

Termination or Transition: A 21st Century Perspective on the Military's Role in Conflict Resolution

**A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT The termination theories developed since the Korean War that influenced the development of joint doctrine are confusing and contradictory. Joint doctrine therefore did not address the military's role in obtaining US national interests in the long-term. As a result, US military planners developed termination criteria focused on the short-term cessation of military operations for most conflicts between 1990 and 2003. Campaigns framed upon such criteria resulted in destabilization, thus hampering obtaining US interests post conflict. An examination of US operations within the region known as the Arc of Instability indicates planners must synchronize their actions with the other instruments of national power to prevent this from happening. Thomas Barnett's concept of the Leviathan and the Sys Admin forces presents a method of how to achieve this synergy. Senior military leaders, specifically within the US Marine Corps, embraced these concepts when developing security cooperation operations and the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force. Accordingly, termination criteria focusing on a quick, decisive victory followed by a rapid withdrawal is no longer valid. Joint doctrine therefore needs updating to reflect the US military's responsibility in obtaining national interest in conjunction with the other instruments of national power not only during open conflict, but at all times.					
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Abstract

TRANSITION OR TERMINATION: A 21ST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE ON THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION by Lt. Col. John R. Polidoro, Jr., USMC, 49 pages.

The multiple termination theories developed since the Korean War are confusing and contradictory. The intellectuals who developed these theories offered multiple interpretations regarding the role of the military during conflict resolution. Their theories directly influenced the development of military doctrine. Specifically, joint doctrine did not address the military's role in nation building. Instead, joint doctrine focused upon the importance of obtaining military objectives quickly and decisively, then redeploying from the conflict area as rapidly as possible. US military planners developed termination criteria focused on the short-term cessation of military operations for most conflicts between 1990 and 2003. Campaigns framed upon such criteria can result in destabilization, enabling other state powers and non-state actors to gain influence, thus hampering obtaining US interests post conflict.

The argument to reexamine termination begins with a review of the theories developed between the Korean War and the start of the Global War on Terror. An examination of the region known as the Arc of Instability reveals US military planners must synchronize their actions with the other instruments of national power in order to create the conditions necessary to obtain US national interests. Three case studies of military operations within the Arc of Instability support this argument. Each case study used the variables of infant/child mortality rates, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, and diasporas to measure stability post conflict. Building upon these case studies, an examination of Barnett's concepts of the Leviathan and the Sys Admin forces presents a method of how the US military can assist in achieving long-term post conflict stability.

Senior military leaders, specifically within the US Marine Corps, embraced Barnett's concepts. They saw the Sys Admin force as a permanent, forward deployed force conducting as security cooperation and other shaping operations. This force sets the conditions needed for obtaining US national interests for the long term. The US Marine Corps developed the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC-MAGTF) as the Sys Admin force in order to accomplish such missions. The Leviathan force is the US Army, capable of deploying during a crisis and resolving conflict through major combat operations. After meeting their objectives, the US Army withdraws, leaving the SC-MAGTF to continue its security cooperation operations. Based upon these concepts, termination criteria focusing on a quick, decisive victory followed by a rapid withdrawal is no longer valid. Accordingly, joint doctrine needs updating to reflect the US military's responsibility in obtaining national interest in conjunction with the other instruments of national power not only during open conflict, but at all times. As such, the US military must replace termination theory with transition theory within joint doctrine.

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Introduction

Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, Secretary of State Colin Powell advised President George W. Bush of the “Pottery Barn Rule.” With this advice, Powell expressed his concept of conflict termination. He believed that if the US met its objective of regime change within Iraq, then a significant effort would be required after major combat operations in order to achieve US national interests within the country. The military could not conduct a huge deployment, defeat the Iraqi Army, topple Saddam Hussein, and then simply redeploy. A long-term presence focused on capacity building was not only necessary, but also essential. Simply put, Powell told Bush, “If you break it, you buy it.”¹

This conversation indicates that Powell’s concept of conflict termination changed significantly since Operation Desert Storm. During this 1991 operation, Powell viewed termination as many US military planners of the time did. Specifically, they developed termination criteria focused on ending conflict quickly then withdrawing forces versus setting the conditions for obtaining US national interests. Often, this focus on “exit strategy” created more instability than existed prior to conflict. As seen with the destabilization of Iraq and Haiti after US military operations in the 1990s, both state and non-state actors exploited this increased instability and significantly hampered the long-term achievement of US interests.

An examination of the development of termination criteria provides insight into why US military planners focus more upon an exit strategy versus obtaining US national interests within a region. The very different conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Kuwait provided theorists with the foundation for examining conflict termination. From the differing outcomes of these conflicts, termination theorists developed various viewpoints on the role of the military in achieving long-

¹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 71.

term US national interests. These viewpoints directly influenced the military planners of the time, as reflected in numerous military monographs and doctrinal publications.

Specifically, prior to 2003 joint doctrine explained termination in terms of conventional warfare between established nation states. The writers of joint doctrine did not address the emergence of non-state actors as powerful entities within the underdeveloped section of the world known as the Arc of Instability.² Additionally, they did not address the military's role in post-conflict nation building. Instead, the writers of joint doctrine identified the need for rapid termination of military operations. As a result, between 1990 and 2003 US military planners developed termination criteria focused on the short-term cessation of military operations. Campaigns framed upon such criteria can destabilize a region, enabling other state powers and non-state actors to gain influence, thus hampering US interests.

To prevent increased destabilization within the Arc of Instability region post-conflict, a long-term military presence is required. The military's role in Kosovo during Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian demonstrated the effectiveness of this concept. This does not suggest, however, that a permanent military presence is required after conflict. Instead, the military must shift its focus to nation building and other civil military operations. This requires not only a change in skills and focus, but also in force structure. US military leaders recognized this requirement with the introduction of security cooperation operations.³

² The Arc of Instability is an area of interest encompassing the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia, the South Asian Pacific, Central America, the southern Caribbean Islands, and the southern states of Latin America. The origin of this term and the history of the United States' interests within this area are explained in detail between pages 15 and 17 of this monograph.

³ Security cooperation operations came into existence in 2003 in a direct response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, believed security cooperation operations were vital in eliminating the global conditions that fostered international terrorism. The first government document describing security cooperation operations and other shaping operations is in US Department of Defense, *Security Cooperation Guidance 2003* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2003). This is a secret document.

Like these leaders, international security strategist Thomas Barnett identified the requirement for post-conflict presence.⁴ He postulated that the US needs two different types of military forces, the Leviathan and the System Administration (Sys Admin). The Leviathan is a large conventional force able to conduct traditional warfare. The Sys Admin is smaller, focused on country capacity development. The Sys Admin operates both before and after the employment of the Leviathan, creating and maintaining post conflict stability. These concepts of the Sys Admin and Leviathan forces clearly coincidence with the US military's concept of security cooperation operations.

In 2008, embracing not only security cooperation operations but also the writings of Barnett, the leadership of the US Marine Corps developed a new strategy for its structure, mission sets, and employment. They developed structure to support the implementation of the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC-MAGTF).⁵ The SC-MAGTF is the embodiment of Barnett's Sys Admin force. This restructuring indicated the US Marine Corps' leadership understood the requirement for long-term military presence within the Arc of Instability. The joint community should embrace this responsibility as well by redefining "termination" as "transition." As Colin Powell recognized this need in 2003, so should the military leaders and planners of 2009.

Methodology

The argument to reexamine termination begins with a review of the termination theory developed between the Korean War and the start of the Global War on Terror. An examination of

⁴ Thomas P.M. Barnett is a predominant theorist who has analyzed national security affairs since the end of the Cold War. From 1998 through 2004, he was a Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor at the US Naval War College in Newport, RI. During this period, he was assigned as the Assistant for Strategic Futures with the Office for Force Transformation. While in this position, he developed his concepts of transforming the US military detailed between pages 36 and 39 of this monograph.

⁵ US Marine Corps, *The Long War: Send in the Marines* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2008) explains the SC-MAGTF in detail. The unit's organization and capabilities are also outline between pages 41 and 44 of this monograph.

several military monographs and doctrinal publications reveals how these theories affected military planners. These documents reflect numerous conflicting termination theories. When combined, these theories offer military planners vague, contradictory explanations of conflict termination, termination criteria, and military endstate.⁶ Because of this vagueness, military planners often focus more upon decisive, conventional operations followed by a rapid withdrawal versus establishing the conditions needed to meet US national interests.

An examination of the history of the Arc of Instability reveals US military planners must synchronize their actions with the other instruments of national power. Numerous military operations focused on defeating an enemy's army, followed by a rapid withdrawal of combat power, resulting in destabilization within this region of interest. This destabilization established conditions favorable for both state and non-state actors to hamper US efforts post-conflict.

Three case studies of military operations within the Arc of Instability support this argument. Each case study used the measures of infant/child mortality rates, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, and diasporas to measure stability post conflict. A study of Operation Desert Storm reveals that US military action in 1991 significantly destabilized Iraq resulting in a return to combat operations in 2003. Examining Operation Uphold Democracy reveals that the US military was successful initially in post-conflict operations, but failed to maintain its dedication towards obtaining US national interests. This failure also resulted in a return to major combat operations. Analyzing Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian shows how maintaining a military presence post conflict focused upon security and capacity building provided the long-term stability needed to obtain US national interests.

⁶ The contradictions regarding these concepts result from differing opinions of the military's role during conflict resolution as explained in detail between pages 5 and 15 of this monograph. One such viewpoint is that during conflict resolution, military leaders are incapable of determining proper termination criteria and therefore must be subordinate to their political leaders and the other instruments of national power. A countering view is that the military is responsible for obtaining these objectives, therefore must work in concert with their political leaders when developing them.

Building upon these case studies, an examination of Barnett's concepts postulates how the US military can provide post conflict stability. An example of a Leviathan force is the US Army, and an example of a Sys Admin force is the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Accordingly, the US Army is capable of accomplishing major combat operations and other traditional warfare roles while another type of force is necessary for the post-conflict nation building operations required for long-term stability.

US military leadership recognized these post-conflict nation-building requirements when they developed the concept of security cooperation operations. An examination of the SC-MAGTF reveals the leadership of the US Marine Corps not only embraced security cooperation operations, but also agreed with Barnett's concepts of the Sys Admin force. The argument concludes that termination theory no longer applies to military operations. Accordingly, military leaders should readdress termination in terms of transition within joint doctrine.

The Confused Concept of Termination

Termination theory first developed after the Korean War. Because of the lack of resolution after open conflict, many intellectuals believed the United States lost the war. Accordingly, several international relations theorists questioned the relationship between the military's objectives and US national interests within Korea. After the Vietnam War, the examination of termination increased significantly. A common theme emerged that military planners were best suited for achieving military and strategic objectives vice assisting in their development. After the overwhelming military success of Operation Desert Storm, termination theory became more diverse. Theorists questioned the importance of a quick victory, the need for a rapid exit of military forces, and the role played by both military and political leaders in determining termination criteria. As seen in the writings of military planners and in the development of doctrine, attempts to reconcile all these viewpoints were not successful. When

faced with such unclear and conflicting theories, military planners defaulted to what they were most comfortable with, conventional warfare.

One of the first theorists to discuss conflict termination was Lewis Coser.⁷ In 1961, he posited that conflict termination is not as easy as defeating the enemy and setting the conditions needed to meet the US strategic interests. Instead, he believed

Contrary to what common sense might suggest not only the potential victor but also the potential vanquished make crucial contributions to the termination. As a military commentator has pointed out, “war is pressed by the victor, but peace by the vanquished. Therefore, to determine the causes of peace, it is always necessary to take the vanquished’s point of view.”⁸

Several years later, Berenice Carroll furthered Coser’s concepts by proposing the most significant, negative factor influencing conflict termination is a focus on “past events and present conditions, with little regard for perceptions of the future.”⁹ These concepts grew from the perception both US political and military leaders of the Korean War focused more upon punishing the Communist forces instead of addressing the factors that allowed them to flourish. As a result, the US failed in to achieve its national interest of containing Communism.

Theorists of the Vietnam War era furthered the belief that military leaders failed to plan conflict termination effectively. In 1978, Michael Handel postulated a military planner’s confusion stems from a lack of clarity regarding termination, from mismatched semantics and epistemology, and from comparing peace conditions with conflict conditions. Because of this confusion, he believed military leaders were not suited for peace negotiations.

⁷ Lewis Coser was a social scientist with a Ph.D. from Columbia University. From 1956 until 1987 he wrote eleven books and dozens of articles on the sociological aspects of conflict. Throughout this period, he was a professor of sociology at Stony Brook University in New York. In 1974, Coser served as President of the American Sociological Association.

⁸ Lewis A. Coser, "The Termination of Conflict," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5, no. 4 (December 1961): 348.

⁹ Berenice A. Carroll, "How Wars End: An Analysis of some Current Hypotheses," Special Issue, *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 4 (1969): 303. Carroll was a professor of political science and women's studies at Purdue University and editor of numerous professional journals. Her interest in conflict resolution began with her Ph.D. dissertation in 1966.

Military men are customarily less aware than anyone else...that war is fought to achieve political ends, namely a better peace. For them, war is an activity with an independent momentum and logic....At the peace conference, military men frequently endeavor to translate military success into a one-sided monopoly of power over the enemy....[I]n perpetuating the enemy's military inferiority, they also perpetuate his bitterness and desire for revenge....A potentially successful peace settlement is thus turned into a truce, an introduction to the next round of war.¹⁰

Handel clearly believed in subjugating military leaders to their political leaders because of their narrow focus upon military objectives.

Paul Pillar's classic work on conflict termination, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, supported the viewpoint of the military's subordination to its political leaders planning conflict termination.¹¹ Pillar stated military operations do not influence diplomacy directly. Instead, these operations influence an opponent's perceptions, interpretations, and expectations. He clearly believed military action is a tool for use by diplomats in the negotiations of peace. He stated the objectives assigned to the military, and the amount of violence used to obtain them, must rely on obtaining a political or diplomatic objective.¹² In other words, the political leadership must set the limits and the objectives for the military for proper conflict termination in order to prevent military leaders from souring the process by using excessive and unnecessary violence. The use of such violence often leads to deep-seeded hatred and mistrust, hampering the pursuit of national interests.

Another prominent theorist, Fred Iklé, believed that military leaders, while skillful at campaigns and coordinating maneuvers, remained blind in projecting the resources needed to

¹⁰ Michael Handel, "The Study of War Termination," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 1 (1978): 62-63. This article expounded on his Ph.D. dissertation on Government from Harvard University. During his career, he edited numerous professional periodicals and wrote numerous books on the theory of war. He served as a Professor of Strategy at both the US Naval and Army War Colleges.

¹¹ Paul Pillar received numerous degrees in politics, to include his Ph.D, from Princeton, Dartmouth and Oxford Universities. In addition to writing numerous books on international relations and politics, Pillar served in numerous positions as a high level analyst within the US intelligence community.

¹² Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 144-220. This section clearly shows that Pillar believes in civilian leadership assigning and controlling military objectives and end states in order to obtain a desired settlement post conflict.

accomplish their objectives.¹³ Additionally, they fail to link such costs to how well their campaigns actually meet the nation's interests. Reflecting upon the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam, Iklé addressed how military leaders often underestimate the cost of winning a conflict. This, coupled with the lack of an exit strategy, often results in conflict becoming extremely unpopular.¹⁴ This sentiment resounded through most Vietnam Era termination theory, and provided the groundwork for termination theory developed after Operation Desert Storm.

The overwhelming military victory of Operation Desert Storm resulted in a new generation of termination theorists. One of the first theorists to emerge was Bruce Clarke.¹⁵ Recognizing how these disparities in termination theory could confuse military planners, he addressed the importance of synchronizing the military's actions with the political objectives during war. Specifically, Clarke believed there are three critical guidelines for successfully developing conflict termination. First, political leadership must provide a clear vision of the characteristic of the post-conflict environment. Factors defining this environment are regional powers, culture, public and international support, legal/political constraints, and US national values. Second, political leaders must clearly outline the strategic objectives needed to obtain the desired environment. From these, military planners should establish the military objectives required to obtain the first two.¹⁶

¹³ Fred Iklé was a well respected political scientist. He served as a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology prior to entering the office of the Undersecretary of Defense during the second administration of President Ronald Reagan. He published numerous books and articles focusing upon conflict and conflict termination.

¹⁴ Fred C. Iklé, *Every War Must End*. 2nd rev. ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). The first edition of this book was published in 1970 during the Vietnam Era. Chapters One, Two, and Five explain these concerns in detail.

¹⁵ Bruce Clarke is a retired US Army Officer who published numerous books and articles focusing on military and national security. He started his own international relations consulting firm upon retiring from the military.

¹⁶ Bruce B. G. Clarke, *Conflict Termination: A Rational Model* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College), 1992. The inference drawn is from the author's summary, the environmental factors outlined on page 13, and the "10 Step Analytical Process" detailed on pages 26-27. Clarke's attempt at establishing a rational model fell short when he aligned the process to the US Army's Military Decision Making

A second termination theorist, Tansa Massoud, saw Clarke's approach as problematic.¹⁷ In 1996, he postulated that the variables of conflict termination are the military dimension, economic cost, and diplomatic terms of settlement. From these variables, there is no distinct formula for successful termination. He identified the impact of domestic politics and external intervention as areas needing more research. Since he believed military planners approach termination in a scientific method and are constantly seeking a universal formula, he concluded military planners and leaders do not have a good understanding of what war termination actually is, let alone how to accomplish it successfully.¹⁸

Steven Chan was not as critical of Clarke as Massoud.¹⁹ He believed the military planners of Operation Desert Storm were effective in determining termination criteria, resulting in the overwhelming success of the operation. In 2003, he used Boolean algebra to examine post World War II conflicts. According to his research, gradual escalation always results in long, drawn out conflicts. If, however, a massive amount of damage occurs in the opening stages of conflict, an adversary will more likely concede quickly due to the perception that a long war would be too costly.²⁰ Clearly opposing many previous theorists, Chan believed the more violent the conflict in its initial stages, like Operation Desert Storm, the shorter the conflict will last and the more favorable the outcome.

Process. The rigidity of the "10 Step Analytical Process" eliminates multiple environmental and cultural factors that affect conflict termination. His approach exemplifies the reductionist approach taken by military planners as explained within the Operation Desert Storm case study within this monograph.

¹⁷ Tansa Massoud earned a Ph.D. from the University of New York in International Relations and Middle East Studies. He was a professor of political science at Bucknell University.

¹⁸ Tansa G. Massoud, "War Termination," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 4 (November 1996): 494-495.

¹⁹ Steven Chan served as a Professor of International Relations, Dean of Law and Social Sciences, at the University of London. He authored numerous articles and several books in the field of international relations.

²⁰ Steven Chan, "Explaining War Termination: A Boolean Analysis of Causes," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 1 (January 2003): 49-66.

Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg presented a different viewpoint.²¹ In their research, they noted that from 1989 to 1997 there were one hundred and three armed conflicts, of which a vast majority was regional, not strictly nation state versus nation state. Because of the multitude of influences and complexities within a region, a “quick win” such as in Operation Desert Storm can upset the regional balance of power. As a result, the region often destabilizes and violence returns within a short period. Accordingly, Wallensteen and Sollenberg suggested military planners consider the politics and balances of power within a region when developing termination criteria.²²

Finally, Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner thoroughly reviewed the history of termination theory in an effort to determine why there were so many differing viewpoints.²³ In their 2002 article, they postulated that prior termination theory varied widely because theorists field to recognize the importance of political negotiations in conjunction with military operations. Filson and Werner believed prior theories addressed the symptoms of a conflict, and not the cause. Political negotiations address the roots of the conflict, therefore must continue after the onset of war. Additionally, leaders should pursue termination simultaneously along all instruments of national power, not just the military.²⁴

The differing viewpoints of conflict termination clearly influenced not only the writings of numerous military planners, but also the development of doctrine. A review of several Masters of Military Arts and Science monographs written by students of all the US military services’

²¹ Peter Wallensteen was a professor of International Relations with the Kroc Institute at Notre Dame University. He authored numerous books and articles focusing upon conflict resolution. Margareta Sollenberg received her Ph.D in International Relations from Uppsala University in Sweden. She published numerous articles in various professional journals regarding conflict resolution.

²² Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 5 (September 1998): 624-625.

²³ Darren Filson was a professor of Politics and Economics at Claremont Graduate University. Suzanne Werner was a professor of Political Science at Emory University. Both professors published numerous articles on conflict resolution.

²⁴ Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (October 2002): 820-821.

advanced military studies programs between 1992 and 2002 reflects this. One monograph echoed Chan in that a quick decisive victory ensured successful conflict termination; another postulated a quick victory resulted in returning to conflict as stated by Wallenstein and Sollenberg. As one student believed that political and military leaders must develop termination criteria in concert as postulated by Clarke, another thought agreed with Pillar's argument that political leaders must dictate the termination criteria that define the military's objectives. The only common theme resulting from the review of these monographs echoed the thoughts of Massoud; these military planners did not understand termination.²⁵

Joint doctrine does not clarify termination for military planners. On the contrary, joint doctrine confuses the concept further. Almost all capstone Joint Publications stated the most important element of operational design is the creation of termination criteria, yet the authors only dedicated five pages towards the concept. If the concept of termination criteria is as important as expressed by the authors of joint doctrine, one would imagine a deeper exploration of the topic. Instead, joint doctrine focused on explaining simple concepts, such as the exact format used to convey a joint operation plan.²⁶

²⁵ George Woods, *In Pursuit of the Endstate - What's All the Fuss?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993) reflected Chan's concepts while Emmett Schail, *Planning and End State: Has Doctrine Answered the Need?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998) reflected Wallenstein and Sollenberg. Donald Darnell, *War Termination Winning the War and Winning the Peace--What's a CINC To Do?* (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2001) reflected Clarke's theories while James Walker, *War Termination: Why, When, Who, What, Where, and How* (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 1996) echoed the writings of Pillar and Handel. Both Michael Griffith, *War Termination: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992) and James Raymer, *In Search of Lasting Results: Military War Termination Doctrine* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2002) agreed with Massoud's theories.

²⁶ US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 - Joint Operations*, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008) and US Joint Forces Command, *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 - Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006). Termination, termination criteria and military end state are explained in *JP 3-0* pages IV-5 through IV-8 and *JP 5-* pages III-7 through III-9. Pages C-1 through C-8 in *JP 5-0* explained the Joint Operation Plan.

The explanation of termination within joint doctrine is vague, contradictory, and confusing. For example, the February 2008 version of *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0: Joint Operations*, stated

Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners....[H]asty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.... Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that achieved military objectives endure. Further, development of a military end state is complementary to and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and the national strategic end state.²⁷

JP 3-0 also provided the definition of military end state as “a point in time or circumstance beyond which the president does not require the military instrument of national power to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic end state.”²⁸

These passages expressed four contradictory points. First, commanders must strive to end combat operations favorable towards obtaining US strategic interests as postulated by Pillar. Second, commanders must strive to obtain a quick victory as expressed by Chan. Third, quick victories are not complementary in establishing conditions favorable in obtaining US strategic interests as suggested by Wallensteen and Sollenberg. Finally, as stated by Coser, the military is not capable of, nor responsible for obtaining national interests after achieving its military objectives.

Because of these four contradictory points, the authors of joint doctrine failed in providing the reader with a clear explanation of a military commander’s responsibilities while planning and achieving termination criteria. Instead, joint doctrine dictates that commanders must maintain a “delicate balance” between achieving a military endstate quickly and establishing conditions favorable for other instruments of national power to obtain national interests. From this viewpoint, military planners easily imply that the successful and rapid

²⁷ USJFCOM, *JP 3-0*, IV-7-8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, IV-8.

achievement of their objectives is not complementary to other instruments of national power obtaining US national interests during post-conflict operations.

JP 5-0 confused the concept of termination further. It explained when planning conflict termination

It must be understood that US forces must be dominant in not only the phases that involve major combat operations, but also in the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases to achieve the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution. If the termination criteria have been properly set and met, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities and to dissuade other adversaries from interfering. When addressing conflict termination, commands and their staffs must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, reconstitution, and redeployment.²⁹

The concept of US military dominance combined with enabling leverage confuses US military planners. Inherently, military planners define dominance as having a significant, military presence capable of successfully conducting traditional missions such as major combat operations and stability operations. Since leverage is not defined, military planners imply this is the diplomatic, informational, and economic capacity needed to shape the strategic environment. Within doctrine, these shaping activities occur in phases 0, 1, and 5 of joint operations. The deployment of military forces for major conventional warfare is in phases 2, 3, and 4.³⁰

The authors of *JP 5-0* believed US dominance was not related to, nor does it contribute towards the establishment of such Phase 0 leverage. Therefore, instead of exploring how to support the other instruments of national power after achieving the military endstate, this passage emphasized military commanders focus strictly upon such traditional military operations as force protection, reconstitution, and redeployment. As with *JP 3-0*, the authors of joint doctrine

²⁹ USJFCOM, *JP 5-0*, III-9.

³⁰ USJFCOM, *JP3-0*, IV-25-IV-30. The six phases of joint operations are Phase 0: Shaping, Phase 1: Deter, Phase 2: Seize the Initiative, Phase 3: Dominate, Phase 4: Stabilize, and Phase 5: Enable Civil Authority. The cited passage from *JP 3-0* explains each phase in detail. These explanations also outline to the military planner that other agencies are more prevalent than the military in obtaining US national interest during phases 0, 1 and 5. The term “post-conflict operations” used throughout this monograph refer to phases 0, 1, and 5 collectively.

seemed to separate the responsibility of the military from the rest of the instruments of national power in achieving national interests. As explored later, it was not until the development of security cooperation operations and the US Marine Corps' SC-MAGTF that military leaders recognized the military's role in obtaining national interests post-conflict.³¹

A third joint publication adds to the confusion. *JP 5-00.1: Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* stated, "if the [National Command Authority] does not adequately articulate the termination criteria, the combatant commander should request further guidance or clarification, as appropriate."³² This was contradictory to an explanation provided within *JP 3-0*. Specifically, *JP 3-0* stated that after

consider[ing] the nature and type of conflict, the national strategic end state, and the plans and operations that will most affect the enemy's judgment of cost and risk to determine the conditions necessary to bring [the conflict] to a favorable end...the [Combatant Commander]...will consult with the [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the [Secretary of Defense] to establish the termination criteria.³³

While *JP 5-00.1* defined the role of the combatant commander as subordinate to the National Command Authority (NCA) when determining termination criteria as Pillar and Iklé did, *JP 3-0* defined the reciprocal relationship as Clarke did. These contradictory statements contribute to the confusion of military planners regarding the responsibility of military planners when generating termination criteria.

The differing perspectives of termination criteria outlined within the separate services' doctrine clearly reflect the confusion created by joint doctrine. Each of the US military services address conflict termination differently. The US Army provides a cursory examination of the topic in two of its capstone manuals, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0: Full Spectrum Operations* and *FM 5-0: Army Planning and Orders Production*, but fails to provide clarity. These documents

³¹ US Marine Corps, *The Long War*, 9. This publication clearly states the SC-MAGTF concept focuses upon Phase 0, or Shaping, operations.

³² USJFCOM, *JP 5-00.1 – Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002), II-4.

³³ USJFCOM, *JP 3-0*, IV-8.

outlined that a commander must embrace the established criteria in order to allow other instruments of national power to succeed after obtaining the military endstate and subsequent withdrawal. This doctrine does not clarify the concept by exploring the role of a military commander during the development of termination criteria, nor does it address the role of the military in supporting the other instruments of national power post major combat operations. The US Air Force addresses termination within *Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine*, in a similar manner. US Naval doctrine does not address the concept at all.³⁴

The US Marine Corps, however, explored the concept of termination in more depth by dedicating several sections to termination in one of its capstone documents. *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-2: Campaigning* argued that “two of the most important aspects of campaign design are defining the desired end state and planning a transition to post-conflict operations....Military leaders...are participants in the decision making process. It is their responsibility to ensure political leaders understand both the existing situation and the implications – immediate and long-term, military *and* political – of a suspension of combat at any point in the conflict.”³⁵

By comparing these doctrinal publications, it is clear the services have different perspectives of a military commander’s role in both the development and implementation of termination criteria. US Army doctrine reinforces the belief that clear termination criteria must be defined by civilian leadership. US Air Force doctrine supports this. US Marine Corps doctrine, however, embraces the concepts presented by Clarke. *MCDP 1-2* proposed the military commander was responsible for advising his civilian leadership on the ramifications of their

³⁴ John W. Guthrie, *The Theater Commander: Planning for Conflict Termination* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2006), 11-14.

³⁵ US Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP 1-2) – Campaigning* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1997), 50.

chosen termination criteria. Additionally, the military's responsibility does not end after obtaining such criteria, but instead transitions to Phase 0 operations.

With all these differing theories, concepts, and definitions of termination it is no surprise military leaders have difficulty planning for it. When faced with conflicting concepts, it is human nature to default to what one is most comfortable. For US military planners after 1990, termination theory focused on conventional warfare between well-established, rational state actors was the most comfortable to address. This is not the type of conflict, however, prevalent within the contemporary operating environment of 2009. The most prevalent threat instead is from non-state actors and rouge nations within regions of instability. The authors of joint doctrine failed to recognize that establishing termination criteria that neglects the military's responsibility after conflict often results in destabilization. Specifically, military planners must consider the military's post-conflict responsibility within the region commonly known as the Arc of Instability.

The Arc of Instability

In 1979, the Carter Administration identified the area between the Indian sub-continent and the Horn of Africa, the Middle East included, as vital towards achieving US national interests. This region was of interest because of its rich oil reserves that the United States needed access to because of the 1970's energy crisis. Unfortunately, drawing on these resources proved difficult due to anti-American sentiments, primarily from Islamic fundamentalists and other extremist organizations. Economically, this area is collectively the poorest within the world. Combining the prevailing anti-American sentiment with economic squalor resulted in the creation of a breeding ground for violent non-state actors and rogue nation states that threaten US national

interests within this resource rich region. Because of this, US leaders deemed this area the “Arc of Crisis.”³⁶

In 2002, the George W. Bush administration reintroduced and expanded this concept to address the US national interest of promoting democracy, increasing global security and combating terrorism. The area grew to include not only the Middle East but also Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia, the South Asian Pacific, Central America, the southern Caribbean Islands, and the southern states of Latin America. By March 2006, the US government and news media referred to this area as the “Arc of Instability” as defining the contemporary operating environment for the Global War on Terror (see Figure 1).³⁷




Figure 1. The “Arc of Instability”³⁸

³⁶ George Lenczowski, “The Arc of Crisis: Its Central Sector,” *Foreign Affairs*, 57, no. 4 (Spring 1979): 796-820. Lenczowski provided an excellent explanation of the importance of this region in obtaining US National Interests resulting from the energy shortage during the Carter Administration.

³⁷ US Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006), 12.

³⁸ Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map,” <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/thepentagonsnewmap.htm> (accessed 13 November 2008). This map first appeared in *Esquire* magazine in March 2003. Dr. Barnett called this region the “Non-Integrating Gap” vice the Arc of Instability. The boundary of the Arc of Instability was enhanced for readability.

Each US administration from 1976 to 2004 understood long-term stability within this region was a prerequisite for obtaining US national interests. In order to draw from the vast resources within this area of interest, US oil companies needed both time and security to develop the infrastructure required to extract and ship commodities. In addition, long-term stability increased revenue within the region, thus raising the quality of life and providing the framework for “democratization.” US leaders believed democratization not only contributed to the global economy, but also reduced the susceptibility of the population in turning towards terrorism. As a result, the US military conducted over thirty operations within the “Arc of Instability” between 1980 and 2002 focused on obtaining stability.³⁹

During the same time, military planners developed criteria ineffective in promoting long-term stability partly because of their confusion regarding the military’s role in planning termination. In most cases, they devised conventional military operations focused on the destruction of an enemy force, followed by a transfer of responsibility for developing stability to other agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Accordingly, these actions often resulted in an opposite effect. Three case studies of military operations within the Arc of Instability reveal how termination criteria contributed not only to destabilization post-conflict, but also a probable return to major combat operations.

Case Study Selection and Indicators of Stability

Three case studies best exemplify how shortsighted termination criteria can affect both long-term stability and obtaining US national interests. These case studies are Operation Desert Storm, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian. These three

³⁹ A full listing of US military operations conducted from 1980 until 2002 is available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/index.html>. From those listed, operations conducted outside the Arc of Instability and/or not focused on stability such as noncombatant evacuations were not considered. This list includes such operations as Desert Storm in Kuwait, Bright Star in Egypt, Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf; Restore Hope in Somalia, Support Hope in Rwanda, Assured Lift in Liberia, Fundamental Response in Venezuela, Urgent Fury in Grenada, and Strong Support in El Salvador.

operations are unique in their source of conflict, international context, execution of major combat operations, and US national interests within each region. Despite these significant differences, they relate in several similar characteristics important to the argument of this paper. First, the region for each operation was within the Arc of Instability. Second, each had stability as a termination criterion. Third, the United Nations and international community as a whole recognized and supported each operation. Fourth, planners meticulously developed each of these operations based upon clear termination criteria and strategic guidance from the NCA. Finally, military planners, the NCA, and the American public believed each operation was an overwhelming success.

In order to make this argument, measures of stabilization must be determined. Because of the qualitative nature of international relations, this proved problematic. Therefore, measures used are a hybrid of several recognized indicators. Two of these are directly from the Collier-Hoeffler (CH) Model of Civil War Onset. The CH Model provides twenty quantifiable variables that indicate opportunity and grievance for civil war. As explained by the developers of this model, these variables are not causal for conflict, but instead are markers of the conditions necessary for civil war to erupt.⁴⁰ Therefore, the CH model provides variables valid to use as measures of stability. Of these twenty factors, the two used are GDP per capita growth rate and the number of diasporas because of the availability of data and relevance towards internationally recognized stability.

A third variable used to measure stability is not part of the CH Model, but instead recognized internationally as a marker of stability.⁴¹ This variable is the infant/child mortality rate. The infant/child mortality rate reflects a country's lack of basic services and infrastructure,

⁴⁰ Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), 6.

⁴¹ The primary source of data for infant/child mortality rate is the United Nations Children's fund. The United Nations uses this data as a delineator between industrialized and unstable, third world nations.

primarily healthcare, food distribution and water availability. In these case studies, an increase or decrease in infant/child mortality rate reflects the affects of US military operations upon the critical infrastructure within a region. Additionally, as with the other two measures, the availability of infant/child mortality data allows for comparison more readily than other variables.⁴²

By examining these three measures, the impact of the US military operations on long-term stability is evident. The military's actions upon achieving the military objectives of Operation Desert Storm indicate that the termination criteria developed was short sighted, and did not consider the conditions needed for long-term stability. Iraq significantly destabilized as a result. Military actions upon completion of Operation Uphold Democracy indicate termination criteria included developing the infrastructure needed to develop stability within Haiti, but not considered a responsibility of the US military. As a result, the military focused on a timeline for withdrawal vice establishing the conditions needed for stability. Finally, actions upon completion of Operation Allied Force show how termination criteria focused on maintaining a military presence capable of nation building and other civil military operations significantly enhanced the capability to achieve US national interests.

Desert Storm – Stage Setter for Future War

The first case study examined, Operation Desert Storm, was the most significant US military operation within the Arc of Instability prior to the Global War on Terror. On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein laid claim on the neighboring oil-rich country of Kuwait as sovereign

⁴² Of the 20 variables used with the CH model as explained in Collier and Sambanis's *Understanding Civil War*, diasporas and GDP per capita growth provided the strongest link between the three case studies. A common source of data, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for diasporas data and the World Bank for economic data, provided information within the timeframe needed. A common source for examining other variables such as male secondary schooling, ethnic dominance, and religious fractionalization could not be located for all three of the case studies. Locating reliable data for Haiti from 1990 until 2002 was particularly difficult. Different sources provided conflicting data.

Iraqi territory. Capitalizing on this claim, he deployed more than 200,000 troops and 2,000 tanks across the border resulting in the rapid defeat of Kuwaiti forces. Upon the end of the first full day of the invasion, the Emir of Kuwait fled to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait City was in Iraqi hands. Having recently fought a ten year war with Iran, Iraq's military was formidable, battle-tested, and the largest within the region. Recognizing no regional force could stop Hussein if he decided to continue his conquest into the oil-rich nation of Saudi Arabia, the other Arab nations and the international community demanded his withdrawal from Kuwait. Saddam refused.⁴³

The George H. W. Bush administration viewed Iraq's actions as a significant threat towards the stability of the Persian Gulf Region. As the situation within Kuwait developed, then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney stated the US would "take seriously any threat to US interests or US friends in the region."⁴⁴ With the annexation of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein controlled over twenty percent of the world's oil supply and poised to gain another twenty percent if he conquered Saudi Arabia. In addition to this vital US national interest in energy resources, US leaders expressed concern with the security of two of its closest allies within the Middle East, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the President ordered the deployment of forces to the region to defend Saudi Arabia and eventually eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait.⁴⁵

Immediately upon receiving the order to prepare for the defense of Saudi Arabia and the possible invasion of Kuwait, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Commander in Chief of US Central Command, began planning. He ordered his staff to draft and submit a proposed strategic directive determining the strategic and operational objectives needed to obtain the US national interests within the region. This document, although never formalized by General Colin Powell, clearly identified US Central Command's basis for planning (see Figure 2).

⁴³ USJFCOM, *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), V-1.

⁴⁴ Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

⁴⁵ Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1996), 463-464.

<u>Strategic Objective</u>	<u>Military Objective</u>
- Destroy Iraqi armed forces.	- Destroy or neutralize the Republican Guard Forces Command. - Degrade or disrupt Iraqi strategic air defenses.
- Liberate and secure Kuwait to permit the restoration of its legitimate government.	- Occupy southeast Iraq until obtaining strategic objectives.
- Repatriate foreign nationals held against their will in Iraq and Kuwait.	- Safeguard foreign nationals detained in Iraq and Kuwait.
- Promote the security and stability of the Arabian/Persian Gulf Region.	- Destroy Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical production facilities and weapons of mass destruction. - Neutralize or disconnect the Iraqi national command authority.

Figure 2: US Central Command's Objective Linkages for Operation Desert Storm⁴⁶

Despite identifying at least one military objective as maintaining a long-term presence in occupying southeast Iraq until obtaining strategic objectives, military planners focused more upon defeating Iraqi forces than anything else. Not only was the occupation of southeast Iraq ignored, military planners never mentioned it while planning major combat operations. The ignoring of this military objective was not intentional. General Schwarzkopf's lead planners were several graduates of the newly formed US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. These planners focused on implementing the US Army's maneuver warfare manual of the time, *FM 100-5: Operations*.⁴⁷ This document took a Clausewitzian approach to major combat operations,

⁴⁶ Norman H. Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1992), 450. The chart summarizes the *Draft Proposed Strategic Directive to Combined Commander* as written by General Schwarzkopf's Plans and Policy Chief, Rear Admiral Grant Sharp.

⁴⁷ Woodward, 347-348.

dedicating only four paragraphs to other operations such as peacekeeping and other stability missions.⁴⁸ Military planners, therefore, saw their termination criteria as the destruction of Iraqi forces, not establishing the conditions necessary for long-term stability. This was not their responsibility, but instead that of the US Department of State, the United Nations, or someone else.

The NCA agreed with the military planners regarding termination criteria. President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell agreed that stability was possible by meeting the termination criteria of ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the destruction of the Iraqi Army. By 27 February 1991, General Schwarzkopf met both these criteria. He successfully reduced the million-man Iraqi Army by fifty percent, ejected them out of Kuwait, and established a buffer zone between the two countries. Accordingly, President Bush declared, “Kuwait is liberated. Iraq’s Army is defeated. Our military objectives are met....forces will suspend offensive combat operations.”⁴⁹

General Schwarzkopf and the rest of the US leaders were wholly unprepared to deal with the overwhelming military success of both the air and ground campaigns of Operation Desert Storm. Both planned on a prolonged battle that included time to prepare for a transition from military to other agencies responsible for nation building operations. The meetings at Safwan between General Schwarzkopf and the Iraqi delegation were limited discussions focused on meeting the military objectives and endstate not on meeting the strategic objectives and US national interests. As such, several concessions such as the free use of attack helicopters in the so-called “No-Fly Zone” allowed the Iraqi military to exercise its might upon the region without

⁴⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 100-5: Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Development Command, 1986). The four paragraphs referring to the responsibility of the US Army in some type of stability operation is in Chapter 1, page 5.

⁴⁹ Powell, 487.

violating the terms of the cease-fire agreement.⁵⁰ In essence, General Schwarzkopf focused on only ending the operations with terms favorable to meet the near term objectives without considering the long-term ramifications on security.

After obtaining its objectives the US military withdrew the majority of its combat units rapidly, leaving only a small force to enforce the mandated No-Fly Zone. US leaders did not consider, nor did they implement any other actions focused on rebuilding the Iraqi capacity destroyed during Operation Desert Storm. As a result, Iraq was significantly destabilized. The effects of such destabilization became apparent to the international community as early as 1996.⁵¹ The three measures of stability detailed earlier quantified these effects.

The first measure focuses on economics. In the ten years after Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's GDP did not reach the same level as prior to US military action. Iraq's GDP fell from approximately \$39 billion in 1989 to \$8 billion in 1991. Between 1991 and 2003, the GDP capped at \$34 billion. During the same timeframe, the Iraqi per capita GDP grew at a negative rate. The two significant gains in GDP growth rate resulted from a temporary lifting of US economic sanctions in 1992, and the acceptance of the United Nation's Food for Oil program in 1996 (see Figure 3).

⁵⁰ Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, 556-568.

⁵¹ Gresh, Alain. "The Legacy of Desert Storm: A European Perspective." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 4 (Summer, 1997): 70-77. In this article, Gresh calls Operation DESERT STORM a "failed western crusade" that did more to destabilize the region than provide long-term stability. Many of his arguments, although appearing valid, are not proven statistically.




Figure 3: Iraq Economic Growth 1989-2003⁵²

The second measure of stability after Operation Desert Storm is the number of Iraqi diasporas. Diasporas are middle class persons who leave a country voluntarily to escape persecution or repression. Measuring the asylum applications in industrialized countries correlates to the number of diasporas from a specific country. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided in Figure 4, Iraqi applications increased

Numbers of Iraqi Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries, 1991-2002													
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	Total
Industrialized States (x 37)*	18,500	17,700	15,200	12,900	18,700	27,100	43,200	41,500	36,600	47,200	50,700	51,900	381,100
European States (x 31)**	17,900	17,200	14,800	12,500	18,300	26,200	40,400	40,800	35,200	44,400	47,900	50,900	366,400
EU States (15)	10,500	11,100	9,900	9,800	14,800	22,300	35,200	31,200	25,300	38,900	40,500	42,000	291,400
* Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, United States, plus European countries listed in footnote below													
** European Union members plus Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey													

* Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, United States, plus European countries listed in footnote below
 ** European Union members plus Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey

Figure 4: Iraqi Asylum Applications 1991-2002⁵³

⁵² Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq Economic Data (1989-2003)," https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxD.html (accessed 1 October, 2008).

⁵³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Iraqi Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Statistics," UNHCR. http://www.centrodirittumani.unipd.it/a_temi/crisi/iraq2/unchr.pdf (accessed 2 October 2008).

from approximately 46,900 in 1991 to 107,000 in 2002. In 2002, Iraq became the country with the most diasporas in the world.

The final measure of stability is the infant/child mortality rate. Studies conducted by numerous non-government agencies indicated this was a significant factor in the destabilization of Iraq after Operation Desert Storm. Between 1990 and 1995, the infant/child mortality rate in Iraq increased over five hundred percent. The large increase in the infant/child mortality rate indicates not only a shortage of food but also a lack of the infrastructure needed for basic human services (see Figure 5).




Figure 5: Estimates of infant and under-5 mortality in Iraq 1970-2005⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Tim Dyson, *Occasional Paper no. 1: On the Death Toll in Iraq Since 1990* (London, UK: Crisis States Research Centre, 2006). This chart combined estimations from both the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS). The author believed the UNICEF data as more reliable. 1q0 represented infants under the age of one while 5q0 represented children under the age of five.

As shown by these three indicators, military forces focused more upon meeting their military objectives and not setting the conditions for long-term stability. The forces that remained behind did not attempt nation building or other stability operations, but instead focused on maintaining the military objective of a no-fly zone. Therefore, the military actions taken to provide stability by stopping Hussein's aggressive actions had quite the opposite effect. The destabilization created within Iraq after Operation Desert Storm strongly influenced Saddam in turning to the only options available to remain in power – brutal repression, targeted ethnic cleansing, and deceiving neighboring countries with the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

George W. Bush's administration perceived Saddam's actions as threats towards the US interests of defending Israel, accessing to fossil fuels, and preventing global terrorism. In 2003, US leaders decided the threat was too great to ignore. In response, Operation Iraqi Freedom occurred. US planners could have avoided this long-term and costly conflict had they planned Operation Desert Storm to include the post-conflict capacity building operations needed for long-term stability. These ramifications of shortsighted, military focused termination criteria were not unique. Military planners felt them again when dealing with Haiti.

Uphold Democracy – Failing to Stay the Course

Just three years after Operation Desert Storm, US military leaders faced a completely different type of military operation. On 30 September 1991, Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide fled his country after a successful military coup led by the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Army, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. Aristide was the first democratically elected President since the election of the brutal and repressive Francois Duvalier in 1957. Because of this, many Haitians viewed him as capable of bringing Haiti out of a third world country status. After the coup, many Haitians believed the country took a step backwards and feared an increase in government repression. Over the next several years, refugees flooded out of the country by ship, boat and raft headed towards the US, specifically the Florida coast. Unsure whether or not to

grant refuge to such a large number of people, the US government established temporary camps at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for those intercepted within US territorial waters.⁵⁵

Because of the sheer numbers of Haitian refugees, the poor seaworthiness of their vessels, and the deteriorating conditions within the country US leaders faced a growing refugee and humanitarian crisis at Guantanamo Bay. To address this growing crisis, military planners developed two versions of a plan for an intervention into Haiti, eventually termed Operation Uphold Democracy. The major difference between the two plans was one assumed an opposed invasion of the island, while the other assumed a peaceful landing. The military objectives for both plans, however, were the same. The US military would come ashore, restore civil order, protect US citizens and property, protect designated Haitians and third-country nationals, create the stable conditions needed for the restoration of the legitimate government, and provide assistance in infrastructure development to the government of Haiti.⁵⁶ Reflecting upon the recent, dismal outcome of the US intervention in Somalia, military planners included a timeline for the termination of military operations within both plans. They believed this timeline prevented military forces from assuming the non-traditional roles associated with LIC, and was far more important than obtaining the conditions needed for obtaining US national interests. As seen in the Operation DESERT STORM case study, senior military leaders and planners believed the responsibility for obtaining these interests fell to other instruments of national power.⁵⁷

On 19 September 1994, US forces landed peacefully in Haiti to start establishing civil order. This initial force, named Joint Task Force (JTF) 180, planned to terminate operations thirty days after landing and transition responsibility to a follow-on stability focused force named

⁵⁵ Walter E. Kretchik, Robert E. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, and "Intervasion": A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 18-20.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 78. The authors drew this information from the original OPLAN 2380 Plus as issued from the USS *Mount Whitney* on 19 September, 1994.

⁵⁷ John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 69.

JTF 190. This transition occurred on 25 October 1994. JTF 180 had more specific, traditional military objectives than JTF 190. Specifically, JTF 190 was to create a functional security force in Haiti, reduce Haitian-on-Haitian violence, reintegrate the Haitian migrants interned at Guantanamo Bay, and create an electoral process. The termination criteria for these operations were not effects based, but instead founded upon a timeline of transitioning authority to a United Nations sponsored force in March 1995.⁵⁸

On 31 March 1995, US forces turned over responsibility for peacekeeping and development of Haitian infrastructure to the United Nations. Undeniably, progress occurred during the missions of JTF 180 and 190. Aristide returned to power, the nation developed critical infrastructure, and the Haitian National Police force grew not only in numbers, but also in capability and credibility. At the same time, the NCA recognized that the conditions were not set for long-term stability. In response, the United States Support Group-Haiti (USSG-H) stood up on 1 April 1995 to continue the progress obtained by JTF 190.⁵⁹ The Department of Defense renewed USSG-H's mission until the cost of the operation outweighed its benefits. With the blessings of the Commander-in-Chief of US Southern Command, General Charles Wilhelm, Congress prohibited the Department of Defense from funding the USSG-H past 31 May 2000. Clearly senior military leaders defined termination criteria by time, not the effects needed to obtain US national interests.⁶⁰

After US forces left Haiti, government sponsored violence, repression, and corruption increased. Not surprisingly, stability in Haiti deteriorated as indicated by the measures of stability. The first measurement examined is the per capita GNP growth rate. During the

⁵⁸ Ibid., 134-135.

⁵⁹ Max G. Manwaring, Donald E. Schulz, Robert E. Maguire, Peter Hakim, and Abigail Horn, *The Challenge of Haiti's Future* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997).

⁶⁰ Center for International Policy, "Just the Facts: A civilian's guide to US defense and security assistance to Latin American and the Caribbean: US Support Group Haiti," <http://www.ciponline.org/facts/ussgha.htm> (accessed 27 December 2008).

presence of US military forces in Haiti from 1994 to 1999, the growth rate averaged a positive 3.16 percent. After their departure, the growth rate deteriorated to an average of negative 0.79 percent over the five-year period between 2000 and 2004. Although conditions improved overall within Haiti after the US intervention, the increasing decline in the growth rate in 2004 indicate conditions would continue to deteriorate at an increasing rate as they did in 1994. In other words, with the economic structure needed to maintain positive a growth rate diminished, Haiti's per capital GDP growth rate would continue to decrease exponentially thus significantly destabilizing the country (see Figure 6).




Figure 6: Haitian per Capita GDP 1980-2008⁶¹

As with the per capita GDP growth rate, the measurement of diasporas also indicates that the departure of US forces from Haiti in 2000 destabilized the country. As with the Operation Desert Storm case study, examining the number of annual applications for asylum effectively

⁶¹ IndexMundi, "Haiti GDP – per capita (PPP): Equivalent Data from the International Monetary Fund," [http://www.indexmundi.com/haiti/gdp_per_capita_\(ppp\).html](http://www.indexmundi.com/haiti/gdp_per_capita_(ppp).html) (accessed 1 October, 2008).

measured the number of Haitian diasporas. As reflected in Figure 7, the UNHCR recorded the number of asylum applicants in 1994 as 10,282. During this, time the US maintained a presence

2. Asylum applicants during the year--main asylum countries (main countries in 2003 -- 1994-95 data only incl. industrialized asylum countries)										
<i>Asylum country</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>
United States	9,403	2,396	3,792	4,310	2,676	2,492	4,257	4,938	3,643	3,316
France	390	146	138	134	357	503	1,886	2,713	1,904	1,488
Canada	460	222	210	212	174	295	354	237	256	195
Other	29	8	42	30	26	51	63	42	21	62
Total	10,282	2,772	4,182	4,686	3,233	3,341	6,560	7,930	5,824	5,061

Figure 7: Haitian refugee and asylum application data 1994-2003⁶²

within Haiti, the number of applicants dropped significantly, averaging 3,642 per year. After the USSG-H's departure in 2000, the number of diasporas drastically increased to an average of 6,344 per year until 2004. Although the 2004 numbers were less than in 1994, the increase from 2000 indicates increased destabilization after the departure of US forces.

The final measurement of stability, infant/child mortality rate, significantly increased between 2000 and 2004 as well. Prior to the US intervention in 1994, Haiti's infant/child mortality rate was approximately 13 percent. Over the six-year period the US was in Haiti, the rate dropped significantly to 8.63 percent. Between 2000 and 2004, however, the rate steadily increased to an average of 11.84 percent.⁶³ As with per capita GDP growth rate and diasporas, this measurement indicates the United States' presence in Haiti increased stability in the short term. The rapid increase in infant/child mortality rate after the USSG-H departed, however, indicates their departure countered this progress, resulting in destabilization.

Analyzing this case study further, it is clear Operation Uphold Democracy and the presence of US forces within Haiti increased the country's stability in the short term. Since the termination criteria developed centered upon time and not establishing the conditions for

⁶² UNHCR, Media Relations and Public Information Service, "2003 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook – Haiti," UNHCR, <http://unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/41d2c1770.pdf> (accessed 2 October 2008).

⁶³ Macro International, "Measure DHS: STATCompiler: Infant and Child Mortality (5 Year Rates)," <http://www.statcompiler.com/tablebuilderController.cfm?userid=247829&usertabid=269171> (Accessed 30 October 2008).

obtaining US national interest within Haiti in the long-term, these gains quickly disappeared with the withdrawal of US forces in 2000. In less than four years, Haiti drastically destabilized resulting in yet another intervention by US forces in 2004 called Operation Secure Tomorrow.⁶⁴ If senior military leaders and planners focused upon establishing long-term stability within Haiti instead of preventing “mission creep,” they could have prevented this second, significant military intervention.

Allied Force/Joint Guardian – Committing to Long-Term Stability

After the break-up of Yugoslavia into smaller nation states in the early 1990’s, ethnic tensions grew within the region, specifically between Albanians and Serbs. In 1990, the president of Yugoslavia, an ethnic Serb named Slobodan Milosevic, declared control over the autonomous Albanian region of Kosovo. Accordingly, he dispatched tens of thousands of military personnel not only to keep the peace, but also to repress the Albanian Kosovar government. A shadow Kosovar government developed in 1992 fostering the growth of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). By 1998, clashes between the KLA and Serbian forces resulted in the death of more than fifteen hundred ethnic Albanians and the expulsion of almost four hundred thousand people from Kosovo.⁶⁵

Such conditions not only caused a humanitarian crisis within the region, but also threatened the security of commerce flowing to Europe. During the final months of 1998 and in the beginning of 1999, numerous diplomatic attempts at ceasing the violence within the region failed. Accordingly, it was in the best interests of western, European nations to stop the violence. These nations used their alliance organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

⁶⁴ For further information on Operation Secure Tomorrow, refer to John Pike, “Operation Secure Tomorrow,” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/haiti04.htm> (accessed 19 February 2009).

⁶⁵ R. Cody Phillips, *Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007), 6-9.

to intervene. NATO threatened military action against Yugoslavia unless they allowed United Nations and NATO peacekeepers to enter the region.⁶⁶

Before examining the US military objectives, an explanation of the US national interests within the region is necessary. As published in October 1998, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (NSS) identified the conditions within Serbia and Kosovo as relevant for two specific reasons. First, the NSS identified participating in NATO operations focused on global security as an important national strategy. Second, the NSS highlighted the refugee crisis and ethnic cleansing within the region as a humanitarian interest. From these two interests, US security strategy within the region focused upon the objectives of enhancing global security and promoting democracy abroad.⁶⁷

In 1998, with close coordination with the other executive agencies, US military planners developed four separate plans to meet these objectives, all of which were planned post major combat operations. The planners labeled these plans Options A through D. Of these four plans, only C and D were viable. In Option C, the military took a supporting, limited role in providing assistance to international civil authorities and US executive agencies in operations such as holding elections, assisting police training, and other civil-military operations. In Option D, the military would assume a much larger role and in certain situations become the lead agency.⁶⁸

As indicated within each of the plans, at no time did the US military view major combat operations as a way to obtain these objectives. Instead, they determined a long-term presence was required to obtain long lasting peace and democratization. As Slobodan Milosevic continued to prevent peacekeepers from entering his country, the United Nations and NATO authorized

⁶⁶ Ibid., 9-13.

⁶⁷ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1998), <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nssr-98.pdf> (accessed 2 January 2009), 5-6.

⁶⁸ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*. 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 102-105. Options A and B focused on using non-US forces to create the infrastructure needed for long term stability within Kosovo. Since the US did not have tasking authority over these organizations, General Clark viewed these options as nonviable.

military action. Operation Allied Force began on 24 March 1999. This intense air campaign had five clear objectives:

1. Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo
2. Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police, and paramilitary forces
3. Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
4. Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations
5. Provide credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo⁶⁹

Milosevic capitulated on 3 June 1999 after seventy-plus days of intense bombing, agreeing to all terms. Accordingly, NATO forces entered Kosovo peacefully on 12 June 1999. Because of the limited availability of executive agencies and international experts needed to stabilize and develop Kosovo, US military and interagency planners chose to execute Option D. Once focused on Option D, the US ground forces positioned to execute major combat operations shifted their focus to a new mission set of nation building and peacekeeping. With this new mission set, Operation Allied Force became Operation Joint Guardian.⁷⁰

As of March 2009, Operation Joint Guardian has continued without a planned date for termination. Despite the ongoing nature of this NATO endeavor, the international community recognized it as a success. Because of this success, military planners often refer to it as a template for future peacekeeping and nation building operations.⁷¹ As with Operations Desert

⁶⁹ John Pike, "Operation Allied Force," GlobalSecurity, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/allied_force.htm (accessed 2 January 2009).

⁷⁰ Ibid. A counter argument that Operation Allied Force was not successful was found in Grant T. Hammond, "Myths of the Air War Over Serbia: Some 'Lessons' Not to Learn," *Aerospace Power Journal* 14, no. 4 (Winter 2000), 78-86. Phillips' *Operation Joint Guardian* discussed the transition from major combat operations to peacekeeping and nation building operations.

⁷¹ Headquarters, US Army Europe, *Joint Guardian After Action Report* (Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, GE: US Army Europe, 2000). Operation Joint Guardian is described on page i of this document as a successful, ongoing "contingency operation." Because this document was published prior to naming security cooperation operations and Phase 0, the terminology used describes a shaping operation. Annex A of this document provided a checklist of recommendations that form a template for units conducting similar shaping operations. Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and William O'Neill, *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002) offered conflicting opinions of the success of Operation JOINT

Storm and Uphold Democracy, an analysis of the per capita GDP growth rate, the number of diasporas, and infant/child mortality rate verified the effectiveness of the Joint Guardian.

The first stabilization measurement examined in this case study was per capita GDP growth rate.

A comparison of data before and after 2000 provides evidence that a US military presence within the region increased stability. As seen with the data provided in Figure 8, there was a marked increase. Per capital GDP decreased from \$1280 in 1995 to \$1160 in 2000, reflecting a negative growth rate of 9.4 percent. With the presence of US forces from 2001 to 2007, the per capita GDP grew to \$5387, a staggering growth rate of 250.7 percent over a seven-year period (see Figure 8). This large increase in per capita GDP growth rate indicates the

Year	Per Capita GDP	Annual Growth Rate	Year	Per Capita GDP	Annual Growth Rate
1995	\$1280	NA	2001	\$1536	32.4%
1996	\$1330	3.9%	2002	\$2036	32.5%
1997	\$1420	6.7%	2003	\$2640	29.7%
1998	\$2046	44.0%	2004	\$3186	20.7%
1999	\$1451	-29%	2005	\$3408	7.0%
2000	\$1160	-20%	2006	\$4009	17.6%
			2007	\$5387	34.3%

Figure 8: Serbian per capita GDP 1995-2007⁷²

creation of the economic infrastructure needed to provide long-term stability.

GUARDIAN. Paris' viewpoint was strategic while O'Neill focused on specific tactics and policies. International Crisis Group, "Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition," *ICG Europe Report*, no. 170 (February 2006): 1-31 detailed the potential problems associated with ending Operation JOINT GUARDIAN before reaching its objectives.

⁷² International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008," http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=59&pr.y=17&sy=1997&key=2013&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=942&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH%2CLP&grp=0&a= (accessed 2 January 2009). The economy of Kosovo is not separated from the economy of Serbia, therefore Serbian economic data was used. The IMF database for this country was limited to data after 1995. These numbers were adjusted for inflation.

The second measurement, the number of diasporas, also indicates that a US presence resulted in increased stability (see Figure 9). From 1996 to 1999, the number of Serbian asylum

2. Asylum applicants during the year--main asylum countries (main countries in 2005)										
Asylum country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Germany	24,773	30,962	34,979	31,451	11,121	7,758	6,679	4,909	3,855	5,522
Austria	1,025	1,084	6,647	6,834	1,486	1,637	4,723	2,526	2,835	4,403
France	699	717	1,283	2,480	2,053	1,591	1,629	2,704	3,812	3,997
Sweden	636	2,115	3,446	1,812	2,055	3,102	5,852	5,305	4,022	2,944
Italy	15	21	4,557	4,851	2,417	1,526	1,769	1,510	1,991	1,704
Other	12,444	14,556	48,368	75,759	27,272	13,092	13,615	13,618	7,862	6,200
Total	39,592	49,455	99,280	123,187	46,404	28,706	34,267	30,572	24,377	24,770

Figure 9: Serbian Asylum Application Data 1996-2005⁷³

applications increased significantly. In 1996, approximately 39,600 applied for asylum. In 1999, this number increased over 210 percent to over 123,000 applications. This drastic increase in diasporas indicated the deteriorating conditions within Kosovo prior to Operation Allied Force. Almost immediately upon implementation of Operation Joint Guardian, the number of new diasporas dropped to less than 46,500. Applications for asylum continued to drop as stability increased resulting in less than 24,800 new diasporas in 2005.

The final measurement of stability used to examine the effects of Operation Joint Guardian is the infant/child mortality rate. As with the other two measures, this data clearly indicated a marked improvement in stability. As recorded by the United Nations Children's Fund, the infant/child mortality rate in 1995 was approximately 14 out of every 1000 live births. Reflecting the deteriorating conditions within the country prior to Operation Allied Force, the mortality rate rose to 16.5 in 1999. After Operation Allied Force and upon commencing Operation Joint Guardian, the infant/child mortality rate dropped sharply to 10.8. The mortality

⁷³ UNHCR, "2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook – Serbia and Montenegro," UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4641bed311.pdf> (accessed 2 October 2008). The UNHCR did not classify Kosovar asylum applicants separately. The data reflected, therefore, was for all applicants from Serbia.

rate continued to decrease over the next seven years, resulting in only 6.6 deaths per 1000 live births in 2006.⁷⁴

An analysis of the three measures clearly indicates that stability within Kosovo drastically improved after the end of major combat operations. Unlike the other two case studies, these results continued to trend positively because of the termination criteria for Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian. In this instance, military planners focused on the long-term results needed for stability instead of terminating the conflict quickly or within a prescribed timeline.⁷⁵ Because of its success, Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian became a template for nation building and stability operations within the Arc of Instability. With the acceptance of this template the nature of foreign relations, international security, and military operations changed. As a result, the military searched for new approaches towards accomplishing their missions. Once source used when developing these approaches was Thomas P. M. Barnett.

The Non-integrating Gap, the Leviathan Force, and the Sys Admin Force

Thomas Barnett is an international security theorist who recognized the importance of addressing stability within the “Arc of Instability.” In his capstone book, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, he outlined the history of the region he termed the “Non-integrating Gap.” He believed this area as the single most important region for international relations within in world. Geographically, the Non-integrating Gap aligned perfectly with the Arc of Instability. Barnett postulated that within this region, third world countries enter the international arena prematurely as an effect of globalization. These easily influenced countries potentially become either a great

⁷⁴ UNICEF, “Infant Mortality Rate: STATISTICS BY AREA/Child Survival and Health.” http://www.childinfo.org/mortality_infantmortality.php (accessed 2 January 2009). As with the other two measures, the data provided was for all of Serbia, not just Kosovo.

⁷⁵ Headquarters, US Army Europe, *Joint Guardian After Action Report*. Although sources detailing the planning and approval of termination criteria for Operation Joint Guardian were not located, page II-15 of this document described the evolution of the military endstate and objectives of US Forces Europe’s plan for Operation Joint Guardian, OPLAN 4250.

asset, or a significant detriment to obtaining US national interests. Because of this, the US and its allies must apply significant influence towards these countries. Contrarily, nations and super-empowered individuals focused on preventing the US from obtaining its interests do the same. Barnett believed that this competition for influence within these unstable countries was not only fierce, but also unrelenting. Accordingly, he suggested US leaders focus upon long-term and continual influence to ensure achieving these interests.⁷⁶

To accomplish shaping the countries within the “Non-integrating Gap” Barnett suggested the development of two separate, yet complementary types of military force. He called these forces the “Leviathan” and the “System Administration,” or Sys Admin for short. According to his theory, the Leviathan is an extremely large military force that conducts major conventional military operations. The SysAdmin is a small, specialized force that focuses on non-traditional roles of the military, specifically nation building and other civil military operations. To sum the differences between the two forces, Barnett stated

The System Administrator force will be everything the Leviathan force is not. Where the Leviathan projects power menacingly, the Sys Admin will export security non-threateningly. Where the Leviathan will be event focused, the Sys Admin will be continuous – the former’s vertical scenarios of war yielding seamlessly to the latter’s horizontal scenarios of transition, integration, and peace. The Leviathan will destroy rogue regimes wielding immense lethality, but the Sys Admin will build nations wielding nonlethal technologies appropriate to the policing systems they will generate as legacies to the succeeding political order. The Leviathan will be punitive, bringing down enemy networks and blindsiding foes, but the Sys Admin will seek preventative cures that emphasize making networks more robust and crisis situations more transparent.⁷⁷

When explaining the concept of these forces, Barnett provided two examples. He stated the US military, specifically the US Army, is the world’s Leviathan force. Leaders created this force to defend from a predominantly Soviet threat. Barnett continued by stating no military unit in the

⁷⁶ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 1-190. Between pages 183-190, Barnett expressed his hatred for the term “Arc of Instability.” He believed that “Arc of Instability” theory hinges upon managing the region vice influencing and or shaping the countries within the region to meet US national interests as he suggested.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 320.

world matches the US Army in terms of precision, speed, and lethality. He also stated that since there is no match for the Leviathan, the enemies of the United States choose not to fight it, but instead focus on asymmetrical warfare. Such enemies do not seek decisive battle, but instead countering US efforts through terrorist acts focused on disrupting economic interests and governance. Barnett concluded that although the Leviathan is always victorious in the opening stages of any conflict, it is ill suited for the latter stages to include post-conflict reconstruction.⁷⁸

After concluding his description of the Leviathan, Barnett focused on explaining the Sys Admin. He believed the force that entered Kosovo for Operation Joint Guardian was a truly effective Sys Admin Force. He believed that military planners developed their operation correctly, focusing more upon establishing stability and reconstruction than decisively and rapidly defeating an enemy force. The Sys Admin, not the Leviathan, therefore is the focus of effort and the force required for victory. Once the Leviathan NATO force defeated the Serbian forces, the Sys Admin, also known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR), worked in conjunction with several international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in developing and supporting the plans necessary for economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian stability.⁷⁹ The success of this operation continues as explained in the previous case study.

As previously discussed, Barnett did not believe these forces are independent of each other. Instead, he suggested maintaining both forces. Barnett clearly stated that he believed the US Army is the most effective Leviathan in history. Despite naming KFOR as effective in

⁷⁸ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2005), xvii. On pages 336-339 of *The Pentagon's New Map* Barnett explained how the US military traditionally assembles and deploys the Leviathan into the Non-Integrating Gap. Although he stated that the US leaves a token military or other agency presence in a country post-conflict, it did not demonstrate a long-term commitment to shaping the environment of the country and ensuring long-term stability. Instead, it was simply a “trip wire” force to communicate the need to redeploy the Leviathan force.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 54-55.

accomplishing the missions of the Sys Admin force, Barnett did not believe this ad hoc organization is the best model of such an organization. Instead, Barnett suggested using a military force that was small, specialized, and rich in tradition and history in assuming the military missions associated with peacekeeping, stabilization operations, and nation building. Barnett thought the perfect Sys Admin force was the US Marine Corps.⁸⁰ Based upon the development of the SC-MAGTF in 2008, it seems the leadership of the Marine Corps agreed.

The Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force – the SysAdmin in Action

As stated by Barnett, globalization prevents the isolation of military operations from the other instruments of national power as postulated by Coser, Handel, Pillar and Iklé.⁸¹ Termination theory leading up to and directly after Operation Desert Storm, therefore, does not apply to conflict within the Arc of Instability. Within this region, the military plays a significant role not only during direct conflict, but also in actions prior to and after the conflict. To meet these new requirements, the military developed a new type of military operation called security cooperation.

Joint doctrine defined security cooperation operations as the means by which the Department of Defense not only encourages, but also enables countries and international organizations to work with US agencies and forces to achieve national interests within a specific area or region. These are shaping operations conducted in Phase 0, 1 and 5 within the Joint Operational Planning Cycle.⁸² Such means span all instruments of national power, and include such operations as the training of security forces, foreign military sales, governmental assistance programs, humanitarian assistance programs, and other operations within the realm of civil

⁸⁰ Ibid., 38-39.

⁸¹ Barnett, *Blueprint for Action*, ix-x.

⁸² USJFCOM, *JP 3-0*. Refer to footnote 26 on page 11 of this monograph for more information on the phases of joint operations.

military operations. The focus of such operations is establishing not only stability, but also establishing the conditions needed to obtain US national interests. To conduct these security cooperation operations successfully, members of a military force are specialized. Specifically, these forces have a historical and cultural understanding of the region in which they operate. They are comfortable working not only in conjunction with, but also subordinate to other agencies including the departments of State, Commerce, and Justice.⁸³ In essence, a force capable of conducting cooperation operations embodies Barnett's concept of the Sys Admin force.

Traditionally, US Special Operation Forces (SOF) possess the specialization required to conduct these operations. This specialization, however, is only a fraction of the capability of SOF. Only two of the nine core tasks of special operations meet security cooperation operations requirements.⁸⁴ Because of this, assigning SOF as the primary unit for security cooperation operations is a misuse of assets. Recent advances in technology and training bridged the gap between SOF and conventional, allowing other elite forces to assume some of the traditional SOF roles as evident with the transfer of security cooperation responsibilities to the US Marine Corps within Georgia.⁸⁵ Accordingly, SOF is best suited to augment conventional forces when conducting security cooperation operations versus being the lead organization.

⁸³ USJFCOM, *Joint Publication 3-57 - Civil Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008), I-12.

⁸⁴ USJFCOM, *Joint Publication 3-05 – Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003), II-4 – II-13. An examination of the nine core tasks reveals only Foreign Internal Defense and Civil Affairs Operations are required for security cooperation operations.

⁸⁵ James D. Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 80-81. Kiras stated SOF is misused when relegated to training missions and other non-direct approaches. Drawing upon the history of World War II, he believes the other core missions, such as direct action, are historically more effective. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb. *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) offer a differing viewpoint, stating that the indirect approach, to include Foreign Internal Defense, is the most effective use of SOF. Both books, however, recognize that elite forces such as the United States Marine Corps are capable of assuming some of the SOF core missions. Tucker and Lamb acknowledge the success of these organizations on page 193 of *United States Special Operations Forces*.

Based upon the successful assumption of the Georgian mission, the leadership of the US Marine Corps embraced security cooperation operations and took steps towards tailoring its entire force around it. The US Marine Corps developed a new force structure centered upon providing geographic combatant commanders with the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC-MAGTF) as depicted in Figure 10. Formed around the core of an infantry




Figure 10: SC-MAGTF Task Organization Chart⁸⁶

battalion, the SC-MAGTF is tasked-organized with the capability, mobility, and sustainability to conduct a wide variety of security cooperation and other civil military operations. The primary taskings within the SC-MAGTF mission set include building national infrastructure and security capacity for developing countries across the globe. To accomplish these tasks, the Marines within this organization receive specialized training focused upon the languages, cultures, and nuances of the region in which it operated. In addition to the traditional forces associated with a

⁸⁶ US Marine Corps, *The Long War: Send in the Marines* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2008), 17. All images from this reference were extracted from a digital version of this document.

MAGTF, the SC-MAGTF possesses numerous foreign/regional affairs officers, linguists, and other personnel with the expertise needed for successful security cooperation operations (see Figure 10).⁸⁷

The US Marine Corps' employment concept for the SC-MAGTF consists of establishing three permanent standing organizations deployed to and focused upon the regions of Africa, Southwest Asia, and South America (see Figure 11). Once established the SC-MAGTF




Figure 11: The US Marine Corp's Concept for SC-MAGTF Employment⁸⁸

disaggregates task-organized forces from a central forward operating site to mission specific training sites throughout its region. From these locations, the SC-MAGTF conducts not only its security cooperation and civil military operations, but also constitutes an operational reconnaissance asset that enabled a geographic combatant commander to maintain situational awareness and influence in areas not normally accessed. As required, these forces assist in the

⁸⁷ Ibid., 16-17. The number of these specialized Marines depends upon the region in which the SC-MAGTF operates. As of March 2009, the Tables of Organization identifying the exact numbers were unpublished.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 36.

development of ungoverned space, denying sanctuary to an enemy, strategic communication, ideological warfare, and interdicting terrorists and other dangerous non-state actors. In addition to these capabilities, the SC-MAGTF provides a permanent, forward deployed military force capable of influencing unstable areas by obtaining limited military objectives. If a crisis occurs requiring an increased military presence, the geographic combatant commander could augment SC-MAGTF with additional forces up to a division size to conduct major combat operations (see Figure 12).⁸⁹




Figure 12: SC-MAGTF Force Expansion⁹⁰

After examining the SC-MAGTF's task organization, force expansion capability, and employment concept, it is clear this organization is the embodiment of Barnett's concepts. The SC-MAGTF's mission set focuses on developing the stability needed to obtain US national interests. The Leviathan augments the SC-MAGTF as needed. The permanent locations to which the SC-MAGTF deploys to allows access to and influence within the Arc of Instability. Clearly, the US Marine Corps accepts the reality that the US military must play a larger, permanent role in obtaining US national interests within a globalized operating environment. With the US Congress authorizing the US Marine Corps the increased end strength needed to deploy the SC-

⁸⁹ Ibid., 19-21.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 18.

MAGTF, the NCA seems to agree.⁹¹ Accordingly, the concept of termination criteria takes on a new meaning.

Conclusion

Joint Doctrine defined termination criteria based upon the concepts provided by theorists who analyzed the Korean, Vietnam, and first Gulf Wars. Because of the nature of these conflicts, these theorists emphasized the need for political leadership to provide solid guidance to military leaders, the need for a rapid victory followed by a planned and deliberate withdrawal, and the transition from the military obtaining US national interests to other instruments of national power. Because of these viewpoints, between 1990 and 2000 US military planners focused on obtaining quick victories with a planned withdrawal of US forces.

With the evolution of globalization, the basis behind these concepts of termination criteria became questionable. The region known as the Arc of Instability became the focus of US national interests internationally. Within this region, stability is the most significant factor in obtaining these interests. As seen with Operations Desert Storm and Uphold Democracy, US military planners focused more upon a quick decisive victory and a rapid withdrawal than obtaining long-term stability. As a result, they obtained the opposite effect than desired. Iraq destabilized significantly after Operation Desert Storm resulting in the resumption of military operations 12 years later. In Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy met with limited success until time became the driving factor behind termination vice obtaining the conditions needed to obtain national interests. Again, a premature withdrawal resulted in destabilization and an eventual return to open conflict. Only in Kosovo, after establishing a long-term military presence focused

⁹¹ Commandant of United States Marine Corps, "ALMAR 008/07 - Marine Corps Endstate Increase," <http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/2007/MARINE%20CORPS%20END%20STRENGTH%20INCREASE.aspx> (accessed 19 February 2009). Although this message did not specifically discuss the SC-MAGTF, it did address the development of three new infantry battalions. These three new infantry battalions, named as part of the non-existent 9th Marine Regiment, became the core units upon which the concept of the SC-MAGTF developed.

on nation capacity building, did the US achieve the conditions necessary for sustainable post-combat stability.

The operations in Kosovo provided the groundwork for Barnett's theories. Senior military leaders and planners, specifically within the US Marine Corps, embraced his concepts of the Sys Admin and Leviathan forces. They saw the Sys Admin force as a permanent, forward deployed force conducting security cooperation and other civil military operations. This force set the conditions needed for obtaining US national interests within the Arc of Instability. The United States Marine Corps developed the SC-MAGTF as the Sys Admin force in order to accomplish such missions. The Leviathan force was the US Army, capable of deploying during a crisis and resolving conflict through major combat operations. After meeting their objectives, the Leviathan withdraws, leaving the Sys Admin to continue its security cooperation operations. Based upon these concepts, termination criteria focusing on a quick, decisive victory followed by a rapid withdrawal is no longer valid. Accordingly, joint doctrine needs updating to reflect the US military's responsibility in obtaining national interest in conjunction with the other instruments of national power not only during conflict, but at all times. As such, the US military must replace termination theory with transition theory.

Areas for Further Research

Four areas of research require further examination. First, as of March 2009 the SC-MAGTF was conceptual. Despite gaining the end strength and force structure needed to implement the organization, the US Marine Corps did not plan on implementing the program until after the conclusion of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. They based this not upon the validity of the concept, but instead upon the manpower and specialization requirements of these two operations. Further analysis is required once this force becomes a reality. Second, Operation Joint Guardian was ongoing as of March 2009. It is not possible to determine the long-lasting effects of this operation until after KFOR disbands, and US forces

withdraw. An analysis of the measures of stability used in this case study must therefore occur several years after the conclusion of this operation to determine its true success.

Third, the case studies did not consider the impact of US allies in obtaining national interests. With NATO taking a more active role in post-conflict operations, the US could accomplish many of its security cooperation operation objectives by funding or assisting allied forces. Further research into this area could result in an alternative approach towards influencing countries within the Arc of Instability. Finally, as with Operation Joint Guardian, Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were ongoing in March 2009. An analysis of the US military's approach towards enabling civil authority and transitioning to security cooperation after these significant military operations end will either validate or nullify the arguments presented.

Recommendations

The aftermath of Operations Desert Storm and Uphold Democracy clearly showed that termination criteria focusing on a quick, decisive military victory and a timed withdrawal resulted in decreased stability within the Arc of Instability. This instability hampered obtaining US national interests. The development of security cooperation operations and the SC-MAGTF indicates that not only did senior military leader recognize a shift in the military's role in international relations, but so did the NCA. The four instruments of national power are responsible for obtaining US national interest at all times, not just during open conflict. The termination theories upon which the writers of joint doctrine relied upon, therefore, are no longer viable.

Accordingly, the concept of termination of military operations needs reexamination. The effects of globalization require geographic combatant commanders to maintain a permanent military presence in the periphery of, if not within, the Arc of Instability in order to meet national interests. Understanding the force expansion concept of the SC-MAGTF, planners faced with

such situation should consider not terminating military operations, but instead transitioning from a Leviathan force to the Sys Admin force, and back again, as the situation requires.

To institutionalize this concept, joint doctrine defining and explaining conflict termination must change. First, joint doctrine must address “transition” from security cooperation operations to major combat operations vice “termination” of military operations. Second, the writers of joint doctrine must remove all contradictory information regarding the topic. To do this, one common definition should exist based upon the information provided within the 2008 versions of JP 3-0 and 5-0.⁹² Specifically, the definition of transition criteria is “the conditions beyond which the President does not require major combat operations to achieve the national strategic end state.” To expound this further, a detailed explanation of transition is

It must be understood that US military forces must be dominant in all phases of combat operations, but also in the “stabilize,” “enable civil authority,” and “shaping” phases to achieve US National Interests. If transition criteria are properly set and met, the necessary resources from each of the instruments of national power will exist, preventing an adversary or other hostile actor from renewing or instigating hostilities. When addressing conflict transition, commanders and their staffs must consider a wide variety of operational issues to include a reduction of forces and the transition to security cooperation operations.

While the definition provided is vague enough to allow for the continued use of the Leviathan force, it is distinct enough to convey the understanding that a Sys Admin force is required to achieve US National Interests. The detailed explanation provided clearly reinforces the concept of integrating all instruments of national power to obtain US national interest.

Finally, the role of the military commander in developing transition criteria also requires clarification. This clarification must address not only the responsibilities of the military commander, but must also reinforce the concept of integrating all instruments of national power together to achieve national interests. Referring to the passages contained within *JP 3-0* and *JP*

⁹²This recommended explanation is a modification of the extracts from *JP 3-0* and *JP 5-0* provided between pages 11 and 14 of this monograph.

5-0 regarding the role of the military commander when developing termination criteria, the explanation of this responsibility is

Considering the interdependence of all instruments of national power in obtaining the national strategic end state, it is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the criteria needed for transition between security cooperation operations and major combat operations in concert with the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense in turn expresses the concerns and capabilities of the military to advocates of the other instruments of national power seated within the National Security Council.⁹³

By making these changes within joint doctrine, military planners would not repeat the mistakes made when concluding Operations Desert Storm and Uphold Democracy. Instead, they would be prepared to address conditions needed to achieve US national interests within the Arc of Instability on a continual basis vice ignoring them in lieu of traditional military functions such as major combat operations.

⁹³This recommended explanation is a modification of the extracts from *JP 3-0* on page 14 of this monograph.

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