than situational awareness based on unclassified but difficult-to-access information.”⁸⁶ This requirement refers to the need to orient in a “cultural and demographic jungle of population groups” and the need to understand the “physical, human, cultural and informational terrain”⁸⁷ rather than emphasize intelligence that enables direct attacks against key insurgents.

3. How Does Contemporary Counterinsurgency Relate to the Diamond Model?

While Kilcullen’s observations have obvious implications for the operational and tactical execution of counterinsurgency, it is not equally clear that it changes the strategies of the Diamond Model.

The fundamental principle that a counter-state needs to start from nothing and grow has not changed. There might be changes to whether the majority of this growth comes from the population or from international actors, but the fact remains that the counter-state is dependent on retaining the information advantage in order to grow. Such

⁸⁴ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” 10.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

an advantage can only be achieved in an effective manner by blending in with the population and relying on their passive support. As Kilcullen states, “the people remain the prize.”⁸⁸ This, of course, is very much in line with the model.

In theory, there would be a point where the tactics and weapons of the counter-state were so effective that the fight could be carried out with such small numbers of insurgents that the information advantage could easily be retained. This point does not seem to have been reached, but it is worth recognizing that the tactics and weapons of the counter-state will have an effect on the dilemma between size and visibility. Future insurgents may be able to inflict massive casualties with a very small organization if they are able to obtain more effective weapons (i.e., chemical or nuclear weapons) or improvised weapons that create similar effects.

The different end being pursued (i.e., insurgents being spoilers rather than trying to take power) is no fundamental departure, either. It certainly offers the insurgents the option of being more decentralized and thus makes it more difficult for the counterinsurgents to dismantle their organization. Nevertheless, an insurgent group that acts as a spoiler group will still have to attack the state in more or less the same way as a classical insurgency. Attacking the state is an activity that arguably precedes any attempts to organize an alternative government. As such, a spoiler group can be seen as a lesser-included case of a classical insurgency.

The primacy that Kilcullen places on influencing audiences and “winning the story” is not a departure from the model, either. Strategies 1 and 5 are aimed at influencing the population and the international actors to support the state rather than the counter-state actor. Kilcullen’s observations, therefore, are more amplifying than they are contradicting.

For these reasons, the most important aspects of contemporary insurgencies do not change the Diamond Model. Thus, the model is a highly useful tool to understand the dynamics of, and the countermeasures to, both classical and contemporary insurgencies.

⁸⁸ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” 6.

D. CONCLUSION

In summary, insurgency conflicts are characterized by an asymmetry in force, which favors the counterinsurgent; an asymmetry in information, which favors the insurgent; and a battlefield consisting of the population, their perceptions, and their support.

III. INFORMATION OPERATIONS: MAKING SURE THAT THE GOOD GUYS FINISH FIRST

A. INTRODUCTION

General Richard G. Stillwell argued that armed “conflict ends, at least temporarily, when one side makes the decision that there is more to be gained—or less to be lost—by allowing the antagonist to prevail” and that “the side that desists has simply lost the will to continue the conflict.”⁸⁹ The psychological aspect of armed conflict is important in all types of warfare, but in COIN the counterinsurgent is not only dependent on “breaking the will” of the insurgent, but also on influencing the local populace and gaining their support to be successful. Indeed, “the wars of liberation that have erupted in the third world over the past four decades document the crucial role of psychological...” aspects in such conflicts and how they shape the final outcome of such conflicts.⁹⁰ As such, this chapter outlines how a counterinsurgent force should address the psychological aspects in insurgency conflicts by systematically influencing the perceptions and preferences of the actors of the conflict that were outlined in Chapter II. The purpose of this chapter is to provide general guidelines for how COIN forces should implement information operations (IO) in their overall efforts. This will be done by discussing the crucial role IO plays in insurgency conflicts and also the components and challenges of IO in COIN.

B. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN INSURGENCY CONFLICTS

Insurgency conflicts “are fought politically and psychologically, with the assistance of military capabilities”⁹¹ and can, in many ways, be considered a form of “armed theater.”⁹² In this theatrical show the actors, insurgents, and counterinsurgents

⁸⁹ Stillwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” 319.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 322.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Steven Metz, “Small Wars, From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” in *Rethinking the principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. Mc Ivor, (Annapolis, MY: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 288.

are locked in combat at the same time that each is playing for a wider audience predominantly made up of the local population, but also of external audiences who might provide external support or opposition.⁹³ A distressing fact is that public opinion and the importance of local public support have repeatedly eluded the attention of counterinsurgents throughout history, at least in the initial phases of COIN campaigns. For instance, this is very much the case in the ongoing struggle between the Western COIN forces and violent jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which the political and psychological aspects of armed conflict are manifested through public opinion and the populace's support, or lack of thereof, for the adversaries.

Professor McCormick's Diamond Model directs that separating "the populace from the insurgents [is the key to success and thus] should be a basic objective of COIN strategy."⁹⁴ Gaining the support of the population is strategy 1 according to the Diamond Model, and success in subsequent strategies 2 and 3 of interdicting insurgency infrastructure and targeting the core of the insurgency organization is anchored on popular support for the counterinsurgent. This coincides with the observation that the local population comprise the battlefield in insurgency conflicts and the critical fact that the actors (i.e., the insurgent and counterinsurgent) "are competing for the same objective: the people" and their support.⁹⁵

This quest between the insurgent and counterinsurgent to win the support of the population can be viewed as a "war of ideas" and it follows that the goal is to win the support and recognition of the population. This involves "far more than neutralizing [insurgent] leaders, disrupting cells, and dismantling networks"⁹⁶ and "while

⁹³ Metz, "Small Wars, From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges," 288.

⁹⁴ Emery, "Irregular Warfare Information Operations," 28.

⁹⁵ Joseph D Celeski, Operationalizing COIN, JSOU Report 05-2 (Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press, September 2005), 82.

⁹⁶ William Rosenau, "Waging the War of Ideas," in *Rand Reprints*, www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1218/, (accessed May 22, 2008).

conventional warfare is [focused on] direct military confrontation between states,” COIN campaigns must be focused on the “control and influence of populations, rather than the control of an adversary’s forces or territory.”⁹⁷

As a matter of fact, “non-kinetic capabilities have a more prominent and necessary role [in COIN] than in conventional warfare.”⁹⁸ The ability to influence both adversarial and non-adversarial actors in a systematic and planned manner, or what is termed information operations (IO), is imperative to the success of a counterinsurgent.⁹⁹ IO directly influences what should be the operational focus of counterinsurgents according to the Diamond Model, namely the population and the support they can offer.¹⁰⁰ While this has been hard for counterinsurgents to recognize and implement in past and present conflicts, insurgents, on the other hand, “understand how to leverage the information environment”¹⁰¹ and their “choice of weapons [has a strong tendency to] put a conventional high-technology force at a disadvantage.”¹⁰²

An example of how insurgents have recognized the importance of the population is the letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the ideological leader of al Qaeda, to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of the group now called al Qaeda in Iraq. In this letter al-Zawahiri stated that “we [al-Qaeda] are in the midst of war, and more than half of that struggle takes place on an information battlefield; we are in an information war for the hearts and minds” of the population.¹⁰³

97 Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 27.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 32.

102 Stilwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” 322.

103 Ayman al- Zawahiri, 2005, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/203gpuul.asp>, (accessed February 7, 2009) The letter, between al-Qaeda leaders Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, was reportedly retrieved in Iraq through counterterrorism activity. It is dated July 9, 2005, and was released by the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence in October 2005, which claims its authenticity. The letter discusses al-Qaeda plans including specific steps for attaining jihad in Iraq, and how to proceed following the departure of U.S. military forces from Iraq.

1. The General Target Audiences for Information Operations in Insurgency Conflicts

The target audience for information operations in an insurgency conflict can, in simplified terms, be divided into three segments:

- The local population: the most vital target for information operations in an insurgency conflict
- The contending actors of the conflict: the insurgents and counterinsurgents
- External actors: foreign populations and political entities that might influence both the actors and the outcome of the conflict

Conventional IO doctrine tends to put the emphasis on influencing the adversarial decision-maker at the same time as it slights the importance of influencing key non-adversarial audiences, especially the local population in an insurgency conflict.¹⁰⁴ While the focus on adversarial decision makers retains a valid role in insurgency conflicts, it is crucial that the lion's share of information operations is targeted at the "constituency of the undecided, or the fence-sitters"¹⁰⁵ within the local population.

The local population is faced with the challenge of deciding which of the actors they should support. In Chapter II, the authors described the following options/choices available to the local population:

- Support the insurgency
- Support neither the counter-state nor the state
- Support the state
- Support both the state and the counter-state

Additional aspects, which will influence the choice of the "undecided fence-sitters," are the short- and long-term consequences of these options to the individual. It follows that even though the state or counterinsurgents may provide a better situation in the long-term for society and the individual in general, the individual's need to survive in the short-term is likely to outweigh the value of long-term improvements.¹⁰⁶ As a result,

¹⁰⁴ Emery, "Irregular Warfare Information Operations," 27.

¹⁰⁵ Peter W Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, "The requirement for Full Spectrum Operations," *Military Review*, (July–August 2005): 8.

¹⁰⁶ This is described in detail in Chapter II of this study.

the vast majority of the undecided will be “waiting out progress and security concerns to determine who they will support”¹⁰⁷ because “when a man’s life is at stake, it takes more than [generic] propaganda to budge him.”¹⁰⁸ “The victor will be the ones who get them off the fence”¹⁰⁹ and counterinsurgents should therefore aim to create a favorable bandwagon effect by influencing and shaping the convictions of this entity.

“Breaking the will” of an adversary is important in all types of armed conflicts, but even more so in insurgency conflicts. Insurgents seek “to shift the decisive battle space from the military to the psychological”¹¹⁰ and it follows that counterinsurgents are also required to target the opponent in this battle space.

Finally, external actors, foreign populations, and political entities are also an important audience because they are likely to influence the freedom of action for both actors and possibly the outcome of the conflict itself.¹¹¹

2. Information Operations: from the Perspective of the Insurgent

The primary goal of most insurgencies is “to weaken government control and legitimacy in the population,” while simultaneously obtaining support for their cause through the use of force, coercion, and subversion.”¹¹² The continued existence, growth, and potential for success for the insurgents hinge on developing and maintaining a relationship with the populace that favors their cause.

Furthermore, it is important to realize that insurgents are elusive, asymmetric adversaries who will use any effective “weapon” within their reach to counter the

¹⁰⁷ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 28.

¹⁰⁸ Galula, *Counter Insurgency Warfare* (1968), 78.

¹⁰⁹ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 28.

¹¹⁰ Metz, “Small Wars, From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” 289.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 288.

¹¹² Milan Vego, “Counterinsurgency Campaign Planning” (2007, unpublished), 2. Milan Vego is a Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and his article on COIN campaign planning has not been published. The authors have received a copy of through the Norwegian Defense Staff.

strengths of the counterinsurgents and take advantage of their weaknesses.¹¹³ In a “war of ideas,” for the “heart and minds” of the population, information, and propaganda become part of the insurgent’s asymmetric weaponry, and as a result the insurgent will “not [primarily] seek success on the streets, but in the information environment.”¹¹⁴

At the same time, it is likely that the ideas and ideology of the insurgents do not have a strong foothold within the populace. A common trend is that insurgents are faced with both the challenge of justifying their actions, and garnering support for their often radical and dangerous movement from a somewhat hesitant community. These monumental tasks compel insurgents to use a somewhat-indirect approach to achieve their goal of acquiring direct support (defined as people, guns, and money¹¹⁵), and indirect support, from the population. This indirect approach involves a deliberate, efficient, and consistent dissemination of their ideological message. To undermine and break the “will of the enemy,” the insurgents are likely to utilize asymmetric attacks in combination with propaganda targeted at the popular support for the enemy. In sum, this requires, according to Robinson, that insurgents must have “an innovative and nimble information strategy.”¹¹⁶

Information is the “commodity with which [the insurgent] purchases cooperation, survivability, the perception of victory, and silence,”¹¹⁷ and his information operations thus become pivotal means in the effort to gain the necessary support and legitimacy within the population.¹¹⁸ As a result, information value and the degree of desired influence within the relevant population often trump the military value of kinetic operations for the insurgents. In Afghanistan, for instance, the Taliban’s “information

¹¹³ Raimundo Rodriguez Roca, “Information Operations during Counterinsurgency Operations: Essential Option for a Limited Response,” *Athena Intelligence Journal* 3:1 (2008): 24 <http://www.athenaintelligence.org/informationoperations.pdf>, (accessed July 14, 2008).

¹¹⁴ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 32.

¹¹⁵ In accordance with Prof. McCormick’s Diamond Model described in Chapter II.

¹¹⁶ Glenn Robinson, “Jihadi Information Strategy: Sources, Opportunities and Vulnerabilities,” *Information Strategy and Warfare*, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York, Routledge, 2007) 86.

¹¹⁷ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 32.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

objectives tend to drive kinetic [violent] operations.”¹¹⁹ Every kinetic operation “they undertake is specifically designed to influence attitudes or perceptions within the Afghan population.”¹²⁰

In the initial phases of the conflict, insurgents follow no rules, are “not confined by the truth”¹²¹ and, as a result, they often “reign supreme in the information environment”.¹²² Their ability and tendency to “lie, deceive, and create false causes,” combined with inherently-close cultural and social ties to the population, provide them with an advantageous position from which to “create propaganda which furthers [their] cause.”¹²³ The insurgents’ propaganda works because it is deliberately and carefully tailored and attuned to the people’s preconceived notions, and easily conveyed to the affected population.¹²⁴ Still, insurgents are also likely to engage in the instrumental use of violence against innocent people and targets of limited or no military value. This is commonly defined as terrorism and it is based on “the idea that the virtual impact of an act of terrorism [on public opinion] is more important ... than the kinetic effects of the act itself.”¹²⁵

Moreover, insurgents are also likely to utilize a combination of persuasive and coercive means to obtain the necessary cooperation and support from the population.¹²⁶ Acts of terror show how persuasion and coercion, in practice, are intimately linked. Severe coercion can be used by insurgents, in combination with IO, to influence the local populace to create what Leites and Wolf define as an assisted preference for their cause.¹²⁷

¹¹⁹ International Crisis Group, “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words,” Asia Report 158 (July 2008), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5589>, (accessed August 2, 2008).

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3–24, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 5-2.

¹²² Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 32.

¹²³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3–24, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 5-2.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Mackinlay and Al-Baddawi, “Rethinking COIN,” 18.

¹²⁶ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 33.

¹²⁷ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 45.

3. Information Operations: from the Perspective of the Counterinsurgent

Information operations can be defined as a “set of coordinated actions undertaken to affect adversary systems and information-based processes while protecting one’s own.”¹²⁸ Conventional information operations commonly encompass the following core capabilities within a military organization: psychological operations, military deception, operational security, electronic warfare, and computer network operations.¹²⁹ This definition, and the core capabilities that it encompasses, is highly focused on information processes within a military organization, and ways to optimize and protect these processes in order to gain an information advantage over a military adversary in conventional conflicts.

In a counterinsurgency environment, however, the most vital goal of information operations is to influence the public’s perception of the adversary by conveying “a more compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and narrative,” thereby discrediting their propaganda and deeds.¹³⁰ The overall objective is to “create divisions” between the insurgents and their “mass base” while simultaneously strengthening the sense of legitimacy of the counterinsurgents within the population.¹³¹ To accomplish this, information operations must exceed the more conventional information processes by integrating civil-military operations and public affairs into the information-operations concept.¹³²

The U.S. Air Force uses the term “influence operations” to describe information operations that “are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations.”¹³³ Influence operations encompass public affairs, which

¹²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 2006, ix, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf, (accessed July 12, 2008).

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 5–2.

¹³¹ Ibid., 5–2, 5–78.

¹³² Roca, “Information Operations,” 24.

¹³³ Air Force Staff, Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5: Information Operations, 5, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_5.pdf, (accessed January 25, 2009).

has not been defined as a core capability in conventional information operations, but is considered a subset of information operations. The objective of influence operations is to “influence adversary decision-making, communicate the military perspective, manage perceptions, and promote behaviors conducive to friendly objectives.”¹³⁴ The U.S. Air Force defines this as “desired effects in the cognitive domain”¹³⁵ but, in simplified terms, this can be translated into winning the “war of ideas” for the “hearts and minds” of the population.

Information operations in COIN should not only be focused on projecting messages, but also on denying and degrading the adversary’s messages¹³⁶ and, although terms like “offensive information operations” and “defensive information operations” have been discontinued, it is important to recognize that information operations can and should be applied for offensive purposes. “Their use will add to the positive effect of counterinsurgent operations on public opinion, and serve a defensive purpose at the same time by countering insurgent propaganda.”¹³⁷

Finally, military deception is a core capability of conventional information operations that should also be exploited and utilized by counterinsurgents. Insurgents still compose the enemy in COIN and they are potentially just as vulnerable to deception as a conventional enemy. Military deception can be defined as “those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's inclination,”¹³⁸ and the main objectives are to:¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Air Force Staff, Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5: Information Operations, 9, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_5.pdf, (accessed January 25, 2009).

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 32.

¹³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Publication 3–13: Information Operations, iii.

¹³⁸ Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms www.asafm.army.mil/pubs/jp1-02/jp1-02.pdf, (accessed March 13, 2009).

¹³⁹ Walter Jajcko, “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning,” *Comparative Strategy*, 21, No 5 (2002): 362.

- Provide a commander with the freedom of action to carry out his mission by deluding the enemy as to his intentions, and by diverting the enemy's intention away from the action being taken.
- Mislead the enemy and persuade him to adopt a course of action that is to his disadvantage.
- Gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages.
- Enhance success and, ultimately, save lives of the counterinsurgent's own troops.

Deception is a useful tool which can act as an enabler and force multiplier if it is properly coordinated and incorporated with the overall COIN effort.

a. *Why Use Information Operations?*

The essential role and importance of the population in insurgency conflicts account for the fact that such conflicts cannot single-handedly be won by traditional and conventional military means. The public's involvement restricts the spectrum and extent of the kinetic operations of the counterinsurgents, and one of the key fundamentals of COIN is the concept of minimizing the use of military force.¹⁴⁰ Contemporary and historic examples, like the conflicts in Afghanistan and Vietnam, confirm that "it is [clearly] possible to conduct a brilliant series of tactical actions with overwhelming force and firepower and [still] lose the larger strategic goal."¹⁴¹

Information operations, on the other hand, offer a non-kinetic alternative that can be used to separate the insurgents from the general population. Information operations are not subject to the same limitations as kinetic operations, for example, rules of engagements (ROE) or risk of collateral damage, and can be conducted with relatively limited economic expense. If information operations are properly embedded in an overall counterinsurgency campaign, they have the potential to not only counter the opposing information operations of the insurgents, but to also act as an "effect-multiplier" in support of the counterinsurgents' kinetic and non-kinetic efforts. Lastly, information

¹⁴⁰ Frank G. Hoffman, "Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace," *Rethinking the principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor, (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 309.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

operations can also be conducted as independent operations aimed at shaping public opinion and influencing the morale of the insurgent forces. At best, they also have the potential to be a vital element in overall population and area control.¹⁴²

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES

Since insurgencies are people-centric conflicts, the use of traditional kinetic operations has more than just physical results.¹⁴³ “Traditional combat will only comprise one part” of the overall effect the counterinsurgent is trying to obtain.¹⁴⁴ The other part is based on the effects kinetic operations have on public opinion.¹⁴⁵ Thus, the intent of an operation should not be limited to the kinetic results alone. It should also include thoughtful consideration of the long-term effects on the population and on public opinion, especially in respect to the public’s support for the counterinsurgent effort over the long run. COIN “strategists and commanders must not only ascertain what they should do, but also how the audience will perceive, understand and react to these actions.”¹⁴⁶ The role of information operations is to shape these perceptions and create the foundation for favorable reactions in line with the objectives of the counterinsurgents.¹⁴⁷ Information operations are ideally mutually supporting and interrelated with all counterinsurgency efforts, and systematic integration can facilitate and maximize the potential for beneficial long-term effects of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.¹⁴⁸

Information operations should also be employed more aggressively from the beginning, so that operations are specifically instigated for the purpose of creating, facilitating, and conveying a message to the population. It follows that information operations not only can be used effectively in support of other operations, but also should

¹⁴² Roca, “Information Operations,” 26.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Metz, “Small Wars,” 291.

¹⁴⁷ Air Force Staff, Doctrine Document 2–5: Information Operations, 9.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

be the main effort of larger multifaceted operations as well. Moreover, when information operations are conducted in conjunction with other kinetic and non-kinetic operations, it is of paramount importance that the deeds and actions are in harmony with the conveyed message, and vice versa, to assure a favorable long-term effect on public opinion.

When information operations are conducted independently, that is, not in conjunction with kinetic or non-kinetic operations, and directed at either the population or the insurgents they must still follow the axiom of separating the insurgents from their base of popular support and legitimizing the presence and actions of the counterinsurgent.¹⁴⁹ Independent operations should ideally follow the common principles of countering the strengths while exploiting the weaknesses of the enemy's ideology and propaganda.¹⁵⁰

D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES: MAJOR CHALLENGES

The primary concerns of counterinsurgency forces in information operations are related to both messages and means of delivery. The success of these operations depends on both the content of the message and the medium or channel used to convey it.¹⁵¹ As John Arquilla points out, even “the very best wiring in the world simply cannot make up for poor wording.”¹⁵² Nor can success in conveying a message, via a channel that the target audience believes is highly reliable, compensate for a message that is not appropriately attuned to that audience.¹⁵³

Moreover, a “perfect” message cannot compensate for the use of an imperfect medium which reveals that a counterinsurgency operative is the sender. In worst case, the

¹⁴⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 5–2, 5–78.

¹⁵⁰ Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, “Stealing Al-Qa’ida’s Playbook,” Center for Combating Terrorism (2006) 5, digital copy.

¹⁵¹ John Arquilla, “Thinking about Information Strategy,” in *Information Strategy and Warfare*, edited by John Arquilla and Douglas A Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 9.

¹⁵² Arquilla, “Thinking about Information Strategy,” 9.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

“perfect” message will “instinctively be treated with the utmost suspicion,”¹⁵⁴ and could also be “branded hostile and . . . automatically rejected.”¹⁵⁵ It follows that the two most significant challenges facing information operatives in a COIN environment are achieving access to channels that can convey the message without being automatically rejected, and having the ability to adjust the message so that the content is appropriate and resonates with the local population.

E. INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT: GUIDELINES

COIN operations are characterized by the continuous quest to “favorably influence the perceptions” of the local population and attain their support.¹⁵⁶ In today’s insurgencies, “emotional and political support is gained and lost through the interpretation of events rather than the events themselves.”¹⁵⁷ Thus, the use of savvy, focused information operations aimed at shaping public perceptions and interpretations is essential for the success of any counterinsurgency effort.¹⁵⁸ First of all, the sine qua non to successful information operations in COIN is systematic integration. Furthermore, the effectiveness of information operations in counterinsurgency operations also “...depends on the adherence to four basic rules: a clear cut aim and purpose, a well defined target audience, a credible message and a reliable means of communication.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006): 3.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations,” *Military Review* (May–June 2006): 16. Col. Baker served as the CO of 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 1st Armored Division, in Baghdad, Iraq, in 2003, and has written two articles in *Military Review* on his experience combating the initial insurgency in Iraq.

¹⁵⁷ Mackinlay and Al- Baddawi, “Rethinking COIN,” 22.

¹⁵⁸ Patrick B. Mackin, *Information Operations and the Global War on Terror: The Joint Force Commander’s Fight for Hearts and Minds in the 21st Century*, 3, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA422766&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, (accessed July 12, 2008).

¹⁵⁹ Stilwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” 321.

1. Information Operations: Integration, a Prerequisite for Success

In COIN, for long-term effects, the way an operation is conducted and coordinated with information operations is as important as the isolated outcome of the operation itself. Information operations must have a specific purpose and focus within an overall plan of action, but at the same time must operate under the same dynamics, and be “considered inseparable from kinetic combat operations.”¹⁶⁰ In essence, this implies that information operations “must be pre-planned [, integrated,] and deconflicted across the spectrum of planning and execution” of all types of counterinsurgency operations.¹⁶¹

Furthermore, successful COIN requires unity of effort in the use of all means, both kinetic and non-kinetic, and because the population is likely to be heavily exposed to insurgent influence, this cannot be done by deeds alone. Counterinsurgents must demonstrate through a combination of words, deeds, and long-term policies that they represent a more compelling alternative to the population than the insurgents.

Lastly, a thorough integration of information operations throughout the entire COIN campaign is likely to have positive synergistic effects that not only enhance the execution of other kinetic and non-kinetic operations, but also highlight the positive aspects of the counterinsurgency efforts and strengthen the probability of desired long-term effects.

2. Information Operations: A Clear-Cut Aim and Purpose

Separating the populace from the insurgents is a basic objective of COIN strategy and commonly recognized as a prerequisite for successful counterinsurgencies.¹⁶² Thus, the aim of information operations must be derived primarily from the objectives of separating insurgents from the population and stemming popular support for the cause of the insurgents.

¹⁶⁰ William Darley, “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Information Operations,” *JFQ*, (1st Qtr 2006), 73–76, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4015.pdf, (accessed February 5, 2009).

¹⁶¹ Air Force Staff, Doctrine Document 2–5: Information Operations, 9.

¹⁶² Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 28.

The ultimate success in counterinsurgencies “hinges on legitimacy and the moral right to govern”¹⁶³ and the primary aim of information operations, indeed most counterinsurgency operations, should be to create the favorable perception of the counterinsurgents within the population, which will substantiate the legitimacy for the counterinsurgents. In simplified terms, this involves “winning the hearts and minds” of the uncommitted majority, namely the “fence-sitters” of the population. Furthermore, information operations must also aim at denying and degrading the adversary’s messages and information operations that are targeted at the same segment of the population.¹⁶⁴

The secondary aim of information operations is to “break the will” of the insurgents to oppose the counterinsurgents and debilitate the sustainment they receive from their cohorts within the population. Lastly, information operations should also be aimed at boosting the morale of the counterinsurgents and their supporters within the population.

The main purpose of information operations is, of course, to enhance the likelihood of success for the counterinsurgents. This encompasses both the independent and isolated effects information operations can achieve, as well as serving the purpose of being a “force multiplier” of other, really all, COIN efforts. Nonetheless, “unity of effort and purpose in the information environment is vital”¹⁶⁵ and a clear-cut aim and purpose for information operations are likely to prove insufficient unless both are thoroughly comprehended and adhered to throughout the counterinsurgency organization.

3. Information Operations: A Well-defined Target Audience

The target audiences for information operations at the tactical and operational level in a COIN campaign are primarily the local population, which is the most important part, and then secondly the insurgents. The population can be divided into the following

¹⁶³ Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach To Counterinsurgency Operations*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 7 June 2006), 14, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/manual.pdf, (accessed January 24, 2009).

¹⁶⁴ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 32.

¹⁶⁵ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 33.

three groups: those who support or are part of the counterinsurgency; those who avidly support or are part of the insurgency; and those who are uncommitted, which is usually the majority of the population.¹⁶⁶ The composition of constituencies within the population is depicted in Figure 3.




Figure 3. The Population Constituencies in an Insurgency Conflict (After: Emery¹⁶⁷)

Counterinsurgency operatives use different methods in their information operations to target each of the three audiences. In targeting those who support or are part of the counterinsurgency, they often use a “conventional type” of information operation, one that focuses on information processes within the counterinsurgency organization or one that is intended to boost morale. In targeting those who avidly support or are part of the insurgency, operatives may use propaganda, psychological operations, and deception in an attempt to weaken their will and reduce their capability for opposition. In targeting neutrals, which is the uncommitted majority of the population, operatives utilize

¹⁶⁶ Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 3.

¹⁶⁷ The figure is derived from a figure in the article “Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities, and Effects” by Lt. Col. Norman E. Emery in *Military Review*, November-December 2008, 29.

messages and themes that legitimize the existence and actions of the counterinsurgents while simultaneously delegitimizing the insurgents and their propaganda, as well as focusing on the benefits of supporting the counterinsurgency effort.

This method is intended to shift public opinion and entails that information operations should be aimed first of all at influencing the perceptions of the “silent majority,” namely the uncommitted members of the population and, consequently, generating a favorable public opinion of the counterinsurgency.¹⁶⁸

However, cultural and social mechanisms in third world countries are likely to suggest that some segments of the population are more important than others, even though these segments appear to be less susceptible to the information operations of the counterinsurgent. Third-world societies are often tribal and communal in nature and a vital catalyst for generating a favorable public opinion depends on the careful assessment and achievement of at least tacit support from “the most trusted and most influential community members, the societal and cultural leaders” within these societies.¹⁶⁹ Given, for instance, the general religious adherence of Muslim populations, members of the Ulema are by far the most important members of such populations, along with tribal leaders and other individuals of societal weight. It follows that the counterinsurgents should strive to influence these individuals. The support and cooperation of trusted and influential community members have the potential to cause a desired bandwagon effect, which means that the support and cooperation of these individuals are likely to cause the majority of the communities where they originate from to follow suit and cooperate with the counterinsurgents.

Lastly, the insurgents themselves are also a target audience, but they should be exposed to a different type of information operation designed specifically to weaken their will power, and thus their capability to oppose the counterinsurgency. This typically involves psychological operations (psyops) which, in short, is aimed at stopping the insurgents from acting like automated “killing machines and start them thinking again,

¹⁶⁸ Baker, “The Decisive Weapon,” 17.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

about their homes, their family, and life in general.”¹⁷⁰ It follows that psyops should be aimed primarily at lower rank and less-motivated insurgents, in order to turn them away from their masters, or hard-core elements of the insurgency, to make them lay down their arms and defect. Psyops messages should focus on moral themes and be aimed at promoting strong feelings of guilt at the individual level, all in order to weaken the insurgents’ resolve, “diminish their will to fight, and undermine their ability to wound or take lives; in sum, destroy their effectiveness.”¹⁷¹

In addition, there is also a potential, and highly favorable, second-order effect of defection within the insurgency ranks. In Chapter II, the authors discussed the inherent limitations of the Dragonworld and how insurgents would be forced into prioritizing security over efficiency in the short-term. The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) of the U.S. Military Academy has used this insight, along with agency theory, to study al-Qaida. Given the reasonable assumption that the Dragonworld will influence insurgent organizations in the same way that it will influence al-Qaida, the CTC’s model may be used on a generic insurgency as well.

Agency theory predicts that an insurgent organization will face an inherent trade-off between *security* on the one hand, and its *efficiency* or *control* on the other.¹⁷² This basic trade-off stems from the need to delegate control and resources while not achieving a perfect alignment of preferences between leader and subordinates.¹⁷³ It follows that influencing either of the two variables may change the effect that an insurgency organization has. This is depicted in Figure 4.

¹⁷⁰ Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 3.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), *Harmony and Disharmony, Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities*, 22, www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Harmony%20and%20Disharmony%20--%20CTC.pdf, (accessed January 25, 2009).

¹⁷³ CTC, *Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities*, 12–13.




Figure 4. An Insurgent Organization's Utility Function (From: CTC¹⁷⁴)

The variable control or efficiency may be decreased if insurgents can safely desert the insurgent's organization. By causing a steady stream of defections through the use of psyops, the insurgency movement will suffer from loss of personnel, competence, and material. This will limit the insurgent leadership's ability to direct operations, as well as the overall efficiency of the insurgency movement.

4. Information Operations: A Credible Message

One of two major challenges for counterinsurgents when conducting information operations is getting the message right.¹⁷⁵ The information goal of insurgents is "to be first" in supplying information with regards to individual events and the ongoing struggle

¹⁷⁴ CTC, *Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities*, 22. The curves U1, U2, and U3 are indifference curves – representing three different and constant levels of utility with varying mixes of control/efficiency and security.

¹⁷⁵ Arquilla, "Thinking about Information Strategy," 9.

with the counterinsurgents.¹⁷⁶ Rumor-centric societies reward this achievement.¹⁷⁷ “However, being the first with a message is not necessarily a victory, and being second is not necessarily a loss.”¹⁷⁸ “The rapid dissemination of accurate credible information can make or break the counterinsurgents’ effort,”¹⁷⁹ but the prime goal of the counterinsurgent “should be to be first with the truth”.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, to gain the support of the population, the message “must be indigenous in content and execution”¹⁸¹ and hence culturally-attuned and in accordance with local values and cultural norms.¹⁸² The counterinsurgents must shape and articulate value-based themes to which the population can relate and ensure that “all actions of the government and its personnel are consistent with—and reinforce—those themes.”¹⁸³

The most important messages in counterinsurgent information operations are those aimed at convincing the local population that the presence and activities of the counterinsurgency are in the best interests of both individual members of society and the populace as a whole. Such messages should focus on the potential as well as actual ability of the counterinsurgent forces and state actor to facilitate economic, political, and social development that is far superior to the often draconian alternative of insurgents.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, messages must also invalidate the enemy’s exploitation of socio-political grievances within the population, pointing out and challenging inaccuracies in their ideological interpretations of these grievances, and at the same time emphasizing the consequences of violent acts conducted by the insurgents.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁶ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 31.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Col Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone: On War In The 21st Century*, (Zenith Press, St Paul, MN, 2004), 72.

¹⁸⁰ Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 31.

¹⁸¹ Stilwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” 329.

¹⁸² Roca, “Information Operations,” 34.

¹⁸³ Stilwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” 329.

¹⁸⁴ Baker, “The Decisive Weapon,” 20–21.

¹⁸⁵ Remy M. Mauduit, “Effect-Based Information Battle in the Muslim World,” *Air & Space Power Journal-Summer*, 2008. www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/spr08/mauduit.html, (accessed July 21, 2008).

Messages that are aimed directly at the insurgents with the purpose of undermining their will to fight should focus on their military inferiority and must emphasize the image of the counterinsurgent as a steadfast and resolute opponent who will never yield. Lastly, to minimize the potential for misinterpretation and the effect of counterpropaganda, the messages must be simple, consistent, and truthful.¹⁸⁶

5. Information Operations: Reliable Means of Communication

The second major challenge for counterinsurgents in information operations is how to convey the message in a way that it will not be automatically rejected by the target audience.¹⁸⁷ To begin, the counterinsurgents should assume that the local population may discount most of the information simply because they are culturally or politically suspicious of the counterinsurgents.¹⁸⁸ Thus, the choice of channels for conveying messages must be attuned to the cultural characteristics of the local population. In addition to being simple, consistent, and truthful, messages must then be repeatedly disseminated through as many channels as possible to assure that they reach and are accessible by the target audience.

In order to make the messages resonate within the local population and prevent potential rejection of their contents, counterinsurgents must strive to use local proxy sources to convey messages in accordance with the axiom “that the message communicated must be indigenous in content and execution.”¹⁸⁹ This means not only using local channels that shield the true originator, but also framing the messages as much as possible in terms similar to the chosen channels’ routine views and perceptions. The use of proxies increases the credibility of the message itself, while assuring that it is sensitive to the cultural, political, and religious perceptions of the local population. It puts a “local face” on the counterinsurgency efforts in general, and helps bridge potential cultural and political gaps between the counterinsurgents and the local population.

¹⁸⁶ Baker, “The Decisive Weapon,” 20–21.

¹⁸⁷ Arquilla, “Thinking about Information Strategy,” 9.

¹⁸⁸ Baker, “The Decisive Weapon,” 20–21.

¹⁸⁹ Stilwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” 329.

The use of key social and cultural leaders as interlocutors between the counterinsurgent forces and the silent majority of the population is particularly important. Key leadership engagement is a vital part of information operations in contemporary COIN campaigns. It provides the counterinsurgent with an influential channel for conveying his message that is likely to be perceived as highly credible by the general populace. Furthermore, if the counterinsurgent is able to gain the cooperation of local leaders, the cultural foundation of the insurgents may be further weakened.

F. SUMMARY

If a counterinsurgency is to succeed, it is imperative that a wedge be driven between the insurgents and the local population, and that the allegiance of this very same population is shifted towards the cause of the counterinsurgency.¹⁹⁰ This cannot be achieved by kinetic and coercive means alone. As Al-Baddawi and Mackinlay demonstrate, contemporary counterinsurgents must engage as intensely in propaganda efforts as they do in a traditional military conflict.¹⁹¹

The brilliant 19th century military theorist, Karl von Clausewitz, argued that “public opinion is won through great victories,”¹⁹² but great military victories are rare in insurgency conflicts. Moreover, “caution must be exercised [in insurgencies] and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the minimum loss of life.”¹⁹³ The only way “public opinion can be won” is by a systematic implementation and savvy exploitation of information operations, which is the most effective and possibly the only way to convince the “silent majority” of the population that their personal and national interests reside with the counterinsurgent and not with the insurgent.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Baker, “The Decisive Weapon,” 20.

¹⁹¹ Al-Baddawi and Mackinlay, *Rethinking COIN*, x.

¹⁹² Carl Von Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, trans and ed. Hans W. Gatzke (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003), 46.

¹⁹³ USMC Small Wars Manual, quoted by Hoffman, “Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace,” 309–310.

¹⁹⁴ Baker, “The Decisive Weapon,” 20.

This requires a major effort on the part of the counterinsurgents. They must overcome the challenges involved in developing the appropriate “indigenous” message and in successfully conveying this message to the target population without it being distorted, misunderstood, or rejected. The use of local proxies can help remedy these challenges, particularly if the counterinsurgents can attain the cooperation of local societal and cultural leaders. This will greatly enhance not only the credibility of the message, but also the likelihood of success for the information operation as a whole. While information operations aimed at exploiting the weaknesses and contradictions of the insurgency ideology and violence may undermine their popular support, it is just as important to inaugurate a favorable perception of the counterinsurgency.

Moreover, a counterinsurgent force must align its actions with the messages being propagated through information operations, which emphasize the attitudes and perceptions the counterinsurgents seek to establish within the local population. Doing this involves shifting the major focus of COIN operations from combating insurgents to addressing the local population’s grievances and challenges. Merely good intentions and deeds are likely to prove insufficient. In current and future counterinsurgency campaigns, it is the use of skillful information operations that may prove to make “the difference between victory and defeat.”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ Arquilla, “Thinking about Information Strategy,” 9.

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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF NATION-BUILDING FOR COIN

A. INTRODUCTION

The Diamond Model prescribes broad strategies for the counterinsurgent. In the long-term, an effective execution of strategy 1 (securing the population) requires a security system that is not only capable of providing physical security to the population, but also of acting upon information from the population, conducting criminal investigations, avoiding the pitfalls of corruption, sentencing according to a legitimate law, and carrying out those sentences as decided by the courts. Similarly, it may require substantial reform in national or local government practices, as well as the services the government provides, in order to influence the true preference of the population. An insurgency that is able to persist and grow is a testament to a state's failure, and the transformation of this state, as well as its civil society, is therefore part of the removal of the root causes of the insurgency.

The broader task of transforming the state and its civil society therefore provides a framework in which COIN has to take place. This framework has implications for the execution of COIN. The purpose of this chapter is to elicit the major principles that occur as a consequence of operating within a larger framework of transformation, and then add these principles to the already-established understanding of how to counter an insurgency. The combined requirements will later form the basis for formulating a Norwegian model for counterinsurgency.

Since this thesis addresses the question of how to use the Norwegian Armed Forces in a counterinsurgency abroad, it seems useful to separate the efforts that lead up to going after the insurgency, from the efforts to reform various parts of the state and civil society. The first type of effort can still be designated as *counterinsurgency*

(COIN), as this is mainly what classical counterinsurgency theory deals with. The second type of effort has been termed *civil counterinsurgency* (civil COIN) in a RAND counterinsurgency study.¹⁹⁶

The tasks that fall within civil COIN can also be said to be part of what is described as nation-building. The RAND study states that the tasks in civil COIN and nation-building are essentially the same, but that the environment in which civil COIN is conducted gives rise to special requirements.¹⁹⁷ These special requirements mainly concern the need to have a standing capability, as well as an ability to deploy and operate during hostilities. The literature that discusses these tasks primarily falls under the nation-building term, which is the reason for choosing nation-building rather than civil COIN as a reference point in this chapter.

Dobbins understands nation-building to involve “the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.”¹⁹⁸ Similarly,

Multiple terms have been used to describe operations that generally fall under the category of post-conflict reconstruction. These include nation building, state building, stability operations, stabilization and reconstruction, security and stability operations, transition, transitional authority, trusteeship, phase IV warfare, peacekeeping, peace building, and peace operations.¹⁹⁹

The term nation-building therefore covers a very broad set of processes, and like Dobbins, the authors will use the term broadly.

¹⁹⁶ David C. Gompert et al., *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, (Santa Monica, the RAND corporation, 2008), www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf, (accessed February 11, 2008).

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ James Dobbins et al., *The beginners guide to nation-building*, (Santa Monica: the RAND corporation, 2007), xvii, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG557.pdf, (accessed December 10, 2007).

¹⁹⁹ Bathsheba Crocker, John Ewers and Craig Cohen, “Rethinking and rebuilding the relationship between war and policy,” in *Rethinking the principles of war*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor, 360–387 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 362.

In some instances, the execution of nation-building introduces requirements to COIN that may seem to conflict with the most effective way of carrying out the tasks of the latter. One example can be the efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) former fighters. DDR is an important means in COIN because it drains the counterinsurgent of weapons and people. From a nation-building perspective, however, the need to quickly establish jobs (for instance, within the state apparatus) might undermine efforts to create an effective state apparatus and fight corruption. Certainly, giving exclusive benefits to former fighters might trigger negative responses from the ones that do not benefit from such programs and increased recruitment for the insurgency is thus a negative, but nonetheless a possible result of such programs.

The subject of this chapter then is to discuss the most important of these tensions and their implications for conducting COIN. These tensions can be divided into three categories.

First, assuming that the host nation has military and law enforcement forces, there is a balance to be struck between the use of international and host nation forces. Given the opening condition that there is an insurgency, the host nation is presumably unable to handle it on its own. Relying on international forces might mean more advanced weapons and doctrine, may give benefits of command and control, can reduce friction resulting from language problems inside the COIN organization, may promote intelligence sharing, etc. Use of local forces might therefore introduce an ostensible efficiency reduction. On the other hand, local forces have local knowledge, speak the language, and are ultimately necessary to legitimize the host nation government.

Military forces are widely used in nation-building efforts; they are deployable, can provide for their own security, have built-in and trained command and control functions, etc. At the same time, many tasks in both COIN and nation-building are inherently within the law enforcement domain. The second balance to be struck is therefore between the use of military and law enforcement forces.

Non-governmental organizations (NGO) are normally present in the trouble spots of the world. These organizations deliver important services, but they depend on distinguishing themselves from the intervening forces in order to benefit from their image as neutral actors. This distinction is increasingly blurred as the intervening forces deliver the same services as the NGOs. At the same time, it is evident that a nation-building effort might require substantial deliveries to the civilian population. The third tension is therefore the balance between the interveners' directed reconstruction efforts, and the NGOs' voluntary assistance.

In addition to these tensions, this chapter also lists a few requirements where armed forces have no major role, but where they still need to observe and adhere to these requirements.

B. BALANCE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL FORCES AND HOST NATION FORCES

The natural propensity for an intervening force to curb an insurgency is to rely on its own personnel, equipment, and procedures, and thus create a parallel structure to any host nation security forces. The process of merging these two structures is a complicated one, and this section attempts to shed some light on when and why this should be done, rather than how.

1. Exploiting the Golden Hour

Dobbins argues that a *golden hour* can arise in the wake of an external intervention into a society in disorder.²⁰⁰ This golden hour is a situation that is "highly malleable."²⁰¹ It can last for a few weeks following the end of major combat operations, and is the result of shock and relief among the population, disorganized resistance, and uncertainty for potential spoilers.²⁰² In other words, the golden hour can be seen as

²⁰⁰ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 15.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

preempting an insurgency through kick-starting nation-building efforts. It follows then that the golden hour can and should be exploited to shape the situation and consolidate the intervening powers' authority.²⁰³

Several obstacles may make this exploitation difficult. First, the nature of an intervention by a foreign power gravitates towards a gradual build-up of forces. The forces first in place are likely to be combat forces, and therefore not necessarily the forces most fit to take advantage of the golden hour. A complete deployment of the intervening forces might take weeks to accomplish, during which the possibilities of the golden hour disappear.

A second obstacle is the fact that the golden hour is likely to occur at a time when the intervening powers have not yet been familiarized with the host nation and its population. The likelihood of misinterpreting signals and misjudging situations is therefore comparatively higher in this time period than later on.

The third factor is the status of the host-nation security forces. Although these could provide the numbers, force composition, and local knowledge necessary, they are likely to be either discredited by the local population or in a state of disarray.²⁰⁴

Exploiting this golden hour means that intervening powers must overcome these obstacles. Instead of relying on a gradual build-up of forces, a wide array of forces must be ready to start working almost simultaneously. This is not limited to military forces only, but also "police, civil administrators, and humanitarian workers, followed quickly by judicial and penal experts."²⁰⁵ This naturally puts great demands on prior planning and coordination. As will be discussed later, these forces need to be of sufficient size to fill the void in the host nation.

The second obstacle is traditionally a major problem for conventional military forces conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. Historically speaking, the most successful COIN forces have been those that have focused on interacting with the

²⁰³ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 25.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 15.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

population rather than utilizing large unit formations and massive firepower.²⁰⁶ Galula argues that COIN forces should be divided into static and mobile units, where the static units should live among the population in order to understand the local situation and the needs of the population.²⁰⁷ This indicates that to the extent that conventional military forces are being used, these should be reoriented for COIN prior to their deployment.²⁰⁸

The third obstacle requires that the counterinsurgent has resources and flexibility to rebuild local security forces quickly. This task includes facilitating the selection process, vetting, and the training of forces. Depending on the situation, this may be done within the structure of existing security forces, or entirely new personnel may be recruited.²⁰⁹ Additionally, there is a need for monitoring newly-commissioned forces in their daily conduct.

The need for exploiting the golden hour therefore calls for a broad intervention, a well-connected organization, and well-trained, prepared forces.

2. The Importance of Using Local Security Forces

General Richard Stillwell presents an argument that on the surface seems to run counter to Dobbins' argument.²¹⁰ One of Stillwell's truisms for counterinsurgency is that the "message communicated must be indigenous in content and in execution."²¹¹ According to Stillwell, a successful counterinsurgency is contingent on using primarily local security forces. His point of view seems to be that the legitimacy of the government has to be built by the government itself, not by an external agent. The role of foreign forces in a counterinsurgency campaign is therefore to act as advisors.²¹²

²⁰⁶ Kalev I. Sepp, "Best practices in counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, May/June 2005, 11.

²⁰⁷ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 65.

²⁰⁸ Sepp, "Best practices in counterinsurgency," 10.

²⁰⁹ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 50.

²¹⁰ Stillwell, "Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency," 319–331.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 329.

²¹² *Ibid.*

One can of course argue that Stillwell based his discussion on experiences from the Philippines in the 1950s and the Vietnam War, none of which reached the level of disintegration seen in failed states over the last two decades, and subsequently that his argument does not extend to recent cases. While this is a fair argument, Stillwell's main thesis is that the use of local forces will influence and facilitate the creation of a legitimate foundation for the state. Regardless of the state of affairs in the host nation, that seems to be true on two different levels.

First, the state needs to be perceived as *useful* for its population; that is, present a more attractive solution than the counter-state. According to Stillwell, the use of local security forces is one of the best tools a state possesses to demonstrate such utility.²¹³ Use of host nation security forces therefore improves the legitimacy of the state as long as they are seen as useful. In this respect, international forces may act on behalf of the state, but they are rarely confused with the state itself.

Second, even though the host nation state may use foreign forces to support efforts to establish a secure environment, it still needs to demonstrate that its own apparatus will be capable of governing effectively in the future. Foreign forces may add to the capability and capacity in an interim period, but this added capability and capacity have to be replaced by indigenous forces over time. Johnson and Mason demonstrate the importance of this point through the Taliban's use of intimidation:

They [the Taliban] are fond of saying, "The Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time." The simple message they deliver in person or by "night letter" is one of intimidation: "The Americans may stay for five years, they may stay for ten, but eventually they will leave, and when they do, we will come back to this village and kill every family that has collaborated with the Americans or the Karzai government."'²¹⁴

²¹³ Stillwell, "Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency," 324.

²¹⁴ Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "Understanding the Taliban and insurgency in Afghanistan," *Orbis*, 51 (2007): 87.

Put in another way, the counter-state can outlast an intervening international force without outfighting it. As demonstrated by the Taliban, a persuasive argument can be made by claiming that the counter-state will win as long as it is able to avoid a complete defeat. A similar argument against competent host-nation security forces will resonate to a much lesser degree, because the element of time is no longer a determining factor.

3. Implications for Counterinsurgency

The implications of using local security forces for counterinsurgency will naturally depend on the circumstances. However, a few general observations based on the conflicting interests above can be made.

First, exploiting the golden hour has the potential of marginalizing the power of local and transnational spoilers.²¹⁵ This, however, requires the intervening power to project a near complete force package for the nation-building effort at the time of intervention, or alternatively at the conclusion of major combat operations. The counterinsurgent component of this force package needs to act quickly with overwhelming force (i.e., in terms of numbers, not in terms of violence) in order to establish law and order and thereby consolidate its power position.²¹⁶

It is evident that a successful nation-building effort requires effective host nation security forces to be established. For the counterinsurgent to succeed, the population needs to actively support its government by providing information. As described in Chapter II, such active support requires the absence of immediate threats from the counter-state and a long-term expectation that the state will provide a better solution than the counter-state.

²¹⁵ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 25.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 25, 50.

The role of the host nation security forces is therefore to establish an impression of itself as the ultimate winner of the contest with the counter-state.

At the operational level in small wars (insurgencies), however, credibility becomes fundamental. All actions must serve to create and sustain credibility in the eyes of the supported populace or government.²¹⁷

As such, effective host nation security forces are part of the end-state for an intervening power.

Also, it is of course necessary to establish an impression of the state as the preferred option, absent of any threats. Stillwell suggests that civic action is the most suitable means to such an end.²¹⁸ Assuming that the likelihood of creating this favorable impression is reduced the longer the counter-state puts up an effective fight, it follows that effective host nation forces need to be established as soon as possible.

Apart from exploiting the golden hour, the role of the intervening power is therefore to provide conditions under which immediate threats are absent, as well as developing host nation security forces as quickly as possible. It is also clear from the discussion above that this role should only cover tasks that the host nation security forces are not able to do. In a choice between a host nation security force and an intervening force that are equally capable at a task, the host nation security force is clearly the better option. Given the need to establish the host nation security force as a potent and capable force, one should probably be willing to stretch it even further. T. E. Lawrence advised such an approach in his 27 articles.

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Hoffman, "Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace," 308.

²¹⁸ Stillwell, "Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency," 324.

²¹⁹ Thomas Edward Lawrence, *Seven pillars of wisdom: a triumph*, (Garden City, NY: Garden City Pub, 1938), 465.

The ability to exploit the golden hour depends on a rather massive foreign intervention that is capable of handling most tasks by itself. This, however, should not be an excuse for not starting immediate work towards developing host nation security forces. As such, there is no conflict between the arguments of Dobbins and Stillwell. Seen together, they prescribe a solution with a broad and complete force package with the weight on the intervening power initially, where the weight is distributed to the host nation security forces as quickly as possible.

C. BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES

The ratio between military and civilian components is related to the challenges of balancing the use of international versus local forces. The recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the important realization that COIN is not only executed within the military domain. Civil COIN aside, it is even fair to argue that classic COIN theory postulates that COIN is more in the law enforcement and civil domain than it is in the military, as “a revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political.”²²⁰

Nevertheless, the combined requirements from deployment, self-protection, and sheer numbers have ensured heavy military presence in most COIN campaigns over the last decades.

1. Numbers in Stability Operations

Chapter II demonstrated that there is a need for security forces to prevent insurgents from threatening the population into an assisted preference that favors the counter-state. Further, given the opening condition that insurgents can move among the population without being identified, it follows that the size of the population, in contrast to the size of the insurgency, is the primary determinant for the size of the security forces needed.

²²⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 63.

A few studies of the size of forces necessary to establish a secure environment have been carried out. Quinlivan's study from 1996 remains the seminal work on this topic.²²¹ According to this study, a security force ratio of one-to-four per thousand inhabitants is fitting for a society at peace.²²² Such ratios have also been observed in UN operations and in Germany after World War II. Dobbins et al. see ratios around (or sometimes below) one per thousand inhabitants as suitable for situations where the contenders have exhausted themselves and are ready to cooperate.²²³

Quinlivan asserts, "Force ratios above ten members of the security forces for every thousand of population are not uncommon in current operations [...]." ²²⁴ The counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya had a ratio of about 20 per 1,000 inhabitants and Northern Ireland saw similar numbers.²²⁵ In 2007, coalition forces in Iraq numbered 169,000, which equaled a ratio of 6.3 per thousand inhabitants.²²⁶ If the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police are added to this number, the ratio increases to 18.4 per thousand Iraqis.²²⁷

In a more updated study of international peace enforcement operations, Dobbins et al. found an average of 13 international soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants.²²⁸ It seems, therefore, that Quinlivan's estimate of 10 to 20 security force personnel per 1,000 inhabitants is reasonably validated in recent operations. The number of 20 per 1,000 inhabitants has been accepted as a benchmark estimate for force requirements where security needs to be enforced.²²⁹ The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have adopted this view:

²²¹ Peter J. P. Krause, "Troop levels in stability operations: what we don't know," *MIT Center for International Studies Audit of the Conventional Wisdom*, 07-02 (2007), 2.

²²² Quinlivan, "Force requirements in stability operations," 61-62. In calculating the number of security forces, Quinlivan adds together military, paramilitary, and police forces.

²²³ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 39-40.

²²⁴ Quinlivan, "Force requirements in stability operations," 68.

²²⁵ Krause, "Troop levels in stability operations," 3.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

²²⁸ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 41.

²²⁹ Krause, "Troop levels in stability operations," 2.

Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.²³⁰

The important understanding from these ratios is the force numbers they generate. Quinlivan makes an important observation when he states that an intervention might require rapid stabilization of the capital, entry ports, and other major cities. If not, the legitimacy of the intervening force is likely to drain away as control remains elusive.²³¹ The growth of cities over the last decades can make this a very tall order. For example, the UN estimates Kabul's population to be just below 3 million people.²³² Using the ratio of 20 security personnel per 1,000 inhabitants yields a requirement for approximately 60,000 security personnel to secure Kabul alone.

Sixty thousand is a big number, even for a coalition of several nations undertaking such an effort. According to NATO, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan currently commands 55,100 troops, which is spread over the entire country.²³³ It follows that an intervention in a reasonably small country can be a challenge even for a coalition. As the participating nations are required to contribute civilian COIN personnel at the limit of what they are able to, use of military forces becomes an inevitable solution. Additional requirements from the need to deploy, sustain the force, endure security risks, etc. only justify the use of military forces.

As a side point, large nations "are simply not candidates for stabilization by external forces."²³⁴ Pakistan currently estimates its population at approximately 166 million people.²³⁵ Using the same ratio of 20 per 1,000 inhabitants means a security

²³⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24*, 1-67.

²³¹ Quinlivan, "Force requirements in stability operations," 65.

²³² UN, "World urbanization prospects: the 2007 revision population database," <http://esa.un.org/unup/p2k0data.asp>, (accessed February 13, 2009).

²³³ NATO, "Expansion of NATO's presence in Afghanistan," www.nato.int/isaf/topics/expansion/index.html, (accessed February 13, 2009).

²³⁴ Quinlivan, "Force requirements in stability operations," 64.

²³⁵ Pakistani Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, "Pakistan at a glance: 1998 census," www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/, (accessed February 16, 2009).

force consisting of 3.3 million personnel. Similarly, Iran's current population of approximately 70 million people²³⁶ would require a security force consisting of 1.4 million personnel.

2. The Paradox of Force

As discussed above, the struggle between the state and the counter-state is ultimately one of legitimacy. As Galula puts it, "in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness."²³⁷ If the population does not view the state as preferable to the counter-state in the long-term, efforts to prevent the counter-state from influencing the assisted preference of the population will be a waste of time. Should it come to that point, the state is left with the options of either giving up or coercing its population into submissiveness.

The role of military or police security forces then is to provide an environment in which a state can both transform and deliver the services that are required. If this is primarily what the security forces are used for, their composition should reflect the nature of this task.

The need for personal safety is a deep-rooted need in human nature, and providing for public safety is therefore a key goal. Such public safety should ensure that economic and social relations are maintained. This task includes patrolling streets, guarding key buildings and infrastructure, detaining suspected criminals, and countering drug traffickers as well as other organized criminal groups.²³⁸

Military forces are perhaps suitable for tasks at the simplest end of the spectrum, such as guarding key infrastructure or establishing checkpoints. Beyond the basic level, however, it seems obvious that police forces are more suitable. That is certainly the case for tasks such as investigations, questioning, collection and preservation of evidence, etc.

²³⁶ Statistical Centre of Iran, "A glance at Iran: Population," www.sci.org.ir/portal/faces/public/sci_en/sci_en.Glance/sci_en.pop, (accessed February 16, 2009).

²³⁷ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 4.

²³⁸ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 26.

Dobbins et al. describe responsiveness and accountability as key goals for building legitimacy.²³⁹ Responsiveness refers to the police's ability to react to cues from members of the public, not just from the government.²⁴⁰ A security force that is responsive to the public ensures that members of society can count on assistance in a short time. Further, it is a strong indication that the security force is working for all factions of the public, as opposed to being an instrument to be used by the government.²⁴¹ The command and control structure in combination with inherently large formations make military forces poor at this. Time-sensitive targeting has become very important as part of the global war on terror, but this still refers to the ability to react to situations within a timeframe that is extensive when compared to day-to-day police operations.

Accountability refers to the police's "submission to and acceptance of outside supervision."²⁴² An accountable police force demonstrates that police work according to the law rather than the government, and in this way it builds legitimacy.²⁴³ As military organizations are designed primarily for fighting wars, the operational decision-making processes and bureaucratic procedures are not designed for revision and external control at every step. Rather, a military organization is geared towards use of force in critical situations, which is normally not subject to subsequent revision. While targeting at the operational level might resemble the rigidity and accountability seen in law enforcement, the nature of military forces is still to plan based on uncertain intelligence and assumptions, and act upon crude indications and possibilities. It follows, therefore, that the police is a better fit for public order tasks and for building legitimacy through responsiveness and accountability.

²³⁹ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 62.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

Beyond public order and law enforcement, the picture becomes more blurred. There is clearly a place for small and precise military raids, but these should not be the main focus of the counterinsurgent.²⁴⁴ Instead, there should be a focus on conducting a census, implementing movement control of people and goods, public information, intelligence gathering, etc.²⁴⁵ All of these tasks indicate that the focus needs to be on interaction with the population, rather than exclusively seeking out and fighting the insurgents. In determining the mix of military forces, police forces, and civil administration, several factors are important. First, the threat level is obviously central. A high threat gravitates towards military forces, while a low threat will favor police forces and enable civilian administration. Second, the training and competence of the personnel entrusted with the task is obviously also important. This indicates that to the extent that military forces are used for these tasks, special training is required. Finally, as Galula points out, a military force imposing control on a local society can more easily be exploited by insurgent propaganda, as it can be pointed out that the government has no other means to execute their task besides relying on the armed forces.²⁴⁶ A corollary to this is the insight that the more force and coercion the state uses, the less likely it is to gain its legitimacy.²⁴⁷

3. Implications for Counterinsurgency

The first important implication for COIN is the fact that a force needs to be relative to the population it is dealing with. As Quinlivan points out, there is normally a need to quickly bring certain key areas under effective control, and this requirement drives the force requirement for the counterinsurgent.

In the continuation of operations, Quinlivan's insight means that a counterinsurgent needs to be present in sufficient numbers wherever he decides to be. As demonstrated in Chapter II, this requirement goes beyond daytime presence. A situation

²⁴⁴ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 51.

²⁴⁵ Ibid, 84.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, 63.

²⁴⁷ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 63.

where the counterinsurgents rule by day and the insurgents rule by night is equal to no control at all, as the insurgents will be able to access and intimidate the population.²⁴⁸ A logical fallout of this insight is the need to have local counterinsurgent forces in place all the time (i.e., live and operate locally).

Given that there is likely to be a shortage of forces compared to the favorable ratio of 20 security personnel per 1,000 inhabitants, an oil-spot approach might be the only possible compromise between necessary force numbers and the need to bring the entire country under control. An oil-spot approach means that the counterinsurgent will gradually expand into new areas only when previously engaged areas are considered safe.

The quest for legitimacy presents multiple requirements to the counterinsurgent. First, for many tasks related to interaction with the population and law enforcement, police forces are inherently more suitable than military forces. Dobbins et al. see gendarmerie forces, which combine elements from civil and military police, as an ideal solution. Such forces, however, are in short supply as only a few nations keep them.²⁴⁹ Second, to the extent that military forces are necessary, they need to be trained for their task and observe the need for responsiveness and accountability. This places a strong demand on forces to live and operate locally.²⁵⁰

The place for raids and operations against the insurgents then is both second in priority to, and dependent upon, the efforts geared towards gaining legitimacy. As Galula succinctly put it, “Nevertheless, conventional operations by themselves have at best no more effect than a fly swatter.”²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 83.

²⁴⁹ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 48–49.

²⁵⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 79–80.

²⁵¹ Ibid, 51.

D. BALANCE BETWEEN DIRECTED RECONSTRUCTION AND VOLUNTARY EFFORTS

In recent years, the tension between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and military forces has become more pronounced. The fact that the number of NGOs has increased in the later years is obviously a contributing factor. Further, and perhaps even more importantly, military forces have entered the domain of aid workers by distributing humanitarian aid, thereby potentially depriving NGOs of their neutrality and security.

1. NGOs Must be Distinguished from the Counterinsurgent

Since the mid-19th century, it has been an honored principle to grant access for humanitarian aid in armed conflict. This principle was later adopted in the Geneva conventions, and is founded on the distinction between combatants and non-combatants.²⁵² By being truly neutral actors, NGOs have therefore had a *humanitarian space* to operate within. This humanitarian space has given NGOs access to most armed conflicts, and enabled humanitarian aid to be distributed to the victims of war.

It follows then that as soon as a NGO is associated with one party to the conflict, the neutrality is broken. Such association can for instance be a result of a NGO collecting intelligence for one party. The consequence is of course that the opposing party no longer will honor the principle of unrestricted access, and the NGO will not be able to perform its desired tasks without risk to its personnel.²⁵³ A related argument often put forward by NGOs is that only impartial parties should provide relief.²⁵⁴ A counterinsurgent, on the other hand, is likely to direct aid towards winning “hearts or minds” or some other goal.²⁵⁵ For these reasons, most NGOs are unable and unwilling to cooperate with the intervening powers.

²⁵² Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 120–121.

²⁵³ Ibid., 121.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 120–121.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 121.

The utility of a humanitarian aid organization needs no other justification beyond the aid it is providing. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the value also from a counterinsurgency point of view. NGOs are often present early in the conflict, are normally collectively present over a large area, have tried and tested methods of bringing in supplies, etc. Combined, this means that NGOs can provide vital support to large portions of a distressed population, which in turn may help the counterinsurgent in the effort to bring about a secure and stable environment.

Even though a NGO might be able to operate in its humanitarian space, it is still dependent on the larger security situation. The security situation will have both direct and indirect effects on what NGOs attempt to accomplish. Efforts may be directly affected when the population is prevented from travelling to or utilizing the services provided. The security situation may also indirectly affect NGO operations through, for example, unavailability of goods or labor. From a NGO standpoint, therefore, security forces should put all their effort into providing security, while NGOs should focus on humanitarian work.

2. All Reconstruction Efforts Need to be Coordinated

Against this clear-cut divide between NGOs and the counterinsurgent is the need to coordinate efforts. “Fragmentation, gaps or duplication in aid-financed programs” is a problem in virtually all humanitarian relief efforts.²⁵⁶ This ultimately leads to key priorities not being addressed.²⁵⁷ The Utstein study had similar findings for peace operations, and indeed, most COIN theory postulates a need for a *unity of effort*, precisely in order to ensure a coordinated approach to the most important objectives.

Further, it seems obvious that the host nation state apparatus’ means to achieve legitimacy is delivering basic services. This might include such services as access to clean water, electricity, basic health care, basic education, and clearing of minefields.²⁵⁸ Moreover, early in a conflict or in high threat areas, COIN forces may also be the only

²⁵⁶ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 110–111.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 111.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 55–56.

ones in a position to provide humanitarian relief.²⁵⁹ This, of course, brings the counterinsurgent into the domain of many NGOs. Even though NGOs are important, it would be putting the cart in front of the horse if protection of NGOs prevented the host nation from reasserting its rights and responsibilities.

The urgency of these questions is addressed above under the need to exploit the golden hour. From the point of the counterinsurgent, therefore, there is an urgent need to coordinate with NGOs in order to succeed at an early stage.

An often overlooked point in this dilemma is the meaning of *impartial*, as this effectively defines the humanitarian space. It seems evident that this is at least as much a judgment that the belligerents have to make as it is a defined standard. If one party does not see a NGO as impartial, it is not likely to grant it the access it requires. In the past, actions like providing electricity or basic education may not have been very controversial. In today's religious-ideological conflicts, however, this question is very much contested. This is amply demonstrated by the Taliban's violent campaign to destroy schools, and in particular those for girls. Another example can be found from NGOs working with judicial reform, which is equally contested.²⁶⁰ A third case in point is the fact that the intervening powers often choose to channel post-conflict assistance through various NGOs²⁶¹, and thereby in some sense make the NGOs agents of the intervening powers.

From this insight, it follows that not all NGO activities properly belong in the humanitarian space. The problem then is how to ensure that the ones that do provide impartial relief are not confused with the ones that do not. The NGOs' solution of implementing a categorical divide between NGOs and the counterinsurgent may be as wrong as the strong desire for the counterinsurgent to coordinate efforts.

²⁵⁹ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 122.

²⁶⁰ Ibid, 90, 101–102.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 152.

3. Implications for Counterinsurgency

A few general observations can be made. It seems to be necessary to distinguish between the components of the counterinsurgent force that are made up of international actors and those made up by the host nation itself.

First, the international components of the counterinsurgent forces should take steps to see that the local population does distinguish between NGOs and international COIN elements. Using uniformed personnel and material is a simple and powerful means of differentiation. Similarly, military personnel should avoid riding in NGO vehicles and socialize with NGO personnel, and vice versa. Furthermore, collocation of facilities should also be avoided.²⁶²

A separation in time may also be acceptable. As long as security has not been established in a particular area, NGO activity may be limited to purely humanitarian aid. As soon as the area has been secure, however, the full panoply of NGOs may be allowed to work. In this way, a clearer separation is kept as long as the security threat is significant. Incidentally, such an approach fits well with the oil-spot approach recommended above.

It also follows that the same counterinsurgency forces need to show restraint on activities that belong to the humanitarian sphere. From the discussion above, it is obvious that a counterinsurgent can and should provide aid in order to take advantage of the golden hour. The same is true in areas where there are no humanitarian organizations. If those requirements are not fulfilled, however, the most prudent solution seems to be to distribute aid and other forms of assistance in close partnership with the host nation's apparatus. The host nation, as opposed to the international component of the counterinsurgent forces, should have no restrictions on what reconstruction efforts to undertake or what aid to distribute.

²⁶² Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 122.

Second, the counterinsurgent should avoid using NGOs as its implementing partner in various projects.²⁶³ This principle should also extend to the intervening powers and other donor states. Instead, COIN forces should route resources through the host nation government to implement its policies. While this may include less oversight and efficiency, it does improve the capacity and legitimacy of the host nation government.²⁶⁴

The level at which such interaction takes place is dependent on how capable the host government is. Exploiting the golden hour means that delivering results is at least as important as building up capacity to govern in the short-term. The transfer of large funds at the top of a broken hierarchy is therefore likely to be a poor solution, as it will not produce the desired effects. A workable alternative might be to allocate funds and work with local authorities at the lowest possible level initially, and then gradually leave oversight of lower echelons to their host nation government as capability improves.

Third, achieving unity of effort between numerous Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), NGOs, counterinsurgent forces, and the host nation government might prove far harder than maintaining a differentiation between the counterinsurgent and the NGOs. Such a unity of effort might be achieved where there is a unity of command, for instance in a UN operation. Where such unity of command does not exist, however, unity of effort will be far more elusive. Given that no formal command relationship can be established, any coordination and cooperation will have to be based on a voluntary basis. Dobbins suggests the establishment of a civil operations center.²⁶⁵ The purpose of this would be to provide all participants with a common meeting ground and thereby the means to develop a common understanding of the tasks that have to be carried out. A different RAND study proposes a shared network, namely an *integrated counterinsurgency operating network* (ICON).²⁶⁶ The idea of such a network is similar to Dobbins', namely that an attempt to achieve unity of effort between disparate

²⁶³ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 122, 203.

²⁶⁴ Ibid, 203.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 55–56.

²⁶⁶ Gompert et al., *War by Other Means*, 144.

participants is best served through sharing information. This fits well with Kilcullen's insight, which is the following: "In modern counterinsurgency, secret intelligence may matter less than situational awareness based on unclassified but difficult-to-access information."²⁶⁷ Kilcullen also seems to agree that the road to unity of effort goes through information sharing between all actors.²⁶⁸

E. OTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

In addition to balancing the interests described above, nation-building introduces other requirements to the counterinsurgent that also have an impact. This impact, however, is arguably less than that described above.

Controlling inflation is one such need of the process of nation-building. A high inflation rate will discourage investments and impede the capital market, and thereby the long-term goals of the whole process.²⁶⁹ As the counterinsurgent will buy services locally and perhaps even pay for civil servants, it is important to size wages and salaries to the per capita gross domestic product.²⁷⁰ In this way, inflation is not encouraged, and the set wage level is sustainable in the long-term.

A second requirement is to help prevent corruption. Reducing the level of corruption is critical in building legitimacy for the state.²⁷¹ Establishing reliable and sufficient payment for security forces and civil servants is an obvious requirement for the counterinsurgent. Similarly, the counterinsurgent needs to establish open and transparent processes for contracting local services and goods.²⁷² As described earlier, it is important to use the host nation government to the fullest extent possible for handling contracts that are in the domain of government services.

²⁶⁷ Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency redux," 11.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 10.

²⁶⁹ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 214.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 159.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 89.

²⁷² Ibid., 89.

Third, experience shows that NGOs and international military forces often employ a substantial portion of well-educated host nation individuals.²⁷³ Since these individuals often speak English, they are in high demand for roles as drivers or translators. This practice does not only lead to an unsustainable income level for this category of personnel, it is also a significant brain-drain for the formation of a new state.²⁷⁴ It seems evident that this category of personnel could be better used for other purposes than driving and translation. Thus, the counterinsurgent needs to show restraint in depriving the new state of qualified personnel. Solutions can be found either in educating COIN personnel in language and culture or starting language courses for local citizens who can serve in roles where no higher education is needed.

F. CONCLUSION

This chapter has described the need for the counterinsurgent to engage a society with an insurgency problem with sufficient numbers to quell the fighting. This requires not only combat forces, but also a wide array of other types of personnel and resources able to start working at an early point. As a second dimension, a substantial effort has to be made in providing for proper law enforcement.

In combination, these two first dimensions prescribe a development from an initial weight on international military forces towards a situation where local law enforcement forces dominate. This development can be depicted as follows in Figure 5.

²⁷³ Dobbins et al., *Beginners guide to nation-building*, 171.

²⁷⁴ Ibid, 171.




Figure 5. Desirable Development of Security Forces Over Time

This chapter has also argued that achieving unity of effort with NGOs is difficult, but that some degree of coordination may be achieved by creating a common understanding of the situation in the host nation. The counterinsurgent should not use NGOs as contracting partners. Instead the local government should be asked to carry out the same tasks. The important ramification of this is that the counterinsurgent forces should be prepared to act as a channel for funds from the intervening powers to the host nation government. Such funds may need to be distributed locally at first, and then gradually higher up in the host nation government system as its capability and capacity improves.

Finally, the security component of the counterinsurgent force also needs to support the wider effort to fight inflation, corruption, and prevent depriving the host nation state of qualified personnel. These objectives can be achieved through prudent policies on spending, contracts, and hiring of local personnel.

V. NORWEGIAN CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, the Norwegian government confirmed in Parliamentary Bill 48 that the Norwegian Armed Forces are a vital instrument to secure Norwegian interests not only at home, but also abroad.²⁷⁵ Furthermore, the bill emphasizes that the challenges of the contemporary global security environment are multifaceted and that NAF, as a result, are just one of several means to protect and secure Norwegian interests internationally.²⁷⁶ However, to optimize the overall effects of Norwegian efforts to strengthen international security and the credibility, influence, and political integrity of Norway as an international actor, the bill argues for a more comprehensive approach with regards to the use of NAF abroad.²⁷⁷ Lastly, the bill confirms that the use of NAF in international military operations and interventions within a UN or NATO framework is an integrated part of the Norwegian defense and security strategy.²⁷⁸ It follows that NAF must be prepared to participate in COIN operations or COIN-related missions in the future.

This chapter will address the structure and capabilities of NAF. The aim is to identify the opportunities and limitations of NAF with regards to how COIN should be conducted, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI. The theory discussed in Chapter II (Diamond Model), Chapter III (the necessity and role of IO in COIN), and Chapter IV (the implications of nation-building for COIN forces) will be used as a framework for identifying the limitations and opportunities of NAF in a COIN environment. Furthermore, this chapter will also address some key Norwegian non-military means and the level of coordination and unity of effort that is required to achieve the stated goal of optimizing the overall effect of all Norwegian efforts. Insurgencies take

²⁷⁵ Forsvarsdepartementet[Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 10.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 10–12.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

place on land and it follows that COIN campaigns primarily revolve around land operations. As a result, the authors will focus on the elements within NAF that directly operate on land and/or can directly support and influence the actors of the Diamond Model as identified in Chapter II.

B. NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES

The Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine states that the purpose of land operations is:

To hold and control areas of land, or to seize and defend these with the aim of combating an adversary, stabilizing the situation between conflicting parties or protecting the civilian population, infrastructure and own forces. Control of territory is also a precondition for humanitarian aid and other measures which over time can improve conditions in the conflict area.²⁷⁹

Even though this describes the purpose of generic land operations, it encompasses and identifies operational elements that are vital to successful COIN operations. Yet, while the definition as such is not sufficient to implement a successful counterinsurgency effort, it does provide an overarching concept that can be used for COIN if augmented with a set of more detailed guidelines specific for such conflicts. Then again, the Norwegian Armed Forces are by no means new to low-intensity conflicts and military operations outside Norwegian borders.

1. Norwegian Military Operations Abroad 1951–2009

The first deployment of NAF elements as part of a multilateral coalition was a light field hospital (NORMASH) as part of UN operations in Korea from 1951 to 1954. This mission was followed by deployments of combat, support, and staff units to UN missions in Gaza, Egypt from 1957 to 1967 and the Congo from 1960 to 1965.²⁸⁰ The next major deployment of NAF elements abroad was as part of the UN International

²⁷⁹ Forsvarets stabsskole [Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College], Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Staff, 2007), 111, http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00106/FFOD_English_106143a.pdf, (accessed February 25, 2009).

²⁸⁰ Kjetil Skogrand, *Norsk Forsvarshistorie del 4, 1944–1970 Allierte i Krig og Fred* [The History of the Norwegian Defense part 4, 1940-1970] (Bergen:Eide, 2004), 231–239.

Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978. The participation in UNIFIL lasted until 1998, and even though Norway deployed different kinds of military units ranging from a light field hospital to a helicopter unit, its main contribution was a battalion-sized infantry unit. NAF also took part in the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). All of Norway's military operations abroad, in the period from 1951 to the early 1990s, were conducted under UN auspices.²⁸¹

The end of the Cold War brought not only changes to the global security environment, but also to the Norwegian perceptions of how NAF could and should be perceived as a vital tool of Norwegian foreign policy. In the period since 1991, the Norwegian government has shown a greater will not only to take part in NATO and coalition-led operations outside what is defined as the *Euro-Atlantic area*,²⁸² but also to expose elements of NAF to a higher degree of risk than in previous international military operations. In the mid 1990s NAF were highly involved with combat forces in the Balkans, and in 1999 Norwegian special operation forces (SOF) were among the first NATO units to enter Kosovo. In the post-9/11 era, Norway has taken part in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with combat forces since 2002. Norway also deployed an engineer unit, a naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit, and a small element of staff officers tasked with training local Iraqi counterparts in the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Nevertheless, the current use of NAF in international military operations still retains characteristics that were prevalent in the period leading up to 1999. First, the use of NAF outside Norwegian borders has always been within a coalition where other countries or international organizations, predominately NATO and the UN, have acted as framework nations or entities. The Norwegian government states in Parliamentary Bill 48 from 2007 that deployment of NAF is only feasible within a multilateral framework and

²⁸¹ Jacob Boeressen, Gullow Gjeldseth, and Rolf Tamnes, *Norsk Forsvarshistorie del 5, 1970–2000 Allianseforsvar I endring* [The History of the Norwegian Defense part 5, 1970–2000] (Bergen:Eide, 2004), 168–227.

²⁸² Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 24.

this will also be a prevailing factor in future deployments of NAF abroad.²⁸³ Second, past history and current use of NAF abroad suggest that different types of units and capabilities, to include purely staff and support elements, are likely to be deployed as part of a larger international coalition with a limited time perspective and few expectations with regards to achieving a purely Norwegian effect. Third, the number of failed, or failing, states and the increased Norwegian will to use NAF outside the Euro-Atlantic area implies that NAF must be prepared to operate in semi-permissive and hostile environments and take part in COIN operations in the future as well.

2. Ground Force Elements of NAF

The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine argues that the function of land forces in a joint and combined military operation is “territorial control over time and close interaction with the actors in the conflict area.”²⁸⁴ Furthermore, the doctrine emphasizes the importance of a persistent presence of soldiers on the ground in order to gain “access to first hand information”²⁸⁵ related to the “parties in a conflict and other factors that affect the operation.”²⁸⁶ Finally, the doctrine also accentuates that land forces influence an adversary’s freedom of action “directly and indirectly” by use of both “lethal and non-lethal” means.²⁸⁷

A long-term presence of ground forces aimed not only at providing security, but also at establishing a close rapport with the local population, is the foundation of strategy one in the Diamond Model. The doctrine also correctly identifies the importance of gaining “access to first hand information” to counter the information advantage of the adversary in a counterinsurgency environment. Furthermore, the doctrine identifies the important role of non-kinetic means with regards to limiting “the adversary’s freedom of

²⁸³ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 35.

²⁸⁴ Forsvarets Stabsskole [Norwegian Defense Command and Staff College], Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine, 111.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

action and affecting his will and capability” to resist the efforts of a counterinsurgent. As such, the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine reflects a basic understanding of how to counter an insurgency. However, the constant presence of ground forces, as part of a COIN campaign, is a resource-demanding affair. Therefore, it is necessary to address the size, quality, and capabilities of Norwegian ground forces to properly identify the possibilities and limitations, and consequently what realistically can be expected of NAF in a long-term COIN setting.

3. The Norwegian Army 2009

The main element of the Norwegian Army is its independent mechanized brigade, known as Brigade Nord (Brig N). This unit consists of two mechanized maneuver battalions, one light infantry battalion, and conventional combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units (engineer, artillery, logistics, and medical units). The Norwegian Army has at its disposal a Border Guard battalion; His Majesty the King’s Guards, which is a battalion-sized unit; a battalion-sized Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) unit; and a CIMIC Company. In addition, the Norwegian Army also has a SOF unit, namely the Norwegian Army Special Operations Command (NORASOC).²⁸⁸

The Border Guard and His Majesty the King’s Guards are tasked with purely national duties. This excludes these units from being deployable abroad or function as significant manpower sources for such missions. NORASOC is also required to retain a minimum of its manpower on call in Norway to handle purely national missions. In addition, approximately half of the manpower/units in Brig N are busy with basic training of conscripts at any given time. This leaves the Norwegian Army with at best two maneuver battalions of combat forces available for missions abroad. In addition to this are elements of NORASOC, CS and CSS units, and the CIMIC Company. In essence,

²⁸⁸ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 75 and Norwegian Ministry of Defense, *Norwegian Defence 2008*, 19.

this means that the Norwegian Army will probably struggle to maintain a long-term contribution to an international military operation and international-led COIN campaigns that exceed a company-sized element of combat troops.

However, the CIMIC Company is an example of how the Norwegian Army does possess other types of assets and/or niche capacities that can have vital roles and the potential to make a difference in joint military operations abroad, especially in a COIN setting. Engineer units, for instance, can be of incomparable value when rebuilding infrastructure and tending to the basal needs for clean water and a sufficiently working sewer system among the local populace in many third world countries. Mine clearance capacities and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are also often in high demand in war-torn countries. Norway has a long-standing history and reputation of highly professional mine clearing personnel, and Norwegian Army mine clearing teams were used in the initial phases of both OEF in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq. If such units are used to improve the security of the populations in third world countries they are likely to create favorable perceptions of the international military presence among the local populace. Lastly, medical units can also have invaluable effects in a counterinsurgency environment if they are able to provide medical services to the local population that otherwise would be scarce or non-existent.

Nevertheless, the numerical limitations of the Norwegian Army direct that contributions to joint COIN campaigns will not only be limited primarily to a tactical level, but also characterized by lack of personnel and units to sustain the long-term commitments necessary in COIN. Still, NAF also have certain units and elements in the other service branches that can mitigate the numerical limitations of the Army and thus help sustain long-term Norwegian presence if needed. This has occurred in the past, and the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Meymameh, Afghanistan, has for instance previously been manned with personnel from the Norwegian Navy. At the time of writing, this unit also has an element made up of personnel from the Norwegian Home Guard, a reserve service branch that is organized and trained along somewhat similar lines as the U.S. National Guard.

4. Potential Assets for COIN Operations in the Norwegian Navy, Air Force, and Home Guard

The Norwegian Navy has within its ranks three units that are highly suitable for COIN operations. The Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commando (NORNAVSOC) is a battalion-sized unit highly capable and trained in land operations. Elements of this unit have been deployed along the same lines as elements from NORASOC, primarily as part of OEF and ISAF in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Norwegian Navy also has its own Naval ISTAR unit, regularly identified as the coastal rangers. This is a company-sized unit, primarily trained for land operations in the coastal waters of Norway. This unit has also been used to man the Norwegian PRT in Meymameh, and proved themselves to be highly confident and well-qualified for such tasks. Lastly, the Norwegian Navy also contains an EOD unit, the mine clearance divers, which clearly can contribute to land-based operations. This was for instance the case in 2001, when a team from this unit was deployed to the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The unit was a part of operation Task Force Harvest (TFH), a NATO operation, aimed at facilitating peace talks between the Macedonian government and the Macedonian branch of the UCK, as well as the ensuing disarmament of the UCK. In the post-9/11 era, the unit has been deployed to Afghanistan as part of OEF as well as to Iraq as part of OIF.

The Norwegian Home Guard has at its disposal thirteen “rapid reaction forces,” which are battalion-sized units trained and organized along the lines of light infantry units, but with no generic mobility or fire support. Their mission is to be “capable of deployment at short notice to support the exercise of sovereignty, national crisis management and assist the civil power in maintaining public security”²⁸⁹ in Norway. Home Guard personnel have all been through at least six months of basic training and are required to go through yearly training to maintain their readiness. Furthermore, substantial parts of the personnel within these units have previous experience from regular service within NAF and operations abroad. At the time of this writing (2009), there is a military observation team (MOT) currently working for the Norwegian PRT in

²⁸⁹ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], *Norwegian Defence 2008*, 22.

Meymameh, which is predominately made up of personnel from the Norwegian Home Guard. With a total number of almost 5,000 men, the “rapid reaction forces” of the Home Guard must be considered as a viable source of manpower for NAF operations abroad.

However, there are important limitations that must be taken into account. First, the Home Guard units are not combat units per se and the deployment of complete Home Guard units above troop/platoon level cannot be considered a viable option due to lack of mobility, firepower, and joint operational training. However, the deployment of team-sized elements embedded within regular Norwegian units like the current MOT team in Meymameh appears to be an auspicious, but currently unexplored source for NAF operations abroad, to include COIN operations. Second, personnel in the Home Guard are not subject to the same regulations as regular service members within NAF. They have regular civilian jobs and as such all deployments of Home Guard personnel to operations abroad must be based on voluntariness. The result is that Home Guard personnel must be individually recruited and then go through a phase of specifically designed familiarization and preparation training, for instance team level, before they can be deployed.

The Norwegian Air Force must also be considered when addressing possible sources of manpower and units for NAF operations abroad, including COIN operations. Clearly, helicopter units have a vital role in all contemporary military operations, but they have limited effect in a COIN environment, except for medevac and logistical duties. However, the Norwegian Air Force does have guard units that are deployable abroad, primarily for force protection duties. Such units could thus either relieve army units that could be used for more active duties in a COIN environment or ease the current operational toll on the army units.

5. Strategic and Operational Land Force Command and Control Elements within NAF

The Norwegian Army has a Mobile Tactical Land Command (MLTC), which is considered to be a part of its operational capabilities.²⁹⁰ In essence, this is the staff element of the mechanized brigade, Brig N. However, this staff has not been utilized in international military operations and it is likely that they will not be deployed, unless Brig N, or at least major elements of the brigade, is deployed abroad. When NAF units are deployed abroad they are embedded within a multilateral framework, like for instance ISAF in Afghanistan, and are thus subject to the operational lines of command and control within such organizations. When the size of NAF elements that are deployed to any given operational theatre reaches a certain threshold, typically at or above company level, Norway in general establishes an independent staff element, designated the National Contingent Commander (NCC).

The NCC is organized along the lines of a miniature brigade staff and is not a part of a multilateral command and control structure. In many ways, the NCC Chief is the superintendent of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. In addition to being the supreme representative of all NAF units and personnel within the theatre of operations, he is also the “red card” holder with regards to Norwegian national caveats that direct which type of operations NAF units can conduct. Besides maintaining national lines of communication, assessing potential future use of NAF units within the theatre of operations, and the “red card” duty, the NCC is to a limited degree involved in the day-to-day operations of Norwegian units.

6. Future Deployments of NAF Units to Land Operations Abroad

In the 2007 budget for NAF, which was released in 2006, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense stated that the number of personnel in the Norwegian Army was to increase in order to achieve a goal of being able to simultaneously sustain two company-sized NAF

²⁹⁰ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], *Norwegian Defence 2008*, 22.

elements in separate operational theaters.²⁹¹ Once this threshold of personnel was achieved, it was also expected that the Norwegian Army would be capable of sustaining a battalion-sized unit abroad, over a period of three to five years.²⁹² However, less than 24 months later, the Ministry of Defense had toned down their ambitions and stated that the current level of Norwegian land forces was too high to be sustained over time.²⁹³ At the time, NAF had approximately a company-sized element of combat forces deployed abroad, SOF units set aside. In addition, NAF also had smaller elements with niche capacities deployed and were, for instance, manning the PRT in Meymameh.

The Norwegian government correctly recognizes that Norway will never be able to provide the number of forces that other larger countries are able to provide to multilateral operations abroad.²⁹⁴ As such, it appears that future Norwegian land force contributions with regards to long-term COIN operations, like the one currently taking place in Afghanistan, will not exceed the level of a company-sized unit. It follows that a unit of that size and capability, even though they are tasked with independent COIN-related missions, must be embedded within a joint or foreign command and control structure. Furthermore, it is also implied that such units will be operating at the tactical level within an overall COIN campaign, which will have implications on the way Norwegian units conduct IO and deal with issues of nation-building.

In addition, the Norwegian government also asserts that Norway will contribute adequately through high quality forces with the ability to not only operate within, but also enhance a joint operational environment.²⁹⁵ This is partly ensured by the contribution of Norwegian niche capacities like EOD, mine clearance, and SOF units. However, the

²⁹¹ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St. prp. Nr. 1 (2006–2007) *Forsvarsbudsjettet* [The defence budget], Parliamentary Bill no. 1 (2006–2007). Det Kongelige Forsvarsdepartement [Ministry of Defense], 14, www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/STP/20062007/001FD/PDFS/STP200620070001_FDDDDPDFS.pdf, (accessed April 25, 2009).

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 75.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 35.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

limited size of these units directs that they cannot sustain long-term commitments on behalf of NAF within their fields of operation, and in certain cases such units have been deployed abroad for periods lasting less than six months. It follows that the influence and effect such units have on long-term goals and development in a COIN environment must be considered as limited.

7. NAF and Information Operations

The official Norwegian perception of IO is that “Military Information Operations are employed to support the achievement of political and military objectives in any given operation”²⁹⁶ and Parliamentary Bill 48, 2008, argues that IO should be perceived as a strategy aimed at coordinating “military activities in the information sphere.”²⁹⁷ Within NAF the role and utility of IO is somewhat more specified. The joint operational doctrine of NAF argues that the objectives of information operations are to:

1. Influence the adversary at command level; that is to say influence the leaders’ perceptions, plans, actions, and will to continue combat.
2. Influence the adversary’s decision processes, that is to say destroy, degrade, interrupt, deny, mislead and exploit weaknesses in the adversary’s decision processes, information and information system.
3. Develop and maintain a correct awareness of the situation, protect own and allied decision processes, information and information systems.
4. Influence any third parties and others so that they support our operation.
5. Keep non-combatants and neutral organizations informed so that they can cooperate more easily.²⁹⁸

The doctrine also recognizes the importance of “centralized planning and decentralized execution” of IO in order to “ensure synchronization and coordination with

²⁹⁶ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 62–63. Translated by authors.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Forsvarets stabsskole [Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College], Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine, 111.

other operations.”²⁹⁹ If the Norwegian Joint Doctrine gives a reasonably accurate picture of how IO is perceived and conducted, and the authors of this study believe it does, then IO has a “conventional” focus and is primarily “enemy centric” in its execution within NAF. Influencing “third-parties,” which according to the doctrine encompasses the local population, is a goal for Norwegian IO, but the role of the local population in general is perceived as subordinate to that of the enemy and the importance of internal information processes. Based on the discussion in Chapter II related to the counterinsurgent’s information disadvantage, it follows that the local population should be the prime target for IO in insurgency conflicts. As such, it can be inferred that the role of the local population in contemporary conflicts in general and COIN operations specifically is not sufficiently recognized in the Norwegian perception and execution of IO.

Furthermore, based on the authors’ experience and general impressions, IO is neither implemented as a career field within NAF on tactical and operational levels, nor perceived as a vital element of planning and execution of military operations at these levels of command in general. At the tactical level, however, the authors believe that officers and soldiers recognize the second- and third-order effects their actions have on the perceptions and opinions of non-combatants, especially the local population in a COIN environment. However, when it comes to systematic long-term planning, coordination, implementation, and execution of IO within Norwegian units and NAF in general, the authors assume there is a significant potential for improvement.

C. NON-MILITARY

As Chapters II through IV have made clear, military forces are not the only tools needed for a successful counterinsurgency campaign. This section outlines the potential for comprehensive counterinsurgency operations within the scope of the Norwegian government.

²⁹⁹ Forsvarets stabsskole [Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College], Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine, 140.

1. Coordination Mechanisms at the Various Levels

a. Strategic Level

Given the nature of comprehensive operations, coordination has to take place between various departments of the government at the strategic level. Such a mechanism is in work today, as it has been implemented as a department coordination forum at the deputy minister level in order to coordinate Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan.³⁰⁰ The fact that the coordination is carried out at such a high level obviously gives a lot of bureaucratic clout. Nevertheless, a government study points to a crucial point when it states that the complexity of comprehensive operations far outrun what an ad-hoc coordination forum can handle.³⁰¹ While the coordination mechanism is powerful, it is therefore also very limited in what questions it can address. The same government study proposes that a permanent capacity for these kinds of questions should be established within the Prime Minister's staff.³⁰² Such a solution would obviously go a long way to alleviate the shortfall should it be implemented.

A related point is the established government policy of relying primarily on the UN. If the UN is providing an integrated mission framework for an intervention, the need for strategic coordination at a national level is reduced. There will of course still be questions that have to be decided at a national level, but much of the day-to-day questions will have to be handled by the UN. As such, much can be achieved by simply responding to the recommendations and requests made by the UN.

³⁰⁰ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 60.

³⁰¹ Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU), NOU 2008:14, Samstemt for utvikling? Hvordan en helhetlig norsk politikk kan bidra til utvikling i fattige land, [Norwegian official studies 2008:14, *Coordinated for development? How a comprehensive Norwegian policy can contribute to development in poor countries*], 160, www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/NOU-er/2008/nou-2008-14.html?id=525832, (accessed April 7, 2009).

³⁰² Ibid.

b. Operational Level

Taking a step down to the operational level, the means for coordination are limited. If, however, a Norwegian Embassy is functioning in the country where the COIN campaign is to take place, that Embassy is of course a candidate to coordinate all Norwegian efforts.

It is worth noting, however, that this capacity may be very limited. After years of focusing on Afghanistan as one of the most important foreign security issues, the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul numbers no more than ten individuals. Compared to the operational level headquarters of ISAF, which employs more than 1,800 personnel,³⁰³ it seems obvious that an Embassy cannot be very detailed in its oversight of counterinsurgency efforts. If one accepts as a premise that a counterinsurgency operation is likely to take place in a failed or failing state, a Norwegian Embassy may not be functioning at all.

³⁰³ NATO, "ISAF headquarters," ISAF Web site, <http://www.nato.int/ISAF/structure/hq/index.html>, (accessed April 9, 2009).




Figure 6. Capitals without Norwegian Embassy Presence (Blue Triangles) Over the Failed State Index Score (Color of Countries)^{304 305}

³⁰⁴ The fund for peace, “Failed states index 2008,” http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140, (accessed April 13, 2009).

³⁰⁵ Utenriksdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Web site, “Norske utenriksstasjoner,” <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/org/utenriksstasjoner.html?id=524467>, (accessed April 16, 2009).

The colors on the various nation-states indicate the failed state index score of 2008. Blue triangles and attached labels indicate the countries where Norway does not have an embassy. Oslo-based embassies are depicted as no embassy presence. Embassy-offices are treated as embassies.

Given the stated policy that foreign interventions have to be carried out through some sort of framework, preferably the UN, a limited capacity might nevertheless be appropriate. In such a case, the Embassy would not carry any responsibility for either planning operations in the near term or overseeing current operations, namely tasks that occupy a majority of the resources in a military headquarters at the operational level. A case in point could be the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul that interacts with the Afghan government, the UN and other IGOs, Norwegian military forces, and Norwegian NGOs. An important part of its mission seems to be to make recommendations and decisions regarding the use of funds authorized by the Norwegian government. By doing so, Norway maintains some flexibility and the ability to solve problems experienced by Norwegian contributors. As an example, the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul keeps two employees stationed with the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab, ensuring that Norwegian funds are spent on projects that are perceived as important in that province and in accordance with the stated policy.

If a Norwegian Embassy is not present when a COIN campaign is initiated, the Norwegian Armed Forces could be given the task of coordinating all Norwegian efforts at the operational level. It should be noted, however, that such a solution is not likely to go over very well with Norwegian NGOs and possibly not with policymakers either.

A more likely solution then is that the operational level coordination will have to be shouldered by the framework organization alone (i.e., the UN, NATO etc.). This solution naturally gives less possibility for pursuing national goals as well as remedying shortfalls experienced by the forces on the ground.

c. Tactical Level

At the tactical level, a limited capacity has been established and used. The Ministry of Justice and the Police has established a pool of personnel that can contribute in state-building efforts abroad, primarily oriented towards programs concerning the rule

of law.³⁰⁶ This pool was established in 2004, originally with the purpose of supporting the UN, the OSCE, and the European Union.³⁰⁷ Currently, the pool consists of forty individuals with specialties as judges and prosecutors (military and civilian), as well as personnel with expertise within prison systems. A few individuals from this group are currently working in Afghanistan, both in Kabul and together with the PRT in the Faryab province. Previously, the pool has been used in the Balkans, Georgia, and Armenia.³⁰⁸

In addition to this pool of personnel, Norwegian police have also been used in international operations since 1989.³⁰⁹ Such contributions have mainly been part of the UN-administered international police force (civilian police). Currently, the Norwegian government has expressed a goal of keeping one percent of the Norwegian police force in peacekeeping operations at any time.³¹⁰ The Norwegian police currently employ around 12,000 persons, 8,000 of which are police officers.³¹¹ Depending on how the one percent goal is calculated, it should provide a pool of 80-120 police officers available for international operations.

Both of these capabilities, the pool of experts as well as the police, are highly relevant for future COIN operations. At the same time, it seems clear that the capacity is very limited. The implications of the limited numbers are discussed in Chapter VI.

2. Use of Non-governmental Organizations

Norway also has a long tradition of funding NGOs through its foreign aid budget. While a fair amount of this funding might be expected to be used for humanitarian aid, some of it is also used for purposes that would fall within the domain of nation-building.

³⁰⁶ NOU, *Helhetlig norsk politikk*, 2008:14, 154.

³⁰⁷ NOU, *Helhetlig norsk politikk*, 2008:14, 154.

³⁰⁸ Utenriksdepartementet, [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] “Styrkebrønnen, well of strength,” www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/well/strength.htm, (accessed April 9, 2009).

³⁰⁹ NOU, *Helhetlig norsk politikk*, 2008:14, 154.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹¹ Politidirektoratet [The Norwegian National Police Directorate], “The Police in Norway,” 12, www.politi.no/downloads/060404_thepoliceinnorway.pdf, (accessed April 14, 2009).

The Norwegian Refugee Council is the largest recipient of aid funding from the Norwegian government.³¹² In Afghanistan, the Norwegian Refugee Council trains lawyers, judges, and community elders in property law.³¹³ It has also assisted the Afghan Ministry of Education with developing a new training program for teachers.³¹⁴ The second largest recipient of aid, the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), is also heavily involved in Afghanistan. The NCA has a wide of array of programs, some of which address the issue of improving governance or promoting women's rights.³¹⁵ The point here is not to undermine the critical humanitarian aid provided by these organizations, but rather that these NGOs are also important implementation partners in the Norwegian government's policy in Afghanistan.

An important insight in this regard is that "so much of peace-building is implemented with NGOs that extended dialogue with them is a strategic necessity."³¹⁶ As long as NGOs have a prevalent role in counterinsurgency theaters, (beyond humanitarian aid), the same must also be true for counterinsurgency operations. At the very least, such an extended dialogue has to be conducted at the strategic level when the funds are distributed. Therefore, the government has a powerful tool in its ability to prioritize where the foreign aid goes. Whether this tool is being utilized or not is beyond the scope of this discussion, although one may assume that there is some unrealized potential.

While NGOs have adapted their efforts to comply with the government's development assistance policy, it is clear that policy is also developed in cooperation with the NGOs. The organisations maintain that there is little pressure to pursue goals other than their own. The authorities exert an

³¹² Norwegian Agency for Aid Development (NORAD), "Norwegian development aid in figures," http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=12461&V_LANG_ID=0, (accessed April 9, 2009).

³¹³ Norwegian Refugee Council, "Facts about NRC's country programme," <http://www.nrc.no/?did=9169435>, (accessed April 14, 2009).

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Norwegian Church Aid, "Country Programme Plan, Afghanistan," <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/Documents/Kirkens%20Nodhjelp/Geografiske%20filer/Asia/KN-NCA-AFG-Afghanistan-Country%20Plan-2005-2009-rev%202007.pdf>, (accessed April 14, 2009).

³¹⁶ Utstein study, 59, <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2000/0265/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf>, (accessed May 21, 2009).

influence through the guidelines for applications for funding and the fact that funding is more readily available for priority themes and countries. In the long term this leads to mutual influence and adaptation, whereby the differences between public and NGO policies are erased.³¹⁷

Nevertheless, a few general observations can be made. First, the Norwegian government needs to consider whether or not to use its funding of NGOs as a potential component of a counterinsurgency effort. If so, the use of foreign aid needs to be seen in conjunction with the goals of a counterinsurgency campaign.

Second, its ability to prioritize and direct the effort of various NGOs will to a large degree depend on the detailed knowledge and understanding that flows from the tactical and operational levels. As the discussion above shows, the bottleneck seems to be at the operational level. The weaker this level is, the more difficult it will be to direct the effects of foreign aid.

Third, foreign aid funds intended for counterinsurgency theaters may be distributed with the condition that some sort of coordination is carried out with other Norwegian assets at the operational and tactical levels. This is obviously a contentious issue, as several Norwegian NGOs have been very critical of coordination with military forces. Chapter IV discussed how such coordination might be achieved.

D. CONCLUSION

Several factors shape how the Norwegian Armed Forces need to think about counterinsurgency operations. First of all, there is a trend towards using NAF outside the Euro-Atlantic area as well as in operations with a higher physical risk than has been observed previously. This trend has become apparent in the post-9/11 era and is driven by Norway's security interests. As such, the trend is likely to continue and means that it is likely that NAF will also be used on counterinsurgency operations in the future.

³¹⁷ Utenriksdepartementet [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], "New roles for non-governmental organisations in development cooperation," http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rapporter/2006/New-roles-for-non-governmental-organisations-in-development-cooperation/4.html?id=420467, (accessed April 14, 2009).

Second, it is a stated goal of the Norwegian government to emphasize the use of a comprehensive approach wherever NAF are employed. It is an important constraint that such future deployments will have to take place within a broader framework, such as NATO or preferably the UN. The present use of forces as well as other government resources in Afghanistan, however, shows that there is also the ability and will to use national channels to work comprehensively in focused areas.

Third, there are severe limitations on any Norwegian military contributions to counterinsurgencies. The Norwegian Army will have problems with maintaining a contribution of combat forces that exceeds a company-sized element in the long run. It should be noted, however, that there is a pool of personnel available from other parts of NAF that might be used to augment and improve sustainability, provided that time and money is set aside for training, equipment, and preparation. Also, there are niche capabilities within the NAF that are highly relevant for COIN operations. These capabilities include special operation forces, EOD units in both the Army and the Navy, engineer units, medical support, etc. The history of NAF deployments, the professional level of soldiers and officers, and the general doctrine in place suggest that there is a promising foundation for the development, implementation, and successful execution of a more detailed doctrine for COIN operations.

On the information operations side, however, experience and capabilities are largely absent. It is also worth noting that the Mobile Land Tactical Command or the NCC concept could provide a means for the Norwegian government to coordinate counterinsurgency efforts at an operational level.

Fourth, outside the military realm, there are some Norwegian resources suited for comprehensive counterinsurgency operations. Given the policy aim of relying on a larger framework, the strategic and operational level resources might be sufficient even though they are very small. In Afghanistan, the Norwegian Embassy has played an important role and demonstrates one way of achieving operational level coordination. In relying on such a solution, however, it should be noted that Norwegian Embassies are not present in all the trouble spots of the world, necessitating a backup concept where there is no

Norwegian Embassy or where the Embassy's resources themselves are severely limited. At the tactical level, there are resources and policies in effect that can produce a viable civilian component of a Norwegian counterinsurgency effort.

Last, the Norwegian government has a long history of using NGOs as implementing partners for foreign aid programs. Presently, this practice is used in Afghanistan. The use of foreign aid is therefore an important, albeit controversial, tool for implementing a comprehensive approach in counterinsurgencies.

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VI. THE NORWEGIAN MODEL

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to develop and describe a conceptual framework that should be used by NAF in counterinsurgency operations. In previous chapters the authors have outlined and discussed what an insurgency is and what the principles for counterinsurgency are: information operations and the important role they play in a counterinsurgency environment; nation-building and common challenges related to this process for counterinsurgent forces; and finally, the limitations and opportunities of NAF in international long-term counterinsurgency efforts/operations. As such, we have not only outlined core theory on COIN in general, but also addressed the military means available for the Norwegian Government with regards to participation in counterinsurgency operations.

The way NAF should conduct COIN should be a product of the means available and the objectives, goals, or ends that Norwegian decision makers want to achieve with the use of these means.³¹⁸ It is imperative that there is an appropriate “balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources available” and “ends, ways, and means” must be perceived “as part of an integral whole.”³¹⁹ “That is ends, ways, and means must be consistent.”³²⁰ As such, the way Norwegian Armed Forces should conduct counterinsurgency operations³²¹ must be derived from the means at hand for the Norwegian government and their stated objectives or ends.

Furthermore, the overall scope of this study is to provide a theoretically informed policy advisory for NAF and the authors will incorporate the theoretical principles outlined in previous chapters as they provide cardinal guidelines for the choice of way or method for Norwegian COIN.

³¹⁸ H. Richard Yarger, Towards a theory of strategy, <http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm>, (accessed April 24, 2009).

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ This is the general research question stated in Chapter I of this study.

In this last chapter, the authors will initially identify and discuss stated and official goals for the use of NAF, as well as associated non-military means, in international military operations abroad. Then they will introduce a generic model for a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency that will be used as a point of departure for discussing and deriving a conceptual framework for how NAF should conduct COIN. The authors' aim is to address the implications of their generic model on the way NAF should conduct COIN and also identify palpable guidelines aimed at improving the effectiveness of NAF in COIN operations. Finally, based on their discussions/study, the authors will provide a set of recommendations for how NAF should prepare for and conduct COIN operations in the future.

Stated and official objectives, or ends for the use of NAF, as well as non-military means, in COIN-related missions will not be subject of any discussion with regards to their validity or feasibility. The purpose of identifying official Norwegian goals and objectives is similar to the authors' discussion on NAF structure and capabilities, namely to create an appropriate underpinning and framework of understanding for the choice of method for how NAF should conduct COIN.

B. NORWEGIAN ENDS

At the strategic level, NAF are considered a vital means for the Norwegian authorities to strengthen the credibility, influence, and political integrity of Norway as an international actor.³²² It follows that future participation in “multinational peace operations and international defense cooperation”³²³ within the framework of NATO and the UN is not only a stated goal of the Norwegian authorities, but also perceived as a vital and integrated part of Norwegian national security policy and foreign policy.³²⁴

³²² Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 12.

³²³ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], *Norwegian Defence 2008*, 5–7.

³²⁴ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 10–35.

Norwegian authorities state that desired ends should direct the choice of means and ways in peace operations and that military means alone, even though they might be readily available, cannot effectively assure success.³²⁵ Norway has taken on a leading role with regards to the development of multilateral and integrated peace operations within the U.N. framework.³²⁶ The goal is to establish a “comprehensive approach” where both military and non-military means are coordinated and interconnected, and mutual parts of the overall strategic effort.³²⁷ It follows that a vital goal is to maximize the overall and synergistic effect of both Norwegian military and non-military means in future operations.³²⁸

The limited size of NAF is also recognized by the authorities, as they acknowledge that Norway will never be able to commit large numbers of military forces abroad. However, a stated goal is that Norway must contribute with military units that are not only of high relevance and quality, but also able to enhance and strengthen multilateral cooperation in international military operations.³²⁹ Furthermore, it is also a stated goal that NAF should draw personnel, units, and capacities from all services with regards to military operations abroad. The rationale is that this will enhance the possibility of long-term commitments by NAF.³³⁰ Lastly, Norwegian authorities also aim to reduce the number of military commitments abroad and focus on as few operational areas as possible in order to maximize “...the operational effect of scarce [military] resources.”³³¹

³²⁵ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *Forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 61.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 61.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 61.

³³¹ *Ibid.*

Insurgencies are people-centric conflicts and victory “hinges on legitimacy and the moral right to govern,”³³² or put in other words, success depends on which of the adverse parties the population decides to support. It follows that the overall and generic aim for NAF at operational and tactical levels in COIN operations must be to enlist active support from the population. To achieve long-term effects it is vital that the active support provided by the population is a result of true preferences rather than assisted preferences. That is, that the populace wants to support the counterinsurgent in contrast to being compelled into supporting him.³³³

In order to attain support and be prone to true preferences from the population, the counterinsurgent must be perceived as a more favorable option than the insurgency movement. This presupposes that COIN forces are able to “create and sustain security and manage political, economic, and social developments within the local population,”³³⁴ all of which should be vital sub-objectives for NAF at the operational level.

At the operational and tactical levels in COIN, credibility is also a vital aspect of the process of establishing true preferences towards counterinsurgency forces. NAF must thus strive to be perceived as a credible actor in counterinsurgency environments and must “ensure that all military operations, especially civil-military actions, deliver as promised.”³³⁵ In essence this means, “all actions must serve to create and sustain credibility in the eyes of the supported populace and government.”³³⁶ In the end, the likely effect of a steady increase in active support from the population is the following: first, better intelligence that counters the information disadvantage of the

³³² Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach To Counterinsurgency Operations*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 7 June 2006), 14, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/manual.pdf, (accessed January 24, 2009).

³³³ Assisted and true preferences are discussed in Chapter II.

³³⁴ Marine Corps, *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats*, 14.

³³⁵ Hoffman, “Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace,” 309.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, 308.

counterinsurgent and enables him to conduct more effective operations against insurgency forces; second, less freedom of action for the insurgency movement to evoke support and supplies (people, guns, and money) from the population.

C. OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL




Figure 7. The Norwegian Model

The purpose of the model is to relate the theory to the capabilities of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The model also provides a holistic view of the theory, and thereby attempts to put the various parts in perspective. In many ways, the Norwegian model can be seen as a depiction of the state actor in the Diamond Model. In other words, the model describes the tasks and theory that governs the state actor in a counterinsurgency struggle.

The first pillar, *provide security*, is derived directly from strategy one in the Diamond Model. The critical goal for providing security is to deny the insurgents the ability to influence the assisted preference of the population. Successfully doing so will lead to information about the insurgent organization coming forward, and thus enable the dismantling of the insurgent organization. Further, establishing security will make it easier to start building up local security forces as well as enabling the local government to carry out its function.

The second pillar, *train and assist host nation security forces*, can be traced back to both information operation needs as well as nation-building requirements. Establishing host nation security forces is necessary from an IO point of view in order to establish an impression of the state as the ultimate winner of the conflict. By influencing the population's perception of who is the likely winner of the conflict, more support is likely to be forthcoming from the population. From the nation-building point of view, it is also important to demonstrate the capability and intent of the host nation government. Establishing security forces that respond to the population's needs is one of the most important services a government can deliver. Establishing local security forces is of course also a necessary step before the intervening powers can successfully leave the host nation. In any case, the successful establishing of local security forces is likely to influence the security situation positively. Not only does that give the rest of the government structure a much-needed boost, it also improves the conditions under which the rest of the government must function.

The third pillar, *improve governance*, is derived from the requirements of nation-building. The ultimate goal of this activity is to produce a society that is at peace with itself, since it is the disequilibrium in society that created the insurgency in the first place.³³⁷ As such, establishing good governance will be the final determinant of whether the COIN effort will succeed or not. At a more tangible level, improving governance needs to take aim at providing fundamental services to the population, as well as establishing the necessary revenue to run the state in the long run.

³³⁷ See Chapter II for a discussion of why insurgencies occur.

The relationships between the pillars are important to notice. Without security, the other two are hard to get started. Without establishing host nation security forces, security may be short-lived. Further, the government may never be seen as sincere or genuine in its attempt to serve the population. Finally, without improving governance, any effort at establishing security and local capacities may be reversed in the long run.

Information operations are illustrated to encompass all these three activities. This depiction reflects the point illustrated in Chapter III, namely that a counterinsurgency is first and foremost a struggle that happens in the psychological and informational domains. As such, information operations must permeate all efforts in the attempt to achieve the victory in these domains.

This also reflects the critical conclusion from Chapter II, namely that it is the population that holds the key to success. As demonstrated in the same chapter, it is not only the population's true preference that determines the outcome, but also the insurgents' ability to influence the population's actions. The primary goal of all efforts must therefore be to ensure the active support of the population.

Finally, the nature of a counterinsurgency is complex, not only because of the span of the problem itself but also because of the multitude of actors that are likely to operate within the host nation. Chapter IV established that the old precept of unity of command is no longer possible, and that a unity of effort needs to be a guiding principle for all actors. This is necessitated by the time pressure to alleviate the problem as well as the limited resources at hand.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR NAF

1. Security

Given the imperative of denying the insurgents the ability to influence the population, a few deductions can be made. Based on the discussion of the theory, it seems obvious that the Norwegian Armed Forces should be given the mission to protect a certain portion of the population in the host nation. The size of this portion naturally depends on several factors, such as the level of the insurgent threat, the population's

geographic dispersion, the capability and capacity of the host nation's security forces, etc. As a rule of thumb it is still the size of the population, as opposed to the size of the area they live in, that is the most determining factor. Theory points to a need for up to 20 security personnel for every 1,000 inhabitants. With a company-sized element, that ratio suggests that NAF may not be able to take on security responsibilities for more than 10,000 individuals.

Nevertheless, the situation needs to be taken into account. Given the goal of providing security, the real recommended force ratio for NAF should be one where NAF at any time can deter or stop the insurgents from using force against the population. This will prevent the insurgents from creating an assisted preference for their cause. While this approach may increase the number to which NAF can provide security, it also contains other significant limitations. One of these limitations is that the Norwegian security forces need to keep a continuous physical presence in the population that is being protected. A situation where NAF will need hours to get to the scene is equal to one with no security presence at all; in such a case the insurgents will have the ability to enforce their threats and thus influence the population. This implies that the larger the geographic area of responsibility the less concentrated the forces will have to be. Another imperative is that NAF will have to be responsive to the needs of the population. A traditional elaborate military process of mission analysis, planning, briefing, coordination, etc. may be out of the question when responsiveness is crucial. It follows that the forces used for this kind of task need to be well trained and of high quality.

This is not to say that all forces need to live among the population. Galula recommends that the counterinsurgent solve these tasks through splitting his force into *static* and *mobile units*.

It seems natural that the counterinsurgent's forces should be organized into two types of units, the mobile ones fighting in a rather conventional fashion, and the static ones staying with the population in order to protect it and to supplement the political efforts³³⁸

³³⁸ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 65.

a. *Static Security Forces*

Galula's recommendation is in line with the theory described in Chapter II, and NAF should therefore employ static security forces in order to protect the population and assist in the host nation's reclaiming its position. These missions have several ramifications.

It seems obvious that the static units must interact closely with the local population as well as formal and informal authority figures. The rationale is that these forces are not only tasked with providing security for, but also winning the active support of the local population, which is also likely the best source of information with regards to the insurgency. It follows that the units to which NAF assign the static security mission to need to be both culturally aware and well-versed in counterinsurgency. Last but not least, static security units must not only have a thorough understanding of the psychological aspect and second- and third-order effects of all actions they undertake, but also know how to systematically influence the perceptions of the local population and leverage a basic information campaign in everyday operations.

As the static units must operate and live among the population, they are protecting, as opposed to working out of larger and well-protected military operating bases, they must also be capable of providing their own security. This is likely to have some consequences for both manning and equipment. The largest adjustment, however, is arguably the transition from a culture that focuses on leaving the operating base for sharply defined missions over to a situation where the whole effort becomes one long operation. That being said, it is a general perception and a source of pride in NAF that Norwegian soldiers are proficient at establishing a close rapport with its host population. To the extent that this is true, combat forces in the Norwegian Army should be well-poised for taking on static security missions.

It appears though that there is room for improvement with regards to the knowledge of the dynamics of population-centric conflicts and insurgencies, not only among Norwegian soldiers on the ground but throughout the ranks of NAF. Furthermore, Chapter V concluded that IO is a somewhat unexplored field within NAF, despite its vital

role in low-intensity conflicts in general and in insurgency conflicts in particular. NAF should focus on heightening the recognition and understanding of the dynamics of insurgency conflicts throughout the ranks through training and education. In addition, it can be argued that NAF also should recognize the crucial role of IO in COIN and that IO, if conducted properly, will act as a force multiplier. This entails that IO should not only be implemented as a special field within NAF, but also that systematical and deliberate IO pervades all operations conducted by NAF forces in a COIN environment.

b. Mobile Security Forces

The mobile security forces should be assigned two main missions. The first is to reinforce the static units wherever necessary. This mission is thereby very similar to the one assigned to quick reaction forces (QRF). The second is to conduct operations directly against the insurgents and their resources. Ideally, the static forces will enlist the support of the population and thereby be privy to updated information about the insurgents. This information can and should then be acted upon, both to demonstrate to the population that the COIN forces are responsive and to reduce the insurgent threat.

The missions for the mobile units are enemy-centric operations based on kinetic means, and thereby very much in the domain of conventional military operations. Therefore, combat units within NAF should be well-suited for this task as well. While the missions for the mobile forces take on characteristics that are comparable to conventional enemy-centric operations, they are still part of an overall COIN campaign. An important distinction then is the primacy of the static mission. Galula, as does most COIN theorists, underlines the danger of letting the conventional mission dominate.³³⁹ He argues that the main effort needs to remain with the commander that has the territorial command, i.e., the commander of the static unit.³⁴⁰ It follows that whenever NAF use their mobile forces, these need to be subordinate to or subject to limitations set by the static forces.

³³⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 65.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

A corollary to the argument above is that the psychological impact and long-term effects on the local population need to be considered by the mobile forces. It is a widely accepted claim that too much focus on use of force can quickly undo all that the static units have managed to build. IO, for instance, should be leveraged in order to emphasize the reasons and underpin the positive effects when kinetic operations are conducted. As such, firm understanding and knowledge of the dynamics of insurgency conflicts is also necessary for mobile forces. This directs that the recommendation with regards to training and education and implementation of IO is valid for NAF units, even if these, hypothetically, were solely to focus on the missions of the mobile units.

c. Use of Special Operation Forces (SOF)

Special Operation Forces are normally in high demand with regards to multinational COIN operations. Special Operation Forces units in general are often perceived as key to successful COIN operations. This is rooted in the history and missions of U.S. special forces, which to a large degree have been related to unconventional warfare (UW). Norwegian SOF (NORSOF), however, are primarily trained and organized, and aimed at conducting direct action (DA) missions at strategic and operational levels.³⁴¹ Nevertheless, some of NORSOF's qualities are applicable to providing security.

First, NORSOF are designed to deploy and reach a full operational capability quickly. At the same time, NORSOF are clearly of very limited size. Further, the forces are also trained to operate independently in hostile or semi-permissive environments. Taken together, these factors indicate that NORSOF should be considered for use in the initial phases of a COIN effort, or for employment where NAF have not yet deployed other forces. It also means that NORSOF are unlikely to sustain a long-term mission.

Second, the heritage from direct action missions does provide valuable skills in rapid reaction, integration of various intelligence sources, use of aerial platforms,

³⁴¹ Petter Hellesén, *Counterinsurgency and its Implications for the Norwegian Special Operations Forces*, 55, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/June/08Jun_Hellesen.pdf, (accessed May 4, 2009).

etc. These skills may be very valuable in exploiting particularly time-critical intelligence, for instance, intelligence on key insurgent personnel. As such, NORSOFF are arguably very well-suited for conducting DA missions that are enabled by forthcoming intelligence from the population.

Third, Petter Hellesén makes the case in his study of NORSOFF and COIN that military assistance (MA) should be considered a primary mission as well.³⁴² The MA mission entails training, organizing, and equipping host-nation forces. NORSOFF should be particularly suited for training other special operation forces. Increased emphasis on the MA mission, however, requires that NORSOFF increase its capability for understanding COIN and IO, as well as focusing on deeper cultural awareness and understanding.³⁴³

2. Train and Assist Host Nation Security Forces

Another mission for conventional military forces in COIN is the training and enabling of local forces to gradually take over control of their own territory and population. These missions follow the principles of MA, but are repeatedly also called foreign internal defense (FID). Regardless of which term is chosen to describe the activity, it is directly related to the pillar of *train and assist host nation security forces* in the authors' Norwegian model.

As concluded in Chapter IV, training and assisting host nation security forces is a task that has to be started as early as possible. Emphasis has to be put on shifting the weight of effort from international military forces over to national police forces. A few general guidelines can be drawn from this starting point.

The first general guideline is the obvious statement that training of police forces, or police-like forces, should take priority over training military forces for national defense missions against conventional and external threats. To the extent that NAF gravitate towards recreating host-nation forces in their own image, this tendency has to be

³⁴² Hellesén, *Counterinsurgency and its Implications*, 72.

³⁴³ Ibid.

counteracted. Spending time and resources on creating a *conventional* army will not do much to fight the insurgency; it may even be a drain on resources and thereby counterproductive. What the police forces should look like, however, is very much dependent on the situation, as typical military capabilities might still be required. Where insurgents operate in small numbers, an ordinary police force might be appropriate. As the insurgent's ability or will to use larger formations increase, the need for police capacities changes as well. Chapter IV suggests that paramilitary forces might be the ideal response for most cases. Under some circumstances, it might even be appropriate to train regular military forces to cover some basic police functions. The common denominator, however, is that the focus should be on securing the local population and not on external threats to the nation in question.

Second, the goal of creating or transforming a police force inherently raises the question of establishing a national-level program to handle training programs, equipment, standard procedures, etc. While this might be desirable in the medium- and long-term, Chapter IV stresses the need to seize the opportunity that results from an international intervention. According to this line of reasoning, local efforts to establish a police force should not be postponed in order to wait for such national-level programs to materialize. This implies that NAF should assure that local police entities operate in ways that underpin the overall effort of gaining the active support of the local population. This entails advising local police forces, but in the worst case scenario NAF must also be prepared to start a rudimentary police training program and run it until dedicated police assets or a national-level police training program take over. If this is the case, NAF will face requirements for: personnel competent in such training; interpreters; capacity for rudimentary selection and vetting of personnel; supplying the local force with basic equipment; paying for the local police force; etc. Should Norwegian police assets be available for these tasks, it would still be a fair assumption that NAF would have to provide logistical support. In any event, NAF need to be prepared to cooperate closely with police assets.

Third, to the extent that spending time and money on training an army is deemed beneficial, the counterinsurgent should never lose sight of the fact that in a COIN context

the value of this army stems from two factors; the first being its application in counterinsurgency operations and the second being the population's perception of it. Training and educating an army in proper counterinsurgency principles is in itself an arduous task—given the fundamental difference between conventional enemy centric warfare and population centric warfare. The fact that the potential trainers often will come from a conventional background themselves only makes it more difficult. It therefore follows that the personnel assigned such a task need to be well trained in counterinsurgency principles. It also follows that these trainers should be given the mission of preparing the host-nation army for use in counterinsurgency operations.

The value the population attaches to the army is largely a result of how the army behaves, which in turn is a result of how it is managed. Magsaysay's use of the Philippine Army, in what was termed civic action, is an example of how an army may transition to being perceived as useful.³⁴⁴ He recognized that army soldiers were the most visible symbol of government in rural areas and that "the government would be judged by the actions of its soldiers."³⁴⁵ If the soldiers and officers of the new or transformed army are known to steal food, harm crops, harass travelers, or in other ways impede on the population's daily life, it will represent a significant setback in convincing the population of the government's good intentions. If, on the other hand, the army's personnel are always respectful of the population's needs and property, it will likely cause a positive effect with regards to popular perceptions of the host nation government. Therefore, this factor demonstrates the need to ensure that host nation soldiers and officers are paid regularly and provided sufficient logistical support. For NAF, this once again underlines the requirement for trainers that fully understand the principles of COIN. Also, it means that a military training mission cannot focus on the operational side only; administration and logistics may be very important as well. It may be deduced that the NAF should also be prepared to take responsibility for payments and logistics until the host nation army itself, or international programs, can properly handle these functions.

³⁴⁴ See Stilwell, "Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency."

³⁴⁵ Stilwell, "Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency," 323.

NAF are based on national compulsory service and it follows that training and educating personnel in basic soldiering and unit tactics is part of everyday life in Norwegian military units. Training and advising foreign forces that will be tasked with counterinsurgency duties is, however, different. In order to properly prepare and train local forces to conduct COIN operations, it requires that the personnel and units in charge of training and advising host nation forces have firm knowledge of how to conduct COIN. As such, mere basic soldier skills and knowledge of conventional military tactics and procedures will not be sufficient. Furthermore, culture and language barriers will also be a challenge in general.

It follows that NAF units and personnel that are tasked with FID missions as part of a COIN campaign should go through comprehensive preparation and training before they take on FID duties. Such training must of course involve basic skills related to the training and education of military units and personnel, but should also focus on the culture and language of the nation in question. More importantly, NAF units and personnel conducting FID missions must also have a thorough understanding of the dynamics of insurgency conflicts. Such knowledge must be passed on to the forces they train and advise to truly prepare the forces for the threat from the insurgency they will have to quell. It follows that NAF must focus on heightening the recognition and understanding of the dynamics of insurgency conflicts, to include IO-related aspects, in the units and personnel assigned to FID missions. As was the case with NAF conducting static and mobile security missions in COIN, this must be done through methodical training and education.

3. Improve Governance

The task of improving governance is not in itself a task primarily for military forces. As demonstrated in Chapter IV, however, there are important connections between how the security component of a COIN force carries out its tasks on one side and how governance develops on the other side. These connections may be divided into two broad groups.

The first group contains issues where governance may be improved as a result of the counterinsurgent working through host nation government structures. If the counterinsurgent chooses to solve all tasks without involving such structures, they will not only miss the possibility to operate, but also the opportunity to positively demonstrate their utility to the local population. Thus, it follows that NAF as a matter of routine should work through local structures as much as possible. Examples of such involvement should be found in most of the counterinsurgent's activity. As concluded in Chapter IV, such cooperation may have to be limited to the lowest level initially, and then only gradually expanded to higher echelons of the host nation government.

It is not given that such involvements are successful in all cases, and NAF need to be prepared to remedy problems within the local government as they become evident. One way of doing so is of course to make sure that the local structures have the resources to carry out the necessary tasks. NAF should therefore be prepared to provide physical resources, such as logistical support, or make engineer units available. Chapter V identified the most relevant units to be the Norwegian CIMIC Company and engineer, mine clearance, EOD, and medical units. A critical insight, however, is that the value of such units does not primarily depend on their expertise, but rather on how they are employed. For instance, a field hospital may have a big impact if it provides health services to the local population, educates local health care personnel, or supplies medications to local clinics. If, on the other hand, the same field hospital is only used for treating Norwegian forces it will have no value for the larger issue of counterinsurgency at all. Similarly, a Norwegian engineer company may help the local administration to repair the electrical grid or an irrigation system, which would arguably be valuable in restoring popular support for the administration. Conversely, if the same engineer unit is exclusively used for building a forward operating base for Norwegian forces, then the COIN value is lost. It follows that to the extent that NAF can employ niche capabilities, these may contribute greatly to the counterinsurgency efforts, provided that NAF are given tasks that elicit popular support for the host nation and the

counterinsurgency forces. Another important observation is that at the end of the day, it is the host nation government, and not NAF, that needs credibility and popular support. As Kitson wrote about coordinating allies conducting COIN:³⁴⁶

The ultimate aim of the host nation [...] is to retain and regain the allegiance of its population. If this is borne in mind, it at once becomes evident that the way in which the ally's help is delivered is as important as the help itself, the main thing being that the host nation should be seen to be at the centre of the picture with the ally coming to its assistance.

For that reason, NAF units need to support the host nation in a way that gives as much credit to the host nation as possible. Again, this underlines the need for understanding counterinsurgency as well as pointing to the crucial role of IO generally and public affairs specifically. It follows also that personnel in such niche units should be given a thorough understanding of counterinsurgency.

Alternatively, money to buy services locally may be provided. The solution that is implemented in Afghanistan, namely that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administers funds for various projects, seems to be one way of providing this ability. In the event that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is less involved than it is in Afghanistan, such funds should be made available to commanders of NAF units. Regardless of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs involvement, military commanders should have smaller funds to fix important small and local problems. Such ability has the potential to not only improve the living conditions of the local population, but also strengthen the stature of the counterinsurgent. Whether NAF choose to provide physical support or money, it follows that personnel within the logistics and administrative branches have to take on expanded roles, and that NAF commanders need to embrace this as a part of their mission. As with every other personnel category participating in COIN, the logistics and administrative personnel need to understand the fundamentals of COIN in addition to their specific role in providing support.

³⁴⁶ General Sir Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations—Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*, (St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 2007), 57.

Further, it is important that local officials meet the expectations of the population. NAF should therefore seek to establish a system where officials are held responsible for their results, and where superiors are able to substitute subordinates that do not meet expectations. Collecting and managing information from interactions with the local government is thereby an important part of making the government work.

The second group of connections includes cases where the NAF have an independent role in improving conditions. It seems obvious that NAF have the ability to influence the local labor market and the local economy wherever it is operating. It follows that such influence should be directed towards what serves the desired development. Use of local labor is a good way of stimulating economic activity and provides legal opportunities for the population. Hiring local companies for various projects will create the same effect. As such, these opportunities should be exploited where possible. In doing so, however, NAF should aim at establishing a fair and transparent process. As part of this process, contracting opportunities should be announced, and that the results should be announced in a similar way. Further, when hiring local employees, NAF should recognize the needs of the host nation government as well. Local nationals that speak English are naturally attractive for a number of jobs, but recruiting a university-educated individual to a job as a security guard or an interpreter may represent a lost potential for the local government. To prevent draining the local work market of critical personnel for non-critical tasks, simple measures like offering courses in English should be considered. Another remedy might be to identify personnel in Norway with the required language skills and actively recruit these individuals to service.

4. Information Operations

In Chapter II, the authors demonstrated that the most important factor in the outcome of the struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents is how the silent majority of the population, the *fence sitters*, decides to act. One important goal of

information operations is therefore to influence the “silent majority” and the uncommitted members of the population, and generate a public opinion in favor of the counterinsurgency.³⁴⁷

The decision that each individual has to make will in large parts be a mix of two variables: the individual's truly preferred outcome and the individual's belief of what is likely to happen (i.e., an individual that believes that the insurgents are in a position to kill him and his family is not likely to proclaim his support for the government). It follows that in order to influence behavior effectively, NAF's information operations need to address both variables.

Furthermore, there are many ways of defining or describing information operations. When addressing the way NAF should conduct IO and which means are required, it is useful to separate information operations into two domains. The first is the information or psychological effect that stems from active or deliberate attempts at spreading information and directly influences the perceptions of the local populace. Such attempts may come in the shape of psychological operations, deception operations, public affairs, etc. The second domain covers second- and third-order information effects and influence on public opinion that arise from other operations—either kinetic or non-kinetic. Examples might include the establishment of an uncorrupt police force, a raid against insurgents, an accidental bombing of an innocent family, or providing of basic medical supplies to the local health clinic.

In order to influence the first variable, the true preference, NAF's information operations should be aimed at creating an impression of the government as the most attractive solution. It is obviously necessary to underpin such an impression with substance, namely that the host nation government is truly making progress towards its aims. In other words, the government needs to outperform any insurgent attempt at governing. Furthermore, IO in COIN “must be indigenous in content and execution”³⁴⁸

³⁴⁷ Baker, “The Decisive Weapon,” 17.

³⁴⁸ Stillwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” 329.

and hence culturally attuned and in accordance with local values and cultural norms.³⁴⁹ It follows that information operations aimed at influencing the true preference within the *silent majority* of the population naturally lend themselves to the systematic use of public affairs and local proxy sources and channels for conveying messages. It also seems legitimate to publicize positive results from other parts of the country where the government has succeeded. NAF should thus systematically and broadly publicize their efforts to improve governance. NAF should also identify and persuade key personnel in the community to lend their support in conveying positive perceptions of the government.

In addition to promoting the government, discrediting the insurgents may be a worthwhile endeavor. Religious and political fundamentalists are often able to garner support for their cause, despite extreme opinions, because they have an inherently better cultural foundation within the population than any foreign counterinsurgency force. Again, public affairs and the use of local proxy sources and channels are excellent means to expose the fact that the insurgents' view of the post-conflict society is a highly unpopular one, should that be the case. The use of key social and cultural leaders as interlocutors between the counterinsurgent forces and the silent majority of the population is crucial in this regard. Key leadership engagement (KLE) is a vital part of information operations in contemporary COIN campaigns, and it has the potential to provide the counterinsurgent with an influential channel to convey his message, as well as counter the cultural foundation of the insurgency. It follows that KLE should be systematically exploited by NAF units in COIN operations.

When attempting to influence the individuals' calculations of what the future will bring, the game changes fundamentally. As demonstrated in Chapter II, and as opposed to the shaping of the true preference, this calculation is likely to be dominated by short-term concerns; when weighing the government's promise of services against the insurgents' threat to use violence, the immediate need to stay alive should be expected to take precedence over future benefits from the government. In terms of IO, this means that NAF should carefully establish an impression of themselves as a credible and

³⁴⁹ Roca, "Information Operations," 34.

reliable support for the population. Based on this imperative, it follows that NAF should not widely publicize an intention to protect a certain population if the promise cannot be kept. Similarly, stories of successful protection in other parts of the country have little importance if the same protection cannot be provided locally. The policy should therefore be not to raise expectations above what can be delivered in terms of security. A deduction would be that in security-related matters, the IO effect should be created as a side effect from physical operations rather than by relying on public affairs. The earlier discussed need for being responsive will be a key factor in succeeding with this aspect of information operations.

A related point is the need for consistency over time. There is a danger in delivering security for an interval that is shorter than the life span of the insurgency. The Taliban's expression "The Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time"³⁵⁰ amply demonstrates this point. The removing of security before host nation forces can take over will result in a breakdown of credibility, which naturally will influence the individual's calculation. It follows that an important principle for NAF's information operations will be to demonstrate that the NAF are committed to a long-term operation and then sticking to those promises. The task of building host nation security forces is of course intimately related to this point. As the population can see that their own government is taking over the responsibility for providing security, there is no need to rely on a continued presence of NAF or other international forces.

In addition to influencing the population, NAF should also use IO to degrade the insurgents' ability to operate. While discrediting the insurgents' goal may make the population less receptive, IO can also be used to directly influence insurgent operations and thus have a positive impact on the security pillar in the authors' model. "...It is in men's minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided,"³⁵¹ and systematic use of PSYOPS and deception programs have the potential to turn less motivated insurgents away from the hardliners and as well as sow distrust in the insurgent organization. This can be done, for instance, by releasing information that there is an

³⁵⁰ Johnson and Mason, "Understanding the Taliban," 51.

³⁵¹ Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 31.

informer within the insurgent organization. There are many ways IO can be used to influence insurgent operations and the case in point is merely aimed at exemplifying the potential of savvy information operations with regards to reducing the effect of and perceived freedom of action for insurgents. If done properly, however, this might cause the insurgents to lower their frequency of operations because of a perceived need of increased security and, in the best case scenario, make the insurgents go after their own people. It follows that this is a desirable tool that NAF should seek to exploit in order to improve conditions in the area of operations.

General Sir Frank Kitson argues that:

All too often successful government action in the civil and military field is rendered completely useless because the machinery for exploiting success in the minds of the people is non-existent. At the same time the enemy who have suffered the reverse in fact, are able to nullify it, or even turn it to their advantage in the minds of the people...³⁵²

As such, mere good deeds are insufficient in a COIN environment. To ensure long-term success, the counterinsurgent must systematically exploit every opportunity to establish favorable opinions and perceptions within the population. It follows that systematic and integrated information operations is a field NAF should explore further.

5. Unity of Purpose

Two factors argue against the need for coordinating between Norwegian contributions to a counterinsurgency operation, as opposed to just relying on the coordination provided by a UN or NATO framework. First, Norway has an expressed policy of working within a coordinating framework, preferably the UN. Assuming that such an overarching framework is working as intended, there should be no need to pursue integration between national contributions. Second, as demonstrated in Chapter V, Norway's means of coordinating at an operational level will in many cases be severely limited. Still, there are some important benefits to be achieved through coordination between Norwegian assets. These can be divided into four broad categories.

³⁵² Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 31.

Obviously, national goals that from those of the framework organization (the UN, NATO, etc.) can best be pursued through standing out as an important contributor to the host nation. Such differing national interests may be within the scope of the COIN operation, for instance a stronger promotion of women's rights in societal reform – or outside it, as for instance access to the host nation for Norwegian petroleum companies. By integrating various Norwegian assets, Norway can take on responsibility for all facets of a counterinsurgency operation in a limited area. By doing so, Norway should expect to gain a stronger connection to the host nation than what can be expected merely by filling disparate positions in a larger framework. This stronger connection can then be leveraged to secure Norwegian interests.

As a second category, Norway could benefit from demonstrating a truly integrated and effective approach to solving the insurgency problem. By doing so, Norway would gain more acceptance for its initiative to reform international interventions. This would arguably increase Norway's image as a peacemaker, and thereby increase its soft power and influence around the world.³⁵³

A third reason for seeking Norwegian integration would be to garner domestic support. Counterinsurgencies often last for many years and entail a considerable risk for loss of lives. Consequently, domestic popular support for a COIN operation is vital. By clearly defining Norway's role and its importance for the host nation, it would be reasonable to expect increased understanding and acceptance of the mission among the Norwegian population. Such a clear delineation of the mission is obviously well served by having all Norwegian assets concentrating on a subset of the wider conflict. Conversely, spreading Norwegian assets over disparate tasks and areas makes it more difficult to achieve that clarity and thus acceptance. Furthermore, Norwegians commonly pride themselves on having a spirit for volunteer work for the good of community ("dugnadsånd"). To the degree that such spirit can be leveraged in a counterinsurgency operation, it seems obvious that it can only happen as long as volunteers and their organizations focus on a well-defined and thus limited problem.

³⁵³ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 10.

Last but not least, pursuing integration between Norwegian assets does have the potential of increasing effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort. The shared language and culture should make it easier to cooperate across functional areas. It also seems like a fair assumption, based on the experiences from Afghanistan, that an integrated Norwegian mission will have better access to Norwegian policy-makers and thus the potential to address unforeseen problems through changing priorities or appropriation of extra funds.

In addition to the advantages following a national integration, there are of course some disadvantages too. The idea of an integrated approach is not only that the various elements operate together in a meaningful way, but also that they are properly sized to the tasks at hand. As discussed above, both military and civilian Norwegian assets available for COIN are limited in numbers. If a truly integrated approach is to be attempted among Norwegian assets, one might have to find the smallest common denominator, effectively reducing the contribution compared to what it could have been if only responding to the needs of a larger framework. If, for instance, the Norwegian police are only able to cover two districts while the military is able to cover three districts, one still has to find a different solution for covering the third district with police officers, or scale the total contribution down to fit two districts. When comparing security related forces (i.e., police or military forces) with components for civil COIN, the disparity may become greater. This is due to the fact that such assistance may not be tied to a local situation, but rather to national or regional programs.

In discussing whether or not a national integration should be pursued in addition to an intergovernmental framework, it is easy to overlook the fact that a good intergovernmental framework may take considerable time to bring about. Similarly, the host nation's ability to absorb financial aid may be poor in the initial stages of a counterinsurgency effort. In such cases, a well-functioning national integration may be very valuable. Chapter IV discussed the importance of exploiting the golden hour, and in the absence of an efficient international framework, a national integrated framework might be necessary to exploit the potential that arises as a result of an intervention.

The discussion above allows for a couple of recommendations. First, NAF should recognize that their priorities need to be influenced by the common need of Norwegian contributions. It follows that NAF will have to answer to both Norwegian authorities and the organization providing the international framework. While this is clearly not an ideal situation, it is not very different from how NAF are used to operating in international operations.³⁵⁴ The international framework should be the primary command, while national channels may play a secondary role through assisting with coordination as well as providing necessary means.

Second, it seems obvious that these national channels need an integration function at a level that is between the central government in Oslo and the various Norwegian components of the COIN forces. As discussed in Chapter V, Norwegian embassies might be well-suited for this task. If that is the chosen alternative, NAF should be prepared to support the other Norwegian contributors with means that further coordination. Such means might be intelligence analysis or other assessments, public affairs resources, communication equipment, logistical support, or localities that support coordination efforts. In such a case, NAF should also provide personnel to the Norwegian Embassy in order to assist with the coordination of NAF units.

Should the case be that there is no Norwegian Embassy, or that the Embassy does not have the capacity to handle the necessary coordination for Norwegian COIN components, NAF should be prepared to provide even more support to facilitate such coordination. The Norwegian NCC discussed in Chapter V could form the basis for such an element, but must, as a result of expanded responsibilities, be augmented with personnel and given sufficient authority to coordinate the use and allocation of Norwegian means. Another option would be to adapt the Mobile Tactical Land Command (MLTC) to handle such a task. Such a solution would arguably be robust and rapidly deployable, which enables the opportunities of the golden hour to be exploited. The CIMIC Company³⁵⁵ is another potential source of manpower. The details of

³⁵⁴ See Chapter V for a discussion on the National Contingent Commander.

³⁵⁵ Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, *forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* (2007–2008), 19.

organizations and tasks are situation-dependent and also outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it should be noted that COIN theory in general points to the need that civilians, and not military personnel, lead any COIN effort.³⁵⁶ It follows that NAF should be subordinated to a Norwegian civilian leader in the secondary chain of command. It also seems evident that if such a coordination mechanism is built on a military framework, it has to integrate personnel from other non-military components in order to be successful.

Third, there may not be a way around a situation where different contributions have varying impact areas; foreign aid funds are likely to continue contributions at a national or regional level, while security forces are severely limited in what they can take responsibility for. Again, the primary goal of securing the active support of the population may be used as a guideline. As discussed earlier, the most critical component of securing this support will be to provide security, given the assumption that the host nation regime is a palatable option for the population. A common area of impact between Norwegian contributions therefore becomes most important within the *security* and *establishing host nation security forces* pillars, and less so in the *improving governance* pillar. It follows that NAF should seek to harmonize their contribution so that they can cover the same impact area as the other components of the COIN contribution working on the first two pillars. Nevertheless, the point can be made that from a COIN perspective, the effect of spending money may be greater where security forces operate as a result of the psychological effect such use will have on the local population.

It is of course possible that the Norwegian government decides not to pursue any integration between Norwegian COIN assets, relying instead solely on the integration role of the international framework in use. In such a case, NAF should be expected to integrate with other contributors that are part of the COIN effort. Such integration and coordination should still follow the principles of the model discussed above, and as such, very little will be different from NAF's point of view.

³⁵⁶ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), 62.

The secondary chain of command, however, will of course take on a reduced importance. One benefit of national integration is the possibility for “greasing” the system, i.e., retaining the flexibility and ability to solve problems that in other cases would remain unresolved for some time. Such flexibility arguably exists both in terms of re-focusing physical resources as well as in terms of appropriating money to take care of pressing needs. Given the importance of securing popular support, such flexibility should also be secured where there is no national integration of COIN assets. It follows that NAF’s National Contingent Commander should be assigned the task of handling such needs on behalf of NAF forces, so that seemingly small but important problems do not become subjects to slow bureaucratic processes or lose the struggle for priority.

6. Summary and Recommendations

Whenever NAF commit combat forces to a counterinsurgency effort, the highest priority mission should be to protect the population. The goal of this mission should be to prevent the insurgents from threatening the population, thereby denying the insurgents the ability to secure passive or active support from the population. The primary determinant of how many people NAF may take a security responsibility for is the population/security force ratio recognized as necessary for success. In any case, NAF need to ensure a continuous physical presence among the protected population. That also means that the forces assigned to this mission should be prepared to live and operate among the population twenty four hours a day. In addition, these forces need to be responsive; they must be able to react quickly to distress calls from the people being protected.

In addition to the forces performing static security missions, NAF should keep mobile forces to reinforce the static forces, follow up intelligence on insurgent personnel or material, and fight larger insurgent formations. The major concern in using such mobile forces is their ability to undo what the static forces built. The principles for COIN apply to both static and mobile forces, and NAF should observe these whether conducting

static security missions only, mobile missions only, or a combination of the two. As a general guideline, mobile forces should be subject to limitations set by the static forces or directly subordinated to the static forces.

Norwegian special operations forces also have a role to play. Their ability to quickly deploy and operate in unknown areas might be very useful early on in a COIN operation. Beyond that, NORSOF should be tasked with developing and executing direct action missions against key insurgent personnel. As a last category, NORSOF should also be tasked with training missions of host nation forces, in particular training of special operation forces.

Furthermore, NAF should be prepared to conduct training of host nation security forces. This mission needs to be started as early as possible, and NAF may find it necessary to not only train, but also select, equip, and pay forces until the host nation is ready to take over these responsibilities. Of particular importance is the need to focus on the establishment of an accountable and responsive police force. To the extent that resources are spent on training an army, this army needs to be focused on COIN operations as well as managed in such a way as to create popular support for the host nation government. Again, NAF should be prepared to take on a responsibility beyond providing advice; logistical support and payments may be critical to demonstrate the utility of the army.

NAF should also aim to improve governance both indirectly and directly. In an indirect way, NAF may improve governance by working through the host nation government wherever possible. Several niche capabilities within NAF are well-suited for supporting important government services, and NAF should consequently be given missions that help the local government to create popular support. Further, NAF should be prepared to either directly use money or support other entities that use money in order to help the local government or administration to function in such a way that it will gain its constituents' support. At the very least, NAF commanders should have small funds to take care of small problems. In addition, NAF should be cognizant of the performance of host nation leaders at all levels and seek to rectify any shortcomings through assistance in making leaders responsible for their results. In a more direct way, NAF should support

the creation of a milieu where business and contracts are managed in a fair and transparent way. NAF also need to recognize the manpower needs of the host nation and avoid using human resources that may be important for the local government to function properly.

This study has also established that NAF need to emphasize information operations. First, because “*it is in men’s minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided.*”³⁵⁷ Second, because there is arguably much to be desired of both means and understanding of information operations within NAF. Information effects should be created both as second- or third-order effects of other operations, and as direct effects of deliberate distribution of information. IO should seek to create a true preference for the host nation government. In doing so, NAF might find it useful to use local proxy sources to discredit the attractiveness of the opponent. IO should also seek to counteract an assisted preference for the insurgency among the population. Such an effect has to be built carefully and without promising more than what can be delivered. Finally, IO should also be employed to degrade the opponents' operations. This may be done either by degrading the insurgents’ sense of security, by disrupting their ability to command and control, or both.

Lastly, the added requirements for coordination of military and non-military as well as kinetic and non-kinetic means in a long-term perspective suggest that NAF will need a resilient command and control element at the operational level. Such an element should operate as a secondary command line and be prepared to exploit and facilitate synergetic effects and enhance efforts of the multinational organization that NAF units will be a part of in a COIN environment.

³⁵⁷ Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 31.

E. CONCLUSION

Two factors necessitate this study. First, there is an expressed political goal in Norway to use a comprehensive approach to peace-building operations, to include counterinsurgencies. There seems to be very limited work on how the Norwegian Armed Forces should participate in such an approach, which in itself implies a need for this study. Second, there seems to be a general agreement among scholars that comprehensive operations will be far more effective in reaching their goals than their traditional counterparts. Succeeding in a comprehensive approach will therefore lead to more effective operations and better results. That is in itself critical, but also has the potential of enhancing Norway's position in the international community.

The key conclusions arrived at in this study are as follows:

- The Norwegian Armed Forces should primarily focus on protecting the population through static security missions. The purpose of this is to prevent the insurgents from influencing the population and thus overcome the insurgents' information advantage.
 - Mobile missions are also necessary in order to reduce the capacity of the insurgents, but these forces need to be subject to limitations set by the static missions due to the inherent risk in the use of military force.
 - Training and assisting host nation security forces is also a critical component of success as well as necessary for letting the host nation reassume responsibility of its own territory.
- The Norwegian Armed Forces should recognize the role of information operations in counterinsurgencies and the importance of influencing the local population. The reason for this is that insurgency conflicts "are fought politically and psychologically, with the assistance of military capabilities."³⁵⁸
- The Norwegian Armed forces should also recognize the importance and challenges of creating popular support for the host nation government. To this end, the Norwegian Armed Forces should employ non-kinetic means alongside other COIN components in re-establishing host nation government structures and functions.

³⁵⁸ Stillwell, "Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency," 319.

- There is also a need for coordination as well as maintaining a long-term perspective among Norwegian actors at the operational level. The Norwegian Armed Forces should be prepared to facilitate and host such coordination. Such means should support a Norwegian Embassy where applicable, and could offer added coordination and flexibility with regards to exploitations of Norwegian non-kinetic means.
- Finally, a counterinsurgency is not a lesser-included case of conventional military operations; COIN is fundamentally different and arguably a lot more complex than the operations that traditionally have occupied most military organizations. In order to be successful, NAF have to provide their officers and soldiers with a thorough understanding of such conflicts. Such an understanding has to be present throughout the organization, logisticians and foot soldiers alike. This, however, is not enough. Winning the battle for *men's minds* also requires a deep understanding of the men and women in question. Therefore, the need for education stands out as a key recommendation for the Norwegian Armed Forces.

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