Understanding Conflicts in a More Proliferated World
Abstract
This paper employs a new model of nuclear conflict to explore the potential nature of a more proliferated world. A fundamental postulate of this model is that it takes more than an arsenal of nuclear weapons to win an interest or defend it. A state also needs the capacity to absorb retaliations and escalations until its adversary is no longer willing to take more damage either to win the interest at stake or to defend it. A second fundamental postulate is that states and alliances would be better able to discipline the evolution of a nuclear war to a tolerable outcome with the least possible damage if they think beforehand about what the potential outcomes might be and establish how much damage they are willing to take to pursue each plausible outcome. A major challenge for strategy in a more proliferated world is that it will become more likely that a nuclear war could involve more than two nuclear states. To understand such possibilities the paper examines a series of case studies of potential nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula that involve first two and then progressively more than two independent states. The case studies show that coalitions of small nuclear states can defeat a much larger nuclear state because they sum not only their nuclear arsenals, but also their capabilities to absorb damage and keep fighting. The incentives of smaller states to form such coalitions against a larger nuclear aggressor and live up to their "obligations" appear strong. The potential formation of such defensive coalitions should have a substantial stabilizing effect on a more highly proliferated world.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA505420
Entities
People
- Andrew J. Coe
- Victor A. Utgoff
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses