Determining the 'Gap'
Abstract
U.S. military doctrine is under attack from within the military and by the American press. According to these critics, the current wars are not being executed properly, and military leaders do not have the tools or guiding principles to properly execute the necessary missions. Accusations of "gaps" within military doctrine have been presented as reasons for these problems. Using a Process Tracing Case Study methodology, this monograph explores American Army and Joint doctrine from the beginning of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) through recent releases of the new FM 3-0, 3-24, and 3-07. The review of doctrinal history allows the reader to follow evolutionary changes to U.S. military doctrine. These changes include General William DePuys' implementation of Air Land Battle, and the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. As the author traces doctrinal history, a baseline for doctrine is established. The author then creates a survey from the established baseline and asks officers with deployment experience how they saw their operations within Iraq and Afghanistan in a doctrinal sense. He compares their answers to the baseline that was established during the process trace and identifies any doctrinal gaps. The results show doctrinal gaps within the U.S. Army on how officers view the role of the military advisor, and how they view the operations that they were involved in. It also shows gaps between joint doctrine and Army doctrine, although the author contents that this gap is critical to maintain as it allows for adaptation and evolution of the Army as an organization.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA505117
Entities
People
- Mark E. Huhtanen
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College