The US Army and Security Force Assistance: Assessing the Need for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability
Abstract
The U.S. Army had difficulty initiating and conducting advisory operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the lack of an institutionalized advisory capability. The need to create an advisory capability after the requirement developed resulted in a 3-year delay in Iraqi Security Force development, which threatened mission success in Iraq. This experience shows that the U.S. Army should consider developing an institutionalized advisory capability. Opponents of this idea view the advisory operation in Iraq as an anomaly and believe that the U.S. Army must remain primarily focused on conventional capabilities. Advocates view the advisory operation in Iraq as an indicator of future requirements and believe that the U.S. Army must have an organization that addresses the challenges of advisory operations. This study analyzes three criteria -- importance of advisory operations, difficulty developing advisory capability, and frequency of advisory operations -- to determine if the U.S. Army needs an institutionalized advisory capability. The criteria are analyzed in the context of past advisory operations in Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Iraq. The analysis shows that U.S. Army doctrine anticipates a frequent and important role for advisory capability in future operations. Analysis of past advisory experiences supports this assessment and identifies the challenges inherent in developing such a capability. Based on the anticipated frequent and essential role of advisory operations and the associated developmental difficulties, the U.S. Army should develop an institutionalized advisory capability.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 03, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA501876
Entities
People
- William C. Taylor Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College