

RESOURCING MOVEMENT CONTROL BATTALIONS
DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 07-09

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

RESOURCING MOVEMENT CONTROL BATTALIONS DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, by Major Charles H. Blumenfeld, III, 61 pages.

This investigation attempts to determine whether the Movement Control Battalions (MCB) during Operation Iraqi Freedom 07-09 were resourced adequately. Under current U.S. Army doctrine, the MCB is assigned to a Sustainment Brigade (SB), an Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) or a Theater Sustainment Command (TSC). During OIF 07-09, the MCB in Iraq was assigned to the Support Operations Section (SPO), a subordinate staff section within the 316th ESC, both organizations were located in Iraq. Portions of the Iraq based MCB staff augmented the ESC staff, while simultaneously performing their MCB roles and responsibilities. The MCB operating in Kuwait was assigned to 1st TSC with tasking authority and technical oversight provided by the SPO section, collocated in Kuwait. The different operational employment resulted in the primary research question: Were the MCBs in OIF 07-09 resourced adequately to perform their missions? Lessons learned reports and interviews were used to analyze the organizations. Each Battalion's experience was different based on the mission, area of responsibility, chain of command and higher headquarters status in the transformation process. A result of transformation at the ESC and TSC levels, the MCB in Iraq was not resourced with a sufficient number of personnel to perform the multiple missions assigned.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
TABLES	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Background.....	1
Primary Research Question	7
Secondary Research Questions.....	7
Assumptions.....	7
Definitions	8
Limitations	9
Delimitations.....	9
Significance	10
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	11
Introduction.....	11
Command and Control Literature	11
Movement Control Literature	18
Summary.....	23
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN.....	24
Introduction.....	24
Research Steps	24
Research Methodology	25
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research	26
Summary.....	26

CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH ANALYSIS.....	28
Introduction.....	28
Interview Analysis	28
Doctrine	30
Mission.....	33
Transformation.....	38
Summary	40
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION.....	41
Findings	41
Conclusion	42
Recommendations.....	42
APPENDIX A Interview Questionnaire	44
REFERENCE LIST	48
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	51

ACRONYMS

APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CASCOM	Combat Arms Support Command
CDDOC	Combined Deployment and Distribution Operations Center
CRP	Central Receiving Point
CULT	Common User Land Transportation
ESC	Expeditionary Sustainment Command
FOB	Forward Operating Base
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ITV	In-Transit Visibility
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
POD	Port of Debarkation
POE	Port of Embarkation
RSO	Reception, Staging, and Onward movement
SB	Sustainment Brigade
SDDC	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SPOD	Seaport of Debarkation
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. The Military Decision Making Process	15
Figure 2. Elements of a Transportation System	20
Figure 3. Total Questionnaires by MCB	30
Figure 4. Which Organization should command and control the MCB.....	32
Figure 5. Support capability of the MCTs	34
Figure 6. Personnel shortfall	37

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Questionnaire Respondents by Rank and Unit Type	29
Table 2. Questionnaire Respondents by Rank and Years of Movement Control Experience	30

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The purpose of this study is to identify if the Movement Control Battalions (MCB) deployed during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 07-09 were resourced correctly to execute their mission. To study the resourcing of the battalions it is necessary to understand the logistical command structure in Iraq and Kuwait, the operational employment of MCBs, their organization, their command and control relationships, and their missions, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 07-09. This chapter also provides an overview of the transformation process that the U.S. Army is currently conducting.

During OIF 07-09, the Iraqi theater was divided into two Areas of Operations (AO), the Iraq AO and the Kuwait AO. The senior logistical command in the Theater was the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), an Active Duty unit with some Reserve positions, located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. Subordinate transportation organizations to the 1st TSC were the 14th MCB, an Active Duty unit, and the 640th Sustainment Brigade (SB), a Reserve unit with an Active Duty Theater Transportation Opening Element augmentation. The 14th MCB served as the Movement Control Center for the Kuwait AO and the 640th SB managed the theater transportation mode operators. In Iraq, the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), a Reserve unit, served as senior logistical command for the Multi National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). The 719th MCB served as the Movement Control Center and five SBs, in different areas of Iraq, served as the transportation mode operators for the Iraq AO.

These two logistical structures operationally employed the MCBs in different manners due to personnel strength and missions, which will be covered later. The 1st TSC arrived to replace the 377th TSC. Part of the TSC was the support operations section with a subsection of the distribution management center (DMC). The DMC was responsible for the management of the theater distribution system. Within the distribution management center was a mobility branch which, “functions as the executive agent for movement control by overseeing the development and implementation of the movement program executed by the movement control battalion (MCB) and provides guidance, plans, policies, and staff supervision for transportation operations” (U.S. Army 2008, 2-12). The 14th MCB was employed under the 1st TSC Deputy Commanding General (DCG) with the DMC Mobility Branch performing the technical oversight. The Battalion Commander for 14th MCB was rated by the 1st TSC DCG and senior rated by the CG. The AO, 316th ESC in Iraq, with a strength of 254, replaced the 13th Sustainment Command –Expeditionary [SC(E)] which had a strength of 329. The 316th ESC modified the structure, the SPO section separated the transportation section from the DMC and assigned the 719th MCB with two missions: perform the function as the Movement Control Center for Iraq and perform the staff function as the ESC’s SPO Transportation Section. The Commander for the 719th MCB was rated by the 316th ESC SPO and senior rated by the 316th ESC CDR.

Functioning as the Movement Control Centers, the MCBs is responsible for the execution of the theater’s movement program. In executing the theater’s movement control program, “movement control units and staffs plan, route, schedule, and control common user assets, and maintain in-transit visibility (ITV) of personnel, units,

equipment, and supplies moving over lines of communication” (U.S. Army 2003a, 7-3). Each MCB was assigned Movement Control Teams (MCT) to command and control in executing the theater’s movement control program. In support of theater reception and retrograde missions, the 14th MCB is assigned between eight and ten MCTs at various nodes throughout Kuwait. Due to the size of Iraq and the number of critical distribution nodes the 719th MCB is assigned between 15 and 30 MCTs to command and control in support of the distribution mission.

In 1999, the U.S. Army began transforming to become a more modular force. This transformation started with the Combat Arms (now Maneuver) organizations. The entire process focused on transforming the U.S. Army from a Division centric to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) centric Army. The endstate was to transform the U.S. Army into an easily deployable organization centered around Brigade Combat Teams and associated support elements.

Transforming the United States Army has been and continues to be an extensive process that has activated and deactivated units, changed the mission of units, added and deleted personnel from some units, designated some units as Multi-component (comprised of Active and Reserve Soldiers), and even altered traditional command relationships among some organizations – especially logistics units. For many units the Army’s transformation occurred too fast, because many units were required to transform and deploy without current or updated doctrine to guide the process. Complicating these efforts, units relied upon outdated doctrine and simply modified their operating procedures to accommodate the newly transformed organizational structures to ensure mission accomplishment.

Brigades that once deployed only as subordinated organizations to a parent Division were now separately deployable Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with organically assigned support organizations. The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) and Forward Support Companies (FSC), were developed to provide direct support to each battalion within the Brigade Combat Team. The major exception to this new structure is that the BSB, of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, do not have FSCs and must task organize to support each subordinate Stryker battalion, based on the missions assigned.

Transformation focused sustainment support to each brigade on an internal or area support basis. The brigades received increased sustainment capabilities in their internal BSB and increased sustainment capabilities in the modular SB providing area support. In the legacy force structure, brigades in the divisions were supported by Division Support Command (DISCOMs) through the Forward Support Battalions (FSB) or the Main Support Battalion (MSB). Non-divisional units were supported by modular units, the Corps Support Groups (CSG), which were tailored by mission with functional logistical battalions or Corps Support Battalions (CSB). When viewed in comparison to the legacy force structure, the Brigade Support Battalion now performs all of the FSB functions and some of the MSB functions, and the SB performs most of the former DISCOM functions and some of the CSG functions. Together, today's BSBs and SB allow for modular sustainment capabilities to be pushed farther forward. Additionally, the BCT Commanders have a more robust internal sustainment capability that is now directly responsible to the BCT Commander. Interestingly, in the legacy structure the Division Commanders enjoyed a command relationship with their DISCOMs. However, with the dissolution of the DISCOM, the Division Commander no longer has command and

control of sustainment assets to respond to their BCTs' requirements. As a result of transformation the Division G4 section received an increase from 10 to 33 personnel to: conduct movement control inside the Divisional AO; provide oversight, plans, and policies for divisional units; establish logistical priorities in the divisional AO; and monitor and track logistical readiness in the division. The Division G4 section and the Division Transportation Office coordinate with the supporting SB to manage the flow of supplies and cargo into the Divisional AO. While this new coordinating relationship is not explored in detail in this examination, there is a tertiary effect that will be discussed.

Most sustainment organizations above the BCT and Division, to include SB and Combat Sustainment Support Battalions (CSSB) began transforming in 2004. These Echelon Above Division (EAD) assets allow Commanders to tailor the units to perform certain support missions similar to the modular intent behind the legacy CSGs and the CSBs. A SB could support a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), and an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) for one operation and then be tasked to support different BCTs for a subsequent operation.

A few EAD support organizations retained their legacy structures while others changed to support the modular force through tailored organizations with critical low density specialties. Examples, the MCBs structure did not change, however the MCTs subordinate to the MCB changed to standardize the teams, with 21 Soldiers and to conduct the various types of movement control missions. The legacy MCTs performed specific missions such as the Air Terminal MCT (ATMCT), area MCT, sea port MCT, division support MCT, Movement Regulating Team (MRT), and Automated Cargo Documentation Team (ACDT). MCBs experienced a change in mission without a

change in doctrine except in the Modular Force Logistics Concept from U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (USCASC). The MCBs were no longer tasked as a Theater or Corps MCB. Now their mission is to provide area movement support at the Strategic and/or Operational level; and, currently as required, an MCT deploys and provides area support to several BCTs or supported units.

The U.S. Army's transformation efforts have changed the way units are organized, manned, trained, equipped and employed to conduct operations. Some of the traditional command and control relationships have also changed. However the terms that describe command and control relationships have not changed. The Army still utilizes Assigned, Attached, Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Control (TACON), and Administrative Control (ADCON).

Command and control relationships between the MCBs and their Higher Headquarters, as well as between the MCBs and the MCTs were altered as a result of transformation. In the past, MCBs were assigned to a support organization under a Corps Headquarters; current doctrine, the Modular Force Logistics Concept, assigns an MCB to an SB, an ESC or a TSC implementing a single operational organization to command and control the logistics operations in the theater.

Prior to transformation movement control doctrine stated, "An MCB will have as many subordinate MCTs as needed to operate in its AO [Area of Operations], based on factors such as number of customers; air terminals, rail terminals, and sea ports; and MSRs [Main Supply Routes]" (U.S. Army 2003a, 4-10). According to current doctrine, "The Movement Control Battalion is the command and control headquarters for between four and ten separate movement control teams. (U.S. Army Combined Arms Support

Command 2006, E-7) During OIF 07-09, the number of MCTs in Iraq varied between 15 and 30 teams, and were collocated on the Forward Operating Bases (FOB) or Camps with their supported units, or with their supported Division Headquarters. Current practices in Iraq are resemble previous doctrine as stated above in Field Manual 4-01.30 *Movement Control* rather than current doctrine outlined in the Modular Force Logistics Concept version 6.

The differing operational employment led to this study with a primary research question and secondary research questions designed to assist in discovering what challenges, if any, the MCBs experienced.

Primary Research Question

Were the MCBs in OIF 07-09 resourced adequately to perform their missions?

Secondary Research Questions

In order to answer the primary question the author will need to answer the following secondary and tertiary questions:

1. Did a change in doctrine create a resource shortfall?
2. Was a resource shortfall due to outdated doctrine?
3. Did the missions the MCBs were assigned, during OIF 07-09, identify a resource shortfall?
4. Did the transformation create a shortage of resources in the Movement Control Battalions, based on total Army priorities for resourcing?

Assumptions

The author made the following assumptions in order to conduct this research.

1. The MCBs are designed to be employed in accordance with current logistics transformation guidance/doctrine.
2. MCTs are performing the tasks prescribed by the appropriate field manuals, Soldier qualification manuals, and the guidance from higher headquarters (designated MCB headquarters).
3. Under the new Logistics Corps, Field Grade Officers assigned to the MCB, SB SPO Section, and the DMC Mobility Section know and understand the doctrinal roles and functions of an MCB and an MCT.
4. The MCB will receive movement control guidance and the DMC's Mobility Section, which has tasking authority over the MCB.

Definitions

Administrative Control: Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters, not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations Also called ADCON. (U.S. Army 2004, 1-3).

Assigned: Those forces that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense (U.S. Army 2004, 1-15).

Attached: The placement of units or personnel in a an organization where such placement is relatively temporary (U.S. Army 2004, 1-15).

Centric: Located in or at a center or concentrated about

Operational Control: Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON (U.S. Army 2004, 1-138).

Tactical Control: Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON (U.S. Army 2004, 1-182).

Transformation: the operation of change

Limitations

The study assessed the resource feasibility and suitability of the operational employment of the MCBs in Kuwait and Iraq during OIF 07-09. The research was conducted between September 2008 and May 2009, without the use of funds. This research was the investigator's initial experience conducting original research.

Delimitations

During this research, the author did not assess the interaction between the contracted Movement Controllers and the Military Movement Controllers. Another topic

that may become apparent, but the research did not address, is the roles and functions of other support agencies located on individual Forward Operating Bases that also interact with the MCTs and the MCB.

Significance

The Army's transformation began in 1999, accelerated four years ago, and has continued in a challenging war time environment. Analysis of the MCBs responsibilities and doctrinal employment may suggest a revision of the current organizational structure and employment/doctrine, in order to better facilitate movement control. The intent is to ensure timely and effective management of surface distribution and ultimately improve support to the Soldiers and war fighters who are dependent on receiving the supplies and services provided by U.S. Army Logisticians.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

A key investigation in this study was to identify if transformation, missions, doctrine or a combination of these created a resource shortfall in operational employment of MCBs, during OIF 07-09. To answer the research questions and to understand the rationale for the operational employment, the study examined many forms of literature. Literature reviewed included congressional research papers, U.S. Government Accountability Office reports, joint publications, joint assessments, Army regulations, Army field manuals, White Papers, Information Papers, transformation briefings, lessons learned, and transcripts of recently redeployed units lessons learned presentations during U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command's Reverse Collection and Analysis Teams (RCAAT) Programs.

Command and Control Literature

Joint publications on logistical support to the joint commander, field manuals on command, leadership, operations, theater distribution, movement control, and TSC structures are used as supporting documents to frame the role of a commander and movement control operations.

The Army defines command as “the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of

assigned personnel” (U.S. Army 2004, 1-37). Based on this definition, the commander may employ the forces in the organization in the best manner possible to accomplish the mission, since the commander is ultimately responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do. Commanders are also responsible for providing a vision, guiding and organizing the unit, and ensuring a functioning chain of command is in place. As a leader, the commander utilizes the Army’s Leader Attributes and Core Leader Competencies to ensure the unit succeeds at their mission. This study focuses on the Core Competencies that a commander must have while in charge of a unit such as a MCB.

The Core Competencies of a leader are: Leads through leading others, extending their influence beyond the chain of command, leading by example, and effectively communicating; Develops by creating a positive environment, self preparation, and developing others; and Achieves through getting results. (U.S. Army 2006, A-1) One manner by which commanders display these competencies is by being with the Soldiers and leaders, observing the execution of various missions and the training conducted to prepare. It is very challenging for a commander to lead by example if the Soldiers and the leaders never witness this key leader conducting physical fitness, qualifying on weapons, coaching junior leaders, or checking on the morale of the Soldiers. In OIF, the MCB in Iraq was responsible for between 15 and 30 MCTs that were spread across the AO and operating on small FOBs. The MCB in Kuwait was responsible for about eight to twelve MCTs operating throughout Kuwait. Based on the availability of transportation a significant amount of time and planning were required to conduct a visit to the subordinate MCTs. This effort minimized the amount of time the commander was able

to spend with the Soldiers. This was a dilemma, because for all commander visiting their subordinate units is a top priority, in order to observe the Soldiers and leaders in action.

As the Army continues to transform, developing subordinates remains an important duty of every commander and leader. Many young leaders and Soldiers have chosen to depart the military due to the continuous deployments, time away from families, and the extensive train ups that cause them to be away from home in preparation for deployments. Each leader must dedicate time to developing the Soldiers underneath them. It is better for leaders to encourage initiative; demonstrate care for their Soldiers; assess developmental needs; help Soldiers learn; and counsel, coach, and mentor the Soldiers in their charge as prescribed in FM 6-22. As stated above, to accomplish the development of the Soldiers and the leaders, the commander must observe the unit conducting their mission and be an active participant in the development of the young leaders in the unit.

Providing a purpose or vision identifies the direction the unit must take to accomplish the mission. Any leader may develop a vision, however a commander must focus his or her vision to include the units subordinate to them versus a staff officer's vision focuses on their immediate section. With this vision, the commander provides the guidance necessary to ensure good order and discipline are followed and ensure programs are in place for Soldier development, to include lower enlisted personnel as well as the leaders that supervise them. For a commander, developing subordinates is a critical component of the Army's Leader Competencies. "Leader development is a deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process grounded in the Army Values" (U.S.

Army 2006, 8-9). It provides junior leaders with the information and guidance to develop into critical and creative thinkers to lead the Army of tomorrow.

The position of commander requires the ability to communicate or to clearly articulate the problem and the commander's intent or actions that are required to solve the problem. In the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) (see figure 1), the unit receives the mission and the commander must provide the staff with the commander's initial guidance to conduct the mission analysis. The commander's initial guidance is a critical aspect of the MDMP as it provides the staff with a start point. Throughout the remainder of the seven steps of MDMP, the commander is required to communicate his or her visualization of the plan through the following means: an approved restated mission, the initial commanders intent and planning guidance, the initial Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), a refined commander's intent and planning guidance, an approved Course of Action (COA), refined commander's intent, refined Commander's Critical Information Requirements, and High Payoff target list. Communicating the plan is critical for the commander and the success of the mission. Following these steps is a part of showing competency in his or her ability to provide direction, guidance, establish priorities; develop, and execute plans. It becomes extremely complex when the commander is also responsible for simultaneously conducting the MDMP as a staff officer on the next higher headquarters staff. Certain outputs from the MCB Commander may not be provided, ample time to complete the seven steps in the MDMP Process may not be available, or the higher headquarters products may be duplicated/sent to the subordinate units. All of this likely contributes to increased risk for the MCB and its subordinate MCTs




Figure 1. The Military Decision Making Process
Source: U.S. Army, Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 3-3.

The establishment of a chain of command during home base operations is generally already designated but during deployments for logistical units the chain of command must be designated and implemented. The Army Command Policy states, “The

chain of command assists commanders at all levels to achieve their primary function of accomplishing the unit's assigned mission while caring for personnel and property in their charge. A simple and direct chain of command facilitates the transmittal of orders from the highest to the lowest levels in a minimum of time and with the least chance of misinterpretation" (U.S. Army 2008, 6). Critical requirements for all leaders is to understand who they work for, what the command relationship is, and for logistical commanders, what units they are supporting. "Organizational decisions establish the chain of command (command and support relationships) and task organization. They directly affect C2 [command and control]. They can influence where commanders obtain facts, whom they rely on for advice, and how they supervise execution of their decisions. Organizational decisions affect the structure of the flow of recommendations to commanders. In large part, organization establishes formal communication channels and determines how commanders distribute information throughout their forces" (U.S. Army 2003d, 5-22). This simple explanation of a chain of command affords the commander the ability to discuss benefits, risks, issues, concerns, and challenges with the next higher commander.

While some of the roles of the commander have been discussed, a critical role for the commander as stated in Field Manual 6-0, "Commanders give their staff leadership, direction, and guidance." (U.S. Army 2003d, 5-5) The staff operates based on the direction and the guidance from the commander to develop potential solutions and provide recommendations. However, at no time does the staff have its own authority to execute their recommendations. The commander retains that authority. Staff officers advise, plan, and coordinate actions for the commander. Other roles that staff officers are

responsible for include: identifying and analyzing the problem; identifying specified and implied tasks, constraints, key facts, and assumptions; developing running estimates; performing Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; formulating the concept of operations and support; developing orders; assisting commanders with assessments of operations; manage information; coordinating with higher, lower, and adjacent staffs; assessing training requirements; conducting staff assistance visits and inspections; conducting risk management; developing written correspondence and information briefings; collecting and evaluating facts to solve problems; and conducting other administrative procedures to include policies, SOPs, and section records.

The MDMP was discussed early identifying the critical outputs the commander must provide to the staff, however there are also products that staff owes the commander in order for the commander to provide these outputs. They include a mission analysis briefing which includes an initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, an initial Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) plan, and initial staff estimates. After step 3, the staff will conduct a Course of Action Briefing which provides the commander with: updated staff estimates, Course of Action statements and sketches, and possible enemy Courses of Actions. Step 4 is to conduct the Analysis of the Courses of Action through War Gaming. Out of War Gaming the staff will develop war gaming results, a decision support template, a possible Task Organization, subordinate units missions, recommended Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), and possible criteria for the Course of Action comparison. Then the staff produces a Course of Action Decision Briefing to gain approval on a Course of Action which leads to the production of an Operations Plan or an Operations Order. The MDMP steps are conducted in

conjunction with executing and tracking current operations. Planning for upcoming missions with the MDMP or similar model, executing and tracking current missions, and assessing previous missions are ultimately how the staff supports the commander.

Movement Control Literature

Good Logistics alone can't win a war. Bad logistics alone can lose. (1943, 226)
— LTG Brehon B. Somervell, *The Army Reader*

Guidance for movement control operations are resident in joint publications, joint staff assessments, Army field manuals, transformation briefings, modular concept documents, lessons learned reports, articles written by deployed units, and research studies into logistical transformation. These documents represent a basis of information that logisticians use to establish a movement control program and structure in a theater of operations. These documents contain the information needed to establish understanding of movement control. This section will define movement control, the organization, and the changes as a result of the logistics transformation.

The military transportation system consist of the three elements (see figure 2): Mode Operations, Terminal Operations, and Movement Control. Mode Operations is the management of the systems that move cargo, units, and personnel to a destination, whether it is a Aerial or Sea Port of Embarkation or Debarkation, an Installation, a Logistical Supply Area, or a Camp or Forward Operating Base. Terminal Operations is the management of the stevedore and port clearance operations utilized to move the sustainment supplies or unit equipment from a sea port on to a vessel and from a vessel into the sea port then into the distribution system. Army Field Manual 4-01.30 states, “that Movement Control is the most critical part of the transportation system.” (U.S.

Army 2003a, 2-3) The Army defines movement control as, “the planning, routing, scheduling, controlling, coordination, and in-transit visibility of personnel, units, equipment, and supplies moving over Line(s) of Communication (LOC) and the commitment of allocated transportation assets according to command planning directives” (U.S. Army 2003a,1-1). The operational employment of MCBs and MCTs are critical to the success of the distribution system and the theater’s movement program. The theater’s movement program must involve the five basic principles of movement control which include: centralized control and decentralized execution, forward support, regulated movements, fluid and flexible movements, and effective use of carrying capacity. In a theater of operation, the requirements always outnumber the capabilities which then requires the transportation system to allocate the capabilities through regulated movements based on the theater commander’s priorities. The transportation modes are managed during movement to ensure effective utilization of their carrying capacity. This prevents inefficient use of transportation assets such as an empty trailer or one carrying a minimal amount of cargo. An example is an M915 (5-ton highway type tractor) and an M872 (34-ton highway type flatbed trailer) delivering a full trailer of sustainment supplies to a Logistical Supply Area (LSA) but returning with an empty trailer.




Figure 2. Elements of a Transportation System

Source: U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 4-01.30, *Movement Control* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003a), 1-1.

“The Chief of Staff of the Army has mandated that the Army be able to move a combat capable brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours. To put a viable combat capability on the ground anywhere in the world in this time frame will require effective movement control” (U.S. Army 2003b, i.). Based on the transforming Army, movement control units have encountered many changes from varying the size of the organizations to varying the missions. MCT are transforming to teams of 21 Soldiers, with more secure vehicles to safely move around on the MSR and Alternate Supply Routes (ASR), and the mission to provide movement control support at any node or perform movement control augmentation to any headquarters. The MCBs are no longer designated to perform only Corps movement control operations or Theater movement control operations, it is now tasked based on the mission and support required in a theater of operations.

One of the more recent publications reviewed was the Modular Force Logistics Concept, version 6, dated September 2006. It explains the designs, structures, command relationships, and capabilities of the United States Army modular force sustainment organizations that are critical to the support of the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, and the 2005 Army Modernization Plan (U.S. Army 2006, 9). The Modular Force Logistics Concept outlines the six transformation imperatives from the Chief of Staff of the Army and then identifies the changes and the support that was required to ensure the Sustainment branches transform to meet the needs of the Modular Force. One of the six imperatives in the Modular Force Logistics Concept, specifies that the TSC provides the Joint Force Commander with a single logistical command and control headquarters in theater. This TSC would supervise and manage the logistical structure in a theater from the operational level down to the upper tactical level of operations. Prior to September 2006, the logistical forces in an operation were assigned to the Division and the Corps Commander. For example, the FSBs and the MSBs were assigned to the DISCOMs which were organic to each Division. The Corps logistical assets were assigned to the Corps Support Commands (COSCOM) which were organic to each Corps. The structure afforded the Commander the ability to control and maneuver the logistical assets and supplies in their assigned area of operations. However, it created challenges for the theater logistical structure to support the theater objectives and priorities, an example would be if the theater commander shifted the main effort from one Division to another. This would force the theater logistical system to shift the priority of support in the theater which might entail repositioning of priority stocks from one Divisional area to another

Division that is designated the main effort. Another example is if there was a critical shortage in one Divisional area but that supply was available in another Divisional area, the theater logistical commander can redirect the supplies to fill the shortage. The result is that the new logistical structure removes the flexibility of the Division and Corps Commanders to leverage organic logistical assets to support their subordinate Brigades and Battalions.

Command relationships for the movement control organizations are further identified in the Concept: “The Movement Control Battalion is the command and control headquarters for between four and ten separate movement control teams . . . The MCB is assigned to a TSC , or one of its Sustainment Brigades or Functional Groups.” The Modular Force Logistics Concept states the “Movement Control Teams are assigned to a Movement Control Battalion and can be placed under the Operational Control (OPCON) or Tactical Control (TACON) of a Corps/Division Headquarters, Brigade Combat Team Headquarters, Support Brigade, or Sustainment Brigade” (U.S. Army CASCOM 2006, E-7).

“Logistics Transformation: The Paradigm Shift” by MAJ Derrick Corbett, US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, 14 May 2007, was another important publication. MAJ Corbett concludes in his monograph that the Combat Service Support (CSS), units should receive acceptable attention to ensure the correct structures, equipment, and training are provided during transformation in order to support Modular Force. He claims in the past, with linear battlefields, commanders were able to accept risk with the sustainment forces. However, with a non-linear battlefield a commander is accepts a greater risk to the entire force if

the sustainment units are not transformed with a similar priority as the core of the U.S. Army. MAJ Corbett's monograph also identifies that as a result of transformation, sustainment structures were changed to create multi-component organizations (Active Component and Reserve Component personnel assigned to the same unit). The multi-component units have and will continue to face challenges with training, resourcing personnel to fill all of the key leadership positions, and resource funding for equipment.

Summary

Logistical units transformed to support the Army to ensure it has the capability to win the battles and wars of today and tomorrow. Movement control doctrine and units will continue to change as the transformation process continues. It is imperative that as movement control organizations are employed, the basic fundamentals of command and control, the fundamentals of movement control operations, and the principles of movement control are not overlooked. Ultimately the Soldiers receiving the support at the lowest level will feel the second and third order effects.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

Data collection for this study began as a case study to research the benefits, challenges, and the reasons for the operational employments of the MCBs in Iraq and Kuwait, in support of OIF 07-09. The research revealed many documents to review including lessons learned documents previous field manuals, current regulations and field manuals, draft field manuals, and other published literature on the subject of Transformation and Movement Control. Observing a lack of primary data on movement control operations, the author developed a questionnaire. The questionnaire provided an current data from Officers involved in OIF and OEF that where either in a movement control organization or worked with one during their deployment. This chapter identifies the steps taken to conduct the research, the methodology used, strengths and the weaknesses of the research, and provides a summary.

Research Steps

The first steps during this research focused on the collecting all documents that identified what movement control was, current is, and what it will be as the Army continues to transform while engaged war. After the collection of this data the author then began to collect data on the command and control of units, the roles of unit commander, roles of the staff in support of the commander, the requirements of a leader, and then benefits and challenges that movement control units experienced during deployments. After about six months of research the study shifted toward the need for

qualitative analysis of the operational employment of the MCBs, during OIF 07-09. A questionnaire, (included in Appendix A) was developed, submitted, and approved for release by the U.S. Army Research Institute on March 30, 2009. Final collection of the answered questionnaires occurred late in April with some of the questionnaires not returned.

The research concluded with the development of the analysis, conclusions, recommendations in late April and early May 2009.

Research Methodology

Researching current doctrine occurred through United States Army Combined Arms Research Library through the internet and experience collected by the author over the last 16 years of service.

After the development and approval of the survey the author identified potential survey participants. The primary focus for participants were officers and leaders that were assigned to a MCB, or worked with a MCB at the higher headquarters or in adjacent units. Participant ranks ranged from Sergeant First Class up to and including Brigadier General. Participants received the questionnaire in an email that included: a brief description of the author, the purpose for the questionnaire, the number of questions, the approximate time to complete the questionnaire, a date requested for the return of the data, reason for the suspense, the questionnaire, and a Privacy Act Statement. Each email that went out the addressees were placed into the blind courtesy copy (bcc) line a certain level of anonymity for the participants. However, some of the participants indicated to the author that they forwarded the survey on to other leaders they felt should also provide information, which is both a strength and a weakness.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research

As the research developed, strengths and weaknesses became evident in both the literature research and the questionnaire.

Researching literature on current movement control operations was easy due to the availability of the Joint and Army doctrine online. The challenge was to find logistics doctrine that was updated since the Army began transformation. Most of the movement control specific doctrine are dated prior to 2003. So, while the Army has revised much of its doctrine in other areas, movement control doctrine has not caught up with current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Weaknesses encountered with the questionnaire consisted of: loss of control in who was included in the focus group when participants forwarded the questionnaire on to other leaders, framing the question in too broad a manner that prevents sufficient usable data, and not receiving enough responses to the questionnaires to provide a representative analysis. The strengths of the questionnaire included a good base line of demographics to represent the focus group, participants forwarding the questionnaire on to other leaders providing additional data and view points, simple questions to answer with yes or no if the participant did not have much time, the opportunity for the participant to provide more detail than a yes or no response, and the final question afforded the participant the opportunity to offer other topics that should be researched.

Summary

The research began as a literature review and then the need for personal experiences relating to the two MCBs became apparent. The procedures conducted in

this research and the methodology used will provide an analysis and an operational overview of movement control operations.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH ANALYSIS

Introduction

Analysis in this chapter covers the literature review and the interpretation of the data collected during the interviews. The analysis assisted in answering the secondary questions and ultimately the primary research question. The primary research question was: Were the MCBs in OIF 07-09 resourced adequately to perform their missions? Since beginning this study, the operational employments for both MCBs have changed. The MCB in Kuwait no longer works directly for the TSC's DMC. It currently works for the theater level Sustainment Brigade in Kuwait. The MCB in Iraq is no longer "dual hatted" as the MCB and the ESC's SPO transportation section. Currently, the MCB only functions as the MCB for Iraq, but it remains collocated with the ESC in a Fusion Cell structure. Chapter 4 covers an analysis of the Literature researched and the returned questionnaires to answer the secondary questions. This will identify if there was a resource shortfall in the MCBs as a result of doctrine, additional missions, or transformation.

Interview Analysis

To augmented the literature review a questionnaire was developed. The author sent the questionnaire to 36 personnel, and received 21 completed questionnaires back. Two of the twenty-one had been forwarded by other participants for a total of 38 potential participants. This equated to a return rate of 55 percent. Below is an analysis of the respondents that returned the questionnaire..

Table 1 provides a comparison of the rank and the type of unit each of the respondents were deployed with during OIF 07-09. This is used to identify the level of military experience with reference to the respondents. Of the respondents, 52 percent were deployed with an MCB on the staff or in a subordinate MCT, 14 percent were deployed in a higher headquarters to an MCB, and 33 percent were in an adjacent unit, either a Transportation Terminal Group (TTG) or a SB.

Table 1. Questionnaire Respondents by Rank and Unit Type				
RANK	MCT	MCB	HIGHER HEADQUARTERS	ADJACENT UNIT
BG			1	
COL		1		
LTC			2	1
MAJ		2		5
CPT	6	1		
LT		1		
SFC				1

Table 2 depicts how many years of movement control experience the respondents have in comparison to the length of their careers in the U.S. Army. Those without movement control experience, but had been exposed to movement control during their careers was 19 percent, 71 percent had experience in movement control jobs totaling less than four years, and the one General Officer and one Colonel who responded had approximately five years each in various movement control jobs.

Table 2. Questionnaire Respondents by Rank and Years of Movement Control Experience				
RANK	0	<4	5<12	13>
BG			1	
COL			1	
LTC	1	2		
MAJ	3	4		
CPT		7		
LT		1		
SFC		1		

Figure 3 utilizes a pie chart to depict the number of respondents and which MCB they were associated with, to group the data in to two groups. Of the 21 respondents, 10 worked for or with the MCB in Iraq, 719th MCB; and 11 worked for or with the MCB in Kuwait, 14th MCB.




Figure 3. Total Questionnaires by MCB

Doctrine

Through a review of literature and the responses to the questionnaire answered the first two secondary questions. The first question was: Did a change in doctrine create a

resource shortfall? The second question was: Was a resource shortfall in the MCBs due to outdated doctrine?

Based on current doctrine the MCB in an AO should be assigned to a TSC, and can be OPCON to an ESC or an SB. That is the extent of current doctrine on the operational employment of MCBs. Therefore it is left to the commander to decide the appropriate manner in which to employ the MCBs. The senior logistical commander in theater will make this decision in order to provide a unity of effort and unity of command, according to the Modular Force Logistics Concept version 6. The senior logistical commander in theater may assess the number and types of units deployed into the AO that the MCB is providing area support to, how many SBs are in the AO, and the scope of the MCBs mission to decide on the operational employment of the MCB.

Respondents were asked if there was an MCB, an SB, and a TSC/ESC assigned to a Joint Task Force, who should the MCB be OPCON to? Figure 4 shows a comparison between the respondents associated with the MCB in Iraq and the MCB in Kuwait. The respondents from Iraq, at 80 percent, stated the MCB should be assigned to the ESC/TSC, and 27 percent of the respondents from Kuwait, stated the MCB should be assigned to a TSC/ESC. Respondents from Iraq making up 10 percent stated the MCB should be assigned to a SB and 55 percent of the respondents from Kuwait stated the MCB should be assigned to a SB. Based this data the only overwhelming response is that the respondents from Iraq felt the MCB should be assigned and OPCON to an ESC/TSC to better execute the theater's movement program. The respondents stated that this affords the MCB additional capabilities and the direct interaction with the ESC/TSC SPO staff.




Figure 4. Which Organization should command and control the MCB

In support of Full Spectrum Operations and transformation, the U.S. Army continues to update, write, and delete doctrine to maintain a current, valid, and relevant set of manuals. Compared to other critical field manuals the movement control doctrine has been slow to be updated with changes as a result transformation, current operations, and lessons learned.

FM 4-0 Combat Service Support was completed in August 2003, FM 4-01.3 Movement control was completed in September 2003, and FM 4-93.4 Theater Sustainment Command was completed in April 2003. FM 4-0 and FM 4-93.4 are currently in final draft but in comparison to other critical U.S. Army doctrine these manuals are outdated. FM 3-0 Operations was updated and completed February 2008, FM 5-0 Army planning and orders production was completed January 2005, and FM 7-0 Training for full spectrum operations was completed December 2008.

The MCBs in both Iraq and Kuwait were operationally employed in accordance with current doctrine. Therefore current doctrine or the lack of an update did not result in a resource shortfall with either MCB. However there are critical movement control references that are need of revision and updated to include the principles in Modular Force Logistics Concept.

Mission

In the previous section the author concluded that the MCBs were employed in accordance with current doctrine, now the missions of the MCBs will be analyzed to answer the next secondary question. Did the missions the MCBs were assigned, during OIF 07-09, identify a resource shortfall? To answer this question, the respondents answered questions discussing the support capability of the MCTs, the effect of the employment on the MCBs mission, the MCBs command and control of the MCTs, the employment's affect on professional development in the MCB, and the additional non-movement control tasks imposed on the MCB.

Was the support capability of the MCTs enhanced, reduced, or minimized with regard to supporting the Brigade Combat Teams, other units in that geographic area, or the Theater Common User Land Transportation (CULT) assets designed to support the Multi-National Corps-Iraq? Eight respondents stated that the operational employment enhanced the MCTs ability to support their customers. No change in support by the MCTs was indicated by six of the respondents and three had no comment. Three respondents felt the support in Kuwait was reduced due to the fact of the MCTs under the MCB working directly for the sustainment command and transportation truck companies were working for the SB. Placing the MCB and the transportation battalions under the same SB in Kuwait maintains a unity of effort with the lowest commander to resolve these issues. One respondent from the MCB in Iraq indicated the support was reduced based on performing additional staff missions of the higher headquarters, and another comment stated less focus was placed on the individual MCTs operations then on the

collective mission. Figure 5 depicts that overall, the MCTs ability to support the customer was either enhanced or not affected by the operational employment.




Figure 5. Support capability of the MCTs

The respondents were also asked: What was the effect on the MCTs ability to conduct of their mission? Eight respondents stated the performance of the MCT's mission was adversely affected. Affects included tasking of MCTs for personnel to augment the MCB, conflicts in Divisional Area of Responsibilities between priorities of the ESC Commander and the SB Commanders supporting the Divisions, MCTs not sufficiently staffed, difficulty in synchronizing and standardizing information, the SB following different guidance than the MCTs were provided. This question was similar to the question above but different responses were received. The responses state that the additional missions and taskings affected their ability to conduct their mission but they were still able to support the customer and accomplish the mission.

How does the recent operational employment of the MCBs affect the ability of the MCB to perform its mission? Five of the respondents stated it adversely affect the performance of their mission by receiving additional missions based on its close proximity to the ESC and TSC SPO sections. Five of the respondents stated there was no

effect on the performance of their missions. Finally, two respondents stated that they were not sure. Conclusion: based on the information collected the MCBs in Iraq and Kuwait were not adversely affected in the performance of their doctrinal mission, however the additional missions did impact their performance.

What is the effect on the MCBs ability to execute command and control of MCTs when the MCB was employed as augmentation to a higher headquarters staff section? Eight of the respondents stated that the command and control of the MCTs were not affected by the operational employment of the MCB. Five respondents indicated there was an effect in the form of additional missions and tasks and the constant involvement by the ESC directly with the MCTs. One respondent specified that it was enhanced by the authority of the ESC's SPO section. Three respondents were not sure or did not respond to this question. Two comments indicated the MCB Commander and staff were not able to conduct battlefield circulation to visit the MCTs due to the additional staff responsibilities. Conclusion: the adverse effect on the command and control of subordinate units in this study is minimal; however, MCB Commanders and staffs should attempt to conduct regular visits to the subordinate units.

What is the impact on the professional development of the leaders and the Soldiers in the unit? This question did not generate a solid stance on the impact. It should have been worded differently, however some of the comments were worth including. Two stated it afforded them and their leaders the opportunity to observe various logisticians performing their missions that they would not have seen away from the sustainment command headquarters. The MCT OICs were afforded a greater ability to conduct their mission within the guidance of the Battalion Commander with less direct

supervision due to the “dual hatted” role of the MCB. The additional missions and competing staff priorities at the sustainment command level limited the Battalion Commander’s ability to conduct battlefield circulation, visually observe the MCTs’ operations, and visit the customers of the MCTs and the MCBs. The remaining respondents provided comments including; minimal operational visits were conducted by unit leadership, sustainment command level issues were exposed to junior leaders, and junior leader development did not occur because of colocation with higher headquarters. The additional missions on the MCB in Iraq was evident in some of their responses to professional development.

What non-MCT related tasks and functions did the MCB Staff perform as a result of the assignment to the ESC/TSC’s SPO Section? Both MCBs in Iraq and Kuwait received additional duties that were outside the normal scope of movement control operations. While these additional duties are not exclusive to MCBs they are additional requirements placed on a battalion performing a low density mission. The tasks included contractor and commercial monitoring such as: contract management, contracting officer representative responsibilities, and monitoring of commercial movements along the MSRs. Other additional missions were the monitoring of radio communications along the MSRs, airfield operations at rotary wing airfields in Divisional Areas of Responsibility, and extensive deployment and redeployment planning versus execution. Sustainment command level staff duties interfered with movement control operations to include: participation in non transportation boards and working groups at the sustainment command levels, participation in sustainment command level Intelligence Preparation of the Theater, participation in sustainment command level battle drills, and tracking

individual Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle movements. These additional tasks and duties are normally conducted by higher headquarters staff. However the placement of the MCB into the staff section forces the battalion staff to conduct or participate in these tasks. The MCB in Iraq was also responsible for the command and control of between 15 to 30 MCTs and MCB in Kuwait was responsible for 8 to 10 MCTs.

One question the author did not ask on the questionnaire but the respondents added comments in one or two other answers they provided was: if the MCBs had an adequate number of personnel to complete all of the assigned missions. MCB Iraq respondents added comments equating to seven out of ten stated they were short personnel and the two out of eleven respondents from the MCB Kuwait respondents indicated they were short personnel. These numbers are depicted in figure 6.




Figure 6. Personnel shortfall

Based on the respondents the MCB in Kuwait was adequately resourced to conduct the missions they were assigned. The MCB in Iraq was responsible for commanding and controlling between 15 and 30 MCTs, performing the Movement Control Center mission for Iraq, and performing the ESC staff function of the SPO

transportation section. MCB in Iraq respondents indicated through their comments that they were able to successfully complete their missions however, the Battalion and the MCTs were under resourced to perform all of the additional missions. The new MCB structure in Iraq was identified as a correction, to the response that the additional mission reduced the MCTs' support capability to customers

Transformation

Did transformation create a shortage of resources in the MCBs, during OIF 07-09? The MCB in Kuwait did not experience a shortage of personnel to conduct their mission as a result of transformation. However, the MCB in Iraq did experience a shortage of personnel as an indirect result of transformation. The investigation identified three aspects of transformation that caused the shortfall of personnel: it was the first ESC to deploy under the new structure, the 316th ESC had less personnel than the unit they were replacing, and the implementation of an ESC Fusion Cell without additional personnel.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of assigning the MCB to the SPO staff section, either in the SB or sustainment command, for technical oversight and tasking authority? The advantages provide the ability to distinguish the Battalion Commander's guidance from the sustainment command's guidance and to distinguish between the battalion's priorities and the sustainment command's priorities. It enables the Battalion Commanders and staff to focus on supporting the battalion versus the entire sustainment command and affording the Battalion Commanders the time and ability to focus only on commanding a large and disperse battalion. It allows for the preparation of battalion level staff products, and provides a battalion headquarters to engage the

sustainment command instead of direct contact to the MCTs. A Fusion Cell structure would afford the ESC and the MCB the ability to work in close proximity to monitor the distribution system in the Area of Responsibility, and the ability to quickly reprioritize cargo or redirect convoys. The disadvantages are that the support operations section has less direct control of the MCB, and more personnel are required to perform the support operations transportation section functions and the MCB functions.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of assigning the MCB to the SPO section and giving the Support Operations Officer command and control over the MCB? The advantages the support operations section has include more direct control over of the MCB and the MCT operations, fewer personnel required to perform the support operations transportation section functions and the MCB functions since they are combined, taskings cannot be disputed, closer synchronization with the support operations section, more influence over the SB, and close proximity to the sustainment command support operations section to resolve issues as they arise. The disadvantages are that the SPO officer is a staff officer not a commander, leader tasks at the MCB level may be disregarded to perform the staff functions of the ESC/TSC, the MCB guidance and plans become intermixed with the sustainment command's guidance, and conflicting taskings arise. Most of the advantages remained and elimination of the majority of disadvantages of this question occurred when 3rd ESC implemented a more robust Fusion Cell and split the responsibilities of the MCB Commander and the SPO Transportation Section Chief.

Based on the documents on transformation, unit lessons learned, and the questionnaires the problem arose as the 13th SC(E) was replaced by the 316th ESC in the

fall of 2007. The 13th SC(E) was deployed with 329 personnel to perform the same missions as their replacement, 316th ESC. However, 316th ESC's required and authorized strength was only 254 personnel, a shortage of 75 personnel. This meant that 316th ESC was assuming the same missions with less personnel as the 13th SC(E) had performed. The decrease in personnel is a decrease that all ESCs will encounter as both Active and Reserve ESCs are required and authorized 254 personnel as they transform.

Summary

Answers provided to the secondary questions of this research presented challenges and benefits to the operational employment of MCBs during OIF 07-09. This analysis showed that the MCB in Kuwait was adequately resourced to perform their missions. However, while the MCB Iraq was able to perform their missions they were not adequately resourced as a result of the additional missions they were assigned. These additional missions were due the transformation of the 316th ESC and the fact that they were deploying with 75 fewer personnel than the unit they were replacing utilized to conduct the same missions.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Findings

The MCB in Iraq faced a challenge in that the Battalion Commander and portions of the staff were “dual hatted” as the MCB and as the ESC SPO Transportation Section. This structure and operational employment afforded the Battalion Commander the ability to quickly receive the mission and any changes in the mission from the ESC. Quick receipt and dissemination of problems at the various nodes minimized the possibility of confusion between the SPO Section and the MCB staff. Synchronization of information, quick dissemination of plans and guidance, and mission tracking and utilization of the Theater level Common User Land Transportation assets ensured a unity of effort in the MCB by operating in close proximity to the Support Operations Section. Many of the advantages were identified by 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, as they replaced 316th ESC, which split the responsibilities of the MCB and the SPO Transportation Section. They continued to utilize the Fusion Cell structure.

The addition of the SPO transportation section mission is a result of transformation and the inability to conduct a sufficient troop to task mission analysis. The Battalion Commander and staff were unable to conduct battlefield circulation due to their performance of two levels of staff operations and the requirement to command and control two to three times the number of subordinate units annotated in current doctrine.

While the respondents to the questionnaire provided very revealing answers, many respondents answered the only operational effect was that the MCB in Iraq was over tasked and under resourced.

Conclusion

The MCB in Kuwait was adequately resourced to conduct their missions in Kuwait, however the MCB in Iraq was not resourced with a sufficient number of personnel to perform the multiple missions they were assigned. The shortfall in resources or personnel was directly related to the multiple missions they were required to perform; but, it was also indirectly a result of transformation.

In accordance with current and previous doctrine, both MCBs had an adequate number of personnel to perform the Movement Control Center mission, and command and control between eight and fifteen MCTs. A shortfall in resources was apparent when the MCB in Iraq was assigned the additional mission to serve as the 316th ESC's SPO Transportation Section and assigned two to three times the number of MCTs prescribed by doctrine in the Modular Force Logistics Concept, version 6.

Recommendations

One: the constant personnel/mission requirements compared to the decrease in assigned personnel strength as a result of transformation in the Active and Reserve Components affected the ESC's ability to perform the modular mission assigned during OIF 07-09. Support organizations should be augmented with personnel to conduct the missions assigned, a proper troop to tasks will minimize the adverse effect on the support units.

Two: the Fusion Cell structure should be implemented in sustainment commands and SB Headquarters to colocate operations of the MCB or the support operations sections. This will assist in the exchange of critical and time sensitive information.

Three: The sustainment manuals and doctrine should follow the other tactical and technical doctrine in quicker updates and revisions.

APPENDIX A

Interview Questionnaire

Approved by U.S. Army Research Institute on 30 March 2009

1. Background: Under current U.S. Army doctrine, a Movement Control Battalion (MCB) is assigned to a Sustainment Brigade (SB), an Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) or a Theater Sustainment Command (TSC). During OIF 07-09, the operational employment of the MCBs varied depending on the needs in the area of operations. In Kuwait, the TSC had command and control responsibility over the MCB, but exercised tasking authority and technical oversight responsibility through the TSC Support Operations (SPO) Distribution Management Center (DMC) or the Transportation Group, colocated in Kuwait, on the same camp. In Iraq, the ESC SPO performed the command and control responsibilities, tasking authority, and technical oversight responsibility of the MCB. The MCB in Iraq also performed another role as the ESC SPO's Transportation Operations Division.

2. Purpose. To collect qualitative data to analyze the challenges of the operational employment of movement control battalions in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and identify recommendations and conclusions to assist the U.S. Army in the future employment of movement control battalions in an operation.

3. Questions.

a. General:

- 1) When were you deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom?
- 2) What was your unit of assignment?
- 3) What was your unit's mission?
- 4) What MCB did you operationally work with?
- 5) What was your position?
- 6) What was your rank during the deployment and your current rank?
- 7) How many years have you functioned in a movement control job throughout your career in the military?

b. Movement Control:

- 1) By doctrine, the MCB performs the functions as the Movement Control Center for a designated Area of Operations (Example: Iraq or Kuwait). In an area of operations

with a Joint Task Force and one MCB, what organization should command and control an MCB?

- A. Sustainment Brigade
- B. Theater Sustainment Cmd / Expeditionary Sustainment Cmd
- C. Division Headquarters
- D. Corps Headquarters
- E. Other, specify:

2) Why?

3) Within the organization that has command and control over the MCB, what should the command relationship be? (OPCON is defined as full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces, as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. TACON is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks.)

- A. OPCON to the Commander with tasking authority from the SPO Section
- B. TACON to the Commander with tasking authority from the SPO Section
- C. OPCON to the Commander but works directly for the SPO Section
- D. TACON to the Commander but augments the SPO Section
- E. OPCON to the Commander but augments the SPO Section
- F. Other, specify:

4) Where is the ideal location for the MCB to operate?

- A. Colocated with their Higher Headquarters
- B. Colocated with the subordinate units
- C. Located near the Corps/Division Headquarters
- D. Located near Sustainment Brigade responsible for the mode operations
- E. Other, specify:

5) What was the operational employment of the MCB you operationally worked with?

6) Did the operational employment of the MCB affect the execution of its doctrinal role? If so, how?

7) Was the command and control of the MCB's subordinate organizations (MCTs) affected by the operational employment? If so, how?

8) Did the operational employment of the MCB have an effect on the MCTs in conducting their mission? If so, how?

9) What were the benefits of the operational employment of the MCB?

10) What were the challenges of the operational employment of the MCB?

11) Would these benefits and challenges have changed if the MCB were employed in a different manner? If so, how?

12) Was the level of support provided to the subordinate MCTs affected by this operational employment? If so, how?

13) Was the support capability of the MCTs enhanced, reduced, or minimized with regard to supporting units in that geographic area or Theater Common User Land Transportation (CULT) assets, due to the operational employment? How?

14) What non-movement control tasks and functions did the MCB perform as a result of the assignment to the ESC's DMC?

15) If the MCB is assigned to an organization, should the SPO section command and control the battalion?

a) What are the advantages?

b) What are the disadvantages?

16) If the MCB is assigned to an organization, should the SPO section only provide technical oversight and tasking authority?

a) What are the advantages?

b) What are the disadvantages?

17) How did the operational employment affect you as a leader in your development, in reference to coach, mentor, and teach?

18) How did it affect the professional development of your Soldiers?

19) Any other topics that should be addressed with regard to the operational employment of MCBs?

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