

Fighting Iraq with Anti-Gang Techniques

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Fighting Iraq with Anti-Gang Techniques

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The insurgency and terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan have direct linkages to and similarities with organized crime and gangs. For example, cars that had been stolen in the US were discovered in vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in Baghdad. In addition, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's August, 2003 study of Iraq's organized crime also noted that this is an area of concern. In June, 2004, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior arrested former death row inmates in Baghdad during a takedown of one of the largest gangs that was involved in assassinations, kidnappings and armed robbery. A majority of those arrested were among those released by Saddam Hussein just prior to the coalition push into Iraq. In order to succeed in battling this threat the focus needs to shift to preparing the Iraqi police, military and citizens to be able to help counter this current threat. The United States has spent billions of dollars and decades fighting organized crime at home and abroad, and should make use of its existing policies, procedures and systems in fighting terrorism in Iraq.

Background

In the early 1970s law enforcement agencies across the country were fighting a losing battle against crime. In order to win this war on crime they needed help. This aid came in several forms: automated systems that helped analyze crime

patterns, help from Federal law enforcement and a "take back the streets" type movement by the local residents. While each major city had its own unique situation, most cities employed these common tools in fighting organized crime and gang activity. These combined steps contributed to the United States' successful reduction of organized crime in many major cities over the past three decades.

Advances in technology allowed city police to develop methods for tracking all crime with automated systems in order to analyze patterns rapidly and predict future crime. This capability replaced the antiquated method of using pushpins in paper maps to track crime, and allowed them to rapidly plan, implement and shift their focus of effort in fighting crime. Additionally, police could measure their effectiveness by looking at the same maps to see if crime had decreased. Secondly, local police received help from higher organizations such as the state police or federal law enforcement agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). The help from these higher organizations was usually combined into task forces that were established to root out the crime organizations in their entirety. These task force organizations shared intelligence reports and access to each others databases.

These task forces provided expertise in dismantling the large crime systems.

The key to success is intelligence. In order to topple the organization, local law enforcement needed to have detailed intelligence that outlined the organization's structure. They did not expend a lot of effort on individual drug pushers, but they tried to infiltrate these large crime networks in order to build their situational awareness. These efforts allowed law enforcement to conduct a detailed analysis and to determine the criminals' nodal network and their critical vulnerabilities, thus enabling law enforcement personnel to build a case first and then attack the nodes whose disruption would do the most damage.

Finally, but most importantly, is that the police and federal agencies were not able to accomplish their goals on their own. They required the concerted help of the local populace. This method is usually depicted by a "take back our streets" type movement among the local residents, who report crimes, do community service to clean up graffiti, trash, etc.. and inform law enforcement of who is connected to whom.

Broken Windows

Mayor Rudy Gulliani and his New York Police Officers made famous the "Broken Windows" approach to law enforcement. The

precept of the "Broken Windows" approach is that disorder (or the appearance of disorder) leads to more crime. If a window is broken and no one fixes it, then no one cares. Therefore, one can commit crimes without the fear of reprisal. Currently, disorder reigns in parts of Iraq. This disorder can be seen in the trash, broken glass, rubble, and wreckage littering the streets; fluctuations in availability of basic services of electricity, running water, and police protection; and the scale of petty crime to murder going unchecked. All of which lead to larger problems. For example, insurgents are placing IEDs along roads and disguising them in trash, dead animals, etc.

Coalition forces need to use Information Operations (IO) to develop a "take back the streets" campaign that appears to originate from the Iraqis. Coalition forces need to continue to develop a pride of ownership and community in the Iraqi people. Civil Affairs (CA) should focus on this effort along with establishing or re-establishing an infrastructure that can provide the Iraqi people with the things they desire. There are things that are important to them that coalition forces might think of as a secondary effort. An example might be a town that has not had running water for many years and are comfortable with that fact. Coalition forces would normally spend time to developing a running water system, when what the citizens really

want is to repair their existing irrigation system first. Building soccer fields in every town is not always the answer. If coalition forces use funds to employ people to repair buildings and clean streets, among other things, coalition forces get many benefits, including the following:

1. Employment of those military aged males.
2. Influx to the local economy.
3. Fewer places to hide IEDs.
4. Iraqis see Iraqis taking responsibility for the neighborhood.

Technology

Technology has been an essential part of the U.S. fight against organized crime and terrorism. The U.S. has large databases and systems that can analyze networks, conduct predictive analysis, and track major incidents. The U.S. does not expect our police forces to accomplish this task without some type of database. Coalition forces need to provide the Iraqi Police with the ability to establish and maintain the type of database that will do nodal analysis independent of U.S. efforts. The Iraqi police should focus on the local crimes of theft, extortion, intimidation, rape and murder. A local database that feeds the national assets this criminal

information is essential to giving the Iraqis the ability to police their own effectively.

Three Tiered Approach

Success in Iraq could be accomplished by implementing changes across three different tiers of government. The local police, Gang Units / Organized Crime Task Forces and the national level could benefit from these changes / reforms.

Local Police - Police Department

Iraqi Security Forces -Gang / Organized Crime Task Forces

Coalition Forces - FBI

Application

International Level

Coalition Forces must foster an Iraqi Nationalism throughout all religious and ethnical sects. Coalition forces alone cannot stop this insurgency. Only the Iraqis can. The coalition effort must make sure that Iraqis understand that if forced to act alone, coalition forces may end up in highly destructive operations that could have a significant impact on the infrastructure and economy of that region for a long time.

National Level

Getting to the root of the problem requires gathering intelligence across a longer time span, in a greater area and from multiple sources. Using the Coalition Forces to coordinate and conduct investigations and intelligence collection in Iraq in the same manner that the FBI conducts its' job in the U.S.

Developing a national automated system for tracking all crime in Iraq is essential to building and managing this intelligence. If someone does not receive any fine for misdemeanors, then criminals will not be afraid to commit more violent crimes.

Local Level

At the local level, coalition forces must compete with the insurgents for the loyalty of the people and the youth. Friendly information operations are essential in gaining the loyalty. An example would be to find something to employ the youth, because idle hands do the devils work. Coalition forces could employ these youth to clean up the neighborhood. This accomplishes many things:

- Gives them something to be proud of.
- Allows them to provide for the family.
- Keeps them Busy.
- Fosters a sense of pride and community.

Just like Police can not stop Gang Violence or Activity by themselves, it takes a community effort to reduce the problem. The Iraqi People need to be responsible and the coalition forces should conduct operations at all levels to reinforce this.

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