

ISLAM'S CHALLENGE: JIHAD AND TERRORISM

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ISLAM'S CHALLENGE: JIHAD AND TERRORISM, by Major Manish Sharma, 92 pages.

In the contemporary environment of Global War on Terror, there is a growing perception of a linkage between Islamic teachings and terrorism. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the vulnerability of Islamic doctrine and teachings to exploitation by terrorists. It addresses the primary question, whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. It focuses on various concepts of the Islamic doctrine that seems to be used by various terrorist groups to justify their cause, motivate their cadres, garner support, and achieve their end state.

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While analyzing the data for these questions, this thesis considers multiple perspectives including those of Western scholars, Islamic scholars, Muslim community, international organizations, and terrorists themselves.

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ACRONYMS

PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him.
US	United States of America.
UK	United Kingdom.
UN	United Nations.
SIMI	Students Islamic Movement of India.
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter He will be in the ranks of those who have lost (All spiritual good). (Qur'an 003.085)

Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have Turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith. (Qur'an 002.191-192)

-Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an

Terrorism all around the globe is on the rise and the number of terrorist groups and attacks have increased. A number of countries including India have become hot beds of terrorism. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, wherein thousands of civilians lost their lives in a single terrorist attack executed by terrorists belonging to "Al-Qaida" demonstrated to the world the dangers from terrorism that was apparently motivated by religious ideologies. A letter was found at three different locations used by suspected terrorists in the September 11, 2001 attacks that was later identified as the "Full Text of Hijacking Letter". It tells the hijackers how to behave on the night before the mission. As per the letter, they were to read two chapters of Qur'an and reflect on their meanings. These verses from Qur'an include the following exhortations (Barcott 2004, 13-14):

So remember God, as He said in His book: 'Oh Lord, pour your patience upon us and make our feet steadfast and give us victory over the infidels.'

When the confrontation begins, strike like champions who do not want to go back to this world. Shout, 'Allah Akbar' (God is great), because this strikes fear in the hearts of the nonbelievers. God said: 'Strike above the neck, and strike at all their extremities.'

Then implement the way of the prophet in taking prisoners. Take prisoners and kill them. As almighty God said: 'No prophet should have prisoners until soaked the land with blood. (As quoted in Barcott 2004, 13-14)

This shows how terrorists who resort to violence, which they claim is divinely ordained, may have been motivated by religious leaders due to misinterpretation of religious preaching to achieve political aims. Their call for jihad, a holy war, has different meanings associated with it. It is perceived to be interpreted to suit the political and cultural motives of some of the learned men, the '*Ulema*' of Islam. '*Fatwas*' or religious rulings issued by the *ulema* traditionally meant to keep those of the faith on the straight path, now are being implicated with assassinations, mass killings and suicide bombings. Cries of '*jihad*' implying holy war are being portrayed to be the united war cry of Islam from Palestine to Mindanao in the Philippines.

In the lexicon of militant Muslim fundamentalists, it's "A" for atom, "B" for bomb, "J" for jihad, and "K" for Kalashnikov, as they call upon the believers to prepare for the prolonged struggle in order to establish the Islamic kingdom on earth. The call is made through audiocassettes, available in multiple languages that are Arabic, Persian, and Urdu, which flood the market in a number of Muslim countries (Mustikhan 99).

When night descends, villagers in Algeria are unsure whether they will see the next morning's sunrise, as Islamic fundamentalist fanatics engage in a killing spree (although the military has been implicated in some of these massacres, which have been seen as attempts to incriminate the rebels). (Mustikhan 99)

An arc of instability is descending over the Muslim landscape, in Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe, where the fundamentalists dream of a rising green crescent or Islamic revolution. Though all the recent fundamentalist events are not the product of any coordinated plan, they are the outgrowth of the relentless spread of militant political Islam, more popularly known as Islamic fundamentalism. As Syed Abul A'la Maudadi,

the founder of Pakistan's Jama'at Islami, declares the need for a universal movement where Islamic revolution expands far beyond the boundaries of a few Muslim countries and establishes its hegemony over all of humanity. This phenomenon is spreading slowly across the Muslim world and it can be described as an Islamist renaissance movement coming to grips with a U.S. dominated unipolar world (Mustikhan 99).

In the context of India, the very fabric of the secular society is being torn apart by violent acts perpetrated in the name of religion. The terrorist attacks in Kashmir, hijacking of Air India plane to Kandahar in 1999, Mumbai blasts of 1993 and 2006, Coimbatore, Ayodhya, Bangalore, Varanasi and Malegaon blasts, are being viewed in the Islamic context. An organisation of young extremist students, the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), has been banned for their radical and inimical activities against the nation's interests. The rise of these radical movements and terrorist activities has apparently resulted in a perceived notion of linking Islamist fundamentalist culture with terrorism. Further the perceived growth of this fundamentalist culture is being regarded as a major threat to democratic values and religious independence. There are questions being raised by some relating to religious tolerance of Islam and its impact upon the world peace.

But there are voices of moderation as well. Many believe that Islamic fundamentalism has largely been misunderstood in the West as a movement calling for non-Muslims' blood.

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, senior editor of Pakistan's influential daily Dawn, maintains that fundamentalism has always existed in Muslim societies and that the West has also been aware of the phenomenon. "Where the West is wrong," he says, "is in the view that Islamic fundamentalism is one big system with extremism as its inseparable part. Any fanatic who murders, kills, and bombs is

labeled an Islamic fundamentalist. This is absurd. A fundamentalist could be a reformer, pacifist, or politician." Ali Siddiqi calls for distinguishing between fanaticism and fundamentalism. (As quoted in Mustikhan 99)

However, the linkage between terrorism and Islamic fundamentalist ideologies is not clearly established. Amidst all the talks relating fundamentalist Islam to terrorism, there appear to be other factors directly or indirectly affecting the global spread of terrorism. A few of them are the political interests of rogue nation states, growing poverty and the differences between the haves and have-nots, illiteracy, failed states and the unrest amongst their population, and a clash between civilizations. These have been described by various schools of thought as the key factors which have been progressively obscured by the shades of the so called "Islamic Terrorism."

The road to war against terrorism has hurdles due to inability of clearly defining and describing the enemy who has been repeatedly being depicted to be related to Islamic ideologies. As part of the national security apparatus of the country it becomes imperative to analyze this perceived phenomenon of Islamic terrorism sweeping the world and put it in proper perspective vis-à-vis the larger aims and objectives of countries. This will help crystallize our thought process on this national security issue of grave importance and help formulate a coherent, institutionalized response to this clearly inimical phenomenon. This, in turn, will safeguard our national security interests and contribute to the global effort to work towards a stable and peaceful third millennium.

Thesis

In the contemporary environment of unconventional and asymmetric warfare, Islamic fundamentalism has been linked to the terrorist activities all over the world. This has led to the perception of a linkage between a religion and its vulnerability as a terrorist

tool. The motivation level of the terrorists to execute their mission, even at the cost of their lives, appears to depict the highest level of indoctrination in the name of “Islam”. The understanding of the root cause for the apparent exploitation of Islam by terrorists is essential to counter its consequences. This thesis explores whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists? To address this primary question, there are three secondary questions that will be analyzed. These secondary questions are as follows: (1) What are the aspects of Islam which seem relevant to terrorism perpetrated in its name? (2) What are the historical aspects of Islamic revivalism, and is there a link between Qur’anic interpretations and modern terrorism? (3) Is terrorism perpetrated in the name of religion alone or are there other causes?

Assumptions

The Global war on terrorism is protracted in nature. The success lies in understanding the psychology of the terrorists and their apparent use of religious motivation.

Limitations

The main limitation is of time and resource management. Where on one hand there is plenty of material available in terms of various publications, on the other hand there is paucity of time due to the strict timeline laid down to complete the thesis. While there are a number of secondary sources available on the subject, there are very few surviving primary sources, such as manuscripts and inscriptions. Most of the Islamic history seems to have been primarily transmitted orally until 100 to 150 years after the

events being referred to have taken place. Islamic scholars then sifted and recorded the traditions.

Delimitations

The scope of the topic will be restricted to determining if Islamic culture is vulnerable to creating fundamentalism and if it is being exploited by religious fundamentalists for spreading terrorism.

Scope

The scope of this thesis will be to analyze whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. It will look into the aspects of Islam that seem relevant to terrorism perpetrated in its name, various aspects of Islamic culture, historical aspects of Islamic revivalism, and motivations and other causes of terrorism.

Chapter Two reviews the current state of literature, identifying pertinent schools of thought and existing works of particular topical relevance. It considers a wide variety of academic publications and websites of interest. The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Command and General Staff College has been the principal source of the literature review. In addition, internet has been extensively explored to establish diverse schools of thought and has been one of the main sources of data collection. Chapter Three describes the research methodology used to conduct the research. Chapter Four analyses the three secondary questions: the various aspects of Islam that seem relevant to terrorism perpetrated in its name; the historical aspects of Islamic revivalism; and the motivators and other causes of terrorism. The fifth and final chapter will summarize the research and its analysis. It will conclude with the findings and a recommendation for

further research.

Relevance

Future conflicts are more likely to be unconventional and asymmetric in nature. This will involve fighting an invisible enemy in intensely populated areas wherein the common people will be the center of gravity. In such an environment, the complexity of conducting military operations will increase manifold with the lack of proper understanding and knowledge of the conflict's foundational causes. Whether it is ethnic clashes or cultural, a resource or a piece of land, religious or ideological, establishing the cause will be the key determining factor in achieving success. The success in such a conflict will be dictated by understanding the psychology of those unconventional warriors or terrorists and establishing the aspects of their motivation and the sources of power. If the global war on terrorism is linked to Islamic fundamentalism, it becomes essential to develop a clear understanding of the various aspects of Islamic culture and determine if it is vulnerable to creating fundamentalism.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis addresses the primary question as to whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. Having discussed in Chapter 1 the significance of this research and its thesis, primary and secondary questions, this chapter reviews the literature already existing on the subject. There are various books, articles, journals, interviews, and research works available and a wide array of these sources were reviewed. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses various aspects of Islam that seem relevant to the perpetuation of terrorism in its name. The second section discusses the historical aspects of Islamic revivalism. Lastly, there is a review of terrorism, its main causes, and whether it is religion alone or other factors.

Islam, Fundamentalism and Terrorism

There have been a number of historical and contemporary writings on the variety of subjects related to Islam. Most of the subjects include the Islamic faith, Islam and jihad, teachings in Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, radical Islam and the holy Qur'an and the Hadith. These subjects are discussed in a manner that gives an insight into either the Islamic faith and religion or discusses challenges from radical Islam and its implications. The focus of most publications remains on understanding Islamic teachings and defining the fundamentalist threat.

Thomas Lippman, in his book *Understanding Islam*, describes Islam as a religion of peace and submission to the will of God. According to him, "Islam is an Arabic word that means submission- submission to the will of God. Muslim, its principal form means

one who submits. The root is the same as that of the word for peace, salaam” (Lippman 2002, 1). It has also been translated as “peace” by many writers and scholars. The Qur’an defines it as submission to the will of God and reinforces the definition of Lippman. Islam has been described as not only a religion, but a way of life. As in Azzam’s book, *The Eternal Message of Muhammad*, “Islam is a faith, a law, a way of life, a nation, and a state, with a system of jurisprudence that is continually evolving for the administration of this world and the satisfaction of human needs under the sovereignty of our creator. Islam’s Kingdom of God on earth, with its faith, its laws, piety, rituals, society, and state, is the prelude and the means to the afterlife” (Azzam 1965, xix).

John Esposito, in his book *Islam The Straight Path*, describes God and the Prophet’s guidance that the Muslim community has a mission to create a moral social order and has influenced Muslim practice throughout the centuries, providing a rationale for political and moral activism. He explains the Islamic law’s importance in the life of Muslims. He states, “Law is the primary religious science in Islam. Once committed to Islam, the believer’s overriding concern and question is What do I do; what is God’s will/law?” (Esposito 1998, 74-75). He indicates that *Sharia*, the Islamic law, has remained central to Muslim identity and practice. He states that Sharia has been based upon two primary sources: Qur’an and Sunna. As these primary sources do not provide an exhaustive body of laws, *ijma* (consensus) and *qiyas* (analogical reasoning) became important factors in defining the Sharia. As jurists applied their own reasoning to interpret Islamic law, it resulted in a number of differing legal opinions. This was finally addressed by evolving consensus of scholars, the *ijma*. However, some legal development did occur which led to the acceptance of a fatwa issued by mufti, a legal expert as a basis

for the law's interpretation. These formal written legal opinions became part of the collection of fatwas that transitioned to authoritative legitimacy in their own way (Espisito 1998, 83-84). This leads to the notion of certain unclear parts of the law that can be interpreted in different ways.

This notion of uncertainty has been discovered in most of the publications, articles, and interviews of Islamic scholars. In the book *War, Terror & Peace*, T.P. Schwartz-Barcott tried to establish a link between peace, terror and war in Qur'an and in Islam. Some passages in Qur'an, he says, imply that world peace might endure if all nations and people convert to Islam. On attacks by non-Muslims, he indicates that Muslims are to invest heavily in defending their far borders and all Muslims must be willing to support a war effort in some way. He also declares that the Qur'an compels believers to exert themselves to spread the belief in Allah over the entire world, which can be done in four different ways: by his heart, his tongue, his hand, and his sword. But all Muslims are obliged to engage in some form of jihad until the entire world has converted to Islam. He further states that anyone within the community who does not support the war effort fully and whose lack of support could sow dissension within the ranks of Muslim armed forces should be silenced (Barcott 2004, 271, 317-321).

In the book *The Arab Mind*, Raphael Patai portrays that the Sharia recognizes only one indivisible Muslim identity, the Muhammadite nation that brings about the idea of the national unity of all Arabs beyond the national boundaries. This has been expressed even more succinctly in the Islamic doctrine due to division of the world into the *dar al-Islam* (House of Islam) and the *dar al-Harb* (House of War). He further describes how Muslims have spread the idea that aggression against any individual

Muslim country is aggression against all and all Muslim lands must cooperate in fighting for the liberation of brethren who are under the yoke of the enemies of Islam (Patai 2002, 217).

Anne-Marie Delcambre, in *Inside Islam*, describes fundamentalism as the very nature of Islam which is the literal, global and total understanding of its founding texts. She argues that the manifestations of support for Osama Ben Laden and Al Qaeda that have occurred throughout the entire Muslim world depict the 9/11 terror attack on the United States as something to do with Islam. She further explains, “Anyone who wishes to be faithful to the letter of the text, to follow the literal reading of the Qur’an, can find therein justification for military, indeed, even terrorist actions. The problem is posed by the very nature of Islam, because it is absolutely impossible for it to distance itself from its own fundamental texts” (Delcambre 2005, 8). She also shows that Islamic law is not compatible with human rights, but it is nevertheless an integral part of Islam. She describes how Islam supports community building. This is obvious from all the obligations of the religion such as communal prayer, which is superior to individual prayer, the communal aspect of fasting, and of the gathering constituted by the pilgrimage to Mecca (Delcambre 2005, 74).

Motah-Hary in his book *The Martyr*, describes *jihad* as an integral part of the Islamic doctrine and is regarded as the door to paradise opened only for the chosen ones. He quotes examples from Hadith to describe how and why the followers of Islam tend to be longing for martyrdom. He further describes the concept of the martyr’s immortality and the respect that has been bestowed upon him in Qur’an and the Islamic society. The ideology of *jihad* is also described in *Jihad and International Security* by Roshandel and

Chadha wherein they study the various Islamic militant groups across the world and attempts to lay out their motivations. They point out that there is ambiguity in the Muslim texts regarding the messages for *jihad*. It is the militant jihad that has been referred to in 199 references in the Bukhari collection of Hadith and the jihadist view it as a fundamental duty for Muslims.

The study of Qur'an reflects the ambiguity in the messages relating to Muslim community's obligation for jihad, permission for militant jihad, and use of force and terror to preserve Islam and spread the message of Allah. The English translation of the Holy Qur'an by A. Yusuf Ali has been quoted for all Qur'anic references. Some of the sections in Qur'an that reflect the contradictory messages are as follows:

Then those who reject Faith in the Signs of Allah will suffer the severest penalty, and Allah is Exalted in Might, Lord of Retribution. (Qur'an 003.004)

Soon shall We cast terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers, for that they joined companions with Allah, for which He had sent no authority: their abode will be the Fire: And evil is the home of the wrong-doers! (Qur'an 003.151)

Nor take life - which Allah has made sacred - except for just cause. And if anyone is slain wrongfully, we have given his heir authority (to demand qisas or to forgive): but let him not exceed bounds in the matter of taking life; for he is helped (by the Law). (Qur'an 017.033)

The Sahih Bukhari Hadith's study indicates that the term, "*jihad*" has been used to describe the militant fighting in the cause of Allah. The translation of Sahih Bukhari by the Muslim Students Association available online (www.usc.edu) has been quoted for all Hadith's references. A few narrations that use the term are:

Allah's Apostle said, "There is no Hijra (i.e. migration) (from Mecca to Medina) after the Conquest (of Mecca), but Jihad and good intention remain; and if you are called (by the Muslim ruler) for fighting, go forth immediately." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 42)

The Prophet said, "By Him in Whose Hands my life is! Were it not for some men amongst the believers who dislike to be left behind me and whom I cannot provide with means of conveyance, I would certainly never remain behind any Sariya' (army-unit) setting out in Allah's Cause. By Him in Whose Hands my life is! I would love to be martyred in Allah's Cause and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again and then get martyred and then get resurrected again and then get martyred." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 54)

Allah's Apostle said, "Know that Paradise is under the shades of swords." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 73)

Allah's Apostle said, "To guard Muslims from infidels in Allah's Cause for one day is better than the world and whatever is on its surface, and a place in Paradise as small as that occupied by the whip of one of you is better than the world and whatever is on its surface; and a morning's or an evening's journey which a slave (person) travels in Allah's Cause is better than the world and whatever is on its surface." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 142)

Islamic Revivalism

In the book, *Jihad and International Security*, by Roshendel and Chadha, Islamic revivalism is traced back to 1258 with the establishment of radical Islamic ideology by the Muslim cleric Ibn Taymiyya. He suggested that Muslims need to return to their roots, to the time when Islamic society was pure. He termed *jihad* as the most important duty for Muslims. He also links the Taymiyya ideology to the mid-1700 Wahhabi movement. It was Muhammad ibn Abd Wahhab, a Muslim cleric and Taymiyya's follower who proposed the idea of rebellion against the Ottoman rulers because of their failure to implement Sharia. He wanted to establish strict laws based upon Sharia and execute anyone who does not subscribe to his views of Islam. The next phase began with the Ayatollah Khomeini seizing power in Iran in 1979. He called for *jihad* against America and wrote that all secular power is the work of Satan and Muslims must stop it.

Louise Richardson, in her book *The Roots of Terrorism*, terms Islamic revivalism as the rise of political Islam. She traces its origin back to the 1940s with the rise of

Egypt's religious writer Sayyid Qutb, who became an ideologue for militant *jihad* and Muslim extremist movements. She states:

Qutb's revolutionary ideas have reverberated in the radical rhetoric revolutionaries from Ayatollah Khomeini to Bin Laden. For Qutb, jihad as an armed struggle in the defense of Islam against the injustice and oppression of anti-Islamic governments and the neocolonialism of the West and the East was incumbent on all Muslims. (Richardson 2006a, 149)

She describes Qutb's radicalized world view as a source for ideologies from the founder of Egypt's Islamic Jihad to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda's call for a global *jihad*.

In the book *Islam The Straight Path* by John L Esposito, Islamic revivalism is linked to the Arab-Israel war in 1967. He explains that the loss of Jerusalem, the third holiest city in Islam, and its sacred shrines was a major blow to Muslim pride and faith, resulting in a crisis of confidence and identity. The "liberation of Jerusalem" became not only a regional political problem, but also a worldwide (Islamic) religiopolitical slogan and issue (Esposito 1998, 161). He further identifies the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 as an "Islamic revolution" due to the prominence of Islamic ideology. He states that the initial impact of this revolution went far beyond Iran. From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur, the reaffirmation of Islam offered an alternative to the apparent failures of secular governments.

The same movement has also been described by Thomas W Lippman in his book *Understanding Islam*. He refers to the Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood movements as puritanical and reformist movements aimed at taking Islam back to its basics: man, God, Muhammad, and the Qur'an. According to him, the Brotherhood movement included restoration of the Caliphate and enforcement of Sharia, but the purely religious activities

were subordinated in an effort to rid Egypt of secularization, corruption, and foreign influence.

In the Policy Papers, “International Affairs” number 18, *Contemporary Islamic Movements in Historical Perspective* by Ira M Lapidus, Islamic revivalism has been referred to as a Muslim response to the breakup of the worldwide system of Muslim empires in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The reformers regarded the breakup of Muslim empires as a punishment by God for not adhering to his principles and thus committed themselves to return to their foundational beliefs. He also regards the Wahhabi movement as one of the first major success in Arabia and whose influence extended to other parts of the Muslim world.

Frontline has attempted to explore some of the questions about Muslim faith, its reputation as authoritarian religion, and role of militancy in the Muslim world. A special two-hour film, "Muslims," investigates the different faces of Islam's worldwide resurgence. Reporting from Iran, Nigeria, Egypt, Malaysia, Turkey, and the United States, *Frontline* told the stories of Muslims struggling to define how Islam will shape their lives and societies. "Muslims" traces the social, historical, and political roots of the renewed interest in Islam worldwide, beginning at Cairo's Al Azhar Mosque-the oldest university in the world. It is here that viewers meet Sheik Abdul Mauwith, an Islamic scholar who staffs the phones of Al Azhar's Fatwa committee, responding to Muslims wanting to know what is right and wrong under Islamic or Shariah Law. In a society increasingly shaped by Western influence, he encourages Muslims to hold fast to the traditions of Islam (Frontline 2002).

Causes of Terrorism: Religion or Other

In a number of books, terrorism has been linked to a variety of causes of which religion appears to be one. In the book *What Terrorists Want* by Louise Richardson, she cites the main causes of terrorism besides religion. These include revenge, socioeconomic changes, poverty and inequality, state sponsorship, and globalization. She explicitly describes, by quoting example from history, how these causes have resulted in various terrorist movements worldwide. She relates Islamic terrorism to all the causes and identifies the impact of religious ideology to exploit these causes to gain support for terrorist movements.

Louise Richardson in the book, *The Roots of Terrorism*, describes the present international system, democracy, globalization, ideologies, economic disparities, and diasporas' discrimination as some of the main causes of terrorism. She states that the present international system, where United States and its allies are hegemonic, evokes the feelings of contempt and hatred across the world. She states that democracy and globalization provide conditions in which terrorist campaigns may operate and sustain. Globalization is a new form of Imperialism in which developed countries are increasing their influence over poor and less developed ones. It creates an environment that can facilitate violent behavior and acts of terrorism.

The same perspective is described by Angel M Rabasa in his book *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists*. He regards globalization and intrusion of Western culture, together with changes in social and economic structures of Muslim countries, as the prime causes for radical political Islam and its use of terrorism.

Alan B Krueger, in the book *What Makes a Terrorist*, explains in a quantitative manner that civil liberties are an important determinant of terrorism. He gives out that wealthier countries are more likely to protect their residents' civil liberties and political freedom, so extremists in these countries might be less inclined to turn to terrorism to pursue their agendas. He further argues that education and poverty have little to do with terrorism (Krueger 90).

The ideological cause of terrorism has also been referred to in the RAND Corporation Joint Conference Report, *The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism* written by its National Security Research Division. It identifies the Diaspora's involvement in terrorist activities in the host countries as a new phenomenon that is related to ideology. It indicates that some Muslim Diaspora communities in Europe are supporting terrorist activities by participating in recruitment, fundraising, training, and operations. It explains why the Muslim community is more integrated into a global Muslim *umma* and how the ideology shapes behavior and action.

Summary

The review of various publications on the subject reveals that there is a contradiction between two distinct schools of thought about Islamic teachings and its perceived meanings. One school of thought refers its teachings as peaceful, harmonious and encompassing religious tolerance. The other school of thought describes its teachings as radical, fundamentalist, and lacking religious tolerance. The same texts from the existing primary sources have been referred to by both the schools of thought, displaying its varied translations. The Islamic revivalism has been linked to different Muslim movements by various writers. The main objective of these movements is described as

abiding by the Prophet's words and the Sharia, and renouncing modern cultural transformations. These movements have again referred to the primary sources but in a manner suiting their cause. As per many other writers, these movements have taken recourse to violence and adopted terror tactics in the name of religion, but the foundational causes, which led to the success of these movements, are far from religion alone. The review of the literature on terrorism establishes that there are a variety of motivators for terrorism such as poverty, economic inequality, socioeconomic changes, globalization, and state sponsorship. The religious ideology is used as a mean to garner support for the political action, through which the wider grievances of the foundational causes are expressed.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis addresses the primary question as to whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. Having discussed the existing literature and its relevance to the thesis in chapter 2, this chapter describes the methods used to conduct the research. It is organized in three sections. The first is research methodology; the second, data collection; and the third, analyses and conclusion.

Broad Research Methodology

This thesis uses qualitative research as the methodology. Qualitative research is one of the two main approaches to research methodology in the Social Sciences. Qualitative research, in simple terms, investigates the ‘why’ and ‘how’, in contrast to the focus on the more measurable ‘what, where and when’ in quantitative research. The information harvested from use of qualitative research cannot be measured or displayed easily in graphs or formulas, whereas one of the primary strengths of quantitative research is that the resulting data it yields can be measured. Qualitative research aims at drawing conclusions by explaining.

Data Collection

The data for the research will be collected from both primary and secondary sources. To base a thesis exclusively on primary sources would probably be possible, but would fail to take into account the results of research done by others, and as such would not have a sufficient base. On the other hand, to base information gathering only on secondary sources would fail to bring new facts to bear on the issue and has less chance

to produce new insights. Additionally, it is necessary to use primary sources to check on secondary sources' accuracy. In cases where there are no primary sources available, care must be taken to examine more than one secondary source, and to insure that different secondary works are not simply based on one source.

The primary sources will mainly consist of Qur'an and Hadith as there is paucity of primary literature existing on the subject. It will also include written and audiovisual material in a wide variety of forms from media interviews to contemporary media reports. The secondary sources consist of a wide variety of literature that addresses the thesis primary and secondary questions. These include books, journals, and periodicals. Internet will be used extensively to conduct research and collect diverse data.

The data collected from these diverse sources will be formulated under three major parts addressing the three secondary questions. The first will be Islam, fundamentalism, and terrorism. It will include the review of Islamic doctrine and its interpretations, the concept of *jihad*, and the approval rates amongst the Muslim community. The second part will be Islamic revivalism. It will provide an insight into the history of Islamic revivalism to include major revivalist movements and ideologues. It will also include significance of revivalism in contemporary Islam. The third part will be the causes of terrorism. It will include the study of various causes of terrorism and its linkage, if any, with Islamic ideology.

Analysis and Conclusion

Data analysis starts as soon as collection of information has reached a certain level. This has the benefit that a lack of information in any area is identified early, and can be rectified right away by collecting other information that would answer the

outstanding questions. There is also a risk to this approach. The risk is that information collected at a later stage might overturn conclusions reached in earlier analysis. However, this is not all negative. If early hypotheses are challenged, that insures that the ones developed later will have greater credibility.

Data gathered will be analyzed based on the primary and three secondary questions. The secondary questions are: What are the aspects of Islam which seem relevant to terrorism perpetrated in its name; What are the historical aspects of Islamic revivalism, and is there a link between Qur'anic interpretations and modern terrorism; and is terrorism perpetrated in the name of religion alone or are there other causes? The analysis from each secondary question will then be interlinked to arrive at the conclusion for the primary thesis question, whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists.

This thesis will use textual analysis to compare and contrast various schools of thought, and multiple perspectives. This method is based on the study of texts recorded in documents in various forms that includes written, spoken, electronic, or visual. The data from wide range of sources, addressing the thesis questions, will be critically examined and analyzed. The analysis will then provide the basis for making conclusions.

Possibly the most challenging part of the job will be to integrate the results of the analysis into a set of conclusions. This process, or synthesis, is one of the strengths of the qualitative research methodology. The fact that information is collected from a rich variety of sources, and the focus is on the how and why, using a broad context from history, culture, society, and others, make the conclusions reliable. Based on the

conclusions, the thesis will make recommendations and suggest topics for further research.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This thesis addresses the primary question as to whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. Having discussed the Research Methodology in chapter 2, this chapter analyzes the three secondary questions to answer the primary research question. This chapter is divided into three parts based upon the three secondary questions. The first part describes Islam and its teachings that seem relevant to terrorism perpetrated in its name. The second part analyzes the historical aspects of Islamic revivalism. The third part analyzes the other causes of terrorism to establish whether religion alone is the cause of terrorism or there are other motivators.

Islam, Fundamentalism and Terrorism

The Holy Texts and its Interpretations

According to Qur'an, Islam is the religion of God and it means submission to the will of God (Qur'an 003:019). The word "Islam" is also being interpreted as "peace" but its true meaning in Arabic is "submission." The term "Muslim" means "one who submits" to God and it includes everyone who follows His guidance and performs His will (Esposito 1998, 23). Islam is not only a religion but a way of life:

Islam is a faith, a law, a way of life, a "nation", and a "state", with a system of jurisprudence that is continually evolving for the administration of this world and the satisfaction of human needs under the sovereignty of our Creator. (Azzam 1965, xix)

The Islamic law, the "Sharia" is based upon two primary sources: Qur'an and Sunna. But these primary sources do not provide an exhaustive body of laws. To clarify the primary sources, ijma (consensus) and Qiyas (analogical reasoning) became

important factors in defining the Sharia. As jurists applied their own reasoning to interpret the law, it resulted in a number of differing legal opinions. This was finally addressed by evolving consensus of scholars, the *ijma*. However, some legal development did occur which led to the acceptance of fatwa issued by a mufti, a legal expert as a basis of interpretation of the law. These formal written legal opinions became part of the collection of fatwas, which became authoritative in their own way (Espisito 1998, 83-84). This represents the ambiguity in interpretation of the Sharia.

The holy Qur'an is the main primary source of Sharia. It encompasses various chapters called "*Sura*" and different chapters cover various aspects of life. The main *ayat* (verses) that have been the focus of contradictory thoughts and interpretations are as follows:

Allah! There is no god but He,-the Living, the Self-Subsisting, Eternal. (Qur'an 003.002)

Then those who reject Faith in the Signs of Allah will suffer the severest penalty, and Allah is Exalted in Might, Lord of Retribution. (Qur'an 003.004)

Soon shall We cast terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers, for that they joined companions with Allah, for which He had sent no authority: their abode will be the Fire: And evil is the home of the wrong-doers! (Qur'an 003.151)

Say to those who reject Faith: 'Soon will ye be vanquished and gathered together to Hell,-an evil bed indeed (to lie on)! (Qur'an 003.012)

As to those who deny the Signs of Allah and in defiance of right, slay the prophets, and slay those who teach just dealing with mankind, announce to them a grievous penalty. (Qur'an 003.021)

If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter He will be in the ranks of those who have lost (All spiritual good). (Qur'an 003.085)

Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have Turned you out; for tumult and oppression are

worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith. (Qur'an 002.191-192)

God has preferred in rank those who struggle with their possessions and their selves over the ones who sit at home. (Qur'an 004.095)

The study of these texts has been of interest to many scholars who have tried to raise serious questions about the aspects of religious tolerance and use of violence in Islam. The main aspect is the division of the world into Islamic and non-Islamic realms: *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*. *Dar al-Islam* is the portion of the world under Islamic rule and *dar al-harb* is the portion of the world not under Islamic rule. According to Islam, *dar al-Islam* should expand until it includes the entire world and God commands Muslims to bring all people under Islam (Khadduri 1979, 16). According to the word of God and the prophet, the Muslim community has a mission to create a moral social order. This command has influenced Muslim practice throughout the centuries and provided a rationale for political and moral activism. The holy Qur'an teaches transnational unity and equality of all believers before God and it is the common faith that binds the community together (Esposito 1998, 29). It also states that the search for peace on Earth is a constant struggle against the devil that includes non-believers; and world-wide peace on earth might endure if all nations and people convert to Islam (Barcott 2004, 317). This gives an impression that the primary source of Islamic law does not recognize lasting peace on earth unless there is only one kingdom, the *dar al-Islam*.

The same has been expressed by Anjem Choudary, former United Kingdom (UK) head of Al-Muhajaroun (a British terror group supporting Sharia law). He said, "The whole world is *dar al-harb*, the world of non Islamic rule and conducting violence in this world is authorized by Islam. The killings of innocents in the 7/7 UK bombings is

legitimate as those people are not innocent according to Islamic law. They were all non-Muslims and I must have hatred towards all persons who are non-believers in Islam. I will always stand with my Muslim brother, no matter what they are doing” (Choudary 2007). Choudary said, "You are innocent if you are a Muslim. Then you are innocent in the eyes of God. If you are not a Muslim, then you are guilty of not believing in God” (Foxnews 2008).

This concept of Islamic ideology can also be seen in the statement of Lt Gen Hamid Gul, Inter Services Intelligence Pakistan (1987-89). On being asked about the war against Islamic militants in Waziristan, he said, “Pakistan army is fighting against own people (Muslims) in pressure from external force. In this fight army cannot win.” He defines the conflict in Afghanistan as a conflict of ideologies and says that it is Islam that should win and it can be verified from the heart of any Muslim (Gul 2007).

The Muslim mission, to be servant of God and to spread God’s rule, is both the individual and a community obligation. Guided by the word of God, the Muslim community has a mission to create a universal social order: “You are the best community evolved for mankind, enjoying what is right and forbidding what is wrong” (Qur’an 003:110). This command has provided a rationale for Muslim’s political and moral activism throughout the centuries. The Qur’an teaches the ultimate transnational unity of all believers of God. It’s the common faith, not tribal or family ties, that binds the community together (Esposito 1998, 29). This aspect of Islamic teaching is also reflected in the words of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, chief of the militant Jama'at Islami group in Pakistan. He says, "Islam knows no geography. The concept of separate Muslim nation-states was itself alien to Islam, as it believes in the unity of Muslims everywhere

regardless of race, color, language, or geography” (Mushtikhan 99). This further reinforces the concept of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* in Islam and the obligation of the Muslim community to strive for the universal expansion of *dar al-Islam*.

Looking back in history, the early advance of Islam went hand in hand with military expansion. Whether it was the motivation for the expansion is difficult to tell, although one recent book suggests that Islam certainly facilitated the growth of Muslim power (BBC 2005). The generous terms that the invading armies usually offered made their faith accessible to the conquered populations. And if it was a new and upstart faith, its administration by simple and honest men was preferable to the corruption and persecution that were the norm in more civilized empires. But the Arab military adventures do not seem to have been intended as a religious war of conversion. In the wake of the Ridda wars in 632-633 AD, and of the Arabs' sudden conquest of most of the Near East, the new religion became identified more sharply as monotheism for the Arab people. As is well known, the Arabs made no attempt to impose their faith on their new subjects, and at first in fact discouraged conversions on the part of non-Arabs (BBC 2005).

Though the holy Qur'an states, "There is no compulsion in religion; Truth stands out clear from error: whoever rejects evil and believes in God hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold that never breaks. And God heareth And knoweth all things" (Qur'an 002.256), the Muslim is not absolutely free. The Suras given below bind a Muslim not to become a disbeliever and incur Allah's wrath:

If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter He will be in the ranks of those who have lost (All spiritual good). (Qur'an 003.085)

Any one who, after accepting faith in Allah, utters Unbelief,- except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in Faith - but such as open their breast to Unbelief, on them is Wrath from Allah, and theirs will be a dreadful Penalty. (Qur'an 016.106)

As to those who reject Faith, and die rejecting,- never would be accepted from any such as much gold as the earth contains, though they should offer it for ransom. For such is (in store) a penalty grievous, and they will find no helpers. (Qur'an 003.091)

As regards communal discord with non-Muslims, the Qur'an has a number of passages that do not recognize peace with non-Muslims. It contains many passages that even support military action against non-Muslims. Some examples are:

But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practise regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. (Qur'an 009.005)

Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. (Qur'an 009.029)

This also reflects the aspect of religious non-tolerance as expressed in Islam. On one hand it says that there is no compulsion in religion, on the other hand it lays down the grievous punishments for anyone who rejects faith. God's religion in essence is a clear call to the worship of the Creator and the rejection of creation-worship in any form. It consists in the submission to Allah as one God, yielding to Him by obeying His commandments, and the denial of polytheism and polytheists. Consequently, the worship of creation, which is the essence of idolatry, is the only unforgivable sin. One who dies in this state of idolatry has sealed his fate in the next life. This is not an opinion, but a revealed fact stated by Allah in his final revelation to man (Philips n.d.): "Verily Allah

will not forgive the joining of partners with Him, but He may forgive (sins) less than that for whom so ever He wishes."

Though it indicates non-tolerance for conversion to other religions, it has the provision of co-existence with other faiths, particularly Jews and Christians. They are regarded as "people of the book" or "people of the covenant" and accorded a protected status under Islamic law. They are designated as "*dhimmis*" and they are required to pay a special tax called "*jizya*." This payment was in exchange for their protection (Lippman 2002, 119-120). The *dhimmis* are expected to refrain from undertakings which might prejudice the beliefs and security of Muslim:

The early Muslim conquerors were extremely conscious of their obligations to the *ahl al-dhimmah*, the protected of God. Khalid ibn-al-Walid returned the *jizya* to the Christians of Homs following his failure to defend that city, feeling that he did not possess the power to repel the attacks of the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius on the city. In his words, "We accepted the *jizya* as a token of your good will and in return for defending you, but we have failed you." (Azzam 1965, 124)

Though it depicts ambiguity in its relationship with other religions, Islam clarifies that Allah's path is a constant struggle and all Muslims must engage in some form of *jihad*.

The Concept of Jihad

Jihad is the most overused and ill-understood word in the contemporary world. Prophet Muhammad in the Hadith says "Shall I not tell you of the peak of the matter; its pillar and topmost part? The peak of the matter is Islam; the pillar is prayer; and its topmost part is jihad" (Lippman 2002, 111). The term *jihad* is derived from the verb '*jahada*' which means 'exerted'. Its meaning in Islam is exertion of one's power in Allah's path, that is, the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word supreme

over this world (Khadduri 1979, 55). The individuals would be rewarded with the achievement of salvation, since the jihad is Allah's direct way to paradise. The basis of this definition is the following Qur'anic Suras:

That ye believe in Allah and His Messenger, and that ye strive (your utmost) in the Cause of Allah, with your property and your persons: That will be best for you, if ye but knew! (Qur'an 061:011)

He will forgive you your sins, and admit you to Gardens beneath which Rivers flow, and to beautiful mansions in Gardens of Eternity: that is indeed the Supreme Achievement. (Qur'an 061:012)

Though the Arabic jihad is generally rendered 'holy war', its meaning is wider than this and it includes any effort made in furtherance of the cause of Islam. Literally, the word means 'utmost effort' in promotion and defense of Islam, which might or might not involve armed conflict with unbelievers (Lippman 2002, 111). This may be achieved by peaceful means as well as violent means. The jihad may be regarded as a form of religious propaganda that can be carried on by persuasion or by sword. There are four different ways in which a Muslim can fulfill his obligation to jihad: by his heart, his tongue, his hands, and by the sword. It is only the fourth way of jihad that is regarded as the 'military jihad' and has its meaning equivalent to that of war:

The first is concerned with combating the devil and in the attempt to escape his persuasion to evil. This type of jihad, so significant in the eyes of Prophet Muhammad, was regarded as the greater jihad. The second and the third are mainly fulfilled in supporting the right and correcting the wrong. The fourth is precisely equivalent to the meaning of war, and is concerned with fighting the unbelievers and the enemies of the faith. The believers are under the obligation of sacrificing their "wealth and lives" (Qur'an 061:011) in the prosecution of war. (Khadduri 1979, 57)

Modern Muslim apologists sometimes explain *jihad* as simply defensive in nature. In its most general sense, *jihad* in the Qur'an and in Muslim practice refers to the obligation of all Muslims to strive in self-exertion or struggle to follow God's will. This

includes both the struggle to lead a virtuous life and the universal mission of the Muslim community to spread God's rule and law through teaching, preaching and where necessary armed struggle.

Though the Qur'an promises paradise for those who die in conflict with unbelievers, and a higher place to those who fight than to those who stay at home, it is not to be underestimated as a motivating force in political and military action by Muslims.

It is important in understanding the willingness of religiously motivated revolutionaries, such as the Sudanese of the Mahdist revolt in the nineteenth century, the rebellious students in Iran, and the anti-Soviet guerrillas of Afghanistan, to accept death; it may also help to account for the psychology of the hijackers who seized four airliners and turned them into weapons in the September 2001 attacks, knowing that their mission ensured that they would die. (Lippman 2002, 112)

In the last century, jihad became a clarion call used by resistance, liberation, and terrorist movements alike to legitimize their cause, to mobilize support and to motivate their followers. The Afghan Mujahidin, the Taliban, and the Northern Alliance waged jihad in Afghanistan. Muslim movements in Kashmir, Chechnya, Southern Philippines, Bosnia, and Kosovo have fashioned their struggles as jihad. Hizbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad Palestine characterized their war with Israel as jihad. Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda waged a global jihad against United States and the West.

The other significant concept is the obligation to respond if faith is challenged. When the Muslim community is subjected to a sudden attack, it is the obligation of the whole community, including women and children, to fight and support the jihad. This obligation is to be met from the innermost conscience in accordance with the decisions of the Islamic command (Azzam 1965, 132). This duty need not necessarily be fulfilled by

recruiting as warriors. It can also be fulfilled by supporting the war effort in the form of food and weapons, supplies, and finances. This concept was witnessed during the Russian-Afghanistan conflict in the early 1980s. The religious aspect of waging jihad against an occupational force became the magnet for the most radical true believers of the Muslim world. Devout outsiders from a host of different Islamic nations flooded into the country, inspired by the chance to engage in a holy struggle against the infidels, the communist Soviets. They brought money and international support with them.

Saudi Arabia gave monetary and some material assistance to some of the fighters, especially the radical Muslim group of Sayyaf. Acting independently, Saudi intelligence funneled huge amounts of money in the form of gold, cash, and checks to these Mujahideens to fund the war. Egypt played a key role in giving Soviet made weapons to the resistance and even providing training to Afghan resistance fighters on its own territory (Bruscino 2006, 53). Pakistan played a key role in providing sanctuaries for the Mujahideen who were fighting in Afghanistan. It also became the primary supply route for the weapons and material that kept the Afghan resistance going throughout the war (Bruscino 2006, 57). Islamic clergy in many lands conducted fund raising in support of the insurgency. The Deobandi and Wahhabbi sects provided funding as did Sufi and Shia communities. The refugees in the Iranian and Pakistani camps provided aid--not so much financially as morally. Mujahideen families were usually in the camps. The camps were also fertile recruiting grounds for new Mujahideen (Grau 2004).

This concept of Muslim obligation to respond in favor of Islamic faith has also been observed in the ongoing Iraq and Afghan Wars. According to Wassim Dureihi, a young Muslim leader in Australia, it is the duty of the whole Islamic world to commence

jihad against the occupational forces. In a news interview, he said, "The occupation of Iraq makes it the duty of every Muslim to raise jihad in self defence to free Iraq and Afghanistan of occupation. The whole Islamic world will unite to fight against the oppression of an Islamic state by a non Islamic state as per the teaching" (Dureihi 2007). The same ideology is being promulgated by terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda who are calling for jihad against America and the West in the defense of Islam.

In the Hadith by Sahih Bukhari, which is the second existing primary source, jihad has been referred to as the military struggle. In all the 199 references in Volume 4, Book 52, jihad has been referred to as "fighting in the cause of Allah," and has been used in the militant sense. Some of the narrations in the Hadith that implicitly give out the meaning of jihad in military sense are as given below:

Narrated Abdullah bin Masud: I asked Allah's Apostle, "O Allah's Apostle! What is the best deed?" He replied, "To offer the prayers at their early stated fixed times." I asked, "What is next in goodness?" He replied, "To be good and dutiful to your parents." I further asked, what is next in goodness?" He replied, "To participate in Jihad in Allah's Cause." I did not ask Allah's Apostle anymore and if I had asked him more, he would have told me more. (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 41)

Narrated Ibn 'Abbas: Allah's Apostle said, "There is no Hijra (i.e. migration) (from Mecca to Medina) after the Conquest (of Mecca), but Jihad and good intention remain; and if you are called (by the Muslim ruler) for fighting, go forth immediately. (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 42)

Narrated Abu Huraira: A man came to Allah's Apostle and said, "Instruct me as to such a deed as equals Jihad (in reward)." He replied, "I do not find such a deed." Then he added, "Can you, while the Muslim fighter is in the battle-field, enter your mosque to perform prayers without cease and fast and never break your fast?" The man said, "But who can do that?" Abu- Huraira added, "The Mujahid (i.e. Muslim fighter) is rewarded even for the footsteps of his horse while it wanders about (for grazing) tied in a long rope." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 44)

Narrated Abu Huraira: I heard Allah's Apostle saying, "The example of a Mujahid in Allah's Cause-- and Allah knows better who really strives in His Cause----is

like a person who fasts and prays continuously. Allah guarantees that He will admit the Mujahid in His Cause into Paradise if he is killed, otherwise He will return him to his home safely with rewards and war booty." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 46)

Narrated Anas bin Malik: The Prophet said, "A single endeavor (of fighting) in Allah's Cause in the forenoon or in the afternoon is better than the world and whatever is in it." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 50)

Narrated Abu Huraira: The Prophet said, " I would love to be martyred in Allah's Cause and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again and then get martyred and then get resurrected again and then get martyred." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 54)

Narrated Abdullah bin Abbas: That Abu Sufyan told him that Heraclius said to him, "I asked you about the outcome of your battles with him (i.e. the Prophet) and you told me that you fought each other with alternate success. So the Apostles are tested in this way but the ultimate victory is always theirs. (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 60)

Narrated Anas bin Malik: The Prophet said, "Nobody who enters Paradise likes to go back to the world even if he got everything on the earth, except a Mujahid who wishes to return to the world so that he may be martyred ten times because of the dignity he receives (from Allah)." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 72)

Narrated 'Abdullah bin Abi Aufa: Allah's Apostle said, "Know that Paradise is under the shades of swords." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 72)

Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah's Apostle said, "Allah welcomes two men with a smile; one of whom kills the other and both of them enter Paradise. One fights in Allah's Cause and gets killed. Later on Allah forgives the 'killer who also get martyred (In Allah's Cause)." (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 72)

Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah 's Apostle said, " I have been ordered to fight with the people till they say, 'None has the right to be worshipped but Allah,' and whoever says, 'None has the right to be worshipped but Allah,' his life and property will be saved by me except for Islamic law, and his accounts will be with Allah, (either to punish him or to forgive him.)" (Bukhari Volume 4, Book 52, Number 196)

The study of these references in isolation implies a clear meaning that military jihad is the highest form of service to Allah. They promise the highest places in paradise to the martyrs of jihad and places them in far superior category than those who sit at home. They also assure the achievement of final victory that can be motivating for any

participant who believes that he will be successful in his mission. However, it is important to place these narrations in the actual context and know the situation under which these narrations were made.

The early Islamic worldview provides a model both for the formation of a state and for protest and resolution. The world is seen as divided between the believers or friends of God, who represent the forces of good, and the unbelievers or “*Kafirs*” and hypocrites, who are the allies of evil, the followers of Satan. The Muslims in Mecca were the oppressed and disinherited, struggling in an ignorant and unbelieving society. Faced with persecution, they had two choices: emigration (*hijra*) and armed resistance (*jihad*) (Esposito 1998, 13).

First, the true believers were expected to leave a godless society and establish a community of believers under God and his Prophet. Second, Muslims were permitted, indeed exhorted, to struggle against the forces of evil and unbelief, and if necessary sacrifice their lives, in order to establish God’s rule. (Esposito 1998, 13)

This can be exemplified by the following quotes in Qur’an:

So let them fight in the way of God who sell the present life for the world to come, and whosoever fights in the way of God and is slain, or conquers, we shall bring him a mighty wage. (Qur’an 004.074)

God has preferred in rank those who struggle with their possessions and their selves over the ones who sit at home. (Qur’an 004.095)

The doctrine of the *jihad* was adopted as a means of survival for the Islamic state, which had to fight the tribal wars.

The importance of jihad in Islam lay in shifting the focus of attention of the tribes from their intertribal warfare to the outside world . . . It would, indeed, have been very difficult for the Islamic state to survive had it not been the doctrine of the jihad, replacing tribal raids, and directing that enormous energy of the tribes from an inevitable internal conflict to unite and fight against the outside world in the name of the new faith. (Khadduri 1979, 62)

Those who wage *jihad* for God were considered to be engaged in a religio-political act, a holy war. These holy warriors were promised to be rewarded with eternal life and the highest status in the heaven:

The God who commands this struggle against oppression and unbelief will assist His Muslim holy warriors as He did at the battle of *Badr*, where, the Qur'an states, an unseen army of angels aided the Muslim army. These holy warriors (*mujahidin*) will be rewarded in this life with victory and the spoils of war. Those who fall in battle will be rewarded with eternal life as martyrs (*Shahid*, witness) for the faith. The Arabic term for martyr comes from the same root, 'witness', as the word for the confession or profession of faith, indicating that willingness to sacrifice all, even life itself, is the ultimate profession or eternal witness of faith. In this way, early Islamic history provides Muslims with a mode and ideology for protest, resistance and revolutionary change. (Esposito 1998, 14)

This establishes that the concept of military jihad finds justification in the early Islamic history, where it was a requirement for the defense of faith and a matter of survival for the religion. However, if one disregards the historical context in which these narrations were made, one can find justification in raising armed jihad even in the present times. The same is depicted by various terrorist groups who quote Qur'anic and Hadith references to justify their cause and garner support from the Muslim world.

In the September 11, 2001 attacks, Al-Qaeda had directed the hijackers on how to behave on the night before the mission. They were to read two chapters of Qur'an and reflect on their meanings. These verses from Qur'an include the following exhortations (Barcott 2004, 13-14):

So remember God, as He said in His book: 'Oh Lord, pour your patience upon us and make our feet steadfast and give us victory over the infidels.'

When the confrontation begins, strike like champions who do not want to go back to this world. Shout, 'Allah Akbar' (God is great), because this strikes fear in the hearts of the nonbelievers. God said: 'Strike above the neck, and strike at all their extremities.'

Then implement the way of the prophet in taking prisoners. Take prisoners and kill them. As almighty God said: 'No prophet should have prisoners until soaked the land with blood. (As quoted in Barcott 2004, 13-14)

This shows how terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda use the holy texts to justify their cause and motivate their cadres.

The obsolescence of some of the Islamic concepts has been reflected by Mosab Hassan Yousef, son of the most influential leader of Hamas militant organization, who renounced the Muslim faith and embraced Christianity in August 2008. According to him, Islam is still clinging on to the concepts that were formulated 1400 years ago. Many of those concepts are not valid in the modern world, but bringing about any change in the Islamic preaching, that is, the Sharia is not acceptable to Islam. Being a follower of Islam for the past 30 years, he gives out his view point about Islam (Hunt 2008):

I believe that all those walls that Islam built for the last 1,400 years are not existing (sic) anymore. They don't recognize this. They built those walls and made people ignorant because they're afraid. They didn't want people to discuss anything about the reality of Islam, about the big questions of Islam and they asked their followers, the Muslims, 'Don't ask about those certain questions.'

There are two facts that Muslims don't understand ... I'd say about more than 95 percent of Muslims don't understand their own religion. It came with a much stronger language than the language that they speak so they don't understand it ... they rely only on religious people to get their knowledge about this religion. Second, they don't understand anything about other religions. So, all their ideas about other religions on earth are from Islamic perspectives. So those two realities, most people don't understand.

People talk about the glory of Islam, they talk about the victory, the victories that Muhammad made. So, when people just like look at themselves and see they're defeated, they have ignorance, they're not educated, they're not leading the world as they're expected to do. They're think they want to get back to that victory by doing the same, what Muhammad did, but disregarding (sic) the timing. They forget that this happened 1,400 years ago and it's not going to happen again. (Yousef as quoted in Hunt 2008)

The holy Qur'an contains very few verses that support violence and far more verses supporting peace. Some Muslim authorities have used the latter to show the captured terrorists that their violent way is misguided. Traditional theologians have visited imprisoned terrorists and brought Qur'an with them. The conversations between the theologians and the terrorists sometimes reveal that the terrorists do not have deep understanding of their belief and are amazed to find out that there is very little support in the Qur'an for their violent ideas (Sageman 2008, 37). This reinforces the idea that terrorist group leaders are using isolated verses from the Holy Scriptures to motivate their cadres, who are unaware of the real context of the actual verses.

According to Brigitte Gabriel, the former news anchor of "World News" for Middle East television and an expert on the Middle East conflict, fighting Islamic jihadists is fighting an ideology that is very difficult to contest. In the Intelligence Summit 2007 conference, she narrates Islamic ideology from her experience as an Arab Christian living in Lebanon. She states:

We are fighting a powerful ideology that is capable of altering basic human instincts. An ideology that can turn a mother into a launching pad of death. A perfect example is a recently elected Hamas official in the Palestinian Territories who raves in heavenly joy about sending her three sons to death and offering the ones who are still alive for the cause. It is an ideology that is capable of offering highly educated individuals such as doctors and lawyers far more joy in attaining death than any respect and stature, life in society is ever capable of giving them. (Gabriel 2007)

This gives an impression that Islamic ideology is susceptible to being exploited by various Islamic groups in conflict. The ambiguity of Islamic ideology and the permission to use violence is also depicted by the analysis carried out by Professor Muqtedar Khan:

Islam does not fully advocate pacifism. Islam does permit the use of force. But the theory of jihad, which means "struggle in the path of God," forbids violence except: (1) when Muslims are not allowed to practice their faith, that is, when

freedom of religion is threatened; (2) when people are oppressed and subjugated; and (3) when people's land is forcibly taken from them. In these situations Islam allows a range of responses. One can forgive the oppressor or one can respond with force. There are Qur'anic sources encouraging both positions. The Qur'an states, "And slay them wherever you find them, and drive them out of the places from where they drove you out, for persecution is worse than killing" (2:191). But the Qur'an also states, "Tell those who disbelieve that if they cease persecution of believers that which is past will be forgiven them" (8:38). Khan went on to say that there is no hierarchy of verses in the Qur'an. Those who privilege the first verse over the second will wage war to fight injustice. And most militant Muslims invoke this verse in the defense of their actions. But then there are Muslims who privilege the second verse and seek a diplomatic end to persecution and urge forgiveness. These two verses are exemplary of the tension between realism and idealism in Islam. But in the final analysis Islam is what Muslims make of it, Khan said. (Smock 2002)

On one hand, where one can find justification in following militant jihad in Islamic teachings, on the other hand there are far more verses in Qur'an about peace than fighting. This further increases the ambiguity in the minds of followers who then rely upon the clerics to clarify the true meaning. The difference of perception between the two schools of thoughts can be clearly established from the varied description of Islamic teachings about peace as described below:

The Qur'an clearly, categorically, and specifically condemns and prohibits terrorism and suicide. The indiscriminate killing of innocent people, which is always the result of terrorism and suicide missions engaged in by misguided Muslim zealots is considered a sin in Islam. Human life is sacrosanct in Islam and only God has the right to bestow it and take it away. In fact Islam emphasizes peace, moderation, and tolerance and opposes all types of violent extremism, including hostage taking, hijacking, planting bombs in public places, and killing innocent non-combatants. Below are some Qur'anic verses that address this issue (Husain 2006, 54):

"Whoever kills a person not in retaliation for murder or to spread corruption in the land, it would be as if he murdered whole of humankind. And (likewise) if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the whole of humankind." (Qur'an 5:32)

"Let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression." (Qur'an 2:193)

Though the above quoted Qur'anic verses clearly explain that killing and violence are prohibited, they leave ample room for argument and interpretation that killing in retaliation and against oppression is legitimate. The same has been the point of argument of various Muslim clerics and leaders who are spreading terrorism and declaring jihad on a routinely basis. This is because the concept of jihad arouses deep-seated feelings in the average Muslim, due to the fact that during Muhammad's time and for several decades afterwards, Islam ruled considerable territory from China to North Africa. Many Muslims would like to return to that glory and only jihad enables attainment of that goal (Sagiv 1995, 133).

Followers: Peace or Jihad

It is important to establish what percentage of the Muslim population follows the jihadist ideology of Islam, and is willing to support the concept propagated by the various terrorist groups. A poll of attitudes taken by Muslims for a Safe America, from 309 Muslims who are American citizens, shows that large segments of the responders, sometimes majorities, sometimes large minorities, believe that: America is at war with Islam, the United States knew the 9/11 attacks were coming, the United States planned the attacks, Muslims did not carry out the attacks, Muslims had nothing to do with the recent terrorist plots uncovered in Britain and Canada, violence by Muslims against the American military overseas is acceptable, and no security measures that might especially involve Muslims are justified. Even the views of small minorities are disturbing, since extrapolated to the larger population, it would mean a significant number of American Muslims who believe, for example, that violence by Muslims against American civilians

or the American military in the US is acceptable. It is also important to note that 70 percent of them considered that they are Muslim first and then American (Ionnane 2006).

It is generally assumed that jihadists are well read in religion and they are trying to implement the religion in its true meaning. That is not the case. The majority of terrorists come to their religious beliefs through self-instruction and the preaching by religious scholars. Their religious understanding is very limited, and they do not start reading the Qur'an seriously until they are in prison, where they have lots of time to read it (Sageman 2008, 51).

Almost one in four British Muslims believe that 2005, 7/7 attacks on London were justified because of British support for the U.S. led war on terror. Thirty percent of British Muslims would prefer to live under Sharia (Islamic religious) law than under British law. According to the report, "Half of those who express a preference for living under Sharia law say that, given the choice, they would move to a country governed by those laws." Twenty eight percent hope for the United Kingdom one day to become a fundamentalist Islamic state. This comports with last year's *Daily Telegraph* newspaper survey that found one-third of British Muslims believe that Western society is decadent and immoral and that Muslims should seek to end it. The NOP Research Survey reports, "hardcore Islamists" constitute nine percent of the British Muslim population. A slightly more moderate group is composed of "staunch defenders of Islam." This second group comprises 29 percent of the British Muslim population. Individuals in this group aggressively defend their religion from internal and external threats, real or imagined (Basham 2006).

In non-Muslim countries, fears of Islamic extremism are closely associated with worries about Muslim minorities. The Western public believes that Muslims in their countries want to remain distinct from society, rather than adopt their nation's customs and way of life. Moreover, there is a widespread perception in countries with significant Muslim minorities, including the United States, that resident Muslims have a strong and growing sense of Islamic identity (see figure 1). For the most part, this development is viewed negatively, particularly in Western Europe. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, those who see a growing sense of Islamic identity among resident Muslims overwhelmingly say this is a bad thing (PewGlobal 2005).




Figure 1. Islamic Identity versus Nationalism
Source: Internet: PewGlobal, July 14, 2005

The belief that terrorism is justifiable in the defense of Islam has a sizable number of adherents (see figure 2). For instance, among Nigeria's Muslim population nearly half

(46%) believe that suicide bombings can be justified often or sometimes in the defense of Islam. Even among Europe's Muslim minorities, roughly one-in-seven in France, Spain, and Great Britain believe that suicide bombings against civilian targets can at least sometimes be justified to defend Islam against its enemies (PewGlobal 2006).

Support for Suicide Bombing

*Violence against civilian targets in order to defend Islam can be justified...**

	<u>Sometimes</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>DK</u>
	%	%	%	%
French Muslims	16	19	64	1=100
Spanish Muslims	16	9	69	7=101
British Muslims	15	9	70	6=100
German Muslims	7	6	83	3=99
Jordan	29	28	43	*=100
<i>Spring 2005</i>	57	31	11	1=100
<i>Summer 2002</i>	43	22	26	8= 99
Egypt	28	25	45	3=101
Turkey	17	9	61	14=101
<i>Spring 2005</i>	14	6	66	13=99
<i>March 2004</i>	15	9	67	9=100
<i>Summer 2002</i>	13	7	64	14= 98
Pakistan	14	8	69	8=99
<i>Spring 2005</i>	25	19	46	10=100
<i>March 2004</i>	41	8	35	16=100
<i>Summer 2002</i>	33	5	38	23= 99
Indonesia	10	18	71	1=100
<i>Spring 2005</i>	15	18	66	1=100
<i>Summer 2002</i>	27	16	54	3=100
Nigerian Muslims	46	23	28	3=100

*Asked of Muslims only.

Figure 2. Muslims' Perception of Suicide Bombings
Source: Internet: PewGlobal, June 22, 2006

The above surveys establish that there are only a minority of Muslims that support violence, but there are a majority of Muslims that support the ideology of Muslims transnational unity.

Evidence of a growing radicalization in the Islamic world is substantive and quantifiable. Data points include the recent deadly riots by Muslims infuriated over

cartoon depictions of the Prophet Mohammad published in a Danish newspaper, and extended rioting and vandalism in France by disaffected Muslim youth. In Europe, intelligence officials report a significant rise in radicalized Muslims joining terrorist networks by the hundreds, and perhaps thousands, in order to wage jihad against the U.S. led coalition in Iraq. This had led to a general perception where Islam and Islamic fundamentalism is being linked to extremism (Esposito 1994).

To equate Islam and Islamic fundamentalism uncritically with extremism is to judge Islam only by those who wreak havoc--a standard not applied to Judaism and Christianity... There are lessons to be learned from a past in which fear of a monolithic Soviet threat often blinded the United States to the Soviet bloc's diversity, led to uncritical support for [anti-Communist] dictatorships, and enabled the "free world" to tolerate the suppression of legitimate dissent and massive human rights violations by governments that labeled the opposition 'Communist' or 'Socialist'. (Esposito 1994)

Indiscriminate use of the term "Islamic fundamentalism" and its identification with governments and movements have contributed to the sense of a monolithic menace when in actuality political Islam is far more diverse. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, and Iran have been called fundamentalist states, but this tells us nothing about their nature: Saudi Arabia is a conservative monarchy, Libya a populist socialist state headed by a military dictator. Moreover, the label says nothing about the state's Islamic character or orientation. Pakistan under General Muhammad Zia ul- Haq embodied a conservative Islam, and Saudi Arabia still does; Islam in Libya is radical and revisionist; clerics dominate in Iran. Finally, although fundamentalism is popularly equated with anti-Americanism and extremism, and Libya and Iran have indeed often denounced America, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have been close allies of the United States and the mujahideen that resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan received support from Washington for years (Esposito 1994).

Based upon the religious outlook and orientation towards change, the Muslim community can be divided into four discreet groups. The first group may be labeled “Secularists.” These are Muslims who advocate restricting religion to private affairs and its exclusion from public life. They believe that mixing religion with politics is inappropriate and whosoever does that is actually manipulating Islam for own political ends. The second group is “conservatives” who represent the majority of the community. They advocate a return to Islam and emphasize following past traditions. They are wary of innovations that alter traditional Islamic law or replace it with new prescriptions. According to them, “It is not the law that must change or modernize, but the society that must conform to God’s will” (Esposito 1998, 228).

The third group may be categorized as “neotraditionalists.” Like conservatives, they also advocate return to Islam and the Sharia. However, they believe in going back to the fundamental sources of Islam to reinterpret and apply them to contemporary situations. They are more flexible than conservatives. They believe in political activism to challenge the political and religious establishments and to revitalize their community. Movements like Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i-Islami follow this approach. The fourth group is the most adaptable and may be labeled as “reformists” or “neomodernists.” They believe that Sharia represents the understanding and interpretation of the jurists who applied the principles and values of the early Islamic society. Hence, there is a need to reformulate some aspects of the Islamic law in the light of the needs of modern society. They emphasize “Islamic modernization,” a process by which traditional Islamic values are reapplied to meet the new social environment (Esposito 1998, 229-232). Reformists are more flexible than conservatives and neotraditionalists, but it was

the latter, which resulted in a number of movements that swept the Muslim world, the so called “Islamic Revivalism.”

Islamic Revivalism

Islam possesses a tradition of revival and reform from the days of its origin. The concepts of renewal and reform are fundamental components of Islam, rooted in the Qur’an and the Sunna. These concepts involve a call for a return to the fundamentals of Islam, the Qur’an and the Sunna. According to Islam, a renewer is sent at the beginning of each century to restore Islamic practices and get the community back on the straight path. The two major aspects of this process are: a return to the ideal pattern revealed in Qur’an and Sunna; and the right to practice *ijtihad* (independent interpretation), to interpret the sources of Islam. As the followers of the concept of *ijtihad*, many revivalists like Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Hassa Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Ayatollah Khomeini claimed the right to reinterpret Islam in order to purify and revitalize their societies. The purpose of this reinterpretation was not to accommodate new ideas but to get back to the complete vision of Islam as preserved in its revealed sources. Hence, we see its militant and revolutionary potential as both a moral and political force, as witnessed by the wave of eighteenth and nineteenth century religio-political revivalist movements that swept across the Islamic world from Sudan to Sumatra (Esposito 1998, 117).

The Salafi Concept

The Salafi concept goes back to mid-thirteenth century just after the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258. A medieval cleric, Ibn Taymiyya, became the ideologue for the

movement. Taymiyya believed that the Mongols, though Muslims, had failed to properly implant the Sharia, and hence they had forfeited any claim to legitimacy and all pious Muslims should consider themselves obliged to rebel against them. He popularized the notion that the most efficient way for Muslims to fulfill their destiny would be to follow the example of their pious ancestors, the Salafi. He argued that Muslims needed to go back to their roots, to the time when the Islamic community was pure, having just embraced the Prophet's message of monotheism. He also believed that the Salafi were divinely guided and advised Muslims to go back to this early approach by reading Qur'an and Sunna for themselves and not rely on the clergy, who were no longer reliable, because most had been corrupted (Chadha 2006, 50). He rejected *taqlid* (legal conformity) and *ijma* (consensus), and insisted on the literal interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah. He denounced Sufism, and censured the cult of Prophet Muhammad and the practice of saint worship (Husain 2006, 331).

Taymiyya's philosophy has been the center of attraction for the jihadists, who prefer to be called Salafi. The Salafis, following Taymiyya, look less to the traditions and instead rely on only the Qur'an and the Sunna for primary guidance. These Salafis called upon Muslims to wage jihad not only against infidels, but also against Muslims who varied from the interpretation of Islam as given in the primary sources. With Taymiyya's innovation, it became a religious obligation for all Muslims to eliminate any Muslim leader who failed to implement Islamic law. It is important to note that not all Muslims who call themselves Salafi endorse the global jihad movement. While these "reformist Salafis" do not fundamentally reject militant jihad, they believe that today's situation is analogous to early Medinean period, when Muslims were advised to focus on

strengthening their own faith. They may be willing to pick up arms in defense of Islam, but they tend to believe that the community is not at the point where it can be fighting to expand the domain of Islam. They argue that Muslims have not yet gathered sufficient strength to wage jihad against the enemies of Islam or even their local regimes (Chadha 2006, 51).

Taymiyya's ideology became the foundational stone for all the revivalist movements in the following era from early eighteenth century to contemporary times. The significant ones amongst those are the Wahhabi movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al-Qaeda. The most important concept given by Taymiyya regarding jihad movement would be the concept that jihad is a Muslim's most important duty. According to Taymiyya, jihad is even more important than a Muslim's other duties which include prayer five times a day, fasting during Ramadan, making Haj, and giving alms to the needy. The only duty which superseded jihad, according to him, was the duty to believe in God and Islam. This was the legacy that that Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab as-Zarqawi cited to justify their call for jihad. Bin Laden quoted Ibn Taymiyya in his 1996 call for jihad against the American forces in Saudi Arabia (Chadha 2006, 52):

Clearly after Belief (Imaan) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. No other priority, except Belief, could be considered before it; the people of knowledge, Ibn Taymiyya stated: "to fight in defense of religion and Belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after Belief than fighting the enemy who is corrupting the life and the religion." (Bin Laden as quoted in Chadha 2006, 52)

In the similar manner Zarqawi, the head of al Qaeda in Iraq, also called upon Taymiyya's concept to justify his attacks against the Shi'ite community. He cited Taymiyya in the support his cause:

Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya spoke with truth and honesty when he said – after he mentioned their (Shi’a) thinking towards the people of Islam- “For this reason, with their malice and cunning, they help the infidels against the Muslim masses, and they are one of the greatest reasons for the eruption of Genghis Khan, the king of the infidels, into the lands of Islam, for the arrival of Hulagu, in the country of Iraq, for taking of Aleppo and the pillage of al-Salihiyya, and for other things.” (Zarqawi 2004)

The Wahhabi Movement in Arabia

The Wahhabi movement is the best known of 18th Century revivalist movements, significant for its formative influence on Saudi Arabia and as an example for modern revivalism to emulate. The name Wahhabi is derived from the name of one of Taymiyya’s follower, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), an itinerant Muslim cleric who was the founder of Wahhabi movement. Wahhab wandered through Arab lands during the Ottoman period (Chadha 2006, 51). He was trained in law, theology and sufism at Mecca and Medina, where he was drawn to the writings of Ibn Taymiyya. He was appalled by many popular religious practices in the region, which he believed to be contrary to Islamic teaching, that too in the Islamic heartland. He believed that the political weakness of the community and its moral decline were due to deviation from the Islamic path. He denounced those beliefs and practices as unwarranted innovations. Following in the traditions of Taymiyya, he urged his fellow Muslims to follow the example of their pious ancestors and return to true Islamic practices. According to him this could only be achieved by returning to a community life based strictly on the Qur’an and the examples of Muhammad and the Medinan community (Esposito 1998, 118).

Wahhab formed an alliance with a local tribal chief, Mohammad bin Saud who saw in the cleric’s teachings the perfect ideology to rationalize support from his fellow Muslims to rise up against his rival warlords and claim territory. This created a militant

reformist movement that would subdue large areas of Arabian Peninsula (Chadha 2006, 52). Its self-designation was the *Muwahiddun* meaning ‘unitarians’ who uphold and practice monotheism. Religious zeal and military power were united in a religio-political movement that waged holy war. The tribes of the region subdued and united in the name of Islamic egalitarianism. The Wahhabi missionary warriors referred to themselves as the ‘*Ikhwan*’ or brotherhood. They, like Mohammad who had cleansed the *Kaba* of its idols, destroyed *Sufi* shrines and sacred tombs in Mecca and Medina, including those of the Prophet and his companions. They also destroyed the tomb of Hussain at Karbala, a major Shii holy place, an act never forgotten by Shii community, which has affected their attitude towards the Wahhabi of modern day Saudi Arabia (Esposito 1998, 119).

According to Wahhab, the true Islamic way of life was to be found in its pure, unadulterated form in the seventh century community. He thus differed from the process of reinterpretation as propounded by the Islamic modernists. Following the Taymiyya’s ideology, the Wahhabi movement influenced other revivalists in Africa and India. Its legacy is also found today in the state and society of Saudi Arabia and the ideological worldviews of many Muslims (Esposito 1998, 119).

Muslim Brotherhood

In 1928 in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hasal al-Banna (1906-1949) as an Islamic ideological party. Al-Banna attempted to unite and mobilize Muslims against cultural and political domination by the West as well as against secular Muslim regimes. According to him, Islam was not restricted to personal piety or a component in social and political life; it was a comprehensive ideology for personal and public life, and a foundation for Muslim state and society. He believed that if Muslims

were to remain faithful to God and His divine will, they must reject the Western secularism and materialism and return to solely to Islam, which is perfect and it assures guidance in all aspects of life (Esposito 1998, 149):

Until recently, writers, intellectuals, scholars, and governments glorified the principle of European civilization . . . adopted a Western style and manner... Today, on the contrary, the wind has change . . . Voices are raised . . . for a return to the principles of Islam . . . For initiating the reconciliation of modern life with these principles, as a prelude to a final Islamization. (Al-Banna as quoted in Esposito 1998, 149)

Al-Banna regarded Islam as the all embracing ideology: “The sharia is a complete scheme of life and an all embracing social order.” He argued that Western secularism and its materialism were the main factors responsible for the political disunity, social dislocation and moral laxity of the Muslim community. He regarded the separation of religion from the state as the inherent fallacy of Western secularism. He compared Western culture, and all those who do not follow Islam to the pre-Islamic society in a state of ignorance and darkness (Esposito 1998, 151). He believed that the unity of the brotherhood of believers must replace the religious, social, and political factions that divided and weakened the Muslim community.

Following revivalist ideology, he called for a return to the true Islamic teaching as given in the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the practice of the early Islamic community. According to him, modernization of the Muslim society must be based upon Islamic principles and values. Keeping with this, he rejected the concept of Western democracy and accepted the modernist reinterpretation of traditional concepts of consultation and community consensus, an Islamic democracy in which the will of the people remained subordinate to the will of God. He also emphasized the universality of the Muslim community and its mission and considered the concepts of nationalism as un-Islamic and

a threat to Islamic identity (Esposito 1998, 152). This was the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.

The Muslim Brotherhood's dissatisfaction with Egypt's government over its failure to establish an Islamic state led to the declaration of jihad in Egypt. This escalated into violence, armed conflict, and the assassination of Al-Banna in 1949. In the mid-1960s, government repression led to a series of confrontations, imprisonments, executions, and finally suppression of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Though the movement was crushed in Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood organizations continued to grow in many other parts of the Muslim world namely Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait (Esposito 1998, 153).

The Muslim Brotherhood influenced another ideologue, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) who joined the Brotherhood in the 1950s and became a key player in the genesis of the ideology of militant Islam. Qutb was an intellectual and religious writer whose works included an influential commentary on Qur'an and provided much of the foundation for contemporary Islamic extremist philosophy. In the Muslim Brotherhood, he quickly emerged as the most important ideologue amid the growing confrontation with the Egyptian regime (Richardson 2006a, 148).

Qutb saw the cause of Muslim weakness as the careless imitation of foreign moralities and philosophies, the rendering of sovereignty to men who elevated themselves over others as rulers and lawmakers:

We are today immersed in *jahiliyya*, a *jahiliyya* like that of early Islam, but perhaps deeper, darker. Everything around us expresses *jahiliyya*: people's ideas, their beliefs, habits, traditions, culture, art, literature, rules and laws. Even all that we have come to consider Islamic culture, Islamic sources, philosophy and thought are *jahiliyya* constructs. This is why Islamic values have not taken root in

our souls, why the Islamic worldview remains obscured in our minds, why no generation has arisen among us equal to the calibre of the first Islamic generation. (Qutb as quoted in Sagiv 1995, 38)

In his view any society that does not worship God, the Allah is *jahiliyya*. That implies that all societies on earth except Muslim society are *jahiliyya*. Qutb also stressed on the need to conduct militant jihad against the oppressors:

He who understands the nature of this religion (Islam) will understand the need for the activist push of Islam as a jihad of the sword alongside a jihad of education. He will also understand that it is not a defensive movement in the limited sense of 'defensive war' as the defeatists would have it, but a movement of pushing and breakthroughs for liberation of the individual on earth. (Qutb as quoted in Sagiv 1995, 39)

Qutb divided the Muslim societies into two opposing camps: the forces of good and of evil, those committed to the rule of God and those opposed. He emphasized the need to develop a special group of true Muslims within the corrupt and faithless society. According to him, it was imperative that Muslims must strive to implement an Islamic government as given by the divine commandment. He argued that an armed jihad against the authoritarian and repressive Egyptian government and many other governments in Muslim world was the only way to implement the new Islamic order. For him, an armed jihad in the defense of Islam against the injustice and oppression of anti-Islamic governments and the neocolonialism of the West was the religious duty of all Muslims. Those who refuse to participate were the enemies of God and should be fought and killed with the other unbelievers (Sagiv 1995, 40).

Qutb's revolutionary vision has reverberated in the radical rhetoric revolutionaries from Ayatollah Khomeini to Osama bin Laden. Qutb defended the legitimacy of militant jihad, which influenced and inspired many militant organizations and their followers. His radicalized worldview became a source for ideologues from the founders of Egypt's

Islamic Jihad to bin Laden and Al-Qaeda's call for a global jihad (Richardson 2006a, 149).

Iranian Revolution

The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 was a watershed in the history of contemporary Islam. The prominence of the Islamic ideology and leadership rendered it an "Islamic revolution". In modern times, it has been the most resounding call to jihad. It occurred on January 29, 1979 just after the Shah of Iran fled into exile, following a revolt led by an Islamic cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini. The Ayatollah Khomeini announced that the next target would be America: "US imperialism must get out of our nation. The people have absolute confidence in victory in this holy war, jihad-e moqaddas" (Chadha 2006, 10).

Its success in effectively mobilizing Iranians against the Shah validated the Islamic activists' claims that a return to Islam would enable Muslims to implement an autonomous and self-reliant way of life. This was seen as a victory of Islam over superior military power of the regime and the Western allies (Esposito 1998, 163). Under Khomeini, the constitutional mandate of the "Islamic Republic of Iran" would be to export Islamic revolution. He wrote, "All secular power, no matter what form it takes, is the work of Satan and Muslims must stop it in its tracks" (Chadha 2006, 10). He insisted that Iran's revolution is an Islamic, not just a Shii, revolution and his call for others to follow suit inspired not only Shii militant but also Sunni Muslims and organizations. For many, it established that the true nature of Islam is the sole comprehensive guide for life and a just society. The flyer "Lessons from Iran" by the Islamic (Student) Association of Cairo University displays such sentiments:

The Iranian represents the first breach in the wall of secularism. . . the Islamic peoples. . . rejected it and began to set up the rule of God. . . Secularism is a call to separate religion from the state and to prohibit Islam from interfering in politics or in the affairs of government. It is perpetual resort of those idolatrous rulers who transgress God's limits, paralyze his Sharia...This revolution confirmed for us as long as laws and constitutions are not derived from Sharia of Islam, they form a counterfeit Sharia...Perhaps the most profound lesson which this revolution embodied was the fruit of working for countries of the East and West. Rulers sold their countries... and were transformed into puppets in the hands of rulers of East and West. (As quoted in Esposito 1998, 164)

Khomeini condemned Western imperialism, the Westernization of Muslim societies and its threat to Islamic identity and culture, and Israel, which he regarded as an outpost of American neocolonialism:

The Foul of imperialism have clutched at the heart of the lands of the people of the Qur'an, with our national wealth and resources being devoured by imperialism... with the poisonous culture of imperialism penetrating to the depths of towns and villages throughout the Muslim world, displacing the culture of the Qur'an. The sinister influence of imperialism is especially evident in Iran. Israel, the universally recognized enemy of Islam and the Muslims, at war with the Muslims people for years, has with the assistance of the despicable government of Iran, penetrated the economic, political, and military affairs of the country; it must be said that Iran has become a military base for Israel which means, by extension, for America. (As quoted in Esposito 1998, 183)

Khomeini stressed on the inseparability of Islam and politics and the role of religion in governance. He asserted that since an Islamic government is one based upon Islamic law, the most qualified people to rule would be an expert in Islamic law, an Islamic cleric. He also stressed that in the absence of the Imam, the clergy should not only advice the government on Islamic matters, but rule directly:

Islam has system and a program for all the different affairs of the society; form of government and administration, the regulation of people's dealing with each other, their relations of the state and people, relations with foreign states and all other political and economic matters... The mosque has always been the center of leadership and command, of examination and analysis of social problems. (As quoted in Esposito 1998, 184)

This doctrine was used to justify the incitement of revolts in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iraq; to support the Moro in the Southern Philippines; to legitimate Iranian intervention in Lebanon; and to justify Khomeini's condemnation of Salman Rushdie. The impact of the Iranian revolution was felt across the Muslim world, from Cairo to Kuala Lumpur. It gave a solution to many who sought explanations for the apparent failures of their governments. It established a belief that the reaffirmation of Islam, less dependence on outside forces and greater self-reliance was the true solution. This revivalism was based on the ideology that Islam is a complete ideology that provides the basic framework of meaning and direction for political, social, and cultural life (Esposito 1998, 165).

Contemporary Islam

The events of September 11 left many Americans asking how such atrocities could be perpetrated in the name of religion: specifically, the religion of Islam. Yet even as U.S. opinion polls reflect a collective sense of mistrust toward a religion few Americans know much about, Islam continues to be one of the fastest growing religions in the United States and around the world. Reports from Iran, Nigeria, Egypt, Malaysia, Turkey, and the United States display the stories of Muslims struggling to define how Islam will shape their lives and societies (Frontline 2002).

"Muslims" trace the social, historical, and political roots of the renewed interest in Islam worldwide, beginning at Cairo's Al Azhar Mosque-the oldest university in the world. It is here that people meet Sheik Abdul Mauwith, an Islamic scholar who staffs the phones of Al Azhar's Fatwa committee, responding to Muslims wanting to know what is right and wrong under Islamic or Shariah Law. In a society increasingly shaped by

Western influence, he encourages Muslims to hold fast to the traditions of Islam. In his opinion, Muslims are challenged by the political, economic, and cultural influence of a dominant West across the Islamic world (Frontline 2002). The importance of Islamic law is also emphasized by a number of renowned Islamic personalities:

“Some Muslims have become very conscious of the fact of dominance, and they have become exclusive,” says Malaysian political scientist Chandra Muzaffer. “They have become inward looking—they have become reactive and sometimes very aggressive.” In Nigeria, “Muslims” explore this desire for a more Islamic society. Dr. Datti Ahmad, president of the Supreme Council on Shariah, argues that for Muslims, Islam is everything. “Islam is our culture...we have no other culture,” he says. “Anything that is un-Islamic you find is not accepted.” In the predominantly Muslim north of the country, an increasing number of states have reintroduced full Shariah Law, with its deterrent punishments of amputations, floggings and executions. “In the West, I think the emphasis is on human freedom,” explains lawyer Muzzammil Hanga, “The overall emphasis in Islamic law is on communal harmony.” (Frontline 2002)

Living in a society that emphasizes individual freedom and has detached politics from religion, we assume that the religious impulse of Muslim community will be overcome by our idea of progress. But Iranian revolution proved it wrong. It demonstrated that cultural confrontation with the West has tended to strengthen Islam among masses, not erode it. New generations are clinging to the faith as it provides them with identity and a channel of political expression (Lippman 2002, 169):

Muslims from West Africa to East Bengal, a group that embraces people of every race, occupation, and social condition, are seeking to balance innovation, material improvement, and intellectual inquiry with traditions and rules inherited from the past to which they cling, not out of sentiment, but out of conviction that these rules were ordained by God. (Lippman 2002, 173)

Hence, Muslims respond to the growing instabilities in their countries by embracing their religion all the more fervently. This leads to the emergence of a phenomenon called “Islamic Revivalism.”

The Islamic revivalism can be regarded as the global reassertion of Islam that extended from Libya to Malaysia. The causes of the resurgence are many and differ from country to country, but common catalysts and concerns may be identified as common to the contemporary Muslim experience. First, an identity crisis precipitated by a sense of failure and lack of self-esteem; second, disillusionment with the West due to the failure of the Muslim governments to address the socioeconomic needs of their societies; third, the sense of pride that resulted from the Arab-Israel war 1967, and the Iranian revolution; and fourth, a quest for a more authentic identity rooted in an Islamic past (Esposito 1998, 160).

Islamic revivalism in many ways can be regarded as the successor to failed nationalist programs. Secular nationalism neither provided a sense of national identity nor produced strong and prosperous societies. The governments in Muslim countries, mostly non-democratic and authoritarian, have been unable to establish their political legitimacy. They have failed to achieve economic self-sufficiency, to stem the widening gap between rich and poor, to halt widespread corruption, to liberate Palestine, to resist Western political and cultural hegemony. The political establishments have come under criticism for being a Westernized, secular elite overly concerned with power and privilege. The disastrous defeat of Arab forces by Israel in the 1967 war discredited Arab nationalism and triggered soul-searching in the Arab world. In South Asia, the 1971 civil war in Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh undermined the idea that Islam and Muslim nationalism could act as the glue to hold together an ethnically and linguistically diverse Muslim population. One finds similar catalytic events or conditions in Lebanon, Iran, Malaysia (the riots of 1969), and many other countries (Esposito 1994).

The founders of many Islamic movements were formerly participants in nationalist movements: Hasan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Rashid Ghannouchi of Tunisia's Renaissance party, and Abbasi Madani of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria. These movements have offered an Islamic alternative as a solution. Islamists argue that secularism and dependence on Western models of development have proved politically inadequate and socially corrosive, undermining the identity and moral fabric of Muslim societies. Asserting that Islam is not just a collection of beliefs and ritual actions, but a comprehensive ideology embracing public as well as personal life, they call for the implementation of Sharia as a social blueprint (Esposito 1994).

As regards the members of these Islamic movements, they are middle class, educated people and in the contemporary environment they are garnering more support amongst professional sects of the population:

In general, the movements are urban-based, drawing heavily from the lower middle and middle classes. They have gained particular support among recent university graduates and young professionals, male and female. The movements recruit from the mosques and on campuses where, contrary to popular assumptions, their strength is not so much in the religious faculties and the humanities as in science, engineering, education, law, and medicine. Organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan as well as South Asia's Jamaat-i- Islami consist in great part of university graduates and professionals. . .In many Muslim countries an alternative elite exists, its members with modern educations but self-consciously oriented toward Islam and committed to social and political activism as a means of bringing about a more Islamic society or system of government. This phenomenon is reflected in the presence of Islamists in professional associations of lawyers, engineers, professors, and physicians. Where permitted to participate in society, Islamists are found in all sectors, including government and even the military. The prime explanation for this phenomenon has been the political and economic realities in the affected Muslim societies. (Esposito 1994)

The political and economic realities have hampered the process of self determination in many parts of the Muslim world. Until political and educational reforms

permit a more broad-based, consensual approach to the development of an indigenous political system and the resolution of issues of Islamic reform, Muslim societies will remain fragile, precarious, and potentially volatile (Esposito 1998, 222).

Causes of Terrorism

Terrorism is not a monolithic phenomenon but rather quite diverse, in terms of ideology, organization, and inception. It cannot be taken out of specific historical contexts or treated as a generic phenomenon. It is a strategy rooted in political discontent, used in the service of many different beliefs and doctrines that help legitimize and sustain violence. Ideologies associated with nationalism, revolution, religion, and defense of the status quo have all inspired terrorism (Crenshaw 2005).

Every terrorist needs a particular cause to justify the use of terror tactics to his own psyche and to the audience he hopes to reach. Most terrorists are not deranged or psychotic individuals. From their point of view terror tactics are logical and valid activities to achieve a particular goal. These individuals do not consider themselves insane nor do they want the world to consider them insane.

Socioeconomic Motivators

Explanations for terrorism are believed to lie in social, economic, political, cultural, and historical factors. This analysis has generated a host of causes for terrorism. The significant ones are poverty, ignorance, biased education, insufficient economic opportunities, and restriction on free political expression (Sageman 2008, 20).

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 attacks President Bush remarked, “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (As quoted in Richardson

2006a, 85). Many tried to link poverty to terrorism. However, the linkage between economic factors and terrorism is complex. The 9/11 attackers displayed some common traits: 1) Very few of the attackers were poor; 2) most grew up in societies undergoing socioeconomic changes; 3) their opportunities for political participation were suppressed by governments; and 4) they were recruited by Islamists committed to jihad against the West. Studies show that terrorism is more likely to occur in developing societies, characterized by rapid modernization and lack of political rights, than in the poorest countries. The members of the terrorist organizations are more likely to be of middle class background and tend to be better educated (Richardson 2006a, 85-86). The same can be seen in the Al Qaeda social movement, which is mainly a middle-class phenomenon:

Those who hold to “poverty as the root cause” do so even though the data does not fit their model. Even leaving aside multimillionaire Osama bin Laden, the backgrounds of the September 11 killers indicates that they were without exception scions of privilege: all were either affluent Saudis and Egyptians, citizens of the wealthy Gulf statelets, or rich sons of Lebanon, trained in and familiar with the ways of the West — not exactly the victims of poverty in Muslim dictatorships. Many poor Egyptians, Moroccans, and Palestinians may support terrorists, but they do not— and cannot— provide them with recruits. In fact, Al Qaeda has no use for illiterate peasants. They cannot participate in World Trade Center-like attacks, unable as they are to make themselves inconspicuous in the West and lacking the education and training terrorist operatives need. Indeed, ever since the Russian intellectuals “invented” modern terrorism in the 19th century. . . Terrorists have been middle class, often upper class, and always educated, but never poor. The South American Tupamaros and Montoneros of the 1970s were all middle class, starting as cafe Jacobins and graduating into urban terrorism, as were their followers among the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, France’s Action Directe, the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua and, before it, Fidel Castro’s Cuban revolutionaries. Considering the composition of many of the antiglobalist groups today, it is a safe bet that middle class, prosperous, and self-righteous as they are, they will soon provide the recruits of a new wave of terrorism in the West. (Radu 2002)

Though poverty is not a key influencer in promoting terrorism, it contributes indirectly to the potential for terrorism. Whereas low levels of development create masses of young people with less alternatives and opportunities who become potential recruits for terrorist groups, low level income reduces the cost of organizing terrorist movement. Thus, poverty indirectly supports the sustenance of a terrorist movement. Economic inequalities seem to play a more important role as a source of terrorism than poverty. People become resentful and disposed to political action when they share a collective perception that they are repressed, marginalized, and deprived of economic and political opportunities. This gives rise to terrorist movements whose members belong to relatively disadvantaged class. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was motivated by the socioeconomic marginalization of Catholics in Northern Ireland. The same analogy of socioeconomic marginalization can be applied to the Hizbollah in Lebanon, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and Brigade Rosso in Italy (Richardson 2006a, 87). This establishes the fact that an increase in inequalities is usually marked by an increase in incentives for separatist movements.

The statistical data about the foreign insurgents in Iraq depicts some of the important findings about causes of terrorism. The total number of foreign insurgents captured from April 2005 to October 2005 was 311. The largest number of captured insurgents came from Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia (klueger 2007, 83). It indicates that literacy and economic inequality have no significant correlation with the motivators of terrorism. However, countries with fewer civil liberties are more likely to be linked with terrorism. The foreign opposition to multinational forces in Iraq comes mainly from citizens of nearby Muslim countries with repressive regimes (Klueger 2007,

103). In term of political rights, foreign insurgents in Iraq came from totalitarian regimes. It appears that civil liberties are important determinant of terrorism. In countries where residents' civil liberties and political freedoms are protected, extremists might be less inclined to turn to terrorism to pursue their agendas (Klueger 2007, 89-90).

The link between civil liberties and terrorism seems to be true even in democratic states. It is the development stage of democracy that dictates its vulnerability to terrorism:

A key point to recognize here is that 'democracy' is far too broad a term. Not all democracies are equally inclusive or pluralistic or respectful of minority rights. Elected majorities may discriminate systematically against minorities. Many of the world's functioning democracies are limited or partial. They are likely to be less developed, less wealthy, and less stable than consolidated democracies. However defined, democracy does not guarantee immunity. Democracy and terrorism are not polar opposites: saying 'yes' to democracy, unfortunately, does not mean saying 'no' to terrorism. Established liberal democracies with long traditions of free speech and tolerance of dissent have been the targets of both domestic and foreign terrorism, both at home and abroad. We can point not only to the United States but also to Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and India. The causes espoused by the groups resorting to terrorism were varied, including ethno-nationalism and separatism, left wing revolutionism, religion, and right wing extremism. (Crenshaw 2005)

This gives an impression that political mobilization, fascist terrorism, and state repression are some of the significant causes of terrorism. However, none of them can be taken as either necessary or sufficient as exception can be found in each case. Some of the obvious cases are:

Political mobilization was low in Spain or Greece during the late 60s; there was no fascist terrorism in Germany; and repression was high in the United States. Yet Spain, Greece, and Germany had important revolutionary terrorism, but United States did not have any. (Richardson 2006a, 79)

This indicates that political mobilization, fascist terrorism, and state repression are independent variables, which increase the probability that terrorist mutation will survive and expand in certain countries, rather than essential conditions. Overall political

instability can be regarded as one of the most important and powerful predictor of terrorism. Terrorist groups emerged in countries with past political instability in the 1960s, where they responded with powerful social movements, counterproductive repression, and fascist terrorism. Though this seems relevant to the terrorist organizations having a territorial base like Hamas in Palestine, it seems much harder for non-territorial organizations like Al Qaeda or the anarchist organizations in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Richardson 2006a, 81).

Rapid socioeconomic changes also appear to be a major factor that increases the risk of terrorism. It creates conditions conducive for instability and the emergence of terrorist movements and ideologies. This is because a large number of people are uprooted from their traditional life patterns, moving into cities and occupations where they are exposed to discrimination. Increasing expectations followed by declining attainments, in the economic and political sphere, create intense grievances and support for political action. These people become susceptible to various movements that provide explanations and remedy for their grievances (Richardson 2006a, 88-89). This situation is further aggravated as a result of globalization.

Globalization as a Promoter of Terrorism

There is no empirical evidence that globalization creates terrorism, but certain aspects of this phenomenon create incentives for terrorism. It is also much easier to organize, finance, and sustain terrorist movements. Globalization is associated with the development of global markets and their social, political, and cultural consequences. It is also regarded as a phenomenon brought about by technological and social change, furthering the links of human activities across regions and continents. On one hand, it

promotes economic growth and prosperity across borders and spreads the values of democracy; on the other hand, it increases the domination of developed nations over the less developed ones and promotes global capitalism and imperialism. It is the latter that makes globalization a perpetrator of terrorism (Richardson 2006a, 103).

A negative impact of globalization is the growth of 'weak globalizers' who become less competitive and increasingly diverge from the global economic decline. This leads to the social consequences of unemployment, political tension, and the growth of religious fundamentalism in those countries. A large number of people in such countries regard globalization as imposed from imperialistic capitalist countries. This creates conditions that can facilitate acts of violence and terrorism. This can be established from the fact that some of the countries that have been associated with terrorism are part of the group of 'weak globalizers', which mainly comprises of African and Muslim countries (Gurr 2005).

Most of the Muslim countries were steadily deglobalized over the last twenty-five years. Unlike East Asia, the growing share of young people, especially men, in relation to the overall population- the demographic bulge- and urbanization in the Muslim world have been accompanied by shrinking shares in world trade and investment. In 1980, about 13.5 percent of world exports came from these countries, whereas in 2002 the figure was about 4 percent. In 2001 the Muslim world- with a population of 1.3 billion people- received barely as much foreign direct investment as Sweden, a country with a population of barely nine million people. Deglobalization made many Muslim countries poorer- the per capita gross domestic product of Arab countries, for instance, has shrunk by nearly 25 percent since 1980, falling from \$2,300 to \$1,650. (Richardson 2006a, 105)

Globalization also fosters cultural resistance. The development of global markets compels many societies to alter their traditional cultural practices and brings about cultural Westernization. This infiltration of an alien culture provokes opposition of large strata of population in the affected societies who find justification for use of violence:

The root causes of apocalyptic terrorism have to do with a condition of blocked or distorted modernization. Mostly traditional societies are being increasingly stressed by external pressures even as changes well up within from greater urbanization, literacy and social mobility. To various degrees, these societies are being pluralized, and this is placing enormous strains on established ways of thinking and behaving. . . Pluralization—a process in which people become aware that there are multiple ways to interpret and act in society—tends to divide traditional societies into three basic groups: a minority that wants “in” to the modern world; nativists who fear for the identity of their society and use religious symbols to mobilize people against the alien intrusion; and those seeking a living tradition to negotiate entry into modernity on culturally acceptable non-Western terms. . . In most Arab societies. . . Loyalty is to extended family, individual agency is weak, and the entire structure tends to resist outside influence. Religion is organic to birth and reinforces the authority of the patriarchal system. However, it is the social structure, which predated Islam that comes first. Assaults to tribe and family, real or imagined, are therefore assaults against religion, and vice versa. . . The Taliban, which most Westerners consider motivated by religion, are as much driven by concern over their tribal structures’ viability. Westerners divide politics from religion and religion from social structure by second nature, but these divisions have no parallel in the Middle East. (Garfinkle 2008)

This is then exploited by various nationalist and religious movements who claim to purify their culture from foreign influence and thus justify their cause. The same was expressed in the statement of Abu Shanab, a leader of Hamas (Richardson 2006b, 60). He said, “Globalization is just a new colonial system. It is America’s attempt to dominate the rest of the world economically rather than militarily. It will worsen the gap between rich and poor. America is trying to spread its consumer culture. These values are not good for human beings. . . It leads to disaster for communities” (As quoted in Richardson 2006b, 60).

Globalization also promotes the development of new minorities and increases opportunities for terrorist groups:

Globalization facilitates the movement of workers and refugees across borders, leading to new minority groups in ‘settled’ societies, many of which are linked politically to kindred elsewhere. . . The cross-border movement of activists, information, and money from supporters (governments, diasporas, political sympathizers) to terrorist groups is facilitated by globalization. Simultaneously,

the sinews of globalization – from pipelines to communication networks – become ‘soft targets’ for transnational terrorists. (Gurr 2005)

They become susceptible to new ideologies that become the driver for new forms of political organizations.

State Sponsorship

State sponsorship is another popular cause of terrorism. If a self-interested government faces opposition by a much stronger state, it will avoid a direct confrontation that it would inevitably lose. The use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy can have many advantages such governments. It has relatively low risk because of the difficulty to prove and it may serve to achieve the state’s foreign policy objectives:

One of the main attractions of terrorism to its perpetrators is that it is a low-cost but potentially high-yield weapon, and it is generally possible to find weapons and cash from alternative sources, including militant supporters and sympathizers in your own home base and those living and working in prosperous countries in the West, as well as from racketeering, extortion and other forms of criminal activity, and in some cases, alternative state sponsors. (Wilkinson 1995)

Hence, relatively weaker states resort to the strategy of sponsoring terrorism to strike against their more powerful enemies. The most pertinent example is the conflict between Israel and its neighboring Muslim countries in the Middle East. They perceive the existence of Israel as inimical to their interest and as they cannot defeat Israel in conventional war, they resort to the strategy of terrorism.

It is also important to recognize the concept of the "security dilemma," which not only applies to relations between states, but also applies equally well to the rivalries of ethnic groups. When one group decides to enhance its capabilities by acquiring new weapons and technologies, in the name of self-defense of the group, its neighbors are likely to see such moves as a threat to their own security. This initiates a race for

enhancement of their own power, thus very probably triggering the conflict they sought to avoid. This often manifests in the form of terrorist attacks in other countries that varies according to political and strategic circumstances (Wilkinson 1995).

The Role of Ideology

Ideologies play a key role in the rise of political terrorism. Radical doctrines profoundly affect people's interpretation of situations, their response to efforts to mobilize them, and to choose the alternative strategies for political action. The presence of an ideology able to transform widespread grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle is decisive to the emergence of a terrorist movement. New ideologies based on religion or nostalgia for a glorious past become prominent when traditional norms and social patterns lose relevance (Richardson 2006a, 91).

However, religion is not the initial problem, but the fact that religion is the medium through which these issues are expressed is problematic. The grievances such as sense of alienation, marginalization, and social frustration are often articulated in religious terms and seen through religious images, and the protest against them is organized by religious leaders through the medium of religious institutions (Richardson 2006a, 142). Hence, it establishes the concept of exploitation of religious doctrines for expressing grievances and mobilizing support:

Religious doctrine is a 'tool of mobilization' or a justification for terrorism rather than a direct cause. For example, discontent with the political and economic status quo leads to support for radical Islamist groups. Religiosity itself is not a cause of political radicalism. Appeals to religion are likely to be a way of framing or representing a struggle in terms that a potential constituency will understand rather than the determinants of a strategic choice. As noted above, groups espousing similar goals often choose different methods, disagreeing over the means more than over the ends. A number of factors contribute to the choice of terrorism, including disillusionment over the possibility of change through non-

violence or through violence other than terrorism (e.g., guerrilla warfare) as well as conceptions of religious doctrine. Religious justifications are often combined with other, explicitly political, goals, such as nationalism or self-determination. (Crenshaw 2005)

The same can be said about the much hyped Islamic terrorists. They are addressing the various grievances through the medium of Islam and are seeking a solution through Islamic teachings. Ideologies derived from Islamic principles are powerful because in Islam, religion covers all aspect of life and gives meaning, counsel, and justifications for action. Depending on the objective of those who propagate them, it may create a potential for political violence and terrorism like jihadist doctrine. The jihadist doctrine helps Islamic militants connect with marginalized people throughout the Muslim world. Ideologies of Palestinian or Kurdish or Chechen nationalism connect dispersed communities in support of a common objective and also facilitate the provision of international support. This doctrine may be used to justify nationalist aspirations, calls for revolution, cultural purification, or a mix of these and other goals. While only some Muslims activists are concerned about jihad, many have more limited political and welfare goals. Islamist doctrine can be used to promote both violent action and provision of welfare goals (Gurr 2005).

A study carried out to establish the characteristics of victims and perpetrators of terrorist attacks depicts that there is more probability of the perpetrators and victims of a terrorist strike being of different religions:

Sixty-two percent of the time there was a difference in religion between the victims and the perpetrators. . . Within a given country, the average probability for two randomly selected people to be of different religion is 27. This means that the probability is much higher than random chance of finding a difference in religion between the perpetrators and victims of terrorist attacks. Interestingly for suicide attacks, 90 percent of the time the victims and the perpetrators are of a

different religion. Something about suicide attack seems to be more closely connected with religious difference. (Klueger 2007, 72)

This evidently depicts the role played by religious ideologies in furtherance of terrorism. However, the impact of ideology cannot be considered in isolation. This is because the content of ideology is itself a product of socioeconomic and political changes. This can be illustrated by using Hamas ideology for radical solutions. Palestinian constituency includes a high percentage of refugees and educated people. Politically, Hamas members have had little trust in the Palestinian Authorities and the dialogue with Israel. Its doctrine of violent struggle, including support for suicide attacks, was a reflection of these traits (Richardson 2006a, 92). It can be seen in the statement of a leading Gaza Muslim activist interviewed on Israel television in 1994. He clearly established a correlation between the strategy of terrorism and the use of religious ideology as a motivator:

We have no planes or missiles, not even artillery with which to fight the evil. The most effective instrument for inflicting harm with a minimum losses is this type of operation (terrorism). This is a legitimate technique based on martyrdom, Though such action, the 'martyr' acquires the right to enter heaven and liberate himself from all the pain and suffering of this world. (As quoted in Hoffman 1998, 99)

The religious ideology also serves as a means to connect to the diaspora all over the world, who can provide support in terms of manpower, finances, safe havens, and propaganda.

The Influences on Diaspora

A study of the circumstances under which people join global jihadist terrorism establishes a linkage between terrorism and the Islamic diaspora. This is established in the study:

About 60 percent of my sample joined a terrorist organization while living in a country in which they did not grow up. An additional 20 percent were the sons and grandsons of Muslim immigrants to the West. So, the total of my sample that was part of the Diaspora, expatriates, and second or third generation, was 84 percent. . . A majority of the sample joined global Islamist terrorism in a country where they did not grow up. Middle Eastern students in Germany travelled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Americans. . . In the more national form of terrorism, local grievances may play a more important in furthering terrorism. In the transnational form of terrorism, like the Al Qaeda movement, the dynamic of radicalization might be more complicated. (Sageman 2008, 65-66)

The main contributing factor to the radicalization of diaspora communities is segregation. The diasporas are not integrated into the society and, hence, they find justification in turning back to their wider cultural bases to establish their identity:

Segregation remains an issue in UK . . . The 2001 census revealed the segmentalization of British society more prominently. The existence of defined pockets of people contests the argument that Britain is multicultural and pluristic. Some of these pockets were created naturally, yet others are the result of segregation . . . Interviews suggest that British Muslims are very integrated into a global Muslim umma. People are more confident in their Islamic identity, partly as a result of the racial hostility that they have experienced . . . The second generation language is English. The mother tongue is spoken at home by force, not necessarily by choice. This language difference is essential in understanding religion . . . Some Asian Muslims in the UK are seen as an Asian underclass. (Hussain 2007)

This radicalization of diaspora communities has been witnessed in many parts of the world. Some significant ones are UK, France, and Netherland, which have been revealed by recent incidents of terrorism:

The July attacks in London demonstrate an uprising reality: radicalization of Diaspora communities in the UK had been occurring well before the July 7, 2005 attacks, and there were clear indications of such activity. According to British authorities, six major plots were foiled before July 7, 2005, and some 3,000 British Muslims trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Yemen, among other places, before 9/11. Between September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 at least fifty British Muslims left the United Kingdom to engage in terrorist attacks elsewhere. (Hoffman 2007)

This shows how religious ideology influences the actions of a part of the Muslim diaspora. Some members of the Muslim diaspora community are willing to forgo the comforts of life to engage in a holy war in favor of their Muslim brothers, even when they are not from the same nation.

Summary

This chapter analyzed the Islamic texts, its teachings, concept of Islamic revivalism, and various causes of terrorism in order to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The answers to the three secondary research questions provided the foundation of data necessary to answer the primary research question. Based on the research and answers to the secondary questions, the analysis suggests that Islamic ideology and culture is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. Though it is not a direct cause of terrorism, it can be exploited by terrorists to justify acts of violence, garner support from the umma, and motivate its cadres in order to address the real socioeconomic or political grievances. Chapter 5 will expand on this conclusion as well as make recommendations for further study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis addresses the primary question as to whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. Having analyzed the data addressing the primary and secondary research questions in chapter 4, this chapter draws conclusions about whether Islam is vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. Additionally, this chapter makes recommendations to counter the exploitation of the Islamic ideology and identifies areas that merit further study.

Conclusions

In the contemporary environment of unconventional and asymmetric warfare, Islamic fundamentalism has been linked to the terrorist activities all over the world. With the Global War on Terror, there is a growing perception of a linkage between Islamic teachings and terrorism. In order to operate in such an environment, it is imperative to establish whether the Islamic teachings are vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. This will suggest effective ways to counter the terrorist's strategy, which appears to be drawing its power from religious doctrine.

Significant Islamic Concepts

Analyzing its first secondary question, this thesis has examined the aspects of Islam which seem relevant to terrorism perpetrated in its name. It establishes that there are a few significant concepts in the Islamic doctrine that depict its relevance to violence and use of force, but it cannot be directly linked to terrorism. These concepts are

ambiguity in the Islamic doctrine, division of world into *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*, transnational unity of *umma*, discord with non-Muslims, and *jihad*.

The first is the aspect of ambiguity in the doctrine itself. In Islam, the Holy Qur'an is the book of God and there can neither be any deviations from it nor any amendments to it. The Islamic doctrine is based on Qur'an and Hadith, which is the foundation of the Islamic Law (Sharia) and the beliefs and faiths of the whole Muslim community (Umma). But these primary sources do not provide an exhaustive body of laws. To seek clarification on these primary sources, *ijma* (consensus) and *qiyas* (analogy) have been accepted as important factors in defining the Islamic doctrine. To further clarify the Islamic law, *fatwa* issued by a legal expert has been accepted as a basis for interpretation of the law. The collection of these legal opinions has become authoritative in its own way. Some Islamic scholars have rejected the legitimacy of *ijma* and *fatwas* and emphasized on the practice of *ijtihad* (independent interpretation) to individually interpret the primary sources of Islam. This process of evolution of the Islamic law has generated varying thoughts and perceptions about the same text. The varying interpretations create ambiguity in the minds of the followers and leave ample space for providing justifications for acts of violence.

The second aspect is the division of world into two houses: the *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*. This acknowledges a state of continuous conflict between the two houses until the establishment of only one kingdom, the *dar al-Islam*. This also indicates that world-wide peace might endure if there is only *dar al-Islam*. It is also the obligation for both the individual and the community to spread the faith of God, the *dar al-Islam*. This becomes the motivating force for those who justify the acts of violence in *dar al-harb*.

This aspect has been seen in the expressions of prominent terrorist group leaders like Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Chief of the militant Jama'at Islami group in Pakistan and Anjem Choudary, former United Kingdom head of Al-Muhajaroun group, who justify use of violence against non-believers in *dar al-harb* and acknowledges the transnational unity of the Muslim community.

The third important aspect is the aspect of transnational unity of the *umma*. Islam does not recognize any national boundaries. It only stresses the unity of the Muslim community. This establishes a direct linkage between the Muslims in a country facing conflict and the global *umma*. The global Muslim community is then bound to respond in support of the Islamic country's cause. The response of the *umma* during Russian-Afghanistan conflict, and in Kashmir and Chechnya are some of the key examples of the underlying concept. This also helps some of the terrorist groups to garner support from the diaspora communities all over the world. The examples are: Middle Eastern students in Germany travelled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Americans; 3000 British Muslims were trained in Al Qaeda camps before 9/11; Between September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 at least fifty British Muslims left United Kingdom to engage in terrorist attacks elsewhere.

The fourth is the aspect of communal discord with non-Muslims. There are a number of passages in Qur'an that does not recognize peace with unbelievers. It even supports violence against non-Muslims unless they convert to Islam or pay a tax called *jizya* (only for people of the Book, Jews and Christians). The examples are: "... slay the Pagans wherever ye find them . . .," and "Fight those who believe not in Allah . . . until they pay the Jizya with willing submission . . ." The aspect of freedom of religious belief

is also not recognized clearly. Though it says that there is no compulsion in religion, it also lays down grievous punishments for anyone who rejects the faith. These aspects indicate that Muslim is not absolutely free and he has to be involved in a continuous struggle to spread the belief of God even by violent means.

The fifth aspect is the concept of “*jihad*.” Literally, the word means ‘exerted’ or ‘utmost effort’ to follow God’s will and in the furtherance of the cause of Islam. Jihad has been categorized into two forms, greater jihad and lesser jihad. The greater jihad is the inner struggle of an individual against its own evils. The lesser jihad means “fighting in the cause of Allah” and it involves armed conflict with unbelievers. It is also regarded as the ‘military jihad’. There are three significant aspects about *jihad*: 1) The greater jihad has been given a higher status than lesser jihad, but it is the military jihad that has been stressed upon in most of the references in Qur’an and all the references in Hadith; 2) It is the most important obligation for the Muslims to engage in jihad if faith is challenged; 3) a higher place is accorded to those who fight than to those who stay at home.

These aspects of jihad have been the motivating force for those who have supported the call for “jihad” in the past during Russian-Afghanistan conflict and presently in Iraq and Kashmir. Devout outsiders from a host of different Islamic nations have been inspired by the chance to engage in a holy jihad against the infidels. Those who have not directly provided manpower support have given monetary and material assistance for jihad. The examples are Saudi Arabia’s financial support and Egypt’s material support, in supplying Soviet made weapons, to Afghan resistance fighters during Russian-Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s. This aspect of Muslim faith to respond to the

call for jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan has also been expressed by many Muslim leaders like Wassim Dureihi, a young Muslim leader in Australia. He says, “The occupation of Iraq makes it the duty of every Muslim to raise jihad in self-defense to free Iraq. . . as per the teaching.”

Out of Context Usage of Islamic concepts

Though isolated study of these concepts justifies violence and use of force, the texts are to be understood in the context in which they were narrated or written. Placing them out of context distorts its meaning completely. The example of the concept of armed jihad in defensive sense finds justification in the 7th century AD when the existence of Islam was in peril. Using the same analogy to justify militant jihad and terrorist activities in the contemporary world is a distorted meaning of the most important term in Islam. The obsolescence of some the Islamic concepts has been reflected by Mosab Hassan Yousef, son of Hamas leader who renounced the Muslim faith. He says, “All those walls that Islam built for the last 1400 years are not existing anymore . . . this happened 1400 years ago and it’s not going to happen again.”

But narrating some of the references from the holy texts in isolation can provide justification for violence and militant actions. The same was seen in the directions given to the 9/11 hijackers who were to read two chapters from Qur’an that included these verses: “. . . make our feet steadfast and give us victory over the infidels. . . when the confrontation begins, strike like champions. . . take prisoners and kill them. . . No prophet should have prisoners until soaked the land with blood.” These isolated texts are used to as a tool to motivate their cadres for their cause. The distorted use of the word “*jihad*” by Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his call for “global jihad” against the West and

infidels are some of the key examples that depict the out of context interpretation and misuse of some of the significant concepts of the Islamic doctrine.

It is also indicated by the fact that some of the imprisoned terrorists do not have deep understanding of their belief and religious teachings. The conversation with them reveals that these terrorists are amazed to find out that there is very little support in the Qur'an for their violent ideas and their violent way is misguided. They believe in the interpretations given to them by the Islamic leaders and they act accordingly. This establishes that terrorist group leaders are using isolated texts from the Holy Scriptures to motivate their cadres, who are unaware of the real context for the actual verses.

Followers of the Significant Islamic Concepts

The study of the *umma*'s support for these Islamic concepts indicates that there is strong sense of Islamic identity amongst the Muslim community. Muslims in non-Islamic nations are more associated with their Islamic identities than national identity. This depicts their inclinations towards the Islamic teachings and concepts. Though there is only a minority of Muslims who support acts of violence (15 percent in Britain, France, and Spain), there is a majority of the Muslim community who are ardent believer in the significant Islamic concepts described above.

Depending upon the acceptance of change in the Islamic doctrine, the Muslim community has been divided into four groups: secularists, conservatives, neo-traditionalists, and reformists. Among these groups, it is the "conservatives" who represent the majority. They emphasize on following the past traditions of Islam and are against any innovations that alter traditional Islamic concepts. They believe that it is the

society that must conform to the God's will and there can be no changes to the "words of God" as given in the holy texts.

The conservatives' majority and the Islamic aspects described in significant Islamic concepts establish that the concept of use of violence against the infidels finds justification in some context in the Islamic doctrine. It can be used by terrorist groups, in an isolated manner, to garner support for their cause as was seen during Afghan jihad in 1980s and present day war in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Historical Evidences

To further analyze the vulnerability of these Islamic concepts, this thesis explored the historical evidences of its usage by various Islamic groups. It primarily focused on the historical aspects of Islamic revivalism. The study of various Islamic revivalist movements establishes that Islamic ideology has always been the center of gravity for all the revivalist movements in history. The revivalist movements have been a "call to purify Islam" as per the interpretations of the movement leaders. The Salafi concept given by Ibn Taymiyya in the mid thirteenth century stressed upon the need to purify the Islamic society and follow the Prophet's message. He denounced the clergy and emphasized on literal interpretation of the Qur'an. He regarded jihad as the second most important duty for a Muslim after *shahadah* (profession of faith). His philosophy has been the center of attraction for the jihadist who followed Taymiyya. The Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia led by Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century depicted dedication for Taymiyya's salafi concepts. He emphasized upon a need to return back to a community based strictly on the Qur'an and the examples of Muhammad and the Medinian community. According to him, the true Islamic way of life was to be found in the seventh century community.

The next significant revivalist movement was the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt in the 20th century. This was founded by Hasan al-Banna who believed in the need for unity of the Islamic society to oppose cultural and political domination by the West. He emphasized on the need to follow the teachings of Qur'an, the Sunna, and the practices of the early Islamic community. He denounced democracy where will of the people is supreme and promoted the idea of Islamic democracy where will of the people remain subordinate to the will of God by following traditional concepts of consultations and consensus. This movement was also supported by Sayyid Qutb who became the most influential ideologue for Muslim Brotherhood in early 1960s. Qutb regarded all the societies except Muslim society as *jahiliyya*. He stressed on the need to conduct militant jihad against the oppressors and called it "the religious duty of all Muslims." The concepts given by these ideologues have been center of attraction for all calls for jihad from Ayatollah Khomeini to Osama bin Laden.

The next important milestone in Islamic revivalism was the Iranian revolution of 1978-79. It is considered a watershed in the history of contemporary Islam and also referred to as "Islamic revolution." It has been the most resounding call to jihad in modern times. This occurred as a result of successful revolt by an Islamic cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini. The prominence of Islamic ideology in Iranian revolution resulted in validating the Islamic activists' claims of returning to Islam to regain the lost identity. This was seen as a victory of Islam over superior military power of the regime and the Western allies. Khomeini regarded all secular powers as the work of Satan and called upon the whole Muslim society to rise against it and establish the true nature of Islamic society based on the *Sharia*.

The success of the Iranian revolution and global prevalence of the revivalist movements' ideologies depicts the vulnerability of some of the Islamic concepts to its usage by various groups to achieve their political and ideological ends. All these revivalist movements have made use the same Islamic doctrine to justify their cause. The use of the Islamic doctrine has been successful in fulfilling their personal ideological goals or their political motives.

Causes of Terrorism

To explore whether religious doctrine is the motivator for terrorism, this thesis analyzes the various causes of terrorism. The analyses of various causes of terrorism reveal that the causes of terrorism are far diverse, but there is a key role played by an ideology in gaining support for the perceived cause. Some of the significant motivators that directly or indirectly create conditions for terrorism are poverty, illiteracy, economic disparity, rapid socioeconomic changes, lack of civil liberties, globalization, state repression, and state sponsorship. The study shows that lack of civil liberties is a greater motivator for terrorism than poverty, literacy, and economic inequalities. The statistical data about the foreign militants in Iraq indicates that foreign opposition to multinational forces in Iraq comes from citizens of Muslim countries with repressive regimes. Rapid socioeconomic changes create conditions for instability and the emergence of terrorist movements and ideologies.

Globalization does not directly causes terrorism, but it creates conditions conducive for terrorism like ease of organizing, financing, and sustaining terrorist movements. The emergence of 'weak globalizers' promotes unemployment, political tension, and religious fundamentalism in those countries. This creates conditions that can

facilitate acts of violence and terrorism. This can be supported by the fact that many Muslim countries, which have become deglobalized over the last two decades, have been more prone to political tension and growth of religious fundamentalism. Globalization also promotes cultural resistance. This happens due to the influence of global markets that compels many societies to change their traditional practices. This is then exploited by various nationalist and religious movements who claim to purify their culture from foreign influence.

State sponsorship is another cause of terrorism where a weaker state avoids direct confrontation with a stronger state and uses terrorism as an instrument to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This has the advantage of being low cost and potentially high yield weapon. The example of the use the terrorism strategy against Israel by its neighboring Muslim countries depicts the same.

Though the study of these causes of terrorism indicates that there is no direct link between terrorism and religious ideologies, however, the religious ideology is used as a means to achieve the desired end. The same is indicated by the study of Islamic terrorists. They are addressing their political, social, and ideological grievances through the medium of Islam. As Islamic ideologies, as shown in significant Islamic concepts, are powerful, it provides justification for their cause and helps them to connect with marginalized people throughout the Muslim world. This can be illustrated by using Hamas ideology for radical solutions. As Hamas members had no trust in Palestinian Authorities and dialogue with Israel, they adopted the doctrine of violent struggle, including suicide attacks. They then used Islamic ideology to justify their cause and gain support from the *umma*. It is reflected in the statement of a leading Gaza Muslim activist.

He said, “. . . The most effective instrument for inflicting harm with a minimum losses is this type of operation (terrorism). This is a legitimate technique based upon martyrdom. Through such action, the ‘martyr’ acquires the right to enter heaven . . .” The same strategy was applied by Osama bin Laden when he declared “*jihad*” against the West and infidels in order to justify his actions and mobilize support of the Muslim community.

Summary

The aspect of ambiguity in the Islamic doctrine and the concepts of transnational unity of *umma*, *jihad* and greater religious propensity as compared to nationalism, serve as a promoter of justification and support for acts of violence against infidels. These aspects indirectly support the terrorist’s actions by providing financial, ideological, and political support as well as manpower, safe havens, and propaganda. The Islamic teachings of division of world into *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*, religious obligation of *jihad*, discord with non-Muslims, and highest stature of a warrior are some of the explicit concepts that are being exploited by various terrorist groups to achieve their political ends. The study of the Islamic doctrine and concepts, its use by various Islamic revivalist groups in the past and present, and the role of Islamic ideology in serving the terrorists’ ends establishes that Islamic teachings can be misinterpreted to promote acts of violence and terror against infidels. It can provide justification for militant action against the infidels and to garner support for the cause, which can be social or political grievance expressed in religious term.

Recommendations

There is need to address some of the concept of Islamic ideology that are being exploited by the terrorists. In doing so, the United States and other non-Islamic nations should engage the Muslim scholars and Imams through mass media. There should be open debates conducted with them on various controversial religious issues which are being exploited by terrorist groups to incite Muslim community and gain support. Though there has been some progress in this regards through internet, but the prime debaters have been the modernist Muslims. There is an urgent need to involve Mullahs and Imams who have the authority to interpret *Sharia* and whose appeal influences the Muslim community.

This could be achieved by strategic engagement of the Muslim community in general and the Muslim scholars in particular. The non-Muslim Islamic scholars should directly involve in an intellectual discussions with Imams and scholars at some of the significant Islamic places like Al-Azhar University in Egypt, which is the global center of Islamic learning. These discussions could be made between the Western scholars in Islam and the *ulema*. They should also be made to understand the implications of keeping a closed system and not allowing change in society to adapt to the contemporary environment.

The United States should support moderate and modernist Islamists in their struggle to promote modernity and changes in Islam. They should be supported by strategic communication. Their views and arguments should be given wide publicity throughout the world especially targeting the Islamic countries with illiteracy, totalitarian Islamic regimes, and increased fundamentalism. These modernists should be promoted to

engage in open debates with Mullahs and Imams over ambiguous and contentious Islamic issue.

The United States and other non-Islamic countries should also make a group of own Islamic scholars to refute the illegal *fatwas* issued by terrorist leader like Osama bin Laden. This group should involve Islamic scholars from countries with substantial Muslim populations like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, and Bangladesh. These *fatwas* should be addressed with authority quoted from the Islamic texts. This assumes greater significance because of lack of proper understanding of the Islamic teachings among common Muslim masses. Though they study Qur'an, they rely on *ulema* for interpretation of the holy text. The Muslim community should be shown how various terrorist groups are exploiting the holy teachings to achieve their political objectives.

It should be communicated to the *umma* that analogical reasoning and right to interpret has been accepted as legitimate actions in the Islamic law. While the holy texts will remain pertinent throughout ages, some of the concepts will have to be interpreted in a manner that facilitates growth of Islamic society in the modern era. The peace messages in Islam should be the center of gravity and given wide media publicity. These should be disseminated through Muslim scholars, Imams, and Mullahs. It should be communicated to the *umma* that Islam is for peace and some of the narrations about war in Islam and violence against infidels were the requirements during the initial stages of evolution. For example, the concept of *jihad* needs a relook. In current times it is the greater *jihad* against own evils that is pertinent. The militant *jihad* was the need of the hour in the 7th century AD. Hence, all calls for militant *jihad* in the contemporary times are illegitimate and against the teachings of Islam.

Topics for Further Research

The following topics are recommended for further research:

1. Means and ways to counter the use of Islamic doctrine by terrorist groups:

This study can explore the direct and indirect approaches to enlighten the Muslim community about the exploitation of pious Islamic teachings by terrorist groups in order to achieve their political and social objectives.

2. Is there a need for change in some of the Islamic concepts? This study can

focus on the concepts which seem to be irrelevant in modern times. It can compare the some of the critical concepts which are being exploited by terrorist with the modern concepts. It can then suggest the ways for the Muslim community to bring about some transformations to maintain relevance in contemporary times and in the future.

3. The role of Islamic doctrine in Al Qaeda: This can be a case study to carry

out in-depth analyses of the role of religious ideology in the growth and activities of Al Qaeda. This will help to reaffirm the findings of this thesis or will bring out new findings.

4. Is the U.S. policy of promoting democracy serving the terrorist's

objectives? This can be a quantitative study based upon the data regarding *umma*'s support for Islamic terror groups in Islamic nations in the aftermath of initiatives by United States to promote democracy.

GLOSSARY

Ayat. Term for verses in Qur'an.

Dar al-Harb. Non-Islamic territory.

Dar al-Islam. Area of the world under Islamic rule.

Dhimmi. Protected people living in an Islamic state.

Diaspora. Dispersion of people from their original homeland.

Fatwa. Religious ruling by an Islamic scholar (Ulema) on a point of Islamic law.

Hadith. Traditions of the Prophet.

Imam. Leader of daily prayer; successor to Muhammad among Shiites.

Jahiliyya. Refers to pre-Islamic Arabia in the state of ignorance of God' guidance.

Jihad. Struggle in the path of God or the holy war.

Jihadist. Muslim involved in a jihad.

Kafir. An unbeliever or atheist.

Madrassa. Islamic school.

Qur'an. Basic scripture of Islam, word of God, and one of the four roots of Islamic law.

Sharia. Islamic law based on the Qur'an, the traditions of Muhammad (Sunna), consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas) .

Sunna. Includes what Prophet said, what he did, and those actions that he permitted as preserved in Hadith.

Sura. Term for chapters of the Qur'an.

Terrorism. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons.

Ulema. Traditional religious scholars of Islam.

Umma. The universal Muslim community.

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