

AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY DURING
THE MORO INSURRECTION IN THE
PHILIPPINES 1903-1913

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by

Daniel G. Miller, Major, United States Army
B.A., University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1996
M.A., University of Oklahoma, Norman, 2001

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2009

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-06-2009		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2008 – JUN 2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY DURING THE MORO INSURRECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES 1903-1913				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Daniel G. Miller				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This thesis explores the strategy followed by the American military government in overcoming Moro resistance in the Philippines from 1903-1913. A chapter is devoted to the period of each of the three Military Governors of Moro Province, Generals Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss and John Pershing. The military governors primarily focused on first establishing a system of governance, followed by economic development and educational initiatives as a means of pacifying and controlling the Moros. Military operations were only intended to play a supporting role in the American strategy to pacify the Moros. However, security threats and violent opposition constantly hindered that strategy so that pacification and acquiescence to American rule could not be established. Ultimately, it was Pershing's decision to focus on security through his disarmament policy and the subsequent campaigns to enforce that policy that finally established conditions for the transition of governance to civilian control and end military government within the province. Though initially conceived of as a supporting effort to a broader whole of government approach, in the end military operations became the decisive means for ending Moro resistance to American authority.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS PHILIPPINES; MORO INSURRECTION 1903-1913					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	177	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Daniel G. Miller, Major, USA

Thesis Title: American Military Strategy during the Moro Insurrection in the
Philippines, 1903-1913

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Richard S. Faulkner, Ph.D.

_____, Member
John A. Suprin, M.A.

_____, Member
Bruce E. Stanley, M.M.A.S.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2009 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

American Military Strategy during the Moro Insurrection in the Philippines, 1903-1913, by Major Daniel G. Miller, 177 pages.

This thesis explores the strategy followed by the American military government in overcoming Moro resistance in the Philippines from 1903-1913. A chapter is devoted to the period of each of the three Military Governors of Moro Province, Generals Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss and John Pershing. The military governors primarily focused on first establishing a system of governance, followed by economic development and educational initiatives as a means of pacifying and controlling the Moros. Military operations were only intended to play a supporting role in the American strategy to pacify the Moros. However, security threats and violent opposition constantly hindered that strategy so that pacification and acquiescence to American rule could not be established. Ultimately, it was Pershing's decision to focus on security through his disarmament policy and the subsequent campaigns to enforce that policy that finally established conditions for the transition of governance to civilian control and end military government within the province. Though initially conceived of as a supporting effort to a broader whole of government approach, in the end military operations became the decisive means for ending Moro resistance to American authority.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks go to my committee advisor, Dr. Faulkner, for his mentorship and guidance through the laborious research and writing process. His input has made this an invaluable experience for me. Thanks also go to my other committee members, Mr. Suprin and Mr. Stanley for their criticisms and input as readers and instructors at CGSC. Special recognition goes to Ms. Alisa van Kleef for her unenviable but much appreciated services as proofreader of my final draft. Finally, I would like to thank all those service members who have supported and participated in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines. It is because of their service that I was drawn to study America's first experiences in Moroland in the first place.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Background.....	1
Primary Research Question	4
Secondary Research Questions.....	6
Limitations.....	8
Literature Review	9
Primary Sources	9
Secondary Sources	10
CHAPTER 2 THE LEONARD WOOD YEARS, 1903-1906.....	14
Introduction.....	14
Government Organization.....	16
Legal System.....	20
Taxation	23
Education	26
Infrastructure.....	30
Economy	34
Security Operations.....	50
Constabulary Operations.....	50
Military Operations	55
Conclusion	66
CHAPTER 3 THE TASKER BLISS YEARS, 1906-1909.....	74
Introduction.....	74
Economy	77
Infrastructure.....	83
Education	85
Government	89

Security	92
Conclusion	105
CHAPTER 4 THE JOHN J. PERSHING YEARS, 1909-1913.....	110
Introduction.....	110
Education	112
Economy	114
Infrastructure.....	123
Government	124
Security	129
Conclusion	147
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION.....	154
BIBLIOGRAPHY	166
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	169

ACRONYMS

FY	Fiscal Year
PRG	Philippine Revolutionary Government
PC	Philippine Constabulary

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

With the defeat of the Spanish in the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States of America was now considered a world power with new territories far beyond the boundaries of the continental United States. However, the native inhabitants of these new territories violently resisted the imposition of American sovereignty over them. In the fifteen years following the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Spanish-American War, the United States waged several counterinsurgency campaigns across the Philippine islands.

Within the Philippine islands there were two major counterinsurgency campaigns during the years of the U.S. Regular Army's occupation and direct engagement in counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. fought the first campaign in the northern Philippines from 1899-1902, and that campaign is known as the Philippine Insurrection or the Philippine-American War. During that first campaign, the conventional forces of the Filipino Philippine Revolutionary Government (PRG) were defeated, and their leaders fought a guerilla campaign across the countryside. Both sides became increasingly more brutal in their tactics with devastating effects on the local population. The 1899-1902 campaign officially ended in the northern islands in July 1902 as the major guerilla leaders were captured, killed or forced to surrender. At that point, the campaign transitioned to the police forces of the American run Philippine civil government, who continued to fight a campaign against guerillas that were little more than criminals and bandits.

The story of the counterinsurgency campaign in the southern part of the Philippines, known officially as the Moro Rebellion or the Moro Insurrection, is much longer, but is often overlooked in most histories of the U.S. occupation. This campaign sought to end Moro resistance in the southern islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. In 1902, the United States created the Moro Province with a separate military government distinct from (but still subordinate to) the civil government of the Philippines. The military government maintained control of the Moro Province until the end of 1913, at which time it was finally deemed stable enough to transition to civil control, thus signaling the end of the military counterinsurgency campaign. During the years between 1902 and 1913, the military government engaged in numerous operations and battles against rebellious Moro bands. Since the Army was the government at the time, most of the historiography of these years in Moro Province focuses on the purely military campaigns conducted by the U.S. Army. It was in these campaigns that John J. Pershing made his reputation and earned his promotion to Brigadier General, and their terms of service as military governors of Moro Province solidified the reputations of generals Leonard Wood and Tasker Bliss. A host of other officers who rose to prominence during World War I did so on the basis of solid reputations for achievement and performance earned fighting against the Moros. But while the military exploits of the campaign against the Moros receive by far most of the credit, these military campaigns were only one aspect of a broad campaign put into action by the military government.

The thesis will explore the strategy followed by the American military government in overcoming Moro resistance during the period of the military government from 1903-1913. The thesis is outlined in five chapters. Following the Introduction, a

chapter is devoted to the period of each of the three Military Governors of Moro Province, Generals Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss and John Pershing. Within each of those chapters, evidence from official reports of the Philippine Commission and Annual Reports to the War Department will show which initiatives were taken by the Military Government, in addition to the military campaigns against the Moros. These reports will demonstrate that a broad spectrum of initiatives to improve the government, economy, health, and education of the Moros was undertaken by the military government, and furthermore, that military operations were only intended to play a supporting role in the American strategy to pacify the Moros. The actual strategy of the American military government and each military governor was to focus primarily on first establishing a system of governance, followed by economic development supported by educational initiatives as a means of pacifying and controlling the Moros. However, security threats and violent opposition constantly hindered that strategy so that the desired end state of pacification and acquiescence to American rule could not be established. Ultimately, it was Pershing's decision to focus on security through his disarmament policy and the subsequent campaigns to enforce that policy that finally established conditions for the transition of governance to civilian control and end military government within the province. Despite only initially conceived of as a supporting effort to a broader whole of government approach, in the end military operations became the decisive means for ending Moro resistance to American authority. The final chapter analyzes the broad-spectrum strategy of the Military Government to determine how effective this strategy was and why military operations were ultimately decisive.

Primary Research Question

How did military operations support a broad-spectrum counterinsurgency strategy of the U.S. Military Government in the Moro Province between 1903 and 1913?

In pacifying and asserting U.S. government control over the Moro Province of the Philippines, the Military Government of the Moro Province adopted a strategy that primarily focused on governance and economic means to overcoming Moro resistance and that only employed military force as a last resort to suppress resistance. Although the Government of the Moro Province was a military government led by the U.S. Army, military operations in the province were initially a supporting effort rather than a main effort in the government's strategy to overcome Moro resistance. Eventually, the focus would shift to a military campaign as the primary focus of American strategy. The thesis will demonstrate how military operations supported a broad-spectrum counterinsurgency strategy of the U.S. Military Government in the Moro Province between 1903 and 1913 and also how this strategy evolved over time until military operations became the main effort of the American administration.

Each of the military governors brought their own unique approach to the pacification of the Moro Province. General Leonard Wood focused on the formation of a structured government for the province down to the local level. Wood believed that the Moro population would recognize U.S. authority once they were shown the benefits of good governance. He believed that the Moros would willingly switch from their customary and traditional forms of tribal rule to the new American system. Wood did believe that some military force would be required, but he also thought that one single demonstration of American power would be enough to convince the Moros the futility of

opposing the American military government. He spent the three years of his command convinced that each fight was the last, only to have resistance spring up again in other parts of the province.

General Tasker H. Bliss focused his strategy on the economic development of the province. Under traditional Moro leadership, individual Moros were reliant on the largesse of their leaders to survive. The economic system for the average Moro was one similar to slavery, peonage, serfdom or vassalage. Bliss hoped that through economic development, combined with education on craft and trade skills, individual Moros would be able to provide for themselves economically rather than relying on their leaders for support. Bliss focused the economic development of the Moro Province and aligned security operations to protect and promote the economic development that he wanted to foster. At the same time, he withdrew his forces out of contact with much of the population in an effort to be less confrontational. As a result, resistance continued to be widespread and the military government did not effectively expand its control or confront the sources of resistance.

General John J. Pershing was the final military governor of the Moro Province. It was during his tenure that security conditions were finally established to transition to civilian control. However, conditions at the beginning of the Pershing administration were such that Pershing thought long-term troop presence would be required and transition to civilian control was much farther off than it actually turned out to be. Pershing's initial strategy was two-fold. First, he would continue to focus and expand on the economic development strategy implemented by Bliss. Second, Pershing would refocus his troops to operate among the population. Pershing believed that the presence

of his troops peacefully moving about amongst the population and diplomatically engaging the population would promote stability in the province without the need for major campaigns. Continuing violence and resistance convinced Pershing that disarmament of the general population was required. Initially, this policy increased resistance. However, the military government's enforcement of disarmament was ultimately successful in ending widespread resistance in the Moro Province. The military government eventually adopted a strategy that relied on military force, but only after eight years of military governance that focused on governance and economics failed to achieve results. After nearly two years of focused military operations enforcing disarmament, security conditions were established so that Pershing could transfer the Moro Province to civilian control and end the military government.

Secondary Research Questions

What were the actual causes of the Moro Rebellion, and how did the government's strategy seek to deal with the underlying causes of the rebellion? How effective was the government's strategy in addressing the root causes of the conflict? Can the campaign against the Moros be properly described as a "successful" counterinsurgency campaign?

The military government was slow in recognizing and adapting its strategy to the root causes of resistance to American authority. Traditional Moro leaders were likely to lose political, economic and social power and prestige under the new American government. As a result, many Moro tribal and religious leaders became promoters of resistance. American attempts to co-opt those leaders through diplomatic engagement at

the local level were insufficient during much of the military government, although Pershing pushed for greater efforts once he took charge.

American governance also failed to sufficiently address cultural considerations that provoked resistance. Moro hierarchical authority and cultural practices such as slavery and the carrying of arms were enshrined in Moro interpretations of Islam so that any changes to custom and tradition were seen as attacks on religion. American concepts of “civilizing” the Moros were too often perceived by the Moros to actually be “de-Islamizing” the Moro way of life. Leaders threatened with loss of power were able to capitalize on those perceptions and gather support for resistance.

Much of the resistance to authority was made worse by missteps of the military government. Economic development eventually led to labor exploitation of the native population that over time prompted resistance among the growing number of agricultural workers. The consolidation of military forces into garrisons during the Bliss administration encouraged resistance leaders to ignore or discount American military power. It took years before the military government realized that expanding military presence into the furthest areas of the province was essential to overcoming resistance and that governance and economic development could not accomplish the job alone.

Significance

The thesis is significant for several reasons. The counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines represents the first time in United States military history that the U.S. conducted such operations outside the continental United States. Additionally, the military governance in the Moro Province represents the first time the U.S. military conducted a counter-insurgency campaign within an Islamic society. Much can be

learned from studying this first example of engaging Islamic societies during a counter-insurgency campaign when since 9/11 U.S. forces have been and are currently engaged in counter-insurgency operations across the globe. One hundred years after first conducting a counter-insurgency operation against Moro insurgents, U.S forces returned to the southern Philippines to assist the Philippine government in suppressing Moro insurgents as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. A more thorough, comprehensive understanding of U.S. military governance of the Moros will provide invaluable insight for conducting counter-insurgency operations within Islamic societies not just in the southern Philippines, but across the globe as well.

Limitations

Research: The focus of this thesis will be on the U.S. perspective. Accounts from the Moro perspective do not exist given the lack of literacy and organized structure of Moro institutions at the time. Research in the Philippines might produce some secondary accounts from the Moro perspective, but they are not available in the United States.

Topic: The thesis will focus on strategies implemented by each of the military governors of the Moro Province. During that time period, the Moro Province was the only part of the Philippines operating under a military government. As such, it stands apart from the rest of the U.S. administration of the Philippines because it had the authority to govern independently from Manila. The military government of the Moro Province passed its own laws and policies based on local assessments and one cannot assume that American policies implemented in Manila applied to the Moro Province during the period of military government.

Literature Review

Amazingly little has been written about the military government of the Moro Province. Most of the secondary sources overlook the Moro Province entirely after the end of the Philippine War in 1902, or make the faulty assumption that American governance there was no different than in the rest of the Philippines during this time. However, primary sources from the American perspective are plentiful.

Primary Sources

The Annual Reports of the War Department for the fiscal years 1903 through 1914 are essential primary source material for this topic. These multi-volume reports include reports from the Philippine Commission, the governmental body that governed the Philippines, as well as includes for most years reports submitted by individual provincial governors. The military governors produced provincial reports for the Philippine Commission, but also submitted reports in their role as military commanders through the military chain of command, and that also appear in Annual Reports of the War Department. As a result, separate reports written by the military governors provide both the military and the governance perspective of how they approached conditions within their province.

The personal papers of the military governors Wood, Bliss and Pershing are all available at the Library of Congress, but time and resource constraints prevented their use in developing this thesis. To mitigate this, biographies that cited those personal papers were used to supplement these military governors' official reports.

Several officers stationed in the Moro Province during this period wrote memoirs of their experiences that are useful in gaining a personal perspective of American

governance of the Moro Province during this time period. These include the following: Lieutenant Colonel Sydney Cloman's *Myself and a Few Moros* (1923), General Hugh Lenox Scott's *Some Memories of a Soldier* (1928), and Colonel John R. White's *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (reprinted 2007).

Secondary Sources

A limited number of secondary sources exist on this topic, and the majority of sources that do exist are long out of print. Biographies of the military governors are useful, but all too often there is little space given to the period in which these men served as military governors. Within most biographies of the military governors, their periods as Chief of Staff of the Army and the events of World War I remain the primary focus even though each of these officers spent far more time in the Moro Province than they devoted to the war in Europe. Biographies of Pershing also devote much more space to his first tour of the Moro Province where he first rose to fame as a Captain than during his tenure as military governor in later years. The day-to-day minutia of military governance attracts little attention compared to exploits in the field. The following are the most useful secondary sources for studying this topic.

Andrew J. Birtle's *U.S. Army Counter-insurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (1998) describes the development of U.S. Army counter-insurgency doctrine and how well the U.S. Army did or did not incorporate experiences in the field into its doctrine for the future. Birtle devotes a chapter to the Philippine War, and another chapter to constabulary operations in the Philippines in the years following. Birtle provides a useful synopsis of military tactics used in region and describes how the

U.S. developed native auxiliary forces such as the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary throughout the Philippines, to include the Moro Province.

A.B. Feuer's *America at War: The Philippines, 1898-1913* (2002) focuses on the experience of the common American soldier in the Philippines. He relies almost exclusively on primary source material from letters and diaries to describe some of the battles and operations that occurred throughout the Philippines. He covers some of the battles in the Moro Province and includes some descriptions of the tactics and techniques used by American soldiers. However, Feuer includes virtually no context of the events in the Philippines so the reader is left with no understanding of why the battles occurred and who were the enemy the soldiers were fighting.

Robert A. Fulton's *Moroland 1899-1906: America's First Attempt to Transform an Islamic Society* (2007) book is the only book in print regarding American governance of the Moro Province. He relies on government reports and official documents, as well as the personal papers of some of the leading figures. Fulton attempts to describe the attitude of the American government in the States, the government's approach to the province, and analyze the American administration of the Moro territories during the years from 1899-1906. The obvious shortcoming is that Fulton only covers part of the time period of military governance, intending to later write a second volume to cover the Bliss and Pershing administrations. Fulton does a good job describing the situation facing Leonard Wood. However, Fulton focuses on the military battles that occurred and describing them, and does not adequately identify the overall strategy that Wood was trying to implement. Although Fulton provides a well-researched account of the military battles, he does not demonstrate how these fights do or do not compliment Wood's overall concept of establishing a government and managing the province.

Peter Gordon Gowing's *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920* (1977) is the best secondary source on the Moro Province during the period of military government. The book relies principally on the Annual Reports of the War

Department, as well as official documentation by the Philippine Commission and Provincial governors. As the book was only published in the Philippines and in a limited quantity, there are unfortunately very few copies of the book available. Gowing does a good job describing what the American military government did, but does not adequately outline and explain the overall strategy of each military governor and how particular government policies were implemented to support their overall strategies.

Hermann Hagedorn's *Leonard Wood: A Biography* (1931) biography of Leonard Wood is useful in describing Wood's views on the Moro Province. Like other biographies, too few pages are devoted to the time Wood spent in the Philippines as military governor of the Moro Province. Additionally, and as is the case with most biographical accounts, Hagedorn is not nearly critical enough of his subject to do a full scholarly analysis or to remove any bias. The preponderance of Wood's actions are interpreted as successes, while mistakes are not identified in the account.

Vic Hurley's *Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros* (1936) and *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary* (1938) were written based on Hurley's own journalistic travel throughout the Philippines and the interviews he conducted with members of the military and constabulary forces. The books are not scholarly works and include no citations. They were written to highlight the exploits of the members of the security forces in the Philippines. *Swish of the Kris* does provide a historical overview of the Moro people, but neither work includes anything more than superficial analysis. Hurley's books are collections of anecdotes designed to emphasize the adventure and martial valor of the men who fought, and are heavily biased towards the American participants against a savage and uncivilized enemy.

Frederick Palmer's *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker Howard Bliss* (1934) remains the only biography written on Tasker Bliss. Like other biographies written in that time period, this one is too biased towards the subject and devotes too little space to the time

spent in the Moro Province. However, it does provide a basic understanding of the background and career that prepared Bliss for his role as military governor of the Moro Province.

There are two useful biographies of John Pershing. Donald Smythe's *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing* (1973) is a basic biography of Pershing, and it makes use of *The Pershing Papers* collected in the Library of Congress. Frank E. Vandiver's *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing* (1977) work on Pershing is the most detailed and comprehensive biography of Pershing. It makes use of *The Pershing Papers* collected in the Library of Congress and devotes significantly more attention to Pershing's time in the Philippines, when compared with other biographies.

CHAPTER 2

THE LEONARD WOOD YEARS, 1903-1906

Introduction

In February 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt informed Judge William Howard Taft, Governor-General of the Philippines, that he was sending Brigadier General Leonard Wood to the Philippines to head the military government of the newly created Moro Province. Wood was coming to the Moro Province from Cuba, where he had been in charge of a combined civil and military government there and had performed successfully. Although Wood had some experience to draw from, he had never served in the Philippines before.

Wood's approach on taking control of the province was based on his idea that reform was necessary in order to bring the Moro Province in line with the United States' ideal of proper government and civilization. Such reforms entailed the abolition of slavery traditionally practiced by the Moros, the establishment of order, even if it required greater direct military force, the implementation of new, more sophisticated (modern) methods of taxation, including the old Spanish *cedula* poll tax that had never before been enforced under the Spanish and, lastly, the replacement of the traditional Moro legal code, which was based on Islamic law, with the U.S. legal code.¹ The reforms naturally clashed with Moro traditions and culture and were bound to provoke hostile reactions. Wood wrote President Roosevelt on August 3, 1903 addressing the Moro groups' unwillingness to acquiesce to American authority and that he believed an upcoming fight with the Moros was imminent. Wood did not think the fight would be that serious, but stated that he intended the American response to be so severe as to

discourage further conflict, thinking that “one clean-cut lesson will be enough for them.”² Wood’s initial strategy did not envision a long, drawn out military campaign designed to eliminate resistance. After handing the Moros a swift defeat, Wood thought he would then be able to implement his policy of reforms and direct control aimed at civilizing the Moros. The establishment of a government to enact these reforms and thereby implement direct control was thus the priority of effort during Wood’s term.

The Moro Province was officially organized by an act of the Philippine Commission on June 1, 1903, and Wood arrived to officially take over governorship of the province in Zamboanga on August 6, 1903. Two days later, he began a tour of the province and its districts. His first impression was that it would be years before the Moros were capable of self-governance.³ Wood initially thought that the Moro problem was blatantly over-exaggerated and believed that the solution lay in the implementation of a simple organized patriarchal government.⁴ This government would craft laws and implement policies that would be designed to develop individualism among the Moros and to break the bonds between heads of households and their traditional leaders known as *datus*. American authority and law and order would be enforced. The population would be educated to prepare them to eventually participate in local and provincial governments that conformed to American standards of governance. The province would be developed economically so that it would become self-sufficient in its operations and thereby increase the standard of living of the inhabitants. Local customs and traditions would be respected, but only so long as they did not interfere with the government’s efforts to civilize or modernize the province. In short, the provincial government implemented by Leonard Wood was designed to transform the inhabitants of the Moro

province into a modern, civilized people, which conformed to an undefined American pre-conception of the level of civilization that was required for eventual self-government. Government organization, education and economic development would accomplish that transformation, while military force would quickly and firmly put down any resistance.

Government Organization

One of the first steps in organizing the Moro Province was the abrogation of the Bates Agreement. The decision to terminate the Bates Agreement was made before Leonard Wood arrived to organize the Moro Province. However, it was up to him to determine what form the military government would take, and how it would implement control over the territory once the Bates Agreement was no longer in effect.

The intent of the military government in the Moro Province was to establish a civil government in all respects except that military officers would hold the majority of the governmental positions.⁵ Wood interpreted that the mission of the government of the Moro Province was to initially provide immediate control over the province. The government would then gradually transform its functions to resemble those at work in the rest of the Philippines until eventually it fully transitioned to the same form of civil government being implemented by the Philippine Commission in Manila.⁶ Wood conceived that he needed to get the inhabitants of the province used to government control, law and order, and attempt to raise them from a state of savagery until they were at the same level of civilization as other parts of the Philippines and therefore ready for the same type of government.⁷ To that end, Wood focused the majority of his efforts on implementing a form of government rather than on efforts at pacification, and military efforts were reactive rather than proactive campaigns.

The governor of the Moro Province reported to the civil governor of the Philippines in all matters of civil government, and reported to the military commander of the Philippine Division only on those issues requiring executive action by the overall commander of military forces in the islands. A legislative council that had the authority to pass legislation for the province assisted the military governor.⁸ The Moro Province was divided up into five districts: Zamboanga, Sulu, Lanao, Cotabato and Davao. Each district was appointed a governor, secretary and treasurer. Each governor was a military officer, either a captain or major, and usually the commanding officer of the local army garrison.

District governors were encouraged to use every means available to establish friendly relations with the local inhabitants of their district, gain their confidence, explain to them the purpose of the new district governments, and “influence the people to discontinue slavery and other vicious practices.” Wood’s initial guidance was an effort on the part of the Americans to attempt to address cultural issues with an eye towards changing those found to be objectionable. The districts were to be divided into municipalities centered in the larger towns in each district, but lack of available and qualified administrative personnel delayed the formation of those municipal governments.⁹

Areas within the districts were governed as either municipalities or tribal wards. Municipalities were organized as representative governments based on small town governance practiced in the United States with town councils and town presidents. Tribal and ethnic representation on the municipal councils was allocated proportionally according to each group’s proportion within the population to ensure fair representation.¹⁰

Tribal wards were established to govern those areas outside municipal limits. The tribal wards relied on traditional Moro leaders to apply the new American rules of government, but still allowed the traditional tribal or paternal form of authority to function. The vast majority of Moros naturally fell under the tribal ward system because they lived outside of towns. In both types of local government, the American government tried to co-opt local leaders and local support into backing American authority and working within the framework of governance the Americans were attempting to implement.

The ultimate aim of the district governors was to establish and promote good governance within their districts with the goal of giving local leaders the experience and knowledge necessary to be able to eventually establish local popular government. From the beginning it was not envisioned that military governance of the province would continue indefinitely, and district governors were expected to keep an eye on eventually transitioning control over to local civil governments. The Americans believed that in time the inhabitants would see the value in a municipal government system after observing the initial municipal governments at work, and elect to switch from a tribal ward to a municipal government.¹¹ Wood was relying on a strategy based on the principle that “good” governance, defined as following the Americans’ model of government, was universally attractive and desirable to all people, and a belief that the Moros would see the inherent value of such a system and voluntarily accept it without coercion. Naturally, this belief did not fully take into account the power of Moro culture, nor the desire of individual Moro leaders to resist threats to their traditional power and authority that switching to a new system of government would involve.

At the end of the 1904 fiscal year, Wood's first year in control, 11 municipal governments had been established. The establishment of municipal government did not always go smoothly. In the annual report for FY1904, the district of Zamboanga had to replace all members of the municipal council due to unsatisfactory performance. But once the replacements were made, the new municipal council was reported to have done their jobs satisfactorily. The district of Davao experienced similar problems, but reported that every effort was made to appoint the best and most capable locals that were available as municipal officials. In order to overcome those difficulties, district governors took a hands-on approach by conducting frequent inspections and visits to the councils in their district to deal with problems and providing guidance and mentorship to native officials.¹²

The organization of the municipal governments reflected many of the ideals enshrined in representative government. They were meant to be representative of the people they governed, with electoral rules somewhat similar to American voter rules at the time. They were also organized in a way to attempt to conform to American interpretations of "good" governance and capable of looking after the welfare of those governed. In the very least, limits were established which aimed to prevent corrupt practices and restrict the use of civic offices for personal profit. Moreover, district governors were expected to provide oversight to prevent the abuse of power. The resulting government was then expected to serve as the best advertisement for what Moros could expect from good governance, so that Moros in the tribal wards would see how preferable it was to their traditional mode of authority and voluntarily place themselves under control of the municipal government. The increasing spread of

American civil control was to be accomplished by the population voluntarily submitting to control, not through subjugation through force of arms.

Legal System

Prior to the American occupation of the Moro territories, all legal authority rested in the traditional headmen, be they sultan or datu, and they had an almost total and arbitrary control over that part of the population that owed them allegiance. Under the Bates Agreement, traditional local leaders were responsible for trying and adjudicating legal and criminal disputes in which all parties were Moros in accordance with traditional law and custom derived from a Sharia based legal code. The majority American view was that the Moro system was inherently corrupt as judges were far from impartial in the disputes. They believed the local leaders were impartial because they had a vested interest in the dispute and because the judges kept as income all money and property resulting from the fines that they imposed.¹³

General Wood concluded that there really was no Moro system of laws actually in practice among the Moros, but instead only a few customs that were arbitrarily enforced. In order for his strategy of promoting good governance to work, it had to be backed by a fair and just legal system that both enforced authority but checked arbitrary power wielded by traditional Moro authorities. Wood's administration abandoned initial plans to collect and codify traditional Moro customs into a legal code that could serve as a basis for an updated legal system. By the end of FY1904, the American government believed that the traditional Moro courts allowed under the Bates Agreement and that were still operating within the tribal ward system must be eliminated. Instead, all disputes and crimes needed to be adjudicated within a single justice system, regardless of ethnic and

cultural background of any of the participants. A district court system was thus established to bring all inhabitants of the province into the jurisdiction of a single legal code.¹⁴

In order to implement a legal system for the province, military officers had to take a role in the courts until the new system was firmly established. Army officers served as justices of the peace, and district governors and district secretaries served as the presiding justices in local courts.¹⁵ The provincial attorney represented the military government as prosecutor during court cases.¹⁶ Given the difficulty in finding locals suitable to serve as justices of the peace, the military government refrained from investing headmen of the tribal wards with any judicial authority beyond strict traditional authority.¹⁷ Therefore, the new legal system gave all the important legal roles in court proceedings to Americans, in effect limiting participation in the legal system. Traditional tribal authorities continued to exercise their own authority, so the only cases brought before the new courts were those that the Americans chose to prosecute and were able to bring before the court.

The tribal ward courts had authority over all civil and criminal cases within the tribal ward and the justices were to ensure that local customs were taken into account in their rulings. The hope was that as these courts gained credibility with the inhabitants through their rulings, trust in the American government would increase, as well as the court's authority and influence.¹⁸ However, the courts' power depended on the cooperation and voluntary submission of local leaders willing to cede their traditional authority to the courts. The courts could enforce American power, but could not extend legal protection and justice to the population as a whole as long as the traditional local

leader remained vested with traditional authority. For years to come, Wood's successors would have to deal with parallel systems of justice where local leaders tried to exert traditional authority and justice within their jurisdiction in defiance of American authority.

One of the first legal initiatives of the military government was to address the problem of slavery that existed within the Moro Province. The newly established Moro Council passed a law on September 24, 1903 to abolish slavery and the slave trade. Vessels involved in the trade were to be confiscated, and the owning, sale of or buying of slaves was punishable by up to twenty years in prison or fines amounting to ten thousand pesos. Wood knew the law would not eliminate the practice overnight, but he hoped that the gradual enforcement of the law would eventually stamp it out. Wood explained his policy in a letter to Taft, stating that he believed a strong policy that was vigorously enforced would convince the Moros to obey the law once they learned that if they broke it they would be tracked down and punished. Over time, Wood believed, the Moros would learn to appreciate justice and the protection of life and property the policy brought. Wood sent out expeditions to spread the word among the Moros of the new policy and explain it to them, believing that continually sending out expeditions would be the most effective way of informing the Moros of the policy and then enforcing it.¹⁹

Despite passage of the anti-slavery law, some slavery still existed within the province, but efforts were made to ensure every slave was informed that they were now free. Also, each slave was informed that they could appeal to the district governor for protection if their former masters were intent on retaining their slaves.²⁰ The district government provided assistance to newly freed slaves to help them settle on independent

land holdings. With the end of slavery, Wood expected that the Datu system of loyalty would collapse within a few years leaving only local leaders appointed within the American government system holding any influence.²¹

Wood's efforts to eliminate slavery ultimately did not work, and the issue rose again during Pershing's term. American authority simply did not extend far enough to eliminate it completely, only drive it out of sight and reach of American authorities for the time being. Wood was able to proclaim a successful end to slavery, but it was only superficial at best.

The American government put in place a legal code that functioned in accordance with the same values upon which the American legal system was based. In doing so, they sought to remove some of the arbitrary power that traditional Moros leaders had possessed over their followers. Despite having to place Americans in the primary judicial positions of authority, the military government expected those Americans to act impartially and in accordance with American standards of justice. However, some conflicts of interest must undoubtedly have arisen since a district governor could order the arrest of an individual and then preside as judge at the person's trial. Such imperfections in the legal system were acceptable compared to what had served as justice under the near feudalism of the datu system. Additionally, the legal system gave the Americans the ability to establish law and order and reinforce its authority while simultaneously weakening the traditional structures of Moro tribal authority.

Taxation

Economic development was one of the key means that Wood expected would civilize and modernize the Moros and enable eventual self-rule, and the military

government had an ambitious plan for expanding the economic development of the province. In order to accomplish its aims at developing the Moro Province, the military government needed to establish a system for collecting revenue. Government revenues paid for infrastructure projects and an educational system that would encourage economic development. Taxation was also another means of establishing government control over the population and asserting its authority.

The military government of the Moro Province immediately set about collecting and disbursing what revenues it could collect. A poll tax and a license tax on firearms and local trading vessels were the first to be implemented. The poll tax, commonly known as the *cedula* from the Spanish poll tax that had been in place in the rest of the Philippines and continued under American administration, was introduced in the Moro Province for the first time. The revenues of the *cedula* were used to support the administration of the tribal ward.²² Early reports claimed the *cedula* was met with little resistance although it was slow to be implemented and collected in all areas. In later years, the government reported that the poll tax was strongly opposed and the inhabitants' resentment of the *cedula* tax was blamed as one of the causes for some Moros to take up armed resistance to against the American government.²³ For these Moros, payment of the *cedula* was interpreted as a form of tribute paid for the right to occupy their own traditional lands, thus causing cultural conflict and resistance. Americans interpreted the motivation of some of the Moros at the Battle of Bud Dajo in 1906 as resistance to the *cedula* tax.²⁴ By the end of FY1906, only 40,000 people had paid the tax. However, as the Moros began to understand and see that the funds raised through taxes were actually

being spent on infrastructure in their areas, the Americans perceived resistance to these taxes to decrease.²⁵

The American government recognized the potential for unfair and corrupt government practices to foment resistance to American rule, so it wanted to minimize that potential opposition, while at the same time getting the population accustomed and used to the mechanisms of modern civil government. The American government went to great efforts to ensure that taxes were assessed and collected fairly and equitably without corruption. A reading of any of the tax acts passed during that time shows that each act was crafted in such a way to ensure fairness in order to limit opposition to it to the greatest extent possible. The revenue generated by the tax was of far less importance than the implementation of a system of taxation that instilled in those taxed expectations of fairness and transparency in civil government behavior. The American system of taxation was designed to help win the hearts and minds of the Moro population and further demonstrate the value of civil government by directly countering the arbitrariness of taxation that existed under the traditional *datu* system. In order to gain acceptance among the people, new tax acts were created in such a way that the people would find the American system more preferable and better than what had existed before.²⁶

Tax collections increased during each year of Wood's tenure, so that when he departed the province was entirely solvent. By the end of FY1906, tax revenues were reliable enough that the military government was able to plan a yearly budget for the province. This was a significant improvement from the years before Wood when it was only possible for the government to budget and allocate funds on a bi-monthly basis because revenue amounts were inconsistent. Customs revenues likewise increased,

especially at the ports in Jolo and Zamboanga that were developed as ports of call for international trade.

However, overall the finances of the province were severely limited due to the difficulty in collecting taxes from all the inhabitants.²⁷ Government reach simply did not extend far enough among the majority of the population to actually collect taxes, even when there was no resistance. It would take many years before a fair and transparent tax policy helped to encourage favorable perceptions of American governance, despite Wood's best hopes that it would do so.

Education

The school districts of Mindanao and Jolo were separated from the other school districts in the Philippines upon creation of the Moro Province. The school superintendent in the Moro Province reported not to the general superintendent of education for the Philippines as other provincial and district superintendents did, but instead reported directly to the provincial governor. The superintendent who took charge of the Moro Province school system was Dr. Najeeb M. Saleeby, who was considered to be an expert on Moro culture and as such was one of General Wood's primary advisors, but he inherited an educational system developed by H. S. Townsend.²⁸

The overall goal of the general superintendent of education for the Philippines was to develop a primary education system that provided every Philippine child at least an opportunity to receive a basic modern education so that the inhabitants of the Philippines would be capable of participating in self-government and every other aspect of economic and social life.²⁹ Within the Moro Province, the main purpose of the school system was to introduce the youth of the population, especially the Moros, certain

“fundamental modern ideas” common among all civilized people and thereby help the inhabitants of the Moro province reach the same level of civilization as the rest of the Philippines. During the early years, spread of government control had not extended sufficiently enough to allow the school system to focus on the Moro population, even though it recognized that the Moros were its primary target population for education efforts. By the end of FY1906, the school superintendent hoped to shift greater attention and funding towards increasing the enrollment and education of Moro students. The main effort for Moro students was to establish manual training and trade schools because the Moros culturally disdained traditional academic subjects as not being worthwhile to learn. Once Moro confidence in the schools was established and they began to see the value of education in earning a living, then the course of instruction could refocus on academics. What the Moro needed to learn in the immediate future was how to be a better farmer and builder of homes, carts, plows and boats.³⁰

In his final report before transitioning control of the Mindanao and Jolo school district to the newly created Moro Province, district superintendent H. S. Townsend reported that the military government in that area had completely neglected to support and organize the formation of the schools in the Moro areas. He blamed the military’s sole focus on policing the territory rather than on attempting to establish government institutions in the area as the source of the problem. As a result, there were few municipal governments that were sufficiently developed enough to support the educational system. He also noted that under military control, the military government allocated no funds for educational development, nor would the superintendent have had any control over the use of such funds had they been available. As a result, the

superintendent had to personally try to convince each military officer to spend money for educational development out of their general operating funds for the areas under their jurisdiction. This was difficult to do and inefficient, and military officers had their own priorities that Townsend was working against.³¹

The first problem in developing an educational system for the Moro people was in getting teachers into the Moro communities. Recruiting teachers was difficult due to poor conditions and the cultural mistrust of the Moros towards outsiders. At the end of 1903, there was no secondary school in operation in Moro Province. Although the superintendent wanted to start one, the lack of adequate funding and staffing precluded such hopes. As a result, there was no higher educational available in the province that could be used to educate a native teaching cadre for primary schools.³² Plans were made in 1904 to establish such a school during FY1905. Through the proposed six-year curriculum plan, the primary school would educate the youth so that they could serve in local government or as teachers.³³ These teachers would not enter the teaching force until the Pershing Administration of the province in 1911 and 1912.

The second problem was in developing suitable curriculum that would make education seem beneficial and useful to a people whose traditional way of life did not require reading and writing. Townsend used the example of the Moro school in Zamboanga to demonstrate how a craft oriented curriculum was perhaps better suited than a traditional educational curriculum. The focus would be geared toward teaching the students something useful in the school that would help them in adult life and would teach the students crafts and economic skills that would be more practical than teaching students to read when there was little purpose to reading in their culture outside of school. Instead of teaching reading and writing, the children were taught how to make simple crafts and ornaments that the students could then sell for money. The acquisition of money was highly valued by Moros, so the idea of making money was well received by students, and they actually made ornaments and sold them in the market. Townsend reported that

the school in Zamboanga was doing so well that he intended that all other Moro schools use it as a model.³⁴ The school continued to do well as a manual training school, but Dr. Saleeby noted in later years that boys were still largely uninterested in learning to become skilled artisans or farmers or anything else that could be construed as manual labor. Dr. Saleeby was concerned that unless there was a class interested in learning the skilled trades, the province, and the Philippines in general, would continue to be underdeveloped economically.³⁵ This approach to education would be greatly expanded during Tasker Bliss's tenure as military governor.

At the end of FY1904, 52 schools were in operation, employing 15 American and 59 native teachers. There were 2,114 students enrolled in school within the province, but only 240 were Moro children. Despite the low numbers, the school superintendent noted that the Moros were becoming much less suspicious of the schools. Over time, suspicion of education decreased especially among Moro leaders who increasingly desired that their male children learn English³⁶. Moro enrollment was expected to greatly increase because Moro leaders were beginning to request that the government establish schools in their areas.³⁷ At the end of FY1906, enrollment reached 4,235 with an average attendance of 2,021 students, with Moros only making up 570 of those enrolled and around 300 of those attending. This is from a population that the school superintendent estimated should be enrolling over 30,000 students, but most still remained out of reach of the school system. In 1906, the legislative council passed a compulsory education law within the province, dictating a school attendance within every school until its maximum teaching and seating capacity had been reached. The law dictated attendance for those children between the ages of seven and 13 and who resided within two miles of either a public or parochial school.³⁸

One of the initial objectives of the schools in 1903 was to teach the students English in order to establish that as the primary language of the province. The Moro languages had never been used to write history or literature, but only to translate the Koran and outdated Islamic legal

codes from Arabic into the local dialect. However, the provincial government saw no value in maintaining the various native dialects within the province as they considered them primitive and crude.³⁹ Eventually, the American school system began to reconsider its position on Moro language. During FY1906, Moro students began being issued textbooks written in Moro languages using Arabic letters. A shortage of teachers proficient in English and the high salaries the province was required to pay American teachers delayed the spread of English language instruction. It proved especially difficult to find suitable teachers within the province that spoke Moro and English, and there was still a shortage at the end of FY1906. By that time, the Americans had reconsidered its position on English being the language of instruction, opting instead that native languages needed to be the primary language of instruction. What was important was that the teacher knew English so that they could be trained and educated in American ideas and then could transmit those ideas to the pupils quickly and efficiently in the native language, thus saving a lot of time and effort. Since the focus of education for the Moros was to be on a manual education, rather than an academic education based on book learning, the study of the English language was not important to their success.⁴⁰ This approach was eventually overturned once the provincial school system was integrated with the rest of the Philippine education system towards the end of Pershing's administration.

Infrastructure

Leonard Wood knew that the key to improving the economic development of the Moro Province was to improve the infrastructure in the province. Additionally, improvements to the infrastructure were also required for military purposes to allow the expansion of government authority. The military government could not control what it could not reach. However, public works projects were planned and executed that had no other purpose than improving the lives of the inhabitants in the province, beginning with

the cities. In order to develop a modern civilized population, the inhabitants needed at the very least some of the basic amenities of civilization.

There were few infrastructure projects completed in the first year after the creation of the Moro Province. Since it was the first year that provincial revenue had been collected, there was little available money to fund infrastructure projects on a large scale. Priorities went to government buildings, repairing wharves, building a provincial jail, and repairing or constructing roads. Water systems and municipal public works were identified as principal needs within the major towns, but at the end of FY1904 there was no money to pay for them. Skilled labor was in short supply and labor shortages also limited projects. While it was permissible to use enlisted soldiers to provide skilled labor for public works projects, such soldiers had to be paid for their time and skills out of provincial funds and in addition to their normal soldier pay.⁴¹

In FY1904, U.S. Army engineers constructed three major road systems that served a primarily military function in maintaining the garrisons in the Lake Lanao region. These roads allowed for the military government to establish and maintain a presence in the interior regions, which was vitally important since contact with the Moros was the principle means of establishing government supervision and authority. Whenever possible, Army engineers employed native labor on these road projects to build as well as maintain the roads once they were completed. Lack of affordable native laborers was actually blamed for the lack of road construction in Davao during that year.⁴²

Army engineers also built wharves at the seaports of Zamboanga and Jolo to improve the commercial capacities of those trade centers. As with the roads, native labor

was used to build the wharves when possible. A wharf was also constructed at Parang for the purpose of turning the coastal village into a harbor capable of supporting ocean vessels with up to a twenty-foot draft. Even though there were upriver companies that needed to be supplied, it was envisioned that this combined road and wharf project would spur economic development at the mouth of the Rio Grande River (also known as Cotabato River) and give the Moros in Cotabato a place on the coast to trade. For all projects, the Army engineers purchased local building materials and only imported building material when it was completely unavailable otherwise.⁴³

As revenues increased during the years General Wood was in command, increased funding was given to public infrastructure projects. However, the projects often took years to complete. A number of the road and wharf projects completed in FY1904 even had to be rebuilt because they degraded quickly due to the tropical environment and the lack of durable building materials such as steel and cement. The American government determined that projects would not be undertaken that were temporary in nature (unless of military necessity). By FY1906, policy dictated that all projects undertaken needed to be permanent in nature and designed to last in the tropical environment. This meant that construction within the province was laborious and expensive, and funds therefore had to be planned for maintenance and upkeep. In addition, the government decided that the best policy was not to build more roads than could be maintained by their resources and justified by their potential use. In some areas such as the Cotabato district, Moros for centuries had relied on water routes along inland rivers and streams, so native travel did not justify the expense of a system of roads the Moros would not use.⁴⁴

At the end of General Wood's tenure as military governor, the Moro Province still did not have a public hospital established anywhere in the province. The government recognized the need for one, but at that time still had not come up with the funds required to build and staff the facility. Military garrisons provided care to the sick and injured among local populations as resources allowed and the provincial government reimbursed military units the cost of treating the locals. Military surgeons that treated locals received additional pay for their services as the local health officials of the government. The medical services provided by the military surgeons established a great deal of goodwill towards the American government by the Moros.⁴⁵

Provincial, district and municipal boards of health were established in FY1905 to assess the needs of the local populations. The government did establish a vaccination program to try to protect the population from several of the more common illnesses, but provincial reports do not provide any details regarding the number of vaccinations or the receptiveness of the population to those vaccinations. The government did assert that the vaccination program and quarantine procedures were very effective at keeping smallpox at bay.⁴⁶ In the interests of public health, government inspectors proposed building public bath and laundry facilities in the larger towns. Also, the government passed ordinances requiring the use of distilled water in restaurants, hotels, and bars to ensure clean water was used in those establishments. Public works in Zamboanga and Jolo included gutters and drainage ditches to eliminate standing water.⁴⁷ While there were no major outbreaks in the Moro Province during Wood's tenure, cholera was a major concern motivating health officials to improve public sanitation. However, most of these

measures were of limited effectiveness with the population as a whole as they were only implemented in the few urban areas of the Moro Province.

Infrastructure development during Wood's tenure did much to improve the economic development of the province. The port improvements cannot be underestimated in the amount they aided the development of trade at the Moro ports. The large increases in customs revenue made it possible to fund most of the government's programs and other economic development projects that will be described later. The Army had to scale back on some of its ambitious road building and construction projects once they became accustomed to the effects of the tropical climate. This slowed down the development, but the Army learned to invest in projects designed for permanent improvements, or simply to scale back. Medical infrastructure was still lacking due to funding, but the Army was making the most of what few resources it possessed so that there was still an overall improvement in the health of those Moros close enough to the Army garrisons to receive care. As a result, the Army was able to foster a degree of good will within its immediate vicinity despite lagging behind the rest of the Philippines.

Economy

General Davis reported that once the Moros were taught useful trades that they could employ to earn wages, the next generation would be more useful members of the community.⁴⁸ If the overall goal was to "civilize" the Moros, then the main methods to be used to civilize them were to be educational and economic through the development of useful trades. Economic initiatives started under Woods' tenure were aimed at stimulating growth and prosperity, using subsidized ventures allowed to operate at a loss if necessary.⁴⁹ With the growth of economic opportunities in the province, the Moros

would be motivated by personal profit to adopt a more civilized lifestyle made possible under American rule.

The provincial government was interested from the start in furthering the economic development of the province. During the provincial government's first year in operation, it was noted that merchants in the province imported the vast majority of their goods through Manila. This meant that the port of Manila collected all the customs revenue from those goods, which accounted for three-fifths of the dutiable goods sold in the Moro Province. The provincial government stated that one of their objectives for the coming year was to improve communications with foreign ports so that international commercial vessels could dock in ports within the Moro Province and trade their goods with local merchants directly.⁵⁰ This would lower the cost that local merchants had to pay for the goods since they would not have to pay middlemen in Manila to transport the goods to Moro merchants. At the same time, revenues within the Moro province would be increased by enabling customs duties to be levied and retained locally from international vessels rather than giving up that revenue to the customs agents in Manila. Having international vessels docking directly in provincial ports was seen as one of the most beneficial objectives towards improving the commercial conditions within the province. Elsewhere it has already been noted that the wharf construction projects undertaken had increased the port's capacity for commercial trade. By the end of FY1906, customs receipts in Jolo and Zamboanga had considerably increased as a result of the government's efforts to make the ports suitable for international trade. There were direct steamship lines between Zamboanga and Chinese ports and the customs revenue was being used to further expand the port capacity for larger ocean going vessels.⁵¹

One of the biggest stumbling blocks for the agricultural sector was the massive livestock losses suffered in 1902-1903 as a result of various livestock diseases such as surra and rhinderpest. Carabao, horses and cattle were vitally important to the agricultural economy and the large losses in livestock hindered development. It also negatively affected the security situation as well, as army officers had to deal with instances of cattle thievery that threatened to provoke violence between various Moro groups.⁵² Cattle thievery between rival Moro groups was widespread and often led to enmity and hostilities between those groups. The government reported significant decreases in cattle thievery in 1906 following government sponsored agricultural expositions which brought large numbers of Moro leaders together to interact with each other in a peaceful setting and where many leaders met each other face to face for the first time.

To improve the health of local livestock, the government employed veterinarians to help vaccinate animals and provide care. By the end of FY1906, the diseases of surra and rhinderpest were greatly reduced in the province.⁵³ All animals imported into the province had to go through an inspection and quarantine period. Initially, veterinarians implemented an inspection program to identify diseased animals and have them killed before the disease could spread. As the killing of the animals caused great resentment among their owners, the veterinarians learned to quarantine suspect animals until observable symptoms manifested so that the livestock owners would acquiesce to the destruction of their animals. To encourage early identification of livestock diseases, the government imposed a fine on any owners failing to report cases of livestock diseases

among their animals or failing to quarantine and later cremate their own infected animals.⁵⁴

Another problem that the government had to overcome was the native practice of selling off their livestock at the end of every harvest season. Due to shortsightedness or inability to provide for their livestock year round, the natives would sell off their carabao as soon as the harvest was complete. The following season, they would purchase new livestock, again selling the animals when the work was completed. This practice caused serious fluctuations in the prices of livestock, and led to shortages of the animals on some of the Sulu islands when annual demand spiked right before harvest times. Education was seen as the only way to remedy this practice that was disrupting agricultural development on some of the islands.⁵⁵

Despite the livestock losses, many districts reported that FY1904 saw positive growth in the agricultural sector. Hemp production was reported to have increased significantly, as well as the production of food crops. The district of Cotabato reported its food production for that year to be the largest ever known among the people of that area.⁵⁶ Each of the following years saw major increases in agricultural production as well. Food production, however, suffered during the drought year of 1905. In some areas, the rice crop was so poor that the government had to purchase rice and distribute it as relief. Part of the food shortage may have resulted from farmers choosing not to cultivate as much rice as in previous years, turning their efforts to those agricultural products that sold well at the new exchanges but were not food staples. Another reason the government identified for food not getting distributed was that some Moro leaders were stockpiling their rice to enable their groups to engage in hostilities with other Moros

or against Americans. When Moro leaders stored their stockpiles in cotta forts, the stockpiles would be destroyed along with the forts by American troops whenever they came upon the forts. Therefore, when Cotabato district experienced their largest rice crop in forty years, the natives experienced a food shortage in that district because it came at a time when Datu Ali was leading a large uprising against the Americans and troops were engaged in security operations throughout the area for many months.⁵⁷

Some areas of the Moro Province had forests suitable for a lumber industry. But in FY1904, little was done to develop the lumber industry. The district governor of Lanao complained that although there was plenty of suitable forest in his district, the forestry laws in place at the time hindered the development of the lumber industry in his area. Lumber mills in Lanao district ceased operating that year because they were unable to profitably acquire raw material legally. As a result, the Army garrisons were forced to import lumber for building barracks at great expense rather than using locally produced lumber from the abundant forests within that district.⁵⁸ In time, the lumber industry did begin to expand as the military government addressed the forestry laws. The island of Basilan established a profitable lumber industry by the end of FY1906. Other areas of the Moro Province were well suited to a lumber industry, but the government saw that there was a shortage in companies with sufficient capital available to establish lumber mills that would spur the development of the industry.⁵⁹

In 1904, the district governor of Lanao made the recommendation that American settlers needed to be induced to come to the Philippines to demonstrate by example to the local population the full agricultural and industrial potential of the islands once modern methods were introduced.⁶⁰ While such an influx of settlers would have increased the

economic development of the Moro Province, increasing the amount of land settlers were allowed to purchase from 40 acres to the recommended 200 acres would have been at odds with Governor-General Taft's policy of keeping Philippine land in the hands of native inhabitants of the islands.⁶¹ Many settlers did indeed come to the Moro Province, settling mostly near Zamboanga, Davao and Basilan. Major General Wood saw the potential that immigration had to improve the agricultural development of the islands. Wood proposed that 1000 farmers be recruited from the United States or southern Europe to settle within the Moro province. These farmers would not just cultivate land for their own benefit, but also teach those local inhabitants around them modern agricultural methods. "What is needed is not alone teachers in the schools, but also in the fields."⁶² Wood was not proposing that foreigners colonize the province for their own benefit, but the hope was that limited numbers of settlers with the proper agricultural background could help stimulate the agricultural abilities of native farmers. To entice foreign settlers to come to the province, Wood recommended changes to U.S. law be made to allow foreigners settling in the Philippines to be able to obtain U.S. or Philippine citizenship without having to travel to the United States.⁶³

Wood did recommend changes to the land laws that would encourage corporate agricultural development. Crops such as sugar cane required such a large amount of land to be cultivated in order to be profitable that they could not be established on private farms, but only on large commercial holdings. Wood wanted changes made to the land law to allow companies to buy up to 20,000 acres of public land so that commercial agriculture could be established. He also advocated that individual land purchases be increased as well to 5,000 acres per individual. The homestead allowance for new

settlers was capped at 40 acres and Wood wanted that increased to 200 acres in order to encourage foreign settlement within the province. At the same time, Wood advocated increased efforts to establish and secure natives' titles to the land they already occupied to ensure that any expansion in agricultural settlement did not displace or drive off traditional inhabitants. Any feeling of insecurity by the natives or encroachment upon their lands would only bring instability to the province, and defeat the purpose of encouraging settlement to educate the populace in modern agricultural methods.⁶⁴

The American government established an 8,000-acre hemp farm at San Ramon, 15 miles outside Zamboanga. The farm was used as a start-up nursery for hemp plants that could be sold to locals wanting to start their own hemp farms. Coconut and abaca plants were also grown there for distribution to private planters.⁶⁵ Also on the farm, the American government conducted growing experiments with a variety of other crops to determine if they could be cultivated for commercial uses in the Moro Province and which methods proved the most productive in cultivation in the local climate. Attempts at cacao showed some promise, but attempts to grow alfalfa for animal fodder failed. There were mixed results with vegetables. Corn, beans, eggplant, radishes, onions, and lettuce were some of the successful vegetables. Tomatoes, beets, turnips, and carrots turned out to be some of the failed crops that could not be productively grown in the local climate.⁶⁶ 1905 was a drought year and lack of irrigation at the farm decreased productivity. The government expected productivity to double once they improved the irrigation system, and once production increased the plan was to use the farm as a teaching institution for local farm boys. To help educate local leaders of the benefit of modern agricultural methods and show how farming could be profitable, the government

invited the Sultan of Sulu and 75 datus and headmen to visit the farm in April of 1906. The government reported that the interaction fostered a great deal of goodwill towards the government and increased interest in agricultural development among the Moros.⁶⁷

By the end of Wood's tenure as military governor, agricultural production had greatly increased. Every annual report noted increases in hemp, cocoanut, coffee and jungle products. Davao experienced significant growth in hemp production during that time period. Hemp production had done so well and had such potential that the military government was looking to resettle 250 families with experience in hemp production from other areas of the Philippines to Davao to help increase the expansion of the industry there. It was found that rubber plants grew extremely well in the climate of the Moro Province, and the government began buying, planting and distributing seeds to encourage the development of a rubber industry.⁶⁸

Beginning in August of 1906, the district governments began holding annual agricultural fairs. The purpose of the fairs was to encourage agricultural development through its expositions and displays. Modern tools and methods were displayed and awards were presented to the best displays of locally produced crops and manufactured goods. The first district fair was in Cotabato, where several thousand Moros attended including many interested local Moro leaders. The fair in Cotabato was the Moros' first experience with fairs. However, once they experienced the first fair support and interest in future fairs greatly increased so that many would travel and visit the fairs in other districts as they occurred. The government took advantage of the opportunity presented by the local leadership's attendance at the fairs and organized large-scale council meetings that ran concurrent to the fairs. Like the exposition held at the San Ramon farm

several months earlier, the fairs drew many leaders to attend an event with many other leaders that they had never met and interacted with before. The large council meetings held by the government helped foster the interaction between these leaders in a peaceful environment so that they could develop trust in their neighbors and overcome traditional enmities between the groups. The meetings also helped the government introduce new aims and policies to large groups at once and in a more receptive setting where everyone's concerns could be addressed.⁶⁹

Changes to the tax system were also seen as one of the ways of improving the economy. Before American governance was established, the datu established and collected taxes however they saw fit, and therefore the tax system only functioned as a means to improve the personal wealth of the datu. The amount collected tended to be everything over the bare essentials for survival, so there was no incentive to develop personal wealth beyond subsistence. By eliminating such arbitrary taxation and putting in place a fair system of fixed, small taxes, it was hoped that the Moros would be encouraged to engage in economic activities and trade to produce individual incomes.⁷⁰ One proposal aimed at stimulating agricultural development was to exempt a portion of the land taxes for land cultivated with desirable agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, rubber cocoanuts, and fruits.⁷¹

Another economic problem faced in FY1904 was the seaborne transportation system. The military government used government steam-powered transports for transportation and shipping between coastal settlements and often provided ferry and shipping service to locals as space allowed. As a result, local commercial services collapsed during FY1904. The recommendation was made to contract future shipping

and transportation requirements of the military government with civilian steamship lines in order to restore commercial services to the area. With civilian services to the area restored, it was expected that there would be an increase in trade and economic investment between those ports serviced by commercial steamship lines. Government subsidization was required to establish and support these services until they became self supporting and profitable, but the high costs charged by commercial companies to initiate the services hindered the implementation in that plan in FY1904.⁷² A subsidized steam transport, the *Borneo*, was contracted in 1905 to provide service between the east and west coast port towns on Mindanao and the ports in the Sulu Archipelago. Under the subsidization contract, the government set the rates for public and private transport on the vessel well below the commercial rate available at the time. The government accepted the loss as it deemed the increased trade that resulted from the subsidization of the *Borneo* to more than cover the cost of the contract. So much, in fact, that the government was considering a contract for another subsidized steamship in FY1907.

In international trade, the military government provided a monetary guarantee to a commercial shipping line that serviced Hong Kong and Australian ports so that it would add Zamboanga service to its line. This allowed international goods to be imported directly into the province without paying customs duties in Manilla. The cost of the guarantee was made up in port usage fees and customs duties derived from the increase in trade. As a result, during FY1905 the military government saw the customs receipts more than double in Zamboanga. In the end, Wood advocated that port fees in Philippine ports should be eliminated altogether to encourage further trade. This would in turn increase customs revenues. The government was actively seeking to establish

commercial boat service on the Cotabato River, and on the Gulf of Davao, to provide services to all the little scattered settlements in those areas. Services would allow small-scale farmers and traders in those areas to travel to the larger settlements to trade their goods.⁷³

Beginning in FY1904, the district governments began to set up a system of exchanges that would encourage interior inhabitants to come to the larger cities to trade. In Zamboanga in 1904, a native exchange was established that included secure areas to conduct trade, and secure quarters for visiting traders and their livestock. Under the act that created it, the market was to be administered for the “special use and benefit” of the local inhabitants and as such be exempt from taxation, although licenses were required for merchants to operate in the market. The license fees collected were to be used for the maintenance and upkeep of the market. The administration of the market fell upon the district governor, who was tasked with the responsibility to teach the locals modern and legitimate business practices. This would ensure that the Moro traders received fair prices for their goods and services during trade.⁷⁴ Not only was the market to provide a safe place to conduct trade, but it was also meant to teach the Moros the Americans’ concept of free market capitalism and entrepreneurialism in order to develop a market economy. The Americans always maintained a government representative at the exchange to ensure that the fair market price of goods was posted and acceptable business practices were followed.⁷⁵

One of the things that made the exchanges so successful was the lodging and storage areas provided for traders bringing their goods from the interior. Before the exchanges existed, traders from the interior only had a limited amount of time to sell their

goods for the best price that they could get before they had to return to their homes in the interior. While arranging the sale of their goods to the merchants on the coast, the interior traders had to provide for themselves and ensure their goods were protected from theft, and this involved expenses that limited the duration an interior trader could remain at the coast. The longer the stay, the more the profits from the sale of the goods would be used up in expenses and the greater the need to offload goods at whatever price could be obtained. The coastal merchants, on the other hand, had an interest in drawing out business negotiations. The expenses incurred by the interior traders during their stays were paid to the coastal merchant community, so the longer the interior traders stayed the more the merchants profited. The coastal merchants also realized that the longer they drew out negotiations the less they would have to pay the interior traders for goods, increasing their profits when they resold the goods later. The Moro exchanges leveled the playing field for the interior traders by providing government facilities that eliminated the need for the interior traders to come to a quick deal with the local merchants. Safety, security and storage were provided without cutting into their profits, and the posted market value of goods ensured that they good negotiate a fair price.⁷⁶

The Moro exchange in Zamboanga proved more successful than the government expected. The end of FY1906 saw additional exchanges established in Cotabato and Lanao, with exchanges in Sulu and Davao established the following year. The government reached agreements with local merchants regarding the standards and rules to be followed in conducting business at the exchanges. Barter trade was to be discouraged in favor of cash transactions and credit was not to be extended without the district governor's approval. Credit practices that encouraged permanent indebtedness by

interior traders to town based merchants were seen as a cause of animosity and distrust towards the merchants and the government hoped to eliminate the practice.⁷⁷ It took some time and education before the Moros were willing to move to a cash only transaction system since many of the interior Moros were unfamiliar with the concept of using cash money.⁷⁸

The Moro exchanges also stimulated the growth of a commercial fishing industry within the province. Coastal inhabitants caught and dried fish and then traded their catches at the exchanges for interior goods. Interior traders sold their goods to purchase dried fish and carried it into the interior regions where fish had been a rare source of protein rather than a staple part of the diet. Government reports noted that the growth of a profitable fishing trade within the province helped reduce piracy by giving pirates an incentive to turn to commercial fishing as a less risky alternative for obtaining goods.⁷⁹

The Army used a great deal of paid local labor to reduce its own operating costs and to put money into the local economy. One of the consequences of this was that during FY1904 the Moro Province experienced wage inflation. Laborers expected locals to pay wages comparable to the high wages paid by the Army and military government. Such expectations stifled economic development in the Province as it led to an increase in the cost of living in the province that outpaced increases in production. The recommendation of one district governor was for the military government to reduce the number of local laborers employed and their wages, but it was noted that it would take some time before inflation leveled out to normal conditions.⁸⁰ In general, the government found the Moro people to be ready and willing manual laborers when offered a wage and better workers than Filipino laborers.⁸¹

The government of the Moro Province completely took over the lucrative pearl fishing trade that existed within the Sulu archipelago. Act 43 of the Moro Province placed the pearl fisheries under government protection. Act 51 placed the control of the trade under direction of the provincial and district treasurers and dictated licensing requirements and procedures that restricted all foreign vessels from participating in the trade in order to protect local pearl divers. The act was also a direct attack on the traditional authority of the Sultan of Sulu, even though he is not explicitly named in the act. Section 11 of the act gave the district governor of Sulu the authority to determine claims to property rights of the pearl beds, and section 12 outlawed any Moro from exacting payment or tribute from any of the pearl fishermen.⁸² These sections directly applied to how the Sultan of Sulu had traditionally received a vast amount of his personal income through his traditional monopoly of the pearl fisheries.⁸³ His monopoly gave him the right to grant permission for a fee to anyone engaged in the trade and also entitled him to claim any proceeds or particularly valuable pearls for himself. Those who sought to keep the proceeds or pearls for themselves risked their lives and there is one instance where American officers had to intercede in Jolo when the Sultan of Sulu went to war with Datu Calbi over the ownership of some extremely valuable pearls that had recently been discovered.⁸⁴ The Bates Agreement had protected the Sultan's monopoly. However, these two acts of the military government took away the Sultan's monopoly, gave it to the government and cut off one of the Sultan's most important streams of income. This naturally weakened the traditional power and authority of the Sultan of Sulu and made him economically more dependent on the large salary he received from the American government. Also, it eliminated a potential threat to physical security since it deprived

Moro leaders of an incentive to go to war with each other as a means of settling possible disputes over tribute since such tribute was outlawed. Before the act, pearl divers risked losing everything they recovered from the pearl beds to an arbitrary claim of the Sultan who alone profited from the trade. Afterwards, divers were allowed to keep their entire haul so long as they obtained the proper licenses, accurately reported to customs officials the size of the haul and paid the customs duties. The acts helped develop pearl diving as a regulated trade that benefitted the local inhabitants rather than just the elites, and provided for protection from foreign competition and over fishing.

It was noted in the reports for FY1906 that locals had begun establishing settlements nearby or just outside military garrisons. The garrisons on Lake Lanao or at the mouths of rivers were not originally established near population centers, but along lines of communication or transportation in sites selected because they could be secured from attack. By the end of FY1906, these garrisons were reporting that locals had established settlements in close proximity that were composed primarily of laborers and traders. The military government ensured these new settlements were established and organized as municipalities rather than tribal wards.⁸⁵ The fact that Moros were seeking to establish these settlements near garrisons is a possible indicator of the positive state of relations that existed between garrisons and the surrounding populations. A certain amount of trust and goodwill, as well as financial prospects, had to have been established between the two groups before the local inhabitants would be willing to build new settlements in such close proximity to the army garrisons. They never would have done so if there had existed widespread hostility and mistrust of American intentions.

In Wood's final assessment, the Moro Province held enormous economic potential if developed properly. There were numerous possibilities for trade and agricultural development that would lead to economic prosperity for the local inhabitants. Much of the unrest in the area was attributable to the lack of economic development experienced in the Province thus far. Wood thought that if commercial relations with the United States were improved then local workers would have greater incentive to work hard at developing the province and would attract investment in the agricultural sector.⁸⁶ Part of the problem involving commercial relations between the Philippines and the United States resulted from the large customs duties placed on Philippine exports of sugar to the United States under a law known as the Dingley Tariff. The Philippine Commission repeatedly sought the repeal of this and other tariff laws put in place to prevent cheap Philippine agricultural products from flooding the U.S. market, a fear the Philippine Commission stated was completely unfounded considering the state of agricultural development in the islands.⁸⁷

A great deal of investment and effort had gone into the economic development of the province by the time Leonard Wood's tenure as military governor ended. Agricultural products with market potential, such as hemp and cocoanut, had seen huge increases in their cultivation. Government programs helped spur the recovery of livestock in the province after the huge losses incurred by diseases in 1902. The initiatives of Moro exchanges demonstrated great signs of developing a market economy. Coupled with the improvements the military government made in seaborne transportation, the market development of the Moro economy showed promises of future growth in the years to come.

Security Operations

Constabulary Operations

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, Wood did not envision a long campaign to pacify the Moros in his strategy as the establishment of civil government would provide a framework of control of the Moros. Rather, local law and order was to be provided by detachments of Philippine Constabulary established in the Moro Province. Once the Moro Province became organized in 1903, military forces increasingly remained in garrison as the Constabulary expanded its coverage of Moro territory. Only when an outlaw group proved sufficiently large or sufficiently dangerous to threaten the security of a significantly large area did the American government call upon military forces to deal with the threat. Even when the military forces were employed in security operations, it was usually in conjunction with the Philippine Constabulary who often retained the lead. Constabulary forces in the Moro Province were officially part of the Philippine Constabulary headquartered in Manila, and continued to be paid, manned, and equipped through that logistical support channel. Within the Moro Province, the military governor had control of both military and Constabulary forces operating in his area, so that the combined operations of military and police forces were easier to conduct than in other areas of the Philippines. When the military had the lead during a particular security operation, such as the campaign against Datu Ali in the summer of 1904, the Constabulary often functioned as scout elements and the advanced guard for the larger military force, increasing the overall capabilities of the force.⁸⁸

The establishment of Constabulary detachments in the Moro Province began before the arrival of General Wood in the province, but he wholly supported the initiative

to get more Constabulary detachments in the field as quickly as possible. An Assistant Chief of Constabulary position was created for the Moro Province in 1903. The non-Moro provinces on Mindanao, Surigao and Misamis, were reassigned to his district because the head of the Philippine Constabulary, Brigadier General Henry T. Allen, thought control of all Constabulary and Scouts on Mindanao would make it easier for the civil-military governor of the Moro Province to exercise control and conduct operations. At the time Wood took charge of the Moro Province, Misamis and Surigao had Constabulary detachments already established, but there were still no stations or personnel assigned for the rest of the areas that would fall under the jurisdiction of the Moro Province. All those detachments would be established under Wood's tenure as military governor. However, those existing detachments were already engaged in security operations to destroy a group of outlaws that had killed several U.S. officers and raided the armory in the town of Surigao when Wood arrived.⁸⁹

The Moro Province comprised the Constabulary Fifth District and included the sub-districts of Zamboanga (also District Headquarters), Lanao, Davao, Sulu, Cotabato, Misamis and Surigao. In accordance with guidance from General Wood, the Constabulary was initially only organized in Zamboanga, Davao and Sulu, with the exception of the island of Jolo, since the military was conducting operations in Jolo, Lake Lanao and Cotabato. As time went on, Constabulary detachments were established in the remaining districts to help supplement military efforts to improve security.

Colonel J. G. Harbord commanded the Fifth District and reported that he instructed his officers to begin recruiting the best men to the Constabulary that they could find in their district. Significant problems arose when trying to find suitable Moros who

were willing and suitable to serve in the Constabulary as the Moro people were intolerant of outsiders.⁹⁰ Colonel John R. White records in his account that some of his earliest Moro recruits in the Cotabato District were actually slaves ordered by their datos to fill the ranks. By and large, the Moro enlistees proved to be loyal and fierce fighters, even though they sometimes ended up fighting against blood relatives as a result of their often being assigned to police the same areas they were recruited from. Local knowledge of the areas they policed naturally made the enlistees more effective. Experienced, non-commissioned officers from other districts were used to make up for the lack of tactical experience and discipline in the detachment.

Colonel Harbord's instructed his officers to familiarize themselves with the people, language and physical geography of their areas and to avoid doing anything to offend the Muslim religion as he believed this was essential to establishing good relations with the people in their districts, both military and civil. Garrisons were only to be manned by enlisted recruits of the same racial or ethnic background due to the animosities between groups, so that Sulu only recruited Muslims, and Davao only pagans. Zamboanga, which was already an ethnically diverse city, allowed recruiting of Muslims and Christian Filipinos, but not other groups. The uniform of the Moro province constabulary was modified to allow the wearing of a red fez with black tassel for official headgear in deference to Moro Islamic culture. Most Spanish and Filipinos thought it impossible for the Moros to make effective Constabulary troops and thought the Moros were likely to turn on their own officers. There is only one instance in which Moro constables turned on their own officer. In 1905, Captain Hayson was killed by one of his constables out of resentment for having been disciplined. Harbord's assessment

was that Moros made good soldiers, but it would be a long time before they were ready to operate unsupervised as police making arrests. The biggest concern was that almost none of the Moros were literate, but stations were establishing schools to teach their recruits to read and write.⁹¹

Colonel White's personal account of the establishment of the Philippine Constabulary detachments in the Moro Province describes it as a rapid and haphazard operation during 1903, but gives credit to the personal efforts of General Wood and Colonel Harbord in making it successful given the short time and limited resources available.⁹² By the end of 1903, Fifth District maintained ten stations (including the headquarters) consisting of 17 officers and 353 enlisted personnel. Of those, 102 were Moros, 59 Zamboangan and 173 Visayans making up the constabulary in the northern, Christian Filipinos districts of Mindanao.

Harbord's recommendation for his district was that more officers needed to be assigned to the Moro Province to increase the ratio of officers to enlisted men. He noted that stability in officer positions and assignments was essential and that local language proficiency should be a requirement for officer promotion.⁹³ In his memoirs, White, who served in the Philippine Constabulary from 1899-1914, also mentions that instability and turn over in officer assignments within the Constabulary negatively impacted progress within the Moro Province. In several places in his account, White writes that in his estimation nine tenths of the bloodshed in the Province could have been avoided had officers remained in their assignments for longer durations instead of constantly being replaced by inexperienced personnel.⁹⁴ By the end of FY1906, the Constabulary had ten

companies operating throughout the Moro Province, with two officers and 46 men per company.⁹⁵

By the end of 1904 General Service Constabulary companies were established by each one of the Constabulary Districts, which would serve as a reserve force if additional forces were necessary.⁹⁶ The General Service Constabulary companies allowed the Constabulary to temporarily reinforce detachments in the field without having to request reinforcements from the Army or the Philippine Scouts because these companies were not tied to manning specific police stations and forts like the rest of the Constabulary detachments.

One of the issues that developed in Constabulary operations dealt with its authority to make arrests without warrants. At the end of FY1906, the Constabulary still was not required to obtain warrants before making arrests, even when they set out on deliberate expeditions to capture or kill specific outlaws. The military government had made it a practice to issue arrest warrants to the commanding officer whenever any Army unit was called upon to assist in Constabulary operations. The ability of the Constabulary to conduct operations without warrants had begun to create opposition among Christian Filipino communities of the province and Wood made the recommendation that the Constabulary be required to comply with the same rules he had imposed on the Army troops in the province.⁹⁷ In his last report as military governor, General Wood weighed in on recent debates about requiring the Constabulary to obtain warrants in order to make arrests. While Wood did not propose to limit the Constabulary's ability to immediately pursue offenders caught committing a crime or fleeing from the scene of a crime, his proposal probably marked a shift in how Constabulary operations, and all security

operations, were beginning to be viewed within his province. His proposal indicated a shift in viewing Constabulary forces in more of a law enforcement capacity and less as a paramilitary force conducting military operations to enhance security.

The issue of requiring warrants and Wood's endorsement of such a policy for Army and Constabulary units alike involves a readjustment of the rules of engagement and the employment of military force. There is a significant change in perception between how a commander views problems in the security environment when the commander perceives them not as combat operations but as matters of law enforcement. Wood had essentially transitioned the Army units under his command to conducting law enforcement rather than combat operations by requiring them to have warrants, and he wanted the Constabulary to do the same. This represented the strengthening of civil authorities and the rule of law within the province and was driven by the perception that security and order had increased to the extent that military operations were no longer required. Force, when its use was required, would be a law enforcement action undertaken by civil, not military, authority regardless of the uniform worn.

Military Operations

Leonard Wood thought that conflict with the Moros would be a likely event as he carried out his mandate to expand American control over the Moro Province. However, he anticipated that one firm blow would be all that was required to cow the recalcitrant Moros into accepting American authority. Wood turned out to be very wrong in that regard. While contemporary accounts make it seem as if the whole province was engulfed in constant warfare and insurrection, violence was concentrated in a few distinct areas. The swift decisive victory that Wood thought would knock the fight out of the

Moros never arrived. Instead, Wood's military forces remained routinely engaged in local fights against certain rebellious datu leaders.

The area around Jolo routinely saw conflict between the followers of the Sultan of Sulu and various datus who increasingly disregarded the Sultan's declining authority. The Sultan of Sulu, while not directly engaged in opposition to the Americans, was often thought to be indirectly supporting attacks against the Americans. In mid-November 1903, Wood led an expedition to Jolo to assist the garrison stationed in Jolo in fighting the rebellious Moros aiming to control Jolo City. Wood's force attacked and destroyed the cottas of Panglima Hassan and Datu Andung and Major Hugh L. Scott's troops in Jolo routinely engaged in operations against local Moros until events came to head at the battle of Bud Dajo in 1906.

In March 1904, Wood led an expedition against Datu Ali in the Cotabato and Lake Lanao region. Datu Ali was trying to unite datus into a coalition against the Americans based on opposition to the anti-slavery law passed the previous fall. For two days Wood's force bombarded the cotta fort where Datu Ali's supporters were gathered. Despite killing over one hundred Moros, Datu Ali escaped. From this failure, Wood received a cable from William H. Taft reiterating that enforcement of new laws was to be accomplished primarily through peaceful means. Wood responded to Taft's cable arguing that the influence of Datu Ali was too great among the Moros and too much of a threat to American authority in the region for him to have responded otherwise.⁹⁸

Colonel White wrote that part of Datu Ali's and other Moros' hostility to the anti-slavery law resulted from recent turnover in the district governors' positions that had resulted in new, inexperienced personnel bearing the responsibility for explaining the

controversial law to the Moro leaders. Had people with more experience and who had established relationships with local Moro leaders been present, White believed such rebellions could have been avoided. The new district governors, however, had not had sufficient time to gain the trust and confidence of Moro leaders before the anti-slavery law went into effect.

The resulting lack of effective personal diplomacy was insufficient in deterring violent opposition to the law by Datu Ali. In May of 1904, followers of Datu Ali ambushed a column of 40 soldiers of the Seventeenth Infantry, killing two officers and seventeen enlisted. In response, General Wood and Colonel Harbord sent then-Captain John White to establish the first Philippine Constabulary detachments in the Cotabato District to assist in quelling the unrest and violence due to Ali's uprising.⁹⁹ Attempts to capture Datu Ali and eliminate his followers within the region of the Cotabato Valley continued throughout 1905. It is because of this that Wood considered the period of Datu Ali's resistance to be the most troublesome of his tenure. It was not until October 22, 1905, that an expedition from the 22d Infantry Regiment was able surprise Datu Ali and his remaining followers, killing Ali in the fight. The government reported that the death of Datu Ali brought an immediate increase in security and productivity within the Cotabato District.¹⁰⁰

The Sultan of Taraca in the Lake Lanao area also resisted American authority. He was known to be behind attacks on soldiers in the vicinity of Camp Vicars and Marahui. Wood wanted to meet with him to negotiate a settlement to end the Sultan's resistance, but the Sultan failed to show at the scheduled meeting on March 31, 1904. Wood's response was to lead a column over the next few days through the Sultan's territory

destroying cotta forts in the region in order to demoralize recalcitrant datu in the region and reinforce American authority. Wood's report of the expedition reveals that he believed earlier American policy had been too lenient in the region, enabling Moros to believe that Americans were cowardly, weak and unwilling or unable to enforce their authority, which encouraged resistance. The solution to this was to act swiftly and firmly with force to maintain order in the district. Major Robert L. Bullard, in charge of the Iligan garrison responsible for the Lanao region, reported that Wood's expedition was effective in demonstrating American order and authority and had convinced many Moro groups to organize civil governments in accordance with the American plan.¹⁰¹

It was during the campaign to track down Datu Ali in 1904 that General Wood directed the establishment of provisional American Scout companies within each regiment. During FY1905, Wood had four regiments under his command within the Moro Province from which to draw these provisional companies from. At the time, the regiments were employed in garrisons with fixed areas of responsibilities. The regiments sent to the Philippines only had 50-60 men in each company, and garrison duties dictated that available troop strength for conducting operations was only around 40-45 soldiers per company. Replacement troops for losses incurred due to combat casualties, disease, or non-battle injuries had to be recruited, trained and then transported from the States resulting in considerable delays before any replacements arrived, if at all, during a regiment's two year tour in the Philippines. As a result, towards the end of a regiment's tour of duty, Wood noted that available troop strength decreased to only 20-30 soldiers per company. The purpose of the American Scout companies was to give each regiment the capability of a standing mobile force that was not tied down with garrison

responsibilities, and therefore always ready to take the field against security threats. Rather than tasking a particular unit with the mission, the American Scout companies were comprised of the most able and fit officers and personnel from within their regiment. These companies were always kept at full strength with troops drawn from the rest of the regiment regardless of the regiment's overall decline in available troop strength. The American Scout companies had a total strength of around 100 men and four officers each and were the primary forces used in long marches that had to seek out and find large mobile groups of outlaws that outmanned and outgunned the small Constabulary detachments trying to secure the area. Wood employed these provisional companies mostly along the upper Rio Grande valley, which was Datu Ali's area of operations and support.¹⁰²

Criminal activity characterized a large part of the problem that military forces had to face. In his 1903 report of the Department of Mindanao, Brigadier General Samuel S. Sumner comments that the Moro propensity to kill or steal whenever they thought it advantageous represented a perpetual threat to security for all Americans and Europeans in the province. "Murder and robbery will take place so long as we are in the country, for years to come. The Moro is a savage and has no idea of law and order."¹⁰³ Despite the authority given to the Sultan of Sulu to maintain law and order within his jurisdiction, as ascribed by the Bates Agreement, soldiers stationed in Jolo were called upon to intercede in dealing with criminal issues. In one instance, the local garrison had to attempt to track down stolen cattle and the parties responsible and bring them to justice. Often those responsible were local datos who were involved in stealing cattle from their rivals. The local datos were generally resistant to American intervention, and in this particular case

they actually called their warriors together and were prepared to fight as the American troops approached looking for signs of stolen cattle.¹⁰⁴ The Americans avoided the fight, but the case demonstrates that there was a fine line between criminal activity and opposition to the Americans. American attempts to crack down on criminal activity and banditry had the potential to incite violent opposition to American authority.

Most of the district governors reported few conflicts and security threats during FY1904. Lanao, however, was the exception. The district governor reported that in that district there was a great deal of Moro raiding on nearby Filipino settlements for female slaves and supplies of food crops. The district governor also reported that there were frequent Moro attacks on troops during that year. His assessment was that attacks would occur often for the next several years in his province, as well as other Moro areas. He noted there were several Moro leaders in his area that were hostile towards Americans and that “Arab priests” influenced many of the population against the new American government.¹⁰⁵ For most of Wood’s tenure as governor and commander of the Moro Province, the Lake Lanao region would continue to require major resources to maintain security. Camps established in those areas were the ones eventually built into permanent garrisons at Camps Keithley, Overton and Vicars. Security threats in other regions (such as Datu Ali’s uprising) did involve considerable efforts to deal with, but those other regions were more accessible than the remote difficult terrain surrounding Lake Lanao so that they could be dealt with in a matter of months and garrisons removed or reduced afterwards.

The Battle of Bud Dajo occurred just as General Wood was beginning to transfer military command of the troops in the Moro Province to General Tasker H. Bliss. It

proved to be one of the enduring legacies of Wood's time in command. During early 1906, a force of approximately 800 Moros began occupying and fortifying a crater on an extinct volcano called Bud Dajo on the island of Jolo. These Moros were a mixed group. Some were the remnants of previous revolts, some were opposed to the poll tax, some were die hard resisters to American authority, while others are merely bandits without loyalty to a specific datu. All the Moros who occupied the crater on Bud Dajo were united in their resistance to American authority, and they thought that their position on the mountain was so impregnable that they could live as they chose. Major Hugh L. Scott, the Governor of Sulu at the time, tried for months to negotiate the return of these Moros to their homes, as the Americans were concerned that their continued presence and defiance would encourage others to flout American authority. Such attempts at negotiation failed and the outlaws in the crater became even more of a problem when they began raiding the nearby countryside for food and supplies. In March 1906, Major Scott requested permission to use force to put down what was considered an insurrection.¹⁰⁶ Wood sent a force of Constabulary, Scouts and Army troops under Colonel Duncan of the 6th Infantry to deal with the problem. Further attempts at negotiating surrender failed and the American force assaulted the cave for two days beginning on March 6, 1906, before Wood arrived with General Tasker Bliss to observe the operation. One final attempt at negotiations was again made and when it also failed the assault continued, eventually ending in hand-to-hand combat. Over 600 Moros were killed, including the women and children of the Moro fighters. American reports of the battle described Moro women fighting alongside the men as combatants, and Moros using their own children as human shields during the final combat. The Americans used

mountain guns in their assault and that artillery may have accounted for many of the women and child casualties. American reports stated that 25 percent of the troops used in the assault were killed or wounded. Media reports of the battle described gory details and claimed the battle was an unnecessary wanton slaughter of Moro men, women and children. Public opinion in the U.S. was outraged and Wood was described as a blood-thirsty monster in the press. The governor of Jolo, Major Hugh Scott, took a great deal of criticism as well for the development of the situation. Official reports addressed the criticism of Scott, exonerating him from any misconduct and instead praised Scott for following the guidance and intent given to him by General Wood and his extensive efforts to peacefully resolve the situation through negotiation. The friendly Moro leaders on Jolo were also supportive of the Americans' actions. At a meeting with them a month after the battle, the gathered leaders told Wood they agreed with his actions and did not see that he had any other choice.¹⁰⁷ They would have preferred to handle the situation between Moros, but in the instance of Bud Dajo they thought it likely that any Moro-led group attempting to confront the defenders in Bud Dajo would merely have been wiped out.¹⁰⁸ American reports noted that the battle marked the end of resistance to American authority on Jolo and many of the surrounding islands. Later years of the American military government would again see organized fighting in Jolo, but for a while the security situation greatly improved.

Throughout Major General Leonard Wood's time in command of the Moro Province, the security situation was deemed by the government to have generally improved. The most prominent military campaigns of the period were the expedition to eliminate Datu Ali in 1904-1905 and the Battle of Bud Dajo in 1906. Government

reports mention several other instances where punitive expeditions were required to maintain security, but these tended to be few. For the fiscal year ending in 1905, the Army reported only 16 engagements in the Moro Province, one of which was the aforementioned campaign against Datu Ali and his followers. By contrast, the military commander for the island of Visayas reported 38 engagements in which his troops were involved during that same time period. Despite the reputation of the Moro as a fierce and unyielding adversary unwilling to acquiesce to American authority, the Moro Province experienced far less violence than several other parts of the Philippines. While the Moro Province remained far from settled, it was no longer the hot bed of violent insurrection that is described in some of the earliest accounts and memoirs. What outbreaks of violence against American authority there were Wood said was the result of the actions of “fanatical Arab priests” that were losing influence with each successive failure against the Americans. Further Wood believed that efforts to increase authority and eliminate resistance were no longer a matter of force, but a matter of time and education.¹⁰⁹

Despite the rosy outlook of Wood’s reports, reports produced at the end of FY1906 (the last of Major General Wood’s tenure) did note that there were several groups of Moros that still remained hostile to American authority. At that time, it was still common for American boats traveling on Lake Lanao to be fired upon. In previous years, sniper attacks or hit and run attacks against small groups were commonplace in the vicinity of Camps Keithley and Vicars and on the road between them. These had largely died down by the end of FY1906, however it was still expected that situations requiring the use of force would still occur from time to time. The mountains surrounding the lake were assessed as the area where most of the resistance to American authority was

concentrated. The American government thought that the security threat was generally manageable by the Constabulary in the area as they were often reinforced by the temporary assignment of Philippine Scout companies when required. The district governor of Lanao used local labor to cut lumber and construct the roads for the American camps in the region in an attempt to use employment as a means of winning over these hostile Moros and increase local security.¹¹⁰

By the end of FY1906, the military government did not expect that any general Moro uprising was possible. Hostility to American authority would only occur on a local basis because traditional enmity between Moro groups prevented the possibility of them ever uniting in common cause against the Americans. Leaders who had shown the capacity to unite large groups of Moros against the Americans had all been defeated in the past and it was thought that those defeats and improvements in the provincial administration made it increasingly unlikely that any leader could wield such influence again. Serious incidents against American authority continued to occur occasionally, even if they were not always uprisings by large groups. In June 1906, Lieutenant E.C. Bolton, district governor of Davao, was murdered during a meeting with a local chief over a territory dispute regarding American agricultural settlers recently arrived in the area. The chief involved was tracked down by an Army detachment and killed when he refused to surrender. In another instance the same month, several local Moros outside Camp Keithley attacked a sentinel. In that case, the local Moro chief actively aided the Constabulary in identifying and arresting the culprits. Instances where local Moros or leaders were active in aiding the apprehension of criminals or attackers were seen to be increasing in general. This was a sign of increased acceptance of American authority.¹¹¹

As the security situation improved, efforts were taken in FY1905 to redistribute troops. The army either reduced the size of or completely eliminated interior outposts in order to diminish the number of camps and the number of troops within them that it had to support logistically. Logistical costs were enormous in terms of the amount of men and livestock required in order to support the interior outposts, especially if they maintained large battalion sized garrisons of troops and support animals. However, the Army was not looking to reduce the overall number of troops in the province, which provides a key indicator of the actual security situation in the province during that year. Wood reported that not only did he advise against any overall troop reduction, but he also wanted two more companies of Philippine Scouts to increase his overall strength. The Army just wanted to reduce the number of locations and the long, permanent logistics tails involved. To that end, the Army expanded the physical size of the garrisons in Zamboanga and Jolo so that those outposts could provide living space for more troops.¹¹²

The military increasingly shifted to deploying troops out of garrisons on an on-call or as needed basis based on a specific security threat, so there was little difference to be made where those garrisons were located at from a security standpoint. Only a few garrisons outside the two major ports, in the Lake Lanao region (Camps Keithley, Overton and Vicars), were deemed necessary to provide actual security in their immediate vicinity. Everywhere else could be covered by either temporary camps if a security threat arose or by the permanent stations of Philippine Constabulary.

In places where a permanent garrison was deemed necessary, construction was undertaken to provide permanent buildings with land set aside for training grounds and rifle ranges so that soldiers concentrated there could conduct training and maintain their

readiness until called to the field.¹¹³ The smaller garrisons lacked available manpower to conduct training in addition to their garrison duties, so Wood thought that concentrating his forces into fewer garrison locations would make it easier to maintain the proficiency level of his troops.¹¹⁴ While Wood's troops might have had a higher level of proficiency, the reduction in the military footprint meant that the American government in the province actually had physical control over less territory. Without continual presence in an area, troops lacked intelligence to identify developing problems and counter them before they developed into violent resistance or rebellion. Military forces were put into a position where they could only react in response to an outbreak of violence. They allowed those recalcitrant Moros to maintain the initiative until military forces were finally prompted to take the field in search of a decisive engagement that would eliminate that particular pocket of resistance.

Conclusion

Throughout the time that Leonard Wood was military-governor of the Moro Province, military troops were often in the field putting down resistance to American rule. The troops performed well on campaigns in Jolo, through the Cotabato River valley and around Lake Lanao in dealing with rebellious Moros. Yet, each time the troops went out on campaign, the military government thought it would be the last major operation they would have to accomplish and they continued to publish reports that painted an optimistic picture of the security situation. By and large, security operations were effective and the situation did improve. As each rebellious group was defeated, their area of the Moro Province became largely secure against resistance to American authority. As security improved, economic productivity in those areas also increased. What violent

incidents occurred afterwards were usually incidents of outlaw activity rather than active resistance to American authority. The military garrisons covered the major settlements first and then gradually drew down into fewer garrisons as the situation improved. The Americans made effective use of tactical adaptations to the threat as well, learning how to conquer the cotta forts, make use of gunboats on Lake Lanao and make recommendations to improve the equipment and training of troops in the islands. Gradually, security operations were transitioned to the Constabulary, although there was still a need for military troops in the Moro Province. Although General Wood had made considerable progress, major outbreaks of violence continued to occur for many years afterwards.

¹ Charles Byler, "Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 42-43.

² Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood: A Biography*, vol. 2 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1931), 5.

³ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁵ War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903*, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903), 152.

⁶ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁸ War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903*, vol. 3, 152.

⁹ Bureau of Insular Affairs, 5-6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 6, 69.

- ¹² Ibid., 17-19, 29.
- ¹³ War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903*, vol. 3, 364.
- ¹⁴ Bureau of Insular Affairs, 8, 15-16.
- ¹⁵ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, *Fifth Annual Report of the Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands to the Honorable Governor-General Covering the Period from July 1, 1905, to June 30, 1906* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1906), 464.
- ¹⁶ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1.* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), 330.
- ¹⁷ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 426.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 465.
- ¹⁹ Hagedorn, 17-18.
- ²⁰ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 16.
- ²¹ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 436.
- ²² Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 12.
- ²³ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 425.
- ²⁴ Carlos Quirino, *Filipinos at War* (Philippines: Vera-Reyes, Inc., 1981), 186.
- ²⁵ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 425, 461.
- ²⁶ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 71-79.
- ²⁷ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 425, 461.
- ²⁸ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 680.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 695.
- ³⁰ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 470-473.

³¹ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903, 770-771.

³² *Ibid.*, 773.

³³ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 14.

³⁴ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903, 775-776.

³⁵ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 422-23.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 422.

³⁷ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 13.

³⁸ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 423, 468, 470.

³⁹ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 13.

⁴⁰ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 422-423, 472-473.

⁴¹ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 15, 91.

⁴² War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903*, vol. 3, 302, 311.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 155, 198, 313.

⁴⁴ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 424, 462.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 477.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 431, 477.

⁴⁷ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1., 330.

⁴⁸ War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903*, vol. 3, 152.

⁴⁹ Hagedorn, 49.

⁵⁰ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 11.

⁵¹ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 45.

⁵² War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903*, vol. 3, 358.

⁵³ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 475, 481.

⁵⁴ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1.*, 342, 351-352.

⁵⁵ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 483.

⁵⁶ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 17-18.

⁵⁷ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1.*, 342.

⁵⁸ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 19.

⁵⁹ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 415, 461.

⁶⁰ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 19.

⁶¹ Hagedorn, 49.

⁶² Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 415, 430.

⁶³ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1.*, 328.

⁶⁴ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 440-441.

⁶⁵ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 23.

⁶⁶ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904* (Government Printing Office, 1905), 515.

⁶⁷ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 429, 474.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 420, 463.

- ⁶⁹ Ibid., 480.
- ⁷⁰ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 12.
- ⁷¹ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 462.
- ⁷² Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 21, 24.
- ⁷³ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 421, 428, 476.
- ⁷⁴ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 17, 90.
- ⁷⁵ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 414.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., 414.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid., 414, 482.
- ⁷⁸ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1.*, 341.
- ⁷⁹ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 415.
- ⁸⁰ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 24.
- ⁸¹ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1.*, 341.
- ⁸² Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 79.
- ⁸³ Robert A. Fulton, *Moroland 1899-1906: America's First Attempt to Transform an Islamic Society* (Bend, OR: Tumalo Creek Press, 2007), 69.
- ⁸⁴ Sydney A. Cloman, LT. COL., *Myself and a Few Moros* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1923), 166-171.
- ⁸⁵ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 434.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid., 437.
- ⁸⁷ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1.*, 70-71.

⁸⁸ John R. White, *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2007), 222.

⁸⁹ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903*, 25, 42.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 143-144.

⁹¹ White, 195, 219, 230-231, 263.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 202.

⁹³ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903*, 143-144.

⁹⁴ White, 191, 202, 216.

⁹⁵ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 488.

⁹⁶ White, 253.

⁹⁷ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 427-428.

⁹⁸ Hagedorn, 21, 41-43.

⁹⁹ White, 218.

¹⁰⁰ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 418.

¹⁰¹ Hagedorn, 44-45.

¹⁰² War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1905* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905), 302-312. Also White, 224.

¹⁰³ War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903*, vol. 3, 320.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 358.

¹⁰⁵ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904*, 19.

¹⁰⁶ White, 299-300.

¹⁰⁷ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 421.

¹⁰⁸ Hagedorn, 64-68.

¹⁰⁹ War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1905*, 239-241, 299-300.

¹¹⁰ Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands, 416-417.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 432, 485, 488.

¹¹² War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1905*, 300-303.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 302.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 313.

CHAPTER 3

THE TASKER BLISS YEARS, 1906-1909

Introduction

The spring of 1906 brought a change in leadership to the Moro Province, with Brigadier General Tasker Bliss replacing Major General Leonard Wood as Governor of the Moro Province. The arrival of Bliss brought about some changes to the strategy of the Americans and the approach they took to dealing with the people of the troublesome Moro Province. Economic development began to take center stage as the major priority for the American government. As a result, economic factors began to play a large role in decisions and approaches to providing security through the positioning and use of military and constabulary forces. Changes in provincial government policy began to reflect a more realistic approach that took Moro culture into account and that acknowledged the necessity for adaptation on the part of the American government. The Americans were forced to refocus their philosophy regarding education, making changes to tie education to their economic development program for the province. The overall security situation still remained problematic, but the provincial government continued to view security as a means of setting the conditions for establishing governmental control and economic development. However, the use of military force was increasingly restricted to only those threats directed at provincial governmental control and American authority or involving large-scale disruptions to economic development.

In August 1905, Brigadier General Tasker Howard Bliss became military commander of the Department of Luzon in the northern Philippines. A short eight months later, he succeeded Major General Leonard Wood as military commander of the

Department of Mindanao in March 1906. After a two-month transition period, Wood handed over to Bliss the role of military-governor of the Moro Province as well. Bliss remained in charge of the Moro Province until early 1909.

Bliss's initial assessment of the province was that the reforms and progress made during Wood's tenure were in jeopardy due to a sense of growing resentment among the *datus* of the Moro Province. Additionally, many of the best district and provincial personnel, such as Major Hugh L. Scott, had begun to rotate out of their assignments in the Moro Province as part of their military career progression. Bliss judged that the Moro people had developed trust in the individual government officials, but not in the government itself, so the loss of key personnel represented a setback in government progress that he was concerned could lead to renewed violent resistance. Bliss immediately began a tour of the province to meet with key Moro leaders to reinforce their loyalty to the American government using personal diplomacy.¹

Bliss had in mind several reform initiatives for the province. He wrote, "Schools and roads will be the islands' salvation."² His first priority was to increase the number of roads in the province. Bliss thought this would have a positive effect on security in a clever way. *Datus* were used to traveling with large retinues of fifty to sixty armed followers. Once roads were established, he hoped to encourage *datus* and Sultans to travel by coach, rather than on foot. Bliss promised several of the most important *datu* leaders that the American government would provide them a coach of their own once they completed the road building projects in their districts. The *datus* saw the coaches as status symbols. However, travel by coach meant that the *datus* would have to leave their large dismounted retinues behind when they traveled. If they were to leave their retinues

of personal bodyguards behind, Bliss knew the Moro leaders would work to maintain the peace so that they could show off their increased status and travel by coach in relative safety.³

General Bliss hoped to reenergize the progress of education within the Moro Province by linking it even further to economic development than it had been under Wood. Bliss had ambitions for increasing the number of trade schools in the province to train craftsman, such as blacksmiths and carpenters, and introduce them into the Moro economy. Bliss noticed that the Moros had a preference to learn those types of craft trades. Even more so than Wood, he thought that by providing them the kind of training that they desired then the Moros would be more willing to support the American government. Bliss' view of Moro education was that his priority was to educate the Moros in manual skills and that the teaching of English was a waste of time and resources. Another of his educational objectives was to recruit Malays who spoke English to take charge of the Moro school system. The Moros were a Malay people with hereditary ties to Borneo and the Malays of Borneo had been living under British rule for some time so there was a potential resource pool to recruit English speaking teachers and administrators who shared the same ethnic, cultural, and religious background as the Moros. Bliss also planned to employ enlisted soldiers within the school system that had already demonstrated an ability to work well with Moros.⁴ Part of his emphasis on education may have been a result of his military background as an instructor at the Naval War College and as first President of the Army War College.

After a year, Bliss began to express disappointment with the academic school system. The teachers were of poor quality and were making no progress towards

“civilizing” the Moro. The province’s inability to offer sufficient salaries stymied efforts to recruit capable college graduates to teach either academic or manual trade subjects. He also noted that some districts still lacked sufficient security to enable the government to establish schools in the more hostile areas. By the end of 1908, after his second year, Bliss was more satisfied with the progress the manual trade schools were making as teaching quality gradually improved and enrollment increased.⁵

Bliss maintained a harsh assessment of the security situation. Many of the Moros leaders were still involved in slavery and murders for economic and political benefit despite improvements made in enforcing the law over the previous years. In his annual report for 1908, Bliss stated that the Moros were as willing to fight when provoked as they had ever been.⁶ Bliss believed that the best strategy for maintaining the peace was to maintain a large enough military force in the area to serve as a sufficient deterrent to anyone opposing American authority and thereby ensuring that military force would never actually be used. For that reason, Bliss opposed reducing troop strength in the province just because the situation appeared to be peaceful. He feared that a reduction in troop strength would actually encourage resistance to American authority and lead to increased bloodshed that he wanted to avoid in order to prevent losing what progress was being made.⁷

Economy

During the tenure of Brigadier General Bliss as military governor, economic development began to take center stage in the American strategy for the province. If the province could be developed economically, the Americans reasoned that the Moros would then be more compliant to American government control and more receptive to

social and cultural changes that the Americans hoped would make the Moros more civilized. Additionally, economic development would also increase the security environment in the province. As Bliss stated it in one of his annual reports, “The dominant idea of the government has been and is economic progress--progress entirely of a material nature--as only in this way can a sure foundation be laid for future advancement along social, moral, and intellectual lines.”⁸ Thus, Bliss made economic development within the province the main priority.

One of the greatest obstructions to government progress in education and economic development in the province was the migratory and nomadic lifestyles practiced by many of the Moro and pagan inhabitants of the province. This lifestyle prevented them from being educated and “civilized” (according to American conceptions of “civilized” society), and their subsistence lifestyle made them economically unproductive. The government realized that it had to encourage migratory families to settle in one place and in sufficient numbers so that they could establish a large enough community to be an educationally and economically viable population. The municipal organization laws passed under the Wood administration provided for the government and administrative needs of newly established communities and settlements. What was needed now was an economic incentive that would encourage migratory people to settle in one spot. The government saw that incentive in the growth of agricultural products that required a large labor force. Hemp and coconut plantations served double duty by first producing marketable products, and second by employing migratory workers and encouraging them to settle in communities near their plantations of employment where

they could be brought under government control, gradually civilized to an American standard and their children educated.⁹

In accordance with the American government's philosophy of economic development, the government in Davao outlined the strategy in that district as one designed to get local inhabitants to settle and acquire land, work the land and plant hemp, then use the proceeds to build better homes and buy better food. By following that simple strategy, their lives would improve so quickly and so dramatically that they would lose their inclination for insurrection. As agriculture was a time intensive business, the Moro farmers would have no time to engage in insurrectionist agitations if they wanted to maintain or expand their new-found level of relative prosperity.¹⁰ In their reports, the government expressed its gratitude to a small group of American planters who had settled in Davao and formed a Planters' Association that educated the natives of its benefits through their own example and encouraged the natives to adopt the planter lifestyle.¹¹ The economic benefit of a planter farmer's lifestyle would serve as an enticement to settle down and allow the government to gradually gain the trust and confidence of the newly settled natives as part of its "policy of attraction".

As part of its program for economic development, the provincial government wanted the port of Davao to be opened for international trade. Large volumes of hemp passed through Davao destined for other ports in the Philippines before it could be exported internationally. Likewise, the growing hemp industry required that a fair amount of imports passed through that port as well. However, all the goods going in and out of Davao were being shipped through other Philippine ports in transit since Davao was not authorized to conduct trade directly between foreign ports and vessels. This

meant that Davao was not collecting customs revenues from international trade since all Davao's goods passed through Philippine customs houses located at ports in other parts of the Philippines, and thus Davao did not received the benefits of customs revenues on its own trade. The provincial government hoped to receive permission to open Davao to direct international trade so that more of the customs revenue derived from goods destined to or originating from that district remained in the provincial coffers.¹² An Act of the Philippine Legislature enacted in May of 1908 gave the Governor-General that authority to establish and open an international port in Davao.¹³ As a result, trade through Davao increased in support of the growing number of hemp plantations in that area.

The economic strategy of opening ports was also designed to attract capital investment in the pearl industry, which could be a highly profitable endeavor if it was expanded. The largest capital expenditure was on the fishing vessels themselves. The province was able to attract a large commercial shell fishing fleet for the pearl industry by modifying the laws to allow any vessel owned by a U.S. citizen to participate in the trade. By amending the law to include U.S. citizens and thus occasioning an influx of foreign vessels, the government of Moro was able to expand the lucrative trade of pearls.¹⁴

The cornerstone of the economic development plan for the Moro Province had always been focused on marketable agricultural goods. Commercial farming needed to be encouraged and more land brought under cultivation. Enforcement of land tax laws, which included exemptions for those cultivating land, further encouraged more land to be brought under cultivation than previously before.¹⁵ The most important feature of the land law was that it appropriated for the government as public land all land not settled

and under cultivation. Clauses of the land law allowed for public land to be titled directly to those willing to settle and improve it in 40-acre tracts for only a small fee, making land very cheaply acquired for those willing to develop it. The size and pricing of the land tracts ensured that land remained affordable to the local inhabitants who had a self-interest in ensuring that forest resources were maintained as renewable resources, unlike companies who would have no vested interest in the land or in its inhabitants after the resources were harvested to extinction.¹⁶

The provincial government noted that the amount of rice imported into the province began to drop significantly as more rice began to be produced locally. The provincial government hoped that the province would soon be self-sufficient in that dietary staple and eventually be the main producer for all the islands of the Philippines.¹⁷ The drop in rice importation could have been indicative of the relative increase in security. When rebellious Moros prepared for war, they established rice stockpiles and caches that took food supplies out of circulation. In areas of unrest, American troops searched for and destroyed any rice stockpiles they could find to prevent prolonged resistance, further depleting the amount of rice available for the local population. In those same areas, local production of rice would also decrease since the security situation precluded rice planting and harvesting. The local population was forced to rely on increased levels of imported rice to survive. Thus, it is possible that a decline in imported rice and an increase in local rice production within the province was a reflection of increased security. The local population had enough to eat since rice planting and harvesting was uninterrupted and rice was no longer being hoarded by rebels and later destroyed by American troops leveling the cotta forts of recalcitrant datus.

Throughout Bliss' tenure as military governor, economic development continued to increase throughout the province. Customs revenues continued to increase as ports were expanded. Agricultural development continued to rise, with more and more land being cleared for the cultivation of hemp, coconut and rubber. The agricultural development was also geared towards those crops that were more labor intensive, requiring more and more local workers to keep those farms operational and expand the agricultural sector of the economy. The need for a labor force to keep up the pace of agricultural development would have a great deal of influence on the approach to security operations within the province, as will be described below. Bliss' economic development definitely improved the quality of life for much of the local population. However, economic development had secondary effects that Bliss did not anticipate and which did not always manifest until after Bliss had turned the province over to Pershing. Moro leaders whose personal wealth increased as a result of economic development were much more likely to support the American government. But other leaders, such as the Sultan of Sulu who continued to lose wealth with the government takeover of the pearl trade, continued to remain un-reconciled to American authority whenever they lost power, prestige, wealth or part of their followers to the agricultural labor force. Growth in individual wealth was a stated goal of the Americans, but that broke the common Moro's dependence on the largesse and patronage of the traditional Moro leadership. Those Moro leaders that could not adapt and position themselves as economic winners became power losers that continued to remain hostile to the Americans. Additionally, the creation of a large agricultural labor force dependent on wages resulted in labor inequalities, disputes and exploitation between plantation owners and laborers that

eventually erupted into a period of unrest during the Pershing administration. Bliss' economic strategy created considerable progress in some areas, but created unanticipated problems in other areas that only prolonged overall unrest in the province.

Infrastructure

Infrastructure development continued under Tasker Bliss much as it had under Leonard Wood. The priority was still on roads and transportation networks that would foster economic development and provide for better lines of communication for military garrisons in the interior. However, much like during General Wood's rule, under the governorship of Bliss the Moro Province still faced funding shortfalls that limited what could be accomplished. Interior areas that required the most economic development remained as inaccessible and underdeveloped as ever. This meant that those most resistant to American authority received the least benefit from the economic development strategy Bliss hoped would overcome resistance.

Only one half mile of new road was built in FY1907 as a result of a lack of funds. Also, wear and tear on previous road works was requiring expensive repair work to be done. However, progress was made on improving some of the roads required to support military garrisons in the interior. Congressional relief funds paid for initial construction, but the work continued under the U.S. Army Quartermaster Department.¹⁸ This implies that Army resources that could have supported field operations were redirected towards improving military logistical lines for economic reasons instead of being fully focused on security operations. This is a possible indication of where military priorities were truly aligned during the Bliss period.

The provincial government continued on with its drive to bring modern civilization to the Moros through public works in the larger towns. Improvements in street construction gave the most important towns curbs, gutters, grading and ditches. In Jolo, the administration planned to allow the city access to the water and sewage systems installed by the military garrisons. In such a manner the government hoped to spread the appearance of modern civilization, which would also bring health and economic benefits to those cities.¹⁹ An act passed by the legislative council required that all able bodied prisoners in the judicial system be put to work on municipal public works projects to provide for the maintenance and upkeep of those public works projects. Another law required that all males who were required to pay the *cedula* poll tax were also required to contribute five days of unpaid manual labor to the province each calendar year or pay the cash equivalent in taxes. The projects involved work on bridges, wharves and roads in the taxpayers' local area. As it was for their benefit, the government did not expect taxpayers to resent the tax. In this manner, the government hoped to increase progress on public works projects that were stymied by lack of funds to pay for the labor.²⁰ The Moro population generally complied as the government had hoped, at least in those areas where government control was sufficiently established to enact tax policy. However, the government found the Filipinos to be reluctant and poor performing manual laborers compared to Moros even when paid, and worse when the labor was compulsory as part of a tax program.

The government attempted to use innovative approaches to come up with the funds and labor required so that economic development would not be unduly hampered by infrastructure. However, the shortfalls were never overcome during Bliss'

administration. The oft talked about railroad project across the interior of the province, which would have greatly simplified military logistics and spurred economic development at either end and along the length of the line, continued to be pushed for by the government. However, it was never funded by the War Department and provincial revenues were never close to approaching the level required to fund the project on its own. Eventually, the acquisition of motorized trucks during Pershing's tenure partially solved the military logistics problem, but that solution did nothing to improve infrastructure or serve to economically develop the interior in the way that a railroad would have. While the larger towns such as Jolo and Zamboanga gradually became more modern and civilized in their appearance, critical infrastructure improvements continued to lag at the end of Bliss' tenure. Limited to improving what had already been built in areas mostly compliant, the Bliss administration was unable to push deeper into the interior sufficiently enough that economic development could quickly transform and stabilize conditions where it was needed most.

Education

During the Bliss administration the educational system in the Moro Province was aligned to support Bliss' economic strategy. The philosophy followed by the education system was simple. American officials saw the purpose of the education system as assisting the local population in making progress in the development of its people and culture. These officials thought that the natural way to achieve that progress was through the growth of material prosperity of the people. The only way the government saw to increase that prosperity was by increasing agricultural and industrial capacity of the province. Therefore, it was the school system's mission to provide agricultural and

industrial training that would enable the natives to develop their economy, and ultimately allow them to progress and develop as a “civilized” culture.²¹

Bliss made education one of his primary focus areas upon taking charge of the province and he intended education to focus on teaching trade skills. By the end of FY1907, the province had 21 American teachers on duty, but only four were teaching manual or trade skills. Of the 65 native teachers employed, none were teaching trade skills and many were not certified to teach the full primary school course of instruction. The shortfall in qualified native teachers was expected to improve in FY1908 as those students enrolled in Zamboanga’s provincial school began to finally graduate and provide an increased hiring pool of eligible native teachers. The provincial government was eager to replace the American teachers with effective, qualified native trained teachers. In order to reach and educate more of the Moros, more Moro teachers would have to be employed. This was because native teachers were paid less than their American counterparts, so the province could afford to employ many more teachers as soon as enough Moro teachers could be hired to replace the Americans working the few schools in the interior. To improve the quality of instructors, the government established teacher training courses during the January-February and April-May school vacation periods. During these training courses, morning sessions were spent on academic subjects, while the afternoon sessions were dedicated towards manual trade skills. This reflected Bliss’ strategy to bring more vocational training to the school system.²²

Bliss also had the primary school curriculum updated to put even more focus on trade skills. The administration established certain guidelines regarding those skills to be taught. Students were to be taught trade skills already practiced in their native areas or

those skills useful to the successful introduction of a new industry the government thought might be suitable for that area. Also, the projects and crafts constructed by the students in the course of their training were to have commercial salability. A four-year primary course was envisioned where lower grade students would begin by learning simple mat and hat weaving. Mid grade students would move on to rattan weaving for boys and needlework for girls, while senior boys would begin to learn carpentry and senior girls took up advanced needlework. Artistry in the crafts was to be encouraged to develop uniqueness and an appreciation for quality.

Education administrators hoped that students would be able to sell their projects for money to learn to appreciate the economic value of what they were learning and to contribute to the economy while still students. Students would thus be prepared to be full participants in the market economy the Americans were trying to establish. This strategy saw the overlapping of educational and economic objectives the American government was trying to develop in the province.

The relative shortness of the four-year course of instruction meant that a greater number of students between six and sixteen years of age would have a chance to attend school despite the shortages in qualified teachers because students would have ten years of eligibility in which to cycle through the four year program. This was crucial if the government was to ever actually educate Moro and pagan children when school enrollment numbers equaled only a fraction of the number of children the government estimated should be attending school at one time even with only a four year curriculum.²³ When Bliss took over the province, only 4,231 students were enrolled in school, of which only 570 were Moro children. This was a significant dearth when compared to the

administration's estimate that there were over 30,000 school-age children within the province. School enrollment rose to 4,894 students during Bliss' last two years of administration, with the vast majority of the increase in enrollment seen in the increase of Moro and pagan enrollment to 842 and 130 children respectively.²⁴ Despite increasing enrollment, the educational system was still under serving the local population. The government hoped that the shorter curriculum would enable it to serve a greater number of students over time to narrow that shortfall when it only had resources to teach so many students at one time.

The Bliss years in the Moro Province represented a refocusing of the educational priorities within the province. Under General Wood, education was seen as a means of civilizing the Moros. Bliss' approach put education clearly in support of economic development and efforts to civilize the Moro people were no longer the basis of educational policy. The refocusing of education onto trade skills with economic value demonstrates and reinforces the centrality of economic development to Bliss' strategy for the Moro Province. In terms of supporting economic development, Bliss' educational initiatives were successful. Students learned skills and put them into use upon graduation. However, his educational program was limited in its reach. Just as economic development could not transform elements of the population that were out of reach, the educational system could not educate where there were no schools. Bliss only increased enrollment from approximately 14 percent of the 30,000 eligible children to 16 percent, meaning that the impact on society as a whole was limited, even though more Moro children were enrolled than ever before. In order to have the widespread effects that Bliss wanted, the educational system needed to expand its reach and ability to provide

services to that large mass of the Moro population in the interior regions where resistance was greatest. However, Bliss was unable to accomplish such an audacious task in the short time he was in charge of the province. Bliss lacked the number of available teachers and the time to train a qualified native teaching cadre that could expand the educational system into the interior. Bliss oversaw the design of an educational strategy and curriculum that remained the basis of education in the province for years to come, but his lack of personnel resources to carry it out meant that only those already in the most developed areas of the province received the benefits.

Government

The governmental structure of the Moro Province did not significantly change during the Bliss tenure. The goal continued to be eventual self-rule of a civil government that was part of the Philippines as a whole and that local participation in government affairs be gradually implemented as conditions improved. However, that was a long-term strategy and there was little expectation that considerable progress could be made in only a few short years. As the government model put in place seemed to be effective, Bliss made only slight modifications and reinforced the same basic governmental model of Wood's tenure. Modifications to government took Moro customs and attitudes into account to make the exercise of government control more acceptable to the Moros or more effective.

After his first year in command, Bliss believed that self-government of the Moros was still a long way off. If the government gave too much power and authority to local headmen without proper supervision, Bliss judged that the headmen would be sure to abuse their power and return to the arbitrary rule that had existed before the arrival of the

American government. This would be especially likely if a local leader was given control over another ethnic group, as the Moro tendency was to see other ethnic groups as sources of plunder. Therefore, the American government had a responsibility to maintain and exercise strong government over all ethnic groups in order to protect the weaker from the stronger.²⁵ Bliss reached this understanding from recent experiences in dealing with the all-Filipino municipal council in Zamboanga. Zamboanga had a mix of Moro, Filipino, and Chinese inhabitants and the performance of an all-Filipino municipal council had proven so disastrous that the American government had to step in and reform the membership of the council to be more representative of the actual population.²⁶ It would be some time before the government would feel that local government officials were capable of overcoming their cultural animosities towards other ethnic groups to a degree in which corruption and persecution did not figure in to officials' motivations for using government authority.

One of the ways of bringing American rule more in line with traditional Moro custom was to begin to invest tribal headmen of the tribal wards with some judicial authority. Before the imposition of American rule, tribal headmen were endowed with supreme judicial authority over their followers. During Wood's tenure as governor, the American government had stripped the headmen of these judicial functions. However, the Americans knew that they were unable to prevent the tribal headmen from exercising their traditional judicial authorities over their own followers and that the headmen continued to try and punish offenders in accordance with Moro custom so long as the perpetrator of the crime was a member of their tribal ward. The only cases brought before the tribal ward court for the American officials to adjudicate were those involving

members of other tribal wards or of the municipalities. To allow the tribal headmen to continue to flaunt American authority was only reinforcing the limits of American power and encouraged disregard for American rule. Therefore, the American government decided that they needed to co-opt the tribal headmen and their traditional authorities.

The American government legally recognized the authority that the tribal headmen continued to exercise regardless, but the American government established guidelines to restrict the arbitrariness that had characterized tribal headmen's rulings in the past. The guidelines established set fines for various offenses and allowed anyone convicted the right to appeal to the tribal ward court where the American officials presided as justices. By recognizing the legal authority that the headmen were already practicing, the Americans hoped to bind American and Moro law into one code. The vast majority of cases usually involved marriage or contested property and not criminal offenses. Accordingly, the government rationalized it could allow authority for these cases to be resolved by traditional headmen since the government had no stake in the outcome of such cases. While actually ceding some power to the tribal headmen under such a judicial arrangement, the American government hoped to solidify its authority overall.²⁷

Under Bliss, the government realized that strict oversight of local Moro government officials and leaders would be required in the immediate future if the Americans were ever to realize their goal of a pluralistic and representative society. The old habits of corruption, persecution and traditional exercise of power needed to be taken into account, at least in the short term if the American government was going to be effective in the long term. As a result, adaptations to the American imposed local

government structure were required to take those cultural considerations into account. Only by incorporating the traditional authorities into the American system of government and granting them some measure of legitimacy could the Americans hope to eventually change the actual practice of authoritative power among the Moro people. The reforms were more effective in those areas where American control was strongest. Those leaders who nominally recognized some measure of American authority were less likely to rebel once these reforms were implemented. However, these reforms did not persuade any leader who already resisted American authority to reconcile with American authority. As a result, many recalcitrant *datus* continued to defy American authority throughout Bliss' administration.

Security

General Bliss' approach towards security is referred to as the "velvet glove," as opposed to General Wood's "mailed fist" approach to enforcing and expanding American governmental control and authority throughout the province.²⁸ Under Bliss, the official position was to refrain from using military force except when the local people directly threatened American authority. Despite this approach, the Bliss years continued to see a great deal of fighting. Much of it was undertaken on the American side by the constabulary forces in the region. Therefore, the administration perceived the threat as mostly criminal in nature and thus not part of organized resistance to American authority (when often it actually was part that resistance). Another facet of security during the Bliss years was that economic considerations began to be used as a means of focusing and directing security forces, military and constabulary, throughout the region.

Under Bliss, the government began to take a less aggressive stance on security operations overall and increasingly relied on Philippine Constabulary forces. During FY1907, the military garrisons in the Lake Lanao region were forced to send out numerous expeditions against small groups led by rebellious *datus*.²⁹ The American government began to realize that large-scale operations to put down resistance or capture rebellious Moros were having a negative impact on the economic development of the regions troops operated in. Large expeditions on the move tended to frighten the native laborers so that they fled. This was especially hard on agricultural plantations that required a great deal of labor and were the mainstays of the newly developing economy of the province. The frightened workers were slow to return to their employers and this placed the plantations in jeopardy.

The government soon realized that it simply was not worth the effort of sending large expeditions to capture or kill resisters, especially since large expeditions were easy for rebels to avoid and therefore might not achieve their objectives anyway. Instead, the government took the position that unless the act was a deliberate resistance against the government on a large scale then it was better to task the Constabulary with tracking down and apprehending the “criminal” offender. The military government often avoided distinguishing between criminal and insurgent activity undertaken by the perpetrator, instead deeming all Constabulary operations as against criminals regardless of the nature of the offense. It often took the Constabulary a great deal of time to eventually track down and apprehend the offender, but it did so more quietly and thus avoided costly economic disruptions.³⁰ An added benefit was that the Constabulary enlisted men who were locally recruited Moros and who could operate with less hostility in an area. Even

when the administration realized that it would take an expedition of nearly 200 troops to put down a group of rebellious Moros in the Taraca Valley, the Constabulary was the preferred force to use in that operation because they would cause fewer overall disruptions despite not normally operating in detachments numbering more than a dozen men.³¹ Such a stance demonstrates the growing primacy of economic development in the list of government priorities and shows how security considerations were increasingly subordinated in order to achieve other objectives. The government even used increases in the amount of land under cultivation to show the effectiveness of security in the province.³²

Likewise, the government was also making increased efforts to address criminal activity, such as inter-ethnic robberies and murder, in the interior areas. Different groups often preyed upon each other, and as a result many of the weaker groups were forced to maintain nomadic lifestyles out of self-preservation. By using the Constabulary to pursue and apprehend such criminals and put them on trial in the tribal ward courts, the government hoped to offer sufficient security to these tribes so that they would settle permanently in areas where they could contribute workers to the agricultural labor force. Again, this is an example of the government's strategy to use security efforts to support economic development.³³

Inter-ethnic feuds and cattle stealing still presented some problems in parts of the province. These instances could quickly escalate to small-scale sectarian wars if not handled quickly by the government. The government solution to these conflicts was not generally to use military force, but instead to address them as legal matters for the tribal courts to attempt to arbitrate and mediate. In such cases, district governors or officials

acted as the mediator in their role as judge of the tribal ward court system. If force was to be used to impose the ruling of the judge or to compel the parties to appear in court, then the Constabulary, and not military troops, were to be used to coerce obedience.³⁴

Throughout Bliss' military command, the administration defined the major threat to security in criminal terms. Outlaw bands formed the core of the resistance to the American government and their attacks were not limited to American soldiers and government officials. The Philippine Constabulary identified five different bands of outlaws operating on the island of Mindanao during FY1908 comprising between 265 to 400 men.³⁵ The government deployed troops numerous times in 1908 to assist in tracking and eliminating criminal bands. However, these troops only deployed at the request of those serving in civil leadership positions, most often at the behest of the district governor. Even though the district governor still acted frequently as a military commander, troop deployments were done under the auspices of civil, not military, authority to aid in the tracking down of criminals and murderers.

Unit commanders would deploy their soldiers to immediately protect key infrastructure, but it was only at the request of the civil authority that the soldiers would pursue and seek to engage the perpetrators. This is done as part of a strategy that saw violence against Americans in terms of criminal activity and not insurrection.³⁶ As such, the burden of dealing with outlaw bands fell on the Philippine Constabulary. However, this was inconvenient for the Constabulary because they had only a fraction of the troops available compared to the military forces stationed in the province. As a result, the head of the Philippine Constabulary began reporting that the extensive field time was discouraging members of the Constabulary in the Moro province from re-enlisting once

their service terms were inspired. The remaining troops were becoming increasingly worn out by these operations as well.³⁷

The lack of Constabulary forces available to conduct operations resulted in renewed requests to increase Constabulary authorizations within the Moro Province at a time when the Constabulary was having trouble maintaining its current level of authorizations.³⁸ Over the years that the Constabulary had been in operation, ever increasing amounts of territory were falling under the control of its companies and detachments. Unfortunately, Constabulary authorizations were not keeping pace with the increase in the amount of territory under each company or detachment's responsibility so that the Constabulary was becoming spread thinner and thinner throughout the districts even though they were steadily becoming the main effort of security operations. It is little wonder that the re-enlistment rates of the Constabulary forces operating in Lanao were nearly zero for FY1908 with nearly every constable choosing to leave service rather than sign on to such a high level of operations. In FY1909, the personnel situation in the Philippine Constabulary became even worse when budget shortfalls forced the Constabulary to reduce its force by ten percent. Adjustments to the stationing of Philippine Scout units were made to help maintain troop strength in the Moro Province, particularly in the Lanao region.³⁹

The situation came to a head in the district of Davao on June 6, 1909 when 23 native members of the local Constabulary detachment mutinied, attacking their officers and government officials, killing one American and wounding four others. The military responded swiftly, sending an Army company to Davao to successfully capture the mutineers and occupy and restore order to the town. The specific reasons for the mutiny

are not recorded in the government reports, but the response shows how quickly the government would move with military force to re-establish government control.⁴⁰

Piracy was a long-standing traditional practice within the islands that had existed for centuries and became a significant problem in the Bliss administration. In FY1908 the American government mounted expeditions to the island Patian to root out groups engaged in piracy and those who supported them.⁴¹ The pirate leader, Jikiri, became one of the most notorious pirates operating in the islands, making raids on coastal plantations and attacking ships at sea throughout the Sulu islands and North Borneo. Concerted efforts to track him down on land and sea began in FY1908 but it was not until July of 1909 that U.S. troops were able to corner him and kill him. What is significant about Jikiri, and pirates like him, was that their predations prompted Moro leaders to cooperate and actively help the U.S. government track down the pirates and eliminate them. The native Moro leadership identified and partnered with the American against fellow Moros who were engaged in piracy. However, now Moro leaders had a stake in the economic development that was fostered by the American government and were cooperative with the Americans efforts to eliminate continued threats to stability in the Moro Province.⁴² For someone like Bliss, who believed that economic development was the best means of pacifying the province, this would only confirm the perception that the American strategy was achieving its aims and focused in the right direction.

Actual instances of insurrection did continue to occur during the period Bliss was governor of the province. In 1908, a religious leader on the island of Basilan began inciting resistance to the American government. The priest,⁴³ Salip Aguil, was able to drum up widespread organized hostility that threatened American authority on that island.

In these instances the government defined the threat in terms of a military one, not a criminal problem. The large expedition sent to restore government control of Basilan was undertaken as a military operation under military, not civil, command. The district governor of Zamboanga, Major J.P. Finley of the 28th Infantry, stepped away from his civil position to take command of the battalion sized force dispatched to the island. Rather than troops reporting to a civil governor as would have happened had the resistance been interpreted as a criminal action, in this case civil authority yielded to military authority until government control was restored.⁴⁴

Governor-General Bliss himself noted the rise of violence during his first years of command. The increase in piracy and the unrest in Basilan he attributed to the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy gunboats that had previously provided the inter-island transportation system in the southern islands. By the end of Wood's tenure, the province was subsidizing unarmed commercial vessels for transportation needs. Therefore, the military vessels were deemed unnecessary and were withdrawn. As violence began to rise, Bliss made the connection that the gunboats had acted as a military deterrent, which was beyond their intended function as transports for government officials. He concluded that capability needed to be replaced in order to bring stability to the outlying islands of the chain.⁴⁵ In order to track down and put an end to Jikiri and his band of pirates, the U.S. Navy provided three gunboats to patrol the area and work closely with Army troops trying to eliminate the pirates. The Governor-General of the Moro Province requested that the boats be maintained on station to prevent any further outbreaks of piracy. Additionally, the experience of tracking down Jikiri among the Sulu islands and putting down the unrest in Basilan and Patian islands prompted the Army to request additional

boats for their own transportation use to move troops and supplies among the islands.⁴⁶ Security of the sea lanes against piracy protected and promoted economic development of the province. The campaign against Jikiri was the most publicized operation during Bliss' administration, perhaps because of the effect piracy had on inter-island and international trade and the pearl fishing industry. As such, seaborne security provides another example of how Bliss used security to reinforce and protect economic development priorities.

American troops also had to restore order to the Lake Lanao region after outbreaks of renewed hostility to the American government.⁴⁷ The cause of the resistance stemmed from a belief that American soldiers were responsible for introducing an outbreak of cholera in the area in November of 1907. The American government responded to the outbreak by enacting immediate quarantine of the area applicable to all the inhabitants and enforced by American troops. Despite such efforts to thwart the spread of cholera, the Moro people continued to blame the indigenous deaths on the Americans. This occasioned a heightened anti-American hostility in the Moro Province. However, another possible and more likely explanation was that the quarantine enforcement engendered just as much or more hostility than the disease itself.

The Americans used printed circulars to disseminate information to the local populace about the quarantine. However, this was largely ineffectual because most of the Moros were illiterate. Even though the circulars were printed in Moro languages, the information campaign to explain the quarantine procedures and the necessity of it would have had limited effectiveness in reaching the population. Additionally, military surgeons were sent to infected regions to help explain what necessary precautions needed

to be taken to prevent the spread of the disease. However, the Moros did not favorably receive the surgeons' suggestions because they would have infringed on the local traditions and cultural practices of the Moro people.

The quarantine temporarily shut down the Moro exchange in the infected area and therewith one of the major sources of economic revenue for many of the interior inhabitants. Shutting down the Moro exchange prevented traders from becoming infected and spreading the disease into other areas. This likely prompted considerable resentment towards the American government within the infected area, since it increased the hardships the Moros already faced from the cholera. The economic disruption, direct deaths caused by the disease and a poorly communicated government response worked together to fan the flames of resistance to American authority.

The military response of sending even more troops to the area in the spring of 1908 to deal with the resulting unrest would have only seemed to justify original suspicion and misinterpretations of American intent. Regardless of the root cause of the resistance, the hostility was directed at the government itself and therefore the military rather than the Constabulary assumed authority for the troops used to restore order in the area.⁴⁸ Cholera again proved to be a destabilizing influence during additional outbreaks in October 1908 and April 1909, prompting an additional round of strict quarantines of infected native settlements.⁴⁹

The Lake Lanao district experienced considerable unrest for the remainder of Bliss' tenure as military governor. Numerous attacks occurred against soldiers on sentry duty at the outposts in the region, and the security forces, military and constabulary alike, had considerable difficulties in tracking down the perpetrators due to a lack of

information from the local populace. Therefore, the military sought to establish additional temporary outposts in the area that could operate as extensions of the garrisons at Camp Keithley. The unrest in the region hindered crop cultivation and the administration hoped that these outposts would provide security so that the local farmers would return to their crops. Increased security was necessary to provide for the economic development of the region. In order to facilitate control of the region, the duties of district governor for the Lanao district were transferred as an additional duty to the commander of the Camp Keithley garrison so that civil and military authority both resided in the military commander of the troops trying to establish security. Again, civil authority was ceded to military authority in a situation where the unrest was directed at American authority itself.⁵⁰ Here is another instance where military force was focused on pursuing economic development objectives as a measure of success in security as it sought to increase cultivation in the region.

The American government in time began to realize that security of the province and the “civilizing” of the Moro people were linked together. The Moros often interpreted “civilizing” the Moros as interference in their religious traditions. The Moros’ customs and traditions were based on their interpretations of Islam and, therefore, any change or modification imposed by the government could be resisted as a means of defending the faith. The government made promises not to interfere with religion, but the Moros often saw changes to customary practices or privileges as a breaking of the government’s promise. Therefore, when the government outlawed a customary practice such as slavery that was permissible under the Koran, the Moros interpreted it as religious interference that the government had promised not to do. Accordingly, there

existed an Islamic duty to resist. Incidents involving Moro suicide attacks against American troops or government employees were seen as a matter of religious resistance meant to obtain justice for an insult to Islam. The government realized that true security would only be achieved by developing a program for “civilizing” the Moros that took the Islamic religion into account even if it meant allowing some practices that were not commensurate with western ideals.⁵¹

Therefore, the government of the Moro Province sought some exemptions or flexibility in the implementation of laws passed by the Philippine Legislature. Recognizing the cultural importance of firearms among the Moros and the status they conveyed to the individuals who possessed them, the provincial government sought some reprieve from law passed by the Philippine legislature. Act 1808, passed on February 11, 1908, gave the Governor-General of the Moro Province the authority to suspend or modify the Philippine law controlling the sale or ownership of firearms within the Philippine Islands.⁵² As a result, Moros were generally able to put off comprehensive disarmament for a few more years, which was important in a culture where masculine identity was so heavily dependent on the bearing of weapons. Furthermore, the flexibility given to the provincial government allowed it to continue the practice of influencing *datus* and settling disputes between them by collecting firearms from the *datus* as fines or restitution as part of judgments and arbitrations. Unfortunately, these cultural accommodations did not go far enough in assuaging Moro fears of religious interference by the American administration. Religious leaders eventually exploited these fears and became some of the leading instigators of resistance to American authority during the Pershing administration. Bliss’ administration identified a problem

in their strategy but did not act sufficiently to prevent it from developing into a source of resistance that later confronted Pershing.

The Americans began to place renewed emphasis on the gathering of intelligence in their areas. One of the first priorities was the completion of accurate maps of the interior areas. When units conducted practice marches for training, new guidelines stated that these practice marches were to serve a dual purpose as reconnaissance patrols to gather more complete and accurate terrain data of that unit's area of operation. Practice marches were also to be conducted under the command of the local intelligence officer, as they were specially trained in map making and planned to go beyond the unit's usual operating distance of 20 miles from their post to increase the knowledge of unknown areas. Additionally, intelligence sections were now responsible for gathering and storing ethnographic information about the various groups occupying the area as well, recoding information on language, customs and religious practices that could have relevance when dealing with the local inhabitants. Profiles of local headmen were also assembled as part of the intelligence gathering duties. The intelligence sections at each post were to maintain this data as it was deemed crucial for providing background information to incoming officers and government officials necessary for the assumption of their duties.⁵³

During Bliss' tenure, the administration allowed municipalities to recruit municipal police and place them on patrol. These police were responsible for enforcing town ordinances and worked directly for the town president or district governor. These municipal police also supervised convicts working off minor offenses within the municipal district. They were not part of the Philippine Constabulary, nor did the Constabulary have any authority over them.⁵⁴ Rather, the municipal president hired the

municipal police officers, often predominately as political appointees. At the end of the municipal president's time in office, the municipal police left their positions as well and were replaced by new officers who had been appointed by the incoming municipal president.⁵⁵ This naturally limited the effectiveness of the municipal police as a credible policing force. Despite this, increasing numbers of municipal police helped keep some order in the towns so that the Philippine Constabulary could focus their policing operations in the interior regions where most of the violent crimes and disorder occurred. In order to make local sheriffs who controlled municipal police more effective, the government was able to get the Philippine legislature to pass a law to deterring corrupt practices among these sheriffs. Act 1817, passed on April 3, 1908, required that persons appointed to the position of sheriff within the Province post a bond before assuming their duties. This kept the sheriffs from using their position of authority for personal profit as their bond served as collateral against any future fines and judgments they were to collect during their period of appointment.⁵⁶ This anti-corruption measure would have helped prevent corrupt politically connected sheriffs from actually exacerbating the local security situation.

During Bliss' tenure, the security situation remained a considerable problem for the American government. The role of security in the overall strategy of the government was clearly intended to support government objectives for economic development in the province. Accordingly, security operations had to be scaled back whenever possible to remain aligned with those objectives. However much Bliss might have wanted to take a less aggressive approach, insurgent opposition to the government did occur and force the government to act militarily. When possible, the American government sought to define

violence in criminal terms so that the burden of security could be shifted to the more locally acceptable Constabulary forces. The government proved adaptable at shifting between military and civil authority to meet the nature of each threat as it occurred and apply the element of authority best suited to defeat the threat. Unfortunately, shortfalls in the number of Constabulary and the increasingly reliance on those limited forces stretched them far beyond their capacity to adequately address the security issue. Overall, the province was only marginally more secure at the end of Bliss' term than it was at the beginning and his "velvet glove" approach saw such considerable use of force throughout the province that it was hardly discernable from Wood's oft-maligned "mailed fist."

Conclusion

The years in which Brigadier General Tasker Bliss was military governor of the Moro Province experienced significant changes to the American strategy. Economic development was clearly the main effort and principle means that Bliss hoped to use to create long-term sustainable gains in the province. Economic development, especially in the agricultural and trade-goods sectors, had the capacity to create voluntary social changes among the Moro lifestyle in ways that force could not compel them to make. The education system was directly linked to support long-term economic development. The American government also began to consider the Moro culture and tradition as it sought ways to continue progress in the province. Missteps and resistance to authority continued to create instability in the security environment, hindering Bliss' objectives, even as the provincial government sought to transition responsibility to local Constabulary forces. While Bliss' tenure was devoid of high profile engagements, such

as the Battle of Bud Dajo, violence remained a considerable impediment to government efforts to shift its focus towards creating the conditions for economic development.

¹ Frederick Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker Howard Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934), 85-87.

² *Ibid.*, 87.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 87-88.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 88-89.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 89-90.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 92, 96.

⁸ War Department, *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1907 (in Three Parts) Part 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908), 387.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 378.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 387.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 373.

¹³ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in Nine Volumes) Volume IX Acts of First Philippine Legislature Inaugural, First, and Special Session Nos. 1801-1878, Inclusive Public Resolutions, Etc. From November 1, 1907, to September 15, 1908* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908), 19.

¹⁴ War Department, *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1907 (in Three Parts) Part 1*, 380.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 389.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 382.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 374.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 380.

²¹ Ibid., 378.

²² Ibid., 374-375.

²³ Ibid., 376-377.

²⁴ Peter Gordon Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920* (Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines System, 1977), 196-197.

²⁵ War Department, *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1907 (in Three Parts) Part 1*, 381.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 395-396.

²⁸ Robert A. Fulton, *Moroland 1899-1906: America's First Attempt to Transform an Islamic Society* (Bend, OR: Tumalo Creek Press, 2007), 374.

²⁹ War Department, *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1907 (in Three Parts) Part 1*, 384-385.

³⁰ Ibid., 382.

³¹ Ibid., 385.

³² Ibid., 390.

³³ Ibid., 383.

³⁴ Ibid., 392.

³⁵ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1908 (in Two Parts) Part 2* (Manila: Government Printing Office, 1909), pg. 369.

³⁶ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in Nine Volumes)*, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908), 272-273.

³⁷ Bureau of Insular Affairs, 369.

³⁸ Ibid., 429-430.

³⁹ War Department, *Annual Reports, War Department Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1909, Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1909 (in One Part)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), 137-138.

⁴⁰ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1909 (in Nine Volumes)*, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), 210-211.

⁴¹ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in Nine Volumes)*, vol. 3, 272-273.

⁴² Vic Hurley, *Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1936), 200-207.

⁴³ American reports referred to all religious leaders as “priests” regardless of religious affiliation. Islamic religious titles varied widely among the numerous Moro dialects. “Pandita” entered the provincial government’s lexicon as a term for a Moro Imam, but it derived from the Lanao region and thus was not commonly used among other Moro groups to refer to their own religious leaders.

⁴⁴ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in Nine Volumes)*, vol. 3, 272-273.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 294.

⁴⁶ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1909 (in Nine Volumes)*, vol. 3, 209, 213.

⁴⁷ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in Nine Volumes)*, vol. 3, 272-273.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 282-284, 293.

⁴⁹ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1909 (in Nine Volumes)*, vol. 3, 217.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 209-210.

⁵¹ War Department, *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1907 (in Three Parts) Part 1*, 393.

⁵² War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in Nine Volumes) Volume IX Acts of First Philippine Legislature Inaugural, First, and Special Session Nos. 1801-1878, Inclusive Public Resolutions, Etc. From November 1, 1907, to September 15, 1908*, 6.

⁵³ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1909 (in Nine Volumes)*, vol. 3, 289-290.

⁵⁴ Bureau of Insular Affairs, 425.

⁵⁵ War Department, *Annual Reports, War Department Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1909, Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1909 (in One Part)*, 138.

⁵⁶ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in Nine Volumes) Volume IX Acts of First Philippine Legislature Inaugural, First, and Special Session Nos. 1801-1878, Inclusive Public Resolutions, Etc. From November 1, 1907, to September 15, 1908*, 13.

CHAPTER 4

THE JOHN J. PERSHING YEARS, 1909-1913

Introduction

This chapter covers the period of the military government under the administration of Brigadier General John J. Pershing and the transition from a military government to a full civil government. Pershing arrived in the Moro Province seeking to further the economic development of the region and continue the work of improving conditions for the Moros. Like the previous military governors before him, Pershing initially thought that good governance and continued economic development was the only/best strategy to achieve success in the Moro Province. Upon arrival, he quickly found that conditions in the province had in some measure deteriorated to the point that progress was hindered by a lack of security. Economic development remained at the forefront, but over time security became an overriding concern. Eventually, security became the main focus for Pershing as he pursued a policy of complete disarmament. However, that policy engendered significant resistance and extensive campaigning by security forces was necessary to enforce the policy. Afterwards, the security situation was so improved that Pershing was able to plan for and conduct a full transition from military government of the province to a civil government. The shift in strategy to a focus primarily on security through disarmament became the key factor in ultimately enabling that transition.

Brigadier General John J. Pershing served as military-governor of the Moro Province from November 11, 1909 until December 15, 1913. He was the last of the military governors of Moroland. Upon taking command, Pershing was the most

experienced of any of the three military-governors of the province. While Wood and Bliss had prior experience in military governance in Cuba and Puerto Rico, only Pershing had extensive experience in dealing with the Moros prior to taking command of the Moro Province. Pershing served nearly four years in the Philippines as a captain and most of his service was in Mindanao. Pershing achieved his renowned reputation and promotion to Brigadier General due to his expertise in dealing with the Moros and his famed 1902-1903 expeditions into the interior and around Lake Lanao. When searching for a replacement for Tasker Bliss, President Taft placed Pershing at the top of the list as the best and most capable officer in the Army for that position.¹ Numerous biographies and accounts exist that describe Pershing's exploits during his first tour of the Philippines, such as the expeditions around the entirety of Lake Lanao in Spring 1903, so there is no need to cover that here.²

What most accounts agree on is that Pershing was successful during that first tour because he believed in direct engagement with the local Moro leaders and put considerable time and effort into a campaign of personal diplomacy to cultivate and build relationships between leaders based on mutual trust, understanding and confidence. Pershing maintained that approach as military-governor. Upon taking command in 1909, Pershing saw that his successors and their subordinates had not maintained many of the relationships that he had cultivated during his first assignment. Pershing acted to immediately rectify that situation. Throughout his time as military-governor he made it a practice to meet regularly with local leaders to discuss issues and concerns, especially on controversial subjects such as disarmament. Pershing also encouraged his district

governors to likewise engage in personal diplomacy with local leaders and also the growing group of white planters settling in the province.^{3,4}

Pershing's philosophy for the use of troops in the province was merely an extension of his belief in the personal diplomacy of American officers towards local Moro leaders. Pershing thought the troops were spending too much time in garrison and not venturing far enough into the interior where the origin of most of the security problems resided.⁵ Pershing thought previous use of military force was unwisely applied as a means of vengeance and retribution that only generated more resistance to American authority. Therefore, he sought to change how forces were used in the province. Pershing thought more could be accomplished with a more deliberate and tactful approach to using force.⁶ Pershing thought it was necessary for the troops to get out of their garrisons and into the interior areas in direct contact with the local inhabitants as a means of building trust and confidence in American authority and attracting support from the local population through examples of restraint rather than the arbitrary use of force.⁷ As one biographer puts it, Pershing's overall plan was "pacification by persuasion."⁸

Education

Under Pershing, the Moro education system continued to focus on trade skills and craft work just as it had under Bliss. Education became further tied to economic development when an act of the Philippine Legislature authorized the hiring of a sales agent to market the crafts produced by the students at the trade schools in the Moro Province, and provide for the construction of a shop in which the goods would be sold.⁹

School attendance rose significantly during Pershing's administration as he kept up the general emphasis on trade and craft skills that had dominated Bliss's approach to

education. The increase in enrollment came even during those years that were marked by considerable violence and resistance to American authority. Pershing closed under-attended schools and opened up new schools in the Moro interior of Lake Lanao. This led to a 42 percent increase in school attendance by Moro students. In the later years of his tenure as military-governor, Pershing spent more money on school construction than ever before. Education also benefited from the many students in teacher training programs that had begun to graduate and fill the significant instructor shortages in the new schools in the final years of Pershing's tenure.¹⁰ Also, American teachers began receiving bonus pay for demonstrating ability in one of the local languages. This gave teachers an incentive to learn the local dialects and thus become more effective in teaching their students.

Part of the spurt in school building may have been the increase in the number of Muslim organized religious schools that had begun springing up in the interior regions around Lake Lanao. These schools, run by the panditas or Moro Muslim holy men, focused mainly on Muslim religious instruction. Pershing was concerned over the influence the panditas held among the local population and blamed that influence for stirring up revolt and resistance to American authority over the years. The charge was most likely true as the secular American government had eroded the traditional influence and power held by the Moro religious leaders and encouraged the panditas to foment resistance towards the threat to their power. Therefore, Pershing established secular public schools in areas of the interior with large numbers of pandita organized religious schools to offer an alternative to the panditas' religious based instruction. By Pershing's account, the move was effective as he noted significant numbers of students switching

their enrollment to the American government's public schools as fast as the schools could be established.¹¹

However, the basic ratio in school enrollment remained the same with Christian Filipinos making up nearly 60 percent of student body despite the fact that they were a minority of the population.¹² Filipino students, who generally lived in the larger towns, were unaffected by the violent resistance of the Moros in the interior and had far better access to schools. Moro students could only go to schools situated in the immediate vicinity of military garrisons in the interior and only then when conditions were friendly between Moro and American military troops in their region. As a result, Moros naturally lagged behind in educational opportunity. This eventually led to a disparity between Filipino and Moro inhabitants, giving rise to a better-educated minority Filipino elite class. The better-educated Filipino elite would come to dominate the province's economic and political spheres once American military-government transitioned to a civil government. This minority Filipino dominance still plagues the Moro occupied areas of the Philippines today, leading over the course of decades to numerous insurrections and revolts that are beyond the scope of this present work. What is important here is that the roots of that disparity were sown by the American military government's failure to correct the imbalance in educational opportunities for the Moros that increasingly widened the economic and political rift between the two ethnic groups.

Economy

Pershing strongly believed in the economic development of the Moro Province and on taking command he continued to build upon the work of General Bliss. During the course of his command, Pershing focused on economic development and new

initiatives to stimulate growth. It was only during his tenure as governor that that the Army placed more emphasis on establishing security than on developing the economy. This shift was mostly the result of the resistance engendered by his disarmament policy. Throughout the fall of 1909, Pershing worked to engage white planters and modify their treatment of the local labor force to help encourage native cooperation with American authority.¹³ Throughout his time in command, Pershing looked for ways to stimulate growth in food production within the province as a means of improving economic conditions for the common Moro, rather than the development of profitable agricultural exports.¹⁴

Ever since the Moro Province had first been organized it had been exempt from the majority of the laws passed by the Philippine Commission and Philippine Legislature. During Bliss' tenure, Acts of the Philippine Legislature began to be passed that removed those earlier exemptions for the Moro Province. Under Pershing's tenure, Acts were passed that continued to remove exemptions and bring the Moro Province further in line with the Administrative system for all of the Philippines. The majority of these now-applicable laws and acts applied to the economic sector of Philippine Administration. The progress made in developing the economy of the Moro Province had advanced to such a degree that the time had come to begin to integrate the provincial economy with that of the rest of the Philippines. Starting with the Act no. 1966 passed in 1910, Moro Province had to abide by the same customs and administrative rules that the rest of the islands had been using for several years, as well as following the tax laws applicable throughout the rest of the Philippines.

Another earlier law that was now applied to the Moro Province was the establishment of Postal Savings Banks in the province to encourage inhabitants to save money. The Postal Savings Banks were part of the postal system in the Philippines and allowed every inhabitant with access to a local branch of the post office to deposit funds in nation-wide banking system operating on the same rules throughout the Philippines and backed by the government through the Bureau of Posts.¹⁵ For the postal service to expand this banking service to the Moro Province, they had to transfer large amounts of cash into the region and routinely transfer it between branches. While this would have tremendous benefit for account holders saving, sending and receiving money, it also demonstrates the confidence in the level of security now present in the Moro Province in order for currency to be transported reliably without fear of criminal activity or anti-government unrest that could interfere with the movement of that money.

The same act allowing for the establishment of Postal Bank branches in the Moro Province also allowed for branches of the Government Agricultural Bank of the Philippine Islands to begin operating in the Philippines. The establishment of banks is a strong indicator of the progress of economic development in the province, especially as the agricultural bank existed to lend funds.¹⁶ It was now possible to fund the large amounts of capital investment required to meet the start-up costs for new operations. This encouraged the establishment of export crop producing, labor-intensive operations such as hemp farms and coconut plantations that were usually beyond the means of an individual local inhabitant to acquire. The accumulated effect of all these laws is that the Moro province economy was increasingly interconnected with the whole Philippine economic system.

One of Pershing's economic initiatives was the establishment of an annual provincial fair in Zamboanga, the first of which was held in February of 1911. This built upon the district fairs held at the Moro Exchanges that had begun during the previous administrations. The first provincial fair had a significant turn-out of over 20,000 visiting Moros and for that alone was considered a success. The main purpose of the fairs was to encourage the economic development of trade between Moro groups and thereby continue to reduce internecine violence that had continued to plague the province.¹⁷

Pershing also updated the Moro Exchange system and began a system of Industrial Trading Stations in the interior areas. The Industrial Trading Stations were initially run by the government as a place where goods could be bought and sold at fair market value to prevent the enormous mark ups and price gouging on goods bought cheaply on the coast and transported into the interior at extortionary prices. The Industrial Trading Stations eventually replaced the Moro Exchanges in an effort to equalize the economic playing field. The Moro Exchanges had been dominated by coastal Chinese and Filipino merchants looking to take advantage of Moros traveling to the coast from the interior, whereas the newly established Industrial Trading Stations sought to eliminate the remoteness of the interior as a factor favoring buyers over sellers. The American government purchased locally manufactured goods such as brassware and cloth through the Industrial Trading Stations and sent it through the Moro Exchange system to Manila where it was sold in the store of the Insular Sales Agency.¹⁸

In 1911, the provincial government began putting a renewed emphasis on the development of forest products for export. The government established a provincial forest service similar to that which had been operating in other areas of the Philippines

and whose main function was to develop sustainable lumber, rubber and other forest product industries. The government initiated the granting of long-term licenses of up to twenty years to corporations working to develop the forest industry. The licenses dictated how many and what type of trees the companies could harvest, how many they were required to plant and how many living trees needed to be maintained for any given hectare of land to protect against over-use and deforestation. Most importantly, the companies were required to buy and sell their products through the Moro Exchange system to ensure appropriate prices were set on native goods and labor and also to ensure money was reinvested in the local economy.¹⁹ These requirements would have prevented the over-exploitation of forest resources and native labor, as well as harnessed a potentially profitable export economy to support local development.

The government continued to conduct agricultural experiments to open up new crops for production. The government utilized the military commissaries to conduct some of these experiments. The commissaries at Camp Vicars began an experimental farm to attempt to grow potatoes in the higher altitude Lake Lanao region. At the time, the potatoes were a staple of soldiers' rations and were shipped in tins from the United States. However, the long voyage often resulted in product spoilage. The potato experimental farm was initially intended to meet a shortfall in troop rations that had resulted from considerable spoilage. However, the provincial government strongly supported the initiative in the hopes of establishing a new export crop for the entire district. Despite initial poor yields due to soil quality, the provincial government directed that the project continue at a variety of sites because of the enormous economic returns to the local population if such a crop could be successfully introduced to the region. The

government recognized that what began as an attempt to solve an internal logistical problem had the potential for great benefit if it could be made to work. Therefore it was worth the investment in time and effort.²⁰ Unfortunately, the effort was abandoned as a total failure despite significant time and resources spent in attempting to make it work.²¹ Pershing was disappointed by the failure of the potato crop, but continued to devote military resources to experiment with other food crops, particularly corn.²²

Also in 1911, the provincial government enacted a cadastral survey law for the Moro Province. A cadastral survey is one usually conducted for the purposes of establishing clearly defined boundaries of land for the purposes of taxation. In the Moro Province, the justification of the law was to help ordinary landowners obtain clear title for their land and establish legitimate ownership.²³ This was a continuation of the strategy under Bliss to make it easy for ordinary people to acquire a piece of property on which to settle without fear of dispossession, thereby encouraging more people to settle in fixed sites and settlements. Land surveyed was also distributed in tribal allotments rather than individual allotments since many Moros had not yet reached an understanding of the concept of private property ownership versus that owned by the tribe or family. An additional provincial law was passed in the same year that dictated that Moros could not sell tribal or individually owned land without the consent of the district governor. This would protect local Moros from unwittingly selling their land without the full knowledge of their actions or without getting a fair price for it.²⁴

The provincial government sought to protect the Moros from exploitation by greedy individuals or companies wanting to establish large plantations and acquire the land at a cheap price. The government wanted to avoid resentment from Moros who

would inevitably realize they had been cheated and dispossessed and left rootless and inclined to government resistance. Under American governance, such attempts to persuade Moros to settle in fixed locations with individual property that they could farm for their own subsistence, if not profit, helped to provide the Moros an alternative to resistance. Without such initiatives, resistance to American authority would likely have been much stronger even with disarmament. Despite the intent of the government surveys and laws to protect Moro property and encourage private ownership, the effect of the laws was that publicly held land was now easily and cheaply transferable to the hands of private ownership. Those with larger amounts of capital, such as Europeans and Filipinos, naturally had an advantage in consolidating large parcels of land for cash crop cultivation. The tribal allotments effectively placed Moros into tribal reservations that forced the Moros to remain in fixed places and that limited their opportunities. These protections were relaxed with the Filipinization of governance within the Moro lands following 1920. Large land inequities eventually developed between the Filipino and Moro people, leading to insurrection and unrest.

The agricultural economy of the Moro Province continued to flourish and develop under Pershing's tenure. The number of large plantations in the province increased from 97 in 1910, to 159 in 1912. However, the vast majority of these plantations were in the hands of Americans, Europeans or Chinese landowners rather than local Filipinos or Moros. Foreigners managed the plantations and pocketed the profits, while the local population provided the labor force on subsistence wages. Unrest in Davao and the Cotabato Valley areas where the majority of these plantations were located was tied back to some of the resentment arising from inequalities in land ownership and labor

practices.²⁵ Although the province was developing agriculturally, conditions for the individual Moro was worsening as a result of the survey and selling off of public lands. While Pershing's administration identified and tried to correct some of the problems, the root causes of later insurgencies were planted and would not come fully to fruition until after American administration had ended.

Labor exploitation became an issue that ultimately created an environment of unrest in the Moro Province. Pershing personally insisted on steps to improve labor practices by plantation owners, passing a series of provincial laws that dictated that laborers be paid promptly in cash rather than in credit and punishing violators for breach of contract.²⁶ An act passed in FY1913 made it illegal for an individual to compel any laborer or employee to purchase commodities, personal property or merchandise.²⁷ The measure targeted a coercive practice of forcing laborers to buy goods from their employers, possibly at inflated prices for credit in order to create a state of permanent indebtedness to the employer. It was a common enough method of exploiting labor in the United States that it could very well been imported by white planters or agricultural companies into the province.²⁸ In 1913, Pershing noted a decline in peonage among plantation laborers and an increase in the local labor supply as proof that these laws were effective in improving labor conditions in the province.²⁹

The Philippine government and Moro provincial government took steps that aimed to improve economic conditions in the province. However, these steps actually created more issues. The Philippine Legislature passed an act providing for the colonization of Mindanao with Christian Filipinos. Similar smaller initiatives had been encouraged in previous years to bring agricultural expertise to the Moro Province.

However, this act was the beginning of mass colonization. The purpose of the act was to bring a large labor pool to Mindanao to put large uncultivated tracts of land to use in growing food crops for the whole islands. Additionally, the American Philippine Government believed that the increased interaction between Filipino and Moro people would foster a common Philippine identity.³⁰ Relations between farmers and laborers were not the best, as evidenced by the above-mentioned act regarding exploitation. Colonization in large numbers would have only created further animosity, especially given the long-standing enmity between Moro and Filipinos, and the fact that large tracts of traditional Moro lands were now given to their traditional enemies. This push came at the end of Pershing's administration, so the level of animosity and instability this move generated is not indicated in any of his reports. However, Pershing was aware of the level of animosity between the two groups and knew that the Moros resented control and interference from Filipinos more than they did Americans.³¹

Philippine Commission reports indicate the success of colonization as an economic plan and overlook that the seeds for significant levels of instability were planted by such a move.³² Given the history of animosity between the two ethnic groups, especially in light of the Moro reaction when Filipinos attempted to assert control over them in Zamboanga and nearly triggered an insurrection (see below under Security), it was irresponsible of the administration to think colonization would foster better relations. The administration in Manila was unaware of the danger as they sought to expand the agricultural development of the area. The government reported that the local Moros responded to these new colonies by requesting colonies of their own because they assumed the Moros desired to emulate the agricultural success of the Filipino colonies in

their midst.³³ An alternative explanation is that the Moros demanded their own established colonies as a means of protecting and maintaining their land and territory against encroachments by the American government or their traditional Filipino rivals. The Moro demand for colonies of their own could have been a sign of rising inter-ethnic animosity and tension that the American government likely ignored.

Infrastructure

During Pershing's term of office, public works continued much as it had before. Much work needed to be done, but funds had to come from within the revenue generated by the province. The range of projects continued to be the same, focused on road works, harbor and wharf improvements and citification of the major towns.³⁴ FY1911 saw the approval of funds for the establishment of municipal electric light, power, and water supply system for Zamboanga.³⁵ In FY1913, the Philippine government authorized the Moro Provincial government to raise \$115,000 through the sale of municipal bonds to raise money for continued infrastructure improvements in the city of Zamboanga.³⁶ Additional appropriations were made to greatly expand the wireless telegraph system in the Moro islands.³⁷ Following disarmament and the ensuing pacification campaign, work on roads and telegraph lines jumped significantly in the province, especially in the years 1913 and 1914, which was made possible by the increase in security credited to Pershing.³⁸ The large jump in infrastructure improvements undertaken during that time suggests the extent to which violent resistance hindered the development of infrastructure in the interior.

Government

When Pershing took command of the province, he began to work at improving the basic governance of the province. While he initially anticipated that military governance would continue for many years, his efforts to improve governance included changes that made the provincial administration more cost effective and efficient, setting the administrative conditions for easing the transition to civilian government of the province. Pershing also sought to use improvement in the quality of governance to reduce some of the causes and reasons that provoked Moro resistance.

Pershing began to further subdivide the Moro Province into more districts than the original five districts established by General Wood. He subdivided the entire island of Mindanao into a total of 12 districts with its own appointed district governor. Most of the new districts were subdivided areas of the Mindanao interior where Pershing hoped to bring more control over the nomadic people there.³⁹ This move brought more governmental control over local areas. An increase in governmental presence may have played a role in the increase in resistance to American authority that marked much of Pershing's administration.

Pershing integrated more Moro leaders into the provincial government. Deputy district governor positions were created and the most cooperative Moro chiefs were appointed to those positions. Moro leaders acting as deputy district governors reinforced American authority even when acting within their traditional role. Conversely, traditional authority exercised by Moro leaders not appointed to government positions was de-legitimized. Pershing hoped that over time, the Moro leaders co-opted into the American administration would demonstrate that loyalty and service to the American

government would be rewarded and thus make cooperation more attractive to Moro leaders.⁴⁰

Pershing also revamped much of the civil administration during his time as military-governor and sought to eliminate redundant positions, thereby making the bureaucracy of the Moro Province more efficient and cost effective.⁴¹ He also implemented tax reform. Pershing combined several taxes, such as the Road Tax, which was established by Bliss, and the *cedula* tax into a single tax, and putting more emphasis on paying the tax through labor on public projects instead of through cash payments to the provincial government. In this way, Pershing reported that he greatly increased the amount of work done on public works projects without increasing the costs to the government.⁴² These tax reforms were designed to reduce taxation as a cause of resistance to American authority. Although Pershing eventually achieved success through the military solution of enforced disarmament, he never stopped trying to use improvements in governance as a means of reducing resistance.

During Pershing's term, slavery again became an issue in the Philippine islands. Slavery and human trafficking still existed within the islands despite passage of a law several years earlier and several provincial reports claiming to have nearly eradicated the practice. On May 1, 1913, the U.S. Senate demanded that the Philippine government investigate allegations that such slavery was still ongoing.⁴³ The Philippine government also passed a law in FY1913 again outlawing slavery, the trading of human beings and any involuntary form of peonage.⁴⁴ Earlier claims of eradicating the practice were premature and efforts to stamp it out had proven ineffective. As Pershing encouraged his troops to spend more time in the field and in contact with the local inhabitants, the true

extent of slavery was doubtlessly becoming known. Efforts to more fully eradicate the practice, which the Moros would have seen as an attack on their cultural values (see chapter 3), would likely have stirred up considerable resentment along the same lines as the enforcement of the disarmament law and resulted in an increase in violence in the province. Moro leaders in the interior were using slavery and peonage as a means of retaining their base of support. This enabled them to resist American authority or, at the very least, maintain their traditional status. In the final year of Pershing's administration, yet another law addressing the issue in the Moro areas was passed, signaling that the issue of slavery and its place in Moro culture would remain incompletely resolved after military government was discontinued.⁴⁵ The administration still sought to remove slave holding as a means for status to maintain status and power, but was not putting soldiers in the field to enforce it as they had disarmament. The military government thus never achieved what was one of Leonard Wood's principle objectives in the early years of military government.

The most significant legal and governmental change during Pershing's tenure was the passage of a provincial disarmament law that went into effect in September 8, 1911. As has been mentioned in previous chapters, the bearing of arms was extremely important to masculine identity in Moro culture and there was an immediate backlash against this legislation and increased incidents in resistance to American authority. The disarmament law was followed by a period of widespread insecurity and resistance to American authority. The disarmament law directed the forcible disarmament of the Moros and was based on a law already in effect in the rest of the Philippines for several years. In the Moro Province, it also applied to the traditional bladed weapons (the kris

and barong) carried by Moro males as visible symbols of their warrior status within their caste system of social hierarchy. American troops, Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary units began enforcing the law. It was not until July 8, 1913 that Pershing was able to report to the Governor-General of the Philippines that the disarmament of the Moros was nearly completed.⁴⁶

In immediate terms, the disarmament move was a direct cause of considerable unrest to the province that resulted in a great deal of bloodshed. One must naturally question the timing and wisdom of the move. This has been one of the enduring criticisms of Pershing's administration, especially since Leonard Wood publicly disagreed with it at the time.⁴⁷ Pershing was aware of the resistance that the disarmament law would provoke, but went ahead with the law anyway. The question of why he would undertake such a move is because disarmament paved the way and set the conditions for the transition to civil government. Once disarmament in the Moro province was initiated, the Philippine Commission looked upon disarmament of the Moros as ultimately decisive in creating a level of pacification that allowed for the transition to civil government. The Commander of the Philippine Division, J. Franklin Bell, concurred by recommending the withdrawal of troops from the Moro areas. The ultimate endstate of pacifying and civilizing the Moro people was seen by the Americans of having been achieved through the disarmament law and enforcing compliance.⁴⁸ Despite the bloodshed enforcement of disarmament entailed, Pershing's move was hailed at the time as a rousing success in achieving a final victory, although there is no indication that when he undertook disarmament he considered it to be so decisive. Even while undertaking disarmament,

the Pershing administration continued to focus on improvements in governance and economic development.

In the final year of Pershing's administration, the name of the Moro Province was changed to the department of Mindanao and Sulu. At that point, it also signaled the end of military government in the Moro areas. Various acts of the Philippine Legislature were enacted to complete the work of previous years in bringing the administration and organization of the department of Mindanao and Sulu in line with the other departments of the Philippines.⁴⁹ The decision to transition from a military government did not happen overnight, but had long been planned by Pershing. On first taking command of the Moro Province, Pershing was resistant to the idea of replacing military government with a civil one. By 1911, he realized that civil government was inevitable and began planning to enable the transition.

Pershing was also forced to re-examine earlier positions with regard to the changing political landscape. The 1912 election of Woodrow Wilson brought a complete change in administration to the War Department and the Philippine Commission. Only one of the seven members of the Commission remained after Wilson's inauguration. Moreover, under Wilson's direction the Filipinization of Philippine government began to gather speed and the majority of the members of the Commission were now Filipinos rather than Americans. Moros were not represented on the Commission and it is unlikely that an increased number of ethnic Filipinos on the Commission resulted in an increase in objective concern for what was best for the Moro people.⁵⁰ Therefore, many of the changes in the Philippines and the approach taken regarding the transition of the Moro Province to full civilian control were made by people new to their positions and less

familiar with the unique characteristics of that region. It is plausible that the shift in direction could have resulted from inexperience and external attitudes rather than as a reaction to events on the ground.

Under Pershing, the administration of the civil government and the role of military commander for the military troops in the province had been kept separate. Pershing even maintained two offices in different buildings with different staffs in order to keep his two roles separated. During his final two years, Pershing worked to transition duties and responsibilities for government administration away from military personnel and onto civilians wherever possible. When Pershing took control of the province in 1909, all the district governors were Army officers, as were all but one of the district secretaries and three of the six members of the Legislative Council for the province. In 1912, Pershing began to install civilians into civil positions whenever Army personnel rotated out to their next duty assignment and left a vacancy.⁵¹ By the end of FY1914 (which lasted 18 months in the Philippines that year to end in December 1914), Pershing was the last military officer in a critical role within the administration of the newly formed department of Mindanao and Sulu. His departure completed the transition.⁵²

Security

The Pershing administration of the Moro Province saw an increased emphasis on security as the main effort in improving conditions within the province. However, this emphasis came about gradually, and security was not the main focus when Pershing took command. Pershing's term saw a large increase in violence and instability because he directed more forces into the field and the enforcement of controversial laws that inspired Moro resistance. The focus on security as a main effort only came about in response to

the increased violence that Pershing's initiatives provoked. Annual reports continued to paint a rosy picture that only minor incidents were occurring and that progress was being made. Only in 1913 did the violence become so pronounced that it was recognized in the official reports. By the end of his tenure as governor in December 1913, the Philippine and American government recognized that Pershing's term was the one that finally brought about peaceful control on the province. In doing so, they intimated that the preceding years were indeed remarkably violent ones in the province.⁵³ Although Pershing never stopped working to improve government administration, economic development and education, the official mood was that it was through his efforts in security that Pershing was finally able to pacify the province and set the conditions for transferring control to a civilian administration.

The first full year of Pershing's administration in 1910 brought about a redistribution of military force within the Moro Province. During FY1910, two additional battalions of Philippine Scouts were added to the total troop strength available in the province. Pershing used the increase in Scout strength to spread the troops throughout the province in company sized or smaller stations. In the rest of the Philippines, Scout organizations and military troops were being consolidated in battalion sized or larger garrisons to cut costs. As mentioned in previous chapters, this consolidation also occurred in the Moro Province prior to Pershing taking over, but the provincial government began to distribute its forces into temporary camps in the Lanao region to deal with outbreaks of unrest. Pershing now implemented a widespread redistribution of auxiliary forces to cover as much ground as possible. The extra strength allowed the government to establish four additional outposts in the troublesome Lanao

district, dedicate a battalion to securing Davao and establish eight new stations along the Cotabato River Valley. Only two companies of those Scouts were comprised of Moros. However, Pershing authorized those two companies to recruit additional Moros to expand into a battalion.⁵⁴ Eventually, Pershing recommended that the redistribution and stationing of these auxiliary forces within the Moro Province become permanent.⁵⁵

Pershing saw the purpose of the troops in the province “to encourage the peaceably inclined and to discourage the lawless element.”⁵⁶ To that end, Pershing wrote that troops needed to maintain a steady presence outside of garrisons and to be in contact with the local population in order to maintain good relations between the government and the population.⁵⁷ Only the persistent presence of American troops guaranteed peace and stability in the province and prevented a return to the previous lawlessness.⁵⁸ Despite his dedication to improving governance and economic conditions, Pershing became increasingly convinced that regular, peaceful contact with American forces was vital to ending resistance. Pershing’s approach can be exemplified by the following excerpt from instructions given to the Philippine Scout companies for their operations:

At regular intervals of not less than three months, if practicable, detachments will be sent to the principal localities, including rancherias and villages of influential wild men, to remain for short periods ***. During their stay at such places, and, in fact, at all times, both officers and enlisted men should use every endeavor to create and maintain friendly relations with the inhabitants, especially the Moros and wild people, to the end that the latter may be brought under governmental influence and control.⁵⁹

Regular contact with the local population was the means by which the government sought to establish control, build trust and confidence in the government by the population and establish security. Subsequently, Pershing kept the Scouts in the field as much as possible during his tenure, “scouting and patrolling during the entire year” as

one report stated.⁶⁰ As a result, Pershing thought the government should recognize that a permanent troop presence would be required and he thereby advocated for a return to permanent construction of several larger outposts. Pershing recommended a permanent regimental headquarters in Jolo, a brigade headquarters in the Lake Lanao region and another regimental headquarters in Zamboanga, as well as several of the smaller camps, such as Keithley and Overton in the interior, to be built up to permanent status. Pershing noted that the construction of permanent buildings was enormously expensive since large amounts concrete would be required. However, he thought such an expense was well justified. This recommendation for permanent facilities had been made years before, but the argument then was based on efficiency and ease of logistics. Alternatively, Pershing justified the construction of permanent garrison facilities as a necessity for long-term security presence. This represents a significant shift in strategy as it recognized that the eventual transition of security to local Scout or Constabulary forces was not possible, viable or desirable in maintaining long-term security in the province. It meant that locally provided security was no longer a viable option as an envisioned endstate for security conditions as long as Pershing was in charge. In fact, Pershing specified that the three permanent posts at Jolo, Zamboanga and Lake Lanao needed to be permanently manned specifically by “white troops” while the indigenous forces occupied only the smaller posts.⁶¹

Along with construction of permanent facilities, the Pershing administration required the permanent stationing of troops to occupy them. Pershing made recommendations that would increase the number of combat available troops within units and give him more forces that could interact (militarily or peacefully) with the population

in support of his strategy. Pershing's overall recommendation is that all Philippine troops needed to be maintained and trained as though perpetually on a "war footing."⁶² This meant that the authorized troop strength would be increased from the peacetime authorization of approximately 65 soldiers per company to the wartime authorization of 150 soldiers per company. This would greatly increase the capability of individual units operating in the Philippines, while at the same time allowing a reduction in the actual number of regiments serving in the islands without reducing the number of soldiers conducting operations. In effect, such a recommendation reduced the overhead cost of maintaining headquarters elements by replacing the headquarters personnel with regular riflemen. Overall troop strength could be kept the same or actually increased, but the number of regimental headquarters elements must be cut in half from 12 to six, so that the proportion of riflemen to administrative personnel would be greatly increased.⁶³

When one's strategy was based on troop presence, the more troops that were available for actual field operations was critical as more troops could naturally cover more territory and come into contact with more of the local population. The recommendation to cut the number in units in half and make them twice their normal size was a clever way of reducing the apparent costs of keeping units in the Philippines without decreasing (and possibly even increasing) the combat power available to the commander on the ground.

One unidentified drawback of the proposal not mentioned in the report was that a reduction in headquarters elements reduced the number of military administrative personnel, officer and enlisted, that were available to serve in positions with the civil government. Significant numbers of military personnel filled positions in the civil government of the Moro Province, and had since the very beginning of the provincial

government. The fact that the recommendation was made to reduce the number of those available personnel in favor of ordinary enlisted riflemen only underscores the emphasis Pershing placed on getting troops out into the territory and among the population as the main focus of American efforts rather than the development of civil government and administrative capabilities in the Moro Province.

Eventually, the recommendation was made in 1911 to discontinue the method of rotating U.S. based regiments to the Philippines in favor of direct recruitment and enlistment of soldiers for service in units permanently based in the Philippines. This would help the military deal with the problem in personnel instability brought about by constant troop rotations of units back and forth from the United States. Units would be able to establish better long-term relations with the local inhabitants leading to more trust and confidence in those units by the local population. It was also thought that soldiers who enlisted expressly for duty in the Philippines would be more motivated than those soldiers whose units merely rotated through the islands on a two-year tour.⁶⁴

The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1910 indicates that the efforts of General Pershing had a positive effect in establishing security within the province.⁶⁵ During the year preceding the annual report for FY1910, U.S. Army troops and Scouts participated in 16 separate engagements across the province. These engagements included a variety of operations to assist civil authorities in maintaining order and control, as well as in eliminating pirate or outlaw bands.⁶⁶ The most significant of these occurred in November 1909 in the district of Zamboanga when a group of the Subano ethnic group occupied and fortified a position in the hills not far from Zamboanga. A force of Constabulary sent to investigate was driven back with casualties. The district

governor of Zamboanga, Major J. P. Finley, personally took charge of a force of military troops and put down the uprising. Several important decisions played in the suppression of this revolt and in the aftermath of the insurrection. The first is that the Americans identified a group of Moro leaders from the Lake Lanao region as the primary instigators of the revolt, intimidating and coercing the Subano ethnic group into rebelling against U.S. authority. The fact that the instigators were from the Lake Lanao region likely influenced Pershing's perception that the main focus for security should be the Lake Lanao area rather than the area actually occupied by the Subano group in the Zamboanga district. The second outcome of the revolt was that several methods for dealing with insurrection were found futile. Cash rewards did not bring in information or assistance, nor did the Americans receive support from the local populations physically threatened by the insurrectionists. Intimidation by the insurrectionists or general apathy towards the American government was considered to be the root cause, but the Americans walked away from the incident believing that in the future only troop presence could be relied on to end insurrections against the American government.⁶⁷ This likely influenced Pershing's perception that only a strategy of long-term and widespread troop presence could secure the province.

The actual method used by Finley to put down the revolt was not one of brute force and violence. Finley moved slowly and deliberately and avoided hostile actions. He was convinced that the presence of troops acting friendly and in a protective manner towards the common Subano people making up the body of the insurrectionist force would establish trust and confidence in the intentions of the American government and be able to persuade the Subanos to return to their homes without bloodshed. Finley wanted

to convince the Subano that “this form of government power was friendly and really interested in their salvation and prosperity.”⁶⁸ Finley’s strategy worked and the Subano returned to their homes and offered assistance to the American forces in capturing and testifying against the Moro instigators of the rebellion. Finley’s conduct of the operation outlines the overall approach during Pershing’s term towards using troop presence to provide security without relying on actual physical force to crush resistance. The philosophy of troop presence not only served to preserve American authority, but was also intended to protect the population and persuade them of the American government’s good intentions. Pershing’s strategy of troop presence was a form of persuasive diplomacy designed to gain the trust and confidence of the population in American government, but at the same time capable of providing protection and enforcing law and order.

However, in addition to crime and resistance to American authority, both of which still existed even if somewhat diminished, another security threat began to emerge. This time the threat was actually in favor of American authority. It was noted that the Filipino population of Zamboanga was agitating for more control over the local civil government than other ethnic groups. They argued that the Filipino inhabitants were the more educated, civilized, law abiding and tax-paying portion of the population to justify their demands for an increase in their representation in local government. This was highly resisted by the Moro population as it would have resulted in greater Filipino control over Moro affairs, and the Moros backed up their opposition with threats of violence. It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that there was considerable inter-ethnic rivalry in the Moro Province. The provincial government denied the Filipino request for greater

participation out of security concerns over the violence that would likely result from approving such a proposal.⁶⁹ However, the issue indicates that the provincial form of government was gaining increased support from Filipinos and Moros alike. In this case the Filipinos were seeking to modify the system for their benefit. To counter their move, the Moro people had to throw their support behind the status quo of the American system. Rather than rejecting the system altogether and ceding local government to another group, the Moros thus had to embrace the current system and strengthen it.

For several years, the political struggle between Moro and Filipino for local and provincial control in Mindanao threatened to break out into inter-ethnic violence. The Filipinos in Mindanao were strongly supported by Filipino Nationalists in other parts of the Philippines, raising the issue in the Manila press and Philippine Legislature.

However, the Moros leaders made it clear that too much provincial authority given to the Filipino minority would result in violent Moro resistance. The situation would grow more serious under the civil government of Frank W. Carpenter after Pershing's tenure ended, but for the time being Moro leaders courted the favor of the American authority and saw compliance and loyalty as a means of maintaining American support against the Filipinos.⁷⁰

Camp Keithley was considered the most important post in the Moro country. Pershing thought that a post in that region of Lake Lanao would always be required to maintain security and that it would always need to be able to house a considerable sized force.⁷¹ This was one of the arguments both the provincial and Philippine governments used to try to persuade the War Department to fund the railroad from Iligan to Camp Keithley. Part of the argument was that because of the camp's importance it could never

be closed in the near future thus justifying the expense of building the rail line to the camp.⁷² Additionally, the improved logistical capability the rail line would provide would allow Pershing to expand the post to house a full sized brigade. The security situation was such that Pershing thought Keithley should be a brigade outpost, but at the time logistical considerations made it impossible to support that number of troops in the interior.

When fire destroyed many of the barracks buildings in 1910, Pershing took the opportunity to move the post and establish a new lay out and organization of the camp. Security of the post was stated as the primary reason for reconfiguring the post. The new barracks were built several hundred yards closer to Lake Lanao so that the lakeshore formed part of the post perimeter so that the perimeter was smaller and more compact. Site improvements were also made so that area was available for the rapid expansion of the post should it eventually be necessary to situate a whole brigade there. The immediate result of the improvements was that fewer soldiers were required to secure the new Camp Keithley than the old post. Yet the larger implication is that there existed a need for security improvements at the post and the need for the post to be more permanent and expandable in size. This is significant for two reasons. It demonstrated how Pershing focused on security, that the existence of long-term presence of troops in that region was necessary, and showed the importance of the post to providing security to that region. For Pershing, the Lake Lanao region was increasingly seen as the main effort of a security focused strategy and this required that Camp Keithley be more secure, permanent and expandable to accommodate more forces. This indicates that Pershing foresaw the possibility of a deteriorating security situation in that area.⁷³ Camp Vicars

was likewise moved and reconfigured at a new location six miles from the original site during Pershing's second year in command.⁷⁴

Troop presence worked well in dealing with violence when actual problems arose. When a Moro uprising occurred in Davao in FY1911 that targeted American run and Filipino worked plantations, the Americans responded similarly as it had during the Subano uprising. A force of Philippine Scouts went into the area in pursuit of the hostile bands of hill tribes that had begun attacking the plantations. Additionally, numerous base camps were established throughout the area so that the Scout units could be spread throughout the territory and deter a resurgence of violence through constant patrolling. When necessary, the different detachments coordinated their movements to close in on an area from different directions and temporarily gain the mass necessary to deal with an insurgent group.⁷⁵

Over time, Pershing thought that the strategy of troop presence was an effective one. "The mere presence of troops has a very beneficial and restraining influence on the lawless elements," he wrote in his report for FY1911.⁷⁶ To that end, he began sending the troops out on operations for more of an extended period of time. Of the 19 operations Pershing reported in his annual report for FY1911, nine of those were of extended duration lasting weeks or in some cases months.⁷⁷

As under Bliss, the Philippine Constabulary remained the unit of choice for dealing with security threats during Pershing's period in office. When a situation arose, the Constabulary responded first and was assisted or replaced by military troops depending on the scale of the operation required. During the Subano incident in late 1909, the Constabulary was used to investigate the situation and Major Finley only took

over when the Constabulary was beaten back and the true scope of the problem was understood.⁷⁸ The Constabulary operated on a routine basis of constantly patrolling their areas of responsibility, which fit in well with Pershing's methodology of using troop presence to maintain security. The Constabulary detachments were always interacting with the people and this is what made them more effective. Pershing hoped to do the same with Philippine Scout detachments and wanted a vigorous program of "practice" marches by regular troops that would effectively get forces out of their garrisons and moving throughout their local areas.

Reliance on the Philippine Constabulary to bear the burden of security operations resulted in a severely overworked force.⁷⁹ The Lake Lanao region always required considerable policing,⁸⁰ and the various minor insurrections of the Subano or Davao hill tribes over the years kept up the strain on the Constabulary force. A situation that had developed during Bliss' tenure continued during Pershing's term as well. Personnel shortages and lack of funds continued to hamper the Constabulary. One of the options considered was to combine the Constabulary with the Scout organization into a single insular army for the Philippines. This would greatly expand the size of the force. One of the benefits besides simple numbers is that the Scout units would return to company sized posts and greatly increase their operations in conjunction with the constabulary forces. Scout units outside the Moro province had begun consolidating into battalion sized garrisons. The consolidation of Scouts and Constabulary was actually favored by the senior ranking leaders of the constabulary and Philippine government. The combined force would report solely to the civil authorities, increasing the power and ability of the Governor-General and civil authorities to deal with security issues.⁸¹ This suggestion

was not acted upon at the time, possibly due to unease in Washington at the suggestion of having such a single large body of native auxiliaries organized and armed operating in the islands. One possible concern of the U.S. administration might have been that the recommended combined force might later on become a threat to the government in a situation of renewed insurgent Philippine independence movement. Funding of the force was also likely to have deterred support for establishing it. However, such a combined force with the efficiencies it would have produced in operations, administration and logistics could have been highly useful in the Moro Province where local auxiliaries were stretched thin and being the larger cost of establishing security. The mere fact that such an action was suggested and endorsed in the Philippine Commission's reports indicates the seriousness of the situation facing the overworked Constabulary throughout the Philippines.

By the end of FY1911, the shortfalls of the Constabulary were extremely severe. At the end of that fiscal year, the total number of Philippine Constabulary operating in all of the Philippines was under 4,500 officers and enlisted personnel, down from a high of 7,500 personnel a few years before. The main cause of the drawdown was in funding shortfalls that slashed the personnel budget, even though the Secretary of Commerce and Police for the Philippines recognized that demands from provincial and district governments were steadily increasing.⁸² The increasing inability of the Constabulary to meet demand for those forces probably influenced Pershing to make more use of military troops for routine than Bliss had done. As the Constabulary decreased in ability to cover the increasing amount of ground, Pershing had to make use of every available soldier at his disposal to further a strategy that was dependent on getting troops in contact with the

local population. However desirable it would have been to transition security to native police forces, it became increasingly apparent that such an approach was not feasible within the Moro Province. The Constabulary would never be up to the task, so the only other option was to shift the security focus back onto military troops and accept that their permanent presence in the province was the only viable option for establishing security.

Funding for the Constabulary did begin to come through and in FY1913 the Constabulary was able to add an additional 300 enlisted men to their end strength. The declining security situation during the Pershing administration doubtlessly reinforced the demands to increase the strength of the Constabulary. Although not a view shared by Pershing, the Philippine Commission hoped that the end of large-scale resistance in the Moro Province would mean that the Philippine Constabulary would be sufficient to maintain security in the province, with the Regular Army troops only required to provide support in case of emergency situations. This is basically the same approach that Tasker Bliss had hoped for during his tenure as military governor, but had proven to be such a failure.⁸³ Given the enormous cost that Pershing was proposing by advocating a permanent large scale troop presence in the province, an increase in the less expensive locally recruited Constabulary was likely more politically and economically feasible.

Pershing's term as military-governor saw a change of direction on the disarmament of the Moros. As explained in earlier chapters, the carrying of weapons and arms was extremely important to Moro masculine identity and for that reason exceptions had been made on a cultural basis regarding the implementation of the Philippine law of firearms possession and ownership. However, Pershing began to do away with that exemption and began a program of general disarmament in 1911. A general disarmament

of the Moro population was hoped to increase security.⁸⁴ This in fact did not happen in the short term. The military government faced considerable unrest, which took nearly two years to quell, as well as fought two significant battles during a period of considerable campaigning.

Disarmament was discussed during the terms of Generals Wood and Bliss and was regarded as being a necessary step at some point. However, those administrations rejected disarmament as impractical given the large amount of resistance they knew would immediately result. Pershing was aware of the likelihood of violent resistance to a disarmament policy, but by 1911 he believed the time had come to implement disarmament regardless of the cost in terms of blood and violence “even though the result should be a general uprising or holy war.” In implementing the plan, the Pershing administration gave the Moro people until December 1, 1911 to turn in their weapons voluntarily in return for a cash payment. Some Moros did in fact voluntarily turn in arms. In several instances local Moro leaders, personally persuaded to assist by Pershing himself, helped in the effort to collect and turn in weapons. Other Moros violently resisted, individually or in groups.⁸⁵

The first violent resistance occurred in Jolo in November and December 1911 when 1300 Moros opposed to disarmament occupied the crater of Bud Dajo, scene of the earlier 1906 battle. Pershing personally led a force of 1,000 Regular Army, Scouts and Constabulary troops to deal with the situation. Negotiations by Pershing resulted in all but 300 of the resisters to peacefully return to their homes. Guidance from the Governor-General of the Philippines, Newton W. Gilbert, was that Pershing could neither directly assault the crater, nor use artillery to shell the crater’s defenders in order to prevent a

repeat of the political fallout that had accompanied the earlier 1906 Battle of Bud Dajo. Pershing instead sealed off access to the crater and played a waiting game to compel the surrender of the remaining resisters when their supplies were exhausted. The Moro defenders were forced to attempt to break out of their encirclement, but after several desperate attempts failed, the majority were compelled to surrender at the end of December. During the final surrender, a large group of Moros made a last attempt to flee and escape. When these Moros were later captured, the Americans held them in jail in Jolo and only released them when a ransom of five firearms apiece was turned over to the authorities to secure their release.⁸⁶

The chief of Constabulary directly linked the disarmament law as the cause for considerable instability and unrest in the Lake Lanao and Jolo regions of the Moro Province. Shortly after the law went into effect, the Constabulary experienced its largest single desertion of Moro Constables ever. In October 1911, eleven Moro Constables deserted in the Lake Lanao region with their weapons, showing that even those Moros authorized to retain weapons were hesitant to carry out the task of disarming others given the personal risk they faced in attempting to force compliance with the law.⁸⁷

Throughout 1912, vigorous unit patrolling by Army, Scout and Constabulary carried out disarmament. When patrolling units came across a Moro carrying a weapon, bladed or otherwise, the usual practice was to attempt to talk the Moro into giving up the weapon without any trouble. Most of the time, the Moro preferred to attempt to flee, or worse, sometimes fight to the death to preserve their honor as a warrior rather than undergo the emasculation and humiliation of having his weapons (and thus his manhood) taken away from him.⁸⁸ Those Moros that fled were diligently and aggressively pursued

until they were finally captured. Aggressive patrolling deterred organized resistance for most of that year.⁸⁹ A minor engagement near Jolo in January of 1912 resulted in no U.S. fatalities but twenty attacking Moros killed when recalcitrant Moros engaged a column of four U.S. companies.⁹⁰ It gathers brief passing mention in the Secretary's report as a minor event, but it is significant that it involved a large Moro force attacking a considerable force of American troops out in the field. Large-scale resistance to American authority was still possible and still being provoked by the American government. This incident was a foreshadowing of the battle of Bud Bagsak a year later.

The final clash resulting from the disarmament policy came in January 1913. A group of three blood related Moro leaders in the Lati Ward of Jolo island organized a short campaign of resistance. After a failed American attempt to crush the Moros at Sahipa Cotta on January 23, 1913,⁹¹ the Moro force occupied the top of Bud Bagsak, taking with them nearly the entire local population of six to ten thousand people. Negotiations lasted for months between Americans and the resisters. Some Moros were persuaded to surrender their arms and return to their homes in exchange for individual land plots. Most of the unarmed resisters and their families were ultimately persuaded return to their homes by American promises that military troops would withdraw from the region of Jolo. Ultimately, a core group of resisters refused to surrender and disarm and a bloody American assault on Bud Bagsak from June 11 to 15, 1913 defeated that group. Many of the Moro leaders were killed along the majority of their followers, with estimates ranging from 300 to 500 Moros killed in the assault.⁹²

Bud Bagsak did not end the resistance to disarmament. A few Moros who escaped death at Bud Bagsak continued organizing resistance. Several other

engagements were fought between June and October 1913. However, due to the press coverage of the Battle of Bud Bagsak it was seen as the decisive battle that finally brought pacification to the Moro Province. Pershing was criticized in the press for the casualties, but also nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor for his personal actions on the field. This however was not approved.⁹³ Pershing later received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions at Bud Bagsak after that award was created and accepting it only after he retired.⁹⁴ Disarmament and the ensuing pacification campaign established such a condition of security that American Regular Army troops were withdrawn from Mindanao and Jolo in October of 1913, and the task of security transitioned to the Philippine Constabulary and Philippine Scout units.⁹⁵ The prediction and recommendations made by Pershing that long-term troop presence, particularly “white” Regular Army troops, would be required to maintain security for some time to come turned out to be unfounded. According to government accounts for the rest of FY1914, the Philippine Constabulary was able to handle the task for security and continue to make progress. Reports cited the successful capture or surrender of numerous notorious outlaw and resistance leaders as indicators that the rebellious Moros were no longer able to cause trouble in the Moro Province for an extended period of time. Security could not be described as exactly as peaceful as government reports made it out to be, but Pershing had successfully reduced violence to such an extent that the remaining Scouts and Constabulary were up to the task, even though the government itself expressed surprise given some of the conditions in the province. However, the limited numbers of security forces available after military government ended forced the new civil administration to recognize the limits of its ability to further expand control into

previously ungoverned regions. They would have to continue to remain ungoverned space for some time to come.⁹⁶

Conclusion

Under Pershing, the main focus of American efforts in the Moro Province transitioned to the establishment of security. This was not Pershing's aim when he took command of the province, but a reaction to events on the ground. While continuing to foster economic development, Pershing established a policy of troop presence to spread American influence farther and wider throughout the province than either of his predecessors. Once it became apparent that the security situation was hindering the development of the province, Pershing set forth a risky disarmament policy that he knew would generate a backlash against American authority. The long campaign to establish security that resulted from the disarmament policy fortunately proved decisive in finally establishing the conditions necessary for transitioning from military to civil government. Despite making initial projections that force would be an enduring requirement in the province, Pershing was forced to embark on a security strategy that ultimately ended organized resistance and accomplished the goal of stabilizing the Moro Province far sooner than anticipated. The disarmament policy paved the way for a successful conclusion to military operations and control within the Moro Province.

¹ Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing*, vol. 1 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 463.

² See Smythe, *Guerilla Warrior*, Chapters 4-6, or Vandiver, *Black Jack*, vol. 1, Chapters 8-9, for accounts of Pershing's first tour in the Philippines. See also the Annual Reports of the War Department for 1902 for official accounts.

³ Donald Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 146.

⁴ Vandiver, 477-479.

⁵ Smythe, 145.

⁶ Vandiver, 477.

⁷ Smythe, 145.

⁸ Vandiver, 499.

⁹ War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912), 2.

¹⁰ Perter Gordon Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920* (Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines System, 1977), 212-215.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 217.

¹² *Ibid.*, 212-215.

¹³ Vandiver, 479.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 516-517.

¹⁵ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1911), 29-36.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁷ War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*, 23.

¹⁸ Gowing, 227-229.

¹⁹ War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*, 75-78.

²⁰ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910), 249.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 232.

²² Vandiver, 517.

²³ War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*, 19.

²⁴ Gowing, 224, 229.

²⁵ Gowing, 222-223.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 224-225.

²⁷ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914), 3.

²⁸ The “company store” method of labor exploitation is where a single company has a monopsony on labor (is the sole employer) and a monopoly on goods (is the sole seller) in today’s economic terminology, and it has a history going back to the beginnings of the industrial revolution. See John Steinbeck’s *Grapes of Wrath* for a depiction of how it worked in an agricultural labor market.

²⁹ Gowing, 225.

³⁰ War Department, *Annual Reports War Department Fiscal Year Ended 30 June, 1915 Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War July 1, 1913, to December 31, 1914 (In One Part)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1915), 61.

³¹ Smythe, 154.

³² War Department, *Annual Reports War Department Fiscal Year Ended 30 June, 1915 Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War July 1, 1913, to December 31, 1914 (In One Part)*, 7.

³³ Gowing, 224.

³⁴ War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*, 23.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁶ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4, 3.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁸ War Department, *Annual Reports War Department Fiscal Year Ended 30 June, 1915 Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War July 1, 1913, to December 31, 1914 (In One Part)*, 60-62, 187-189.

³⁹ War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*, 23.

⁴⁰ Gowing, 245-246.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 211-212.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 212.

⁴³ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914), 36-38.

⁴⁴ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4, 5.

⁴⁵ War Department, *Annual Reports War Department Fiscal Year Ended 30 June, 1915 Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War July 1, 1913, to December 31, 1914 (In One Part)*, 3-5.

⁴⁶ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 1, 33-34.

⁴⁷ Smythe, 164.

⁴⁸ War Department, *Annual Reports War Department Fiscal Year Ended 30 June, 1915 Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War July 1, 1913, to December 31, 1914 (In One Part)*, 60.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵¹ Gowing, 248.

⁵² Smythe, 144, 156-157.

⁵³ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4, 15.

⁵⁴ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 263.

⁵⁵ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912), 230.

⁵⁶ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 246.

- ⁵⁷ Ibid., 246.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., 250-251.
- ⁵⁹ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 243.
- ⁶⁰ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1912 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913), 121.
- ⁶¹ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 232.
- ⁶² War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 261.
- ⁶³ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912), 17-18.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid., 19.
- ⁶⁵ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4, 35.
- ⁶⁶ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 258-259.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., 260-261.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid., 260.
- ⁶⁹ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4, 35.
- ⁷⁰ Gowing, 250-253.
- ⁷¹ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 255.
- ⁷² War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4, 8.
- ⁷³ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 251.
- ⁷⁴ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 233.

⁷⁵ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 1, 12.

⁷⁶ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 230.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 237-239.

⁷⁸ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 3, 260.

⁷⁹ War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*, 8.

⁸⁰ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 1, 12.

⁸¹ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4, 15.

⁸² War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*, 105.

⁸³ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4, 16.

⁸⁴ War Department, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*, 23.

⁸⁵ Gowing, 235-238.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 236-237.

⁸⁷ War Department, *War Department Annual Reports, 1912 (In Four Volumes)*, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913), 145.

⁸⁸ Vic Hurley, *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc, 1938), 340.

⁸⁹ Gowing, 238.

⁹⁰ War Department, *Annual Reports, War Department Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1912, Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1912* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913), 8-9.

⁹¹ Russell Roth, *Muddy Glory* (West Hanover: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 148.

⁹² Gowing, 238-241.

⁹³ Ibid., 241-242.

⁹⁴ Smythe, 204.

⁹⁵ War Department, *Annual Reports War Department Fiscal Year Ended 30 June, 1915 Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War July 1, 1913, to December 31, 1914 (In One Part)*, 178, 389.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 338-341.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the end, the American military government was able to quell resistance to American authority in the Moro Province. The years after Pershing's administration were generally peaceful. Criminal violence continued to occur under the civilian administration of Frank Carpenter, who acted as civil governor from 1914-1920, but not nearly to the extent that it had before. At the start of Carpenter's tenure as governor, there was one last holdout of resistance to American authority. That holdout, Datu Alamada, was eventually persuaded to formally surrender in May 1914. The only other instance of organized resistance to American authority during Carpenter's term was in 1917. When participation in World War I prompted American troop reductions in the Philippines, a group of datos in Bayan area of Lanao used it as an opportunity to attempt a break with American authority. The resistance was quickly suppressed when American forces made quick work of the cotta fort the resisters occupied. The incident served as a deterrent example to any of the other local datos considering similar resistance.¹ The lack of other major incidents during that time period certainly indicates that military governance, particularly during Pershing's administration, successfully pacified the Moro Province and ended organized resistance. American authority over Moroland was established, secured and recognized by the inhabitants.

However, it was a long road for the military government to get to that point. It took the military government over ten years from the time that it decided to abrogate the Bates Agreement and implement direct rule over the Moros before resistance was decisively ended and security established. The American government committed thousands of troops to the task and provided

many of the best officers available at the time to serve in the military government. Despite the amount of resources and capabilities available to it, the military government was for a majority of the time unable to make significant progress in pacifying the resistance. Obviously, the strategy it was implementing was in some way failing to meet the objectives of the military government. Basically we must question what happened and why it took so long to accomplish the government's objectives.

As I have argued throughout the thesis, each of the military governors of the Moro Province arrived at their commands with different strategies for pacifying the Moros. All of them considered the establishment of effective government and economic development as the primary means of ending resistance to American authority. However, none of them took command with the impression that a long, drawn out military campaign was required to achieve that endstate.

Leonard Wood bears considerable responsibility for establishing the initial strategy of the American military government. As shown earlier, Wood's strategy was to focus on establishing a system of governance. He thought that firm and fair government would be attractive to the population in and of itself, and Moros would naturally be inclined to choose the American version of governance over their traditional forms. He never considered a military campaign of conquest as a requirement for ending resistance. One firm example would be enough to end all resistance, or so he thought, so he approached every act of resistance as if it was the last and decisive. Unfortunately for him, there was always one more battle around the corner until he was confronted with the Battle of Bud Dajo. The comparative size of this battle to the others during his command likely only confirmed his belief that this was indeed the decisive battle that he anticipated, rather than just another in a long series of resistance that continued for the remaining years of military governance.

The mood in the American administration after the Battle of Bud Dajo was that resistance was indeed at an end. Tasker Bliss kept his focus almost completely on economic and

educational improvements. Under his tenure, most resistance was primarily viewed as criminal activity. As shown earlier, this was a misconception. If one believes that the decisive battle has already taken place, then it is natural to view continued resistance in a way that confirms earlier perceptions. Bliss undertook actions in positioning and adjusting his forces to ease administration and logistical support that actually decreased security in the province, but would seem like sound decisions if one truly believed that there was no organized threat to authority. In accordance with such a perception, military force was consolidated, withdrawn from the field and reserved only for those instances when security threats were most obviously instances of resistance to American authority.

Neither the Wood nor Bliss administrations believed that a military campaign was required to actually conquer and overcome resistance by the force of arms. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, they continued to maintain these perceptions throughout their time in command. As a result, Pershing arrived to take command of a province that was no more secure than when he had departed six years previously.

As shown earlier, Pershing immediately recognized there were problems with security when he took command. He also determined that he needed to get more of his troops out of garrison and interacting with the population if he ever hoped to establish security. Like the others, he strongly believed that improvements in governance and economic development were essential ingredients to success in pacifying the province, and initially those areas were his main efforts. However, over time he concluded that disarmament was required and security would have to become his main focus. He recognized that disarmament would inspire considerable resistance from the Moros and that considerable force would be needed to enforce this policy. While neither Wood nor Bliss envisioned a military campaign to conquer the Moros, this is exactly what Pershing eventually found necessary and embarked upon to achieve success. Only

after that military campaign was organized was resistance defeated. Without this, widespread violence and resistance to American authority would have continued for many more years.

Naturally, we must question how Pershing succeeded in getting it right and Wood and Bliss fell short. It is tempting to fall into the trap of thinking that Pershing succeeded because of his “intellectual superiority,” as most biographers wish to argue (especially given the record of animosity and disagreement between Pershing and Wood). Biographers say that Pershing’s success was due to his personal qualities of leadership. Pershing was either a more competent commander in assessing the situation or more adaptable and flexible in mind and therefore able to shift strategy while the other commanders were not.

However, the idea that personal military competency was responsible is an insufficient explanation. All three men were highly intelligent and capable officers who were chosen for that command based on proven abilities and selected for a position recognized as requiring the best officer available for the job. Afterwards, all three went on to eventually serve as Chief of Staff of the Army, which was a formal recognition that they were considered the most capable military officers of their particular year groups. Clearly, there was no shortage of military competence in any of these men. Nor can one question the competency of the subordinates working for any of these men when so many of these subordinate officers rose to prominence in later service. In particular, Wood’s two most accomplished subordinate officers included Hugh L. Scott, later to become Chief of Staff of the Army (1914-1917) in his own right, and Robert L. Bullard, commander of the 1st Infantry Division and the Second U.S. Army during World War I. We cannot say that compared to Pershing, any of the other military governors was incompetent in their position or lacked competent subordinate leaders to execute their strategy.

It is certainly true that Pershing proved to be better than the other two military governors at engaging local leaders in dialogue and encouraging his subordinates to do likewise. This definitely made it more likely that conflicts and misunderstandings were avoided and violence

averted during his command than during the others. This is indeed one of the methods that enabled disarmament to work as a successfully strategy and convince many of the local leadership they were better off siding with the Americans than against them. Pershing also had the advantage of having six years of prior military government to look back on and assess its effectiveness when he took command. He was able to examine what had occurred before his command, see that it was not working and make appropriate adjustments. That he was able to do so has as much to do with him being in the right time and place to effect change as it does with his personality and leadership ability. There is no reason to think that another officer, Hugh Scott or even Wood returning for a second term, would not have made a similar shift in strategy. Therefore, one cannot explain Pershing's success solely on the basis on personal leadership, competence or the ability of subordinate leaders and staffs. Some other explanation outside the realm of the personalities involved must be examined.

What the history of the military government of the Moro Province shows is that smart, competent leaders can still come up with flawed strategies. Even with the most competent subordinates executing that flawed strategy, they still will not achieve success. What we must examine now is whether or not the earlier strategies of Wood and Bliss were flawed.

One of the first things a leader does as part of developing a plan for an operation or campaign is to assess the enemy they are going up against and incorporate that assessment into their strategy for defeating that enemy and accomplishing the desired objective or endstate. In the contemporary American military this process has become detailed, formalized and sophisticated in its practice, but it has always been conducted in modern warfare to some extent, even if only in the mind of the commander rather than as a staff process. It is not our purpose to conduct a Clausewitzian center of gravity analysis of the Moros, especially given that such an idea, as military professionals understand it today, would not have occurred to the military governors crafting their strategies for the province. However, the military government did assess and

identify the source of the opposition's strength. As mentioned in the preceding chapters, a man with considerable experience among the Moros, Dr. Najeem Saleeby, was one of Leonard Wood's principal advisors. Saleeby identified the power wielded by the *datus* and their positions of influence within Moro society as the center of Moro resistance that the American government must seek to co-opt or eliminate.² Therefore, the American government did have a good idea of who they really needed to influence, either by military defeat or persuasion, from the very beginning if they wanted to secure the province. In crafting their strategy, the Americans did indeed seek to undermine, defeat or co-opt the power of the *datus* to assist them in pacifying and controlling the province. The preceding chapters include numerous examples in governance and economic development that the Americans attempted to use to influence the power of the *datus* for their own advantage. So it cannot be said that the strategies the military governors adopted failed to adequately consider the base of power of the source of resistance.

So why was it that the strategies either did not work or took so long to work? One of the obvious reasons is that no strategy is perfect and mistakes often get made. Previous chapters have noted instances where each military governor initiated policies that antagonized and enflamed opposition and resistance in one way or another. Pershing's policy of disarmament, while being the most successful, was also the one most resisted and it generated considerable violence before it succeeded. Policies regarding land reform and agricultural development also created other issues such as labor exploitation and inequality that generated resistance to American authority that the American government never fully resolved and only worsened after the Filipinization of the provincial government after 1920. American policy decisions more often than not simply created some degree of opposition and resistance that had to be overcome before the policy was accepted in general.

Cultural misunderstandings also generated opposition at various times and places. The Moros were a traditional society, and therefore resistant to any change. Many of the changes the

Americans implemented in order to “civilize” the Moros threatened the culture of the common Moro as much as it threatened the power of the datus and religious leaders that had the most to lose in accepting American authority. Slavery, the bearing of weapons, piracy, ownership of land and property, and many other areas affected by American government all had cultural implications that affected every Moro. The Moro leadership could, therefore, capitalize on these cultural implications to garner support for resistance. The American objective of “civilizing” the Moros was itself a source of resistance that the American strategies never took into account and none of the strategies were able to overcome. Pershing’s disarmament campaign only rendered cultural opposition to American authority a moot point.

Another shortfall of the American strategies is that they assumed that the positive attraction of American governance and economic development on the common Moro would be sufficient in overcoming opposition to resistance. The strategies were more reliant on the “carrot” versus the “stick” approach to gaining support from the population. Without being too culturally biased, it is fair to say that the lives of the average Moro tended to improve materially and politically under American governance. The Moros took to trade, market agriculture, education when it was accessible, and many of the changes in governance readily enough that we can be certain that the Moros themselves thought that these were desirable, positive developments. This is especially true during the Wood administration when common Moros could choose between municipal and tribal ward styles of government and many Moros voluntarily choose to live under municipal rather than traditional government. That trend only increased over time, so there is plenty of indication that the American belief in the attraction of their authority was bearing out over the long run. Unfortunately, the attractiveness of American authority only proved valid for those exposed to it, meaning those that were nearest to American authority, and more for the common Moro than for Moro leaders. The things that made American authority attractive to the common Moro also weakened the power of the Moro leadership,

making it unattractive to them. The natural tendency on the part of the Moro leadership to attempt to maintain their power when threatened ensured that there would be resistance to American authority.

Those Moro leaders in more isolated areas were able to exploit two weaknesses in American strategy to resist. The first is that the benefits of American authority that made it attractive to the common Moro could only be manifested in proximity to American authority. Limited contact with American authority meant that the Moro population could either be kept ignorant of the benefits, or denied access to the benefits by Moro leaders wanting to maintain their authority. The Bliss administration's co-option of traditional Moro legal authority into the American provincial judicial system is a good example of this. The benefits of American authority that could be seen as attractive to the Moros could only be extended to those areas where the Americans could exert control. As long as the Americans did not exert full physical control, the datus were free to continue as they had always done.

The second weakness in the American strategies builds off the first weakness. Just as the American strategy of attracting support from the common Moros failed in attracting those common Moros it could not reach, the American strategy likewise failed to attract and co-opt the Moro leadership in those areas for the same reason. During every administration, many Moro leaders saw the benefits of cooperating with the Americans. Cooperative datus continued to wield influence among their supporters, maintained political and legal authority by assuming a role at the local level of administration and had opportunity for economic gain by entering the market with an advantage in regards to access to resources, labor and material property that common Moros did not have. For many Moro leaders, cooperation with American authority meant no reduction in economic or political power, especially compared to neighboring datus who chose to resist. However, just as common Moros could not receive the benefits of cooperating with the Americans if they were too far removed from the American system of

governance and economy, neither could their leaders benefit from the American system if they did not have the means and opportunity of benefiting from cooperation. The American system was least likely to co-opt and attract the cooperation of datus in those interior regions where American authority was the most remote. Resistance in those areas continued for the longest time not only because Americans could not exert their authority to overcome, but also because any benefits of cooperation could not be realized. The American strategies were focused on the power of the “carrot” approach, but the carrot could not influence the datus of the interior in any more significant way than the stick. It was only during Pershing’s disarmament campaign that the carrot could really be applied to the interior regions in any meaningful way, but by then the enforcement of disarmament reduced much of the attractiveness of American control.

These two weaknesses led to a third failure in the American strategies. The Americans were correct in identifying the power of the datus as the main strength of the opposition. The datus were not a collective body by any means. The Moros had no leader to organize true opposition and as a result they were never a real militarily existential threat to American power in Moroland. The Americans knew that the Moros were incapable of mounting a large enough force that was competently armed and could throw the Americans out of Moroland any more than the Moros were able to threaten the Spaniards before them. As a result, the Americans had the luxury of believing that force and a drawn out military campaign was not required to pacify the whole province. The Americans could focus their strategies on governance and economics because they did not perceive a major threat to their ultimate control.

When force was required against the Moros, it was usually a localized affair with none of the resistance coordinated between groups. The opposition would always be at a military disadvantage, unable to compete against American firepower and forced to always remain operationally on the defensive, manifesting their greatest strength and numbers when occupying their fixed cotta forts. On the surface, this seems like it would make the problem of defeating the

Moros easier, which is why Wood could be forgiven for thinking that one fight would be sufficient to demonstrate the futility of opposing the Americans by force of arms. However, because the datu leaders were independent actors, and not part of an organized resistance movement, it was essential then that they all be defeated or co-opted individually. No cadre of elite datu leaders existed that could be defeated, and on their surrender urge their subordinates to lay down their arms and acquiesce to American authority. The defeat of a particular datu had no influence on other Moro leaders beyond his immediate neighbors. There were also cultural factors within the martial society that encouraged leaders to continue resistance until militarily defeated. Moro leaders never learned from the example of others as Wood anticipated, therefore Wood and Bliss never received a decisive battle that ended resistance. What was actually required was that each Moro leader had to be conquered individually, and that never occurred until Pershing initiated his disarmament campaign. Still, it took considerable time and effort for that campaign to achieve success because every individual leader choosing to resist had to be confronted before the campaign was over.

Because the Americans did not fully understand the weaknesses in their strategy, it was many years before they initiated a military campaign that effectively eliminated resistance. There were practical and cultural limits on what could be achieved using strategies based on the power to attract support from the populace. The focus on governance and economic development was crucial to American success in Moroland, as it did provide an alternative to resistance. However, the individual nature of the resistance on the part of Moro leaders and the inability to provide the benefits of co-option or surrender to the majority of those leaders meant that only military force could pacify the province. Pershing's disarmament policy was decisive because it engendered a campaign of enforcement that confronted every Moro leader individually and forced them to accept death or defeat, or willingly submit to American power.

The military government of the Moro Province remains a grossly overlooked part of American military history. However, it is a significant episode. Much of the American military's experience with counter-insurgent warfare begins in the Philippines. However, the focus remains in the Northern part of the Philippines, rather than on the longer more drawn out, but equally violent struggle to control and pacify the southern islands that made up Moroland. More focus must be applied to the American rule of Moroland. Moroland was America's first counter-insurgency and pacification campaign within the context of an Islamic culture. That alone is significant as the American military continues to be militarily engaged in the Muslim world. Southeast Asia has a long history of insurgency involving Islamic peoples; in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, among other places. Operation Enduring Freedom has taken American troops back to Moroland nearly one hundred years later. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that the fight for American security from terrorism will include military engagements within that part of the Islamic world in the future, especially given the strategic importance of the region.

American military leaders would do well to examine their Army's first experiences dealing with those Islamic forces in the region. America's conduct of operations in Moroland does provide positive examples that should be incorporated into future operations in the region. Establishing good governance and economic measures that attract the support of the population and provide the opposing leadership an alternative to resistance is essential. However, there are limits to the power of attraction that confine it only to areas under effective control. The American military government always sought to co-opt the enemy opposition whenever possible. The power of engagement, by leaders and individual troops visible amongst the population, was exemplified during Pershing's administration, and his engagement of leaders in dialogue enormously decreased the violence of his disarmament campaign. Unfortunately, a hard line of resistance remained and too often that hard line of resistance must be militarily defeated, and

perceive itself to be beaten, before true security can be achieved. Ultimately, military leaders must understand their enemy and the nature of the resistance and craft a strategy that effectively eliminates that resistance among the opposing leadership as much as the common citizen. Most importantly, leaders must be willing to adopt new strategies when initial strategies fail to achieve results.

¹ Peter Gordon Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920* (Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines System, 1977), 277-279.

² *Ibid.*, 336.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Documents

- Bureau of Insular Affairs. *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903. Part 3*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904.
- _____. *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905. (in Four Parts.) Part 1*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906.
- _____. *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, September 1, 1903, to August 31, 1904. Vol.1*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904.
- _____. *Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904. Vol. 2*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905.
- _____. *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1908 (in Two Parts) Part 2*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909.
- Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands. *Fifth Annual Report of the Executive Secretary of the Philippine Islands to the Honorable Governor-General Covering the Period from July 1, 1905, to June 30, 1906*. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1906.
- War Department. *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903. Vol. 3*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903.
- _____. *Reports of the Division and Department Commanders Vol 3 of Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1905*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905.
- _____. *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1907 (in 3 Parts) Part 1*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in 9 Vols.) Vol. 3*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1908 (in 9 Vols.) Vol. 9 Acts of First Philippine Legislature Inaugural, First, and Special Session Nos. 1801-1878, Inclusive Public Resolutions, Etc. From November 1, 1907, to September 15, 1908*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908.
- _____. *Annual Reports, War Department Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1909, Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1909 (in One Part)*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909.

- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1909 (in Nine Volumes)*. Vol. 3. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*. Vol. 3. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1910 (In Four Volumes)*. Vol. 4. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1911.
- _____. *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1911 (In One Part)*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (In Four Volumes)*. Vol. 3. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912.
- _____. *Annual Reports, War Department Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1912, Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1912*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1912 (In Four Volumes)*. Vol. 3. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1912 (In Four Volumes)*. Vol. 4. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914.
- _____. *War Department Annual Reports, 1913 (In Four Volumes)*. Vol. 4. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914.
- _____. *Annual Reports War Department Fiscal Year Ended 30 June, 1915 Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War July 1, 1913, to December 31, 1914 (In One Part)*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1915.

Books

- Cloman, Sydney A., LT. COL. *Myself and a Few Moros*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1923.
- Fulton, Robert A. *Moroland 1899-1906: America's First Attempt to Transform an Islamic Society*. Bend, OR: Tumalo Creek Press, 2007.

- Gowing, Peter Gordon. *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920*. Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines System, 1977.
- Hagedorn, Hermann. *Leonard Wood: A Biography*. Vol. 2. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1931.
- Hurley, Vic. *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary*. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc, 1938.
- _____. *Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros*. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1936.
- Palmer, Frederick. *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker Howard Bliss*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934.
- Quirino, Carlos. *Filipinos at War*. Philippines: Vera-Reyes, Inc., 1981.
- Roth, Russell. *Muddy Glory*. West Hanover: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981.
- Smythe, Donald. *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.
- Vandiver, Frank E. *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing*. Vol. I. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977.
- White, John R. *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands*. Reprint ed. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2007.

Journal Articles

- Byler, Charles. "Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913." *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 41-45.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Richard Faulkner
DMH
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. John Suprin
DMH
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Bruce Stanley
CTAC
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301