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ABSTRACT

Title: Countering the Impact and Influence of Non-State Threats.

Author: Major David W. Hudspeth, USMC

Thesis: The MFT's preemptive focus on the triple bottom lines of social, economic, and military performance in conjunction with similar host nation activities facilitates the isolation and erosion of non-state threats.

Discussion: Non-state actors are indigenous social, political, and military organizations who often receive international support. The military arms of non-state actors do not rotate at a prescribed time; rather they fight from their own homes for a conflict's duration and upon conclusion of the conflict, non-state threat members become the political and social leaders who emerge to lead local and federal governments. Rather than commit troops, external national supporters provide money and technical support that are not easily if at all traceable back to their sources. Such arrangements allow both the non-state threat and their supporters to continually confront and attrite a common opponent frequently without global awareness and world opinion turning against them. Conversely, opponents to these groups often rotate both units and individual combatants into and out of the battle zones at prescribed times. Short deployments do not optimize the opposition's abilities to isolate the spread and erode the influence of the non-state actors. Due to this inability, the non-state actors often persist and eventually win. In order to win, non-state threats have taken on social and economic agendas that have gained them constituencies and subsequent legitimacy that rivals their host nation. The restoration of the host nation's capabilities and credibility to improve the social and economic living conditions of its people facilitates the isolation and erosion of the non-state threat's constituency. U.S. current military missions must therefore be pushed down in conjunction with host nation activities to the local levels adjacent to the non-state threats. These combined local actions must be expanded beyond current military and security means alone to include social and economic means. This new triple bottom line focus facilitates competition between the host nation and the non-state threat for the loyalty of the local constituent base. MFT reinforcement of host nation activities at this level enables the erosion of non-state threat influence and re-establishes the credibility and legitimacy of the host allied government while simultaneously improving the state's economic and social living conditions.

Recommendation: The recommended solution offers that preemptive deployments of highly trained MFT that focus on improving the triple bottom lines of host nation's social, economic, and military performances will lead to the isolation and erosion of non-state threats.

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Introduction

Non-states represent a growing threat to the national security of the United States. Despite their historic lack of a national constituency and international recognition, today some non-states often exhibit state-like characteristics. Non-states can mobilize and receive financial support externally from other nations. The military arms of non-state threats do not deploy or rotate from conflicts; rather these combat organizations fight from their own homes for a conflict's duration. Rather than commit troops, a non-state's international supporters provide their proxies money and technical support that are not easily traceable back to their sources. Such arrangements allow both the non-state threat and their supporters to constantly confront and attrite a common opponent without world opinion turning against the legitimate external nation. Conversely, opponents of these groups often rotate both units and individual combatants into and out of the conflict at prescribed times. Short deployments do not optimize the opposition's ability to isolate the spread and erode the influence of the ever presence non-state threat. Non-state threats thus persist eventually eroding their host's national will via attrition.

This essay identifies and describes some of the emerging non-state threats to the United States and its allies. Following the description, the essay explains the premises underpinning a proposed Multi-Faceted Team (MFT) construct. The proposed MFT model described includes team member selection considerations, desired core and individual competencies, and concludes with a hypothetical deployment scenario. The MFT's preemptive focus on the triple bottom lines of social, economic, and military performance in conjunction with similar host nation activities facilitates the isolation and erosion of non-state threats.

Emerging Non-State Actor Threats

Middle Eastern Non-State Threats

Hezbollah is a social, political, and military non-state threat that possesses national characteristics and capabilities. Americans remember Hezbollah agents driving "a truck bomb into the U.S. Marine Corp's Beirut barracks in 1983, killing 241 American troops."¹ Since 1983 however, Hezbollah has matured markedly. In 2006, only 24 years after its formation, Hezbollah has "already become a virtual state within a state in southern Lebanon."² Hezbollah "elected 14 representatives to the 128-seat Lebanese parliament, assumed two cabinet posts, ran schools and hospitals, and secretly amassed arms and some 14,000 rockets to rain down on Israel with the concurrence of its Iranian patron."³ G. Cooper (n.d.) estimates Hezbollah receiving as much as \$33 million pounds of financial support per year from Iran.⁴ Iranian support coupled with recognized social, economic, and military successes have made Hezbollah a model for other Islamic movements worldwide.⁵ Following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, "Hezbollah was widely seen as the cause of the Israeli defeat" and "many observers hailed the group as the first Arab military force to defeat an Israeli army."⁶ The success "at driving Israel out of Lebanon has inspired many other Islamic groups around the Middle East from Hamas in Palestine to Muqtada al-Sadr's Madhi Army in Iraq."⁷

Asian Non-State Threats

Though comparatively occupying a lower category of military and politico-social effectiveness than Hezbollah, the Asian non-state threat, Abu Sayyaf Group, conveys danger throughout the Republic of the Philippines. Pilipino police arrested six Abu

¹ Henricksen, T. "Security Lessons from the Israeli Trenches." Policy Review. February/March 2007: p. 27.

² Henricksen, p. 27.

³ Henricksen, p. 27.

⁴ Cooper, G. "Hezbollah." The London Evening Standard.

⁵ Brandon, J. "Factfile: Hezbollah." News Arabworld. 14 July 2006.

⁶ Brandon.

⁷ Brandon.

Sayyaf agents in May 2004. The Abu Sayyaf agents at the time of their arrest were reading biological warfare instruction manuals.⁸ C. Enemark offers Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Al Qaeda Islamic extremist social-political group operating in Indonesia as second Asian non-state threat now exuding nation-like characteristics.⁹ JI previously attempted to acquire biological weapons in 2003; however, due to JI's perceived obligations and concerns for its remote constituency the organization suspended its biological weapons proliferation and development.¹⁰

Other Areas

Some non-state threats are also emerging in South America and Africa. G. Coronel reports, Hezbollah now resides in Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, and more recently in Venezuela.¹¹ Coronel describes, "They [Hezbollah] have been behind terrorist acts in Argentina and have actively promoted the infiltration of Islamic fanatics into the U.S."¹² Coronel argues, "The main objective of Hezbollah in Venezuela is, most probably, to make a psychological impact, to let the world know they are there" and to serve as a counter balance to Western Culture.¹³ Coronel notes the coincidental nature of Hezbollah appearance in Venezuela occurs simultaneously with the "strange liaison between Hugo Chávez and [Iranian President] Ahmadinejad."¹⁴

It should be no coincidence that non-state organizations capable of competing with their host national governments are also emerging in developing African nations. The globalization of the gas and oil industries in Nigeria creates stratified social conditions lending to the emergence of fledgling non-state threats unilaterally capable of impeding oil flow or aligning with globally

⁸ Enemark, C. "Biological Attacks and the Non-State Actor: A Threat Assessment." Intelligence and National Security. December 2006. 21(6): p. 923.

⁹ Enemark, p. 923.

¹⁰ Enemark, p. 922-223.

¹¹ Coronel, G. "The Hezbollah Venezuelan Metastasis." The Venezuela Today. 4 September 2006.

¹² Coronel.

¹³ Coronel.

¹⁴ Coronel.

situated terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. A preemptive strategy implemented to improve socio-economic conditions might reverse the maturation of these fledgling non-states and reduce threats to the U.S. and its allies before the non-state threat fully matures.

MFT Underpinning Premises

Preemption and the Triple Bottom Line

Post 9-11, the Bush Doctrine expressed in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* "vigorously advocates strategic preemption – the use of military force against threats that have not yet fully matured, but nevertheless endanger American security – as core component of American statecraft in the Twenty-First Century."¹⁵ Henriksen underpins the importance of preemption by observing, "That he who waits in counterinsurgency is lost."¹⁶ Rivkin argues, "The only way to avert, with a sufficient degree of certainty, clandestine terrorist attacks by pan-national Islamist organizations [or other non-state threats] is to act against them months, or even years, in advance."¹⁷ Rivkin further argues that traditional deterrence fails against Islamic extremists such as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda because these non-states have "no nation or citizens to defend."¹⁸ Contrarily, organizations such as Hezbollah that have taken on social and political constructs have acquired constituent population bases.

Though some of the non-state actors previously discussed have not fully matured into threats to the United States, they do represent the potential to do so. The MFT concept is therefore a tool for preemptive isolation and erosion of non-state threats.

Military, social, and economic actions form the "*Triple Bottom Line*" premise underpinning MFT employment. The term *Triple Bottom Line* reflects modern business

¹⁵ Rivkin Jr., D. "The Virtues of Preemptive Deterrence." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. Fall 2005. 29(1): p. 85.

¹⁶ Henriksen, p. 20.

¹⁷ Rivkin, p. 86.

¹⁸ Rivkin, p. 87.

methodologies that when slightly modified only slightly hold application to MFT constructs. Berger, Cunningham, and Drumwright describe *Triple Bottom Line* as business leaders having "added attention to social and environmental bottom lines to their traditional financial bottom line focus."¹⁹ Historically, business leaders concerned themselves with the traditional financial bottom line of profit making. The traditional financial bottom line however, delivered only short-term gains very similar to kinetic military actions delivering tactical victory. To transform short-term financial and military successes into long-term sustained earnings, leaders adopted the additional focuses of environment and society whose emphasis guaranteed long-term customer/constituent loyalty. The modification of the *Triple Bottom Line* premise with regard to the MFT construct replaces the traditional bottom line of finances with the amended bottomline of military/paramilitary performance. Financial considerations however, continue to surround the MFT construct's three bottom lines because these teams, like all military units, seldom have blank checks. Figure 1 reflects a graphic depiction of the MFT Triple Bottom Lines.

Conversely, a conventional military team's concern with economic and social conditions reflects a divergence from traditional military focus on military activities alone. This divergence and inclusion of social and economic performance however, proves crucial for MFT's capabilities to isolate a non-state threat. Nigeria's worsening economic and social conditions and proportionally growing non-state threats are one example where preemptive MFT economic and social interdiction might arrest and reverse non-state threat maturation.

A. Ikelegbe describes the Niger River Delta area having significant economic, social, political, and environmental problems stemming from "environmental degradation, pollution, destruction of local occupations and income sources, high levels of unemployment, poor

¹⁹ Berger, I., Cunningham, P., and Drumwright, M. "Mainstreaming Corporate Social Responsibility: Developing Markets for Virtue." California Management Review. Summer 2007. 49(4): p. 132.

economic infrastructures, and near total neglect by the federal government."²⁰ Ikelegbe observes, "Citizens of this region are now demanding compensation from the [Nigerian] federal government for the many years of neglect and from the multinational oil companies for the destruction of their ecosystem"; however, neither the federal government nor the oil companies are addressing the public's social and economic needs fueling popular frustration.²¹ Ikelegbe states, "The level of frustration in the Delta Region is so high that even hitherto law-abiding citizens are gradually being seduced by militant groups violently seeking ways to change social, economic, and political conditions in the region."²²




Figure 1. MFT Triple Bottom Line.

Upon arrival to Nigeria, the MFT would vet the potential hirees against the host nation's police records for trustworthy, skilled workers for placement in economic organizations.

²⁰ Ikelegbe, A. "Encounters of Insurgent Youth Associations with the State in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria." *Journal of Third World Studies*. Spring 2005. 22(1): p. 151.

²¹ Ikelegbe, p. 152.

²² Ikelegbe, p. 152.

Some of these economic organizations form paramilitary security companies guarding local hospitals, medical clinics, or logistical distribution centers. Other organizations might form sanitation companies collecting and disposing trash. Still other organizations may form utilities based organizations responsible for clean water distribution and electrical power. Such organizations and socially beneficial activities decreases the idle percentages of the population available for threat recruiting via increased employment and resulting economic and social improvements.

Forming Alliances with Non-States

The host national government and local indigenous leaders credited with social and economic improvements occurring within a MFT's area of operations further facilitates the erosion and isolation of non-state threats. Criminal elements funneling arms and funds illegally into the non-state threat typically occur without the knowledge of law-abiding or neutral citizens. Improving economical, social, and security conditions atop the covert funnels of illegal arms shipments and funding brings increasing opportunities to smother these covert funnels via increasingly helpful civilian informants whose lives are improving due to the MFT's involvement and their own government's improvements. Reestablishing host national government credibility and eroding non-state threat influence will take time and may be divisive if the MFT perceivably loses its neutrality at the local level. For example, in 1983-1984 the United States identified and supported antagonistic groups such as the Druze, Sunnis, and some Christian groups in attempts to marginalize Hezbollah.²³ These reactive, short duration efforts proved ineffective because "the [Hezbollah] militia was so accepted by the villagers in the area that no outsider gets to know what is really going on there."²⁴ The specific attempts by the United States in this case were

²³ Hirschberg, P. "Mideast: Israel Watchful of Hezbollah Moves." IPS: The Story Underneath. 15 December 2006.

²⁴ Moutot, M. "Hezbollah: Gearing for War." NosyRoom.Net. 28 June 2007.

largely ineffective because the U.S. was perceived as having taken sides in the conflict.

Resultantly, those groups not on the American's side took out their frustrations on U.S. forces on the ground in Lebanon.

Lengthy Deployments

Unlike conventional military units whose deployments are comparatively short duration, the MFT concept envisions two year or longer deployments. Lengthening deployments serve two purposes. The first purpose demonstrates American resolve. Rivkin reports, "The disdain for America's staying power is not particularly surprising" after "several decades' worth of American retreats under fire in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia."²⁵ Additionally, "our failure to respond, except through ineffectual law enforcement methods, to Hezbollah and Al Qaeda attacks on American assets in the 1990s; and our seeming toleration of the kidnapping and torture of American personnel in the Middle East have all fostered the impression that in Osama bin Laden's own words, America is a weak horse."²⁶ Through lengthy uninterrupted deployments, the MFT displays American commitment to finish.

The second purpose of longer uninterrupted deployments allow the individual MFT the time needed to fit into the cultural terrain. This time is necessary to identify clandestine funnels of arms and illegal funds supporting non-state threats. For example, in 1971, General A. Sharon subdivided Gaza into zones in which he "assigned squads of elite soldiers."²⁷ These elite soldiers "were to learn intimately the paths, orchards, houses, and other features as well as the routine comings and goings of the inhabitants."²⁸

²⁵ Rivkin, p. 93.

²⁶ Hirschberg.

²⁷ Henricksen, p. 20.

²⁸ Henricksen, p. 20.

Most importantly, lengthy deployments provide a MFT the time needed to fully vet and hire trusted workers from within the indigenous population. These employees provide the personnel needed to create new businesses and social organizations the successes of which may influence less-than-totally committed member of the non-state threat to switch sides in order to take advantage of more prevalent economic and social opportunities occurring elsewhere.

Monetary Sources

Primarily the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) budget provides the funds in support of the MFT construct. DoD already funds foreign national military training missions. For example, R. Wright reports, "The U.S. is preparing a package of almost \$1 billion in aid for Lebanon's military and police."²⁹ Wright points out that the \$1 billion aid package comprises ammunition, spare parts, and leadership training."³⁰

Foreign nations whose strategic interests involve a reduction and erosion of specific non-state threats may also provide material and monetary support for MFT missions. Wright reports that the U.S. \$1 billion military aid package "is part of an effort by the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates."³¹

Hypothetical MFT Model

Team Selection Considerations

The initial selection process for MFT members includes thorough psychological, behavioral, and intellectual screening. Thorough screening prevents the selection of deviants or Stockholm syndrome prone individuals from selection as MFT members. The ideal MFT

²⁹ Wright, R. "U.S. Readies Security Aid Package to Help Lebanon Counter Hezbollah." The Washington Post, 22 December 2006.

³⁰ Wright.

³¹ Wright.

member reflects a problem-solver, an innovator, and a critical thinker possessing complex individual skills enabling them to operate independently for years.

Desired Individual and Core Competencies

The five-year preparation time depicted occurs because the MFT needs the capabilities to assimilate as closely as possible into the operational culture. For example, a MFT assigned to southern Lebanon to isolate Hezbollah would need to be individually fluent in the Arabic dialect spoken in southern Lebanon. Currently at the Defense Language Institute at Monterrey, Arabic instruction is approximately 15 months in duration that alone equates to 25 percent of available MFT training time. Table 1 depicts an extensive MFT desired skills list. The listed skills need not be individual competencies necessarily but rather may be skills found within the MFT. Referring to Table 1, an (*) denotes those skills that might be common to all members. Some individual members receive specialized training. A few of the skills are “eyebrow raising” but can be explained. A polygraph technician is necessary to initially screen indigenous employees and subsequently vet them periodically. Operating within foreign culture, even the trained MFT member may not be able to notice deception as ably as here in America. Employing a polygraph further erases the possibility of deception.

<u>Skill</u>	<u>Level Desired</u>
*Language/Culture	Fluent
*Self Defense	Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (Black Belt)
*Defensive Driving Techniques	Able to avoid capture
*Threat Weapons	Expert
Interrogation Techniques	Able to question potential employees
Polygraph Operator	Able to vet potential employees
Urinalysis Tester	Able to test potential employees
*Corpsman School	Ability to self diagnose and self-treat
*Survival, Escape, Evasion, and Rescue	Ability to avoid capture
Administration	Keeping financial and personnel records
*Field Radio Operator	HF/TACSAT/VHF
Communications Technician	Able to set up and operate a website
City Planning	Capable of setting up small townships
Hospital Administration	Capable of running a hospital
Logistician	Set up distribution and supply points
*Military Instructor	Design and execute small unit training

Table 1: Core and Individual Competencies Desired

MFT members with hospital administration skills are needed. Such specialists know what and who to look for in order to keep a hospital or clinic operational and improve its overall performance. Improving medical services rivaling those provided by a non-state threat pulls neutral populations toward the government and improves overall living conditions. Improving

living conditions thus removes reasons for the population to join or support threat causes. An expanding hospital and improving satellite medical clinics employs more people further reducing idle populations. Stockpiled medical supplies and established MEDEVAC services could also prove valuable in the event of U.S. or allied military intervention.

Hypothetical Deployment Scenario

MFT's deploy preemptively to prevent future reactionary intervention by large numbers of U.S. and allied conventional forces. Diagram 2: MFT Conceptual Model depicts one possible organizational construct for a south Lebanon based MFT. Each section potentially comprises 3-5 personnel equally approximately 27-45 total personnel. Comparatively, L. Korb reports the U.S. currently employs approximately 60 military officers in Lebanon.³² As the MFT begins deployment to south Lebanon, potential hostage situations confront the members continually. Multiple escape and evasion routes, rally points, and extraction plans must remain executable at all times. As the members perform their duties, they would do so in concert with Lebanese armed forces and with the permission of the Lebanese government. Despite the combined overt nature of the MFT's mission some operations may require MFT members to wear indigenous dress.

Each MFT section is multi-roled. For example, the Transportation Section procures and maintains the team's transportation and assists with the procurement of transportation for the created businesses such as the security firms, medical clinics, and sanitation departments alluded to earlier. The provided transportation for these created businesses consists but is not limited to ambulances, dump trucks, construction equipment, and fire trucks. All represent the capabilities to concentrate under host national control in order to support the community during crises.

Crises aside, the human resources (HR) Section is arguably the most important section. Working closely with the Communications Section through created websites and circulars, the

³² Korb, L. "Fixing the Mix." Foreign Affairs. March/April 2004.

HR Section recruits employees to lead and staff the variety of created economic and social entities.




Diagram 2. MFT Conceptual Model.

Security companies represent the second most important initial organization requiring staffing. The MFT Security Section along with the host nation armed forces organizes, equips, and trains the indigenous security company to protect convoys, provide point defenses of key infrastructure, and integrate with both host national security forces and potential U.S. conventional and special operations detachments. Ideally, the security company can also mass and coordinate security activities in support of the government in the event of national crises. The Communications and Transportation Sections equip and train the indigenous security company with their respective assets.

The Host Nation Liaison Section and also its headquarters element collocates within the U.S. Embassy where communications and coordination with key civilian and military leaders can occur. This team facilitates immediate clarification of host nation concerns and allows the MFT to go immediately to the U.S. Chief of Mission - the Ambassador - for approval and assistance. The Liaison Section proves very valuable during crises where the MFT, the created socio-economic organizations, and the host national government agencies interact in concert and support of one another. For example, should the Israelis again intervene militarily in Southern Lebanon, a MFT located in the areas north of Hezbollah enclaves assists the Lebanese armed forces and government to mobilize all social, economic, and security organizations to isolate the scatter of Hezbollah northward. Security companies augment police at checkpoints and protect key infrastructure while public transportation and shipping companies pre-position assets in support of evacuation or mass casualty possibilities. Sanitation, utilities, and construction companies mobilize to restore human services and clean rubble. Once the crisis passes, some of the economic and social organizations can immediately move south into the damaged Hezbollah area to provide aid and recovery. The speed and efficiency with which this recovery effort unfolds competes directly with Hezbollah's own social and economic systems. A quicker host national government response lends to the erosion of Hezbollah's credibility and influence and likely transposes the lost credibility back onto the host national government. With an economic and social foothold within the Hezbollah enclaves, the host national government and MFT can pursue economic and social improvements that may further diminish Hezbollah's influence. Eventually given this competition and continual erosion, Hezbollah would cease to be an effective social, political, and economic influence within southern Lebanon all without the

necessity of large scale conventional deployments. Although this hypothetical example uses Lebanon and Hezbollah, this scenario is globally transposable.

Conclusion

Preemptively employed MFT's operating with the permission of allied host nations and in concert with their armed forces focus on the triple bottom lines of social, economic, and military performance in order to isolate and erode non-state threats. This essay identified emerging non-state threats to the United States, explained the premises underpinning MFT employment, and offered a MFT model, which included member selection considerations, proposed core, and individual competencies desired and offered a hypothetical deployment scenario. In 1982, American experienced the destructive power of the non-state threat when Hezbollah attacked the Marine barracks in Beirut. Today, in addition to military tactics employing suicide bombers and attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, technologically perceptive non-states threats wield social, economic, and political powers making them distinctly more influential and destructive. Supported by third party states, these non-state threats over the course of the next 15 years may acquire weapons of mass destruction and use them unless America preemptively employs MFT's to isolate and erode the non-state threats now.

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Appendix A: MFT Command Relationships

