Strategic Deterrence in Cyberspace: Practical Application
Abstract
This research outlines practical steps that the United States can take to improve strategic deterrence in cyberspace. The unique character of cyberspace requires a retailoring of traditional deterrence strategies to fit the domain. The research uses the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC) and the New Triad as models for organizing deterrence operations. The DO JOC focuses on tailoring deterrence operations based on the actor, but deterrence operations must also be tailored to the uniqueness of cyberspace. The effective tailoring of deterrence operations for cyberspace will require both the application of new ways and means and the tailoring of traditional deterrence concepts to fit the new domain. Practical application of cyber strategic deterrence involves the following: declaring a U.S. cyber deterrence policy, removing sanctuaries for cyber adversaries, changing U.S. and adversary mindsets and expectations as to what is permitted in cyberspace, changing military planning so that it takes into consideration adversary cyber capabilities, and appreciating key policy tradeoffs with respect to cyber deterrence implementation. Cyberspace deterrence should include all three ways of implementing a deterrence strategy: imposing costs, denying benefits, and inducing adversary restraint. Influencing the "Consequences of Restraint" fulcrum through attribution, identity management, and incentivizing trust holds great promise for cyberspace deterrence.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA502250
Entities
People
- Kevin R. Beeker
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology