

REMOVING THE ROSE COLORED GLASSES: EXPLORING MODERN SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT'S EFFECT ON THE ARMY ASSIGNMENT POLICY FOR WOMEN

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ABSTRACT

REMOVING THE ROSE COLORED GLASSES: EXPLORING MODERN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT'S EFFECT ON THE ARMY ASSIGNMENT POLICY for Women by Karen J. Dill, 140 pages.

The U.S. Army's policy for assigning female soldiers is significantly more challenging to implement in the era of persistent warfare. The problem is that the Army policy needs to be revised because the more recent Office of the Secretary of Defense women's assignment rule, the challenges in 21st century security environment, and the adaptations in tactics and force structure make the existing policy open to interpretation by commanders and open to public criticism. Thus, the primary research question is: How should the Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers be revised in order to address the modern battlefield? Four areas were studied. First, the current Army policy was examined in order to determine potential gaps between lower and higher policies. Next, the researcher studied the system of assignment to verify that women were placed according to the policy understanding. The third area of study focused on identifying unique characteristics of the irregular battlefield including specific differences in the security environment. Finally, the researcher determined how the environment caused the Army to adapt to the dangers. The researcher applied the information gathered to each section of the potential gaps identified in the assignment policy and made recommendations for potential revisions to policy and training.

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ACRONYMS

AR	Army Regulation
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
DA	Department of the Army
DoD	Department of Defense
DCPC	Direct Combat Position Code
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
OE	Operating Environment
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
WAC	Women's Army Corps
WAAC	Women's Auxiliary Army Corps

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Historical Background

Private First Class (PFC) Monica Brown repeatedly risked her life on April 25, 2007, to shield and treat her wounded comrades during an IED attack and ambush of her patrol in Khost Province, Afghanistan. She was awarded the Silver Star by Vice President Cheney. Within a few days of her of her heroic acts and receipt of the award she was pulled out of her unit, “because, her platoon commander said, ‘Army restrictions on women in combat barred her from such missions.’”¹ The role of women in the Army, specifically regarding participation in combat operations is extremely controversial.² Likewise, significant changes associated with the Army Transformation, Army doctrine, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) resulted in a perception that the Department of Defense (DoD) policy is antiquated, confusing, and incomplete.³

In order to accurately determine the relevance of a revision to the Army policy for the assignment of women and make plausible recommendations for change, the author reviewed two key areas of information. She first reviewed historical information, the existing policy on assigning women soldiers, the identification of key terms, the shared outlook or prevailing mood here defined as “spirit” of the Army assignment policy, and the areas where confusion concerning assignment of women may occur. Second, the author examined the contemporary operating environment (OE) related to the enemy, the current Army structure, Army doctrine, and some examples of employment of women in the GWOT.

Significance

Putko noted a student comment in his U.S. Army War College survey that stated, “The current regulation needs to be reconsidered, clarified, or changed. It is ambiguous and places commanders in awkward situations.”⁴ Revising the existing Army policy to reflect changes in the role of Army women pertaining to the operating environment (OE) and modifying descriptive language will enable Army leaders to effectively implement the policy. This policy revision is significant because it will reduce confusion about how, where, and in what activities female soldiers can participate while supporting the unit mission. An effective policy will enable commanders maximum flexibility in effectively supporting combat operations.

The Corps of Women

Women contributed in every United States war from the American Revolution up to and including the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).⁵ Given that a majority of women serving the military were in the medical field and were so important the Surgeon General established the Nurse Corps Division which was made a permanent part of the Army Medical Department.⁶ In 1942, Congress approved a bill that established the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) to work with the Army.⁷ The purpose of the WAAC was to make knowledge, skills, and special training the women held, available to the military to improve national defense⁸. The WAAC Director, Oveta Hobby often publicly noted that women filled, “‘the noncombatant jobs where women’s hands and women’s hearts fit naturally’ . . . WAACs were to help the Army win the war, just as women had always helped men achieve success.”⁹ In fact, the WAAC even took on the slogan, “Replace a Man for Combat.”¹⁰ WAAC women were provided with subsistence,

living quarters, pay, and medical care.¹¹ The women could serve overseas, however, the women did not receive overseas pay and benefits entitled to male Regular Army soldiers and WAAC members were not protected by any international agreements should they become prisoners of war.¹²

In 1943, the Army was desperate to have more women fill positions because there was a manpower shortage¹³. Army leaders requested that Congress place the WAAC into part of the Regular Army instead of maintaining a separate Corps. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Public Law 78-110 which established the Women's Army Corps (WAC).¹⁴ Under this law, the WACs were subject to Army regulations. Historian Bettie J. Morden recorded:

Congress had not included in the WAC law, as it had in the WAAC law, the statement that women would be noncombatants. But, in the hearings on the WAC bill, every legislator involved made it known that he expected the secretary of war to ensure that women would be noncombatants. Thus, Army regulations excluded women from combat training that involved weapons or tactical exercises and from duty assignments that required weapons.¹⁵

The regulated exclusions were the Army's first combat exclusion policy.

Following World War II, President Truman approved the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. The Integration Act established:

the Women's Army Corps in the Regular Army, to authorize the enlistment and appointment of women in the Regular Air Force, Regular Navy and Marine Corps, and in the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and for other purposes.¹⁶

The Integration Act recognized the WAC as a permanently standing part of the regular Army force. In keeping with congressional intent, the Army limited the assignments of women to align with Army policy, unlike the sister services, who limited the women's assignments by statutes of law. There is no clear explanation why the Army differed

from the other two services, except to say that the Army leaders may have recognized the fluid nature of war and the need to adapt quickly to changing Army needs. The Army policy reflected the original limitations of the WAAC that protected women from assignments requiring small arms operation, with the exception of some noncombat duty positions such as disbursing or pay officers, intelligence personnel who worked in code rooms, or drivers in certain overseas areas.¹⁷

One Army, by Exclusion

The Congressional Act of 1948 was amended in 1967, removing the restriction on women's promotions and eliminating the cap on the number of women in the force.¹⁸ In the 1970s, the Department of Defense and Congress were fully committed to ending all remaining segregation within the Army. With an amendment to the fiscal year 1979 Defense Procurement Authorization Bill, Congress called for an end to the WAC. President Jimmy Carter signed Public Law 95-485 which disbanded the WAC as a separate Corps in the Army and integrated women into the regular Army force structure.¹⁹ Although women were integrated, the Army continued to use the Combat Exclusion Policy which was revised by Secretary of the Army Alexander in December 1977 to state:

Women are authorized to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty except those listed below, at any organizational level, and in any unit of the Army, except in Infantry, Armor, Cannon Field Artillery, Combat Engineer, and Low Altitude Air Defense Artillery units of battalion/ squadron or smaller size.²⁰

The Combat Exclusion Policy remained unchanged for the next 15 years while the number of women who joined the Army increased from approximately 4 percent deploying in support of the Panama invasion to 14 percent of the Army force in 2006.²¹

Following the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, and in recognition of the advancement in technology, Congress revised the Combat Exclusion law to open some positions previously closed to military women.²²

Over the next two decades, the Army continued to revise its policies by opening a multitude of jobs to female soldiers. The current policies, procedures, and responsibilities for assignment of female soldiers in the U.S. Army are documented in the 1992 Army Regulation (AR), *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*. The regulation stated the overarching policy is to allow

women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions, or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat, or which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.²³

In 1994, Secretary of Defense Aspen revised the Department of Defense (DoD) assignment policy to state, “be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground...”²⁴ In addition to the DoD guidance, the National Defense Act also established guidelines for integrating women into the military and specified that the Secretary of Defense would inform Congress of changes to the restriction policy within 90 days of the change.²⁵ The Army policy was not revised following the release of the 1994 DoD guidance. However, in 2005 Congress enacted guidance requiring DoD to notify them of any policy changes which would allow women to be assigned or collocated with ground combat units.²⁶

The Changing Force and Changing Warfare (Full Spectrum Operations)

Although the DoD and Army policy guidance have not changed in over a decade, the warfighting environment has changed. The Army transformed from the pre-1980s, large scale, forward- based, cold war force to the scaled down and more technology driven Force XXI -Army of Excellence that defeated the Iraqi Republican Guard in Kuwait during the Gulf War. The Desert Storm battlefield, a conventional battlefield, was characterized by the force on force battle, operating in an open, desert battlefield similar to previous wars like World War I, World War II, and Korea. The U.S. Army anticipated and rehearsed war against their Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. The battlefield had distinguishable lines between the combat and rear support areas and the actual battles generally took place away from urban population centers.

Following Desert Storm, the U.S. conventional Army participated in various campaigns as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or United Nations (UN) force, conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in the Balkans and Haiti. These missions marked the beginnings of the transformation from a desert battlefield to an urban battlefield and from fighting enemy armies to fighting smaller militias.²⁷ For nearly ten years the enemy continued to suffer qualified defeat at the hands of American soldiers.

The 2001 attack on the World Trade Center spawned the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) campaign. The campaign against terror started in Afghanistan with American led coalition forces toppling the Taliban government.²⁸ The Taliban forces, suffering from the defeat, reverted to guerrilla tactics that they successfully used against

the Soviet forces in the 1970s. Intermixed with the local insurgent force were pockets of foreign fighters and international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida (AQ).

In March 2003, U.S. forces directed their unequalled combat power against their old adversary, Iraq. U.S. forces quickly defeated the Republican Guard and the Iraqi Army in order to remove the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, from power. The power vacuum created by removing Hussein resulted in widespread violence and rioting.²⁹

The operating environment (OE) in Afghanistan and Iraq are marked with significant differences from the Gulf War of the 1990s or the small wars of Latin American insurgencies that conventional U.S. Army forces (the non-Special Forces community) participated in. A first difference is that insurgent fighters are not uniformed soldiers. The insurgent works independently or as part of a small team of guerrilla fighters seeking to inflict the most damage at the least cost.³⁰ One technique used by the insurgents is engaging in a low cost, high value fight using suicide bombers.³¹ Second, the insurgent fighter is difficult to identify because he blends into the population and is often protected by civilian non-combatants.³² U.S. forces have to go through extensive operations to separate the “good guys” from the “bad guys.” Because the insurgents live among the people, the battlefield is no longer physically separated from cities and towns. Another difference is that there is no delineated front or rear lines where forces meet in face to face battle, and then retreat to their support areas to rest, recover, and rearm. The lack of front or rear lines means that U.S. forces and their supporting elements have a 360-degree parameter and could potentially be surrounded by the enemy at all times, a characteristic of the non-contiguous or irregular battlefield.³³ Understanding the enemy, the way he fights, the weapons he uses, and the location of the conflict are all key to

describing the contemporary operating environment (OE). All of the above differences lead to the final consideration that makes today's battlefield distinctly different than those of previous fights, the differences that used to apply to only a few soldiers and units now apply to many soldiers and units.

Primary Research Question

This thesis sought to answer the question: How should the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* be revised in order to address the modern battlefield?

Secondary Research Question

In order to answer the primary research question, five secondary questions were addressed. First, what is the current Army assignment policy for the assignment for women soldiers? Next, why and how are direct combat positions coded? Fourth, what are the characteristics of the modern battlefield or security environment? And finally, what adjustments did the Army make in organization and employment of personnel in order to operate effectively in the modern OE?

Assumptions

The Army did not revise their policy for assigning women in combat following the establishment of the DoD policy in 1994. Additionally, the Army did not revise the policy during or following peace keeping operations in the Balkans in 1996 and 1999, humanitarian assistance operations in Haiti in 1994, or major combat or stability operations in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). As a result, the validity for writing this thesis rested on two key assumptions. The researcher's first assumption was that the Army would not revise the policy for assignment of women prior to the completion of

this thesis. The second assumption was that current Army doctrine was likely to remain unchanged. The current U.S. Army doctrine centers on conducting full spectrum operations which includes stability, offensive, and defensive types of operations rather than focusing on a specific enemy.³⁴ Therefore, the doctrine would likely meet the needs of the Army over the next two decades regardless of enemy or terrain.

Scope

This study focused specifically on defining the existing policy shortcomings, identifying areas for clarification, and investigating the job placement of women soldiers rather than analyzing the actual utilization functions of women in Iraq. The study specifically considered how the current campaign in the GWOT, the contemporary battlefield, and the doctrinal employment of women complied or conflicted with the Army policy and the types of changes that must be made to adjust the policy to the realities of the modern nature of warfare.

Delimitations

The subject of women in combat is a very controversial and polarizing subject.³⁵ Given the bulk of research available on this topic, this thesis did not address equal opportunity or sexual harassment, combat readiness, pregnancy rates, or deployability criteria. Second, the researcher did not tackle performance- based entry into occupational specialties. Nor did she compare the Army placement policy to the policies of the sister services. Finally, demographics or promotion rates of women in the Army were not the focus of this study.

¹Ann Scott Tyson, "Woman Gains Silver Star--And Removal From Combat," *WashingtonPost.com*, 1 May 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/30/AR2008043003415_pf.html (accessed 22 February 2009).

²*Independent Lens*, "Lioness," Directed by Meg McLagan and Daria Sommers, Comment by CPT Lory Manning, USN (retired), 2008. Originally broadcast November 2008 and currently available on DVD, at the 50:43 time elapse minute mark. Hereafter this source will be referred to as *Lioness*.

³Michele M. Putko and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Women in Combat Compendium*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008) viii.

⁴Christopher Putko, "USAWC Women in Combat Survey Interpretation," In *Women in Combat Compendium*, by Michele M. Putko and Douglas V. Johnson II. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008) 2.

⁵Mark R. Lindon, "Impact of Revising the Army's Female Assignment Policy," in *Women in Combat Compendium* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 37.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Bettie J. Morden, *Women's Army Corps 1945-1978*, <http://www.history.Army.mil/books/wac/index.htm#contents> (accessed 10 November 2008), 3.

⁸Judith A. Bellafaire, "The Women's Army Corps: A Commemoration of World War II Service," *U.S. Army Center for Military History* (7 November, 2008), <https://www.history.Army.mil/brochures/wac/wac/htm> (accessed 10 November 2008), 3.

⁹*Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 13.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 3.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Bettie J. Morden, *Women's Army Corps 1945-1978*, <http://www.history.Army.mil/books/wac/index.htm#contents> (accessed 10 November 2008), 10.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁶U.S. Congress. “U.S. Public Law 625: The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948,” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948).

¹⁷Bettie J. Morden, *Women’s Army Corps 1945-1978*, <http://www.history.Army.mil/books/wac/index.htm#contents> (accessed 10 November 2008).\

¹⁸Ibid., 220.

¹⁹Melissa K. Wilford, “Army Observes 30th Anniversary of Integrating WACs” *Army.Mil News*, <http://www.Army.mil/-news/2008/10/20/13428-Army-observes-30th-anniversary-of-integrating-wacs/> (accessed 10 November 2008).

²⁰Bettie J. Morden, *Women’s Army Corps 1945-1978*, <http://www.history.Army.mil/books/wac/index.htm#contents> (accessed 10 November 2008), 384.

²¹Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Personnel: 1960-2006*. Census Bureau Report: 2008 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), and Lindon 37.

²²Kim Field and John Nagl, 2.

²³Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-13, *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), 1. Hereafter referred to as AR 600-13.

²⁴Margaret C. Harrell, Laura Werber Castaneda, Peter Schirmer, Bryan W. Hallmark, Jennifer Kavanagh, Daniel Gershwin, and Paul Steinberg, *Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2007), xi. Hereafter this report is referred to as RAND.

²⁵U.S. Congress, Public Law 103-160, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993).

²⁶Jimmie O. Keenan, The DoD Combat Exclusion Policy: Time for a Change?” in *Women in Combat Compendium* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 23.

²⁷Tom Rockmore, “On War, Politics and Capitalism After 9/11,” *Theoria: A Journal of Social & Political Theory* 110 (2006) 74-96, 75.

²⁸Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Keeping Central Asia Stable,” *Third World Quarterly* 25 (2004) 689-705. 700.

²⁹Phebe A. Marr, “Marr: Sectarian Violence Has Iraq ‘Teetering on the Brink,’” *Council on Foreign Relations* (2009), <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10900/marr.html> (accessed 4 May 2009).

³⁰FM 3-24, 1-2.

³¹IW JOC, G-6.

³²*Ibid.*, 17.

³³Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0: *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008) (Incorporating Change 1), II-20.

³⁴Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0: *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008) 3-1.

³⁵Kim Field and John Nagl, “Combat Roles for Women: A Modest Proposal,” *Parameters* (Summer 2001): 74.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this literature review was to determine the status of current publications about the Army Policy for the Assignment of Female soldiers in order to identify if there are policy areas or gaps that require clarification or revision in light of the 21st century security environment and the changes in Army structure, doctrine, training, and practices. In order to answer the research question, research for this thesis included available information about the Army's assignment policy for female soldiers, the implementation of the policy using the Direct Combat Positions Coding (DCPC) system, and the changes in the force that resulted from the shift to an era of persistent warfare. The literature review is organized by these topics: current policy, DCPC Code, the modern battlefield, and the changing force.

Current Policy

The Army Policy for the Assignment of Female soldiers is a polarizing topic at the highest levels.¹ Extensive history about the creation of the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC), the conversion of the WAAC to the Women's Army Corps (WAC), the WAC inclusion as a permanent part of the Army force structure followed by integration of women into the regular force, and various policy changes contributed to the current Army policy for the assignment of female soldiers and how it is interpreted. An understanding of the current policy is necessary in order to determine the gaps generated by changes in the force and warfighting environment since the publication of the policy.

The Army Regulation 600-13 is the Army's sole guiding document for the assignment of women. The current regulation was most recently updated on March 22, 1992, and stated:

The Army's assignment policy for female soldiers allows women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions, or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat, or which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.²

The 1992 regulation further defined two key terms, collocation and direct combat:

[Collocation] Occurs when the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. Specifically, positions in units or sub-units which routinely collocate with units assigned a direct combat mission are closed to women. An entire unit will not be closed because a subunit routinely collocates with a unit assigned a direct combat mission. The sub-unit will be closed to women.³

The Army's definition for direct combat defined in the regulation is:

Engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy's personnel and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect in order to destroy or capture the enemy, or while repelling the enemy's assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.⁴

In January, 1994, then Secretary of Defense Ashton revised the Department of Defense (DoD) assignment policy in his Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule memorandum. The higher level policy ruled:

Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.⁵

The memorandum further defined direct ground combat as:

engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward

on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.⁶

Aspen's memorandum also authorized services to include restrictions on the assignment of women "where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women".⁷

In 2007 an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) sponsored study was conducted by the RAND Corporation. The monograph *Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women* extensively compared the DoD and Army policies and found that there was no common understanding of the assignment policies. The study attributed the incongruity to no shared understanding of lexicon in the policies, including words such as *enemy*, *forward* or *well forward*, and *collocation*.⁸ RAND researchers conducted a survey of a small number of senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DA leaders to determine the spirit of the policy and desired purpose of the policy. The report recommendation included significant counsel including:

Recraft the assignment policy for women to make it conform-*and clarify how it conforms*--to the nature of warfare today and in the future, and plan to review the policy periodically.

Make clear the objectives and intent of any future policy.

Clarify whether and how much the assignment policy should constrain military efficiency and expediency can overrule the assignment policy.

Consider whether a prospective policy should exclude women from units and positions in which they have successfully performed in Iraq.

Determine whether collocation (proximity) is objectionable and whether collocation (proximity and interdependence) is objectionable and clearly define those terms, should they be used in the policy.

If unit sizes (or levels of command) are specified in the assignment policy, make apparent the reason and intent for specifying unit size, given that modularization, as well as the evolving battlefield, may blur even negate this distinction.⁹

Putko and Johnson compiled a 2008 report for the Strategic Studies Institute called, *Women in Combat Compendium*.¹⁰ A portion of the compendium was the 2006 United States Army War College (USAWC) survey, which surveyed the perception of war college students regarding women in combat. Two hundred and thirty-six war college students who were familiar with the ground combat exclusion policy were surveyed about the policy. The survey analysts interpreted that:

Students [were] familiar with the ground combat exclusion policy for female soldiers, but their perception [was] that because of the asymmetric nature of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army does not follow the policy and female soldiers are engaged in direct ground combat.¹¹

Putko recommended that the entire issue of women's service to the nation be reexamined with an eye towards replacing antiquated and obsolete rules and laws. In the same compendium Keenan examined the current state of the DoD policy, its evolution, and the recent public interest. Keenan recommended revising the DoD Combat Exclusion Policy in order to make it representative of the 21st century, modern, asymmetric battlefield.¹² Finally, Burba noted that the GWOT provides the Army with a unique opportunity to evaluate the sufficiency and relevance of the combat exclusion rule and needs of commanders during conflict.¹³

Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* is the Army doctrine that provides the organization with a common philosophy, language, and purpose.¹⁴ The key doctrine provides instruction for troop leading procedures and the military decision making process. Command relationships such as operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON) and their associated definitions are contained provided in this manual.¹⁵

Field and Nagl noted in their journal article that in times of need such as national emergencies, the rules on gender roles are not enforced as zealously as when no crisis exists.¹⁶ They further identified that women's roles have gone through incremental changes throughout history. For example, the "risk rule" was eliminated in 1994 because of a "partial recognition of the fact that given the changing nature of warfare there were no longer any 'safe' places on the battlefield."¹⁷ The authors continued by recognizing the need for the Army to remain capable of fighting a conventional war, while also being able to execute a variety of missions now considered part of a full spectrum capability.¹⁸

In summary the current Army assignment policy for women is contained in AR 600-13. The Office of the Secretary of Defense produced a separated policy in 1994. RAND provided the most significant comparison and research assessment of the two policies.

DCPC System

In order to answer the secondary questions, why and how are combat positions coded the researcher looked at literature about Army system for assigning women, policies that address utilization of women, and public media illustrating the modern experience of women in a deployed environment.

The Direct Combat Position Code system is prescribed in Army Regulation 600-13 and implements the Army policy by rating job positions by three dimensions: duties of the position and area of concentration or military occupational specialty, unit mission, and routine collocation. Positions are assigned a code of P1 through P7 in organizational documents. Those jobs with a P1 rating are closed to female assignment and those with a P2 rating are open to women.¹⁹

There is very little outside documentation or reports showing how the Direct Combat Position Codes (DCPC) system is implemented. The DCPC system uses three dimensions to classify Army positions. The dimensions are the area of concentration, unit mission, and routine collocation. The RAND report noted that doctrine determined the units that women could be assigned to, not the activities a unit routinely performed in war.²⁰ Some literature indicated that women are no safer serving in support roles than male soldiers serving in combat positions.²¹ Some contemporary literature indicated that deploying units were manned according to deployment manning documents for a directed mission which temporarily changed their mission statements and allowed the units to side-step the policy and DCPC restrictions.²² Accordingly, further investigation focused on locating information about units' activities during deployments, casualty statistics related to combat injuries, and conflicting policies, doctrine, or loopholes. Finally, this thesis reviewed the effects of modularization of the Army and how modularized units interact in the OE.

AR 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation--Consolidated Policies* asserts that military positions are designated to be occupied interchangeably by either males or females unless an approved exception is received from HQDA. The regulation further indicates that Major Commands (MACOM) will not alter the P codes in Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment from those prescribed by DCPC in the Tables of Organization and Equipment.²³

AR 611-1 reiterated the Army policy stating:

It is current Army policy that female officers may be designated in any branch or FA [functional area] except Infantry (11), Armor (12) and Special Forces (18). They may be designated in all other branch and FA AOCs [Areas of

Concentration] except Cannon Field Artillery (13E) and SHORAD [Short Range Air Defense] Artillery (14B).²⁴

The regulation identifies enlisted and warrant officer occupational specialties, in the combat arms fields previously identified and prohibited to women. The document addressed women's service in closed (all male) units and stated that officers, warrant officers, and enlisted women will not be assigned to any unit or position that a P1 DCPC code even if there is a position requiring their specific occupational skill.²⁵ This regulation is accompanied by Army Regulation 611-21 which specifically identifies the military occupational specialties that are closed to enlisted and officer women soldiers.²⁶

An analysis of Army policy conducted by the Center for Military Readiness noted multiple instances where female soldiers were assigned or collocated in P1 coded units. Illustrations in the 2008 report concluded that 170 female Indiana National Guard soldiers deployed with the 1st Battalion, 293d Infantry after they were cross-leveled into the unit under the authorization from the deployment manning document (DMD).²⁷ Further cases included placement or collocation of women in Mobile Training Teams, closed field artillery units, infantry battalions, and in support of reconnaissance teams in accordance with current Army policy.²⁸

The General Accounting Organization Testimony of Ferber in 1987 discussed the military services' interpretation and application of the combat exclusion laws for women in the military. Ferber testified that in 1987 the Army combat exclusion policy was "governed by the Direct Combat Probability code system, introduced in 1983, which ascribes to each Army job an assessment of the probability of that job participating in direct combat."²⁹ The use of the code to implement policy was reiterated in the later GAO report published on the same topic.³⁰ Ferber concluded that the application of

exclusion provisions that “the extent to which degrees of danger can be reliably differentiated in the context of modern warfare is questionable.”³¹ Ferber further observed that precluding women from front line fighting roles offered some protection; however, the extent to which women could be protected was questionable.³²

Ferber’s opinion during his GAO testimony to the House Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation was that women were already stationed forward of the brigade’s rear boundary on a continuing basis. Women were assigned to the forward support battalions who provided combat service support to combat units. He also posited that women soldiers would travel as close to the battlefield as they need to, on a temporary basis, in order to do their jobs.³³

The Army DCPC system uses the term “collocate” as part of the criteria to restrict the assignment of women.³⁴ Army policy states collocation “Occurs when the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat.”³⁵ The RAND report documents two commonly accepted definitions among senior military leaders of the word collocate. The first definition of collocate is in reference to a unit or soldier occupying an area in close proximity to a combat unit in order to share facilities.³⁶ The second definition is based more on the habitual relationship between a maneuver unit and its support unit.³⁷ The subtle difference between the accepted definitions led to further confusion about the spirit of the policy and how to assign women effectively. The author’s analysis concluded that the Army policy appears to support the first definition.

The Women in Combat Compendium includes a number extracts from 2006 U.S. Army War College (USAWC) student monographs, papers, and studies about the status

of implementation of the exclusionary policies and battlefield observations. Two key topics addressed in the paper were societal perceptions about women in combat, and the observations and conclusions of combat seasoned students.³⁸ The author summarized that:

The Combat Exclusion Policy with its attendant “collocation” restriction is incompatible with the nature of war in which the U.S. Army is currently engaged and the forms of conflict it is likely to be engaged in for the foreseeable future, [and that the] the Combat Exclusion Policy and the associated “collocation” restriction is likewise incompatible with the Army’s transformation to a modularized force.³⁹

The RAND report further investigated the question about controlling relationships between units. The example used in the report was control of the newly organized Forward Support Companies (FSC).⁴⁰ By doctrine the FSC are assigned to a Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) and then operationally controlled (OPCON) to their supported battalion.⁴¹ The report summarized that “Some service members felt that assigning women to the FSCs was a de facto violation of the assignment policy” but that the Army sidestepped the policy by assigning them to FSCs under a Base Support Battalion on paper even though the FSCs are with the infantry companies once they are deployed.⁴² Commanders interviewed for the report “confirmed that they did not send women out to do combat patrols. Thus, women were not actively engaging and closing with the enemy, though they were interacting closely with the teams that were doing so.”⁴³

Frels’ strategic research project cited discrepancies or inconsistencies of position coding which sometimes allowed women in support units to be positioned ahead of combat units or precluded women from serving in positions normally placed behind other combat units. For example, “the argument for not opening MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System] is based on the collocation restriction, but the MLRS is the Army’s long-

range indirect fire system normally positioned behind other units that women can be assigned to.”⁴⁴ Further, Field and Nagl similarly compared military police and mechanized infantry mission essential tasks and noted that the tasks appear different when applied in conventional war but the differences were extremely similar in the Balkans peace operations.⁴⁵

Contrary to the RAND report, the Independent Lens film *Lioness* documented the creation and use of a group of Army women who became the first female soldiers in American history to be sent into direct ground combat from September 2003 to August 2004. While assigned in support positions such as mechanics, signalers, and supply clerks, team members were attached on a temporary basis to all-male combat units without violating the Army assignment policy. The filmmakers uncovered that Team *Lioness* soldiers did not receive identical training to the infantry soldiers they were detailed to support. The women fought in some of the bloodiest counterinsurgency battles with Army and later Marine combat units.⁴⁶

The researcher obtained comments from subject matter experts for some portions of this thesis where published sources were limited or not available. Colonel Alberto, Chief of the Army G-1’s Human Relations and Readiness Division, verified the current focus and intent of the DCPC system addresses assignments of women, not utilization, and that women are functioning as intended in the current deployed environment. Next, Mr. Harold Hodges and Ms. Andrea Auvil-Jones from the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Force Design Directorate, provided the most current information about how the DCPC system is used to identify open and closed positions in each unit across the Army. They further provided documentation to support the analysis in Chapter

4. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Meredith, Army Force Manager and expert on the development of manning documents for deployed forces, assisted the researcher to determine how positions are coded in the organizations that are manned by defense manning documents (DMDs) and TDAs. Experts provided counsel on the current processes in their field of expertise.

In summary, the DCPC systems say that the system functions to assign women according to the established DA policy and those assignments are based on the probability of direct combat. Donnelly and Field and Nagl identified potential flaws within the DCPC system that authorize assignment or placement of women in open jobs or units where they are doing similar jobs as men in closed units and specialties.

The Modern Security Environment

Defining the modern battlefield plays a significant role in answering the research question because environmental conditions, circumstances, and influences shape the force and doctrine development which in turn dictates how Army commanders define the problem and determine a solution to that problem in order to achieve victory.⁴⁷ There are a host of factors that affect ground force operations today including, but are not limited to: globalization, technology, environmental changes, and political changes.

The Training and Doctrine Command Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats' analysis of the contemporary operating environment (OE) recognized "Warfare has changed – no concrete battle lines exist, technology is an ever-changing friend or foe, and globalization brings myriad players into the equation that did not exist even a decade ago."⁴⁸ The TRISA analysis recognized that no mutually understood restrictions on warfare exist in the current environment. In fact, "all is fair game. Adversaries will

wage warfare across all domains of power- political, diplomatic, economic and military” reflective of the unrestricted warfare described by Clausewitz and “postulated by Chinese military theorists.”⁴⁹ The intelligence analysis showed that war is the Army’s new steady state and pointed out the importance of the move from a peace time condition to a state of persistent conflict, commenting:

The Army’s new strategic reality is that war is our steady-state environment – a war against adversaries employing irregular, unconventional, and asymmetrical means. A recent Army Posture Statement articulates, “the Army must be prepared to sustain operations during a period of persistent conflict – a blurring of familiar distinctions between war and peace.” Today’s constant tension and conflict is not completely driven by nation-states. From a training perspective, the Army must be prepared to fight any type of adversary (or combination of adversaries), across the entire spectrum of conflict while preparing for possible attacks on U.S. soil.⁵⁰

The TRISA-T analysis clarified, “Though U.S. military forces are familiar with conflict, and the current war bears little resemblance to the wars that have shaped U.S. Army doctrine and training events.”⁵¹ The TRISA-T analyst showed the growing interconnectedness of adversaries is a driving force, enabling small groups to affect the military, stated:

Globalization brings the spread of weapons and technology to many new actors, such as Hezbollah, allowing technologies and capabilities to flow into the hands of small groups and even individuals. This can lead to increases in armed aggression, criminal activities and terrorism on a transnational scale with ease and little cost.⁵²

TRISA-T was among the most significant commentators about the current and projected OEs. Members of TRISA-T provided theories of future environments and examples of how traditional IW tactics are still applied and adjusted in the modern warfighting environment.

In his 2002 *Military Review* article Brower commented that women are an indispensable military asset for future victorious militaries.⁵³ Brower suggested that westernized armies place themselves at a disadvantage by having gender restrictions while terrorist organizations will leverage any capability available in order to win battles.

Using experimentation and lessons learned the U.S. Special Operations Command and Marine Corps developed the operating concept for the irregular warfare (IW) called the Joint Operating Concept (JOC).⁵⁴ One of the objectives of the concept paper was to:

influence joint and Service combat development processes by helping the joint force gain a better appreciation for IW challenges that will result in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes.⁵⁵

The desired end state of the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) authors was to have a joint force that is “as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare.” JOC defines IW, frames the military problem, and poses a solution, needed capabilities. Finally the document lists risks, mitigation, and implications of developing forces to achieve the desired endstate.

Field Manual 3-24, the U.S. Army field manual for counterinsurgency, specified that guerrilla tactics common to insurgency are among the most common approaches to warfare seen throughout history.⁵⁶ The counterinsurgency doctrinal manual explains that the overwhelming conventional military superiority of the U.S. U.S. forces its competitors towards unconventional means of fighting that mixes “modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency and terrorism.”⁵⁷ The document reported:

Any combatant prefers a quick, cheap, overwhelming victory over a long, bloody, protracted struggle. But to succeed against superior resources and technology, weaker actors have had to adapt. The recent success of U.S. military forces in major combat operations undoubtedly will lead many future opponents to asymmetric approaches. Because the United States retains significant advantages

in fires and technical surveillance, a thinking enemy is unlikely to choose to fight the U.S. U.S. forces in open battle. Some opponents have attempted to do so, such as Panama in 1989 and Iraq in 1991 and 2003. They were defeated in conflicts measured in hours or days. Conversely, other opponents have offset America's fires and surveillance advantages by operating close to civilians, as Somali clans did in 1993 and insurgents in Iraq have done since mid-2003; these enemies have been more successful in achieving their aims.⁵⁸

The Center for Strategic and International Studies conducted an analysis of the evolving insurgency in Iraq. Cordesman's study focus on the growth and character of the insurgent threat, measuring the evolution of the insurgency, and patterns of attack. The study documented a variety of irregular warfare (IW) methods of attack and combat that targeted and effected elements of national power including the political, psychological, and information areas. Some of the irregular methods of attack the insurgency identified and exploited included: 1) adapting targets to maximize pressure on the Iraqi social and political structures, 2) using suicide, car, and mass bombings to draw public attention and as a political weapon, 3) using low-cost high pay-off weapons like suicide bombers and IEDs, and adapting technology to counter U.S. and coalition defensive capabilities and countermeasures, 4) attacking lines of communication, rear area, and support activities 5) using mixed attacks, sequential ambushes, mixed weapons types, blended attacks, and snipers, as well as, attacking emergency response forces after the attacks, and 6) exploiting the weaknesses of U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi combat and logistic vehicles and vulnerable forces, and soft targets.⁵⁹

Multiple sources indicated that war is inherently risky regardless of the time period or location of the conflict. U.S. Army doctrine recognized that the Army will be involved in a variety of conflicts across the full spectrum of Army operations.⁶⁰ Media reports tended to indicate that the current operating environment is significantly more

risky for women. In a 2004 Washington Times article online, the reporter noted that at least one terrorist leader in Iraq specifically directed terrorists to target American service women stating, “Terrorists in the Abu Musab Zarqawi network in Iraq are specifically trying to kidnap an American female service member to further horrify the U.S. public”.⁶¹

Multiple printed, audio, and television news media sources publicized insurgent actions including bombings, kidnappings, and beheadings. The media outlet, USA Today covered these stories including the beheading of the American, Nick Berg, which showed part of the agenda of insurgents and dangers to non-combatant personnel in Iraq.⁶²

Infantry Colonel and former Infantry Battalion Commander, Robert J. Botters article included in the *Women in Combat Compendium* addressed the value of and risks to forward basing women on the battlefield. He specifically noted that the “battlefield is wherever the enemy is found” and that soldiers can expect combat to occur anywhere.⁶³

CSM Cynthia Pritchett was assigned to the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan for two years.⁶⁴ When questioned about the differences that women face in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan compared to previous wars she stated:

In previous wars, there was the front line, the intermediate level and the rear. Most women were back in the rear. Today, it's a 360-degree battlefield. The enemy attacks supply lines, logistics convoys, that have female truck drivers and MPs. Women aren't in combat arms (infantry, artillery or armor units) but they're definitely in combat. I got shot at more than once, and I shot back.⁶⁵

Likewise, Army Major Kate Guttormsen, of team *Lioness*, related that they experienced “very gray lines” because there are no identified frontlines and that once you “leave the gate” the enemy does not care what gender you are and everyone runs the same risk of hitting an improvised explosive device (IED) or being ambushed.⁶⁶ Pritchett and

Guttormsen's comments are echoed by other soldiers in numerous news articles about women soldiers and the ongoing war.

Field Manual 3-34.119, *Improvised Explosive Device Defeat* in describing the OE summarized the physical threat of IEDs saying:

The enemy clearly understands that less complex and open environments favor U.S. U.S. forces with our long-range, precision-guided weapons and our sophisticated ISR capability. Because of this, the enemy usually avoids open terrain and operates in urban areas and other complex terrain to mitigate U.S. technical superiority.⁶⁷

Asymmetry in warfare is not a new phenomenon, but given the relative capabilities of the United States as opposed to its potential opponents, it is increasingly likely that our enemies will seek adaptive, asymmetric approaches. They will seek to avoid or counter U.S. strengths without having to oppose them directly, while exploiting perceived U.S. weaknesses. In such cases, IEDs may become the weapons of choice.⁶⁸

The publication was developed from a study of lessons learned and is the Army and Marine Corps doctrine for defeating adversary IED operations.⁶⁹ IEDs are one of the main causes of death in the land component and therefore this manual was created to be an “authoritative reference for emerging doctrine, TTP, materiel and force structure, institutional and unit training, and standing operating procedures (SOPs) for IED defeat operations.”⁷⁰

Rice, of the Defense Manpower Data Center, provided a one-time report requested by the author. The report included casualty data for all active duty and reserve forces casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan from the start of OIF and OEF through March 28, 2009. The report included casualty dates, gender, casualty classification (hostile or non-hostile), and casualty reason (e.g. gunshot, explosive device, aircraft crash, etc.). The report also included casualty rank, unit of assignment, and military occupational specialty code.⁷¹ In addition to the report provided by Rice, Dillaber, from the Army G-

1 provided a Contingency Tracking System Deployment File report of currently deployed personnel by service and gender. This report was a snapshot in time from 30 September 2008 and the quantity of service members deployed to Iraq by gender, branch, and component of service.⁷²

The Army Field Manual 4-93.2, *The Sustainment Brigade*, outlines the concept of support operations for Army operations. The sustainment doctrine specifically outlines the asymmetric threats to support elements, deeming them as prime targets for opposition forces in a noncontiguous AO. The doctrine establishes that the expected asymmetric threats included IEDs, VBIEDS, and suicide bombers, as well as occasional attacks by fire and maneuver. In response to the foreseen threats, “the sustainment brigade and its subordinate organizations must plan for and be able to defend against these threats while conducting the primary mission.”⁷³

Notably significant in all wars is that the winner is usually the one with an advantage that cannot be overcome by the losing force.

Asymmetric tactics and strategies work! Success against the U.S. does not require superior military capabilities, but rather the ability to sense and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and constraints. Adversaries are not required to counter U.S. military power symmetrically; instead, fighting with unconventional, irregular and blended forces can bring success. Success comes from attacking the U.S. across all dimensions of its power, be they political, economic, social, informational or military.⁷⁴

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment report by Krepinevich stated:

The United States currently faces three major strategic challenges that will dominate its defense policy over the next decade or longer: defeating Islamist terrorist groups, hedging against the rise of a hostile and more openly confrontational China, and preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers.⁷⁵

Krepinevich further recommended that the Obama administration address these challenges as part of the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review when crafting the defense strategy, plans, and force structure for the next two decades.⁷⁶ Krepinevich claimed that globalization was responsible for facilitating the strategic challenges.

The authors of FM 3-24 summarized, “Culture is a ‘web of meaning’ shared by members of a particular society or group within a society.”⁷⁷ The manual further described culture as “an ‘operational code’ that is valid for an entire group of people” specifically noting that “culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into existing categories.”⁷⁸ In fact, the Army’s manual for psychological operations processes reported, “Cultural awareness is key to gaining the trust and respect of the TA [target audience].”⁷⁹

Army policy does not permit women in combat, but the Independent Lens film *Lioness* documents how necessity has trumped policy almost from the beginning of the war in Iraq. “Army commanders in the field realized that they needed female soldiers with them on searches and raids to help diffuse the culturally charged reality of male soldiers having to search and/or even be in the same room as unescorted women.”⁸⁰

Army doctrine in *Field Manual 3-20.96: Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron* provides guidance to the HBCT on how to use female service members to search females when conducting checkpoints during stability and support operations⁸¹. Separate articles in *Defend America*, *Iron Sights* magazine, and *Marine Corps News* confirmed the use of Female Search Teams (FiST) to support BCTs missions, humanitarian and infrastructure projects, and to work at check points.

Summary

In summary, the major works about the modern security environment say that insurgents are likely to use asymmetric means of attack in order to reduce U.S. Army capabilities. Writers documented the growing trend in IW tactics including the use and effects of explosive devices to attack political, social, economic, and military targets in order to capture the will of the people.

Force Reorganization

General George William Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army recognized in his interactive introduction of FM 3-0, *Operations* that the current operating environment drives how forces are structured, trained, and deployed stating,

Today we are in an era of persistent conflict. A period of protracted confrontation amongst state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. This concept goes straight to how commanders will employ Army forces, combining offense, defense, and stability operations simultaneously, as part of a joint force, to seize the initiative, exploit opportunities, and achieve decisive results.⁸²

In addition to recognizing the external influences of the enemy which shaped current operations and force structure, General Casey declared the new concepts necessitated a shift in the Army's organizational leadership to embrace "full spectrum operations" and affirmed that the operations manual will force the transformation of the Army organization, "equipment, training, leader development, and institutional practices to create a campaign-capable, expeditionary Army."⁸³

There are a number of strategies that drive how the U.S. Army approached the GWOT and training for forces entering the OE. The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the president's strategy that outlines the major national security concerns of the U.S. and

how the administration plans to deal with national security concerns. The 2005, the NSS directed the military to reorient itself in order to address the challenged of the GWOT. The NSS was used by the Department of Defense analyze the strategic objectives and develop the Quadrennial Defense Review.⁸⁴ The QDR provided congress with information about how the defense strategy would support the NSS. The 2006 QDR showed a shift in the force to meet the challenge of a persistent wartime environment.⁸⁵

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The Goldwater-Nichols Act directed the Armed Force to work jointly. Resultantly, the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessment published a paper the emphasized the importance of joint operations to the future force stated:

it must be kept in mind that the U.S. military fights as a *joint force*. Accordingly, each Service or force must ensure that the forces it acquires and the operational concepts it employs are interoperable with those of the others, and, equally important, that there is not a major mismatch between the support one Service assumes that it can expect from another, and what is actually the case.⁸⁶

The Army Strategy 2008 recognizes two types of mission essential tasks, core tasks and directed tasks, as part of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Core tasks are tasks “based on the unit’s *as designed* mission, and consist of tasks which support execution of Full Spectrum Operations.”⁸⁷ Directed tasks are mission specific for units deploying as part of a Contingency Expeditionary Force or a Deployment Expeditionary Force and tailored to support Full Spectrum Operations in a specific theater.⁸⁸ Units adjust their training in order to gain task proficiency prior to deploying in support of an operation.

The Army established guidance for training soldiers in order to successfully accomplish tasks necessary in the modern security environment. Army Regulation 7-0,

Training the Force, was the Army doctrine for training and the *Army Training Network (ATN)* website provided Army leaders with standardized training task requirements based on the unit type and unit size down to the brigade level units. The website is the Army's method of providing the most current and relevant information to trainers and educators.⁸⁹ Army training is focused on preparing soldiers to accomplish the necessary offensive, defensive, and stability operations tasks identified by Army doctrine. Field Manual 3-90, *Tactics*, is considered one of the primary doctrinal manuals and serves to provide a standard guideline for military operations. The manual includes the tactics for offensive, defensive, and enabling operations.⁹⁰ The doctrine serves as the basis for tactics, techniques, and procedures. You need to add a transition sentence to introduce the next paragraph

Radzikowski noted the introduction of the forward operating base (FOB) to the conventional force in his *Infantry Magazine Article*, "Contemporary FOB Operations." His article identified the challenges that infantry BCTs face when implementing FOB operations which the units were not structured to support.⁹¹ Further information about the doctrinal use and operation of FOBs was not found. The *Washington Times*, article "Briefing: FOBs the Closest Thing to Home in Iraq" addressed the importance of FOBs and the smaller outposts to current operations in Iraq.⁹²

Kagan's 2007 *Iraq Report* identified the importance of the smaller joint security station (JSS) as a new concept of operation in Iraq. The report detailed the plan to establish security across Baghdad and the role of the JSS. Reporter Brian Williams' documented his visit to a JSS and his growing awareness of the security situation during his 2007 travel with U.S. Army generals in Iraq.⁹³

Summary

In summary, the changing nature of warfare and Army force modernization resulted from the DoD realignment in support of the national strategy. Contemporary operations include tactics and operations based out of bases located in the 360 degree battle area.

Conclusion

A review of the major works and sources indicate ongoing debate about the validity of the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*. Further, sources document both a change in the OE and modernization of U.S. forces and tactics.

In the next chapter the author describes the methodology used in this thesis and describes how this literature review supports the analysis to reach a conclusion to answer the research question.

¹Round table discussion between Chief of Staff of the Army General George W. Casey and selected Army Command and General Staff College students on October 20, 2008. When asked by the author for comments regarding revision of the Army's combat exclusion policy, General Casey commented that it was a hot subject and that he would not touch it.

²AR 600-13, 1.

³Ibid., 5.

⁴Ibid.

⁵RAND, 72.

⁶Ibid., 73.

⁷Ibid.

⁸RAND, 27.

⁹RAND, xxi.

¹⁰Michelle M. Putko and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Women in Combat Compendium* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2008), vii.

¹¹Christopher Putko, “USAWC Women in Combat Survey Interpretation,” In *Women in Combat Compendium*, by Michele M. Putko and Douglas V. Johnson II. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008) 1.

¹²Jimmie O. Keenan, The DoD Combat Exclusion Policy: Time for a Change?” in *Women in Combat Compendium* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 24.

¹³Kathleen A. Burba, “Leveraging the Army Vision to Amend the Combat Exclusion Law” (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2007), 3.

¹⁴Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005) v. Hereafter referred to as FM 5-0.

¹⁵FM 5-0, F-5.

¹⁶Kim Field and John Nagl, “Combat Roles for Women: A Modest Proposal,” *Parameters* (Summer 2001), 75.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 76.

¹⁹AR 600-13, 2.

²⁰RAND, 4.

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²³Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 611-1, *Military Occupational Classification Structure and Development and Implementation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 43.

²⁴Department of the Army, AR 611-1, *Military Occupational Classification Structure Development and Implementation*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 11.

²⁵*Ibid.*, paragraphs 5-4 and 6-2.

²⁶Department of the Army, Army Regulation 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007) Chapters 6, 12-1, 13, and table 13-1. Hereafter referred to as AR 611-221.

²⁷Center for Military Readiness- Policy Analysis, *Army Policy on Women in Land Combat: Disrespecting Regulations, Congress, and Military Women*, (Online: CMR, 2008), 1.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹Martin Ferber. *Combat Exclusion Laws for Women in the Military*, GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, House Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House. (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1987) 11.

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³²Ferber, 13.

³³Ferber, 15.

³⁴AR 600-13, 2.

³⁵AR 600-13, 5.

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³⁹*Ibid.*, viii.

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⁴¹Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 4-93.4: *Theater Support Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), and Field Manual Interim 4-93.2: *The Sustainment Brigade* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008).

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⁴³RAND, 34.

⁴⁴Frels, 21.

⁴⁵Field and Nagl, 4.

⁴⁶Room 11 Productions. *Lioness: There for the Action: Missing from History*. (2008) http://lionessthefilm.com/about_the_film/ (accessed November 29, 2008)

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⁴⁸Training and Doctrine Command Intelligence Support Activity- Threat, *The Contemporary Operating Environment*. Threat Analysis: 2007. (Fort Monroe: Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 1. Hereafter referred to as TRISA-T.

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⁵⁰TRISA-T., 37-38.

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⁵²TRISA-T, 43.

⁵³Michael J. Brower, "A Case for Women Warfighters." *Military Review*, November-December 2002: 66.

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⁵⁸FM 3-24, 1-2.

⁵⁹Cordesman, 22-28.

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⁶⁵ Cox.

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⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 2-5.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, iv.

⁷⁰FMI 3-34.119., Forward and iv.

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⁷⁴TRISA-T, 53.

⁷⁵Andrew F. Krepinevich, *Strategy for the Long Haul: An Army at the Crossroads*, Monograph (Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: 2008) vii.

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⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 3-6.

⁷⁸FM 3-24, 3-7.

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⁸²Department of the Army. *Interactive Guide to FM 3-0: Operations*. (Washington, DC: 27 February 2008) https://courses.leavenworth.Army.mil/@@8151a1cc0dac6d7336e63c6568785720/courses/1/MASTER_LIBRARY_AY06-07/content/_313374_1/dir_@464d2033.zip/FM%203.0/flash/main.swf (Accessed 17 March 2009) Introduction video clip by General Casey, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

⁸³*Ibid.*; Conclusion of introduction video.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In order to determine necessary revisions for the Army *Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* the researcher must answer five questions. First, what is the current Army assignment policy for the assignment for women soldiers? Next, why and how are direct combat positions coded? Fourth, what are the characteristics of the modern battlefield or security environment? And finally, what adjustments did the Army make in organization and employment of personnel in order to operate effectively in the modern OE ?

This research was important to identifying gaps and necessary changes for the Army policy and to reflect changes in the role of Army women pertaining to the OE and force modularization. The modification of the policies descriptive language will enable Army leaders to implement it more effectively and reduce confusion about how, where, and what activities female soldiers can do to support the warfighting unit's mission.

Data Collection

To answer the policy question the author reviewed historical documents to determine the genesis of the Army policy and the spirit of its intent. Congress commissioned their investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), to review and report on a range of female Soldier related subjects. Their final report contained a range of observations about the spirit and intent of the assignment policy. This researcher reviewed available testimony and reports generated from the Secretary of

Defense (SECDEF) and the Army Chief of Staff (CSA), and private organizations to obtain the Army's position and changes in women's assignment policy stance over time.

The Army policy should be nested within the Department of Defense policy and by doctrine the Army could revise their organizational policy to be aligned with or more restrictive, but not more lenient than the DoD policy. The nested concept "is a planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon's concept of operations is embedded in the other."¹ The researcher further obtained the published DoD and Army policies and conducted an extensive review and comparison of these sources to determine if the Army's policy is aligned with or more restrictive than the DoD policy and not more lenient.

The Army established the Direct Combat Position Code (DCPC) to manage personnel assignments across the organization as directed by the Army policy. The researcher reviewed AR 600-13: *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* which prescribes the DCPC system used to regulate the placement of women and combat, and casualty statistics to determine if the coding supported the letter and the spirit of the assignment policy. The purpose of the review was also to determine if statistics supported the assumption that, in wartime, open positions are safer than positions closed to women.

The researcher further compared the linear and irregular operating environments and determined differences in the key risks to soldiers. Contiguous and noncontiguous battlefields and full spectrum operations definitions were defined according to Army field manuals, doctrine, and descriptions compiled in various published news articles. This work described the battlefields with multiple examples including the operating

environments in Iraq created by reviewing unclassified reports and reviews generated by units who rotated through these battlefields and from information obtained by news articles about the combat zones. Articles, editorials, and blogs from various military oriented, professional magazines, and public news source journals confirmed an accurate assessment of the threats in each of the operating environments.

This thesis reviewed how units and female soldiers were regularly employed in Iraq, and emergent female specific jobs. A literature review of online and published literature, periodicals, and case studies was conducted on how units support the war (either in accordance with their mission or outside of their identified scope). A further review of the Army G-1's website, *Women in the Army (WITA)*, which tracked women's demographics, history, and stories, provided historical documentation about individual women's experiences while deployed. Some articles indicated that units did not function according to their doctrinal missions while deployed in OIF and OEF. Further, news and personal interest articles documented the resurgence of female search teams. Finally, the researcher reviewed casualty statistics, risk assessments, and concept information to determine and recommend changes to tactics, techniques, and procedures, and force structure that affected the approach to modern security operations. This information was used to determine how the OE fostered changes in the force which impact how the policy is interpreted.

Data Analysis

The data collected from a review of historical documentation to answer the policy question was analyzed in the following ways. The Army's policy for the assignment of women was compared to the more recent Department of Defense (DoD) combat

exclusion policy and the RAND report to verify conflicting verbiage and perceived definitions of specific verbiage. Secondly, the thesis compared historical documentation, reports, and testimonies to determine the spirit of the current Army policy. Data collected from a review of Army policy for the assignment of females was analyzed by comparing the Direct Combat Position Code (DCPC) system to the stated Army policy. Further, casualty statistics were analyzed to determine the effectiveness of the DCPC coding to support the letter and intent of the policy when applied in a real-world, persistent conflict environment. Abnormalities found are not analyzed in this research.

Data collected from reviewing field manuals and online and published commentaries about the OE and from professional journals was compared in order to define the current battlefield. Key differences between contiguous and noncontiguous battlefields were identified. Further, the researcher compared the defined noncontiguous battlefield to the current battlefields of OIF and OEF. Existing discrepancies were identified but not analyzed in this research.

Finally, to answer the planning considerations question this thesis compared data collected to answer all of the previous questions to determine if placement of women on the noncontiguous battle field and whether the official policy meets the spirit of the Army's stated position on women in combat. Identified abnormalities were examined in Chapter 4 to determine the cause of the abnormality and served as a basis to provide recommendations for changes to the Army policy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, data collected from Army sources including Army regulations and field manuals, joint doctrine and publications, open source journal and news articles, and

analysis of casualty reports were used answer the secondary questions. The researcher identified policy gaps by determining how verbiage is understood in light of the modern OE and Army organization and tactics changes. The next chapter is the researcher's analysis of the policy, the 21st century security environment, and Army structure.

¹Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1-16.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Women make up 13.2 percent of the active duty Army enlisted force, 16.9 percent of the active duty Army officers.¹ If strictly adhered too, the Army's outmoded combat exclusion policy potentially damages its ability to project combat power to fight and win the nation's battles.² The growing demographic of Army women dictates that the Army combat exclusion policy be revised.

The researcher sought to analyze current literature and information to determine the gaps in the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* generated by changes in the army structure and the shift toward irregular warfare. As shown in the background information presented in Chapter 1, changes in the standing and function of women in the military previously occurred in conjunction with significant historical events. For example, the establishment of the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps and later the Women's Army Corps were need driven by World War II manpower and skill deficits.³ The elimination of the cap on women in the force and rank restrictions occurred in conjunction with a dwindling pool of willing male recruits after the conversion to an All-volunteer Army.⁴ The Department of Defense opened some previously designated and restricted combat jobs to women in 1991 after reevaluating the inherent danger and advancement of technology in warfighting equipment. Army modernization, changes in Army doctrine, and the modern battlefield dictate that policy change is necessary. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is the catalytic event needed to power the policy revision.

In order to determine what changes are necessary, this analysis must answer five questions. First, what is the current Army policy for the Assignment of Female soldiers? Then, why and how are direct combat positions coded? Fourth, what are the characteristics of the modern battlefield? And finally, how does the changing nature of warfare dictate employment of women in the current combat zones?

This chapter contains the analysis of the data collected as a result of an extensive literature review of policies, reports and report generated statistics, Army doctrine, new articles, and documentary footage. The analysis of the reviewed literature is organized by these topics: current policy, DCPC Code, modern battlefield, and the changing nature of warfare in an effort to answer the secondary questions above using the current information available.

Data Analysis

Current Policy

This research compared the Army Policy for the Assignment of Female soldiers and the Defense Department's Combat Exclusion Policy in order to determine the "letter" and spirit of the policy, and if a significant difference between the Army and OSD policies exists. First the researcher compared the policies to determine the letter of the policy. Second, she reviewed the genesis of the Army policy and its evolution into the current policy to determine the spirit of the policy.

The "Letter" of the Policy

Determining the letter of the Army and DoD policies is important. If the two policies are identical, or if discrepancies are insignificant, then the margin for interpreting

gaps is reduced. Below is the DoD Assignment Rule followed by the Army Policy for the Assignment of Female soldiers, respectively.

[personnel can] be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground⁵

[women can] serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions, or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat or which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.⁶

Unfortunately, the Army policy and DoD rule are not identical and the Army policy is not nested in the Defense rule. The RAND report “Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women” confirmed significant differences in interpretation resulting from ill-defined and obsolete terms resulting from changes in the context due to the ongoing wars, and disparity from differing DoD and Army definitions of identical terms.⁷ Additionally, the researcher noted shortcomings in Army policy verbiage not identified in the RAND report.

The RAND report focused on individual verbiage contained in both the policy and rule themselves, as well as the individual explanations of key terminology such as ground combat and collocate. The researcher will focus first on verbiage unique to this study and not addressed by the RAND policy, then direct policy verbiage that is dissimilar between the two policies, and finally on policy wording definitions where the definitions are no longer clearly defined due to the modernization of Army structure and shift in the nature of warfare away from conventional warfare.

As noted throughout history, words have meaning. In this case, specifically the Army policy words “to serve in” versus the Department of Defense policy’s “to be assigned to” have been examined. The Department of Defense defines command

relationships using terms such as assigned, attached, operational control (OPCON), and tactical control (TACON), among others.⁸ The command relationship is used to determine the placement of units or personnel, serves as an indicator of permanence or duration of presence, and dictates command, tasking, and administrative authority and support relationships to the unit or personnel.⁹ The selected wording appears similar except when examined through the lens of joint doctrine.

There is no command relationship defined as “to serve in” even though the terminology is suggestive of working, operating, or performing in a specific job there is no specific guideline identified. To the contrary, the defense policy’s verb selection is “to be assigned to” which is defined by the military services as the relatively permanent placement of a person in a military unit or organization where the person performs functions for the unit and the unit provides support and administrative control to person.¹⁰ Therefore, the Army policy controls the utilization of female soldiers based on the function they perform and further restricts women from serving in battalion sized units or smaller units with routine missions to engage in direct combat. The job restrictions are demonstrated by the Army’s practice of barring women from accession in infantry, armor, Special Forces, and selected field artillery occupations.¹¹ The unit restrictions are determined using the DCPC coding that will be examined shortly. The DoD policy limits positioning women below brigade level into specific units based on potential for ground combat. Therefore, their methodology limits only the units to which women are assigned, not the jobs they can hold.

The second significant difference between the two policies is in the description of the type of mission performed by a unit. The OSD memorandum restricts women from

assignments to units whose *primary* mission is direct combat. Aspin's memorandum does not define the primary, however, a general interpretation is that primary means most important or basic.¹² The DA policy uses the term *routine* mission to describe the restricted units. It further defines routine as "a regular course of procedure."¹³ The RAND report discussed the difference between the definition of routine and primary in great detail concluding that the word *routine* is more restrictive than the word *primary* because unit missions change and adapt to the environment.¹⁴ The report further postulated that units could adopt "a routine mission of self-defense which would likely close to women a large proportion of the deployed support units and even potentially all units" if the Army definition of ground combat continued to include the phrase "repelling the enemy assault."¹⁵ The researcher agrees in part that routine missions may change often depending on the evolution of tactics, techniques, and procedures used in the wartime environment while the unit's primary mission remains unchanged. The RAND research did not account for the Army migration to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process in order to facilitate a more responsive and ready force.

Routine is a regular course or procedure as indicated by the Army definition of the word. However, RAND's determination, that self-defense will become such a common practice among support units that it must be considered routine, demands the establishment of a rubric to determine if an action is routine. There is no standard or guide established to determine when an action becomes routine, part of the regular course of action. The term *routine* is not as restrictive as suggested by RAND. The determination is simply more subjective due to the varied circumstances of the full spectrum battlefield. As

indicated, *routine* missions flex based on the environment, so to, do the *primary* missions of units.

The Army's shift to be an expeditionary Army is supported by the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process which is a system to provide demand and event based, adaptable, trained and equipped troops and units for full spectrum operations.¹⁶ Under ARFORGEN, units designated as deployment expeditionary force (DEF) units train for missions with known operational requirements using a directed mission essential task list (DMETL) which focus to support the theater mission and METL.¹⁷ Once units are trained and resourced they are available to deploy in support of global missions. The other path of units in the ARFORGEN model is as a contingency expeditionary force (CEF) unit. CEF units are not synchronized against a specific, known enemy and therefore they train for proficiency of the unit's core METLs (CMETL) and to support the theater METLs using established contingency plans (CONPLANS) and training events.¹⁸ Recently, the Army approved standardized Core Mission Essential Task Lists (CMETL) for all like units (brigade and above).¹⁹ CEF units may move through the ARFORGEN cycle without being deployed or, if necessary, they can be converted to a DEF, thus allowing the Army the flexibility to focus resources where and when they are operationally needed. The RAND report indicated that primary mission is reflected by the doctrine of a unit and that it must change to reflect a direct combat mission in order to close a unit to women.²⁰ However, the standardized CMETLs identify two types of missions, doctrinal missions stated only as nouns like offense, defense, stability operations, etc., and, core mission, which are statements that identify a specific purpose and actions for each unit type.²¹ The researcher concluded that the doctrinally defined

mission, that mission identified by the unit's Task Organization and Equipment (TO&E) documents, may not accurately reflect the mission of a DEF unit and should no longer be used to determine if the primary mission of a unit is direct combat.

One of the most researched incongruities between the policies was the definition of direct combat. It is important to note that neither policy restricts women from participating in ground combat; rather the policies restrict women from positions generally identified as combat arms jobs.²² Both the Army and DoD definitions for ground combat were provided in Chapter Two and are summarized here. Both definitions generally stated ground combat or direct combat is engaging an enemy in battle with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire with a high probability of contact with hostile personnel. Beyond this point in the definition both DoD and Army definitions diverge and introduce murky and obsolete language.

The Army definition of ground combat continues, and includes the words "the high potential for capture" and that ground combat "includes closing with [engaging in battle] the enemy to destroy, capture, or repel his attack."²³ This is noteworthy in light of Guttormsen's testimonial, "When we go out of the wire... everyone runs the same risk of an IED ambush or small arms ambush"²⁴ The author's determined that more than half of all Army casualties resulting in death were caused by an explosive device, and Botters observed that the battlefield is anywhere that the enemy chooses. U.S. troops showed tactical superiority in the 1990 conventional Gulf War and during other operations that ensued prior to and into the early years of OIF. Army doctrine reiterated that the enemy will avoid fighting their opponents in their areas of strength.²⁵ Therefore to gain an

asymmetric advantage over the U.S. Army the insurgents moved away from large scale attacks toward successfully using IEDs to inflict casualties without exposing themselves to dangerous head to head confrontation. Further, the “typical goal of the ambush force is the death or capture of all enemy personnel located within the kill zone.”²⁶ However, is it the enemy’s intent to capture soldiers, not to just kill them? Army tactics dictate defeating an ambushing force by maneuvering the unit out of the kill zone, usually by closing with the hostile force. Yet, as previously noted, there may not be an enemy to close with. By combining the preferred method of attack, an ambush surprising the enemy, with current technology and procedures used by insurgents (i.e. unmanned IEDs), the result is that U.S. forces defending against insurgent ambushes may not be under significant risk of capture and may not be able to close with and destroy or capture the enemy because the enemy will not be seen.

A return to the DoD definition of ground combat revealed the problem of outmoded verbiage that resulted from a shift away from conventional warfare to irregular and urban warfare. The DoD ground combat definition uses the terms *forward* and *well-forward* to describe the location of ground combat on the battlefield. As noted in the RAND report, positional terms such as *well-forward* and *collocate* do not hold the same significance on the modern battlefield as when they were originally posed. In the 1990s and into the millennium, commanders and staffs used spatial references like deep, close, and rear areas to describe the operations area.²⁷ Using these conceptual references one could easily determine where “forward” or “well-forward” were on the battlefield in proximity to the enemy.

In 2008, the Army operations doctrine changed in order to address military operations in an “era of persistent conflict. A period of protracted confrontation amongst state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.”²⁸ To that end, the contiguous terms were completely removed from the revised manual.²⁹ Under the new doctrine commanders control their forces in their area of the battlefield using descriptive concept of operations designed to guarantee effective unity of effort to defeat the enemy. Operational concepts are often described using terms like decisive, shaping, and operation, or supporting and main effort.³⁰ Therefore, the term *well-forward* does not have a battlefield reference point and is now obsolete.

Finally, in addition to restricting women from assignments in units with a routine mission to engage in direct combat, the Army policy introduces another level of restriction by preventing women from serving in units “which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.”³¹ The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) rule does not direct any such restriction, however, among other things; it authorizes the individual services to further restrict assignment based on physical collocation with ground combat units.

The meaning and understanding of the word collocate is the source of some further controversy in understanding the letter of the DA assignment policy. The Army considers that collocation occurs when the position (e.g. liaison or staff officer) or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit whose mission is direct combat.³² However, it is important to note two things. The Army definition of collocation was established in the era of conventional warfare which only accounts for a

portion of the expected range of operations considered in full spectrum warfare today. Secondly, the terms *routinely* and *remain* are vague and not further defined in Army or Joint doctrine making it difficult to validate compliance.

RAND confounded the definition of collocation by suggesting multiple interpretation of collocation among various military groups familiar with modern Army operations. RAND researchers pointed out that senior military interviewees in the RAND study defined collocate as “to place two or more units in close proximity so as to share common facilities” in contrast to other interviewees who defined the term as to imply “a high level of interaction and interdependency between units, rather than just physical proximity.”³³ The former was dubbed “colocate” and the later term “collocate” by investigators analyzing the Army assignment policy. RAND introduced the dictionary interpretation of the verb as “to ‘place in the proper order’ or ‘to occur in conjunction with something,’ suggesting that neither could perform its mission without the other.”³⁴ None of these definitions were approved by either the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or by the Department of the Army.

Regardless of how collocate is defined, statements by leaders like infantry commander Botters and leaders who interacted with the *Lioness* Team, suggested that there is not even an intuitive understanding among leaders about where, when, and how women are authorized to serve in the Army.³⁵ This is further supported by Field and Nagl’s observation that “In times of national emergency, traditional restrictions on gender roles tend to be eased.”³⁶ The result is that if collocation is not clearly defined as part of the military vernacular and as a concept that can be applied in all aspects of full spectrum warfare, it will never be universally applied or enforced by Army leaders.

The “Spirit” of the Policy

Determining the purpose or spirit of the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* grew in importance in light of the increasingly perplexing application of the letter of both the OSD and the Army assignment policies. The spirit of the policy is important because, in the absence of current definitive guidance, the Army could still comply with the understood purpose and achieve the desired endstate.

Research about the spirit of the policy was included in RANDs report which stated “our research suggests that the policy objectives are not clear.”³⁷ Researchers identified a variety of arguments from popular news media, as well as congressional statements that supported a generalized conclusion that the potential purpose for the policy was to protect women, alongside other claims that the policy was in place to protect military men and women from injury or distraction.³⁸ The proclamations supported the wide variety of policy objectives RAND identified as the potential moral basis for maintaining any specialized women’s assignment policy.³⁹ Many of the concerns collected in the RAND study were echoed by Army Command and General Staff College students attending a public presentation of the ongoing research for this thesis.⁴⁰ This supports both RANDs conclusion that the objective of the policy is not immediately clear that their further determination of potential policy objectives is valid.

Throughout a series of interviews with congressional personnel, senior OSD officials, and Army soldiers RAND researchers identified more than ten perceived policy objectives.⁴¹ The top responses that were further assessed by RAND and included:⁴²

Maximize operational effectiveness of military

Maximize flexibility in assigning people

Exclude women from ground combat occupations/units

Maintaining current career opportunities for women

Open new career opportunities for women

Protect male service members from physical harm

Protect female service members from physical harm

Simplify unit leadership by limiting male-female interaction

Act of compromise.

Exclude women from occupations requiring considerable physical strength⁴³

The RAND surveyors analyzed the responses by interviewing five Joint Service, OSD staff, and six senior Army members to determine their opinions concerning the purpose of a combat exclusion policy and their perception of whether or not the specified purpose was reflected in the current assignment policy.⁴⁴ The survey results overwhelmingly showed that the six senior Army staff members strongly agreed or agreed that the desired purpose of any assignment policy was to maximize the operational effectiveness of the military, followed closely by maximizing flexibility in assigning people.⁴⁵ However, the analysis showed that most of the responses about the intent of the current assignment policy pointed to the objective to “provide career opportunities for women” and to “maximize operational effectiveness.”⁴⁶ Yet, the responses were distributed between strongly agree down to disagree. The most concentrated agreement responses identified the purpose of the current policy was to “exclude women from ground combat occupations and units.” The RAND study concluded that “Senior Army, OSD, and JS personnel fairly consistently portrayed the objectives of an ideal policy.”⁴⁷

As noted above, both Army and OSD respondents agreed that the current policy was in place to prevent women from serving in ground combat occupations and units. Further, Army staff uniformly indicated the desired purpose of any assignment policy was to maximize operational effectiveness of the military and also to provide flexibility in assigning people. There is evidence to suggest that each of these individual objectives is part of the overall intent of the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*.⁴⁸

In support of the perceived purpose of the Army Policy for the Assignment of Women, that the policy was established to prevent women from serving in ground combat occupations and units, history provides ample information to suggest that this is a true objective of the policy. First, prior to the establishment of the WAAC, women had generally only served the military in medical specialties and other non-combatant jobs such as serving as a seamstress. Second, Morden admitted in her historical accounting that “American social customs and the physiological differences between men and women led to Congress' expectation that women be noncombatants.”⁴⁹ Decades old expectations were reflected by current congressional delegates, as indicated by Botters in his notation that Congress made the *Defense Combat Exclusion Policy* a statute in 2006.⁵⁰ Further, Congress directed the SECDEF to notify them of any proposed changes to units and assignments where women can be assigned.⁵¹ This shows continued congressional intent, bridging the 1948 exclusion of women from combat and the 1994 OSD policy which remained effective in 2006. Lastly, survey results contained in the *Women in Combat Compendium* showed that the oldest age group of respondents opposed the idea of women serving in combat, thus showing that the social values of the U.S. citizenry did not support women as combatants, although more recent polls provide opposing results

supporting women as combatants among the primarily younger demographic.⁵² By adding these points of information, it is clear that at least a portion of the intent of the policy was to keep women out of combat jobs and units.

The second and third perceived and desired purposes of a military assignment policy were to create a policy that both maximized the operational effectiveness of the military and provided commanders with flexibility in assigning people. Historians noted that during WWII:

the national pool of qualified male draftees dwindled, it became clear that for every woman recruited, one less man had to be drafted. Women volunteers came to be viewed not just as a source of women's skills, but as a valuable source of high-quality personnel to meet overall manpower requirements for the massive military buildup.⁵³

Chapter 1 explained the intent of using women to augment the Army which was to free the available pool of men to fill combat jobs.⁵⁴ History shows the incremental changes that integrated women across the Army. Driving each incremental change was the military need to fill manpower shortages with qualified people. In 1946, it was the Army commanders who requested that congress make the WAAC into a permanent part of the Regular Army.⁵⁵ Since the end of the WAC the Army recruited males and females to fill rolls necessary to meet the manpower needs of the massive force. A dilemma developed when the Army moved to become an expeditionary organization. As reported in the Washington Times, a briefing portrayed the Army as in a bind.⁵⁶ By collocating Forward Support Companies with BCTs, and keeping the FSCs as P1 units the Army was facing a potential long-term challenge because the pool of male recruits was too small to sustain the force.⁵⁷ The article further indicated that the Army entertained the option to place the FSCs outside of the BCT on an organizational chart, bypassing the need to code

the FSCs as P1 units.⁵⁸ Doctrinally, following the transformation to the current force, FSCs are assigned to the Brigade Support Battalion and operationally controlled by the BCTs that they support.⁵⁹ Additionally, the same Army doctrine that delineates the Army assignment policy also states that “once properly assigned, female soldiers are subject to the same utilization policies as their male counterparts. In event of hostilities, female soldiers will remain with their assigned units and continue to perform their assigned duties.”⁶⁰ The comparison of the historical actions and current doctrine reveals that the purpose of Army doctrine is to provide commanders with maximum flexibility in assigning personnel while maintaining peak operational effectiveness in the force.

The Direct Combat Position Code

The Direct Combat Position Code (DCPC) system is the Army’s procedure for restricting women from job specialties and unit positions identified by the Army and OSD exclusion policies.⁶¹ Of specific importance to this thesis is the process that the force designers use to determine which positions will be closed to women and the resulting effectiveness of the coding when units are deployed to combat in Iraq.

The Direct Combat Position Code System

AR 600-13 prescribes the implementation of the Army women’s assignment policy and contains a decision matrix for force designers to use to consistently apply the DCPC to all positions in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).⁶² The regulation also stated that once women were properly assigned they could be used in accordance with the same utilization policies as their male counterparts.⁶³ Colonel Alberto of the Army G-1 office clarified there was a difference between ‘assignment’ and

‘utilization’ and reiterated the regulation about proper assignment, utilization, and that in the event of hostilities; women soldiers would remain and fight with their units.⁶⁴

Alberto cited the three highly publicized examples where all of the actions occurred within the established standards:

like the Lioness Teams that go out with IN [infantry] and Marine patrols to LNO [be a liaison]/ search Iraqi and Afghani women and children, and Medic SPC [specialist] Monica Brown and MP[military police] SGT [sergeant] Lee Ann Hester, both winning the Silver Star for bravery in combat during ambushes. They were conducting non- combat missions, had to react to unplanned hostilities and had to rely on their training to survive and save the lives of their fellow Soldiers. They were not on an offensive routine combat mission to seek, close with and destroy the enemy.⁶⁵

Alberto’s comments show three separate types of utilization. First, team *Lioness*, was an ad hoc team of women used to fill a specific need within a command. RANDs research uncovered the HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron doctrine which indicated that “when checkpoints are used in stability and support operations, female service members should be used to search females.”⁶⁶ In an HBCT, women soldiers would have to be requested from external units because HBCTs do not have women assigned. The study further indicated that filling the ad hoc missions depleted unit end strength because the pool of women was limited and other soldiers needed to fill in the gaps caused by the self-generated shortage of soldiers in supporting MOS.⁶⁷ It was a common occurrence for women to be assigned special duties on Female Search Teams and at Checkpoints, outside of their regularly military occupational skills, in support of necessary missions.⁶⁸

In the case of the Silver Star recipient, Specialist Brown, she was tasked to fill a dual need within a combat unit. “In Afghanistan as well as Iraq, female soldiers are often tasked to work in all-male combat units -- not only for their skills but also for the culturally sensitive role of providing medical treatment for local women, as well as

searching them and otherwise interacting with them.”⁶⁹ Brown was tasked to fill the needs of a battalion in the brigade to which she was assigned.

Finally, Army Military Police Sergeant Hester received a Silver Star after defending against an insurgent ambush in Iraq. Sergeant Hester was performing her assigned and doctrinal mission as an MP conducting a route security mission. According to the Army doctrine MPs and maneuver companies are both acceptable unit types to provide support for route security. Field and Nagl conducted a comparison of an MP unit and mechanized infantry unit who provided similar tasks in support of operations in Kosovo.⁷⁰ The authors noted that in a conventional war the tasks would be unique, but in stability operations there was not a distinct difference in support provided.⁷¹ Further, nearly every incident requiring law enforcement required an MP response.⁷²

The Center for Military Readiness (CMR) cited additional examples of women serving in the combat zones in or alongside of combat arms units.⁷³ Most questionable on the list of apparent violations was the case of 170 females who deployed while assigned to an Indiana National Guard Unit in 2008.⁷⁴ The CMR commentator noted that the unit used the deployment manning document (DMD) to cross-level soldiers in the battalion. Army Force Manager Tim Meredith confirmed that DMDs are used to cross level troops in support of directed missions.⁷⁵ Meredith further explained that all Army manning documents including, TOEs and Table of Distribution of Allowances (TDAs), are vetted using the DCPC process in order to comply with the Army policy.⁷⁶

The Effect of DCPC in OIF

The researcher generated statistics from an analysis of casualty information generated by the program analyst Rice from the Defense Manpower Data Center for the

OIF Theater. The study included all reported fatalities originating in Iraq from 19 March 2003 to 28 March 2009.⁷⁷ The research purpose of the analysis was to determine the effect of the DCPC system as applied in the modern battlefield environment.

Figure 1 shows the comparison of the quantity of male casualties versus the quantity of female casualties' in the aggregate total, hostile, and non-hostile categories. Of importance is the observation that male soldiers accounted for the majority of the 3093 casualties, between 95 and 98 percent, in each category. It is also important to recognize that approximately 80 percent of casualties are the result of hostile actions. The researcher recognized that the aggregate casualty statistics indicate that women contributed only 2.7 percent of the total casualties and only 1.6 percent of hostile casualties.⁷⁸




Figure 1. Gender Comparison of Casualties

The DCPC system serves to funnel women into non-combat arms occupations and units. Figure 2 depicts the comparison of casualties from Army occupations closed to women versus Army coed occupations.⁷⁹ The researcher recognized that 59 percent of the casualties in OIF are from occupations that are closed to women with nearly 70 percent of those casualties being the result of a hostile action.




Figure 2. Comparison of P1 and P2 Casualties from OIF

The casualty statistics in Figures 3 show the comparison of the casualties from the P1 designated units and open P2 units. P1 units are closed to female soldiers and therefore even the supporting jobs (i.e. cooks, mechanics, administrative specialists, etc.)

that are not otherwise restricted are still filled by male soldiers. The researcher noted that nearly 30 percent of the total casualties from OIF were not from closed units, and, while not represented here, nearly one-fourth of the casualties came from soldiers who worked in coed occupations and were assigned to P2 units.




Figure 3. Comparison of P1 and P2 Units

Given that the DCPC code keeps women out of P1 units and occupations the researcher compare the casualty rate between males and females properly assigned to coed units and in coed jobs. The researcher analyzed a September 2008 snapshot-in-time report of deployed soldiers provided by Dillaber.⁸⁰ Her analysis determined that women made up approximately 10 percent of the deployed force. The same report also indicated that women made up approximately 11 percent of the ever deployed force ratio.⁸¹ Figure 4 is a gender comparison of casualty rates among soldiers assigned to coed units and in

coed jobs. It shows that women make up 10.7 percent of the fatalities when compare when compared to the same male peer group.




Figure 4. Gender Comparison of Casualties Assigned to Gender Neutral Occupations and in P2 Units

Summary

In summary, the Direct Combat Position Code (DCPC) system is the Army's procedure for restricting women from job specialties and unit positions identified by the Army and OSD exclusion policies.⁸² Force designers use the established DCPC to classify and restrict certain combat arms jobs and units from being filled by women soldiers. The DCPC system is also used to classify jobs in units like mobile training teams where the force structure is determined by TDAs instead of MTOEs. The result of the implemented coding systems is that women fill non-combat arms jobs in non-combat

arms units. In Iraq, the casualty figures show that female fatalities account for less than 3 percent of the total casualties, but over 10 percent of the fatalities when compared to their similarly assigned male peers in P2 occupations. The report from Dillaber indicated that women made up approximately 10 percent of the currently deployed force and 11 percent of the force that has ever deployed.

21st Century Security Environment and the Operational Army

The Army structure and the security environment in which the Army focuses for training and doctrinal development both evolved significantly over the past decade. The operating environment is not new; however, the focus of the majority of troops shifted from a focus on conventional warfare fought on a contiguous (formerly termed “linear”) battlefield to focusing on stability operations and counterinsurgency operations throughout a noncontiguous area of operations in an era of persistent conflict.⁸³ The force converted from a forward located, conventional war focused, division-based organization into a full spectrum, brigade-centric, expeditionary force.⁸⁴ The focus of this data analysis was to determine what the characteristics of the security environment were and how the Army adapted to those environmental changes.

The Modern Security Environment: The Enemy and the Battlefield

The modern security environment and how the enemy fights is constantly evolving, introducing new threats as old threats are countered, modernizing as new and inexpensive technology floods world markets, and reorienting towards emerging adversaries while remaining vigilant against old enemies. The characteristics of the

modern battlefield and the enemy must be defined in order to determine its affect on the U.S. force, doctrine, and current policy application.⁸⁵

Irregular

The first characteristic of the modern battlefield is that the nature of warfare shifted from so called limited, conventional, regular warfare to irregular warfare (IW). Similar to Napoleonic warfare, traditional warfare steered the Army to focus on rapid and decisive military victories over another military force in order to influence political leaders.⁸⁶ In contrast, IW is a struggle to gain "legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations."⁸⁷ Training and Doctrine Command Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats analyzed the current environment and concluded that the adversary does not adhere to the traditionally accepted rule set that was customarily honored in conflicts between state sponsored armies.⁸⁸ TRISA-T asserted that the "current war bears little resemblance to the wars that have shaped U.S. Army doctrine . . ."⁸⁹ This shift influenced how leaders approach IW.

The IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC) recognized that IW, formerly termed "low-intensity conflict," favors indirect and asymmetric approaches over traditional military capabilities and that IW included "insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism."⁹⁰ All wars contain a mixture of regular and irregular warfare; however, wars are classified by the types of operations that are the focus of the preponderance of the force.⁹¹ The Department of Defense recognized the shift away from traditional operations to IW and the need to reorient the force to enable future commanders to address the IW threats.⁹²

In summary, IW is the first characteristic of the modern security environment. Adversaries adjusted their means to attack and influence the diplomatic, social, military, and economic elements of national power in order to achieve their desired ends. The following section introduces the asymmetric approach as the preferred means to achieve the effects in the elements of national power.

Asymmetric

The way that the adversary most likely will prosecute the long-war established the second characteristic of the 21st century security environment, with an asymmetric means. IW JOC included indirect and asymmetric approaches as part of irregular warfare, not without reason, when they recognized that:

Faced with the conventional warfighting capacity of the United States, our adversaries will likely choose to fight using a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, catastrophic, and traditional capabilities as a way to achieve their strategic objectives. The strategy of our adversaries will be to subvert, attrite, and exhaust us rather than defeat us militarily. They will seek to undermine and erode the national power, influence, and will of the United States and its strategic partners.⁹³

Threat analysts noted that asymmetric tactics and strategies that were successful against the U.S. because they did not require superior military capabilities; rather, they identified and exploited the nation's vulnerabilities.⁹⁴ In essence the adversary did not need to meet U.S. forces in head-to-head battle because they could attack "with unconventional, irregular and blended forces" to gain success across the entire spectrum of national power (political, social, informational, or military).⁹⁵ By attacking the U.S. on their terms, the enemy tries "try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support."⁹⁶

The Army doctrine counterinsurgency cited multiple historical examples of why current and future opponents would pursue asymmetric approaches to warfare. The battles in Panama and Iraq showcased American strength and advantage in fires and technical surveillance, while battles in Somalia and current day Iraq showed the offset of U.S. advantages in fires relegated by adversaries operating in urban areas close to civilians.⁹⁷ The Army's doctrinal field manual *Improvised Explosive Device Defeat* contains a brief and telling history of incidences where terrorists successfully attacked the U.S., including military barracks, navy ships, international flights, and commercial centers with explosive devices.⁹⁸ Clearly, the IED is a key weapon in the asymmetric arsenal of current and future adversaries.⁹⁹

Historical displays of asymmetric power projected by the use of IEDs are supported by current casualty statistics. Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the recorded reason for hostile and non-hostile fatalities in OIF. The bar graph shows that the extreme majority of fatalities (54.4 percent) were caused by explosive devices. The second leading cause of death was gunshot wounds which claimed approximately 16 percent of the total casualties. The "Not Reported" causes were identified by the researcher and consisted of all fatalities that did not have an identified cause in the original casualty reports. The "Other" category is a combination of fatalities due to: burns/smoke inhalation, drowning, drug or alcohol overdose, electrocution, fall or jumps, and physical training and exercise which were reported separately and accounted for a negligible part of the population that the researcher consolidated the category. Likewise, the medical category is a consolidation of all reported cancer, heart related, and stroke related deaths.




Figure 5. Comparison of Casualty Reasons

With the prevalent use of IEDs throughout the OE it is important to remember the asymmetric approach to IW includes actions to attack perceived weakness which will in turn erode public support for the U.S. military and government, and coalition partners. The beheading of American freelance, telecommunications contractor Nick Berg in Iraq and the resulting news articles is one example of an action perpetrated to grind down public support.¹⁰⁰ In a conventional war Berg would have been considered a civilian on the battlefield, however, in the growing insurgency he was the target of a violent response to U.S. abuse of Iraqi captives in the Bagdad Abu Ghraib prison.¹⁰¹ The posted video included a statement which said:

For the mothers and wives of American soldiers, we tell you that we offered the U.S. administration to exchange this hostage for some of the detainees in Abu Ghraib, and they refused. Coffins will be arriving to you one after the other, slaughtered just like this.¹⁰²

The result of the combined execution, video publication, and verbal statement of the execution rippled across the domains of national power. The resulting effects included: 1) the diplomatic effect included increased concern by the American public which showed eroding support for the political objective and statements against the government by grieving family members which shows the reach into the information arena, and 2) increased Army leadership fear of backlash for the prison incident which touched the military arm of national power.¹⁰³ Captured Zarqawi documents (Zarqawi claimed responsibility for multiple beheadings) included instructions to his supporters to target U.S. service women.¹⁰⁴ At that time, it was widely believed that the U.S. population was not prepared to see women in combat zones, although since that time surveys have shown otherwise.¹⁰⁵

In summary, the second characteristic of the modern battlefield is that American forces are challenged by an adversary using an asymmetric approach to warfare.¹⁰⁶ In order to counter U.S. strengths like fires and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities, the enemy fights in urban terrain and from among the population.¹⁰⁷ Finally, the opponent avoids disadvantageous head-to-head confrontation by countering U.S. military strength with IEDs attacks and by attacking all of the areas of national power instead of just focusing on the military forces.¹⁰⁸

Noncontiguous Operations Area

The final characteristic of the modern battlefield is that it is a noncontiguous area of operations. The revised Army manual, *Operations*, recorded the obvious changes stating:

The nature of modern land operations has changed in geography and time. In general, operations have become increasingly distributed in space while more simultaneous in time. At the tactical and operational levels, subordinate units routinely operate in noncontiguous areas of operations. This contrasts sharply with the contiguous and hierarchical arrangement of land forces in operations prevalent in the past.¹⁰⁹

The manual further rescinded the outmoded terms linear and nonlinear previously used to describe force arrays in favor of the terms noncontiguous, contiguous, and unassigned areas of operation (AO).¹¹⁰ Likewise, linear battlefield descriptive terms: deep, close, and rear were also removed from the current Army lexicon.¹¹¹ “Noncontiguous” AOs pose new and unique challenges for conventional forces because they are normally characterized by a 360-degree boundary as opposed to operating with friendly units at the rear and flanks, and the enemy to the front.¹¹²

As indicated, forces operating on a noncontiguous battlefield operate increasingly spread across the Area of Operations (AO).¹¹³ This is possible because joint capabilities give commanders added means to achieve mutual support over extended distances.¹¹⁴ The noncontiguous aspect of operations means that units and soldiers will potentially be employed in remote, hostile areas, surrounded by the enemy all of the time.¹¹⁵ Recall, Botters claimed that “the battlefield is wherever the enemy is found.”¹¹⁶ The war in Afghanistan is being prosecuted in terrain comparable in size to Texas, with extremely limited infrastructure, and over diverse terrain ranging from mountain ranges to deserts, and with tribes with combatants and non-combatants interspersed across the country an

into neighboring safe havens.¹¹⁷ This collection of challenges presents unique challenges to the contingent of deployed forces.

Force Modernization

The characteristics of the 21st century security environment presented challenges that the conventional forces were not trained or organized to effectively address. In fact, the 2005 National Security Strategy expressed, “our experiences in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our military forces to contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.”¹¹⁸ The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2006) addressed shifting DoD capabilities in order to address the rising security challenges which included both steady-state long-term operations and the ability to surge troops to combat long-war IW campaigns.¹¹⁹ The U.S. Army and Marine Corps leaders noted that U.S. general purpose forces were well equipped and trained to execute conventional warfare, however, the QDR directed leaders to rebalance the conventional forces to improve their adaptability and capability to operate in hostile IW environments.¹²⁰ The next section addresses the U.S. Army adaptations in organization, training, and doctrine that the Army made in order to support the National Security Strategy, meet directed QDR objectives, and to enable forces to meet IW challenges.¹²¹

Effects of IW on the Army

IW was first characteristic of the modern security environment. The key feature of the IW environment was the opponent’s willingness to carry out warfare across the spectrum of national power versus a reliance solely on military confrontation.¹²² The following case studies showcase the cause and effect relationship of how the opponent

has attacked or could attack across the political and diplomatic, information or social, military, and economic elements of power and how the Army adjusted to counter the effects of IW.

The first example of attack is from the political or diplomatic lines of operation. Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan established shadow governments that provided basic services to the people. The effect of the shadow government was to show that the legitimate government was incapable of providing those services, even if the Insurgents were responsible for preventing the legitimate government from providing the services.¹²³ In order to counter the shadow government the U.S. Army worked to establish an enduring presence within and near the populated areas with the creation of Joint Security Stations (JSS), manned by national military personnel and coalition forces, and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) used to support forward based security operations and counterinsurgency missions. Further, the coalition established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, and later in Iraq, manned by military personnel, diplomats, and experts with the common purpose to empower local governments to effectively govern the people.¹²⁴

It was shown above that the information, especially when it is disseminated using the mass-media can form a devastating affect when left unchecked. In the Iraqi culture it is not permitted for males to touch females.¹²⁵ However, in 2005 a female suicide bomber successfully detonated near a group of U.S. soldiers. As a result of incidences like this, Female Search Teams like the *Lioness* team in Iraq were formed after leaders recognized the need to prevent smuggling of weapons and IED parts.¹²⁶

Military force is always a part of war, conventional or any other type of warfare. Adversaries offset U.S. and coalition military strengths by successfully using explosives to attack U.S. forces with a low risk to themselves. The third case demonstrates the insurgent use of IEDs to attack the better equipped opponent: U.S. forces. IEDs are not a new technology in asymmetric warfare. They were introduced by Hezbollah in well structured ambushes and later by Afghans against the Soviets.¹²⁷ In Iraq insurgents and extremists extensively used IEDs and vehicle borne IEDs to attack U.S. soldiers and equipment.¹²⁸ “Insurgents had also learned how to make crude shaped-charges to attack U.S. armored and other vehicles.”¹²⁹

Up-armored vehicles existed in the Army’s inventory prior to the invasion of Iraq. However, small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and IED attacks pressed the Army to raise the priority and to shorten production schedules in order to provide the vehicle kits to soldiers in harm’s way.¹³⁰ In 2005 Army leaders recognized the devastating effects of IEDs which were so “successful that the U.S. announced that even up-armored Humvees were unsafe in high threat areas, and were being replaced with heavily armored 5-ton “gun trucks.”¹³¹ Further, the Army continued to upgrade protection and prevention measures and equipment such as body armor and IED remote controlled detonation jamming technology. Each time the U.S. adapted equipment or developed counter measures, the insurgents developed new defeat mechanisms for those countermeasures.¹³² Fighting an irregular war requires continued evolution among the warfighters because as the world changes so must the Army.¹³³

The final ways attacked in the IW spectrum were the economic elements of national power. The insurgency used their IED attack capability to tie down manpower

and equipment, disrupt operations, and disrupt economic and aid activity.¹³⁴ Insurgents carried out attacks on Iraqi oil facilities which resulted in the drop in oil production.¹³⁵ The attacks cost Iraq over \$11 billion that directly impacted the government's ability to operate because 94 percent of their income came from oil exports.¹³⁶ In order to effectively improve security and thus restore the Iraqi economic strengths multiple actions were taken by the Iraqi government and Coalition forces. The Iraqi government countered insurgent propaganda about the Iraqi natural resources, while U.S. armed, tribal-based councils improved regional security, and there was an increase in the size and capability of American trained Iraqi security forces. Finally, Iraqi Oil Ministry spokesman Assim Jihad called out the American surge strategy as a significant act resulting in improved security of the Oil industry, and therefore the country's economy.¹³⁷

The Effects of Asymmetric Approach to Warfare and the Noncontiguous Battlefield

The IW fight is about influencing the target population, not winning the battle by using superior technology.¹³⁸ The adversary chose to use asymmetric methods to attack the spectrum of national power in order to wield influence over the objective population. The defining characteristics of the modern security environment are the irregular warfare struggle, fought with an asymmetric approach in a noncontiguous AO. Many of these asymmetric approaches were identified in the previous section, however, the approaches in combination with the noncontiguous nature of the modern battlefield further influenced how organization, training, tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the Army today.

Three defining characteristics of the asymmetric approach used in this period of persistent warfare were: (1) “the opponents offset America’s fires and surveillance advantages by operating close to civilians,” (2) “the insurgents can be expected to conduct ambushes, guerrilla attacks, and use a large array of explosive devices,” and (3) “opponents will attempt to counter U.S. strengths by attacking or exploiting perceived weaknesses.”¹³⁹ The defining characteristics of the noncontiguous area of operations include: (1) joint capabilities enable units to be placed beyond supporting distance or supporting range at some risk to soldiers, and (2) the operational area normally has a 360-degree boundary with higher headquarters responsible for the intra-areas between noncontiguous areas.¹⁴⁰ These defining characteristics caused a cascade of adaptations to the Army structure, employment, and force-enabling training.

In 2003, the Army initiated the first changes, converting the Army structure into an expeditionary force. As noted in Chapter 2 and periodically throughout Chapter 4, this is a period of persistent conflict that could last for decades.¹⁴¹ General Casey claimed that the U.S. Army, the best led, trained, and equipped Army in the world, was unbalanced after years of effects resulting from the high operations tempo, insufficient recovery time, and focused counterinsurgency training which degraded conventional capabilities and rapidly consumed unit readiness.¹⁴²

Army leaders recognized that some of the assumptions and processes developed to in the Cold War era for an “Army with a ‘window of opportunity’” were ineffective in the GWOT.¹⁴³ Starting in 2003 the Army began reorganizing its forces in order to provide tailored combat power that could operate effectively as part of the Joint forces, across the full spectrum of battle.¹⁴⁴

Brigades are the principal tactical units for conducting operations. To provide higher echelon command and control, the Army fields a mix of tactical and operational headquarters able to function as land force, joint, multinational, and Service component command headquarters. The headquarters mix is not a rigid hierarchy and does not require a standard array of forces. Each headquarters provides a menu of capabilities to best match the combatant commander's requirements.¹⁴⁵

This was the most significant force transformation in the past 50 years, transforming from a 10 active duty division force to an expeditionary, 48 BCT force in order to meet the security concerns in an era of persistent conflict.¹⁴⁶ The purpose of the change in force structure was to address the long-term demand for operational forces that were trained, equipped, and ready to meet the needs of any conflict.¹⁴⁷

The adjustment to the fighting force also generated a realignment of supporting forces. "Sustainment brigades consolidated selected functions previously performed by the corps and division support commands and area support groups into a single operational echelon."¹⁴⁸ The sustainment brigades' subordinate units included modular Combat Sustainment Support Battalions which organized to provide further support and distribution functions including "delivering supplies, materiel, equipment, and personnel over the theater ground distribution network from theater base to BCTs and forward distribution points . . ."¹⁴⁹

The second adaptation to the security challenges was the establishment and use of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), Joint Security Stations (JSS), and combat outposts (COP). GWOT triggered the Army to reexamine sustainment and platforms necessary to support the stability operations in OIF and OEF.¹⁵⁰ Radzikowski recognized that FOBs are self-managed, secure:

logistics and support areas where munitions and supplies are stored, vehicles are maintained or repaired, headquarter detachments are based, mail is received,

medical care is available and facilities such as showers and recreation centers help relieve the stress of deployment and missions ‘outside the wire’.¹⁵¹

Radzikowski emphasized that the focus of a FOB was to conduct combat operations and that in order to do so effectively, “robust logistical systems and facilities must be in place to maximize the maintenance, equipment, and morale. . .”¹⁵²

In a situation update briefing for Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Major General Caldwell IV, explained:

[W]e have realized, to protect the population . . . we the coalition force . . . can’t be living on some big operating base. We need to move our forces off those big operating bases down into the city and be co-located with our Iraqi counterparts, both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police, so that we have a better feel for what’s going on in that neighborhood.¹⁵³

The newest adaptation to how forces were deployed in response to asymmetric threats and in support of stability operations was the Joint Security Stations (JSS). News anchor, Brian Williams, documented in 2007 by recounting his visit and ride-along with Brigadier General Campbell to a JSS:

In an Army that loves its acronyms, the hot new initials are JSS — Joint Security Station. It means that instead of just five big bases, the Army is opening 40 new small bases in neighborhoods, with Americans and Iraqis living and patrolling together, in one building, under the Iraqi flag.

JSS are part of the ongoing security operations in Iraq. FOBs and JSS support tactical operations, but, by far the smallest and most vulnerable dispersion of soldiers is the combat outposts (COP). After JSS are created, troops radiate into the more dangerous areas using COPs.¹⁵⁴ The outposts:

are located in towns and villages miles from forward operating bases. This is where the “door kickers” can live for days before rotating back to a forward operating base [or JSS], conducting anti-terrorist sweeps, presence patrols and other nitty-gritty duties in a counterinsurgency war — all the while risking snipers and improvised explosive devices.¹⁵⁵

The development and use of FOBs, JSS, and COBs enabled the U.S. Army to effectively surge forward U.S. troops to curtail the Iraqi insurgency and give the recognized national government time to become established and allowed U.S. teams to better train Iraqi security forces to respond to and deny insurgent attacks against IW political, social, military, and economic targets.¹⁵⁶

The final adjustments to the operating environment were to equipment, tactics, and training. IEDs are noted to be the most significant threat in both of the current war zones. A public outcry over IED related casualties led the Army to retrofit Humvees with armored plates and ballistic glass in 2005.¹⁵⁷ “The modifications gave the Humvee a higher center of gravity. Not only was the driver in the 2005 rollover not trained on how to handle the more top-heavy vehicle, but many Army drivers were similarly unprepared.”¹⁵⁸ As a result, in 2006, the Army introduced the Humvee Egress Assistance Trainer to show soldiers how to better survive a rollover and exit the vehicles in a safe manner.¹⁵⁹

Prior to operations in OIF it was widely assumed that “because they [women] were not infantry men, or even combat arms soldiers, there would be no need for them to be out there [involved in combat].”¹⁶⁰ However, as shown in 2005 when leaders established the Lioness team, there was a need for women to assist combat arms soldiers in operations including humanitarian assistance, cordon and search, and check point operations where Iraqi women or children interacted with U.S. soldiers.¹⁶¹ The *Lioness* documentary showed the resultant unpreparedness of the Army to meet the need generated in the IW environment and the identical unpreparedness that results when soldiers are not trained.¹⁶² Following her experience with the *Lioness* team Guttermsen

was assigned to the National Training Center (NTC). She acknowledged that currently all women training at NTC are trained to conduct *Lioness* type missions and as members of patrols who conduct all sorts of missions.¹⁶³ The Department of Defense Inspector General conducted an overall audit to determine if U.S. ground forces [Army and Marines] received training necessary to and relevant for forces deploying to Iraq.¹⁶⁴ They found that the services provided realistic, theater inspired training for units deploying in support of OIF.

Summary

In order to answer the question, “How does the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* need to be revised?” the researcher sought to answer five secondary questions: 1) what is the current Army policy for the assignment of female soldiers, 2) why direct combat positions coded, 3) how are direct combat positions coded, 4) What are the characteristics of the modern battlefield, and 5) how does the changing nature of warfare dictate how soldiers are employed in Iraq? In Chapter 4 the researcher analyzed the history of women in the military describe in Chapter 1 and the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. She compared and contrasted Army and OSD policy and reports, generated and analyzed statistics from casualty reports and manning documents, outlined the key characteristics of the current security environment, and established a cause and effect relationship between the adversary’s ends, ways, and means and the U.S. Army reorganization and changes in doctrine, equipment, and training. Summarized here are the results deemed import by the researcher. These determinations were used to draw the conclusions discussed in Chapter 5.

Current Policy Summary

The first area analyzed by the researcher dealt with current policy. The researcher compared the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*, the 1994 OSD Assignment Rule, and major works and reports including the RAND Corporation report *Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women* and the Strategic Studies Institute work *Women in Combat Compendium*.

The researcher compared the Army policy and the OSD rule that confirmed the RAND researcher's conclusion that "there is no shared understanding of the meaning of many words used in the DoD and Army assignment policies. . ."¹⁶⁵ The researcher analyzed key verbiage unique to this thesis, dissimilar verbiage contained in the two policies, and finally verbiage that is now difficult or impossible to define.

Unique wording of each (OSD and Army) policy was assessed for relevance and meaning. The researcher determined that the phrase *to serve in* used in the Army policy is not defined by any command relationship definition. Therefore assignment restrictions are determined through other means that are open to interpretation of the policy.

Second, a comparison of divergent verbiage in the two policies showed a discrepancy between the mission descriptions of *primary* versus *routine*. Research showed that neither adjective maintained relevance. *Primary mission* (used in the DoD policy) loses relevance if a unit receives a directed mission that is different from the doctrinal MTOE mission. Much of the Army policy is difficult to define because the term *routine* is not defined in Army doctrine. Finally, the researcher noted that the Army approved core METLs which defined "doctrinal missions" and "core missions".¹⁶⁶

The third portion of analyzing the policies was a review of word definitions. The researcher reviewed *ground combat* definitions which were spelled out in the OSD policy memorandum and defined differently in the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*. The Army explanation of ground combat addressed both the potential for capture and repelling an enemy assault which may logically be risks faced by all units in the noncontiguous environment. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the DoD definition includes references to special terms like *forward* and *well forward* which cannot be defined in a noncontiguous environment.

Finally, the researcher identified the word *collocate*, which is used to restrict assignments only in the actual Army policy and not in the DoD policy. The researcher identified the Army definition, and two derived definitions from the definitions contained in the RAND study. The researcher determined that if the term *collocate* or *collocation* is not clearly defined in the military vernacular and as a concept is not applicable to full spectrum operations that commanders will never be able to uniformly apply any policies containing the word.

Multiple terms that were not in agreement and which could not be defined in the modern security environment caused the researcher to seek to determine the underlying spirit of the Army assignment policy. The researcher reviewed the RAND survey results of the top responses from the highest echelons for the perceived purpose of the policy. Based on respondent answers consolidated by RAND, the researcher extracted the top three responses that described the perceived purpose for the current policy and the desired assignment policy and examined historical and current discussion, doctrine, and proposed legislation to determine if the responses were supported or contradicted by the

her findings. The researcher determined that all three of the responses of the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* were supported by former and current practice, doctrine, and legislation. The “tri-spirit” of the assignment policy was to prevent women from serving in ground combat occupations and units while maximizing military operational effectiveness, and allowing commanders flexibility when assigning personnel.

The Direct Combat Position Code Summary

After analyzing the letter and spirit of the current *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*, the author looked into how the Army implements the established policy and the effects of the implementation. First, the researcher reviewed the DCPC system requirements detailed in the policy regulation to determine the letter of the Army policy. Next, she reviewed some case studies of women who were involved in combat actions or deployed seemingly not in accordance or as authorized under the Army policy. Finally, the researcher requested and analyzed Defense casualty and manning reports in order to determine the effect of the DCPC system on the deployed force.

In reviewing the DCPC system, the author determined the decision chart found in the Army policy regulation leaves little room for error in determining which units are open or closed if the person applying the decision tree has a relatively unclouded understanding of the terms used in the policy, even if the terms are not correct. The researcher conducted a site visit to the Training and Doctrine Command, Force Design Directorate and verified that the assignment doctrine is used to determine the appropriate position codes for each MTOE position. The researcher determined that the concept is applied to all MTOE positions, defense manning documents (DMDs) that accompany

directed missions, and most recently it was also applied to all Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) used to establish immediate structure for previously ill-defined unit types such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs).

The in-depth study of casualty statistics clearly established some facts. First, the majority of casualties are male and the result of hostile enemy actions. Second, the combat arms positions and units currently closed to women account for well over half of the recorded fatalities. Finally, women make up 14 percent of the Army population, 11 percent of the of the population of soldiers who have deployed, and yet, women make up less than 3 percent of the fatality figures, therefore showing that the DCPC system does route women into jobs and units that are statistically safer than male only jobs and units in the Army.

Operational Security Environment and the Army Summary

The final section analyzed for this thesis was the combined topic: the 21st Century Security Environment and the Operational Army. The purpose of this topic of research was to define the current Operating Environment (OE) and the changes in the Army due to both force modernization and the effects of the OE. The researcher conducted an extensive literature review of doctrine, analysis documents, case studies, and reports and professional journals in order refine her definition of the OE and determine the effects on the Army. The collection of data was reviewed to identify the key differences between the former security environment and the 21st Century environment and adaptations made by the Army.

The analysis of the security environment exposed three distinct characteristics of the modern security environment. In this era of persistent conflict, the enemy chose irregular warfare (warfare unbounded by conventional rules or objectives) to achieve his desired endstate, which is to control the relevant population. The adversary's most effective strategy to achieve his goal is through an asymmetric approach. The approach favors tactics that avoid head-to-head confrontation with well-armed, well-trained, and superiorly equipped Soldiers in favor of those that attack political stability, exploit information warfare effectively, crumble U.S. and coalition support, capabilities, and commitment, and control the economy. Key tactics include extremely effective use of explosives, snipers, and information while retaining a low tactical foot-print through compartmentalization.

The U.S. military adapted to the security challenges through force modernization, new training, equipment, and operations. To address the challenges of a persistent war the Army modularized into the brigade combat teams which created the ability to better tailor forces to the needs of the commander. In order to continue the deployment cycles the Army instituted the ARFORGEN process that established a system for reset, training, readiness, and deployment. The Army revised training to address wartime needs such as cultural awareness, convoy and detainee search operations, and directed METL training. As training needs are identified they are instituted into the pre-deployment training for all land forces. Obtaining new equipment was always a challenge for the armed services because the research, development, and procurement is lengthy and time consuming. IED threats caused the Army to accelerate procurement and fielding of force enabling equipment such as up-armored Humvees and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)

vehicles. Finally, the noncontiguous environment caused forces to carry support forward to supporting locations like FOBs, JSSs, and COPs which the expeditionary Army use to extend their power throughout the battlefield.

As a result of this study there is enough information available for the researcher to answer the primary and secondary questions presented in this thesis. The next chapter will address the researcher's findings and conclusions, and provide recommendations for further study on the combat exclusion topic.

¹“Army Profile 2009,” *Army Well-Being* (18 April 2009), https://www.Armywell-being.org/skins/WBLO/display.aspx?action=display_page&mode=User&ModuleID=8cde2e88-3052-448c-893d-d0b4b14b31c4&ObjectID=d9c695fa-c830-40be-8402-947f4dbddf1f&AllowSSL=true (accessed 14 May 2009).

²Michelle M. Putko, “The Combat Exclusion Policy in the Modern Security Environment,” in *Women in Combat Compendium* (2008), 30.

³Women In Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, “History & Collections”, Women in Military Service for America, [http://www.womensmemorial.org/H&C/History/wwii\(wac\).html](http://www.womensmemorial.org/H&C/History/wwii(wac).html) (accessed April 9, 2009).

⁴Women's Research & Education Institute, “Chronology of Significant Legal & Policy Changes Affecting Women in the Military: 1947--2003,” (Women's Research & Education Institute), <http://www.wrei.org/Women%20in%20the%20Military/Women%20in%20the%20Military%20Chronology%20of%20Legal%20Policy.pdf> (accessed 9 April, 2009).

⁵Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, “Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule,” memorandum, January 13, 1994.

⁶AR 600-13, 1.

⁷RAND, 14.

⁸FM 5-0, January 2005, F-4.

⁹FM 5-0, January 2005,

¹⁰FM 5-0, January 2005, F-6.

¹¹AR 611-21, Table 13-1.

¹²*Encarta Dictionary in Microsoft Word 2007*, s.v. Primary.

¹³AR 600-13, 5.

¹⁴RAND, 40.

¹⁵RAND, 41.

¹⁶Army Force Management School, Book 2: Advanced Force Management Course: Week One: Strategic Guidance. From slide number four of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Lesson.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹HQDA Approved Standardized Core Mission Essential Task Lists (CMETL), 17 December 2008, Slide 2, <https://atn.Army.mil/Media/docs/DA%20CMETL%20DEC%2008.pdf> (accessed 6 May 2009).

²⁰RAND, 40.

²¹HQDA Approved Standardized Core Mission Essential Task Lists (CMETL), 17 December 2008, Slide 2, <https://atn.Army.mil/Media/docs/DA%20CMETL%20DEC%2008.pdf> (accessed 6 May 2009).

²²Donna Alberto, Chief, Human Relations Readiness Division, Army G-1, email to author, April 13, 2009.

²³AR 600-13, 5.

²⁴*Lioness*, Directed by Meg McLagan and Daria Sommers, 2008. Originally broadcast on the *Independent Lens* in November 2008 and currently available on DVD. This comment comes at the 19:00 minute elapse time mark of the video.

²⁵FM 3-24, 1-2.

²⁶Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-90: *Tactics*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001)

²⁷Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0: *Operations*, (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office: 2001) 4-22.

²⁸Department of the Army, *Interactive Guide to FM 3-0: Operations*. Washington, DC, 27 February 2008. https://courses.leavenworth.Army.mil/@8151a1cc0dac6d7336e63c6568785720/courses/1/MASTER_LIBRARY_AY06-07/content/_313374_1/dir_@464d2033.zip/FM%203.0/flash/main.swf. (accessed 17 March 2009). Introduction video clip by General Casey, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Hereafter referred to as FM 3-0 Interactive Video.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰FM 3-0, 27 February 2008, 5-11 - 5-12.

³¹AR 600-13, 1

³²AR 600-13, 5.

³³RAND, 18.

³⁴RAND, 18.

³⁵Botters related a story about having an attached Advance Trauma Life Support team attached to his platoon during DESERT STORM and though it was wrong, it was a life saving position.

COL Paul J. Kennedy (USMC) stated in *Lioness* “There was supposedly a 3-day jehad being planned. So we put together an operation to arrest two, known insurgent leaders. The *Lioness* teams were assigned to support to the Whiskey Company.”

Marine Lieutenant Colonel “Did I have female soldiers in battle? Yes. Was the intent of those soldiers to be in battle when they went? Uh, well I don’t know, probably not. But, did battle come to them on occasion? Yeah, it did.”

MAJ Robert Weiler, Whiskey” company commander, 2/4 Marines. “I really didn’t want to have the responsibility of having a female soldier that was attached to me get killed during this operation.”

³⁶Field and Nagl, 74.

³⁷RAND, 19.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 19.

³⁹RAND, 21.

⁴⁰Public thesis presentation at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College on March 30, 2009. See Appendix A for the abridged transcript.

⁴¹RAND, 23.

⁴²RAND, 23.

⁴³Ibid., 21.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵RAND, 23.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷RAND, 27.

⁴⁸Morden's history of the WAC commented about congressional debates, Manning elaborated that in 2005 Representative Hunter, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Botters identified recent legislation that directed the SECDEF to notify Congress of proposed changes to the usage of women Soldiers, etc.

⁴⁹Bettie J. Morden, *Women's Army Corps 1945-1978*, <http://www.history.Army.mil/books/wac/index.htm#contents> (accessed 10 November 2008), 14.

⁵⁰Botters, 72.

⁵¹Botters, 72.

⁵²Mark R. Lindon, "Impact of Revising the Army's Female Assignment Policy," in *Women in Combat Compendium* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 39. Lindon cited multiple Gallup polls that showed the public opinion shifted from opposing women's assignments to combat arms jobs toward supporting women's combat assignments.

⁵³Women in Military Service for America Memorial Foundation History and Collections, "World War II: Women and the War," Women in Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, <http://www.womensmemorial.org/H&C/History/wwii.html> (accessed 24 April, 2009).

⁵⁴Judith A. Bellafaire, "The Women's Army Corps: A Commemoration of World War II Service," *U.S. Army Center for Military History* (7 November, 2008), <https://www.history.Army.mil/brochures/wac/wac/htm> (accessed 10 November 2008), 13.

⁵⁵Judith A. Bellafaire, "The Women's Army Corps: A Commemoration of the World War II Service" in Center for Military History Publication 72-15: *The Women's*

Army Corps. <http://www.history.Army.mil/brochures/wac/wac.htm> (accessed 24 April, 2009).

⁵⁶The Washington Times, “Despite pressure, Bush Vows ‘No Women in Combat’”, The Washington Times, 11 January, 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/2005/jan/11/20050111-101005-5277r/?page=2> accessed 10 November, 2008.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6: *The Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 3-2. Hereafter referred to as FM 3-90.6.

⁶⁰AR 600-13, 2.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., 1.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Donna Alberto, Email to the author, 13 April 2009.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶RAND, 51.

⁶⁷RAND, 52.

⁶⁸Richard Ybarra, “Female Search Teams, Key Part of Security.” *Iron Sights Magazine*, December 2007. This article addressed using women to search Iraqi women at checkpoints.

Defend America, “Female Search Teams Aid Battalion’s Mission,” 16 October 2006. This article addresses using women as Female Search Teams.

Andrew Kalwitz, “Female Search Teams work to eliminate Fallujah’s inbound threats,” Marine Corps News, 9 October 2007.

⁶⁹Ann Scott Tyson, “Woman Gains Silver Star--And Removal From Combat,” *WashingtonPost.com*, 1 May 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/30/AR2008043003415_pf.html (accessed 22 February 2009).

⁷⁰Field and Nagl, 78.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³Center for Military Readiness, “Indiana National Guard, 1st Battalion, 293rd Infantry,” *Center for Military Readiness- Policy Analysis* No. 7 (2008) 1, http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/CMR_PA_March_2008.pdf (accessed 28 April, 2009).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵Tim Meredith, Explanation to author, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 28 April, 2009. Lieutenant Colonel Meredith is an Army Force Manager (Functional Area 50) and subject matter expert on the subject of manning documents.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Jean Rice.

⁷⁸ See Appendix B for the statistical analysis of OIF casualty figures.

⁷⁹ AR 611-21, Chapter 12-1 and Table 13-1 list the occupational specialties for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted Soldiers that are closed to women.

⁸⁰ Kathleen Dillaber, “Current Deployed Personnel by Service and Gender,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Army G-1 DAPE-DRS, 2008). Ms. Dillaber provided this ad hoc report at the request of the researcher from the source: Contingency Tracking System Deployment File, which contained all current data as of September 30, 2008, for all of the Armed services. The report was e-mailed to the researcher on April 16, 2009.

⁸¹ Ibid. The researcher was unable to determine if “ever deployed” means every deployed in the history of the Army or ever deployed in support of the GWOT.

⁸² AR 600-13, 2.

⁸³ FM 3-0, C-2.

⁸⁴ RAND, 137.

⁸⁵ FM 3-0 Interactive. General Casey’s introduction to the revised FM 3-0.

⁸⁶ Department of Defense, “Irregular Warfare (IW): Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 7.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 1.

- ⁸⁸ TRISA-T, 7.
- ⁸⁹TRISA-T, 7.
- ⁹⁰IW JOC, 6.
- ⁹¹TRISA-T, 10.
- ⁹²IW JOC, 1.
- ⁹³IW JOC, 16.
- ⁹⁴TRISA-T, 53
- ⁹⁵Ibid.
- ⁹⁶Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006) ix.
- ⁹⁷FM 3-24, 1-2.
- ⁹⁸Field Manual (FM) 3-34.119, *Improvised Explosive Device Defeat* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), v.
- ⁹⁹Cordesman, 23.
- ¹⁰⁰Bill Nichols, "Video Shows Beheading of American Captive," *USA Today*, 11 May 2004. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-11-iraq-beheading_x.htm (accessed 3 May 2009).
- ¹⁰¹Ibid.
- ¹⁰²Ibid.
- ¹⁰³Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁴News, *The Washington Times*. "Zarqawi Targets Female Soldiers." July 1, 2009 edition.
- ¹⁰⁵Mark R. Lindon, "Impact of Revising the Army's Female Assignment Policy," in *Women in Combat Compendium* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 37.
- ¹⁰⁶IW JOC, 1.
- ¹⁰⁷FM 3-24, 2-2.

¹⁰⁸FMI 3-34.119, 1-1.

¹⁰⁹FM 3-0, C-1.

¹¹⁰FM 3-0, D-4.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²JP 3-0, II-20.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴FM 3-0, 4-10. In 2008 the researcher assisted in fixed-wing Low Cost/Low Altitude (LC/LA) resupply missions during which supplies and ammunition were air dropped to remote company and platoons outposts in the remote border areas of the mountains in Afghanistan and separate rotary wing resupply operations along the “black ring” resupply route to larger operating bases in Afghanistan..

¹¹⁵Rose Cox, “23,000 Women Make Effort in Iraq.” *Anchorage Daily News*, 9 November 2007, (accessed 16 October 2008).

¹¹⁶Botters, 72.

¹¹⁷This summary is based on the researcher’s personal experience while deployed to Afghanistan in 2008.

¹¹⁸President of the United States, “National Defense Strategy for the United States of America,” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005_ib.htm (accessed 12 April 2009).

¹¹⁹Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005_ib.htm (accessed 12 April 2009).

¹²⁰IW JOC, 13.

¹²¹IW JOC, 5.

¹²²TRISA-T, 53.

¹²³Cordesman, ii.

¹²⁴Wikipedia: s.k. Provincial Reconstruction Team. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provincial_Reconstruction_Team (accessed 4 May 2009).

¹²⁵Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency: The Nature of Attacks and Patterns and Cycles in the Conflict,” (Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies: 2006), 20. www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0602cordesman.pdf (accessed 4 May 2009). Cordesman is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy.

¹²⁶*Lioness*, Comments by LTC William Brinkley, Commander, 1st Engineer Battalion, film elapse time 25:58-26:30.

¹²⁷Cordesman, 21

¹²⁸Cordesman, 21

¹²⁹Cordesman, 21.

¹³⁰GlobalSecurity.Org, “Up-Armored HMMWV,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/hmmwvua.htm> (accessed 4 May 2009).

¹³¹Cordesman, 22.

¹³²FM 3-0, 1-5, and Cordesman, 24-28.

¹³³Edward Cardon, “The world is Changing-- So Must the Army,” (lecture, Lewis and Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 May 2009). Brigadier General Cardon’s lecture to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Students addressed the inclusive changes of the Field Manual 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, and the process used to develop the document.

¹³⁴Cordesman, iii.

¹³⁵Cordesman, 25.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷Fadhil Ali, “”Insurgent Attacks on the Iraqi Energy Sector,” *Terrorism Monitor* 7, no. 5 (13 March 2009): 1, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34697 (accessed 5 May 2009).

¹³⁸IW JOC, 1.

¹³⁹FM 3-24, 1-2, and IW JOC, E-4, and TRISA-T, 54.

¹⁴⁰FM 3-0, 4-10, and JP 3-0, II-20.

¹⁴¹Pete Geren and George W. Casey, Jr., (26 February 2008), *America’s Army: The Strength of the Nation, A Statement on Posture of the United States Army 2008*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), i.

¹⁴²Ibid. i.

¹⁴³The U.S. Army, Introduction to “Our Army at War” in *The U.S. Army: The Way Ahead*. 1. <http://www.Army.mil/thewayahead/acpdownloads/RelevantAndReady.pdf> (accessed 30 April, 2009).

¹⁴⁴FM 3-0, C-2.

¹⁴⁵FM 3-0, C-2.

¹⁴⁶Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress,” (Congressional Research Service: 2005). <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32476.pdf> (accessed 30 April, 2009)

¹⁴⁷Richard P. Formica, “Memorandum: FY09 Command Plan Guidance” (Washington, DC: 2006). Major General Formica was the Director of Force Management for the Department of the Army G-3,5,7.

¹⁴⁸FMI 4-93.2 (draft), 1-4.

¹⁴⁹Ibid. 1-4 and 2-9

¹⁵⁰Phillip Radzikowski, “Contemporary FOB Operations,” *Infantry Magazine*, March-April 2006. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_2_95/ai_n16690002/ (accessed 7 May 2009).

¹⁵¹The Washington Times, “Briefing: FOBs the Closest Thing to Home in Iraq” *The Washington Times*, 26 March 2008, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/26/briefing-fobs-the-closest-thing-to-home-in-iraq/> (accessed 7 May 2009), and Radzikowski.

¹⁵²Radzikowski, 2.

¹⁵³Kimberly Kagan, Enforcing the Law: the Baghdad Security Plan Begins, *Iraq Report*, 10 February 2007- 5 March 2007 (The Institute of the Study of War) <http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/pdf/IraqReport02.pdf> (accessed 7 May 2009).

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 11.

¹⁵⁵The Washington Times, “Briefing: FOBs the Closest Thing to Home in Iraq” *The Washington Times*, 26 March 2008, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/26/briefing-fobs-the-closest-thing-to-home-in-iraq/> (accessed 7 May 2009)

¹⁵⁶Kenan, 15.

¹⁵⁷Joe Parrino, “Fort Campbell Safety Manager Wins Safety Professional of the Year,” <http://www.Army.mil/-news/2009/04/02/19153-fort-campbell-safety-manager-wins-safety-professional-of-the-year/> (accessed 7 May 2009).

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹Rachel Brune, “Soldiers Train to Exit Overturned Humvee,” *Defend America* (27 June 2006), <http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/june2006/a062606tj1.html> (accessed 7 May 2009)

¹⁶⁰*Lioness*, Statement by Colonel Kennedy at the 42:34 elapse time.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.* Statement by Lieutenant Colonel Brinkley at the 26:16-26:30 elapse time.

¹⁶²*Lioness*, Breslow remarked about her realization during the battle in Ramahdi “I didn’t know how to use our biggest casualty producing weapon. (42:34), Guttormsen remarked, “Army language is different than the marine language itself. So just understanding when somebody is yelling at you to do something and understanding what it means is pretty significant. There is a vocabulary barrier there. (45:22)

¹⁶³Guttormsen, Katherine P., e-mail to Karen J. Dill, 27 February 2009, Subject: Question Regarding *Lioness* Documentary.

¹⁶⁴Robert F. Prinzbach II., 2008 Department of Defense Inspector General Report: “Training Requirements for U.S. Ground Forces Deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), i.

¹⁶⁵RAND, 27.

¹⁶⁶Army Training Network, <https://atn.Army.mil/Media/docs/DA%20CMETL%20DEC%2008.pdf> (accessed 10 May 2009)

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The researcher sought to answer the research question: How should the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* be revised in order to be relevant in the 21st Century security environment. In order to make the determination, the author sought to answer five secondary questions. First, what is the current Army assignment policy for the assignment for women soldiers? Next, why and how are direct combat positions coded? Fourth, what are the characteristics of the modern battlefield or security environment? And finally, what adjustments did the Army make in organization and employment of personnel in order to operate effectively in the modern OE?

This topic is important because women make up growing percentage of the Army. Assignment restrictions for women are in place based on policies put into effect during a peace-time state following an extremely successful conventional war against Iraqi in 1991. General misunderstanding about the policy verbiage and changes in the security environment, Army equipment, doctrine, training, and tactics over time left commanders with an identifiable gap in policy versus reality. Further, time passed and the gap was exposed to public and congressional scrutiny which could eventually result in added congressional oversight demanding or directing changes that damage the Army's ability to prosecute the nation's national defense strategy.

The researcher presented background information about women's integration into the Army in Chapter 1, a reviewed of current and historical literature in Chapter 2, offered her research methodology and plan for analysis in Chapter 3, and her analysis of

the subject based on the secondary question topics in Chapter 4. In this chapter the researcher will draw her conclusions from the analysis presented in Chapter 4. First, she will answer the posed secondary questions and then provide recommendations which will answer the question: How does the current assignment policy need to be changed in order to retain relevance across the spectrum of battle? The conclusion will address: 1) the identification of the Army assignment policy for women soldiers, 2) an explanation of the direct combat positions code system, 3) the defining characteristics the modern security environment, and 4) what adjustments did the Army make in organization and employment of personnel in order to operate effectively?

Conclusion

The Legacy Army Policy

The researcher closely examined this topic in order to answer the question, “what is the current Army assignment policy for women soldiers?” The Army’s policy was identified in Army Regulation 600-13, *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*, which stated the Army position:

The Army’s policy for female soldiers allows women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions, or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat, or which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.¹

The researcher determined that the Army policy did not match the more recently established DoD policy and contained multiple problems with obsolete, ill-defined, and limiting verbiage and phraseology. The researcher identified the underlying intent of the policy concluding that its purpose was to maximize military operational effectiveness and to allow commanders flexibility when assigning personnel, and to channel women’s

assignments into job specialties that are statistical less likely to clash with the enemy. The shortcomings of the policy and will be addressed throughout this conclusion.

The Direct Combat Positions Code System

The researcher sought to answer the questions: why and how are direct combat positions coded? The Army policy dictates the exclusionary criteria that restrict women from assignment in some combat arms officer and enlisted specialties and in some combat arms units. The DCPC system was established in the policy regulation to assist force designers and assignment personnel to implement the Army policy. A closer examination of the policies revealed that phraseology contained in the Army policy left room for interpretation. The phrasing *to serve in* is not defined by any doctrinal command relationship. The term was not defined in the DCPC system either and therefore could be challenged. The RAND researchers confirmed that force designers interpreted *to serve in* as meaning *to be assigned to* as presented in the DoD policy. Since force designers assign the position codes to the authorization documents, the result is an even handed, even if flawed, application of the policy across the force.

The researcher analyzed the application of the DCPC system and determined that the system characteristics were applied to new authorization documents such as the defense manning documents used for directed missions and TDAs used to stand-up new units such as mobile training teams. The result of this application of the policy across all manning documents is that women are funneled, for the most part, into mainly non-combat arms jobs in support units and higher headquarters of combat forces such as the Brigade Sustainment Battalions and Brigade Special Troops Battalions. Casualty statistics confirmed that women are fatally wounded in combat, however, at a much

lower rate than their male counterparts. Even when compared to peers in the identical jobs and unit types, women hold a lower casualty rate. The researcher determined that the result of the continued implementation of the DCPC system is that women are directed in to career fields and jobs that carry significantly less risk than the restricted combat arms positions and units even when placed in the same combat zone.

Modern Security Environment

The modern security environment is one of persistent conflict. The small conflicts that ensued after the Gulf War and the current conflict the U.S. is involved in today, show that the nation is as likely or more likely to face Irregular Warfare (IW) threats now and into the foreseeable future. Expressed differently, today's conflict consists of warfare unbounded by conventional rules and with the intent to control the target population of people. The researcher wanted to know how the evolution of the security environment affected the interpretation of the Army assignment policy. The adversary's successful use of asymmetric tactics helped him to circumvent direct confrontation with U.S. soldiers in favor of tactics which assail political stability and erode the public support for their opponent. Extremely effective use of tried-and-true tactical weapons like explosives, snipers, and information combined with maintaining low visibility inside their organization by operating in small, decentralized, and dispersed "pockets" or operational cells are defining characteristics of the modern military operational situation.

The 21st Century security environment reflects in the understanding and interpretation of the assignment policy because the OE is used to describe the enemy, enemy location, and potential and types of hostile actions encountered by soldiers. The

Army Policy for the Assignment of Women assignment restrictions are tied to the phrase *direct combat mission*. The Army definition of direct combat was provided in Chapter 2 and is reasonable when viewed through the lens of traditional war. However, when viewed in the through the 21st Century security environment lens, the policy could be so restrictive that adhering to it would cripple the national defense capabilities.

In the modern OE, the battlefield and enemy surround forward-based expeditionary soldiers and therefore everyone faces equal, substantial risk of capture in the battle zone. Blind adherence to the existing policy would close to women soldiers all units deploying into a theater of operations, however, the force could not sustain itself if the women were removed from all of the deployed formations. This would be counter to the spirit of the policy to maximize the Army's operational effectiveness and to giving the command flexible personnel assignment options.

Army Adaptations to Persistent Warfare and the OE

The modern security environment triggered multiple changes in Army force size, structure, training, and equipment used to address security challenges on behalf of the nation. That translates into changes in how the Army actually functions in the OE. The researcher sought to determine how force modernization effected the application and interpretation of the Army women's assignment policy. As the Army continues down the IW path, a path that is projected to continue, leaders and soldiers will move further away from a clear understanding of the Army policy terms, which used to be defined either intuitively or by definition. The Army's adaptation to address the 21st Century fight caused obsolete and ill-defined terminology in the legacy assignment policy.

The terms *primary* (used in the DoD policy) and *routine* (used in the Army policy) do not retain relevance or common understanding. *Primary mission* loses relevance because of the Army Force Generation process enacted in order to meet commander's requests for forces over a long time period moves Army organizations away from defining missions as primary or routine and toward missions defined by core and directed METLs in support of wartime objectives. At the same time, the phrase *routine mission* is not defined in the Army doctrine and is widely subjective because routines can easily change and there is no method in place or threshold established to determine when and if an action is routine.

The researcher determined that the terms *collocate* or *collocation* are not clearly defined in the military vernacular and understanding of the terms is not intuitive. Further, the researcher recognized the effect of force modernization changed the Army center of gravity from Division centric units to expeditionary Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). The BCTs is the Army building block for warfighting, the "tooth" of the force. Where goes the "teeth" the "tail" must follow. The realignment of support forces to support the expeditionary force resulted in a large number of women soldiers deploying into noncontiguous operations areas in order to conduct their support missions.

A key and developing feature of fighting from noncontiguous battle zones is the introduction of FOBs, JSS, and COPs as support areas for security and stability operations. These operations include monitoring elections and training local forces, to "door-kicking" missions and cordon and search operations necessary to reduce threats in the environment. The Army doctrine is to push support as close to the warfighter as possible in order to shorten the lines of communication for maintenance and resupply.

The result included supporting FSCs and supported BCTs operating in the same location to execute their directed missions. In a noncontiguous area, there is significant gain added by using operating bases as support areas including added security and reduced duplication of effort and consumption of resources. The introduction of FOBs, JSS, and COPs to support soldiers increased the Army operational effectiveness which is in alignment with the underlying purpose of the Army assignment policy for women soldiers.

The Army recognized that it changed how it operated because of the enemy effect on operations and adjusted equipment and training for soldiers. Pre-deployment training including common tasks like react to an ambush and detainee search operations were added in order to ensure that support troops were adequately prepared to react to the enemy and continue to conduct the mission. Likewise, the Army added protective measures like up-armored Humvees and the MRAP to its fleet and adapted procedures, such as prohibiting soft-skinned vehicles to be used “outside the wire,” in order to reduce risk among all troops, not just combat arms soldiers. This was a move away from the Army’s earlier practice of fortifying combat formations and leaving the support formations with a lesser combat capability. The result of the move was better trained and equipped soldiers, prepared to react to the enemy as needed to conduct their mission. The researcher believes the added training and increased quality of protective equipment coupled with the security of having combat firepower from combat arms units based in the support areas reduced the overall vulnerability of support troops. This postulate is supported by casualty figures which reflect a proportionally smaller percentage of female casualties than the percentage of women actually deployed. Therefore, given that the

Army cannot remove women from the formation and still function effectively, and basing support units separately increases their risk, the Army policy inclusion of *collocation* as a restriction does not support operational efficiency.

Recommendations

Define the Intent

The researcher examined the purpose of any assignment policy after studying the letter of the policy. The order of events made is clear to her that understanding the spirit of the policy is of the utmost importance because it allows an actor to continue to act in the absence of clear guidance. The first recommendation is that the Army specifically identified the intent of the *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers* and all personnel policies that funnel soldiers into or out of specific jobs or units.

Replace Undefined Policy Verbiage

Replace the meaningless phrase *to serve in* with the doctrinal term *assign*. The phrasing *to serve in* does not define the command relationship and therefore the term is open to interpretation. Whereas the DoD definition uses a the term *assigned* which is a clearly defined, and doctrinal relationship. Using the term *assign* would further nest the Army policy under the more recent OSD rule.

Replace the undefined term *routine* from *routine mission* to the term *core* as in *core mission*. The researcher further recommends that the term *core mission* be defined, linking it to the mission identified in Army doctrine by the “HQDA Approved Standardized Core Mission Essential Task Lists (CMETL).”²

If the term *routine* is retained, clearly define the term *routine* and establish guidelines or a rubric to differentiate between routine and occasional acts.

Eliminate Non-directed Restrictive Language

Eliminate the term *collocate* or *collocation* from the Army policy. The Army doctrine for support to the warfighter is to support at battalion level. The Army's practice of using FOBs, JSS, and COPs in the noncontiguous operations area means that support soldiers will operate in the same hazardous areas in which combat arms soldiers conduct their missions. The added risk to operational support soldiers caused the Army to train contemporary soldiers equally on warrior tasks and skills, weapons, and expectations. Hence, *collocation* actually restricts commanders from freely assigning soldiers and units to fit the needs of the current battle. The collocation restriction was self-imposed by the Army and is sidestepped by using command relationships like Operational Control (OPCON). Further, Army policy allows all soldiers to be used equally once properly assigned. Consequently, *collocation* is not clearly understood and hampers force readiness. Therefore, the term and concept should be removed from the Army assignment policy. If the term is not removed from the Army policy it should be clearly defined in both definition and purpose and leaders must be educated about both.

Revise Definitions for the Full Spectrum Warfare

The Army should revise the term *direct combat* or replace it with another doctrinal term. The applied Army policy funnels only men into the most dangerous and physically challenging jobs, not to keep women out of combat as declared by former President Bush.³ The term revision should address the clause "a high probability of

direct physical contact with the enemy's personnel and at substantial risk of capture.”⁴

War is inherently dangerous. This is a characteristic of that could apply to all soldiers who operate outside of the security parameters of FOBs, JSS, and COPs.

Future Study

In the course of her research the author identified the following areas for future study:

1) The Goldwater-Nichols act dictated that the Armed Forces operate jointly. An area for potential study is to determine the need for a joint policy for the placement and function of female soldiers, sailors, airman, marines.

2) IW JOC identified a “the whole-of-government” approach to combating irregular warfare. A feasibility study should be conducted to determine if a “whole government” policy for utilization of women civilian and military employees is necessary.

3) Contractor support to the military is critical. Potential future studies could focus on contractor integration into units closed to females and at hazardous locations and legal issues resulting from application of Equal Employment Opportunity.

4) The RAND Corporation study sought to determine the intent of the army assignment policy. Their study included a survey with a small population. The study should be repeated with a larger population and among different peer groups (i.e. company grade officers, field grade officers, general officers, combat arms leaders, or operational support leaders, etc.) and as a longitudinal study also conducted.

5) The *Women in Combat Compendium* referred to an informal television survey and multiple Gallup poll which suggested a shift in the perceived public adverse response

to women casualties toward gender indifference. The TRISA-T document listed the world perception of American aversion to casualties as a weakness. A future area of study could focus on defining the current American stance on the subject and the continued perception. A longitudinal study could be conducted to address a long-term shift in stance or perception during an era of persistent conflict.

6) The Army definition for direct combat includes a clause regarding the risk of capture. A future area of study about the treatment of women versus the treatment of men in captivity could illuminate how to train soldiers better for preparing and surviving that type of situation. The study could include prisoner of war, hostage, and detention center inquiries.

7) The growing demographic of women serving across the military services could change the force dynamics and how fighting is conducted. Many of the open source articles studied in the preparation of this thesis intuitively indicated dynamics that added value to the force and some drawbacks. A future area of study would be on the “value added” to the force by the increased number of women in the force.

8) The researcher read multiple studies about the physical ability of women to function in combat arms jobs. The researcher did not include any of them in this thesis because they were outside of the scope of this work; however, the researcher noted that modern training and function of women observed by the researcher seem to contradict the studies. A future area of study is a continued study of the physical capabilities and requirements of the modern combat arms jobs and a functional analysis to determine if women have the capability to function in those jobs in an IW environment.

¹AR 600-13, 1.

²ATN, Standardized Core METL Slides.

³Ann Scott Tyson, “For Female GIs, Combat Is a Fact: Many Duties in Iraq Put Women at Risk Despite Restrictive Policy,” *The Washington Post*, 13 May 2005.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/12/AR2005051202002.html> (accessed 12 December 2008)..

⁴AR 600-13, 5. This is part of the definition of direct combat.

Appendix A

Abridged Transcript from Research Presentation

Introduction

The researcher conducted a public presentation of her ongoing research on 30 March 2009. Four U.S. Army majors, and one international military student (IMS) major, and the researcher's research mentor attended the presentation. The following is an abridged transcript of the video archive from the primary presentation. Approximately 20 minutes of dialog followed the researchers concluding remarks about areas outside of the scope of the research were not transcribed into this transcript

Abridge Transcript

Researcher: I want to thank you all for coming today. As you know, I'm Karen Dill, and I've been working on a master's thesis here at the college. The topic of my thesis is Overhauling the Army's policy for the assignment of women, also known as the Combat Exclusion Clause.

First of all, I'm recording this, and I'm data mining. Whatever you say, I might use for further research for my thesis and it might provide me with some ideas of where I should continue to do additional research.

Researcher: Without me telling you anything about the existing policy, what do you think it says?

Respondent 1 (R1): [Chemical Officer]: What do I think it says? I think I'm the wrong person to ask.

Mentor: I would ask, have you had any women in your units

R1: All the time, and that's why I wonder or say that I'm the wrong person to ask. I've been working along with women ever since I've been in the Army and so to me there's no difference. Although I'm not an infantryman, my job is in the supporting roles so there's no difference. What I have understand is that, and this is probably not in the right terms, is that women are not supposed to be in positions that they are going to be in direct contact with the enemy. In this day and age there's not a fine line any more. It used to be don't put women in the front lines. But, it's different now. That's what I thought of

it.

Respondent 2 (R2): I've been in the military for 17 years. I was prior enlisted and I was commissioned in military intelligence, but I was branch detailed in field artillery and then moved back into military intelligence. So, I had both in the enlisted and in the officer corps. So for me, I can understand the point of having women in the military. I've never had any problems working with them, but I do see the exclusion once you get into the combat arms world. There are a couple reasons. I'll put it down in three points, 1) biological, 2) habitual, and 3) political. And this is personal, on the biological point or the social, the nuclear family, even though it's been attacked by gays and other types of interest groups trying to break down what a nuclear family is, it survives throughout the ages. Males have always been the hunter gatherers, and women have been the ones who've been at home doing the home kind of nurturing types of tasks. That personally resonates with me in the way that I've been brought up.

Habitually, I look at it from the stance that with that nuclear family, it's always been the males that have taken the risks. The males are there, and it's socially accepted that he takes risks for his family back home. So, it's understandable and I had a SGM when I was enlisted, back in 2004 and 2005 that gave a brief to us. A female soldier got up and asked with 1991 past we've seen a lot of women getting the possibility of getting engaged in combat? Do you see there being a change to the rules allowing women to serve openly in combat units? He said to us at that particular time, and I still think it resonates now, is that America is still acceptable to see men come home in pine boxes. If they saw women coming home in pine boxes it would change the political climate of whatever war we are in. So I still think that resonates, if you see a great deal of women coming home that served openly in a combat arms branch, it would change a lot of the support for future wars.

Thirdly, the political stand point is whether or not America is willing to accept seeing something like that in the future and whether or not that would be a huge sway against the support for the war. Since, women are seen as the sole point of the family. That would be more or less breaking down the nature of the mother.

Respondent 3 (R3) [Engineer]- I break it into two areas. As an engineer I've served on the combat side which is all male units, and I've served in mixed gender units, in combat heavy construction side. And so as far back as when I was a second lieutenant I had a female platoon sergeant. I've had the whole. [Unintelligible] over the last 15 years. It breaks into 2 areas for me. My understanding of the policy is that it's based on MOS and position, combat arms and combat service support. What position they serve. Some positions are coded for men only. I don't disagree in an undefined, delineated, rear area war anymore. It doesn't exist. I personally don't really care if it's a woman or a man doing the job. My point is as long as they can do the job. I think that's one of the problems that I've seen and I've also worked in TRADOC as a trainer for 12C, combat bride layers. And if you're going to allow someone to go into that job as a woman they have to meet the same standards as a man for the entry. But, and by the book standards are listed, but for whatever reason they are bent for the purposes of enlistment at the recruiting end and they arrive at training and are not able to perform that duty. It doesn't

matter if it's a women or a man, it was the same man that was 90 pounds and was required to lift 110 pounds over his head and can't do it, then the same rules still apply. I think that is a major concern that they have to be able to do the job, wherever they are.

R1: I agree. I personally haven't had that problem. I think one of the biggest things you have to worry about is that they have to be able to do the job. I also see [R1] point. That should be first and foremost. If there is any opportunity for change, that they be able to do the job, male or female. Males may not be able to do the job either.

R3: They shouldn't be there ether. I can look at it from a political standpoint, but the major concern is, I'm trying to look at it from a nonpolitical standpoint, from a military... can I accomplish the mission?

Mentor: Haven't we brought women home now in pine boxes? What's been the reaction.

R2: Well, with the , what 's interesting is that, we've seen, just recently about 2 weeks ago, that the media has been allowed to start taking photographs of coffins that came home. I don't think we can put that in there as an argument. Besides seeing the faces in the Army times, which is a small population, what an example of reaction from the outside is.

Respondent 4 (R4) [Special Forces]: I agree with R2. [unintelligible] definitely not lowering the standards a to what you need for that job description or what you need to accomplish for whatever mission; task, purpose, endstate, method. As long as the person can do it, because, I've seen it on both sides where there's guys that can't do a job either. If you can't do it as a guy; meet the task, condition, standard [unintelligible]. Working with females, I haven't worked with females in the last seven or eight years. But before that I was an ordinance guy and, same thing, if you can't change a 5-ton [vehicle] tire then the guys were gone too. If the guy's got a bad back then you were gone, reclassified. It's really capabilities based and not, my opinion, not sexually based.

Respondent 5 (R5) [Foreign Student]- We have women, but they were officers, medical based. A year ago they decided to let women join the Army. I think, wow! We are not used to it. Part of the Army. . . [unintelligible] ... I haven't experienced it before so I don't know what [to expect]. I have noticed in our country is that it was a political decision not really based on need or any kind of justification. The women didn't demonstrate to say they wanted to be in the Army. One thing, also, is there is a lot of legislation. So they have not prepared the terrain to have women. It was a political decision, 'okay, I will have this percent of women in the government, in the Army,'

Mentor: So it's only two years that you've had them in your country in your armed forces?

R5: Maximum amount of time, maximum.

Mentor: Wow! What a study.

R5: We have always worked with women that were doctors, officers. It's like anybody.

Mentor: So women can hold any position in your Army?

R5: Like doctor. Now they just started. So they just started [unintelligible]...

Mentor: Somebody should be doing a study and getting a Ph.D. from that. Someone should be keeping records or something.

Researcher: [Gives explanation of current research and findings.]

R5: Did you notice if the old policy was driven at the old model where a division would deploy to the Folda gap or something, and you're going to stay there for, the World War Two model, two to three years and moving around as a unit. As opposed to now where people are in a base camp, and you can go out and search and do your checkpoints and all your stuff. And you can come back to where you are operating really from your separate barracks, really from an Army base, a FOB, where as maybe the old model was... Did you see any of that?

Researcher: I didn't really address it, although I did consider as to whether or not that would be considered collocation which is a key consideration in the policy language, how they define collocation or collocation. One is a habitual support to units; one is on the same location. So does that mean you can't have a FSC on the same FOB as an infantry company? Because they are co-located they are in the same vicinity?

R3: In some cases, yes. I've seen it in Iraq where some commanders dictated based on the size of the units that they were separated out. I've physically seen it. That doesn't mean I agree with it. It's at the commander's discretion for a number of reasons...

Mentor: Is that because of the Iraqi culture?

R3: In some cases yes. Because of the way that they are in close proximity, on a say, FOB [forward operating base] to FOB where they would be back to back, they would be concerned. It's like the translator, TT thing. We have working with the national police headquarters, they had a female captain, fairly young, and that makes a difference too. She was going to be joining part of the national headquarters TT and they turned her away because the people she was going to be working with were generally high ranking officers, generals and senior colonels, the culture factors was going to be distracting in addition to the fact that she was a young captain, which didn't help matters. They were concerned about the impact which in this case I think was probably legitimate. It's not because they didn't want to use her. They just understood that there may be other concerns. It had nothing to do the fact that she can't do her job.

Mentor: Would a male person of the same experience have been turned away?

R3: No. Not in this case.

Mentor: It's a culture thing.

R3: Yes, it's a culture thing.

Mentor: And because of where we are...

Researcher: Cultural considerations do play a part in how we do our operations. It's one of the takeaways. An example I found is from 2004 when there was a growing insurgency in Iraq and they had the team Lioness missions. Which is a engineer unit was deployed to Iraq and they formed out of the females that were in their unit. They formed up the Lioness teams and whenever they needed a search team, a female search team, or a humanitarian mission they would take these teams along with them, including on missions where they were doing the cordon and search, which by Army standards is considered a direct combat, going on a search that could place you in direct contact with the enemy.

R2: Were they entering buildings or were they the aftermath?

Researcher: They would guard the interpreter while they [the male soldiers] would kick down the door, then go in and subdue the women and children. There was also one of the teams that got cut to the marines, which were made part of the actual fire team on the assault. So, it just depended on where they were and what was the mission of the day, how people understood that they were working.

That's generally the conclusions that I've come up with. One that I forgot that seems to be fairly important and I'm still trying to work out. It's got nothing really out there from the information that I've collected. So my conclusion is going to be based maybe on a lack of evidence. Is the DPC codes are based on the mission of the unit and the MOS [military occupational specialty] of the soldier; those are the two biggest characteristics, and the proximity to close combat. Are how those codes are determined. Those are the three factors. But there's. . .

R3: That's still subjective by somebody though.

Researcher: It is subjective.

R3: At DA [Department of the Army] somebody's got to be sitting looking, saying... based on the mission, based on the MOS blah, blah, well it's possible...

Researcher: Who said that that guy can't go on the TT team? What's the potential to coming in contact?

R3: Nobody, it's up to the commander. That's it.

Researcher: There are jobs out there right now that we're [women are] doing that are not determined by an MOS, that are branch immaterial. And there's also units that aren't maneuver units but receive a directed mission that would be similar to a maneuver unit. The MPs [military police] or a field artillery unit, which is closed, that is now doing a truck driving mission and by all rights would have been open. So those areas are not addressed by the current policy or methods that we have in place.

[Researcher concluded by providing recommendations for area of future study including the potential need for a joint policy or policy for augmentees.]

[The full video recording of this presentation was donated to the Center for Army Lessons Learned.]

Appendix B

Casualty Statistics

Casualty statistics were derived from a report provided by Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) which contained the fields: name, rank, hostile, gender, unit, occupation code, occupation code prefix, and casualty reason. The researcher used the data to compile the following information used to support conclusions in this thesis.

Table 1. U.S. Army Deaths from 19 March 2003-28 March 2009 in OIF

	Male	Female	Total
Total Casualties	3011	82	3093
(% of Total Casualties)	97.4%	2.7%	
Hostile Casualties	2430	48	2478
(% of Hostile Casualties)	78.6%	1.6%	80.2%
Non-Hostile Casualties	581	34	615
(% Non-Hostile Casualties)	18.8%	1.1%	19.9%

Table 2. Gender Comparison of Deaths in Male Only vs. Coed Jobs and Units

	Male	Female	Total
Male Only Jobs	1785	0	1785
(% of OIF Casualties)	57.7%	0.0%	57.7%
Coed Jobs	1226	82	1308
(% of OIF Casualties)	39.6%	2.7%	42.3%
Closed Units	2145	2	2147
(% of OIF Casualties)	69.4%	0.1%	69.4%
Coed Units	866	80	946
(% of OIF Casualties)	28.0%	2.6%	30.6%
Coed Unit and Jobs	668	80	748
(% of OIF Casualties)	21.6%	2.6%	24.2%

Table 3. Gender Comparison of Hostile Deaths in Male Only vs. Coed Jobs and Units

	Male	Female	Total
Male Only Jobs	1565	0	1565
(% of OIF Casualties)	50.6%	0.0%	50.6%
Coed Jobs	865	48	913
(% of OIF Casualties)	28.0%	1.6%	29.5%
Closed Units	1829	2	1831
(% of OIF Casualties)	59.1%	0.1%	59.2%
Coed Units	601	46	647
(% of OIF Casualties)	19.4%	1.5%	20.9%
Coed Unit and Jobs	438	46	484
(% of OIF Casualties)	14.2%	1.5%	15.6%

Casualties by Cause

The casualty reasons include some fields that were combined under the primary cause categories: medical and other. The medical category included all deaths related to cancer, heart related, respiratory, and stroke. The category other included: burns/smoke inhalation, drowning, drug/alcohol overdose, electrocution, falls or jumps, military exercise, and physical training.

Table 4. Casualties Causes in OIF from 19 March 2003 to 28 March 2009

	Male	Female	Total
Casualty Reason\Aggregate Total	3011	82	3093
(% of OIF Casualties)	97.3%	2.7%	
Explosive Device	1656	29	1685
(% of OIF Casualties)	53.5%	0.9%	54.5%
Gunshot	500	7	507
(% of OIF Casualties)	16.2%	0.2%	16.4%
Not Reported	300	14	314
(% of OIF Casualties)	9.7%	0.5%	10.2%
Vehicle Crash	191	9	200
(% of OIF Casualties)	6.2%	0.3%	6.5%
Aircraft Crash	137	6	143
(% of OIF Casualties)	4.4%	0.2%	4.6%
Artillery/Mortar/Rocket	78	9	87
(% of OIF Casualties)	2.5%	0.3%	2.8%
Other	66	2	68
(% of OIF Casualties)	2.1%	0.1%	2.2%
Medical	42	4	46
(% of OIF Casualties)	1.4%	0.1%	1.5%
Rocket Propelled Grenade	41	2	43
(% of OIF Casualties)	1.3%	0.1%	1.4%

Table 5. Casualty Causes for Hostile Deaths in OIF from 19 March 2003 to 28 March 2009

	Male	Female	Total
Casualty Reason\Hostile Total	2430	48	2478
(% of OIF Casualties)	78.5%	1.6%	80.1%
Explosive Device	1644	29	1673
(% of OIF Casualties)	53.2%	0.9%	54.1%
Gunshot	424	1	425
(% of OIF Casualties)	13.7%	0.0%	13.7%
Unreported*	140	2	142
(% of OIF Casualties)	4.5%	0.1%	4.6%
Artillery/Mortar/Rocket	78	9	87
(% of OIF Casualties)	2.5%	0.3%	2.8%
Aircraft Crash	72	5	77
(% of OIF Casualties)	2.3%	0.2%	2.5%
Rocket Propelled Grenade	40	2	42
(% of OIF Casualties)	1.3%	0.1%	1.4%
Other	19	0	19
(% of OIF Casualties)	0.6%	0.0%	0.6%
Vehicle Crash	11	0	11
(% of OIF Casualties)	0.4%	0.0%	0.4%
Medical	2	0	2
(% of OIF Casualties)	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%

Table 6. Casualty Causes for Non-Hostile Deaths in OIF from 19 March 2003 to 28 March 2009

	Male	Female	Total
Non-Hostile Casualty Total	581	34	615
(% of OIF Casualties)	18.8%	1.1%	19.9%
Vehicle Crash	180	9	189
(% of OIF Casualties)	5.8%	0.3%	6.1%
Not Reported*	160	12	172
(% of OIF Casualties)	5.2%	0.4%	5.6%
Gunshot	76	6	82
(% of OIF Casualties)	2.5%	0.2%	2.7%
Aircraft Crash	65	1	66
(% of OIF Casualties)	2.1%	0.0%	2.1%
Other	47	2	49
(% of OIF Casualties)	1.5%	0.1%	1.6%
Medical	40	4	44
(% of OIF Casualties)	1.3%	0.1%	1.4%
Artillery/Mortar/Rocket	12	0	12
(% of OIF Casualties)	0.4%	0.0%	0.4%
Explosive Device	12	12	12
(% of OIF Casualties)	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Rocket Propelled Grenade	1	0	1
(% of OIF Casualties)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

GLOSSARY

Adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. Adversaries can range from nation-states to non-state actors to individuals.¹

ARFORGEN. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time to produce recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements.²

Battalion. A military unit made up of three or more companies, batteries, detachments, or other smaller units. A battalion is usually commanded by lieutenant colonel and is smaller than a brigade.

Brigade. A military unit made up of two or more combat battalions or regiments and associated supporting units. A brigade is smaller than a division and usually commanded by a colonel.

Conventional Force. The generally accepted, traditional, nonnuclear, military forces such as an Army.

Collocation. Occurs when the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit as assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. Specifically positions in units or sub-units which routinely collocate with units assigned a direct combat mission are closed to women. An entire unit will not be closed because a subunit routinely collocates with a unit assigned.³

Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). The contemporary operational environment is the synergistic combination of all critical variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect military operations today and in the near- and mid-term.⁴

Combatant. A fighter, soldier, or insurgent. A legitimate military target in war.

Direct Combat. “Engaging an enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy’s personnel and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect in order to destroy or capture the enemy, or while repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.”⁵

Full Spectrum Operations. The Army’s operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They

- employ synchronized action--lethal and nonlethal--proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.
- Guerrilla. A fighter or member of an irregular paramilitary force which usually operates in small groups to carry out harassment and sabotage in order to achieve a political or ideological change.
- Improvised explosive device. An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.⁶
- Insurgent. A rebel fighter who belongs to a group involved in an uprising against established leadership or authority.
- Irregular Forces. (joint) Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.⁷
- Irregular Warfare. A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.⁸
- Linear Battlefield. A structured battlefield in which forces have a precise structure, and the functions of close, deep, and rear operations have an adjacent relationship. Operations take place primarily in the forward area. The term linear was replaced by the term contiguous in the 2008 revision of FM 3-0, *Operations*.
- Non-combatant. A member of the armed forces, such as a chaplain or surgeon, whose duties lie outside combat. one that does not engage in combat.⁹
- Non-linear Battlefield. A battlefield with an ill-defined structure. The battlefield areas of close, deep, and rear operations are not clearly delineated. Close operations can occur throughout the battle space and not only in a forward area.
- Operational Environment (OE). A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.¹⁰ The OE is complex, dynamic, multidimensional, and comprises a collection of interrelated variables.¹¹
- PMESII + Physical Environment (P) and Time (T) variables. The joint definition of the OE is framed around the variables of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information. The Army's COE framework adds the variables of physical environment and time to PMESII. These variables are part of the strategic framework and once operationalized, help define the characteristics of any given OE.¹²

Soft Target. Unarmored and undefended or only lightly defended military and civilian targets that are easily attacked.¹³

¹TRISA-T, 13.

²Richard P. Formica, “Memorandum: FY09 Command Plan Guidance” (Washington, DC: 2006). Major General Formica was the Director of Force Management for the Department of the Army G-3,5,7.

³Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-13, *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*, 27 March 1992, 5.

⁴TRISA-T, 13.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Department of the Army, Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-34.119, *Improvised Explosive Device Defeat*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005) <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/Army/fmi3-34-119-excerpt.pdf> (accessed 3 May 2009) 1-5.

⁷Joint Publication 1-02, s.v. “Irregular Forces.”

⁸FM 3-0, Glossary-8.

⁹Merriam-Webster, s.v. “non-combatant.” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/noncombatant> (accessed 10 April 2009).

¹⁰JP 3-0, GL-22.

¹¹FMI 3-34.119, 2-1.

¹²Ibid., 13.

¹³This definition is a combination of “soft target” definitions from multiple online sources including the Suburban Emergency Management Project dictionary, Wikipedia, the authors experience and training in force protection.

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