

FORECASTING EVIL: STRATEGIC WARNING IN THE PREVENTION OF MASS ATROCITIES

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**FORECASTING EVIL: STRATEGIC WARNING IN
THE PREVENTION OF MASS ATROCITIES**

by

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FORECASTING EVIL: STRATEGIC WARNING IN THE PREVENTION OF MASS ATROCITIES

American presidents have consistently articulated that it is in United States (U.S.) national interests to prevent the occurrence of mass atrocities. Unfortunately, recent history points to multiple events where America failed to achieve this laudable objective. Today, policymakers and national security professionals must wrestle with the challenge of rectifying this disparity between desired policy ends and actual outcomes. This study recommends one action to help overcome this challenge. This work argues that improving the United States Government's ability to conduct strategic warning of mass atrocities provides a viable option to enhance America's ability to prevent mass atrocities.¹

Overview of the Problem

Mass atrocities are among the most horrible of human endeavors and most perplexing of policy problems. They are manmade disasters that include, but are not limited to, genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and other acts of violence against a people on a grand scale.² Post-Cold War history, not forgetting the Holocaust or the "Killing Fields" of Cambodia, is filled with examples of where states have initiated, encouraged or failed to stop organized violence against elements of their population. Rwanda, Bosnia, and the ongoing events in Darfur have etched vivid and horrendous pictures into the world's collective memory. Given the world's current instability and ongoing events in Africa, there are no indications that this trend will end in the next few years.

Every U.S. president since the end of the Cold War has had to determine how to address the occurrence or threat of a mass atrocity, and all have all made clear statements opposing such violence. However, specific policy regarding how to address these threats has been nebulous, while past American strategies and actions have, at best, met with limited success. Slow and insufficient responses have failed to prevent the deaths of many and have tainted the image of the United Nations (U.N.) and the United States. Numerous entities including the U.S Government (USG) have undertaken studies to determine how the U.S. and the international community can better address the challenge of preventing mass atrocities. Many of these works argue that a robust warning capability is a key enabler. Unfortunately, a recent comprehensive study found U.S. capabilities to provide adequate warning lacking.³

There is an ongoing debate over how great an investment in time, effort, and resources the USG should dedicate to improving its ability to provide warning of mass atrocities. Some argue that the prevention of such violence is not in the vital interest of the United States and that allocating resources to this issue is unwise and inefficient. They state that it is the lack of political will on the part of policymakers, not a dearth of warning, which is the primary contributor to America's failure to prevent these tragedies.⁴

Many of these points are valid and well-argued. Will does play a vital role in determining U.S. responses to mass atrocity threats, and preventing such violence is a lower priority than many of today's significant national security concerns. However, these arguments concerning warning miss the point. Strategic warning and will are intrinsically linked in policy development and selection.

This paper argues that improving USG strategic warning of mass atrocities through innovative leadership and management offers a viable tool to satisfy this objective. First, the study will validate the need for addressing this problem by briefly reviewing past challenges in preventing these events. Second, it will point out the important role that effective strategic warning can play in achieving the desired policy end. Finally, it will discuss how the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) can apply a comprehensive approach to address these challenges. This will include a description of what a comprehension approach entails, as well as a discussion of its key advantages, challenges, and limitations.

Review of Interests and Policy

One looking for a clear articulation of post-Cold war U.S. policy regarding mass atrocities will be disappointed. Policy is broad guidance concerning particular issues and events as they pertain to achieving the national interests. Ideally, it is articulated in a formal document (e.g., policy paper). However, on many issues, such clear direction does not exist and planners must translate information from various sources (e.g., speeches and interviews) to determine policymaker intent.⁵ Identifying U.S. policy regarding mass atrocities requires one to do the latter. No formal document exists that provides unambiguous guidance on how the U.S. will respond to such threats of violence. However, review of past and current positions, strategies, and actions does provide some broad insights.

Every American post-Cold War president has viewed prevention of mass atrocities as part of the national interests of the United States.⁶ These views were based on two key issues. First, these horrors serve as catalysts for future conflicts and

regional instabilities. For example, leaders in the current civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo use residual post-Rwanda Hutu and Tutsi animosity and violence as a major motivator for ongoing rebel actions. Such instability can contribute to mass migrations and refugee flows that can stress the capabilities of host nations and serve as a launching point for greater human misery via crime, infectious disease, or other horrors. Second, and more basic than the catalytic effect that acts of mass atrocity can have on international stability, is the effect that acceptance of mass atrocities would have on the American ethos. The condoning or ignoring of the mass extermination or violence against innocent people is an affront to the values of a nation based on the worth of the individual and one's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.⁷

With those threats to national interests in mind, various U.S. administrations have taken positions that mass atrocities are unacceptable and that preventing them is the responsibility of the entire community of nations. The George W. Bush Administration's 2006 National Security Strategy provided greater clarity when it stated that preventing and punishing such acts (it refers specifically to genocide) is a "moral imperative". Furthermore, with regard to mass atrocities, the primary goal of the United States and the greater international community must be the prevention of such events. However, when prevention fails, the international community must be willing to intervene to stop the violence and bring guilty perpetrators to justice. Additionally, states should not let legalistic definitions over terms (i.e., genocide) impede protective actions.⁸

The U.S. also articulated its position when it accepted the principles espoused in the 2005 U.N.-sponsored report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P). This work reinforces the

primacy of focusing on the prevention of mass atrocities and the importance of efforts occurring under the auspices of the international community. It expands the concept by stating that a country's government has the primary responsibility for protecting its people. However, if the state fails to meet that obligation, the international community should respond to stop the violence. This could mean some type of coercive act, but direct military intervention should be the last resort and only under very restrictive circumstances. Additionally, once the international community intervenes, it is obligated to take the requisite steps to rebuild a civil society.⁹

The new Obama Administration has shown no inclination to change major components of the current policy. In fact, both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.N. Representative Susan Rice have both publically expressed their conviction to ensuring the U.S. does not divest itself of this commitment.

Policy Outcome Mismatch

Historically, strong presidential statements against mass atrocities (e.g. "never again") have not been matched by equally decisive actions or outcomes. The last two decades are replete with examples of the world's failure to stop large scale violence against a targeted population. In Bosnia, the world's slow reaction to ethnic-inspired violence resulted in force migrations and the deaths of thousands. In Rwanda, the U.N.'s hesitation in and initial U.S. opposition to sending in adequate forces contributed to the ability of radical Hutus to kill over 800,000 Tutsis within a span of eight weeks. Today in Darfur, five years after the U.S. labeled the violence in the region genocide, thousands of black Africans have been killed or displaced due to violence directed by the government of Sudan and their Janjuweed henchmen. Sadly, these are only the

most visible of the many acts that could be labeled mass atrocities in the years following the fall of the Soviet Union and the start of a “new world order”.

Critics of past U.S. performance argue that earlier and greater diplomatic and economic pressure on applicable parties, armed intervention of U.S. or multinational forces into these troubled areas, or both would have prevented or significantly reduced the impacts of these genocides and ethnic cleansings. Statements and after action reviews by the U.S. Government, the U.N., and other interested parties support these criticisms. The issue is why the U.S. and the rest of the international community failed to stop or prevent these human catastrophes - What has caused the mismatch between stated policy ends and actual outcomes?

U.S. failures are not due to racism, greed, or other base motivations. America's successes (e.g., Macedonia and the Baltic states) and failures (e.g., Rwanda and Bosnia) argue for a more nuanced explanation. The inability to generate the requisite will among pertinent decision-makers, who are often influenced by a challenging operational environment and competing national interests, is the predominant reason for past failures.

The Challenge of the Means-Will Equation

Will is a purposeful intent brought about by the intensity of the desire to take a particular course of action.¹⁰ Intensity is the operative word within this definition. The intensity one feels is determined by the perceived importance of the interests at stake, the emotional attachment one has to the issue of concern, or both.¹¹ Will plays a critical role in determining how policymakers decide to respond to the threat of mass atrocities. Strategy is the mechanism through which one applies ways and means to achieve a

policy objective (ends).¹² However, it is the will of the key political actors that sets a strategy's parameters in terms of cost and risk of execution. The greater the inclination a policymaker has to act, the greater the cost one is willing to pay, the ways one is willing to execute, and the risk to other interests one is willing to take in order to achieve the desired policy objective.

Preventing mass atrocities requires the influencing of means and will. This paper will refer to this as the means-will equation (means + will). For a mass atrocity to occur, perpetrators must possess the requisite means to execute such wide scale violence (capability) and the will to carry-out these horrors (intentions). To prevent an adversary who wants to execute a mass atrocity from accomplishing his nefarious intent requires the USG to possess a means-will equation greater than the potential perpetrator (friendly means + friendly will > perpetrator means + perpetrator will).¹³

With regard to preventing mass atrocities, the United States has had difficulty putting the means-will equation in its favor. The U.S. has possessed much greater resources than those of the perpetrators of mass violence (the adversary). However, the will of these adversaries to wreak mayhem, often fueled by generations of fear and hatred, so dwarfed the will of the world's superpower that the instigators, at least initially, achieved an advantageous means-will equation and doomed thousands to a horrifying end. Three interrelated factors have contributed to this inadequate American will. These are the ability to recognize and then convince key policymakers that a mass atrocity may occur, the ability to persuade key players of the need to act, and the ability to develop strategies that are acceptable in terms of relative cost and risk.

Key to building will is the identification that a mass atrocity threat exists. It is often difficult to identify that such an event is about to occur or is ongoing. These horrific acts usually happen within the context of a greater conflict. For example, the ethnic cleansing that occurred in Bosnia and the genocide that occurred in Rwanda were both subsets of a greater violence that constituted civil war within these states. Additionally, these conflicts, and the accompanying mass atrocities, often occurred in regions that policymakers deemed were not in the vital interest of the United States. This contributed to a lack of intelligence coverage and expertise that could have highlighted indicators of potential mass atrocities.¹⁴ Even when indicators are identified, the immense amount of critical issues that the national security community must address on a daily basis can easily cause such data from lower priority regions to get lost in the bureaucratic and analytic processes. President Clinton and key members of his administration point to this challenge as a major contributor for their lack of early intervention in the Rwanda crisis.¹⁵

Generating the will to intervene to stop a mass atrocity is further complicated when such intervention conflicts with another U.S. interest. A president may understand that a mass atrocity may occur or is happening. However, he may choose to not intervene to prevent the violence because he perceives that the price of intervening exceeds the relative interest at stake. Interventions are not cost- or risk-free, and the U.S. has limited means to support its security interests, particularly in regard to military and intelligence capabilities. Preparing and intervening to stop a mass atrocity requires leaders to divert resources away from other national security priorities. These moves can increase the risks the country faces from other threats (e.g., terrorism or China).

This is most challenging when decisions concern the placing of USG personnel in harm's way (e.g., military intervention). This demands that leaders make the difficult determination of when it is acceptable to place American lives at risk to protect foreigners. This concern over competing interests, often, makes the U.S. and its most powerful allies unwilling to allocate requisite resources to prevent or stop a tragedy.¹⁶ This concern clearly influenced President George H.W. Bush's actions regarding requests to send U.S. forces into the Balkans.¹⁷

As the world became increasingly aware of the indications of ethnic cleansing and mass killings of Bosnian Muslims in the former part of Yugoslavia, a call began for U.S. intervention to stop the violence. Secretary of State James Baker justified the U.S. refusal to intervene by highlighting the lack of an American vital interest in the region stating "...we don't have a dog in that fight."¹⁸

Even if a president wants to intervene to stop a mass atrocity he may not act immediately. An administration must develop a strategy that is acceptable to the Congress and the American people. If he does not create and sustain enough will in these two entities, a president risks mission failure and political damage. Generating such will becomes more difficult as the cost in resources and risks to other interests rises.¹⁹ Additionally, "compassion fatigue" or "social apathy" can occur as the media consistently exposes the American populace to multiple natural and manmade tragedies as well as a plethora of competing opinions on policy objectives.²⁰

To reduce the cost and risk to American interests, the U.S. prefers that any intervention to prevent mass atrocities be a multinational effort where cost and risks are widely dispersed.²¹ This approach requires the United States to help establish and

sustain the requisite will among potential partners in such an undertaking. However, the slow and deliberative nature of large bureaucratic organizations such as the U.N. makes the ability to build and coordinate an effective international response to mass atrocities threats in a timely manner problematic. As U.S. efforts in Darfur prove, building such a coalition is difficult and can take a great deal of time. Such delays between threat identification and action can result in the death, displacement, or other harm to huge masses of humanity.²²

It is up policymakers to decide how to respond to the initiation or threat of a mass atrocity.²³ They, and those tasked to support them, face significant challenges and have often failed to meet this objective. Addressing these concerns in an environment of immense security challenges and unprecedented strains on the country's resources will prove extremely demanding. National security professionals will need to seek innovative methods to enable policymakers to prevent mass atrocities within acceptable levels of cost and risk. Though not a cure-all, improving strategic warning of mass atrocities by way of a comprehensive approach provides a viable method to accomplish this demanding task and to alter the means-will equation in favor of American objectives.

The Warning Option

Effective warning provides policymakers with the invaluable resource of time. This gives them the opportunity to take actions that influence the operational environment to create a more favorable future. This paper defines warning as the alerting of policy makers of threats to U.S. national security interests in order to enable them to take actions that prevent or mitigate potential damage.²⁴ Successful warning involves the processing of data into relevant intelligence via direction, collection,

processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination.²⁵ Finally, for the warning to be of value the policymaker must comprehend the implications of the information provided in order to facilitate the selection of the best possible response to a mass atrocity threat. Two subsets of warning exist: tactical and strategic.

Tactical warning alerts policymakers to impending hostile acts.²⁶ It detects near term threats with the intent of avoiding surprise in order to stop or avert damage to national interests.²⁷ It involves analysis of a specific perpetrator and the timing and mode of an act that will threaten U.S. interests. The time window between the alerting and execution of the threatening action is usually relatively small.²⁸

Strategic warning involves alerting policymakers to the potential for a hostile act.²⁹ It aims to communicate to policymakers significant changes and trends in the security environment that require them to re-evaluate current plans and activities to prevent or mitigate hostile actions well in advance of an incident's occurrence.³⁰ It is often needed to change priorities, missions and resources in order to influence the strategic environment in ways that will alter current trends to create a future that is more advantageous to American interests.³¹ It is much broader and has a longer timeframe, but is less detailed, than tactical warning. Strategic warning can address threatening conditions years in advance of potential violence and can enable leaders to make decisions that better prepare the USG to preclude or lessen damage to national interests.³²

When addressing mass atrocities, those tasked with warning can focus on four types of indicators. These are background conditions, intervening conditions, accelerants, and triggers. Background conditions address long-term macro issues (e.g.,

unstable government, global economy, major political upheaval, and violent history) both internal and external to the state(s) of concern that could foster an environment in which mass atrocities can emerge. Intervening conditions are dynamics that create conditions conducive to the initiation of a mass atrocity event. Examples include the nature of elites, government leaders, societal fragmentation, and political and economic power distribution. Accelerants involve events that could rapidly advance societal actions towards the execution of a mass atrocity. Triggers are those events that directly initiate a mass atrocity.³³ Normally, strategic warning would focus on identifying background and intervening conditions; tactical warning would concentrate on accelerants and triggers.

Depending on tactical warning to respond to mass atrocity threats has proven problematic. In past disconnects between desired policy ends and actual outcomes (e.g., Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur), presidents based decisions on such alerts. This resulted in strategies that presented suboptimal policy options. First, they could execute a direct U.S. intervention via military means. Second, they could try to pressure perpetrators by indirect diplomatic and economic sanctions. Third, they could try to build and support a multinational effort that could stop ongoing and imminent atrocities. The first course of action would prove costly and risky. Currently, no U.S. president has been willing to take such unilateral action. The last two options take valuable time to build the requisite will among the relevant players, to include the President and the American people. Though U.S. and international partner actions eventually assisted in stopping wide scale violence, thousands were killed, maimed, or displaced prior to significant international response.

This failure to prevent a mass atrocity goes back to the means-will equation. Perpetrators of mass atrocities attempt to set conditions to maximize this equation in their favor. Preventing such actions would require the U.S. to have the requisite will to apply means that could negate the adversary's trend towards carrying out a mass atrocity. The USG can do this by taking actions that would reduce the adversary's ability or mindset to execute an act of violence by reducing his means to do so, will to do so, or both. Achieving this can take time. Unfortunately, history indicates that tactical warning is unlikely to provide such a window of opportunity. However, strategic warning offers the potential to achieve better outcomes at lower cost and risk to the nation and the policymaker.

First, strategic warning gives American decision-makers the time to develop more acceptable preventive options. It increases the courses of action available to policymakers to influence the future environment in a way that can reduce or negate the potential of a manmade tragedy. These actions can range from diplomatic engagement with likely perpetrators to covert action in support of counter-atrocity operations.³⁴ Diplomatic actions in the Baltic States and Macedonia in the 1990s provide examples of where early non-military intervention by the international community helped to reduce the threat of large-scale ethnic violence.³⁵

Second, strategic warning permits decision-makers to begin to take actions that enable the United States and the international community to better posture the USG to mitigate the impact of a mass atrocity or preempt it if deterrence fails. Identifying likely conditions that would contribute to a mass atrocity can enable leaders to set conditions both domestically and internationally that will make more costly and risky responses

(e.g., military intervention) acceptable. U.S. coordination with NATO partners, the U.N. and others prior to military actions against Yugoslavia to protect ethnic Albanian Kosovars provides such an example.³⁶ Though strategic warning can facilitate policy achievement, there are challenges in using strategic warning to initiate action.

The Analytic and Resource Challenge

The broad and long-range nature of strategic warning analysis creates some challenges for the warning professional. These alerts can appear so broad and non-specific that policymakers may not be willing to act.³⁷ This process can also lead to “crying wolf” scenarios where the unknown and chaotic nature of the future operational environment can make initial warning inaccurate.³⁸ Such “failures” can lead to a misallocation of resources and a loss of analyst credibility. Similar to “crying wolf” is the “paradox of warning”. This occurs when strategic warning leads to actions that prevent hostile activity; however, policymakers misinterpret successful prevention as faulty predictive analysis. This in turn causes leaders to lose confidence in their intelligence system and to disregard future alerts.³⁹ These challenges will require continued refinement of strategic warning methodologies to reduce the potential risk of “false warnings”. Additionally, it demands the development of processes that improve analyst and policymaker interface in order to build trust, confidence, and understanding between the two entities.

Though strategic warning offers the potential for being a superb enabler to U.S. anti-mass atrocity efforts, current USG capability and capacity for conducting strategic warning specifically intended to prevent mass atrocities is minimal.⁴⁰ Today, the U.S. is facing ever-increasing threats and shrinking resources. The realities of this environment

make the likelihood of significant resource increases in support of this effort highly unlikely. The need to identify threats of mass atrocities is only one of a plethora of tasks that the IC must address. These requirements include dealing with major collection and analytic gaps concerning everything from potential nation-state competitors or terrorist groups to the chaos that can emerge from a worldwide financial breakdown or global warming. Given current prioritization and resource issues, the USG's organic ability to provide alerts of mass atrocities will lack key collection, analytic, and exploitation capabilities.

For those tasked with alerting leaders of such threats, resource limitations do not relieve them of the responsibility to provide policymakers with the best possible warning. Therefore, today's national security professional must seek ways to reduce these quantitative and qualitative shortcomings. The USG has tried to establish organizations specifically dedicated to providing early warning of mass atrocities before. However, these admirable efforts to approach the problem via the construction of a dedicated government organization have either failed to come to fruition or have succumbed to the demands of other priorities. Though the outcomes of these efforts were suboptimal, the intent to enhance warning remains sound. The key is to develop a warning system that can meet valid intelligence needs amid the realities of today's operational environment.

Taking a comprehensive approach to fulfilling many of these intelligence requirements offers a viable option to reducing the gap between available and required resources. It will entail enhancing the USG's capability and capacity to provide strategic warning of mass atrocities across each step of the current intelligence process: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production,

dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.⁴¹ This will include improvements in existing processes as well as the utilization of nontraditional organizational constructs.

Enhancing Capability and Capacity

A comprehensive approach would involve the bringing together of various USG, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations, as well as concerned individuals, that share a common objective of preventing mass atrocities. This group would collaborate to achieve mutual goals.⁴² This should include building a community of purpose, sensitizing pertinent entities to indicators of mass atrocities, and enhancing policymaker-analyst interface.

A community of purpose is designed to solve problems and get things done. It is a network of organizations, individuals, or both that form to achieve a particular task and facilitate problem solving.⁴³ A community of purpose for strategic warning of mass atrocities (CoPSWMA) would identify indicators of such violence in order to provide timely and relevant strategic warning to pertinent parties. It would consist of a decentralized organization created from a voluntary global network of concerned groups and individuals dedicated to providing alerts of mass atrocities. Since it would have no centralized command and control, the network would form its own norms.

Information technology and mass collaboration will enable and empower the CoPSWMA. Mass collaboration involves open teaming of groups, individuals, or both to enhance a product, in this case, strategic warning of mass atrocities.⁴⁴ Concerned parties will post information in a way that facilitates the rapid sharing of data and collaborative efforts. For example, an individual in a particular country could post his

observation of a series of government-sponsored messages hostile to a particular ethnic group (collection); a scholar could then take that information and place it into the context of past mass atrocities or the cultural history of that particular country in order to determine if such actions are indicators or enablers of large-scale violence (analysis). Such mass collaboration is not a unique approach to problem solving. It is often used in the creation of numerous information-based products (e.g., Linux and Wikipedia).⁴⁵ The advantage this comprehensive approach provides the USG is that it is a cost-effective way to improve both its capability and capacity to provide strategic warning of mass atrocities.

Sensitizing the concerned entities to the requisite indicators of mass atrocity threats allows the USG to facilitate a unity of effort among governmental and non-governmental groups. These actions can involve informing people with links to areas of interests of conditions that facilitate a mass atrocity. Then, when feasible, these individuals would provide that information to a pertinent node within the CoPSWMA. These actions can encompass everything from television commercials, sending “tweets”, posting information on a website, to ensuring that indicators are included in tasked collection requirements for members of the military and intelligence communities.

Finally, policymakers and analysts must begin dialogues early and continuously to enable both to understand the other’s needs. The critical part of warning is ensuring decision-makers have the best possible understanding of the situation they are addressing. This will require analysts to not only pass information but to present it in a way that best enables the policymaker to understand the context and the implications of

the various courses of action available to him. This demands that analysts learn the policymaking process and the capabilities and limitations of the elements of power available to the decision-maker. Policymakers should articulate their information needs and how they want to have the analyst present analysis to them. Additionally, these decision-makers must learn to appreciate the opportunities and limitations of strategic warning.

This comprehensive approach can improve strategic warning of mass atrocities in several key ways. First, increased policymaker-analyst interaction can better facilitate intelligence planning and direction. It can enhance analysts' access to the IC and enable them to better tailor intelligence (or information) collection requirements to meet decision-maker needs. Second, this approach can also improve collection, exploitation, and processing capabilities. Numerous NGOs, commercial entities, and individuals live and work in dangerous and obscure locations that are not adequately covered by a resource-constrained IC. This often occurs in regions that are not deemed to be in the vital interest of the United States (e.g., central Africa). Therefore, a CoPSWMA could help fill critical gaps in information collection that the IC is unable or unwilling to acquire via its own resources. Network members may possess access and expertise that provides value-added information that alerts the IC to conditions that threaten mass atrocities, pandemics, and natural disasters that could destabilize entire regions. They can also provide indicators of state failure or nefarious activities that could spawn greater threats to U.S. interests. Third, a comprehensive approach provides access to greater analytic resources. In many cases, the foremost experts on particular issues reside outside of the IC. The USG can leverage such expertise that exists in potential

NGO, academic community, and other international organization (e.g., U.N.) partners. The Director of National Intelligence supports this view and recently directed the IC to pursue greater analytic partnerships with experts outside of the USG.⁴⁶ Additionally, the size and diverse nature of the CoPSWMA would help guard against the analytic pitfalls of groupthink and mirror imaging.

Several factors favor pursuit of a comprehensive approach. First, the cost of building a decentralized organization requires small resource expenditures.⁴⁷ The low price of collaborative infrastructures such as the internet and open source software make the cost of developing products via mass collaboration increasingly small.⁴⁸ Second, though not universal, wide-scale international support for the prevention of mass atrocities and acceptance of R2P principles present a wide array of potential partners for achieving this narrow policy goal (strategic warning of mass atrocities). Third, one can leverage emerging intelligence efforts in other areas to support mass atrocity warning requirements. The priority placed on providing warning concerning mass atrocities is relatively low. However, the importance the USG places on understanding and anticipating state failure and other civil conflicts that can spawn a mass atrocity is much higher. Many indicators of these events are similar to or mirror those of a mass atrocity.⁴⁹ This will enable analysts to leverage collection and analytic efforts dedicated to these other challenges to help address warning shortfalls. Finally, a significant network dedicated to preventing genocide already exists.

The IC can build a CoPSWMA by joining a robust and active community dedicated to the prevention of mass atrocities. This network ranges from academia, religious organizations, think tanks, interagency, and multinational partners. Groups

such as Genocide Watch provide high quality analytic products that already address warnings of mass atrocities. Additionally, the USG actively partners with several academic institutions and NGOs on issues regarding mass atrocities. The Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored Global Futures Forum is one such entity. It is already building partnerships outside the IC to address emerging 21st Century challenges.⁵⁰ Given the immense expertise that resides in these networks, the potential for leveraging them to build timely, relevant and useful warning tools is immense. However, though a comprehensive approach to strategic warning of mass atrocities is replete with opportunities, it also presents some challenges.

There is a natural tension that will constantly threaten such a unity of effort. It is based on the differing organizational goals between the various network members. The IC's purpose is to inform policymakers and empower them to make decisions; however, many NGOs (e.g., Genocide Watch) seek to influence policy while businesses exist to make profits.⁵¹ Additionally, many academic institutions, NGOs, foreign governments or international organizations do not want to be seen as serving U.S. interests. Such organizations (e.g., Medecins sans Frontieres and International Red Cross) believe any association with an established government may place the group's ability to accomplish their mission, the lives of their personnel, or both at risk.⁵² The challenges and opportunities of a comprehensive approach provide intelligence professionals with several interrelated leadership and managerial imperatives.

The IC must change its inclination to impede access to information and actually seek opportunities to share data. A community of purpose will predominantly consist of organizations that will not have people with security clearances. Restricting the access

these individuals have to information can severely hamper the IC's ability to focus significant intellectual power on a problem set. It can harm trust among network members and threaten the CoPSWMA's existence. Leaders must do a hard risk assessment and force intelligence personnel to justify why specific data should be classified. Additionally, IC leaders should partner with key CoPSWMA members to set protocols that will enable them to share sensitive information while restricting access to the general public.⁵³

IC leaders will also have to develop the ability to influence and work with other organizational cultures positively. The diversity and natural tensions that can exist within the CoPSWMA will require trust and team building.⁵⁴ Leaders will need to accommodate the concerns and objectives of each of the participants. USG officials must facilitate an understanding of how each participant sees problems, how each entity contributes to the issue, what each member desires from the relationship, what their cultural values and perceptions are, and what each member will not (e.g., red lines) or cannot do. They should base the CoPSWMA on shared interests and respect the limitations placed on each team member. Additionally, members should cooperate on the problem set early and continuously to ensure valid concerns and capabilities are addressed and integrated when feasible.⁵⁵

IC leaders will need to convene interested parties to determine the extent of their shared interests and to identify potential collaborative opportunities. The team should work to "co-create" solutions to accomplish the shared objective. This should include determining ways to leverage the unique strengths that each participating member brings to the partnership. Finally, partners must "co-implement" agreed on solutions to

achieve the desired end. This can enhance future collaboration by better enabling each entity to understand different agendas, accept areas of difference, and manage potential conflicts in order to achieve shared goals. Additionally, exercises can help enhance these partnerships. Having participants role play positions of other interested parties, for example NGO members playing the role of a policymaker or intelligence analyst and vice versa, can enhance mutual understanding and facilitate creative solutions to problems as members address challenges from unfamiliar perspectives.⁵⁶

Preventing a mass atrocity is often dependent on the means and will of the United States and its partners. Historically, the means have existed, but the will was inadequate. Though American leaders have made strong statements against this wide-scale violence, U.S. responses to such threats or acts of evil have failed to match this rhetoric. Obtuse policy guidance, conflicting demands, and poor situational awareness have all contributed to this dearth of will. Unfortunately, the plethora of challenges facing the country today does not bode well for an easy solution to this problem. Though not a panacea, improving strategic warning via a comprehensive approach will provide U.S. policymakers with greater opportunities to match their noble words concerning the prevention of such violence with national deeds and to spare thousands from the horrors of these man-made tragedies.

Endnotes

¹This study does not provide a moral judgment on past U.S. decisions or recommend changes in the relative importance the U.S. places on preventing mass atrocities with regard to other national interests. The paper's intent is to highlight the value enhanced strategic warning can have in optimizing available responses to mass atrocity threats.

²Genocide Prevention Task Force, *Prevention of Genocide: A Blue Print for U.S. Policymakers*, (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, December 2008), XXI-XXII.

³Genocide Prevention Task Force, *Prevention of Genocide: A Blue Print for U.S. Policymakers*, XVII. One of this work's findings highlighted the need for better warning to facilitate the prevention of mass atrocities.

⁴James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, "The Paradox of Early Warning," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, July 4, 1997, <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a017.htm> (accessed January 17, 2009).

⁵Harry Tomlin, "A Perspective on Strategy, Policy, National Interests, and Objectives," presentation with briefing slides attributed to Dr. Terry Deibel of the National War College, U.S. Army War College, February 2, 2009.

⁶Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2003), XXI.

⁷Genocide Prevention Task Force, *Prevention of Genocide: A Blue Print for U.S. Policymakers*, XXI-XXII.

⁸George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), 17.

⁹Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility To Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2008), 41.

¹⁰This definition is a modification of that provided in *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: New College Edition*, ed. William Morris (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 1465.

¹¹This point on intensity is the author's; however it emerged from a description of interests by Dr. Terry Deibel of the National War College in a presentation by Harry Tomlin of the U.S. Army War College on February 2, 2009.

¹²Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book On Big Strategy*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 1, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=641> (accessed January 22, 2009).

¹³Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 77.

¹⁴Alan Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 110-112.

¹⁵David Rothkopf, *The Running of the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and Architects of American Power* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2006), 339.

¹⁶ Miskel, "The Paradox of Early Warning."

¹⁷Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 283.

¹⁸Laura Secor, "Turning a Blind Eye," *New York Times*, April 14, 2002, <http://query.nytimes.com.gst/fullpage.html?res=9F03E4D81E3AF937A25757C0A9649C8B63&pagewanted=all> (accessed March 8, 2009).

¹⁹Thomas Cushman, "Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations," *Journal of Genocide Research* 5, no. 4 (December 2003): 30-33, <http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/analysis/details/2003-02-25/preventable.pdf> (accessed January 24, 2009).

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 17.

²²Cushman, "Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations," 28-29.

²³Jack Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?," January 1, 2003, <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no1.htm> (accessed January 17, 2009).

²⁴This definition is a minor modification from those provided by Jack Davis in "Strategic Warning: Intelligence Support in a World of Uncertainty and Surprise," in *Hand Book of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch K. Johnson (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 173.

²⁵U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication 2.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 22, 2007), I-6 – I-7.

²⁶U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2004 amended through October 17, 2008), 542.

²⁷This definition is a minor modification from those provided by Jack Davis in "Strategic Warning: Intelligence Support in a World of Uncertainty and Surprise," 173.

²⁸Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?"

²⁹U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 524.

³⁰Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?"

³¹Ibid.

³²Davis, "Strategic Warning: Intelligence Support in a World of Uncertainty and Surprise," 173.

³³Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr, "Systemic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 5 (September, 1998) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/425699.pdf> (accessed February 20, 2009).

³⁴For a discussion of a wide array of potential actions to prevent mass atrocities short of military intervention see the following: John G. Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

³⁵Harff, "Systemic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies."

³⁶Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 507.

³⁷Richard K. Betts, "Intelligence Warning: Old Problems, New Agendas," *Parameters* 28, no. 1, Spring 1998, 6, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98spring/betts.htm> (accessed January 14, 2009).

³⁸*Ibid.*, 7.

³⁹U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, I-27.

⁴⁰Frederick Barton et al., *PCR Project Special Briefing: Early Warning? A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2008), 10, http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?page_id=267 (accessed January 17, 2009).

⁴¹U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, x-xi.

⁴²U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), 1.4 -1.5.

⁴³*Ibid.*, A-15.

⁴⁴Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything* (New York: Penguin Group, 2008), 11.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 24-25.

⁴⁶J. M. McConnell, *Intelligence Community Directive Number 205: Analytic Outreach* (Washington, DC: Director of National Intelligence, July 16, 2008), 2.

⁴⁷Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, *Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations* (New York: Penguin, 2006) 201.

⁴⁸Tapscott, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything*, 11.

⁴⁹Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118221> (accessed March 9, 2009).

⁵⁰Roger Z. George, "Meeting 21st Century Transnational Challenges: Building a Global Paradigm," <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/building-a-global-intelligence-paradigm.html> (accessed February 24, 2009).

⁵¹Lucian Hudson and Allen Anstead, "How government business and NGOs can work together to address global challenges," <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/publications/pd-publications/casestudies> (accessed December 2, 2008).

⁵² Ellen B. Laipson, "Can the USG and NGOs Do More? Information Sharing in Conflict Zones." <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies> (accessed, January 30, 2009).

⁵³Tapscott, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything*, 26-27.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁵U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, 1.5 -1.6.

⁵⁶Hudson, "How government business and NGOs can work together to address global challenges."