

Patani and Chechnya: Lessons from a History of Insurgency

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Patani and Chechnya: Lessons from a History of Insurgency by LCDR Timothy P Reidy, U.S. Navy, 45 pages.

The history of Chechnya and that of the Sultanate of Patani, comprised by the southern Thailand provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani, share a religion, Islam, and a long history of insurgency against an ethnically and religiously dissimilar majority. In addition, the present insurgencies in both regions have been labeled by some as Jihadi insurgencies. This monograph explores the cases of Patani and Chechnya as most dissimilar systems to find lessons applicable to the U.S. military as it encounters historic insurgencies with Islamic overtones.

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Introduction

The Kingdom of Thailand's southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala originally formed the center of the tribute paying Malay Sultanate of Patani Darul Makrif.¹ Thailand annexed these provinces in 1902² sparking a primarily ethnic Malay insurgency against the government in Bangkok. This ethnic insurgency continued to modern times when, after a period of successful rapprochement in 2000, the Thai government deemed the insurgency defeated.³ In 2004, after five years of relative peace in the southern provinces, the insurgency returned in a more violent Jihadist form.⁴ Wracked by political turmoil, the Thai government was unable to respond in a consistent manner, initially denying the insurgency and then overreacting.⁵ The Thai government's violent abuses in dealing with the return of the insurgency tended to turn Muslim public support away from the government in Bangkok at the same time as pressure from Jihadists was destabilizing the governance of southern villages and creating a shadow Islamic government.

The Russian experience in Chechnya in some ways parallels this history. The Chechen insurgency began as an attempt by a significant ethnic enclave to assert its independence from Moscow. Due in large part to the success of the Russian government's violent suppression of the insurgency, the struggle in Chechnya transformed into a Jihad. While the regional pressures and governmental conditions vary greatly between the Chechen and southern Thailand cases, the subscript of an ethnic insurgency that is declared defeated by the government and reawakens as a

¹ Shukri, Ibrahim, Conner Bailey, and John N. Miksik, *History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani = Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani*. (Ohio U., Center for International Studies, 1985), Map 1.

² Human Rights Watch, "No One is Safe: Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces," *Human Rights Watch* 19, no. 13 (August 2007): 13.

³ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴ S.P. Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities: The case of Southern Thailand Discord*. Working Paper, (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2006), 16, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP107.pdf> (accessed February 21, 2009).

⁵ Neil J. Melvin, *Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency*. Policy Paper No.20, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (Bromma: CM Gruppen, 2007), 2, <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP20.pdf> (accessed February 21, 2009).

Jihad is shared. The case of Chechnya holds lessons about the transition of insurgency to Jihad that can be applied in Thailand with respect to what techniques are successful and what missteps to attempt to avoid.

The overall methodology used in this monograph will be a comparative case study of most dissimilar systems. The two systems of interest are the insurgency in the Russian province of Chechnya and the insurgency in Patani, the three southern Thailand provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani. These cases were chosen based on dissimilarities of their history, geography, and the strategy employed by the dominant party against the insurgent. They also share the modern perception of similarity of form in that both insurgencies seemingly began as separatist movements centered on ethnicity and seemingly transformed into Islamist separatist movements. While the secessionist movements share a broadly common religious identity, Islam, the dominant party religions which feed into the government's own interpretation of the secession movements, Christianity in Russia and Buddhism in Thailand, are very different in interpretation and focus.

The cases will be developed in the following sections. The first section will be an overview of the literature available to develop the history and analysis of the cases. The next section will be an explanation of the method and analysis to be used. The third section will focus on Chechnya. Subsections will present an overview of the history of Chechnya and its experience with Russia and modern Russian efforts to counteract the insurgency in Chechnya. This includes an analysis of both phases of the Chechen insurgency as well as possible motivations for the separate phases of the counterinsurgency efforts. The final subsection in the Chechen case will compile the lessons learned.

The fourth section focuses on Southern Thailand. It will largely mirror the Russian subsections exploring the history of Patani in phases. Subsections will cover the history of Patani, its incorporation into the main Thai state, the development of Thai rule and the modern insurgency. These sections will include the cultural separation of the southern Thai Muslims, the

treatment of the Patani people and efforts to assimilate southern Muslims into the Thai identity.

This section will end with an analysis and lessons learned from the Patani case.

The final section will be the conclusion wherein common threads will be compiled to explore similarities, differences, and lessons learned from each case. Overarching lessons learned which may be applied to all counterinsurgency operations and applications will be proposed as well as any areas for continued study or further development.

Literature Review

The history of both Chechnya and Patani are provided as a foundation preceding the analysis of the two insurgent case studies. This literature is of varied depth and requires the review of several sources to ensure that no pertinent data is omitted by the over reliance on a single source. Literature on the analysis of the conflicts is also explored. One shortcoming of the literature is that more information from a larger variety of viewpoints and sources is available on Patani than on Chechnya.

Scholarly historical works on the history and culture of Chechnya starting before the major Russian interactions in the 18th century are difficult to find. Works readily available on Chechnya tend to focus on the analysis of aspects of the modern insurgency, such as the use of airpower or specific counterinsurgency tactics, and begin their historical analysis in the modern Russian era. These works neglect the historical context of the insurgency, how the Chechen people came to be, how they view their religion, detailed discussion of their evolution of Chechen culture, or the reasons for Chechen resistance to Russian expansion. While data is available on the internet regarding the history of the conflict, it is not scholarly work, but rather undocumented timelines on Chechen websites or other popular works such as a Public Broadcasting Company documentary. Some of the most detailed writings are unsigned and unannotated. While the reasons for this are beyond the scope of this monograph, it is worthwhile to note the absence of in depth writings and analysis. This is especially noteworthy when viewed in light of the differences in strategies employed by Russia and Thailand in the combating the insurgencies in Patani and Chechnya and when compared to the amount of work available on the insurgency in Southern Thailand.

Much work analyzing the modern Chechen insurgency and its cultural underpinnings has been done in Russian by Russian researchers. Little of this is available to the non-Russian speaker. Even if a translation can be found, much of the work was funded by the Russian

government and tends to be less than impartial. Both of the academic works *Chechnya from Nationalism to Jihad* by James Hughes and *Chechnya – Russia's War on Terror* by John Russell extensively use Russian language sources in the development of their work on the subject. Both authors freely discuss the benefits and drawbacks of the Russian author's viewpoints and analysis as they present their cases. A large amount of the available work is of the first person variety by intrepid adventurers and journalists. While these sources are interesting, this monograph relies on the academic work done by Hughes and Russell to gain insight on the intricacies of the modern Chechen insurgency. The Hughes book is especially useful for its in depth discussion of the basis for the Russian federation and its peculiar use of the concept of asymmetric ethnic federalism as a tool to stave off disunity. The Russell book is useful for its broad coverage of the history and context of the conflict. The downside of the Hughes book, an utter lack of context and the assumption that the reader is both conversant in the bulk of political science concepts and terminology, is refreshingly absent from the Russell book. If taken as a pair and with much time to study them in depth, they impart a very broad and detailed understanding of the issues involved in the Chechen insurgency.

The work done by Emil Souleimanov in presenting an analysis of the Chechen Society and mentality from Prague Czech Republic is very helpful in understanding the underpinnings of Chechen society and the building blocks of the resistance to Russian domination. In much the same vein the work by Chenciner dovetails in to the historical generalities of Souleimanov's work and brings the cultural commentary up to modern influences.

The works by Bergen and Yevsyokova attempt to present a historical account of the Chechen conflict. While the largest part of both of these works is devoted to the modern conflict from 1991 to the present, they present the history and development of the conflict as well.

The literature available on the Patani insurgency tends to be more current but less detailed. Especially helpful are works from the International Crises Group, the East West Center, Human Rights Watch, Assumption University in Bangkok, and pieces from the Institute of

Defense and Strategic Studies Singapore. These groups span the spectrum of analysis from the historic interaction of Islam and Thai Buddhism to a detailed analysis of the use of paramilitaries, to a chronicle of first hand interviews with Malay Muslims insurgents and non-insurgents. As a group the works available break down into three general groups. The first are histories. These include broad histories of Thailand, the whole of Southeast Asia, or Malaysia, as well as specific histories of the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand or the Kingdom of Patani. The second group is the works that focus on the history and development of the Patani insurgency. These tend to reflect the specialty and emphasis of the individual author. They offer the researcher an in depth analysis of an aspect of the conflict. The third group consists of modern analysis and research of the current efforts by the Thai government and the insurgents. These use primary sources, such as interviews, news articles and reports to analyze the impact and evolution of the insurgency with respect to current events and efforts. These provide an excellent insight into the ongoing evolution of counterinsurgency and the perception of action or inaction on the part of the government and insurgents.

Three works, by Syukri, Aphornsuvan, and Kulick and Wilson were especially helpful in the analysis of the history of the interaction between Patani Muslims in Southern Thailand from the fourteenth century to present day. The Syukri work, an indigenous chronicle written under a pseudonym and translated from jawi, the native Patani language, to English by Bailey and Miksic, stands as a key work from the Malay Muslim perspective. While not what would be considered a modern historical work, it traces the detailed history of the Kingdom of Patani and the Patani peoples from their most basic roots and influences to their modern forms as it is perceived by the southern Thai Malay Muslims. The other two influential histories by Aphornsuvan and by Kulick and Wilson are modern historical works. Aphornsuvan's brief history is heavily quoted in many studies on the Southern Thailand insurgency. As the director of the Asian Studies Institute at Thammasat University in Bangkok, Thailand, Aphornsuvan has an intimate knowledge of the history and formative interactions that created and influenced the

relationship between Southern Thai Malay Muslims and the Thai state. As opposed to the other historical writings, Kulick and Wilson's book addresses the development of the Thai nation. This insight allows the history of Patani to be viewed from a Thai perspective, much as the Syukri book allows the relationship to be viewed from the Malay Muslim perspective. Taken together, and used in conjunction with other writings, the three historical works provide a varied and solid base from which to analyze the development of the conflict.

The works by Harish, Melvin, and Yusuf, as well as the one of the works from the International Crisis Group present a short history in support of their analysis of the insurgency in Southern Thailand. These modern writers share a focus on the transformation and identity shifts influencing the perceptions and execution of the insurgency and counterinsurgency in Patani. Imitiaz Yusuf, the head of the Department of Religion at Assumption University Bangkok, Thailand, focuses his work on the role of Islam in the development of the southern Thai insurgency. Neil Melvin and the International Crises Group focus on the conflict in a more holistic way, presenting a broad look at multiple influences and perception of the development of the conflict. In the same way the Harish work is a comprehensive working paper exploring much of the same subject selected for one of the cases in this study.

Amnesty International, Human Rights watch and the International Crisis Group works focus on the conduct of the current insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts. These works focus on what they perceive to be the actions and motivations of the government and the insurgents. In addition to the analysis and research of these groups, they include conclusions and recommendations for the international community as well as the Thai government. While the research found in these works is fairly comprehensive, each of these groups presents a viewpoint that must be carefully analyzed before using the facts presented.

Methodology

The overall methodology used in this monograph will be a comparative case study of most dissimilar systems. The two systems of interest are the insurgency in the Russian province of Chechnya and the insurgency in the three southern Thailand provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani. These cases were chosen based on dissimilarities of history and the strategy employed by the dominant party against the insurgent and the similarity of their superficial modern perception of form in that they began as a separatist movement centered on ethnicity and transformed into a religion centered separatist movement. The cases also share a broadly common religious identity. The cases will be developed in the following sections. The first section will be an overview of the history of Chechnya and its experience with Russia. This will include the geography, ethnic makeup, traditions and governance of the region. The history will also include an analysis of the Russian and later Soviet rule of Chechnya including the tensions between Chechnya and rule from Moscow. Finally, the history section will analyze the period during the post Soviet transition. This will include the modern perception of a modern national identity, the difficulties of the devolution of power from the Supreme Soviet to regional government and the possible motivations behind the initial Chechen separatist movement. The next section will cover the modern Russian efforts to counteract the insurgency in Chechnya. This will cover both phases of the insurgency as well as possible motivations for the separate phases of the counterinsurgency efforts. Also included in this section are the complicating relationships with neighboring provinces and countries, including Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Georgia, and their roles in the Chechen conflict. The final section in the Chechen case will compile the lessons learned and the steps that led to a deepening of the conflict or the conversion of the conflict into an Islamic Jihad.

The third section focuses on Southern Thailand. The history of the Southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat is examined in this section. Specific emphasis on geography and regional identity show that the manner of annexation and the cultural tradition of these three

provinces created and maintained a sense of separation and a regional identity that never reconciled with Thailand. The era from annexation to WWII under the Thai monarchy adds another dimension to the identification of the southern Thai provinces in that have been treated differently from the native Thai Buddhist regions. Finally, post-WWII treatment of the ethnic Malay provinces is examined with specific emphasis on the consolidation of the modern Thai constitutional monarchy and the development of the modern Thai national identity. This effort created tensions within the semi-autonomous southern regions as the national government attempted to fuse the country into a coherent entity.

The cases will be examined specifically to explore the background and basis for the insurgency in the respective cultures. The focus of the analysis will transition to the decisions made by the respective governments with respect to strategy and engagement at the beginning of the insurgency. Later, the paper will analyze the escalation and shifts in strategy and the perception of the reconcilable population, those only tangentially involved or not active in the insurgency. Common threads will be explored to develop criteria for comparison and to develop caveats for the proper translation of the two experiences. The caveats of translating the experiences in discrete insurgencies gleaned from culturally and environmentally disparate areas will factor heavily into the veracity of the lessons and the application of those lessons going forward. Overarching lessons learned for future U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and applications will be proposed as well as any areas for continued study or further development.

Chechnya

Chechnya is a mostly mountainous country approximately the size of New Jersey with fertile lowlands in the east, steppes in the north and the Greater Caucasus Mountains in the south.⁶ The main ethnic group, with over 90% of the 2002 population, is Chechen.⁷ The main languages are Chechen, a Vaynakh language whose only close relations are other Caucasian languages, and Russian, which was introduced with Russian contact and spread under Russian rule.⁸ Chechnya is a densely forested region although much more passable in the modern era due to the road system built mostly by the Russians and Soviets over the last 200 years. The majority of Chechens are Sunni Muslim. Traditionally the Sufi order has been dominant⁹, however since the fall of the Soviet Union and the resumption of the Hajj and other contact with the greater Islamic community, Wahhabism has grown in popularity. Some experts estimate up to 25% of young Chechens practice the Wahhabi order of Sunni Islam.¹⁰

Chechen society is based on a teip, or clan, system of people related to a single common ancestor. Adat, or customary law is still practiced next to Sharia, law and state law under the Russian law system.¹¹ Under adat common defense is prized as well as the veneration of ancestors and the blood feud. There are many circumstances that may require a blood debt, such

⁶ Mariya Yevsyukova, *The Conflict Between Russia and Chechnya*. Working Paper, (Boulder: Conflict Research Consortium, 1994), under “Checheno-Ingushetia,” http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/full_text_search/AllCRCDocs/95-5.htm (accessed February 22, 2009).

⁷ Judyth Twigg, “Differential Demographics: Russia’s Muslim and Slavic Populations.” *PONARS Policy Memo*, no. 388, December 2005:134, http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/pm_0388.pdf (accessed March 21, 2009).

⁸ Johanna Nichols, *Who are the Chechen*. Jan 13, 1995, under “Language,” <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/63/077.html> (accessed March 21, 2009).

⁹ James Hughes. *Chechnya From Nationalism to Jihad*. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 12.

¹⁰ Robert Chenciner, *Russia's Splitting Headache - A brief History of Chechnya*. May 6, 2005, under “Sunni Islam,” <http://polosbastards.com/pb/brief-history-of-chechnya> (accessed February 18, 2009).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, under “Chechen social history.”

as telling a story of another person's uncle who tended to exaggerate his own accomplishments or otherwise dwelling on a poor attribute of someone's dead relative. This results in a culture where heated language is very rare. It also contributes to the perception of Chechens as bloodthirsty savages.¹² That perception is further reinforced by the tendency to resolve a blood debt with a kinjaal, the ceremonial dagger maintained by Chechens. Using a kinjaal to remove the head of an enemy with whom an individual Chechen or teip has a blood debt is not rare in the history of the Chechen people¹³ and is not the same as the beheadings that are perceived as the hallmark of the hardcore Jihadi movement.

Traditionally adat was enforced by a council of elders in a society of relative equals. It formed the backbone of property and family law in Chechen villages as well as governing the assignment of blood debts and feuds. While the feudal or class system sometimes existed in the lowland areas of Chechnya, it was not practiced in the highlands where teips framed the social system. Teips came together in regional tukhums that aligned teips in the short term for defense, but these were temporary and did not form the basis for long term social loyalties.¹⁴ Feudal leadership and individual rule were unknown in highland Chechnya where loyalty was to the teip and adat enforced by teip elders formed the law. Divisions between Chechen teips, however, are exploited to this day.¹⁵ Traditional adat includes representation of females by males in council and exogenous marriage beyond the Teip. The traditional work of the Chechen people has been animal husbandry in the highlands and farming in the lowlands. The chief modern natural resource is oil although Chechen oil has not been of strategic importance to Russia since the mid-

¹² John Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*. (London: Routledge, 2007), 37.

¹³ Emil Souleimanov, *Chechen Society and Mentality*. May 25, 2003, under "Etiquette violations," <http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000015-000006-000006&lang=1> (accessed February 18, 2009).

¹⁴ Chenciner, *Russia's Splitting Headache*, under "Chechen social history."

¹⁵ John Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*. (London: Routledge, 2007), 41.

20th century.¹⁶ Throughout its history the importance of Chechnya has been its position as the gateway to Persia and the Caspian Sea. The origin of modern Russian interest in Chechnya was due to the annexation of Dagestan, Azerbaijan and the protectorate of Georgia.¹⁷ The current Russian interest is compounded by the oil pipelines that run through Chechnya from the Caspian oil fields.¹⁸

Pre-Russian History

The beginnings of recorded organized foreign invasion into Chechnya date back to the Thirteenth century. The mountains of the Caucasus, comprising the highlands of modern Chechnya, were an ungoverned area while the Russian steppes were ruled by the Turkic Kypchak (Cuman) Khanate. East of the Caucasus in the lowlands, the Khwarezmian Empire ruled the lands bordering the Caspian Sea. South and west of the Caucasus, controlling the land from the Black sea to the borders of the Khwarezmian Empire, was the Kingdom of Georgia.¹⁹ The initial Mongol invasion passed through the Eastern Caucasus near the Caspian Sea on the way to rout the Rus'-Kypchak armies and dominate modern Russia. These Mongols left the highlands of the Caucasus mostly alone as they conquered or subjugated the majority of the rest Central Asia.²⁰ Tamerlane who aspired to restore the Mongol Empire again plundered the Caucasus lowlands and

¹⁶ Robert Ebel, "The History and Politics of Chechen Oil." *Caspian Crossroads*, Winter 1995, under "By today's standards," <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/HOMEPAGES/USAZERB/3.htm> (Accessed March 17, 2009).

¹⁷ Michael Khodarkovsky, "Of Chistianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550-1800." *The Journal of Modern History*, (1999): 395, <http://www.jstor.org/ table/2990412> (accessed March 21, 2009).

¹⁸ Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*, 72.

¹⁹ Walter Bergen, *Religion in Eastern Europe*. March 19, 1995, under "GEOGRAPHY," http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swk/ree/CHECHNYA_BER.html (accessed March 21, 2009).

²⁰ Hayrapet Margarian, "The Nomads and Ethnopolitical Realities of Trnascaucasia in the 11th-14th Centuries." *Iran & the Caucasus*, 2001: 77, <http://www.tc.umn.edu/~cmedst/gmap/uploaded/The%20Nomads%20and%20Ethnopolitical%20Realities%20of%20Trnascaucasia%20in%20the%2011th%20to%2014th%20Centuries.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2009).

sent several military expeditions into the highland to punish resistance from the Chechens. The end result of the depredations and rule of the Mongols was the introduction of Islam into the Caucasus and the retreat of the Chechen people from lowland farms which were then taken over by ethnic Tukic and Tatar settlers to the mountains. It also developed the Chechens into a more formal structure of armed and fortified mountain villages or “Auls” for self defense. Life in the mountains was not conducive to agriculture or other labor intensive activities. Without the need to control vast labor pools the Chechens did not develop feudal societies as in the lowlands or on the steppes.²¹ Instead clans or “Teips” consisting of several villages became the center of Chechen society. When threatened, the Teips would combine into regional Tukhums to fight the invader.²²

Following the Mongol invasions, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire gradually extended its influence over the western half of the Caucasus and the Persian Empire extended its influence over the eastern half. Despite the spread of Islamic empires in the Caucasus, Islam remained a small factor in the culture of the Caucasus, more strongly felt in the lowlands than the highlands, but continually present along with the traditional animist religion.²³

Russians in Chechnya

The history of the Russian and Chechen interaction in the Caucasus goes back to Tsar Boris Gudonov who, in 1604, fought the Turks and Chechens in vain for control of Persian trade routes.²⁴ The Russians would not be back until Peter the Great was defeated by the Chechens near Enderi in 1722 on his way to fight the Persians.²⁵ After the East Georgian king of Kartl-Kalcheti

²¹ Souleimanov, *Chechen Society and Mentality*, under “Society and mountain democracy.”

²² Hughes. *Chechnya From Nationalism to Jihad*, 4.

²³ Souleimanov, *Chechen Society and Mentality*, under “Remnants of the cult of ancestors.”

²⁴ Bergen, *Religion in Eastern Europe*, under “Preliminary Moves.”

²⁵ Ibid., under “Peace and Social Change.”

signed a treaty establishing his vassalage to Russia in exchange for protection from Turkish and Prussian aggression, the Chechens felt themselves surrounded by Russian domination. As a way to fight the extension of Russian influence into the Caucasus, Imam Sheik Mansur declared a Ghazavat, holy war, to unite the mountain Islamic peoples, Daghestani, Chechen, Ingush, Tatar and more, against Russia. Mansur also attempted to introduce Sharia law in place of the traditional adat, customary law still in use today. While Mansur enjoyed initial military success, he was captured in 1791 and died in a Russian prison in 1794.²⁶ Russia concentrated on assimilating the lowlands as Daghestan, east of the Chechen highlands, was incorporated into Russia from 1803 to 1813.

In 1830 Russian forces under Aleksey Yermolev moved into the highlands. While not strikingly different in intent than the campaigns against Native Americans or the Scottish highlanders, the Russians under Yermolev were extremely brutal. The highland peoples, mostly Ingush, Chechen and some Daghestani, united under a succession of Daghestani leaders culminating in Imam Shamil. For 25 years Yermolev sent raiding parties from a series of forts along the Sunja River, the most important of which was Grozny, to burn crops and villages and kill all natives they happened upon.²⁷ This culminated predictably in incidents such as on Sept 27, 1819 when General Sysoev ordered his men to massacre all the men, women, and children in the Chechen village of Dadi Yurt.²⁸ Imam Shamil concentrated his power into a strict imamate that enforced Islamic law as he sent his Sufi Muslim followers out of the hills to raid into the lowlands. In 1859 after the destruction of the Chechen economy and half of the population of the highlands, Shamil surrendered to an expeditionary Russian force of 200,000 troops.²⁹ Yermolov's strategy can be summed up in this quotation, "I desire that the terror of my name should guard

²⁶ Bergen, *Religion in Eastern Europe*, under "Ghazawat."

²⁷ Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*, 30.

²⁸ Ibid., 31.

²⁹ Yevsyukova, *The Conflict Between Russia and Chechnya*, under "After Yermolav."

our frontiers more potently than chains or fortresses, that my word should be for the natives a law more inevitable than death”³⁰ and his goal is summed up in his message to Tsar Aleksandr I that “he would find no peace while a single Chechen remained alive.”³¹ Following Imam Shamil’s surrender in 1864, hundreds of thousands of Chechens were expelled or migrated from Tsarist Russia to Turkey and elsewhere within Central Asia and Christian Cossacks resettled in their place.³²

This post-Yermolav exile is the period when abrekhs, honorable bandits from the highlands, began robbing the Cossacks brought in to farm the lowlands and attacking any Russian government representative they found. This type of insurgent resistance remained active under Russian rule through 1917, even after the return of most Chechen exiles. During the Russian revolution Chechnya and Ingushetia formed the Mountainous Republic of the North Caucasus and generally fought with the Bolshevik Red Army against the Tsarist White Army. Much of the violence in Chechnya during the revolution is between White Army supporting Cossacks, who lived in former Chechen areas in the lowlands, and the Chechens and Red Army forces from the mountains.³³ Much of the appeal of the Red Army amongst the Chechens is due to the perception that Lenin supported independence for Chechnya and other discrete ethnicities.

In 1922, Stalin removed Chechnya from the rest of the Mountain Republic and began to assimilate Caucasus. Ten thousand mountain people forcibly relocated to lowlands in 1923. Arabic was removed from the official languages of Chechnya. In 1925, the Soviets disarmed the Chechens and in 1929 the Soviets attempted to collectivize the land. While there had not previously been private land ownership in Chechnya, the teips rebelled against the combining and repurposing of land. The insurrection spread outward from Chechnya, where Chechens seized

³⁰ Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*, 31.

³¹ Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*, 31.

³² Yevsyukova, *The Conflict Between Russia and Chechnya*, under “In order to strengthen.”

³³ Ibid., under “During the years.”

Russian facilities including oil fields, and the Soviets backed down from the land collectivization.³⁴ In 1934, the Soviets realigned the Caucasus regions into a Chechen-Ingush ASSR and begin to relocate ethnic Russians into Grozny and elsewhere in the lowlands leading to a peak of 29% Russian ethnicity in Chechnya. While these lowland areas are not traditionally part of Chechnya, only at times had Chechens farmed some of these areas, the new borders included them and diluted Chechen and Ingush voting majorities.³⁵ Chechen raids and resistance continued against Soviet encroachment.

Although numerous Chechens fought valiantly with the Soviet Red Army in WWII, during the war other large sections of Chechnya rebelled against the Soviet Union. After the war, Stalin accused the Chechens of colluding with the Nazis by showing them mountain passes and fighting the Red Army during Operation Blue, the German push to secure the Caucasian oil fields.³⁶ To punish the collaborators, the entire Chechen and Ingush population, over 500,000 people, were forcibly relocated to Kazakhstan or Siberia by cattle car over the course of a few days time. Approximately half the Chechen population died in the deportation or in exile. None were allowed to return until 1957. When the Chechens did return they were not allowed to return to the highlands and found ethnic Russians in control of the lowlands.³⁷ The Rusification policies of the Soviets continued throughout the Soviet period. Fluency in the Russian language served as a cultural proficiency requirement for advancement or success.³⁸ This left many Chechens with no choice but to turn to the underground black market and organized crime to get ahead.³⁹

³⁴ Paul B. Henze, "Islam in the North Caucasus: The Example of Chechnya." *Circassian World*. (September 1993): 9, http://www.circassianworld.com/pdf/Henze_Islam_NorthCaucasus.pdf (accessed March 21, 2009).

³⁵ Ibid., 10.

³⁶ Yevsyukova, *The Conflict Between Russia and Chechnya*, under "In 1929."

³⁷ Henze, "Islam in the North Caucasus," 11.

³⁸ Ibid., 12.

³⁹ Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*, 46.

Soviet Breakup

In 1988, the Popular Front of the Checheno-Ingushetiya ASSR formed around the popular perception of the need to correct Russian history of the ‘voluntary inclusion of Chechen-Ingush in Russia.’ This served as the opposition to the party-Soviet rule of Checheno-Ingushetiya.⁴⁰ In 1989, the first ever Chechen was elected as head of Checheno-Ingushetiya. The Vaynakh Democratic Party (VDP) appeared in 1990 in opposition to the Soviet government in power. The VDP had the goal of an independent Vaynakh Republic as an equal to the USSR. On November 27, 1990 the Republic Supreme Soviet adopted the ‘Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic’ stating the Checheno-Ingush Republic (ChIR) was a sovereign state that could sign the Union and federative treaties on an equal basis. While this altered little in reality it furthered the notional cause of Chechen independence.⁴¹ After the attempted coup in the USSR of 19-21 August 1991, the Chechen separatists acted. On August 22nd, 1991 the National Congress of Chechen People (NCChP) demanded that the ChIR Supreme Soviet resign for not taking a stand against the coup. During their meetings on the 1st and 2nd of September, 1991 the NCChP declared the ChIR Supreme Soviet overthrown and gave power over to the NCChP executive committee. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet forced the resignation of the ChIR deputies and handed power to the Provisional High Council of the ChIR, in opposition to the NCChP executive committee.⁴² On the night of October 7, 1991 soldiers from the National Guard under the command of the head of the NCChP, General Dudayev, seized the Provisional High Council residence and the councilors. Russia’s President Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in ChIR and sent 650 troops.

⁴⁰ Hughes. *Chechnya From Nationalism to Jihad*, 18.

⁴¹ Yevsyukova, *The Conflict Between Russia and Chechnya*, under “At first, the perestroyka.”

⁴² Ibid.

Dudayev mobilized thousands of armed supporters and the Russian forces withdrew after the Russian legislature and the Kremlin made it clear they did not support armed intervention. However, the state of emergency changed the political climate in Checheno-Ingushetia and General Dudayev declared clear intentions to form an independent republic.⁴³ A year after the declaration by Dudayev a state of emergency was declared in Checheno-Ingushetia due to ethnic fighting between Ingush and Ossetians. The Ossetians held land gained after the Ingush were deported after WWII and the Ingush wanted the land returned. Russia sent troops to the border of Checheno-Ingushetia and Dudayev threatened to declare war on Russia if the troops weren't removed. Since Ingushetiya declared its independence from Chechnya at the same time Russia removed its troops from the Chechen border.⁴⁴

Unfortunately for Chechnya, Dudayev could not form a stable government. Chechnya descended into a mob fueled criminal spiral that interfered with the resolution of Chechnya's relationship with Russia.⁴⁵ One sect of Russian politicians was negotiating with Chechen power brokers to install them as strongmen and restore Chechnya to the Russian Federation. Another sect of Russians was attempting to negotiate with General Dudayev for an autonomy treaty like the one between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan, an ethnic republic wholly surrounded by Russia that would grant substantial autonomy as part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Neither negotiation came to fruition leading Russia to heavily support the opposition within Chechnya in a probable attempt to split Chechnya and make Dudayev a more tractable partner. Dudayev wanted Chechnya to join the CIS as a fully equal partner with Russia.

⁴³ Hughes. *Chechnya From Nationalism to Jihad*, 27.

⁴⁴ Yevsyukova, *The Conflict Between Russia and Chechnya*, under "A year after these."

⁴⁵ Hughes. *Chechnya From Nationalism to Jihad*, 64.

Russia was only willing to allow Chechnya to be a semi autonomous member of the Russian Federation.⁴⁶

Russian and Soviet Rule

While Russian rule was tenuous and full of cruel repression and reprisals, the Soviet period was worse. Yermalov and his successors attempted to exterminate the Chechen people and had limited success due to his limited reach. Stalin, however, had modern equipment and was able to exert a control that came much closer to his goal of exterminating the Chechen culture, and people, than Yermalov got to exterminating the people. Where the two epochs are set side by side the similarities are easy to see. Both include a long heavy military campaign of repression. Both use Islam as an established path to characterize and demonize the Chechens. Both result in the mass dislocation of the Chechens after years of Chechen resistance and low level insurgency in the face of overwhelming Russian or Soviet force.

The Chechens have taken every opportunity to resist Russian encroachment and control from the 17th century to modern times. While Chechen society has nominally been tolerant and tradition centric, Islam has been repeatedly used both by Russians and by Chechens as a rallying cry and motivation for war. From the Ghazavat declared by Imam Mansur, through the Imamate of Shamil, to the Wahabism that motivates many modern Chechen insurgents exemplified in Shamil Basaev, Islam has waxed and waned as a motivation for Chechen rebellion and desire for freedom.⁴⁷

Modern Insurgency

The modern Chechen insurgency is vastly different than under Dudayev in 1991. In 1991, Dudaev could marshal a loosely aligned group of well armed Chechen nationalists. Over the

⁴⁶ Hughes. *Chechnya From Nationalism to Jihad*, 74.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 98.

course of the first and second Chechen wars this group changed. One of the largest changes was due to the actions of Shamil Basaev. While Dudaev talked of using terrorism as a weapon against the Russians, Basaev implemented the course of action. After the first Chechen war, Shamil Basaev saw that there would be a second war. He decided that Chechnya would have to resort to terrorism in the face of a sustained Russian offensive. To this end, he and some of his associates went to Afghanistan to train. In Afghanistan he took on a Wahabi view of Islam and the struggle for Islam against the outside world. Upon his return, he began to implement his view. For Shamil Basaev, terrorism was justified. What the Russians were doing to Chechens, he would bring to the Russians. His group, including Chechens and international terrorists, some of whom were linked to Al Qaeda, perpetrated some of the most egregious acts of terrorism performed in recent history (i.e. the Beslan school hostage taking).⁴⁸ While Russian security forces were responsible for a large amount of the casualty figures, Basaev's actions and the accolades he received in Chechnya for them led to the radicalization of the Chechen conflict on both Russian and Chechen sides. On the Russian side it provided fodder for the extreme actions espoused by the militant governing faction. It not only allowed Vladimir Putin's government faction to gain support, but it allowed his ascension on a war hero status based on disproportionate military actions he directed in Chechnya. The radicalization of both the Russian and Chechen sides through the ongoing use of terrorism led to an escalation in brutality and a hardening of attitudes that prevent a de-escalation of the conflict.⁴⁹

Dudayev's and Maskadov's failure to repudiate the popular Basaev led to the further glorification of Basaev and his methods. This led, in turn, to the appeal of radical Wahabi Islam and the further radicalization of the insurgency. Ultimately, this led to a split between the more moderate sufist traditional and reconcilable faction and the radical wahabi faction. The

⁴⁸ Hughes. *Chechnya From Nationalism to Jihad*, 154.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 94.

reconcilable faction took the Russian offer of limited autonomy after the death of Maskadov.⁵⁰

The same offer that Dudaev spurned and that was unavailable to Maskadov due to his support of Basaev. This reconcilable faction is now responsible for the carrying out the Chechenization of the counterinsurgency whereby Chechen sufist is hunting Chechen whabist in the mountains of the Caucasus. There is a bloody standoff, but the conflict has stabilized after fifteen years.

⁵⁰ Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*, 130.

Patani

The provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala form the bulk of the Thai remnants of Patani Darul Makrif, the independent Malay Sultanate of Patani.⁵¹ Patani is the Malay spelling and refers to the former Sultanate while Pattani is a province of Thailand in the area included in the Sultanate of Patani. Over seventy-five percent of the population in the three provinces⁵² or forty-four percent of the overall Muslim population in Thailand⁵³ are ethnic Malay Muslim. This minority shares, neither the unofficial Thai religion, Buddhism, nor the Thai language with the majority of the country. Instead the language of common use is Jawi, a Malay dialect that is not used in any of the local schools or in the conduct of official business in Thailand.⁵⁴

Patani Vassal State

This ethnic Malay Sultanate was founded in 1309⁵⁵ in the pre-Islamic period on the Malay Peninsula. About the same time that the Patani elites converted to Islam, the kingdom of Siam began to assert its influence.⁵⁶ This early suzerainty allowed the native Malay rajas to remain in power in Patani as long as they continued to pay tribute.⁵⁷ This early association was not without its tension. The Patani rajas were focused toward Malacca more than toward Siam.⁵⁸ Unfortunately the Portuguese defeated the Malaccan Sultanate in 1511 so Malacca was unable to

⁵¹ Shukri, Bailey, and Miksik, *History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani*, Map 1.

⁵² Melvin, *Conflict in Southern Thailand*, vi.

⁵³ Imitiyaz Yusuf, *Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand*. Working Paper, (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2007), 2, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/EWCW_wp007.pdf (accessed February 2, 2009).

⁵⁴ "No One is Safe," 13.

⁵⁵ Melvin, *Conflict in Southern Thailand*, 1.

⁵⁶ Thanet Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand." *Cornell University South East Asia Program Post-Secondary Teaching Materials*. December 2, 2003, 12, <http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/southeastasia/outreach/resources/MuslimThailand.pdf> (accessed February 2, 2009).

⁵⁷ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 4.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

assist Patani in throwing off its obligations to Siam.⁵⁹ Throughout the Ayutthaya period in Siam and into the Bangkok period, Patani proved a troublesome vassal. Whenever Siam seemed weak, Patani would, at the very least stop paying tribute and at the most revolt. Revolts occurred in 1564 when a Patani unit, called to assist Siam against the Burmese, instead seized the King's palace.⁶⁰ Other uprisings occurred in 1630, 1633 and 1767 after the Burmese ransacked Aruthya.⁶¹ Throughout this period the Siamese government took an indirect 'divide and rule' approach to the governing of Patani, splitting the territory up and cultivated rival elites to administer the separate pieces under the observance of the administration of a southern Thai city. This approach succeeded in keeping Patani mostly divided and a vassal of Siam for five centuries.⁶²

Inclusion into Thailand

In 1785, King Rama I, the founder of the current Thai dynasty, enacted a campaign to incorporate Patani as well as the Malay sultanates of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu into the Siamese Empire. Rama sidelined the ruling elites and elevated leaders loyal to Bangkok in their place.⁶³ Further uprisings against Bangkok occurred in 1789-91, after which Siam deposed the Patani raja, and 1808 after which Patani was carved into seven smaller muang or provinces in a repeat of the 'divide and rule' tactic.⁶⁴ This did not stop the seven provinces from rebelling against Siamese rule, but the rebellions resulted only in Kedah being subdivided into two parts. The rebellions during the Arutthaya and early Bangkok periods were mainly conflicts among

⁵⁹ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 4.

⁶⁰ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 13.

⁶¹ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 4.

⁶² Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 12.

⁶³ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 4.

⁶⁴ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 13.

elites over the control of manpower and wealth in Malay provinces of Siam.⁶⁵ Matrimonial bonds between the Siamese and Malay elites focused the conflict in the area to an aristocratic struggle for power, not a nationalist or religious struggle. A united opposition to Rama I's incorporation in the early 19th century showed signs of a Malay identity, but there was no popular solidarity or resistance against Siamese rule.⁶⁶

Modern Thai Rule

At the end of the nineteenth century King Chulalongkorn, Rama V, accelerated his hold on Southern Thailand in the face of British expansion in Malaya. He converted the traditionally semi-autonomous principalities into provinces under direct rule from Bangkok.⁶⁷ In the case of Patani and her sister states, this occurred under the creation of the "Area of Seven Provinces" administrative body in 1901⁶⁸ followed by the official annexation of Patani in 1902 and consolidation through 1906.⁶⁹ This move alienated the Malay rajas and nobility, but, aside from the then-Raja of Patani, this was easily smoothed over by reparations from Bangkok.⁷⁰ The British opposed the Siamese rearrangement of sovereignty requiring the Siamese to sign the Anglo-Thai treaty of 1909 whereby the government in Siam ceded the provinces of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Perlis to Great Britain in exchange for recognition of Thai control of Patani and Satun.⁷¹

In 1902, King Chulalongkorn's decreed, in an effort to unify the code of law in Thailand, that "no law shall be established" without specific royal consent. Up until then the local rajas

⁶⁵ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 13.

⁶⁶ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 5.

⁶⁷ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 14.

⁶⁸ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 5.

⁶⁹ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 14.

⁷⁰ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 5.

⁷¹ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 14.

enforced Sharia law and the backlash from the religious community forced Chulalongkorn to strike the compromise that the state would refrain from intruding into the sensitive areas of inheritance and family relations, following the common British colonial practice. This allowed the locals to create a court system, “the Qadi’s court,” but the government got to pick the ulama who presided over the court.⁷² Where the centers of Malay Muslim life had been the majid, mosque, where rule and law were administered as well as religion, and the pondok or religious school. Under the new order central governance and secular law replaced local customs and religious laws. The Majid was no longer the center of the village. To further exacerbate the changes, while family and inheritance laws were administered in accordance with Sharia law, these decisions could be overturned by a secular Thai judge on appeal.⁷³ In the southern areas there was little formal education amongst the Malay children. In most of the country, government education officials and Buddhist monks implemented the reforms. In the southern areas where, if there was any opportunity for education, it was limited to memorization of the Qur’an, the reforms were implemented by the government without local or religious assistance.⁷⁴

As school reform spread through Thailand in the early twentieth century, the government implemented four years of compulsory education in public schools.⁷⁵ The 1921 Education Act enacted compulsory attendance and required schools that wished to receive public assistance to meet minimum requirements including administering education in the Thai language. King Rama VI campaigned intensely to consolidate a Thai national identity. School reform and a common national curriculum was one of his best tools. In 1922 a serious rebellion occurred. Whereas most rebellions had been the province of the elites or some of the hajjis, religious leaders, protesting the new law structure, the 1922 rebellion had a much wider base including many Malay nobility

⁷² Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 15.

⁷³ Ibid., 16.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 17.

⁷⁵ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 6.

and hajjis, as well as the former Patani raja. In 1923 reforms issued for the south included the repeal of compulsory education, alteration of the tax code to ensure Thai Malays were not taxed more than British Malays, and the assignment of more agreeable Thai administrators.⁷⁶

In 1932, a coup ended the absolute power of the Thai monarchy and ushered in an era of liberal democracy. Greater Patani, consisting of the modern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, elected Muslims to both the National Assembly and the Senate in 1932 and again in 1937. The province of Satun, never a part of the Kingdom of Patani itself, was the only majority Muslim province not to send a fully Muslim slate to Bangkok.⁷⁷ Unfortunately, the democratically elected bodies exercised little control over the Thai bureaucracy. Little progress toward integration occurred prior to the reemergence of nationalism under Marshal Phibul Songkam in 1938. The ultra-nationalist pan-Thai agenda⁷⁸ of Songkam was off-putting enough for the Malay Muslims, but he also undertook a series of modernity initiatives that, while aimed at Thai society as a whole, especially offended Malay Muslims. These initiatives included the requirement to take a Thai surname which Thais did not traditionally use. Also Songkam encouraged men to kiss their wives in public and required western dress, including westernized women's hats, in public.⁷⁹ These regulations forced the Malay Muslim population to forego traditional Muslim dress and deportment. They overturned the special status of Islamic law over inheritance and family matters. They even required the use of forks and spoons as the "national cutlery."⁸⁰ To many Buddhist Thais these were an affront to their traditions, but to Malay Muslims in Patani it was an affront to their religion as well.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 17.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 18.

⁷⁸ Melvin, *Conflict in Southern Thailand*, 13.

⁷⁹ Elliot Kulick, and Dick Wilson. *Thailand's Turn*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 27.

⁸⁰ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 20.

⁸¹ Ibid., 18.

Against the backdrop of the rule of nationalist Songkham in the newly renamed Kingdom of Thailand in 1939, was the run up to war in Southeast Asia. The elites of Thailand backed the Japanese while the elites in Patani backed the British and petitioned the British to liberate Patani from Thai rule.⁸² Thailand capitulated to the Japanese and did nothing to hinder their run toward Singapore. In return the Japanese restored the provinces of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Perlis to Thailand. Northern Malay resistance to the Japanese was largely organized by Tengku Mahyiddin, the son of the former raja of Patani who had moved to Kelantan in British Malaya after his ouster in Patani.⁸³ Mahyiddin hoped that the British would assist in liberating Patani in exchange for his efforts against the Japanese.⁸⁴ Unfortunately British reversals in Malaya left them unable to project power or extensively affect the post war order on the Johor Peninsula. The British needed the help of Thailand to counter the post-war armed Malayan nationalist and communist movements, so there was no real question of liberating Patani from the Thais.⁸⁵ Phibul Songkham left power in 1944 with the slumping fortunes of the Japanese and a more moderate leader arose.

Prime Minister Kwang Aphaiwong attempted to calm and reconcile the restive southern provinces by issuing the Islamic Patronage Act to restore “pre-Phibul conditions” in the four southern provinces.⁸⁶ The Islamic Patronage Act also re-created a redefined Chularajmontri. Originally the Chularajmontri, the senior Muslim advisor to the King focused on the foreign trade of Siam. These Chularajmontri were chosen from Persian Shiite Muslims that had married into the Thai nobility, successful traders and administrators. The Islamic Patronage Act defined his

⁸² Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 7.

⁸³ International Crises Group, *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*. Asia Report, (Brussels: International Crises Group, 2005), 4, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3436&l=1> (accessed February 2, 2009).

⁸⁴ *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*, 4.

⁸⁵ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 20.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

formal position as the king's advisor in matters relating to Islam.⁸⁷ After the 1947 coup reinstalled Phibul Songkam as leader of Thailand, the new Chularajmontri, still a Sunni like the Malay Muslims in Patani, was to be the senior Muslim and the head of all Muslim affairs in Thailand.⁸⁸ Phibul Songkam's choice for Chularajmontri was a Bangkok based religious teacher without ties to the southern provinces or a strong voice in government.⁸⁹ He served from 1947 to 1981.

The Islamic Patronage Act of 1945 also created the National Council of Islamic Affairs (NCIA) and the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs (PCIA). The NCIA is officially responsible for the administration of mosques and religious teaching in Thailand. The PCIA is responsible to oversee the individual Mosque committees and advise the provincial level governments about Muslim affairs. After the Royal of 1948 that redefined the status of the Chularajmontri, the Provincial councils were also responsible to elect the Chularajmontri to a life term. The Mosque councils administer the individual mosques in accordance with Islamic and state law. They also maintain the registration of the mosques with the state. This registration, while not compulsory, is required for state aid. The great majority of mosques were and still are registered.⁹⁰

In spite of the steps taken by the moderate government of Thailand from 1945 to 1947, violence in the southern provinces intensified. Rioting in Narathiwat in 1946 was followed by the formation of the Patani People's Movement (PPM) in 1947 by the leader of the Pattani Provincial Islamic Council, Haji Sulong. Southern Muslims looked on Haji Sulong as their de facto Shaikh al-Islam, religious leader, as opposed to the Chularajmontri whom the Thai government installed to take that role.⁹¹ Educated in Mecca, Haji Sulong aspired to political autonomy within a federal

⁸⁷ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 20.

⁸⁸ Melvin, *Conflict in Southern Thailand*, 14.

⁸⁹ Yusuf, *Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand*, 14.

⁹⁰ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 21.

⁹¹ Yusuf, *Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand*, 13.

system in order to preserve the unique Malay Muslim culture.⁹² Haji Sulong summed this up saying:

We Malays are conscious that we have been brought under Siamese rule by defeat. The term “Thai Islam” with which we are known by the Siamese government reminds us of this defeat and is therefore no appreciated by us. We therefore beg of the government to honor us with the title of Malay Muslims so that we may be recognized as distinct from Thai by the outside world.⁹³

To this end, Haji Sulong presented a list of seven demands from the PPM to the Thai government in 1947.⁹⁴ Some of the demands made by the PPM were that the government has a high ranking southern Muslim elected by Malay Muslims to govern the southern provinces, that eighty percent of the administrators of the southern province be Malay Muslims, and that Yawi have the same official status as the Thai language in the southern provinces. The demands were deemed too radical and unacceptable to the Thai government, but there was no chance for negotiation as Phibul Songkam came back to power in a coup shortly after the list was received in Bangkok. Haji Sulong and some of his compatriots were arrested by the Songkam government and jailed for three and a half years. Haji Sulong was released in 1952, but disappeared under mysterious circumstances in 1954. The popular belief related by histories of Haji Sulong, and a rallying point for Malay Muslim grievances, is that Haji Sulong was drowned by Thai police.⁹⁵ The riots associated with the detention of Haji Sulong in 1949 focused international attention on Pattani for the first time, including from the Arab League and the United Nations, and demonstrated the power of concerted effort in the south. In 1948, a 250,000 signature petition was delivered to the U.N. from Malay Muslims asking that the U.N. oversee the transfer of the Southern Thai provinces to the Federation of Malaya. Under international pressure Phibun Sogkam made some

⁹² Yusuf, *Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand*, 14.

⁹³ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 22.

⁹⁴ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 8.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

reforms, but they were few and only grudgingly implemented.⁹⁶ The events of 1948 and 1949 are considered the birth of the modern form of the Patani insurgency.⁹⁷

The first militant organization constructed around the Patani cause was the Association of Malays of Greater Pattani (GAMPAR). The group was led by Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen, the son of the deposed raja of Pattani and central figure in resistance to the Japanese in WWII in Northern Malaya, and other elites marginalized during the consolidation of Patani. The group was based in northern Malaysia and focused on uniting all Malay Muslims in the Federation of Malaya, as well as assisting each other and preserving Malay Muslim culture.⁹⁸ Unfortunately GAMPAR decided to ally with leftist Malay nationalist parties which brought it into conflict with Great Britain. Without British support GAMPAR could gain no traction militarily or politically.⁹⁹

Three armed groups took over from GAMPAR and the PPM during the late 1950s and 1960s. As the leadership of GAMPAR and the PPM died in 1953 and 1954, the membership looking to be active was collected and formed into the Patani National Liberation Front (BNPP), the first group to call for full independence of Patani. The BNPP tended to recruit from Islamic schools and had bases of power in the Middle East as well as Malaysia and Indonesia. The BNPP came to be associated with conservative Islam and the elites of the former sultanate.¹⁰⁰ Later, in the mid-1960s, a second group, National Revolutionary Front (BRN) formed to advocate for the formation of an independent socialist Patani as opposed to the BNPP which wanted to restore the sultanate. The BRN was divided over the subject, but tended to associate with communist insurgent groups operating in the Thai/Malaysia border region.¹⁰¹ The third major armed group to

⁹⁶ *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*, 5.

⁹⁷ Melvin, *Conflict in Southern Thailand*, 14.

⁹⁸ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 7.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰⁰ *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*, 7.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

form in support of Patani independence was the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO). PULO occupied the middle ground between the BNPP and the BRN. It was the largest of the three groups with between 200 and 600 fighting men and enjoyed extensive patronage in the Middle East. Based in Mecca and Kalantan, Malaysia, PULO focused on recruiting Thai Muslims outside of Thailand on Hajj or studying abroad. Training and support was secured from the PLO, Syria or Libya. PULO had the best trained fighters of the three armed groups as well as the most stable funding.¹⁰² All three groups operated along similar tactics: extortion, kidnap and murder.¹⁰³ All three groups remained active throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s. PULO became more focused on its Islamic character as time went on. By mid 1970 it could successfully reframe its activities as a conflict over Muslim grievances vice Malay grievances. In 1975, PULO turned out 70,000 to protest the extra judicial killings of five Muslim, not characterized as Malay, villagers. In 1980, PULO stopped a bus in Narathiwat and killed all the Buddhists aboard while letting the Muslims go free.¹⁰⁴

The Thai government's approach from the 1960s on was a combination of development projects and reconciliation in an attempt to integrate the southern provinces into the Thai national identity.¹⁰⁵ After Phibun Songkat was deposed in a coup in 1957, a more moderate military government came to power under Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The Sarit government introduced development programs focused on alleviating poverty in sensitive areas. In 1961, this government introduced the Pondok Educational Improvement Program which infused the traditional Islamic Pondokos with an additional secular curriculum in exchange for government support.¹⁰⁶ This had several effects. It elevated the education of the students attending the Pondokos allowing them to

¹⁰² *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*, 8.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁰⁴ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 13.

¹⁰⁵ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 24.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

integrate better into official Thai society, but it undercut the Islamic credentials of the Pondok and encouraged Malay Muslims to go abroad to the Middle East, Indonesia or Malaysia to study. While studying abroad Malay Muslims were sometimes radicalized before being sent home as part of the insurgency.¹⁰⁷ The Sarit government went one step further by building the first state university in south. This would help educate southern Muslims for lucrative state jobs, the lack of access to which was an old grievance, as well as private white collar employment.¹⁰⁸

The result of this activity was that from the early 1960 to the early 1970s the opportunity for southern Muslims improved greatly. The efforts of the government paid off in the reduction of support for the militant insurgents. However, this success tended to radicalize the irreconcilable elements within Malay Muslim society. These irreconcilables pointed out that Islam and politics, government, or education should not be separated. Many leaders, especially religious leaders, rebelled against the government tampering with their culture and power base.¹⁰⁹

By 1980 when General Prem Tinasulanond, a native of southern Songkhla province, came to power he launched a strategy based on increased public participation, economic development, and a broad amnesty which hundreds of former communist and separatist fighters took up.¹¹⁰ A civil-military-police taskforce (CPM 43) was formed to coordinate security operations in the south and end the extra judicial killings and disappearances. The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) was set up to coordinate political issues in the southern provinces.¹¹¹ Through the 1980s two issues remained, official and police corruption

¹⁰⁷ Harish, *Changing Conflict Identities*, 12.

¹⁰⁸ Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 25.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*, 11.

¹¹¹ Melvin, *Conflict in Southern Thailand*, 16.

remained rampant, and government political integration policies remained assimilationist, equating expressions of Malay identity with political demands for separation .¹¹²

By the 1990s when the Thai government was labeling the remnants of the militant separatist groups as bandits, some general social grievances remained. Malay Muslims remain under-represented in civic and political administration of the country. This is in part due to the underachievement of Malay Muslims in educational attainment and mastery of the Thai language, a prerequisite for high-status employment. The southern provinces remain underdeveloped both in infrastructure and in economic development compared to the rest of Thailand.¹¹³

Modern Insurgency

In 1995, a new player emerged in Patani. The Islamic Mujahidin of Patani (GMIP) was founded by a native of Narathiwat who had trained in Libya and fought in Afghanistan in the early 1990s.¹¹⁴ The GMIP and its sister organization in Malaysia Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) were both founded in 1995 and both have been linked to Jamal Islamiya.¹¹⁵ GMIP and other modern organizations are fundamentally Islamic in character. The basis for inclusion and trust in the group is first and foremost piety.¹¹⁶ The modern groups are more have a broader target list and more violent in their attacks than their predecessors. Their aim is to destabilize the state security apparatus and split southern villagers from the government trust.¹¹⁷ The reaction of the state to the resurgence of violence was to careen away from proven methods of settling resurgence in Patani. Instead of responding with an increase in security cooperation and attempting to settle the root of the conflict the Thaksin Shinawatra government responded by

¹¹² *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*, 12.

¹¹³ Melvin, *Conflict in Southern Thailand*, 18.

¹¹⁴ *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*, 13.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ "No One is Safe," 20.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 21.

disbanding CPM-34 and the SBPAC and moving paramilitary rangers into the south.¹¹⁸ These paramilitary rangers handled the transportation of some 1300 protesters arrested after a protest in Tak Bai in October 2004 from the police station to a ranger base for detention. Due to being thrown into large trucks like wooden logs four or five deep, 78 bound protesters died. The Thaksin government's tendency to appoint loyalists to key military posts over the objection of the military and its tendency to delay investigations and protect loyalists when misdeeds occurred exacerbated the mishandling of the growing unrest.¹¹⁹ The Thaksin government's hard line on the handling of the insurgency in Patani created rifts between the hard line political leaders and the military who wanted to take a more conciliatory approach and open a dialogue.

Thaksin was overthrown in a military coup in the fall of 2006. The new Prime Minister Surayud struck a new tone, apologizing for past misdeeds of the security services, ending the blacklisting of Muslims, and opening a dialogue with insurgents. Grievances over language, education and justice for past abuses linger.¹²⁰ Attacks against teachers and troops in the southern provinces continue. These work to radicalize Thai public opinion against the insurgents, pushing the political leaders to take a harder line toward the insurgents and limiting options for reconciliation.¹²¹ Any local collaboration with the state from Malay leaders is met with fierce retribution. In some villages, the entire leadership has been killed, in others they have been driven off by insurgent attacks.¹²² The basis of the fear and separation from the state security apparatus is not always based in religion. The Thaksin government's war on drugs created a wedge between the precariously loyal people of the border region and the government. The indiscriminant and

¹¹⁸ International Crises Group, *Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries*. Asia Report, (Brussels: International Crises Group, 2007), 5, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5132&l=1> (accessed February 2, 2009).

¹¹⁹ *Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup*, 1.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 14.

harsh methods used alienated the people and eroded trust in the state, a gap the Islamist insurgents were eager to exploit.¹²³

At best the current situation in Patani is a stalemate. The government is starting to repair some of the damage done by the Thaksin government's heavy handed war on drugs, its politicization of the security apparatus, its overreaction to the protests in the south and its use of ill trained paramilitary units to deal with southern unrest. However the security losses caused by this period of poor performance may take decades to repair, as it did to establish security in the first place. The control of southern villages exercised by insurgents and cited by studies by the International Crises Group, Human Rights watch and others require a commitment of professional security troops that Thailand may not have, especially in light of the continued civil political unrest elsewhere in the country.

¹²³ "No One is Safe," 31.

Conclusion

This study is composed of a comparison of most dissimilar cases. The first case examined was Russia and the Chechen insurgency. In this case the Russian strategy has been almost exclusively the military domination and subjugation of a stubbornly resistant difficult to reach mountain people. Russia and the Soviet Union have engaged in collective punishments and raiding to subdue the insurgency from the 19th to the 21st century. The Chechens have been relocated en masse twice in their history, once by the Russians after the surrender of Imam Shamil in 1864 and once by the Soviets after WWII. The current Chechen experience is of a divided Chechnya. Over the course of the most recent wars in 1991 and 1999 the insurgency has split. A reconcilable Sufi Chechen faction has taken power in Chechnya in exchange for limited autonomy. This is pitted against a radicalized and international Wahhabi influenced insurgent core that is focused increasingly on Islamic Jihad vice Chechen national resistance.

In Patani in southern Thailand, the experience has been almost opposite of the Chechen experience. Over the first five hundred years of association between Patani and Siam, Patani was under Siamese suzerainty. Patani was an uneven vassal tending to at the least fail to pay tribute when Siam was weak and at worst assisting in the overthrow of Siamese power. Over the last two hundred years, the Siamese and Thai strategy has vacillated between assimilation and accommodation of limited independence. The most common treatment has been the carrot and stick approach of rewarding the southern provinces with development, education, and opportunity in exchange for cultural assimilation and incorporation into greater Thailand. Unfortunately the Malay Muslims feel that they are a subject vassal of Thailand with a distinct inseparable Muslim culture vice a part of the Thai nation. Thai efforts to assimilate the Malay Muslims are seen by many Malay Muslims as an effort to humiliate and debase their culture. Even the term Thai Muslim used by the state is seen as an insult to the separate culture of the Muslims of the former Patani sultanate. The current Patani experience is of a divided Patani. Most of the Malay Muslims

have reconciled through the government's economic development and participation policies. This has served to make the irreconcilables more radicalized. Following the wind down of the Afghan war some Thai Muslims returned to Patani with a perspective of the struggle irrevocably changed by their Afghan experience. This has resulted in a core of Muslim insurgents practicing methods much the same as were used in Afghanistan during the Jihad or by Al Qaeda and affiliated groups.

Despite the different histories and historical methodologies the modern experience is shared, a heavily radicalized corps of jihadists using dissatisfaction and an acculturated feeling of aggravation between a non-Muslim outside force exerting control over a repressed native Muslim population. The common explanation for the oppression is that the outside world is trying to destroy Islam. As the majorities frame the conflict as a war on terror, the jihadists interpret that to the native population as a war on Islam. This is exacerbated by attacks by radicalized Buddhists acting as representatives of the state police, paramilitary rangers, or military, in the case of Thailand, or Christians acting as part of the Russian military or directing policy from the Russian parliament, in the case of Russia, and aggressive state rhetoric about the evils of radical Islam.

From the cases of Patani and Chechnya, however, it is clear that the insurgencies are not broadly Jihads. Detailed understanding of the culture and history of both the Chechen and Malay Muslims in southern Thailand reveal that the insurgencies began prior to the prevalence of Islam in either Chechnya or Patani. Further, neither culture has a tendency to be pious. The most devout leaders of historic Chechen religious turmoil, such as Imam Shamil have been Dagestani. The Malay Muslim insurgency did not even claim a particularly consistent religious vice nationalist until its most recent incarnation. The base that forms the support in any insurgency may be partially motivated and unified by the call to defend Islam, but history demonstrates there is little durability in that argument.

Further analyzing the lessons learned from these case studies, there are four strategies to combat insurgencies, eradication, terror against terror, containment, and development, addressing

the roots of the problem.¹²⁴ Eradication of the terrorists using military forces is clearly seen in the methods of Yermolov and Stalin in Chechnya. In this strategy the government focuses on using military power to destroy insurgents completely. At the minimum the insurgents themselves are targeted, much like Thaksin administration's response to the modern insurgency in Patani. At the intermediate level both the terrorists and their power bases are attacked. This can be seen in Yermolav's tactics of using flying columns to attack insurgent strongholds and administering collective punishment to the teips in the highlands. The maximum version of this strategy is genocide or mass relocation of the insurgent's culture such as occurred after the capture of Imam Shamil or under Stalin. In the case studies at hand, extermination has not worked. Instead the insurgent group has become more radicalized and less tractable after the government's attempted extermination. In both Chechnya and Patani the insurgents cast the struggle in religious terms and attracted wider support as government forces became more extreme in hunting down the insurgents.

Fighting terrorism with terrorism through the use of violent repressive indigenous forces to use terrorist methods against the insurgents and their base is the current strategy in Chechnya. This Chechenization strategy allowed the Russian military to pull much of its combat forces out of Chechnya during the modern insurgency. The Russians used the split in the Chechen insurgency to convince some insurgent to work with the government and redirect their brutality toward the remaining highland insurgents. While this has allowed Russia to draw down combat power, the insurgency remains active. Internally displaced persons still live hand to mouth off of aid group donations. Extra-judicial killings continue and Chechnya remains a lawless and underdeveloped backwater. One risk to the Russian government from the use of terror against terror is from the international community taking note of the continued chaos in Chechnya. In Patani, many atrocities and violations of international and Thai law are attributed to indigenous

¹²⁴ Russell, *Chechnya - Russia's 'War on Terror'*, 102-106.

government paramilitary rangers¹²⁵ While no source attributes the actions of the rangers to a government backed strategy to use terror against terror, the use of such methods by local troops and commanders have only hardened and radicalized the feeling amongst Patani's Muslims. The final risk for Russia in using terror against terror in Chechnya is seen in the al Qaeda example. If the Chechen government forces are successful in destroying the Wahaabi splinter of the insurgency, Russia has no guarantee that the insurgency will not either be used to create a lawless haven as under Dudaev or turn, once again, against Russia in a push for independence or equality. The Chechen would have no more choices or opportunity under that eventuality than they have ever had in their history of insurgency.

Containment through the use of indigenous elements to marginalize and undermine the legitimacy of the insurgents has been tried extensively in Patani, alternating with addressing the roots of the problem. In this strategy, the roots of the problem are not corrected. Instead the government seeks out anyone in the insurgent's power base that is so tired of violence that they are amiable to reconciling with the government in order to stop the bloodshed. The Thai government has not had much success in maintaining the success of this strategy over the long term. The typical experience is that the insurgents regroup and direct their efforts against the reconcilable leaders. Without addressing the roots of the insurgency younger generations, not as tired of the bloodshed, become radicalized and join the insurgency. While containment can work to give the government time to address the roots of the problems, pure containment will not work as a long term solution.

The only strategy that has demonstrated the ability to develop peace in the long term is to address the roots of the inequalities that perpetuate a separate victimized identity in the insurgent base. After years of unevenly addressing the economic and social problems in Patani, the government started to realize peace and stability in the South of Thailand. Unfortunately later

¹²⁵ *Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries*, 3.

governments, noticeably Thaksin Shinawatra, reduced the emphasis on addressing the roots of the problem and focused on eradication. While not solely at fault for the resurgence of unrest in Patani, this strategy undoubtedly led to a rise in radicalization in the insurgent base.

In both cases the insurgents use Jihad to add legitimacy and appeal to their cause. Both insurgencies predate the introduction of Islam into the area. Both insurgent bases tend to be less pious than the insurgents claim to be to the extent that the very Jihadi nature of the insurgency tends to split the insurgents from their base.

The lessons learned from the comparison of the two conflicts is of the commonality of the end state between a repressive unsupportable strategy focusing on collective punishment and a reconciliation, containment, and development strategy that is unevenly or ineptly applied for even a short while. Another lesson is the fragility of security in a containment insurgent environment. In the case of Chechnya only a continuous application of force or terror can maintain the status quo, especially in light of the failure to deliver rebuilding and economic development programs promised by Moscow. In the case of Patani, the government shifted to an inferior strategy by abandoning the strategies that minimized the violence through the 1980s and 1990. This set the stage for the degradation of security which, coupled with tactical mistakes in employing paramilitary troops and maintaining accountability for state abuses, has allowed the situation to spiral.

For U.S. counterinsurgency strategy the lessons presented by these case studies are many. The first is that, even when the insurgents claim a religious war, a careful study of the deep roots of the conflict and the culture of the insurgent's base may expose the lie in the Jihadi's claims. The next is that there is no answer to these insurgencies in the application of military force. Among the strategies analyzed, only consistently applied development to address the roots of the insurgent problems is a long term path to peace and stability. Using terror against terror or attempting to contain the insurgency may yield short term gains. Terror, however, gives no guarantee of peace or a solution to the insurgency. Containment may work by itself in the short

term. But unless it is used in conjunction with development, it will be undermined by the insurgents over the long term.

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