Socially Coherent Negotiation for Cooperative Multiagent Systems
Abstract
This project presents a new mathematical formalization for the design of cooperative multiagent systems. Conventional decision-making concepts focus largely on the foundational premise of individual rationality: the doctrine that the preferences of each participant are concerned with its own welfare regardless of the effect on others. This solution concept may is not adequate for decision scenarios where notions of cooperation, compromise, and negotiation are critical to the success of the system. Cooperation can be enhanced if the system possesses the following properties: (a) a notion of sociality such that the sphere of concern of an individual extends beyond the self, (b) a notion of coherence such that the interests of no agent are categorically subjugated to the interests of the group, and (c) the classical solution concept of optimization is replaced by a more socially accommodating concept of being good enough, or satisfaction. These properties provide a mathematical framework within which it is possible to characterize both group and individual interests and thereby to define a multiagent decision that is satisfactory to the group as a whole and to each of its members.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 16, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA501167
Entities
People
- Wynn C. Stirling
Organizations
- Brigham Young University