Unraveling CORDS: Lessons Learned from a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF)
Abstract
Though the United States military has excelled in winning wars, it has not enjoyed the same success in "winning the peace." That requires the coordinated effort of numerous departments and agencies of the U.S. Government -- an Interagency Operation. U.S. Government interagency efforts since the end of the Cold War have not been extremely successful. However, conducting Interagency Operations is not new to the U.S. Government. During the Vietnam War, the United States established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) civilian-military program that combined all military and civilian pacification efforts, resources, and personnel into a single chain of command. This Whole of Government (WoG) approach differs from current U.S. Government and military doctrine for Interagency Operations. A large body of research consistently cites CORDS as an example to be emulated for Interagency Operations. This raises three questions: (1) Was CORDS an effective JIATF for pacification?, (2) Was that success due to its WoG organizational approach?, and (3) How was CORDS created? This monograph answers the first two questions by looking at pacification efforts in Vietnam across three distinct time periods. It answers the last question by comparing the bureaucratic politicking behind the creation of CORDS to other established patterns of bureaucratic policy making. The results of this research suggest that current doctrine for Interagency Operations is inefficient and ineffective. Given the likelihood that Interagency Operations will increase in number makes this a very relevant topic for research.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA505112
Entities
People
- Patrick V. Howell
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College