

A MULTILATERAL STRATEGY FOR RURAL SOMALIA: PROVIDING A
FOUNDATION FOR THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF
SOMALIA USING A BOTTOM UP APPROACH

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2009

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-06-2009		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2008 – JUN 2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A Multilateral Strategy for Rural Somalia: Providing a Foundation for the Social and Economic Reconstruction of Somalia using a Bottom Up Approach				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Stephen Otieno Radina, MAJ, Kenya Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Somalia has been without a central government since 1991, resulting in the total collapse of state institutions. There have been several interventions by the United States, United Nations, African Union and other agencies to answer the security concerns and mitigate the hunger and suffering of the Somali people. The US, UN and other International agencies have continued funding programs to alleviate hunger and poverty in response to the severe drought and several seasons of failed harvest. These programs have had minimal impact on the Somali population because of lack of basic security. This thesis seeks to focus on the phenomenon as to why there is a persistent security problem despite the numerous international interventions in Somalia. The objective is to determine a multilateral strategy, based on a bottom up approach, which will address the security, poverty and geographical challenges from the rural sub sector, and the re-establishment of traditional leadership that may provide the foundation for Somalia's socio-economic reconstruction and ultimately spur growth and an enduring peace with governance.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Strategy(End state-Enduring peace, Ways –ASAL Programs and Means-Somali people, Donor Partners, UNDP AU/Coalition Forces and other agencies)					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 95	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Maj Stephen Otieno Radina

Thesis Title: A MULTILATERAL STRATEGY FOR RURAL SOMALIA:
PROVIDING A FOUNDATION FOR THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOMALIA USING A BOTTOM UP
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

A MULTILATERAL STRATEGY FOR RURAL SOMALIA: PROVIDING A FOUNDATION FOR THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF SOMALIA USING A BOTTOM UP APPROACH, by Major Stephen Otieno Radina, 95 Pages.

Somalia has been without a central government since 1991, resulting in the total collapse of state institutions. There have been several interventions by the United States, United Nations, African Union and other agencies to answer the security concerns and mitigate the hunger and suffering of the Somali people. The US, UN and other International agencies have continued funding programs to alleviate hunger and poverty in response to the severe drought and several seasons of failed harvest. These programs have had minimal impact on the Somali population because of lack of basic security. This thesis seeks to focus on the phenomenon as to why there is a persistent security problem despite the numerous international interventions in Somalia. The objective is to determine a multilateral strategy, based on a bottom up approach, which will address the security, poverty and geographical challenges from the rural sub sector, and the re-establishment of traditional leadership that may provide the foundation for Somalia's socio-economic reconstruction and ultimately spur growth and an enduring peace with governance.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe my sincere gratitude to my thesis committee chairman, Mr. Douglas E. Lathrop and the committee members Dr. Michael D. Mihalka and Mr Thomas J. Daze for their guidance throughout the study period more so during the analysis phase. Their unique observations on the subject drawn from their wide experience on security studies made a remarkable difference.

I owe my deepest appreciation to my dear wife Rosemary and children Dennis, Mike, and Elizabeth for their patience, compassion, and inspiration during the entire period. They encouraged me to soldier on despite the fact that they were miles away and this made me to stay focused on my study.

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ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
ASAL	Arid and Semi Arid Land Reclamation
AU	African Union: An organization that addresses the development and security aspects of independent African States.
CFLCC	Combined Force Land Component Command
CIC	Committee of Islamic Courts
COA	Course of Action
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPMR	Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
FTP	Federal Transitional Parliament
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
GOK	Government of Kenya
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HOA	Horn of Africa: Is that region consisting of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICU	Islamic Court Union
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
IGO	Intergovernmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MNC	Multinational Corporations

Multilateral	AU, UN, US and Agencies
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP	North Eastern Province
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SHIFTA	War fought between Kenya and Somalia in the mid 1960s
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United Somalia Congress
WFP	World Food Programme

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The history of Somalia is a troubled one. From the days of colonialism, through the regime of its disposed dictator Mohammed Said Barre in 1991, it has become a state of anarchy and lawlessness. This conflict created numerous problems within Somalia and the Horn of Africa (HOA) region. It had many players, both regional and international, each trying to solve the crisis with no fundamental change despite all their efforts to bring about security in the country. The cultural dynamics in Somalia have seldom been properly analyzed by the researchers, intellectuals and conflict negotiators to understand how the culture and historical pasts are affecting the current situation. The majority of the key players striving to influence the future orientation of Somalia have different cultural and ideological mindsets.

While the desire among most Somalis is to remain a secular Muslim state, some parties want to orient Somalia towards adopting radical Islam. Other Western countries want Somalia to become democratic, mainly to prevent them from falling under the influence of radical Islam. Conflicts of interest by groups within Somalia, other nation states and international groups and individual players, have been a catalyst to the continued Somalia failed state. A long term solution can only come from within the region considering that this is a country with a history of misrule and a quasi tribal secular governmental system.




Figure 1. Map of Somalia

Source: Wordpress.com, <http://thx1138.files.wordpress.com/2007/12/somalia-map.jpg> (accessed 31 January 2009).

Somalia is situated in the Horn of Africa and lies along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean as shown in figure 1. It is bordered by Djibouti in the Northwest, Ethiopia in the West, and Kenya in the South West with a population of approximately 9 million. The Somali people share one common language and religion. The majority practice a pastoral nomadic lifestyle (Lyons 1995, 8). Generally it is an arid and barren territory except the region between the Shabelle and Juba rivers where the richest arable lands in the whole of Somalia exist. In this area principal crops are sorghum, Indian corn, sesame, beans, fruits and sugar cane which are mainly cultivated in plantations (Lewis

1988, 4). Farming activity is no longer the main stay due to insecurity, and the physical geography which has resulted in to wide spread poverty. The main clans in Somalia are the Isaq, Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Digil and Rahweyn. The principle government, which is so important in so many parts of Africa, is replaced by binding ties of patrimonial heritage. Somali political allegiances are determined by descent from the male line and whatever their precise historical content, it is their lineage genealogies which direct the lines of political alliance and division (Lewis 1988, 11) . Figure 2 below shows the Somali clans and the major sub clans, and their displacement within the Horn of Africa (HOA).




Figure 2. Somalia Clans Families and Major Sub clans
Source: (http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/cia_somalia.pdf 2009)

Reflecting back to its pre-colonial days, greater Somalia was comprised of what is now the Ogden District of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, Djibouti, Somali Land and Northern Somalia, unofficially known as Puntland. Colonial administration namely; Britain and Italy necessitated the decentralization of authority to enable collaboration with other clans to achieve some aspect of governance. Three of the five districts, namely the Ogden, Kenya's NFD, and Djibouti, found themselves in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti respectively, at the time of independence in 1960, with Somalia remaining with British Somalia land and Italian Somalia land. This new nation state system challenged the traditional structure of governance in Somalia's pastoral system. Upon independence, the leadership challenges and pre-occupation with greater Somalia shaped the character of the formation of Somalia and led to the build up of the Somalia military and ultimately to the shifta resistance of Northern Frontier District of Kenya in 1963-68 and the Ogden war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977-78 (Issa-Salwe 1996, 62-70).

Other problems caused by the collapse of state institutions in Somalia include radical Islam and an increased tendency for people, especially those with a criminal mindset, to possess illegal firearms easily acquired as a result of the military conflicts and flourishing trade in small arms. These contribute to heightened criminal activity and lawlessness, especially in major towns and cities within the region. The most common actors are armed thugs and bandits who pillage and plunder, and warlords battling for control of Mogadishu, the country's capital and other major towns. Because of Somalia's persistent insecurity, the country is a safe haven and training ground for radical jihadists.

This thesis seeks to focus on the phenomenon as to why there is a persistent security problem despite numerous efforts by multilateral interventions in Somalia. The objective is to determine a multilateral strategy that could provide a more effective solution for the future of Somalia. It will also examine development programs as part of stability mechanisms that could be implemented to complement conditions with the goal of establishing a lasting and stable peace for Somalia.

Background of Research Problem

After the fall of the former President Mohamed Said Barre, a new government was established under United Somali Congress (USC) leader Ali Mahdi of the Abgal sub clan. Any hope that the removal of the former president would lead to new political coalition among the clan factions was short lived. With the removal of a common enemy, the loose rebel alliance quickly disintegrated as each faction attempted to capture power for itself and to exclude others. As William Shawcross argues in his book, *Deliver Us from Evil*, “Bad government was replaced by no government” (Shawcross 2000, 67). Political bickering for advantageous positions in Somalia began almost immediately. In June 1991 General Mohammed Farah Aideed, of the Habr Gidr sub clan, was selected as the chairman of the Somali National Alliance (SNA). Mahdi rejected this decision and demanded Aideed’s withdrawal. Aideed had considerable military experience with a well armed militia on his side, while Mahdi controlled an organized militia consisting of only a few officers and soldiers of the former Somali Army (Macqueen 2002, 201). These two previous partners turned against each other because of these fundamental differences.

The situation in Somalia continued to worsen and as the fighting in Mogadishu escalated, devastation and starvation caused by drought and insecurity spread throughout Somalia. This was worsened by its physical environment and geographical location, which makes it more prone to severe weather, and lack of arable land to sustain the population. Exacerbated by the drought of 1991, the fighting had left Somalia in the grips of a humanitarian disaster. By 1992 the UN estimated a death toll of three hundred thousand, with more than seven hundred thousand refugees in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia (Hill 2004, 87).

The shocking film footage of skeletal children dying displayed on television screens, against a background of ruthless gunmen captured the world's attention. The problem was not always lack of food, but the inability to get it to the hungry. The International Committee of the Red Cross paid hefty amounts of money for the security of the port and throughout southern Somalia where the famine was so severe (Clarke, Herbst 1997, 44).

It all started with the United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM I) which was created to oversee the cease-fire in the capital city of Mogadishu between Ali Mahdi and Aideed. Both men agreed to a ceasefire agreement that was brokered by the UN Undersecretary-General James Jonah, which allowed for 50 unarmed observers to monitor implementation.

The first US involvement came with Operation Provide Relief in August 1992. This was a UN sponsored relief effort, with agencies in Somalia, supported by the US with its security and transportation assets. The operation was successful in mitigating the famine and saving the lives of the vulnerable Somalis who were at the brink of death.

The operation also reduced the escalating high intensity civil war into low level, local skirmishes.

The UNOSOM I mandate entailed the appointment of a special representative of the secretary general. The first to serve in this capacity was Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria. Over the summer, he was able to have Aideed and Ali Mahdi agree to the deployment of 500 armed peacekeepers to protect aid coming into Mogadishu. It quickly became evident that UNOSOM I could not provide the desired security and protection. The original UN mediated cease-fire failed as both sides refused to compromise on positions of political authority claiming that such activities would benefit the other faction. Each side engaged in looting and interference in the delivery of humanitarian supplies and services (Macqueen 2002, 204).

Responding to these difficulties, the UN Security Council authorized a United States (US) led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) for deployment in December 1992 (Issa-Salwe 1996, 53). The US was initially involved with the provision of security and protection along the lines of the UNOSOM I. Eventually, UNITAF was to expand its mission under UNOSOM II, and in May 1993 included reconstruction efforts to democratize Somalia. The expanded mandate gave UNOSOM II the authority to seize weapons, rehabilitate and construct political and economic institutions, and foster national reconciliation and stability. UNOSOM II lasted from May 1993 until May 1995 (Durch 1996, 340).

UNITAF was successful in delivering significant amounts of humanitarian assistance to the Somalis. However, neither UNITAF nor UNOSOM II was effectively able to end the conflict and generate sustained political, social, and economic change.

With the exit of foreign troops in May 1995, Somalia was reduced to a state of lawlessness where chaos and violence reigned. These acts degenerated into wars against factions, setting warlord groups against other groups. The wanton destruction of life and property and use of terror in all its forms undermined any past accomplishments (Macqueen 2002, 216). Despite all of these humanitarian and military interventions, Somalia did not achieve any peace. Instead of establishing a stable democratic state, the interventions left Somalia much more disintegrated. The AU and other agencies continued their presence to pursue an elusive peace with the establishment of the AMISOM mission in 2007.

With the exit of its security forces, the UN maintained its presence through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) agencies as the lead UN agency which continued with their objectives despite the complex security concerns in the country. UNDP is a UN global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help build a better life. Its programs support vulnerable communities by providing social services destined towards achieving UN specified development goals (UNDP 2008).

The UNDP coordinated its operations through the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). This was the highest UN office in Somalia which was established in 1995 to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations and from other concerned states (UNDP 2008). All these are noble causes but without a secure environment, the impacts of their efforts are not felt on the ground as Somalia continues to be unstable to this day.

Theoretical Framework

In order to improve the situation in Somalia a well thought out, integrated, synchronized and comprehensive strategy will need to be developed for a long term solution to Somalia's failed state. Up until now, there have been many players, and actors each of them with vested interests in the conflict. But the most basic requirement is to have the conflict resolved.

The core theme of this thesis is to develop one part of a strategy that would help bring long term stability in Somalia. Strategy is defined as a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, informational and military) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national and or multinational objectives (JP1-02 2008). A strategy is the *Ways and Means* to achieve an *End*. Strategy is comprised of various stages/elements of actions with ways being how to achieve security and stabilization, means being the resources to empower the rural population, and the ends the overall objective of the strategy. Two of the stages/elements within any strategy that will be key to Somalia, are re-establishing a functional government and a focus on rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level based on a bottom up approach.

A key way to particularly achieve the empowerment of the rural population is through an ASAL- like program as practiced in Kenya. This is a comprehensive development program that is based on understanding the different pastoralist livelihood systems and the causes of poverty in the ASAL areas. It is also based on the experiences and the lessons learned from the previous interventions in Somalia that were heavily founded on top down approaches, in order to identify critical areas that can stimulate the

economic growth for a local Somali. The Coalition forces need to provide the needed security to support the *Ways* through the use of the effects of a stability mechanism (*compel, control, support and influence*) that will positively affect the civilians, and create a defeat mechanism (*destroy, dislocate, disorganize and isolate*) directed against the warlords, in order to re-establish the traditional system of governance, particularly in the rural areas. The military would contribute through providing security upon which stability can be built, thus providing a platform for economic and political progress. This should be considered right from the start of the planning process of the intervention.

The people of Somalia, the donor partners, and other agencies then become the *Means* to achieve the strategic *Ends* of an enduring peace in Somalia. The previous colonizers, Britain and Italy, may lead this initiative to support the comprehensive programs through the UNDP. The means for achieving this way would come through partnership between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), local communities, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) and other agencies.

The *Ends* are the objectives set by the Somalia's TFG, supported by the Africa Union (AU) and UN, to achieve an enduring peace and a stable Somalia. These objectives include setting conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power in order to de-legitimize the warlords in the face of the Somalis. Within the strategic campaigns, there are major operations that would need to be conducted in a well coordinated fashion. One of these would be a major security operation as had been attempted in the UNOSOM I, UNITAF, UNOSOM II and AMISOM. A second major operation would focus on re-establishing traditional leadership in the rural areas to

facilitate grass root level development programs to improve the quality of life for the rural Somalis.

This strategy sets a framework that outlines the different Lines of Operation (LOO) that must be pursued to achieve the lasting peace in Somalia. Such LOO could include the previous and the current intervention efforts. Rebuilding of the urban society based on top down strategy is another LOO that had been tried through the previous interventions but failed. The key LOO, focusing on re-establishing traditional leadership and facilitating grass root level development, consists of the following:

1. Re-establishing traditional leadership in the rural areas.
2. Improving the ability of the rural population, both pastoralists and agriculturalists, to economically sustain themselves through the Arid and Semi Arid Land Reclamation (ASAL) program as practiced in Kenya.
3. Improvement of the local security.

Statement of the Research Problem

The State of Somalia degenerated into a civil war from 1980. The civil war was triggered by many factors, key of which was the desire to overthrow the government of Mohamed Siad Barre. However, upon the overthrow of Barre, the civil war in Somalia degenerated even further resulting in a humanitarian disaster within Somalia. In response to this situation, the US led a UN intervention in Somalia. Despite these interventions the civil war in Somalia did not achieve any peace. Instead of establishing a stable democratic state in Somalia, the interventions left Somalia much more disintegrated. The AU and other agencies continued their presence to pursue an elusive peace with the establishment of the AMISOM mission in 2007.

The paper will focus on the UN intervention in the Somalia conflict between the years 1992 to 1995 and the current AMISOM efforts up to 2008. This paper will assess the methods of how the sub regional, regional and international communities can come together and better assist Somalia in becoming a viable nation state. This study will also examine how the ASAL-like model, as practiced by the Kenya government, in collaboration with UNDP initiated programs and institutions, can be implemented in Somalia as a comprehensive development approach based on a bottom up strategy. The bottom up strategy is a comprehensive program that targets the needs of the indigenous local Somali based on their preferential communal project requirements.

This bottom up strategy was first introduced by Mohamed Sahnoun, UN special representative to Somalia in 1992, and achieved much in a relatively short period of time. The strategy was equally successful when applied by General Petraeus in Mosul in Iraq, by putting more emphasis on the needs of the local people, since the tactics of insurgencies relies on the populace as their strength.

Research Question

The primary question this thesis will answer is: Can multilateral efforts address the security concerns and provide the necessary environment for the reconstruction of rural Somalia?

In answering the primary question, some questions were identified as critical sub elements of the paper's main thesis. They are:

1. What is the perception of security situation in Somalia?
2. What lessons can be learned from the past UN Intervention/Multilateral efforts?

3. What role could the sub regional and regional organizations play in finding a solution to Somalia?

4. Can the principles of Arid and Semi Arid and Land Reclamation (ASAL) related program, as practiced in Kenya be a model for facilitating grass roots development and support for traditional leaders in Somalia?

The Objectives

The main objective of the study includes the following:

1. To draw the lessons from the previous interventions and inform the study.
2. To identify key elements of a multilateral strategy that could provide a more effective solution for the future of Somalia. The strategic end is to facilitate the creation of a viable and sovereign Somalia.
3. To examine how the ASAL initiative, as practiced by the Kenya government, in collaboration with United Nation Development Program (UNDP) initiated projects and institutions, can be implemented to target the local project requirements to become a way of building capacity for the Somali people and bring legitimacy to the TFG.
4. To assess how the sub regional, regional, and international communities can come together and become a means to assist Somalia in becoming a viable nation state.

Assumptions

This research is based on the following two underlying assumptions: the first assumption is that the warlords must go. How that is done will not be covered in this

thesis. Once warlords are gone, AU/ Coalition forces need to help prioritize security for the Somalia interim Government. The second is that, the UN and specifically UNDP will continue to support projects in Somalia.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research project is to identify a multilateral strategy that could provide a more effective solution or ends for the future of Somalia. The strategic end state is to facilitate the creation of a viable and sovereign Somalia state with an enduring peace. This paper will assess the ways how the sub regional, regional and international communities can come together and assist Somalia in becoming a viable nation state. This study will also examine how the ASAL initiative, as practiced by the Kenya government, in collaboration with UNDP initiated projects and institutions, can be implemented in Somalia as a means of creating sustainable development aimed ultimately at creating a stable nation.

The Scope of the Research Paper

The research will focus mainly on how the ASAL model in collaboration with the multilateral efforts can be implemented in Somalia as a comprehensive development approach based on bottom up strategy for the reconstruction of the rural Somalia.

Justifications

This study is significant to the current and future operational environment as it will cast light on the nature of the Somalia crisis, its origin and effects both within Somalia and the region. It will be a step for future researchers to understand the problem of Somalia and further address it in a more comprehensive manner. Conclusions

resulting from the analysis in this thesis may be the basis from which a solution may be found in an attempt to bring a lasting security and the beginning of sustainable development to the already impoverished Somalis.

Security in Somalia will facilitate governance and economic prosperity to Somalis and the Horn of Africa region.

Definitions

The terms defined below will be used throughout this project research:

Arid and Semi Arid and Land Reclamation (ASAL): A program by the Kenya government, in collaboration with donors, to fund projects and institutions to protect lives and livelihoods in drought prone communities by initiating necessary projects such as water pan, bore holes, expertise on land use, pest control and others project that target the local population (Office of the President, Ministry of Special Programs, Nairobi: Government Printers, 2004 2004).

Horn of Africa: This is the region consisting of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan (Markakis 1990, 3).

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs): An organization created by a formal agreement, for example a treaty between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional or functional basis for wide ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Africa Union (JP1-02 2008, 275).

Multilateral: Understood to mean regional AU countries, US and UN agencies working together to support efforts that provide the necessary environment for the

reconstruction of Somalia. Multilateral as defined in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary is a term used broadly to mean involvement of three or more groups or nations towards a common goal (Hornby 2006).

Multinational Corporations (MNCs): The MNCs are for profit firms that have subsidiaries in two or more countries and engage in transnational production activities involving the movement of goods and services across national boundaries. MNCs require permissive environments much like NGOs. In addition to local security concerns, MNCs also seek favourable international and legal conditions in the host nation. Examples are: Pepsi, Starbucks, Nike, and Toyota just to mention a few (rateitall.com 2008).

Non-governmental Organization (NGO): A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP1-02 2008, 381).

Technical: This is a type of improvised fighting vehicle typically a civilian 4x4 pickup trucks or military modified with an offensive capability, used mainly by Somalia militia (Mburu 2005, 235).

Key Groups

Attempts to resolve any conflict are bound to fail if the key groups are not identified. The key groups refer to all participants in the conflict. All key groups have certain interest in the conflict which is what makes them become involved. The key groups in the Somalia challenge are: the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which

was established and backed by the regional and the international community; the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) which is a union comprised of several Islamic courts and extremists groups that are opposed primarily by the African Union (AU), the United States (US) and the United Nations and their agencies involved in the provision of humanitarian support through numerous humanitarian assistance programs in the country.

Regional Players

The Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is composed of seven Horn of Africa countries namely: Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. IGAD started mediating a peace process in Nairobi, Kenya in 2002, in an attempt to end a decade of anarchy in Somalia. Following the 2002 reconciliation talks, the international community and Somali factions agreed to form a government after a decade of statelessness. In 2004, following two years of reconciliation talks in Kenya, the TFG, led by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi and based on a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), was established. Unfortunately, the formation of the TFG was supported more by the regional and international community than by the Somalis themselves, with TFG continuing to be harassed by Somali factions and warlords (International 2008).

By 2006, a group called the Union of Islamic Courts, which later became the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), emerged from Somalia's numerous Islamic courts. The CIC was known for its popular demands for basic security like the protection of women from sexual violence in the streets of Mogadishu. Over the course of 2006, the CIC gained control of much of south central Somalia. Later, splits between moderate and extremist elements in the CIC itself resulted in the ascension to power of extremists who

would restrict Somali citizens' social and political rights based on their particular interpretation of Islamic law. The CIC leaders grew increasingly more aggressive, expanding their military operations beyond Mogadishu to Baidoa, where the proposed headquarters of the TFG was originally based since it was unable to establish itself in the war torn traditional capital of Mogadishu.

In December 2006, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1725 expressing its support for a regional peacekeeping operation in Somalia (International 2008). As a result, the CIC launched attacks around Baidoa. Ethiopian troops, already in Baidoa providing training to the TFG, launched a counter attack in conjunction with the TFG troops to forcibly expel the CIC from Mogadishu. This conflict only exacerbated the problem in Somalia creating more internally displaced people (IDP) and refugees in need of immediate humanitarian assistance. With decisive Ethiopian military support, the TFG installed itself in Mogadishu in January 2007. Most Somalis strongly reject the Ethiopian presence as the two countries have unresolved historical border issues. The CIC effectively used these reasons to rally popular support for the Ethiopian forces withdrawal from their country.

An AU approved force, comprised of troops from Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi has been present since 2006. Towards this effort, there has been several regional meetings and agreements signed some of which have been violated due to lack of the implementation structures. The following are most of the significant events and agreements as per the; "*Timeline Somalia*," reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News:

Addis Ababa agreement held in 1993 and chaired by the UN in which leaders of 15 factions were brought together in Ethiopia where they signed a ceasefire agreement.

The Arta agreement was held in May 2000 in Djibouti. This was a reconciliation conference that brought more than 2500 participants from all sections of Somali society.

Nairobi agreement of 2002 muted the idea of forming the TFG.

Somali National Reconciliation Conference was organized by IGAD in 2002-2004. Following two years of discussions in Kenya, the Federal Transitional Parliament (FTP) was formally inaugurated on 29 August 2004.

FTP met for the first time in Somalia in February 2006.

CIC took control of Mogadishu from the pro government forces in June 2006.

The Khartoum agreement September 2006, hosted by the League of Arab States resulted in a reconciliation meeting between the CIC and the TFG.

A National Reconciliation Congress was held in Mogadishu, in July to August 2007, with the participation of 2600 delegates representing the clans as well as women groups.

The Asmara meeting was held in Eritrea in September 2007, for members of the CIC and former parliamentarians. The meeting established the Alliance for the Reconstruction of Somalia (ARS) and elected its leadership.

The formation of a new Somali government on 22 November 2007 composed mainly of Somali professionals with little to no traditional representation.

The Djibouti agreement signed on 9 June 2008 between TFG and ARS. The Djibouti declaration held on 26 October 2008 between the TFG and ARS, witnessed by the UN Special Representative for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. (BBC News 2008)

IGOs, NGOs and MNC

There are several Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and numerous Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating in Somali. IGOs are composed of multiple nation states that join together to form an institution based on a charter or treaty. IGOs have a single purpose or a multipurpose agenda. Examples of IGOs are: the UN, the Arab League, the AU, NATO, and the EU. IGOs typically rely on member states for funding and resources.

NGO examples are: World Vision, Doctors without Borders (Medicines Sans Frontiers), and Amnesty International. NGOs rely on private or government funding to conduct their activities. NGOs often require a permissive environment to conduct their activities. Thus, they require security provided either by the host nation or an IGO. Based on these principles, most of the NGOs operating in Somalia endure a lot of risks and because of the security situation their services end up with no impact to the Somalis.

MNC is a corporation that has its facilities and other assets in at least one country other than its home country. Such companies have offices or factories in different countries and usually have a centralized head office where they coordinate global management. Their investments in a country heavily depend on the security because of the cost of their movable and fixed assets.

The provision of essential services is necessary for rebuilding Somalia and returning it to a state of civil society. However, essential services are not sufficient for producing long term stability or a durable peace. Services and security go hand in hand. The UNDP recognizes this relationship and developed a program to help train the Somali police force and to establish the rule of law (UNDP 2008). Without security, local warlords and bandits will continue to generate an environment that is not conducive to IGOs, NGOs and multinational corporations (MNC) operating in Somalia. Iraq is a good example of this. From the year 2004 to 2006, the high levels of violence discouraged NGOs, MNCs, and some IGOs from providing necessary investment or from establishing offices in the country. MNCs, especially, will not invest resources, money and time in a country replete with crime, violence and rampant corruption.

At the same time, a durable peace cannot be achieved by simply providing security. If the local conditions are not improved then locals will continue to support extremists, warlords, terrorists, and insurgents. This is the biggest challenge for the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), United Nation Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS), OXFAM, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), World Food Program (WFP), United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and any other organization working in Somalia. How do these organizations coordinate their efforts so that they can achieve unity of effort and mass against those forces that continue to threaten the stability of Somalia?

The TFG's position is very precarious at the moment. For there to be any meaningful progress, they have to explore ways to reconcile and provide amnesty to warlords who are willing to participate in a new Somali government. This will be critical in the absence of enough international security forces. The IGOs and the TFG will have to co-opt clans and militias to help improve the security environment.

Limitations

The researcher is confined by lack of appropriate sources of primary data due to his distance from Somalia. However, the researcher will consult with the UNDP and agencies whose programs are focused on addressing the Somalia problem which are nested within the overall UNDP development goals for developing nations.

Delimitations

The paper will examine relevant key events from 1991 to 2008. The research will not look at organizations outside of IGAD, AU, US and UN agencies but may mention

some just to draw some parallels as needed. The study will not look at the declaration of Somaliland or Puntland as independent states from Somalia after the collapse of the Siad Barre government, the role of the Somalis in the Diaspora in the peace settlement for Somalia or the struggle to consolidate greater traditional Somaliland under one Somali flag.

Summary of Introduction

The increasing complexity of the Somalia problem calls for a concerted effort to bring it under control. Somalia's stateless status is an obstacle to regional stability and peace and therefore all must adopt an integrated approach to address these challenges.

This thesis attempts to identify how a comprehensive multilateral strategy can address the security concerns to provide the necessary environment for the development of a viable Somalia. Chapter 1 introduces the historical background information, theoretical framework, research question, the objectives, major players, key events and the reasons for pursuing this thesis topic. Additionally, this first chapter provides the scope of the research paper, assumptions, limitations and delimitations. Chapter 2 explores pieces of literature used in completing this project. Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and approach providing the reader with an overview of the overall research design. Chapter 4 is the essence of this thesis and provides the analysis of the various multilateral efforts and how they can be integrated to address the security and development concerns in Somalia. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the conclusion, recommends an implementation methodology, and for recommendations and possible future study.

MAP OF KENYA SHOWING ARID AND SEMI ARID DISTRICTS




Figure 3. Map of Kenya showing ASAL Districts
 Source: Republic of Kenya, “National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands of Kenya,” Draft (Office of the President, Ministry of Special Programs, Nairobi: Government Printers, 2004) ix.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

I never saw an instance of one or two disputants convincing the other by argument

— Thomas Jefferson

Chapter 1 addresses the background and introduction to this thesis while the following chapter introduces the baseline of literature used to conduct the research. This chapter examines the relevant literature related to the study. The study derives literature from themes which include security, multilateral and sub regional efforts in Somalia. The literature also includes discussions related to development programs practiced in a neighbouring state with people sharing common heritage and their impact on security. The information reviewed in this chapter will be discussed in five categories based on the following sub headings:

1. Post Conflict theory
2. Conceptualization of the security situation in Somalia
3. UN Intervention/Multilateral efforts
4. Sub regional and regional organizations
5. ASAL-like related programs as practiced in Kenya

Conflict Risk Theory

Post conflict theory can be defined as post conflict societies that face two distinctive challenges: economic recovery and risk reduction (Collier *et al.*, 2006 3). While it is impossible to attribute most conflicts to a single factor, many elements are clearly decisive when it comes to a conflict's escalation. Collier *et al.*, argues that

leadership is imperative in the polarization and escalation process because group members must be convinced that their grievances can be attributed to the adversary or the other. Followers must also be convinced that the change and particular course of action suggested by the leadership is possible. Conflict damages a country's economy and leaves a country fragile and susceptible to a relapse in conflict (Collier *et al.*, 2006 2).

Lake and Rothchild identify the main cause of ethnic conflict as being a collective fear of the future lived through the past (Lake and Rothchild 1996 41). They see ethnic membership, political ideologies or religion serving as rallying cries in the mobilization and politicization collectively whose stakes are land, economic resources or other forms of control. Collective fear for survival or physical safety occurred when the Somalia state lost its ability to arbitrate the rival opposition groups. With an armed opposition, the Somalia state either became so weak that it lost legitimacy with its people, or its operations were biased in favor of President Siad Barre's clan or allies.

Collier *et al.* came up with the following six stages of post conflict interventions used as a guide to strengthen post conflict peace:

- Negotiated settlement occurs during conflict when one party of the conflict is close to victory over the other.
- Peacekeeping troops monitor and observe the peace process in the post-conflict areas and assist in implementing peace agreements.
- Democracy encourages and influences a government towards a constitution for their country.
- Reform occurs within the government as well as their economic policy.

- Acceptance is achieved by the people through post conflict elections which instil legitimacy and authority to a government.
- Milestones such as withdrawals of international peacekeeping troops allow for stability and peace in a country.

These six elements of post conflict interventions strengthen peace which reduces risks and allows a government to work towards governance and economic recovery in the aftermath of conflict.

Somalia has not had a government for over twenty years. According to Collier *et al.*, in *Post Conflict Risks*, economic reconstruction can develop if there is a liberal government that is able to instil reform within a government. Two schools of thought propagate the view that for a country to develop, security must be immediately guaranteed in the post conflict period, followed by a surge in economic growth programs. Assuming that the warlords are gone, the reconstruction of Somalia can be done in three phases as follows:

- Phase one: AU/Coalition forces to guarantee security.
- Phase two: Re-establishment of traditional leadership in the rural areas.
- Phase three: Rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level based on a bottom up approach.

Conceptualization of the Security Situation in Somalia

The current instability and lack of central governance within the geographical boundaries of Somalia seriously impact regional security. This instability provides a

platform for regional actors such as, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti to further their outstanding domestic political disputes.

Barry Buzan, in his book “*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*,” argues that security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. And it offers a constructive operational method for distinguishing the process of security from politics- for understanding who can secure what and under what conditions. He examines security in five areas: Military, Political, Economic, Environmental and Societal (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, 239).

Two schools of thought now exist in security studies: traditionalists who want to restrict the subject to politico-military issues; and wideners who want to extend it to the economic, societal and environmental sectors. Buzan sets out a comprehensive statement of the new security studies, establishing the case for the broader agenda (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, 2). He argues that security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues, answering the traditionalists’ charge that this model makes the subject incoherent. The traditionalists counter Buzan’s argument by offering a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of security from that of politics. Their approach incorporates the traditionalist agenda and dissolves the artificial boundary between security studies and international political economy, opening the way for a fruitful interplay between the two fields. It also shows how the theory of regional security complexes remains relevant in today’s world (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, 4).

Ken Menkhaus, in his book, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, argues, “one part of the trouble encountered by analysis of Somalia is the tendency to group the country’s multiple crises into a single syndrome” (Menkhaus 2004, 16). He

further argues that Somalia's problems exist independently in three distinct classes, namely state collapse, armed conflict and lawlessness.

There are many ways of managing conflicts in a region. Key among these is the approach to use the sub-regional mechanisms that can easily manage the conflict such as what was in Somalia. Even though there are these mechanisms, the situation in Somalia calls for a concerted effort and decisive leadership from the African leaders.

There were many players and actors, each of them had a certain amount of interest in the conflict. But the most basic was the requirement to have the conflict resolved. Lyons and Ahmed in their book, *"Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction,"* argue that, the Somalia intervention in 1992 which was intended to resolve the Somalia conflict and bring the situation to normalcy was not to be the case. The working environment in Somalia was not very conducive because of the polarization by competing forces between the US, intentions and the UN's goals (Lyons and Ahmed 1995, 61).

Robert Patman, in his book, *Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peace Keepers during UN's Intervention 1992-1993*, explains that the US administration became adamantly opposed to adopting a general disarmament mandate. He further argued that, the US administration felt that disarmament would only embroil it more in Somali politics and thus require it to lengthen its stay. Moreover, the expected need to forcibly disarm the Somali factions risked large numbers of US casualties. This notwithstanding, the cost of the intervention would increase substantially and would greatly impact on US domestic politics. And finally, the administration questioned whether general disarmament was even feasible in a society

lacking basic law and order and in which gun ownership was so wide spread (Patman 1995, 512).

UN Interventions/Multilateral Efforts

The information being reviewed under this sub heading covers the past multilateral interventions and focuses mainly on UNOSOM 1, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II which were undertaken between the years, 1992 to 1995. It also examines the current efforts by the AU and UNDP strategies as part of the multilateral efforts in Somalia.

The UN disarmament processes in Somalia were not designed as part of a comprehensive peace agreement negotiated between former warring parties. They were conducted as part of humanitarian interventions undertaken to prevent the mass starvation of ordinary Somalis who were unable to gain access to food and water due to the extensive devastation brought by years of drought and civil war (Hill 2004, 88).

The international community intervention in Somalia was actually composed of three operations, two led by the UN and one by the US. The first of these operations was the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) which was deployed between April 1992 and March 1993. This was a traditional peacekeeping operation established under the Chapter VI of the UN Charter and composed of a force of 4,200 troops, in addition to the existing fifty observers (Macqueen 2002, 204). The second operation was a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) which was deployed between December 1992 and May 1993. This was led by the US and had a composition of 38,000 troops from 23 countries. This was also provided with a Chapter VII UN mandate. The third UN led operations was dubbed UNOSOM II. It took over from its predecessor in March 1993 and

continued until the end of the intervention in March 1995. This involved nearly 30,000 troops from more than 27 countries.

Issa-Salwe in his book, “*The Collapse of the Somalia State*,” argues that the perpetual fighting in Somalia could not be ended without the involvement of the international community (Issa-Salwe 1996, 129). The UN delays in addressing the crisis in Somalia are out of the concern of breaching Somalia’s sovereignty. He further questioned, “How long the integrity of a disintegrated sovereign state should be safeguarded when thousands starved to death while millions were forced to flee the country?”

In the book, *Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral Interventions and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Lyons and Ahmed states; “UNOSOM I was to monitor the cease fire and support the ninety day plan of action for the emergency humanitarian assistance.” They also argued that the international policy makers were more concerned with monitoring the cease fire as a means to facilitate humanitarian operations not as the first step in a broader strategy to promote political reconciliation to fill the underlying vacuum of authority (Lyons and Ahmed 1995, 30). The fact of the matter is that UNOSOM I was operating within the prescribed mandate, and considering the tactical situation on the ground, it favoured humanitarian relief operations to mitigate the severe famine that threatened the country. However, in a broader perspective, tactical success means nothing. In addition, Lyons and Ahmed further observed that “a clear lesson was that there were no strategies and plan of action to manage the political transition to prevent the state collapse” (Lyons and Ahmed 1995, 34).

External intervention in a conflict is justified on the ground that conflicts are costly to the government and peoples of the region as a whole and the individual countries they affect. Chapter VI of the UN Charter requires consent from the warring parties. It also discourages interference of internal affairs of a member state. Mediation of the Somali State came late as all indications of a failing state existed prior to 1991.

An after action report written by the US Army, “The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994,” analyzed the US and UN operations from the time when the White House announced that the US military would support the multinational UN relief efforts in Somalia in August 1992 until the final UN withdrawal from Somalia in March 1995. The report brought some fundamental insights arguing that “the US involvement in Somalia was as a result of being the sole remaining world power and the leader of the new world order” (Stewart 1994, 9).

Hoffman, in his article presented in Nairobi Kenya during an IGAD Conference, “The Divergent Path of Somalia and Somaliland,” points out that the actions taken by the international community especially the UN after the collapse of the state of Somalia further aggravated the ability of the southern Somalis. It failed to effectively utilize traditional institutions of self governance in an effort to consolidate peace and re-establish effective and just institutions of governance at the level of the state (Hoffman 2002). He argued for a “building block” approach as the way forward, citing the success of the breakaway Republic of Somaliland. Centralization of governance and its effect have been blamed for disrupting the Somali society.

Stephen Hill in his book, *United Nations Disarmament Process in Intra State Conflict*, argues that UNOSOM was given no explicit role in the disarmament of the civil

warring factions or the Somali population composed of initially only 50 Observers (Hill 2004, 88). Its role was only to monitor the cease fire reached between the factions in Mogadishu. Although in the UN resolution 751, the Security Council agreed with the Secretary General's recommendations to deploy a further 500 UN Peacekeepers to provide protection for humanitarian relief convoys and to UN personnel equipment and suppliers, there was still no explicit mention of the potential role in any disarmament process (UNSCR 1992).

Norrie Macqueen in his book, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960*, argues that UN entered this unpromising political landscape ostensibly in what was supposed to be an entirely new type of intervention (Macqueen 2002, 202). Its function was not to keep the peace, or initially to make peace on the basis of a reconstructed state, and to secure the distribution of emergency relief. Armed humanitarianism, as the new approach came to be called, begged a range of complex questions. He further states that in January 1992 the UN under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, James Jonah, went to Mogadishu to attempt to improve the machinery for aid distribution. He had been sent by Javier Perez de Cueller, who in the last weeks of his term as Secretary General, was determined that the UN should offer a lead in the attempt to restore peace to Somalia. By the time Jonah's mission had arrived in the country, Boutros Ghali had come to office and the UN's involvement in Somalia would come to be associated with his leadership. At the end of January, the Security Council discussed the crisis at some length and produced a solution imposing an arms embargo on the territory and urging the Secretary General to seek a cease fire between the factions. In pursuant of this, Aideed and Ali Mahdi were invited to send representatives to negotiate at UN headquarters in

New York at the end of February that would also involve the OAU, Arab League and the Conference of Islamic States. These talks produced an agreement by the rival factions to hold substantive talks in Somalia itself that would be facilitated by Jonah. He soon held talks afterwards in Mogadishu and the negotiations produced a cease fire agreement (Lyons and Ahmed 1995, 30). It proved to be a far from perfect truce, however and humanitarian agencies remained prey to banditry and extortion driven to greater or lesser degree by political motives. Included in the Mogadishu agreement between the factions was an acceptance of a vaguely defined UN security presence to help secure the delivery of relief supplies. This permitted the Security Council to contemplate a peace keeping intervention.

These humanitarian assistance efforts encountered mounting challenges over the years coupled with the delicate nature of the security situation exacerbated by warlords who feel that this type of humanitarian support could render them irrelevant in the eyes of the people of Somalia. In the book, *Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral Interventions and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Lyons and Ahmed lament that “the International community ignored clear warning signs in Somalia and missed several opportunities to use diplomacy to prevent state collapse.” They further argue that, “Because of this neglect, the destruction of the state became more complete and the difficulties in rebuilding a viable system more demanding” (Lyons and Ahmed 1995, 24). The lessons learned in the book shows how the international response should conduct their future operation in Somalia.

A report written by Powel *et al.*, titled, “*Somalia after State Collapse*,” takes a comparative approach in examining Somalia’s performance relative to other African

countries both when Somalia had a government and during the extended period of anarchy (Powel *et al.*, 2006). The report finds that although Somalia is poor, its relative economic performance has generally improved and it compares favorably with many African states. The report further finds that the living standards have greatly improved since the collapse of the Somalia central government (Powel *et al.*, 2006).

Responsibility for this improved standard of living could be the efforts of the multilateral agencies in providing humanitarian assistance programs within the country. Another reason may be that the few who are receiving aid assistance are able to lead a better life, though in a squalid environment. This situation however, makes the Somalis wholly dependent on food aid, while disregarding governance systems which can bring essential services and economic elements of empowerment.

There are many other important factors that the report neglected to address such as the increasing refugee problem, the persistent drought and failure of harvest due to the country's physical geography and degradation of the environment. These are some of the social dynamics which, if properly understood, may bring about lasting security to Somalia. Similarly, multilateral agencies need to emphasize capacity building and programs that match the context of the community focusing on the creation of better and meaningful self sustaining infrastructure.

Issa-Salwe in his book, *The Collapse of the Somali State*, talks of the socio-political factors leading to the collapse of the Somali state and its consequences. In it he states that Somalia has remained without peace for a long time due to the social economic and political challenges that it faces. He failed, however, to explore the reasons why the

Somalis could not agree amongst themselves on the manner of assistance they wanted and to address the fundamentals of the country's future orientation.

The UNDP helps countries reach their development goals from a bottom up approach, while advocating for the protection of human rights and the empowerment of women (UNDP 2006). Unlike other agencies such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund, whose objectives are focused top down, the UNDP maintained its presence in Somalia during the period and was one of the main multilateral agencies that contributed immensely while projecting its programs across the spectrum of challenges (UNDP 2008). Without peace and security, their efforts remain far from being realized.

Sub-Regional and Regional Organizations

The members of regional and sub regional organizations or agencies are expected to make every effort to achieve settlement of local disputes through the regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the UN Security Council. The provision for such regional organizations in dealing with disputes does not affect the comprehensive role of the United Nations. Article 53 of the United Nations Charter states that, "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council" (UNSCR 1992).

The African Union (AU) was formed in April 2001 replacing the moribund Organization of African Unity (OAU). The model of the AU is based on the European Union (EU) with many of the same governing bodies needed for its success. In pursuing this agenda, the AU has met several challenges; most notably among these is the

challenge of ridding the continent of poverty and placing the continent on a path of lasting peace and development.

To address Somalia's security requirements, the AU, with the approval of the UN, formed the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). This body is an active regional peacekeeping mission mandated to support Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, despite these noble intentions, the AU's responses to its prescribed objectives have been ineffective. Richard Connaughton in his book, *"Military Interventions in 1990s,"* argues that, regional organizations such as Organization of American States (OAS), Arab League and Gulf Cooperation(GCC) and OAU just to mention a few, are often seriously divided, disorganized and ineffective" (Connaughton 1992, 61).

Emanuel Erskine in his book, *Mission with UNIFIL*, further examines the experiences of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad, and ECOWAS in Liberia, against the background of UN peacemaking experiences. He argues that, "peacekeeping forces will be required in Africa for lengthy periods in the future since most of the factors generating interstate and intrastate insecurity are endemic on the continent and will continue to persist for some time." He urges that the OAU and sub-regional organizations need to assume more responsibility in the management of conflict since the UN and non-African members of the international community may not readily commit their troops outside their regions (Erskine 1991, 128).

From the time the TFG was formed in 2004, the AU did not approve the AMISOM mission until 2007, almost three years later. The countries currently with troops in Somalia are Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia. This mission was first called for by IGAD during a meeting in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in 2006. The AMISOM mission has nine pledged battalions in Mogadishu with only an estimated strength of 2,613 soldiers as of December 2008. Based on the security force to population ratio as recommended in the US Army Field Manual 3-24, that recommend for every 1000 local residents there should be 20-25 soldiers (FM 3-24 2006, 1-13). The AU security forces are far from adequate for a problem involving between 2 to 3 million inhabitants in Mogadishu alone. For a country of 9 million, one would need a force much more robust than the current 2,700. The subsequent paragraphs review the role of IGAD as it complements the AU in attempting to solve the Somalia problem.

IGAD is a seven member grouping comprising of the countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. The objectives of this group are to examine the economic development of the Horn of Africa (HOA) sub region, and to address issues of mutual concern. IGAD's role is to promote collaboration networks among member countries on conservation management and the utilization of plant gums, the source of gum Arabic that is used widely throughout the world. In addition, it aims to achieve peace and security as an essential prerequisite for development (IGAD 2003).

Due to the unfolding events in the HOA, IGAD member states realized that the developmental problems of the region extend beyond the consequences of drought. Founded to promote economic cooperation and integration among member states, but convinced that economic progress cannot be achieved amidst endless conflict; IGAD has

since taken on the additional mandate of preventing, managing and supporting the resolution of conflicts in the HOA region. Under this mandate, IGAD has been involved in attempting to help resolve the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia.

IGAD has a strategy that was elaborated in 2003 and adopted by the 10th Summit of Heads of State and Government (Somaliawatch 2009). The strategy provides a coherent framework aimed at guiding IGAD priority development programs in pursuit of its mandate, and in moving it forward as the premier regional economic organization for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region. It draws its spirit and substance from the member states' desire to attain viable regional economic development and cooperation in the sub region. It incorporates and benefits from: experiences gained in the past; current framework conditions of development cooperation; and regional as well as global challenges and emerging issues facing the region (IGAD News 2008).

In addition IGAD has a Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) branch based at the AU centre in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The CPMR brings together experts in the field from the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region to discuss the persistence of armed conflicts as a major challenge that faces the region's development efforts. The CPMR branch has a program envisaged to promote a comprehensive and well coordinated approach to peace and security, develop synergies with the ongoing activities in the region and assist regional integration organizations in their endeavors to support their respective member states, within the peace and security of the Africa Union (IGAD 2008, 2-3).

IGAD has often been blamed for lack of a clear strategy to achieve its objectives for the sub region. Menkhaus in his book, *Somalia State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, argues that the IGAD sponsored peace talks are partly to be blamed for being responsible to the continued crises in Somalia. He further argues that, "Somalis

themselves remain deeply divided between unitarian and federalist camps, a split which was not easily papered over in the 2002-03 IGAD sponsored talks in Kenya” (Menkhaus 2004, 21). The talks favored a decentralized federal institution with the formation of the TFG. However, those who favored a unitary system feared that the decentralization would balkanise Somalia, thus destroying any hope of reviving Somalia nationalism and realizing the reestablishment of traditional greater Somaliland.

The IGAD chairman at the time, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, offered to send peace keeping troops. Ethiopia also agreed to take the lead of the peace keeping force. There were earlier calls for Ethiopian troops already in Somalia to be returned home after additional sufficient AMISOM peace keeping forces were deployed. Nigeria, South Africa and Malawi have pledged to send their troops but have been reluctant to do so for more than three years (IGAD 2008).

Following the CIC control of Mogadishu from the pro-government forces in June 2006, IGAD held a crisis meeting and resolved to deploy a sub regional force to protect the TFG. This initiated the first step towards solving the outstanding security problem that has engulfed Somalia for the past three decades.

ASAL Related Programs as Practiced in Kenya

The Somalia problem is a build up of interrelated issues from historical perspective, geographical and socio cultural dimensions. The geographical factors and colonial legacy have continued to undermine the socio economic development of the country ravaged with famine and rampant poverty. Apart from these circumstances, ethnicity and ethnic relations is particularly relevant as an agent of internationalization of conflict in Africa. Virtually every border in Africa divides an ethnic community, often

between two or more states. The Somali community is found in several states including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya. Where an international border divides the same ethnic community the conflict may appear to be internal but actually be internationalized by ideological affiliation or sympathy with a particular group in a conflict. Also when ethnic groups migrate to other countries it alters the demography of the country.

Sustainable development impacts on the local indigenous people who are the majority in Africa. Development means improving the existing ways of doing things to mitigate other extreme factors and make the process more efficient for the inhabitants to create better opportunities for themselves. In the *Policy Paper for the Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands of Kenya*, the Government of Kenya outlines its commitment to the development of the arid regions where the North Eastern Province (NEP) constitutes more than thirty percent of its land mass (Office of the President, Ministry of Special Programs, Nairobi: 2004). NEP was formerly the Northern Frontier District (NFD) carved out of Somalia to Kenya during the partitioning of the Horn of Africa (HOA) by the colonizers. The document takes cognizance of the fact that Kenya will not achieve sustained growth in the national economy as long as the ASAL region and its enormous potential are not factored in the national planning and development. The report further outlines priorities and measures necessary to bring about sustainable development that are associated only with poverty and insecurity. Development does not take place in a vacuum but in an environment that stimulates the people, and their social systems, with values and practices that promote grass root participation.

William Easterly's article in the Foreign Policy magazine titled, "*The Ideology of Development*," differs with the ASAL perception. In the article, Easterly argues that, "the failed ideologies of the last century have come to an

end. But a new one has risen to take their place. It is the ideology of “development” and it promises as a solution to all the world’s ills. But like communism, fascism, and others before it, the perception of development is a dangerous and deadly failure. The one correct answer came to mean free market and, for the poor world, it was defined as doing whatever the IMF and the World Bank tells you to do” (Easterly 2008, 1-3).

Easterly may be right especially when considering that many African states rely heavily on foreign funding for their domestic programs, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank funded programs. However, the situation in Somalia requires a different approach. There are several programs that are funded by various multilateral agencies, many of which are not beneficial to the local indigenous or are totally irrelevant for their long term benefit.

The African indigenous system had the local elder or chief bestowed as the village leader who was an individual generally accepted by the community who commanded the respect of all. The leadership position was bestowed to him by the people and it is the people who would remove him from that position. The situation in Somalia is compounded by the constant civil wars and anarchy that broke the existing fabric of its traditional social system and replaced it with warlords. Given the option where the local indigenous people can change their lifestyle, this would have a deeper far reaching effect to the whole community. This argument is further reinforced by Menkhaus in his book, *“Somalia State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism,”* where he argues that “the fact that efforts at state building and national reconciliation failed so consistently for more than a decade, made it easy for observers to conclude that politics and governance in Somalia is mired in anarchy.” As a result of this, he further argues that “the mosaic of the local Somali polities and informal social pacts has evolved and

provide the citizens with some level of informal governance which in some cases deliver more effectively” (Menkhaus 2004, 19).

The ASAL vision is based upon the values of respect and the active participation of all stakeholders with: a better understanding of pastoralist livelihood systems; the acceptance of mobile herding systems as a rational, economically viable and efficient use of dry land resources; engaging ASAL communities in policy reform and the enhancement of participatory governance; encouraging stakeholders and policy makers to undertake participatory policy research and analysis in the ASALs; decentralized services from Provincial/District administrative centers such that they are available, accessible and affordable to rural and urban users; decision making that is devolved to the grass roots level with the corresponding need to strengthen these local institutions and organizations; strategic public and private investments based on geographical areas with similar livelihood systems; and, allocation of resources the supports problem oriented interventions based on participatory needs assessments (Office of the President, Ministry of Special Programs, Nairobi: 2004).

Summary

The above review of literature reveals that several efforts had been made by the multilateral agencies to create a mechanism for mitigation of humanitarian relief in Somalia. The top down strategy where peace and development was to flow from the urban areas to the rural areas failed through the various interventions. It was that the disarmament of the militias that was very critical in stabilizing the security situation in Somalia but this was not tenable because the hard-line stand of the warlords. From the onset the approaches adopted by the US and the UN in handling the crisis in Somalia differed and lacked the synergy to tackle the problem collectively and this therefore led to failure of the mission.

In addition, some of the literature talks about the lost opportunities where there were instances the international community had the information it needed to stop Somalia from falling in to anarchy but lacked the will or institutionalized mechanisms to act. The

structures to harmonize the political reconciliation largely left Somalia to NGOs who only provided humanitarian assistance with no proper coordination.

Most of the literature reviewed agreed that most of the factors generating interstate and intrastate insecurity, and thereby inducing instability, are endemic on the region and will continue to persist for some time. Therefore, the Somalia conflicts require to be properly understood so that the programs initiated through the multilateral efforts are well coordinated and target the Somali locals. A rapid, responsive, robust and neutral peace keeping force with adequate resources and deterrence capabilities should be in place to foster the gains achieved by the multilateral efforts. AU peace initiatives are, however, deeply flawed because they are not supported with serious and substantive commitments in terms of resources and, most importantly, a credible force to stabilize the otherwise volatile situation in Somalia. The Africa Union, however, cannot be expected to take the sole charge of the burden of attempting to prevent or respond to war on the continent due to its chronic lack of competent leadership and resources. Some other literature revealed considerable international community support for AU peace initiatives. Most literature further agrees that the country is prone to occasional drought and it therefore relies heavily on pastoral economy and irrigation fed agriculture. This has since collapsed due to continued insecurity. To mitigate this trend, the multilateral agencies should come up with a more comprehensive approach for provision of security on which long term stability could be a platform for economic and political progress. This support is needed now to deal with the security issue and, if complimented by the multilateral efforts with a bottom up strategy of the ASAL-like program as practiced in Kenya, could be a step to solving the Somalia problem.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The research for this thesis is based on descriptive content analysis of primary and secondary data. The primary sources include AU and IGAD documents, such as the protocols establishing the various organs and institutions. Secondary data was collected from books, journal articles, magazines, and unpublished materials. Data was also sourced from the Combined Arms Research Library, the National Defence College Nairobi, the Kenyan Defence Staff College, and the Internet. This research was completed in order to conduct an analysis of how multilateral efforts could address the security concerns and provide the necessary environment for the reconstruction of rural Somalia.

Somalis are people who are very enterprising and can easily adapt to any environment with limited resources. A case in point is Kenya, where most Somalis, though hosted as refugees, have defied all odds to rise as merchandisers. In the process, they have displaced the Asian merchandisers who traditionally controlled the domestic wares and clothing sub sector within the retail small scale business enterprise sector. This action probably provides an opportunity to start understanding the Somalis, and it is through the empowerment of the local Somalis through UNDP agencies, and ASAL-like related programs that may provide a lasting solution and help change Somalia into a viable state.

With the assumptions that there are no warlords and all the efforts will be concentrated to avoid the re-emergence of the warlords, this thesis is to develop a three phase strategy as follows:

- Phase one: AU/Coalition forces to guarantee security.
- Phase two: Re-establishment of traditional leadership in the rural areas.
- Phase three: Rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level based on a bottom up approach.

A strategy is the *Ways and Means* to achieve an *End*. The Ends is to make a recommendation on what can be done to initiate grass root development and re-establish traditional leadership as a starting point to bring increased stability at least in the rural Somalia. Ways and Means to be analyzed as programs and resources to achieve the Ends by re-establishing a functional government and focus on rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level based on a bottom up approach.

Collier *et al.*, in *Post Conflict Risks*, describes a model on the re-establishment of a market economy that can develop if there is a liberal government that is able to instil reform within a government. In the model, they argue that for a country to develop into a market economy security must be guaranteed or there must be a surge in economic growth programs immediately after the post conflict period. Somalia, emerging from the civil war, the state institutions became so weak that it lost legitimacy with its people as all the structures were destroyed. A key way to particularly achieve the empowerment of the rural population is to embed the Collier *et al.*, theory into the ASAL-like program as practiced in Kenya. The ASAL is a comprehensive development program that is based on understanding the different pastoralist livelihood systems and the causes of poverty in

the ASAL areas. It is also based on the experiences and the lessons learned from the previous interventions in Somalia that were heavily founded on top down approaches, in order to identify critical areas that can stimulate the economic growth for a local Somali.

With any analysis, it is the data's nature and the problem that dictate the research design or methodology. A qualitative methodology was used in the conduct of this research with the main variables being security, poverty and the geographical location. Qualitative research examines a problem through information collected from several sources, including primary and secondary materials, which constitute the data pertinent to the study (Creswell 1991, 179-182). Similarly, the term qualitative research is further defined as a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. This means that qualitative researcher study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of meaning people bring to them (Lincoln and Denzin 2003, 4).

A variable is a characteristic that takes on different values or conditions for different individuals (Wiersma 1991, 26). There are three known variables, independent, dependent and intervening variables. Independent variables in experiments are those which are manipulated or varied in order to assess their impact; in some settings they can be referred to as the treatments. Dependent variables or outcomes are those which, it is hypothesized, may or may not be affected by their contact with the independent variables while the intervening or mediating variables stand between independent and dependent variables, and they mediate the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable (Davies 2007, 265).

In answering the primary question, the researcher came up with the secondary questions that are tied to the following variables; *geographical* location, *security* and *poverty* that must be understood while attempting to solve the Somalia problem.

Geographical location is a variable based on Somalia's location in the HOA, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, East of Ethiopia. The terrain is mostly flat to undulating plateau landscape rising to hills in the north with a climate that is principally a desert. The unpredictable weather often leads to long periods of drought and hunger that necessitates migration for grazing. Consequently, Somalis lead a pastoral lifestyle that involves a lot of cross country movement. This migration increases competition for limited water and pasture resources. This has always been the source of conflict due to Somalia's physical geographical location. The result is widespread poverty with the populace having no viable long term economic activity. Geographical challenges are therefore the independent variables because the Somalis depend on pastoral lifestyles that involve a lot of cross country movement, while poverty and security are dependent variables.

The situation in Somalia is compounded by the security situation caused by the who are in control of resources corruptly gained to impose their authority on the majority of Somalis. Desperate Somalis are devastated and continue to starve due to drought and insecurity that has spread throughout Somalia. In these anarchic conditions, looting and banditry also increased, mainly due to the existence of gangs owned by the warlords and the warlords' destruction of traditional leadership systems. The border areas continue to remain porous, and with no effective border security, criminal gangs traverse the entire HOA causing mayhem and are interfering with normal life processes in villages and

towns. The militia gangs in this case are the cause of insecurity because the environment is an enabler to their operations. For the purpose of this thesis, the warlords are assumed to be gone and all efforts are geared to avoid their re-emergence.

Poverty in Somalia is a way of life. People have been adjusting themselves to a situation of deprivation by living with severe shortages in terms of basic services which became an accepted norm of life. Poverty is forced on the Somalis due to the physical geography of the country and the rampant insecurity, yet the country has the potential to spur economic growth. Leadership failure in Somalia has caused the Somalis a lot of misery as the country has the potential to be self sustaining in terms of food security. Poverty as a variable depends on the improvement of the physical environment and security. The physical environment may be improved through programs that target mitigation of hostile weather conditions and enhancement of security to attract investment and trade. Infrastructure and social programs such as; dams, boreholes, animal (goat, camel and cow) breeding, basic health care facilities and schools, among others, may form part of the comprehensive programs to eradicate poverty and empower the local Somalis. The geographical constraint as an independent variable is related to or influences the dependent variables of poverty and insecurity.

The researcher followed William Wiersma's five steps for conducting research: identification and isolation of the problem; reviewing of information relevant to the thesis; collection and classification of data; data analysis; drawing of conclusions; and synthesis and presentation in an organized form (Wiersma 1991, 8). The researcher is also informed by the Collier *et al.*, post conflict risks model where reform within the government as well as economic policy reconstruction is addressed through re-

establishment of traditional leadership and rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level based on a bottom up approach.

Step 1: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

Chapter 1 identifies the problem as poverty resulting from lack of Somalia's security and physical geographical location. Somalia has had a share of problems starting from its pre-independence and post-independence eras to eventual state collapse in 1991. John Markakis in his book, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* observes that, "In the Horn of Africa famine ravaged the countryside, decimating peasants and pastoralists alike, while the townsmen felt no discomfort and moreover, showed little concern" (Markakis 1990, 3). The countryside always felt the maximum effect of the famine brought about by drought. In a bid to stabilize the people and government of Somalia, there were several interventions that involved both military and humanitarian approaches. These methods were implemented to bring security and mitigate the hunger problem, without any meaningful long term achievement. The execution of these interventions could have produced tangible results had the planners understood the social dynamics of Somalia based on its background, the Somali culture, and its geography which is fundamental to their orientation. The empowerment of the local Somali people, through UNDP agencies and ASAL-like related programs, may be a lasting solution to change their mindset and the re-establishment of traditional leadership within the rural society to begin the introduction of some governance systems in Somalia.

Step 2: Review of Information Relevant to the Thesis

A review of scholarly literature on the subject matter revealed an obvious need for the total overhaul of the approach to the Somalia problem. The study derives literature from themes which include security, multilateral and sub regional efforts in Somalia. The literature also includes Collier *et al.*, post conflict risks model, and discussions related to development programs practiced in a neighbouring state with people sharing common heritage and their impact on security. A case in point is NEP in Kenya which was part of Somalia in the colonial days and experienced similar security problems due to the shared commonalities. The implementation of the ASAL program mitigated those hardships and the province now competes on equal terms with the other provinces in Kenya.

In Somalia, there are considerable multilateral agencies that continue to fund programs which have had little or no impact upon the local Somali, notwithstanding the fact that the situation does not provide the correct environment for any program to permeate and benefit the targeted group. The UNDP objectives are more focused in helping countries build institutions, policies and programs that target the development of local capacity. Multilateral efforts need to be well coordinated in such a way that those programs meant to target the locals are prioritized and integrated in order to benefit the most vulnerable. Thus, the mode for programs must begin at the grass root level, not the top down programs that have failed in the past. During the review of the literature, it was noted that many authors have given their views, concepts and recommendations which offer potential solutions to the success of future interventions. As a result of step 1 in the process, the efforts being made by the sub regional and regional organizations and the

international community, may be the first step to assist Somalia in becoming a viable nation state. The AU mission in Somalia is a reassuring measure because of the need to have the security in Somalia that will further strengthen other institutions that promotes an enduring peace.

Step 3: Collection and Classification of Data

The data collected for the study was classified into four categories:

1. Conceptualization of security situation in Somalia
2. UN Intervention/Multilateral efforts
3. Sub regional and regional organizations
4. ASAL related programs as practiced in Kenya

Step 4: Data Analysis

The data to be analyzed in five parts:

Part 1: Analysis of the security situation in Somalia.

Part 2: Analysis of the efforts by the multilateral agencies.

Part 3: Identify key challenges facing multilateral efforts.

Part 4: Analysis of the ASAL program as practiced in Kenya and how it can be applied in Somalia.

Part 5: Recommend a Course of Action (COA) that may lead to greater security and the beginning of sustainable development.

Step 5: Drawing of Conclusions and Recommendations

From the analysis of the data in step four, conclusions are derived regarding the challenges faced by the multilateral agencies in its pursuit of mitigating hunger and

restoring security. The research will conclude with a list of recommendations for a new approach in attempting to significantly improve the situation in Somalia and end with recommendations for further possible study.

Arrangement of Chapters

This study is organized in five chapters with each covering a particular portion of the research analysis as follows:

Chapter 1 of the research identifies and isolates the problem and provides the historical background information, a conceptual theoretical framework, major players, key events and the reasons for pursuing this thesis topic. The chapter highlighted the factors believed to be responsible for the country's continued state of lawlessness with no established governance for close to two decades. The chapter also defines strategy and how pursuing the development approach would bring long term stability in Somalia. Chapter 2 explores the literature used in completing this project on a descriptive analysis of the major interventions. Written documents on information from the UN, AU, and several organizations form part of the reviewed literature. Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and approach, providing the reader with an overview of the overall research design. Chapter 4 is the essence of this thesis and provides the analysis of the various multilateral efforts through past interventions, a comprehensive analysis of the ASAL program as practiced in Kenya. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the conclusion, makes recommendations for a Course of Action (COA) that may lead to greater security and the beginning of sustainable development. It also suggests a strategy for the implementation of a methodology for these recommendations using a comprehensive integration of the diplomatic, informational, military (security) and economic instruments of power.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In this chapter, the purpose is to show how the issues discussed in the previous chapters have impacted on the security framework in Somalia and how they relate to this research question: *Can multilateral efforts address the security concerns and provide the necessary environment for the reconstruction of rural Somalia?* The data will be analyzed in five parts as follows:

Part 1: Analysis of the security situation in Somalia

Part 2: Analysis of the efforts by the multilateral agencies.

Part 3: Identify and analyze the challenges facing multilateral efforts

Part 4: Analysis of the ASAL program as practiced in Kenya and how it can be applied in Somalia.

Part 5: Recommend a course of action (COA) that may lead to greater security and the beginning of sustainable development.

Analysis of the Security Situation in Somalia

The genesis of the Somalia's security problems can be traced from the imperial partitioning of its traditional grazing land by the colonialists. Somalis used to graze their herds from the Gulf of Aden, through the Ogaden in Ethiopia, to Isiolo in Kenya. The treaty of 1907 provided for the trans-frontier grazing and watering but the new feeling in Ethiopia was that they had the right to withhold these natural resources from their pastoral kinsfolk; the arbitrary colonial boundary had just converted them into foreigners (Mburu 2005, 28). After the demarcation of the boundaries, the colonialist especially the

British, found themselves in trouble as their authority was being challenged by their subjects. The main beneficiaries, Ethiopia and Kenya, moved swiftly to ratify those border changes and started imposing taxes on those pastoralists who sought water from the wells to feed their herds.

Barry Buzan, argues that security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. And it offers a constructive operational method for distinguishing the process of security from politics, for understanding who can secure what and under what conditions (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, 239). The current instability and lack of central governance within the geographical boundaries of Somalia seriously impact regional security. This instability provides a platform for regional actors such as, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Djibouti, to further their outstanding domestic political disputes.

Buzan further argues that security involve a perceived threats to the survival of some highly valued referent object. The objects of such threats can be varied, including not only territorial states but also non-state actors such as; a nation, tribes, classes, sets of abstract principles, for example, the rules of the liberal international economic order or even nature itself, and the global environment. Similarly, threats can arise from any source, including aggressive states, unfavorable social trends such as, rapid population growth or cultural imperialism for example; Westernization. Existential threats can manifest themselves across a number of different policy contexts or "sectors," including economic, environmental, cultural and the more traditional political and military spheres (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, 4).

The traditionalists counter Buzan's argument by offering a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of security from that of politics. Their approach incorporates the traditionalist agenda and dissolves the artificial boundary between security studies and international political economy, opening the way for a fruitful interplay between the two fields. It also shows how the theory of regional security complexes remains relevant in today's world.

While Buzan looks at security in five different sectors, Menkhaus narrows it down to three classes, namely: state collapse, armed conflict and lawlessness. Mburu Nene looks at the imperial partitioning as the genesis of the security challenges in Somalia. These arguments are valid and sum up the Somalia scenario as being the result of poverty caused by geographical factors and continued insecurity that spreads throughout the country. The writers further agree that security issues can be managed by addressing issues like economic developmental programs.

Conflict can be defined as the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups (Miall *et al.*, 2005, 71). Some scholars have attributed conflict on structural phenomena while others say they are inevitable and ingrained in human primordial behavior. Others see conflict as manufactured by specific individuals who seek power and control. While it is impossible to attribute most conflicts to a single factor, many elements are clearly decisive when it comes to a conflict's escalation. The long struggle of the people of Somalia against oppression and exploitation did not only start with the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre but can be traced from the colonial times. The Barre regime exacerbated weak intra- state security concerns, ethnic geography and rampant poverty. They took charge of the security apparatus to further enhance their criminal ends. They have resisted any form of intervention because their objective is for Somalia to remain ungovernable.

There were many players and actors, each of them having a certain amount of interest in the conflict. But the most basic was the requirement to have the conflict resolved. Lyons and Ahmed argue that the Somalia intervention in 1992, which was intended to resolve the Somalia conflict and bring the situation to normalcy, was not to be

the case. The working environment in Somalia was not very conducive because of the polarization by competing forces between the US intentions and the UN's goals (Lyons and Ahmed 1995, 61). The UN goal was to use all means necessary to establish, as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, while the US intentions were to avoid a protracted stay in the mission by transferring security responsibilities to UNOSOM II. The UN relied upon the US to provide security and their options were limited as they did not understand the wider security implications. The US was not ready to go full blown with disarming as this would embroil them in the murky Somalia politics and prolong their stay unnecessarily. The US further found themselves operating in unfamiliar ground marred in a complex of procedures. The US and the UN coalition problems may also be traced from the constitution of the joint command structure for the mission. Some coalition partners deliberately ignored the command structure and operated with their own known procedures.

Analysis of the Efforts by the Multilateral Agencies

Multilateral agencies continue to promote political stability and support the establishment of a functioning central government and address the humanitarian needs of the Somali people. They remain focused on three priorities designed to restore governance and long term stability by first, encouraging political dialogue between the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) and other key Somali stakeholders with the goal of resuming the transitional process outlined by the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) leading to national elections. Secondly, to achieve full deployment of an African stabilization force, known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Thirdly, mobilize international assistance to help build the mid level governance capacity

of the TFI and support the continuation of the transitional political process as outlined by the Transitional Federal Charter.

The UN operations in general were good because the efforts were geared to help save the lives of the vulnerable Somalis who were at the brink of death. The other objective was to activate the efforts of nation building based on top down approach. The security situation made the execution of these operations untenable because the warlords failed to agree on the mediated ceasefire.

The creation of a functioning justice system is essential to the realization of any level of disarmament in Somalia. The Secretary General acknowledged this in his report of 17 August 1993 when he stated that a well organized and effective police would limit the spread of light weapons. Martin Ganzglass noted that the Somali police were well trained and disciplined and generally non tribal (Ganzglass 1996, 115). This point would be valid during the Barre regime because the police were feared and were part of the secret service to further the status quo. However, during earlier interventions, the UN failed to utilize the local advantages to handle the crisis at its early stages. The use of the locals to augment the security, if properly structured and organized with funding would have brought some legitimacy to the indigenous leadership and the UN operations.

The weakening of the foundation of the national unity and the creation of the clan factor as a political instrument used by ambitious and greedy leaders for their self projection led to the decline of moral, social and cultural values of the Somali society. The UN has failed to identify and provide the correct mandates to address the existing problems within Somalia. Peace process initiatives relied on warlords who were morally corrupt and lacked the ability to enter into and abide by peace programs.

As Ken Menkhaus argues, “the efforts at state building and national reconciliation have failed so consistently for more than a decade and this had made it easier for observers to conclude that politics and governance in Somalia is mired in anarchy”(Menkhaus 2004, 19). This was an area where IGAD, through the AU, identified it as the biggest challenge for the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as they identified the core issues as: persistent famine due to the geographical location; security issues as a result of the and rampant poverty. The other agencies operating in Somalia are coordinated by the United Nation Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS), with United Nation Development Program (UNDP) as the lead organization.

The efforts of these agencies could not be realised despite their noble objective to mitigate hunger and empower the Somalis because they have always restricted their operations to the urban areas. In addition, there has never been any strategy to coordinate all these efforts towards a nested synergy. The emerging reality is that the scope of security has greatly expanded and these security issues could be brought to focus by addressing issues like economic development programs. The UNDP recognizes this relationship with comprehensive development programs which involves; rural rehabilitation, infrastructure development, institutional building and human development plans to improve capacity building and to establish the rule of law (UNDP 2008).

The key existing multilateral security element created by the AU, with the approval of the UN, is the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) (www.globalpolicy.org 2009). This is an active regional peacekeeping mission mandated to support Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) structures.

Identify and analyze key challenges facing multilateral efforts

This section examines the role played by the political leadership in creating clan rivalry in Somalia for their personal selfish interests that finally became a challenge to the multilateral efforts and led to the anarchical situation which precipitated the humanitarian intervention. The analysis outlines weaknesses of the United Nations in tackling the immediate humanitarian crisis and their subsequent failure to restore the statehood of Somalia.

After two decades of repressive, centralized state control, involving the manipulation of clan mentality, the exploitation of traditional rivalry and the suppression and collective punishment of any form of rebellion, a destructive instinct was created in society which was at odds with the notion of Somali nationhood (Issa-Salwe 1996, 137). The decrease in the political resources of the state, both institutional and human, and the dismantling of the traditional leadership systems, undermined the state's effectiveness. And while the state's authority was weakening, other, sub national and non traditional forces of society were growing stronger, and soon the state was unable to withstand the wave which swept it aside.

In this anarchical situation, traditional clan hostility, which during the colonial struggle had been extinguished, was reignited (Betts 1994, 26). There was a reaffirmation of lineage identity and territoriality over national concerns, a re-drawing of alliances and the struggle over the control of resources. It marked an unprecedented turning point for the Somali state, with people returning to their clan settlement areas (Betts 1994, 137). The dispute in the north, between the Isaaq and the Ogaden in the last days of Siad Barre's regime, the feud between the Majeerteen and the Habar Gidir

(Hawiye) in the Mudug region in central Somalia, the confrontation between the Hawiye's Abgaal and Habar Gidir clans in Mogadishu, and the strife in Kismaayo between the Daarood's Harti and the Mahamed subeer Ogaadeen, were over ownership and access to territory (Betts 1994, 138).

Given the weakening of the foundations of national unity, it was inevitable that the relative strength of lineage and clan institutions should become the dominant social theme. In the urban situations, the clan became a political instrument used by greedy and ambitious leaders. The clan's power, position and influence were exploited for the benefit of its leaders, at the expense of its members. The political exploitation created resentments which turned into a mood of destruction towards the state and its institutions.

Under the auspices of the UN, a national reconciliation conference between the Somali warlords was held in Addis Ababa in mid March 1993 and another held in Nairobi in March 1994. Though the Somalis and the world community were hopeful for seeing an end to the disastrous civil war, soon many were sceptical about getting a workable result from the conferences (Omar 1996, 101). The scepticisms were based on the belief that these meetings, like that held in Djibouti in July 1991, had failed to address the real concerns. Both meetings were dominated by the same who were responsible for the civil strife, and the death and starvation of thousands of Somalis. The UN dealt with the warlords as if they were national leaders, without questioning their authority and legitimacy and validated them as holding the keys to peace (Menkhaus 2004, 18). And since UNOSOM's overall purpose was political reconstruction, political support at the highest level of UNOSOM's operations was reserved for initiatives involving the warlords. The UN effort was doomed to fail due to this poor judgement.

The following were the key lessons that should be taken away from the earlier interventions:

- Reaffirmation of clan lineage identity weakened the foundation of national unity.
- UN dealt with warlords as legitimate leaders.
- Peace process initiative mainly relied on warlords who lacked the ability to introduce or abide by peace programs.
- Weaknesses of UN in tackling the immediate humanitarian crisis.

Analysis of the ASAL as Practiced in Kenya and
How It Can Be Applied in Somalia.

The ASAL region is the home to the world's poorest and most marginalized people. In Kenya, the ASAL occupy over eighty per cent of the country and host about 10 million people (Office of the President, Ministry of Special Programs, Nairobi: 2004, 25). These areas have the lowest development indicators and with the highest incidence of poverty. Over sixty percent of ASAL inhabitants live below the poverty line, subsisting on less than one dollar per day. This makes the areas prone to constant security problems due to lack of reasonable economic resources. The government of Kenya and the UNDP, together with the World Bank as the executing agency, came up with a sustainable program in the ASAL districts since 1991 to mitigate those geographical factors.

The program was first tried in Turkana, Baringo, Laikipia, Marsabit, and Wajir Districts of Kenya through the development of appropriate water related technologies (UNDP 2006). The projects involved water extraction and harnessing, for both livestock

and human consumption, and for agricultural production. They also promoted and supported environmental protection activities in those areas. In addition, the communities were provided training to improve their capacities in the implementation and participation in the ASAL program.

The program proved successful in several aspects as employment of appropriate technologies and sustainable methodologies changed the social structure of those districts and improved the lives of the individuals, communities and schools. The provision of clean drinking water reduced the incidence of water borne diseases and other related problems. The provision of livestock drinking troughs around the watering points, and the protection of such troughs also led to additional benefits. The development of watering points reduced trekking distances for both the people and the livestock. The water is also used for irrigating small farmlands thus improving food security for the communities that often depended on food aid.

In Somalia, the main source of conflict has always been associated with access to pasture and water. The struggle over the control of these two critical resources marked an unprecedented turning point for the Somalia state, with people returning to their clan settlement areas, all in search of pasture and water. The clan's power, position and influence are exploited for the benefit of its leaders, at the expense of poor Somalis.

By having the ASAL programs integrated in the rural areas, it would slow down the competition for scarce land resources and empower the local Somali with some form of economic activity. Pastoral life is a traditional way of life in Somalia. It has always provided direct employment and livelihood to the Somalis. ASAL has an enormous

potential to change the socio economic structure of an environment by transforming it to better the lives of the inhabitants.

It also empowers the traditional leaders with authority over the subjects within their designated areas where leadership attributes and competences are tested based on the success of the program. There is a leader development approach where the leader and the locals interact with the donor partner and decide on the targeted project. This environment gives the locals full confidence, especially if they are able to come up with their required projects based on their needs. The selected leader will steer the project development, and during the entire period, the leader conducts bi-lateral meetings between the locals and the donors to review the program. This is one way of developing and promoting indigenous leaders in Somalia.

An example of ASAL, as introduced in Kenya, was based on the Pastoralist Integrated Development Project (PIDP) report on five districts namely; Wajir, Marsabit, Laikipia, Baringo and Turkana. The projects were initiated in those districts between 1991 to the year 1996; and the result showed considerable improvement in terms of poverty reduction, socio economic activity and security (UNDP 2009).

These districts border Somalia and have similar climatic and geographical conditions, and as well share a lot of other commonalities. The implementation of the ASAL program has mitigated these hardships and integrated those communities with the rest of Kenyans. Table 1 below is an extract from the PIDP report of the UNDP document that amplifies the activities of the programs as implemented in various districts. These are the types of programs, if implemented in Somalia, may help bring peace and development from the rural areas to the urban areas.

The operational framework for the ASAL policy is guided by the overall goal of poverty reduction and empowerment of the Somali. This goal is achievable through the Policy Implementation Framework as depicted in figure 4. The goal of the program is to ensure enhanced food security, improve living standards and reduce dependency on food aid (Office of the President, Ministry of Special Programs, Nairobi: 2004, 43). This model shares Collier's *Post Conflict Risks theory*; for a country to develop security must be immediately guaranteed in the post conflict period followed by re-establishment of traditional leadership and then rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level to reinvigorate a surge in economic growth.

Table 1. Implementing Districts by Project Name, Socio Economic Group, Activities and Partners

District	Project Name	Social Economic Group	Demonstration Activities	Partners
WAJIR	Nomadic Primary Health Care	Nomadic Pastoralist	-Community Based Health Care -Introduction to Hand Pumps -Dry land Farming Technology for Security	GOK
MARSABIT	Marsabit Pastoralist Development Project	Nomadic Pastoralist	-Camel Improvement -Animal Health Care -Low yield water point development	FARM AFRICA
LAIKIPIA	West Laikipia Rain Water Harvesting Project	Settled Agricultural Community	- Dry land Farming Technology -Rain catchment tanks -Health and sanitation The program is demonstrating total water concept on family basis.	GOK Diocese of Nakuru
BARINGO	Baringo Semi Arid and Arid Project (BSAAP)	Agro-Pastoralist	-Development of operational and maintenance training program for community management -Reclamation of degraded land	GOK
TURKANA	Turkana Rain Water Harvesting	Agro-Pastoralist	Risk spreading of Nomadic families using improved traditional farming methods to supplement livestock economy	GOK

Source: (UNDP 2009)




Figure 4. ASAL Policy Implementation Frameworks
 Source: (Office of the President, Ministry of Special Programs, Nairobi: Government Printers, 2004, 44)

A COA to Greater Security and the Beginning of Sustainable Development

This thesis seeks to focus on the phenomenon as to why there is a persistent security problem despite numerous efforts by multilateral interventions in Somalia. The objective is to determine a multilateral strategy that could provide a more effective solution for the future of Somalia. A critical examination of development programs was understated as part of stability mechanisms that could be implemented to complement conditions, with the goal of establishing a lasting and stable peace for Somalia. The concept is to develop a course of action that may lead to greater security and the beginning of sustainable development. US Army Publication FM 5.0 explains that a good COA positions the force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution (FM 5-0 2005).

The force envisaged for the Somalia scenario should be from a coalition composed of African countries. The coalition force must be empowered to employ or assist in the employment of the instruments of national power; (diplomatic, economic, informational and military) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, and multinational objectives.

As stated before, two of the stages/elements within any strategy that will be key to Somalia are re-establishing a functional government and a focus on rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level based on a bottom up approach.

A key Way to particularly achieve the empowerment of the rural population is through the ASAL-like program based on the Collier's *Post Conflict Risks model*. The Coalition forces need to provide the security by implementing a stability mechanism

(compel, control, support and influence) that will positively the rural population as they execute the ASAL programs in their areas. The security forces must also create a defeat mechanisms (destroy, dislocate, disorganize and isolate) directed against the militia gangs, in order to re-establish the traditional system of governance, particularly in the rural areas. Thus the military would contribute through providing security upon which stability can be built thus providing a platform for economic and political progress. This should be considered right from the start of the planning process of the intervention.

The *Means* for achieving this way would come through a partnership of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), local communities, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) and other agencies.

The *Ends* are the objectives set by the Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), supported by the Africa Union (AU) and UN, to achieve an enduring peace and a stable Somalia. These objectives include setting conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to be used effectively in order to de-legitimize the warlords in the face of the Somalis.

US Army publication FM 3-0 defines stability mechanism as a primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (FM 3-0 2008). A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against the enemy opposition (FM 3-0 2008). This can be directed towards the militia gangs while a stability mechanism is focused towards the Somali populace. A combination of the stability and defeat mechanisms should produce complementary and reinforcing effects that may help

change the Somali mind set, which for a long time has never known peace, to embrace and legitimize the operation. A visualization of the stability mechanism model is as illustrated in the figure 5 below.

STABILITY MECHANISMS

A *stability mechanism* is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.




Figure 5. Stability and Defeat Mechanisms

Source: (FM 3-0 2008)

To execute this mechanism, there are major requirements that would need to be addressed. One of these would be to restructure and strengthen the current AMISOM force. A second requirement would focus on re-establishment of traditional leadership to re-assert itself, especially in the rural areas.

As stated earlier, the security force to population ratio as recommended in the US Army Field Manual 3-24, must be increased. One way is to make AMISOM more robust

with additional forces being provided by Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) from the UN. Another method, especially in the rural areas should be to create and use clans' home guards to combat organized gangs and militias and to augment local village security, just like the US did in Iraq where they co-opted the Sunni sons in the security of al Tadar province. These home guards are people born within the social and physical environments that are easy to mobilize and less expensive to hire, and are very responsive to local leaders. They could also become a credible neighborhood watch who could also be a vanguard of participatory disarmament of the various warlord groups based on their local knowledge. The approach should be to win the cooperation of the targeted clans, particularly those innocent victims of organized violence, who will then provide real time human intelligence. This would allow the AU to leverage its current numbers so that it could initiate more sectors throughout the country.

To help re-establish traditional leadership or create new legitimate local leaders who can replace the warlords in the rural society we must look again to the ASAL program. The ASAL-like program as practiced in Kenya may be a solution to empower the rural population. This is a comprehensive development program that is based on understanding the different pastoralist livelihood systems and the causes of poverty in the ASAL related areas. The program is owned by the locals and its success is based on the local leadership. The re-establishment of the traditional leadership systems in the rural areas would de-legitimize the warlords in the face of the Somalis. The security of the villages would be enhanced by the local clan's home guard and the coalition forces. Once this is achieved, the UNDP and other agencies would initiate the targeted program

that has the overall goal of poverty reduction and wealth creation through the investments in sustainable development of the ASAL.

This development aspect of an overall strategy does not aim to convert the pastoralist into a sedentary farmer, but rather to provide an alternative means of livelihood and to improve the local environment so that peace and development will not flow from urban areas but will trickle up and in from the rural areas. This would also ease the perennial dependency on humanitarian food aid as it will empower the local towards self reliance.

Summary

In this chapter, it was evident that the past multilateral interventions failed due to misunderstanding of the situation on the ground as the UN and the US were at odds with the intended mission and end state. The Secretary General's recommendation to the Security Council that disarmament was very critical in stabilizing the security situation in Somalia was necessary, but the direct opposition by the US prevented it from happening. From the onset the approaches adopted by the US and the UN in handling the crisis in Somalia differed and lacked the synergy to tackle the problem collectively. While the Secretary General and the other members of the Security Council believed that the UN lacked the capacity to enforce a complex military operation, like the one required in Somalia, the US hurriedly influenced the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations. Selective disarming as necessary became an implied task which led to the cantonment of heavy weapons and gave UNITAF the ability to conduct weapons

sweeps. The unambiguous UNITAF mission statement was designed to preclude mission creep and clearly demarcated the difference between UNITAF and UNOSOM II roles which ultimately led to the failure of the mission.

The Somalia problems are tied in a complex web of regional interests with the frontline states namely, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya, and the two former colonial powers, Britain and Italy as invisible players. The main visible players in the conflict remain the Somali groups, in terms of individuals, clans and warlords. Therefore any strategy without engaging the political support of these visible and invisible players is unlikely to succeed in the efforts to establish peace and security.

The way forward is for the UN, through the AU, to develop one part of a strategy that would help bring long term stability and sustainable development in Somalia. The AU needs to engage both regional governments and the previous Somali colonizers to take the lead in the provision of political support and leadership towards the effort to establish peace and security. The local traditional leadership needs to be re-established as a starting point to bring increased stability at least in the rural Somalia. The leadership, based on the African model of recognizing selected clan elders who are to collaborate with the indigenous Islamic institutions and other organizations will be critical in coming up with a working formula to save Somalia.

The AU needs to constitute a more robust force from African countries deployed across the country, and incorporate the creation and use of the clan home guards to complement local village security.

A key way to particularly achieve the empowerment of the rural population is through an ASAL-like program as practiced in Kenya. This is a comprehensive

development program that is based on understanding the different pastoralist livelihood systems and the causes of poverty in the ASAL areas. The UNDP needs to use the ASAL model to target the local Somali through the introduction of targeted programs best suited for the local need based on their requirement. This ASAL model, in collaboration with multilateral partner nations helping to integrate all instruments of national power: (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) as part of stability mechanisms must be implemented in a coherent framework with respect to the local conditions in order to achieve the goal of establishing a lasting and stable peace for Somalia.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

What comes out clearly is that, there are substantive issues in Somalia conflict which revolves around the contentious issues at the level of individual and clan interests on economic, property and competition of political space that fuelled insecurity. The fall of Said Barre's regime saw the emergence of warlords who randomly plundered and sabotaged all the peace efforts. The way forward requires tying together both interests, that of replacing the old regime and that of unifying and bringing all fragmented groups on board. A regional approach would be feasible considering the complex web of interests. The role of the regional players, the former colonial powers, the Arab league and the international partners, if coordinated well, can bring a viable solution to Somalia's stability.

Even without a nationwide operation, the multilateral intervention still had the option of tipping the balance in favor of one of the warlords. However, the evidence of Somali history suggests that such action would not have brought a lasting peace. Rather the key to sustainable peace in Somalia lay in the continuation of Mohamed Sahnoun's (UN special representative to Somalia in 1992) political "bottom up" strategy that had achieved so much in a relatively short term period. This strategy was equally successful when General Petraeus applied it in Mosul, Iraq in 2008. In this instance, General Petraeus put emphasis on the local people, since the tactics of insurgencies relies on the populace as their strength. He made every effort to win the hearts and minds of the people because he realized that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a political action rather than

a military one. He therefore found it necessary to involve the people who had previously been attacking his forces in re-building their region. In COIN, the major operations should support political action to secure the populace and destroy the insurgents. In order to restore the security of Mosul, he found the need to thoroughly understand the people's culture, the insurgents' motives and interests, and why the people supported the insurgents. Unfortunately for Somalia, by the time the UN and US realized its utility, it was simply too late to turn back the tide.

Thus, it is evident that even with limited intervention, the UN and US could have achieved a great deal more than they actually did. The UN and US also failed to apply adequate diplomacy at the levels of ex-combatants and the general population. Without the creation of a credible Somali police force and justice system there could be no hope of generating the safe political space within which a robust civil society could re-emerge without fear of intimidation or retaliation. At the same time they also failed to apply sufficient inducement, through the provision of economic incentives, to attract faction members away from their predatory lifestyles.

The need to encourage the creation of a civil society would contribute to the generation of sustainable peace also highlights the importance of understanding the contextual rationality at work in Somali culture. The most obvious mistake was to elevate the faction leaders to unwarranted positions of authority by ignoring those members of Somali society that could have had a restraining effect on their behavior.

However, just as the UN must take account of local culture in its strategies for conflict resolution, it must not expect traditional methods to be immediately successful. This is especially the case when, as in the case of Somalia, the collapse of the state has

been accompanied by the breakdown of the traditional structures of society. During the intervention there were many recorded instances in which Somali elders had restrained from engaging in the condemnation or censorship of unruly youths, simply because the traditional respect accorded to them had disappeared in the years of anarchy and fighting. Equally, when traditional methods were used to negotiate disarmament agreements, faction leaders like Aideed continued to show their willingness to circumvent them in order to maintain their positions. Although there can be little hope of a successful outcome if the traditional methods of agreement are ignored. Cultural sensitivity by the UN cannot in itself be viewed as a solution for the ailments of any conflict ridden society.

Despite all these efforts, peace and stability in Somalia remain elusive. A new approach needs to be developed to address the security concerns as a result of the individual and clan interests. The AU efforts are faced with constrained challenges based on the emerging realities and the way forward is to have a strategy that can provide some hope and incorporate at the same time the local security aspect, recognize traditional leadership and embed a comprehensive development approach based on the targeted local requirement. It is through the empowerment of the rural Somalis that could bring a significant degree of stability and reconstruction in Somalia upon which urban areas could eventually emulate later on. The ASAL program as practiced in Kenya may provide a local solution to Somalia.

Recommendations

This thesis seeks to focus on the phenomenon as to why there is a persistent security problem despite numerous efforts by multilateral interventions in Somalia. The objective is to determine a multilateral strategy that could provide a more effective

solution for the future of Somalia. A critical examination of appropriate development programs must be part of the stability mechanisms that can be implemented to mitigate the effects of poverty, insecurity and geographical challenges with the goal of establishing a lasting and stable peace for Somalia. The concept is to develop a strategy that may lead to greater security and the beginning of sustainable development.

Strategy is comprised of various stages/elements of actions with ways being how to achieve security and stabilization, means being the resources to empower the rural population and the ends the overall objective of the strategy. Two of the stages/elements within any strategy that will be fundamental to Somalia are re-establishing a functional government, arising out of the re-establishment of traditional leadership and a focus on rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level based on a bottom up approach.

A key way to particularly achieve the empowerment of the rural population is through an ASAL- like program. It is based on bottom up approaches in order to identify critical areas that can stimulate economic growth for a local Somali. The Coalition forces need to provide the needed security to support the Ways through the use of the effects of a stability mechanism (compel, control, support and influence) that will positively affect the civilians, and create a defeat mechanism (destroy, dislocate, disorganize and isolate) directed against the, in order to re-establish the traditional system of governance, particularly in the rural areas. The military would contribute through providing security upon which stability can be built thus providing a platform for economic and political progress. This should be considered right from the start of the planning process of the intervention.

The people of Somalia, the donor partners, and other agencies along with security forces, then become the *Means* to achieve the strategic *Ends* of an enduring peace in Somalia. The engagement of the previous colonizers, Britain and Italy, and other partners may lead this initiative to support the comprehensive programs through the UNDP. The means for achieving this way would come through partnership between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), local communities, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) and other agencies.

The *Ends* are the objectives set by the Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), supported by the Africa Union (AU) and UN, to achieve an enduring peace and a stable Somalia. These objectives include setting conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to be used effectively in de-legitimizing the in the face of the Somalis.

Within strategic campaigns, there are major operations that need to be conducted in a well coordinated fashion. One of these is a strategy for Somalia that would be to restructure and strengthen the current AMISOM force. A second major operation would focus on re-establishing traditional leadership in the rural areas to facilitate grass root level development programs to improve the quality of life for the rural Somalis. The figure 6 below illustrates the sub-strategy for the rural empowerment.




Figure 6. Somalia Rural Strategy

Source: Created by author.

Based on the above sub-strategy, the following recommendations may be undertaken to reconstitute the state of Somalia and achieve a sustainable peace:

- The AU needs to constitute a more robust force from African countries deployed across the country, and incorporate the creation and use of the clan home guards to complement local village security.
- The re-establishment of traditional leadership and a focus on rebuilding the rural society from the grass root level based on a bottom up approach.
- The ASAL model can be used by the UNDP and other agencies in their comprehensive programs, based on a bottom up concept, whereby peace

and development will eventually flow into the urban areas from the rural areas.

- The targeted ASAL-like projects should be prioritized for the rural areas to stimulate their economic development and help re-establish basic sustainment requirements. The locals should be encouraged to own those programs.

Recommendation for Future Study

This study has only come up with one sub strategies within the major operational campaign plan that could realize better security and the beginning of economic viability, all of which are part of an overall strategy to create a viable Somalia state. As a result of this research, it is clear that the bottom up approach is a suitable way for Somalia to move forward. However, the following aspect needs further study to better achieve the strategic end state.

- Once most of the rural areas have established traditional leadership systems and their economic base, then the question is how a strategy could be developed to effectively link the rural governance systems nationally with the goal of using the rural sector to force the major urban areas into a functional system of governance.

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