

The Paradox of German Foreign and Security Policy: With respect to national energy security

**A Monograph
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Abstract

THE PARADOX OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY by LTC (GS) Tim Zahn, 46 pages.

For many countries, the finite nature of fossil fuels is a matter of significant security concerns. Producer and consumer countries alike increasingly see energy supply security as a subject of their security and defense policy. Being strategically prepared when market forces fail to balance contradictory interests becomes a necessity for many countries.

Based on Germany's dependency on energy imports, a prerequisite for a prosperous transition to other sources of energy is to have effective tools of foreign and security policy ready at hand. In this context, the deep integration of German security and defense policy into multinational structures often seems to contradict the formulation of national security interests. Domestic discussions evolved around the question, which role the Bundeswehr as one element of German security policy should have in securing Germany's supply of fossil fuels and other natural resources. However, the discourse on the efficacy of German foreign and security policy in the context of energy supply security is a synonym for a much larger dilemma: the paradox of an administration struggling to achieve valuable national interests in an environment of value loaded divergent public perceptions.

Values, interests, and perceptions are rooted in the ideals of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. These political theories, although not fully explanatory, provide the normative framework for the research in this work. Based on either political theory or public survey data the monograph will identify two significant contradictory trends. First, that a perceived unfavorable personal economic situation results in an increased rejection of international military engagement is a specific behavioral phenomenon by large parts of the German population. Second, an increased acceptance of the use of hard power means in times of material needs is rooted in the mental model of post-materialist theory. The author concludes that in contrast to post-materialist theories' findings, the German emphasis on a value informed defense and security policy will prevail, even when access to energy becomes more restricted and materialistic needs gain more attention by the population again. However, the author shows that comprehending the role of the military solely as what can physically be achieved is a step too short. Of greater importance is how the presence of military capabilities and the political will to consider this option is perceived. Risk aversion and the administrations need to meet the value informed expectations of the German people would lead to a greater emphasis on very specific military capabilities outside the popular focus. To overcome this development this monograph specifically takes the position that the German people need to reconsider the foundations of their perceptions in times of limited access to energy supplies.

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Introduction

Today's international political system comprises nation states focusing their survival and economic strength on the consumption of fossil fuels. Most states, producers and consumers of fossil energy alike, trust their energy security strategy to the mechanisms of international markets. However, the finite nature of fossil fuels means that problems regarding the access to affordable energy could trigger ever more conflicts in the future.¹ Being strategically prepared when market forces fail to balance the contradictory interests of energy providers and consumers is a necessity for many countries. But for Germany, currently importing over 75 per cent of its energy demands, the efficacy of her foreign and security policy, and to have the necessary tools of foreign and security policy ready at hand, is a question of survival for a prosperous transition to other sources of energy.

Recently, other European countries have often misperceived Germany's energy policy as being selfish and self-centered. An unbalanced disproportional dependency on Russian energy imports and the resulting tendency to make political concessions in other areas of politics are often claimed. National interests and different sets of values are at the center of this discussion. Values and interests stand synonymously for the ideals of Realism and Liberalism. Consequently, the different German and international perceptions can best be explained by normative political theory. However, these theories in reality do not exist in a pure form, nor are they fully explanatory. How Liberalism, Realism and Constructivism frame the following research and their limitations are laid out in greater detail later in this work.

Throughout the last 50 years, promoting values to guarantee interests has been the underlying principle of German foreign and security policy. Concurrently, Germany's

¹ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, *Russia, Europe and the World – prospects on cooperation on global security issues*, Munich Conference on Security Policy Munich, February 5, 2006, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_2008=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=175& (accessed October 5, 2008).

dependency on the import of natural resources to sustain its economic power has always defined a major point of interest. In 2006, the German Defense White Paper² announced the promotion of free and open world trade, the access to raw materials as the basis for economic prosperity, and unrestricted transport routes among the German national security interests. Domestic discussions evolved around the question, which role the Bundeswehr, the German armed forces, as one element of German security policy, should have in securing Germany's supply with fossil fuels and other natural resources. However, this discourse on the efficacy of German foreign and security policy stands synonymously for a much larger dilemma. The paradox of German foreign and security policy in the context of energy security as argued in this monograph exists in the divergent perceptions of value shaped interests as perceived by the German public and the administrations' struggles to fulfill the real politics demands of international political organizations. The question remains how Germany can achieve its valuable national interests while the environment of value loaded public perceptions constantly shapes the political conduct.

Based on either political theory or public survey data, the monograph will identify two significant contradictory trends. First, that a perceived unfavorable personal economic situation results in an increased rejection of international military engagement is a specific behavioral phenomenon by large parts of the German population. Second, an increased acceptance of the use of hard power means in times of material needs is rooted in the mental model of post-materialist theory. As military deployments or the lack thereof are the visible means of an overarching policy, the efficacy of German defense and security policy in the contexts of tightening energy resources and diverging public perceptions is the research subject of this paper. This monograph argues that in contrast to post-materialist theories' findings, the German emphasis on a value

² Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, "White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr," (Berlin: 2006): 17.

informed defense and security policy will prevail even when access to energy becomes more restricted and materialistic needs gain more attention by the population again.

Additionally, the monograph will describe the powerful influence of perception on the conduct of German foreign and security policy. Constructivists emphasize the importance of ideas, preferences, and culture in changing or shaping both people's perception of reality and the discourse of international politics. In the context of this monograph, the question remains, whether a more restricted national fuel supply situation would change German popular opinion in favor of more realist political actions. However, this monograph shows that comprehending the role of the military solely as what can physically be achieved is a step too short. Of greater importance is how the presence of military capabilities and the political will to consider this option among others is perceived. Specifically, this thesis takes the position that the German people need to reconsider the foundations of their perceptions in times of limited access to energy supplies.

The monograph will examine the aspect of German energy supply security. Acknowledging the importance of other components of energy security, their incorporation would exceed the scope of this monograph. Furthermore, the author is aware of the effects of published media on public opinion. If it was true that interests groups, whose strategy is not the balanced perseverance of Germany as a democratic, pluralistic and prosperous nation state but the furtherance of either cooperate interests or single-sided ideological ideals, have a disproportional high presence in the media output, these effects have intentionally not been element of the research presented here. Political decision and processes usually become effective over several legislative periods. Securing Germany's energy supply is therefore a medium term issue, the period this monograph is focusing on. The long-term perspective is left untouched because predictability decreases with longer duration of the prognosis period.

The Political Theory Framework and Other Considerations

No man is an island, entire of itself;
every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.³

The inversion of the 1624 ‘whom the bell tolls’ quote above, makes each country the sum of its entire people and their ideas. As will be shown, this truly constructivist view of the world describes what Germany is currently struggling with at the domestic political stage. Value loaded popular expectations meet the real challenges of an interest driven world. In contemporary public German security policy discussions, the terms *value* and *interest* are frequently used but rarely with the necessary clarity in syntax. The 2006 German Defense White Paper stated that values and interests equally inform German security policy⁴ without explicitly emphasizing any interdependencies or contradictions. Concurrently, several political key personal in the Western World see the need to discuss the topic. Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reflected recently⁵ on how to place US foreign policy in the constructs of political theory. Her article highlights the influence of academic discussions on political decision makers and gives reason for exploring the different theories of international politics before assessing the efficacy of contemporary German defense and security policy. The brief definition of the theories provided here will also support the effort to understand German defense and security policy in the broader context of European integration and the transatlantic security architecture, in both of which it is deeply rooted. This section will finally introduce the political theory of post-materialism to anchor the findings of public surveys described in a subsequent section.

³ John Donne, Mediation 17, *Devotions upon emergent occasions*, 1624, http://www.poetry-online.org/donne_for_whom_the_bell_tolls.htm (accessed October 15, 2008).

⁴ Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, Summary* (Berlin: October 2006): 4.

⁵ Condoleezza Rice, “Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World”, *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2008): 2-26.

Interests and values conceptually are anchored in classic political theory. They stand synonymously for the ideals of Realism and Liberalism. Realism is generally described as the more pessimistic view of international politics. Hobbes descriptions of a continuous *state of war* and the assumption that all nation-states coexist in the state of anarchy – in the absence of governing authority over their power – are its underlying principles. Furthermore, realists see the external environment shaping a states behavior. In general, the existing construct of international powers and developments is seen as unchangeable and adaption as the only way to guarantee survival. How a state defines its national interests, can be explained by classic political theory in a similar way. Realists claim that countries have little choice in defining their national interests because of the existing international system threatening them. A subcategory of political realism is referred to as Neorealism or Structural Realism. It contends that international politics can only be understood, if the effects of a regulating structure are added to the thoughts of traditional realism. This means, that not only the actors themselves but also the established anarchic structures between them must be considered. Here the assumption that states are not infused with a will to power, but merely aim to survive in the structure by seeking security, prevails.⁶

A contemporary example might help to explain the logic of this theory. In August 2008, Russian forces crossed the border into Georgia and threatened Ukraine, it looked like a hegemonic demonstration of power or purely expansionist behavior in the forefront. But with regard to structural realism, Russia's current geostrategic foreign policy could also be explained in a different light. It might appear to be the reaction to NATO's or more generally Western expansion into traditional Russian areas of interest. In terms of a structural realist, great powers

⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 19.

must be careful not to acquire too much power or they are likely to cause other states to join forces against them.⁷ Balance of power has to define their interests or they will not survive.⁸

To the contrary, Liberalism has its roots in the period of the Enlightenment and builds on the philosophies of Montesquieu and Immanuel Kant. Liberals see a global society that functions alongside the nation-states and sets part of the context for states.⁹ Consequently, they emphasize nations' different internal characteristics, as domestic society or culture, and their influence on states' behavior and interests. Montesquieu believed peace settlement to be the natural effect of trade. The free trade of goods and ideas as in today's Globalization would set an end to all conflicts among the people. To the contrary, the Realist Kenneth N. Waltz takes issue with the liberal claim that economic interdependence enhances the prospects for peace.¹⁰ In this regard, Germany's growing dependency on energy imports from Russia can well be seen as a threat to international security. German Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier gave a good example of liberal thought by emphasizing that the strength of the West lay and ultimately still lies not in military power but in credibility in striving for a free, peaceful and just world.¹¹ Liberalism expressed in terms of energy supply security would require German policies that utilize liberal market mechanisms to contribute the energy supply security by power of example, of innovation, and of targeted aid and taxation, even if other major energy consumers do not

⁷ Mearsheimer, 20.

⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 49.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰ Mearsheimer, 15.

¹¹ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Russia, "*Leadership, Trust, Credibility*" – *The future of disarmament policy*, Munich Conference on Security Policy Munich, February 9, 2008, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2008=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=208& (accessed October 5, 2008).

initially cooperate.¹² By liberal theory, a world of only liberal governments is perceived as a world without war, because in times and areas of institutionalized political and economic business, the Realist's anarchy is contained and peace and moderate behavior prevail. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant developed the theory that a world of what he called republican governments is a world without war, because democracies do not physically attack each other. This liberal vision of a zone of perpetual peace within a zone of democracy is often contested. Those favoring the primacy of Structural Realism usually point to missing evidence for democracy at the unit level negating the structural effects of anarchy at the level of the international political system.¹³

In reality however, the ideal types of both liberal and realist theories are at opposite ends of a conceptual continuum on which we can locate different real-world relationships.¹⁴ Although both theories developed several sub-categories in the light of the prevailing world security situation at the time of their publications, criticism developed that both theories fail to adequately explain long-term change in the world of politics.¹⁵ This perspective led to the new label of Constructivism in international political theory. Constructivists emphasize the importance of ideas, preferences, and culture in changing or shaping both their perception of reality and the discourse of international politics. This new focus on the political process analyses international interactions and respective perceptions resulting in individual realities parallel to objective

¹² Adam S. Posen, *German Leadership and the Pursuit of Energy Security in the Global Economy*, Peterson Institute of International Politics, 2007, <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=757> (accessed July 17, 2008).

¹³ Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The myth of the democratic peace," *International Security* 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994): 48.

¹⁴ Nye, Jr., 260-261.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

realities.¹⁶ Constructivists stress the ultimate subjectivity of interests and their link to changing identities.¹⁷ According to the quote in the epigraph of this section, and the preliminary idea of John Donne's 1624 Mediation 17, each country is the sum of its entire people and their ideas. In other words, the factors that inform and shape the national political decision making process for a Constructivist can neither entirely be represented by the selection of single aspects nor are they predictable. The observable political culture surfaces the entire variety of notions. The aspect of political culture influencing political conduct will later gain importance in the analysis of the tensions between German political decisions on force deployments and the respective popular opinion. Consequently, a brief description of post-materialist theory is provided in the following as a tool to analyze factors influencing popular opinion and the resulting social-political climate. To describe the German situation in particular, this theoretical background needs to be considered and will tie into the key findings of a public survey presented in a later section.

Similar to political theory, popular opinion or motivation builds on interests and values or beliefs. Which values people emphasize depends on various variables. Political analyst Ronald Inglehart conducted a cultural analysis from an historical perspective and first published post-materialist theory. It builds on Maslow's hierarchy of needs and seeks to explain how individual attitudes change and value orientations develop. Inglehart characterizes modernization and industrialization by hierarchical institutions, political and religious authority, bureaucratic structures, and strict cultural norms. The shift to postmodernization, in his words is reflected by diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism.¹⁸ While materialist values like physical

¹⁶ Alexander Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1996.

¹⁷ Nye, Jr., 7.

¹⁸ Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 59.

and economic security characterize a modern society, an increase in individually perceived security results in the emergence of post-materialist values. Among those are values of belonging, self-expression, and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction. Evolving and spreading post-materialist values increase public rejection of the use of force as a means of foreign policy. This induces the need for ruling governments in partly post-materialist societies to step away from use of military means or to adapt their public reasoning for the need of military deployments. In the following it will be argued however, that this apparent dichotomy between values and interest is just a matter of individual or national perception.

The current discussion on classic political theories of Realism versus Liberalism combines the two in a rather pragmatic manner. Although rarely publicly announced, the pursuit of national interests has been a necessary part of German foreign policy since the time of its existence. The border between the two political blocks of the Cold War lying right in the middle of Germany, made real-political decisions to defend the shared set of values of the West indispensable. After the Cold War ended, the way ahead has been far less clear. For many, interests and values were by their very nature incompatible. However, the current discussion takes a new approach towards theoretically framing the political conduct. Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently outlined the foundations of U.S. foreign policy¹⁹. She argued that the dichotomy between realism and idealism has never really applied to the United States, because for the United States interests and values have always been indivisible.

In 2004, the former German Federal Minister of Defense Dr. Peter Struck accepted the coexistence of values and interests in German foreign policy and called them equally important. He demonstrated real-politics thinking when arguing that the European economic development in the twentieth century, globalization, and the emergence of new threats lead to shared materialistic interests of the Europeans. He continued: “These interests are equally matched to value driven

¹⁹ Rice, 2-26.

obligations.”²⁰ Among those interests, he lists the protection of the energy and raw material supply and calls them legitimate common interests that might require common European action.²¹ Condoleezza Rice admitted, that interests do dominate the pursuit of values in the short term but in the long term, the interest of security could best be ensured by success of value-based ideals.²²
²³ The latter reflects the underlying principals of the German Comprehensive and Proactive Concept of Security, as laid down in the German Defense White Paper 2006 and explained in the respective section.

Another real world observation is that values need underlying interests to be important enough to get imposed. Robert D. Kaplan argues that the United States must intervene only under circumstances where a moral imperative and her national interests exist.²⁴ In the same way, former German Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety Jürgen Trittin stated that values in reality need motivations to be imposed. In his opinion, only the absence of true interests that enforced actions allowed the genocide in Ruanda to occur.²⁵
However, also an opposite behavior can be observed. States increasingly seek to label their

²⁰ Peter Struck, *Herausforderungen und Perspektiven der Europäischen Sicherheitspolitik*, speech at 15. Forum Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft der Zeitung *Welt am Sonntag*, Berlin, November 9, 2004, http://www.ngo-online.de/ganzes_dokument.php?Nr=9681 (accessed October 3, 2008).

²¹ Ibid.

²² “To state, however, that we must promote either our security interests or our democratic ideals is to present a false choice. Admittedly, our interests and our ideals do come into tension at times in the short term. But in the long term, our security is best ensured by the success of our ideals: freedom, human rights, open markets, democracy, and the rule of law.” Condoleezza Rice, “Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no.4 (July/August 2008): 25.

²³ Critics argue that US foreign policy under President George W. Bush connected a pronounced unilateralism with elements of an instrumental multilateralism that accepts the usefulness of international institutions in those cases where they grant international legitimacy to foreign policy activities and help to reduce the costs to the United States. Peter Rudolph, “American Policy: Some Conceptual Thoughts about Dealing with the Hegemon,” *SWP Research Paper* (January 2007): 12.

²⁴ Council on Foreign Relations: “A conversation with Robert D. Kaplan,” Transcript, January 9, 2002, http://www.cfr.org/publication/4313/conversation_with_robert_d_kaplan.html?Breadcrumb=%2Feducators%2Fmultimedia%3Fgroupby%3D3%26filter%3D2002%26page%3D6 (accessed February 3, 2009).

²⁵ Jürgen Trittin, “Europa postnational denken”, *IP Internationale Politik* (Juni 2007): 122.

military expeditions undertaken to meet national interests to be humanitarian assistance missions by their nature, regardless to their true intent. In this way, they seek to overcome domestic and international resistance by shaping popular perceptions. Besides rising question on democratic legitimacy, this political behavior can also bear significant national security risks, as it plays into the hands of potential adversaries, which seek to target people's values and their '*raison d'être*'.²⁶ If this threat scenario is or becomes true, the Germany people would need to reconsider the foundations of their perceptions in order to recognize the threat. The section on German popular attitude will further expand on this thought. Another vulnerability results from this rather constructivist thought in Germany's pursuit of energy security. Do the German people know what they do not know about intentions of the different actors in the field of energy security? Do different actors just exploit public perceptions in favor of certain energy policies? The following section will take up on some of these aspects.

So far, it has been argued as if there is always a free choice between the pursuit of interests and values. Obviously, this might not always be the case. "The greater the threats to survival, the less room for moral choices"²⁷ supports this side of the argument. Basically, this argument is just a repetition of the former "values need underlying interests to be imposed" in other words. With regard to short-term political decisions, even former Secretary Rice's argument points into the same direction. That in the short-term values and interests can be contradictory²⁸ is well reflected in a scenario that describes limited global energy resources and Germany's access to energy supplies becoming more restricted. Peaceful, almost pacifistic in times of plenty, and more willing to use force in times of despair is a mental model rooted in post-materialist theory.

²⁶ Joseph Henrotin and Tanguy Struye de Sweilande, "Ontological Cultural Asymmetry and the Relevance of Grand Strategies," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 7, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 1-25. http://www.jmss.org/2004/winter/articles/henrotin_struye.pdf (accessed 12/2/2008)

²⁷ Nye, Jr., 25.

²⁸ Rice, 25.

However, as a side aspect of the research presented here, prosperity and participation in the benefits of globalization might equally lead to more violent foreign policy. Nations do not necessarily have to select between the pursuits of hard or soft power to guarantee foreign influence. Nation states might also seek economical integration and institutional adaptation not to give up the geopolitical fight but to dominate it. China might serve here as an example for their own historical term of a “flourishing country and powerful army.”²⁹

As this section has exploited in detail, the world of political theory is still in motion. Limitations in all different theories occur and provide argument for further scholar discussions. The theories of Liberalism and Realism do not exist in a pure form, neither are they fully explanatory in itself. However, they will provide the explanatory power to describe German foreign and security policy in the context of energy security especially. In addition to the value of providing the theoretical framework for this research, this section has also said something about the real or perceived gap between people’s opinion and requirements of real-politics. Survey figures in the section on popular attitude will further explain the impact of this observation. Having gained a better understanding on political theory, the specifics of Germany’s energy supply security must be understood. Therefore, it is to this subject the next sections will turn. It will explore the German energy security situation by market mechanisms, the potentially disruptive role of energy producers and consumer countries, German-Russian relations, and the public perception of personal and national security.

²⁹ Robert Kagan, “Geschichte, die nicht enden will: Wer bestimmt die zukünftige Weltordnung: Die Demokratie oder ihre Feinde?,” *IP Internationale Politik* (Juli/August 2008): 42.

The German Energy Security Situation

German foreign and security policy in the context of energy security faces several domestic and international challenges. These challenges can roughly be categorized by either originating on the energy producer or consumer side, the special character of Russian-German relations, and German public expectation of a peaceful political conduct. In a global context, energy supply security can roughly be described as a playground for conflicting market mechanisms, national interests, and public opinions.

Market forces are widely accepted as the most appropriate means to facilitate energy supply security in the future. In the best-case scenario, the market will in time drive up the price of fossil fuels at a rate that provides adequate incentives for the development of alternative fuels. Equally, the market price must allow continuous economic growth in developing countries in order to meet their aspirations to join the developed world one day.³⁰ Naval Postgraduate School's professors Dr. Daniel Moran and James Russell stress the competitive character of international energy security policy in their understanding of the global situation. In their eyes, it is reasonable to assume that the West and the rest of the developing world will be in the best position to be able to afford higher energy costs. However, according to them, western nations might also be the most susceptible to the pressure of public opinion and powerful economic interests. They also possess the most formidable military resources with which to intervene in the market, should they wish to do so. Developing states that are consumers of oil probably have the least leverage in market terms; but this may only make them more willing to choose the military option in moments of desperation.³¹ An additional element, not mentioned by Moran and Russell,

³⁰ Daniel Moran, James A. Russel, "The Militarization of Energy Security [1]," *Strategic Insights*, Volume VII, Issue 1 (February 2008), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/4/6/1/pages254614/p254614_1.php (accessed July 31, 2008).

³¹ Ibid.

is the unpredictable risk of actors pursuing different rationales or tactics with the only purpose to destroy and to hamper the existing system.

By applying this strategic picture to the German energy security situation, we find a set of predispositions and diverting attitudes. German and European Union governmental organizations share the common understanding that energy security includes sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply³². This equally indicates the diversity of the situation in which politics striving for these energy security goals takes place. The global situation comprises a complex and rapidly adapting system of multiple state, inter-state, and non-state actors with very diverse priorities on their agenda. These entities interact in policy areas of security, economics and ecology. In their regional and global applicable toolbox, they carry various means of politics, market forces, and infrastructure for exploitation, transport and storage of fossil fuels. Some of these interdependencies will be laid out later in this paper to describe the German situation. More specifically market mechanisms, the potentially disruptive role of energy producer and consumer countries, German-Russian relations, and the public perception of personal and national security determine the German energy security situation.

Germany's economic power heavily exploits the benefits of liberal markets. Whether market forces can or should be the only regulating factor to sustain the constant flow of energy from producer to consumer countries is an issue of constant debate. Certainly, this monograph does not aim to take side in this debate conclusively. Instead, the thesis of this research takes their roots in specific political theories into account, at least as far as they mirror in the German public. However, market forces alone cannot ease the pressure of national and ideological competition currently so dominant on the world stage. Trade does not happen in a vacuum. It is constantly

³² European Commission Energy, Second Strategic Energy Review: IP/08/1696, Brussels, November 13, 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.htm (accessed January 16, 2009).

interacting with geopolitical and ideological conflicts.³³ To assure the security of global energy markets requires coordination on both an international and national basis among companies and governments, including energy, environmental, military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies.³⁴

In Germany, like in many Western nations, one can observe the struggle to coordinate this broad approach towards energy security today in instances. Consequently, tensions, and commonalities of political and market liberalism are elements of the contemporary global energy security scene. Critics claim, that any state committed to defend international markets for fossil fuels in their current form must face the unpleasant necessity of accepting other, less attractive aspects of the international status quo, including the prominent role of market participants whose values and outlook may be deeply disturbing in other contexts.³⁵ Market forces will not be able to avert all future conflicts over scarce materials. Some commodities simply cannot be replaced by other substances and many poor societies cannot afford to pay higher prices for essential goods. In these circumstances, conflict may arise between states over access to vital sources of supply. One can assume based on experiences, that in most cases, these conflicts will be resolved without recourse to violence, as the nations involved arrive at a negotiated solution to their predicament. Global market forces will tend to encourage such an outcome: the perceived economic benefits of compromise are generally much greater than the likely costs of war.³⁶ However, while market forces can help avert violence in many instances of resource scarcity, there are situations in which

³³ Robert Kagan, "Geschichte, die nicht enden will: Wer bestimmt die zukünftige Weltordnung: Die Demokratie oder ihre Feinde?," *IP Internationale Politik* (Juli/August 2008): 45.

³⁴ Daniel Yergin, "Ensuring Energy Security," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2006): 79.

³⁵ Daniel Moran, James A. Russell, "The Militarization of Energy Security [1]," *Strategic Insights*, Volume VII, Issue 1 (February 2008), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/4/6/1/pages254614/p254614-1.php (accessed July 31, 2008).

³⁶ Michael T. Clare, *Resource Wars: The new landscape of global conflict* (New York: Henry Holt Company, LCC, 2002), p.20-23.

they are likely to fail.³⁷ The question becomes, how Germany is prepared should the principles of international market liberalism prove less effective.

The potential role of some energy provider states is another threat to global energy market forces. The different countries of energy origin vary widely in their goals and in many cases conduct politics pursuing very distinct values or interests. This setting further determines Germany's energy security situation. Eighty per cent of today's remaining energy resources are under governmental control in their respective country of origin. In fact, these states' readiness to liberalize their energy policy decreases in direct correlation with rising crude oil prices.³⁸ The popular *New York Times* columnist Thomas L. Friedman argued similarly. He identified a direct correlation and negative impact of average crude oil prices on the pace, scope, and sustainability of political freedom and the internal political and economic reform willingness of governments. According to his "First Law of Petropolitics," the higher the average oil and gas prices on the international market, the lower and the more confrontational their foreign and security policies, leading to "petro-authoritarianism".³⁹ Political realists claim that the organization of security for oil and gas supplies can no longer be entrusted solely to the industry at a time when other players pursue aggressive national strategies. In other words, the antagonism between interests determined by geopolitical considerations and the *invisible hand* of market forces is omnipresent. Whereas the traditional separation of economics from politics has made sense for regional agreements like the internal European Union (EU) market due to existing common norms and understandings of the overall importance of market forces, energy policies determined outside of

³⁷ Michael T. Clare, *Resource Wars: The new landscape of global conflict* (New York: Henry Holt Company, LCC, 2002), p.25.

³⁸ Dr. Frank Umbach, Centre for European Security Strategies at the 42. Sicherheitspolitische Informationstagung der Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, 15.-16. August 2008, in Werner Baach, "Klimawandel – Energiesicherheit – Rohstoffe – Welternährung: Kardinalprobleme des 21. Jahrhunderts," *Europäische Sicherheit*, 57. Jahrgang, Nr.12 (12/2008): 77.

³⁹ Thomas L. Friedman, "The First Law of Petropolitics: Why the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions," *Foreign Policy* (May/June 2006): 30.

Europe are more than ever defined by strategic and geopolitical interests in the context of national foreign and security policies.⁴⁰

The opinion described in the previous paragraph describes the energy provider side of international energy security relations. Looking at the consumer point of view however, things look very different. Even inside Europe, the situation is far less homogeneous than publically announced by European Union or its member states. Germany's claim of bilateral and international commitments that are "mutually complementary"⁴¹ is not free of reproaches. In the given situation however, with an imported oil and natural gas share of the European energy consumption remaining over fifty per cent, an effective energy foreign policy is, under the given framework of the common market, indispensable. The achieved level of integration in common European energy policy will be analyzed in detail later, but accusations of unilateralist energy policy can often be heard. EU member states continuously prefer to negotiate with producer countries bilaterally.⁴²

The controversial discussion of a new Baltic Sea underwater gas pipeline from Russia to Germany⁴³ and the, at least publically claimed, missing German consultation of Poland, the Baltic States and Sweden in advance have highlighted the unilateralist tendencies in German energy policies and the lack of a common and coherent EU energy security strategy.⁴⁴ German energy policy is to the most part in the hands of private companies, that theoretically conduct their cooperate engagements outside any strategic political guidance. In reality however, especially

⁴⁰ Frank Umbach, "Towards a European Energy Foreign Policy?," *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 20 (2007): 14.

⁴¹ Federal Republik of Germany, The Federal Foreign Office, "*Foreign policy is peace policy*," <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/Uebersicht.html> (accessed January, 19, 2009).

⁴² Daniel Möckli, "Energiesicherheit in Europa: Stand und Perspektiven," *CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik* 3. Jahrgang, Nr. 36 (June 2008): 2.

⁴³ The former 'North European Gas Pipeline', now 'Nord Stream'. <http://www.nord-stream.com/en/> (accessed January 19, 2009).

⁴⁴ Frank Umbach, "Towards a European Energy Foreign Policy?" *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 20 (2007): 12.

after the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian natural gas dispute, the German administration⁴⁵ saw a growing need for coordination in the German national energy supply portfolio. Here, as in many other European countries national policies still prevail. This bears potential conflicts, when national interests in energy supply security provoke political allies like the NATO and EU member states Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. Germany's national interest in this regard can be summarized as to have natural gas available for a reasonable price and concurrently being independent from transit countries. Public statements of the Polish Defense Minister Radek Sikorski in May 2006⁴⁶ clearly show, that not only interests but also values are at stake in energy supply relations with Poland.

The gap between a value informed political and economic European integration and interest informed national and cooperate energy policy is a central issue of concern in German energy policy. As a potential area for conflict, it also presents a dilemma for describing the situation by political theory. In the subsequent section, the monograph will lay out the theoretical framework. This will help to explain why international cooperation is adding value to Germany's national security policy and concurrently is in line with her national interests. However, the conflict between national energy security policy and continued European integration and cooperation with new member states remains unresolved.

The synthesis of the previously explained risks of *unilateralism* and *petro-authoritarianism* leads over to the role of the German-Russian relationship in Germany's energy supply security. The immediate advantages for Germany receiving natural gas from Russia without any costly passage through transit countries are obvious. However, a potential future

⁴⁵ Judy Dempsey, "Merkel calls meeting on German energy: Dependence on Russia is a main topic," *International Herald Tribune*, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2006/04/02/news/energy.php> (accessed July 17, 2009).

⁴⁶ Polish Defense Minister Radek Sikorski, April 30, 2006:" That was the Locarno tradition, that was the Molotov-Ribbentrop tradition," referring to the 1939 pact between Stalin and Hitler which divided Poland up between Russia and Germany, quoted by Reuters News Agency, BBC news online, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4961186.stm> (accessed January 19, 2009).

threat to stability and security in Europe derives from bilateral German-Russian energy trade itself.

Moran and Russell describe the development of exclusive energy trading blocs as one possible event that might cause governments to militarize energy resource management.⁴⁷ The often discussed blank figures of Germany's fuel import dependency and Russia's monetary and technology import dependency describe the situation only fragmentarily. While the argument of respective needs can continuously be found, the contemporary Russian aggressive expansion and non-interference policy, framed by concurrent public relation efforts, point in a different direction for the future. Some analysts describe the "special relationship" between Germany and Russia as mainly driven by economic and private interests rather than by political concerns. In their view, the interaction of a comparatively small number of political and economic actors resulted in this relationship.⁴⁸ Even when they acknowledge the responsibility of governments to set the legal and regulatory framework⁴⁹, this argumentation is clearly based on actors striving for the common rational goal of mutual economic and ecological benefits. Nevertheless, this argument addresses only elements of the reality for several reasons. The most important are the degree of control by Russian government on the GAZPROM company, the utilization of fuel prices and uninterrupted availability for other political goals, or the growing influence Russian state owned companies seek in the entire energy supply-chain. Due to the limited scope of this monograph, their detailed influence will be left for further research.

⁴⁷ Daniel Moran, James A. Russell, "The Militarization of Energy Security [1]," *Strategic Insights* Volume VII, Issue 1 (February 2008), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/4/6/1/pages254614/p254614-1.php (accessed July 31, 2008).

⁴⁸ Michael Sander, "A Strategic Relationship? The German Policy of Energy Security within the EU and the Importance of Russia," *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 20 (2007): 16.

⁴⁹ Roland Götz, "Deutsch-russische Energiebeziehungen – auf einem Sonderweg oder auf europäische Spur?," Diskussionspapier Forschungsgruppe Russland/GUS, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, FG 5 2006/10, November 2006, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3423 (accessed October 6, 2008).

Another aspect to describe the current German situation is the dichotomy between powerful real-politics and real or perceived public expectations. This dichotomy becomes especially evident in the context of military deployments. Energy supply security has for a long time been understood as securing energy provisions and diversifying supply. This perspective remains true, but a “wider approach is now required that takes into account the rapid evolution of the global energy trade, supply-chain vulnerabilities, terrorism, and the integration of major new economies into the world market.”⁵⁰ To counter these threats and vulnerabilities, Germany’s policy relies on a wide variety of political means. Among others, these means include the deployment of the military, which however is a controversial subject in Germany. The resulting potential conflicts on the domestic political stage provide another area of concern about the efficacy of German foreign and security policy in the context of energy security.

As this monograph will explain in the subsequent section on the German Comprehensive and Proactive Concept of Security, German security interests are nested in multinational structures. The membership in international organizations however requires balancing national popular desires with the policy of the organizations informed by multiple members. As far as support for military engagements of these organizations is concerned, popular opinion in Germany does not always agree on force deployments. The resulting dichotomy between self-inflicted potential international disgrace and the participatory core value of a democracy are visible consequences of the paradox of German administrations striving for valuable national interests in a normative environment emphasizing values. This struggle describes the central aspect of the research laid out in this monograph.

The phenomena of tightening fuel resources and energy-providing states that already proved their will to use force for maintaining their former sphere of influence bear the risk of increased competition in several fields of politics. Will the German foreign and security policy

⁵⁰ Yergin, 70.

change, when agreements can no longer be reached in a peaceful and economically reasonable manner? Will a more restricted national fuel supply situation change German popular opinion in favor of more realist political actions? The political culture in Germany leaves doubts on this development. It is the examination of these linkages, that the issue of public opinion looms large. It is the idea of popular perception, which provides the lens through which these linkages between political theory and the specific German situation will be viewed and analyzed in the following sections.

The German Comprehensive and Proactive Concept of Security

In terms of the previous section on political theory, this chapter will show that Germany's contemporary foreign policy discourse can broadly be understood as the struggle to combine realistic necessities with the chosen course of liberal politics. According to various analysts, the latter leads to limitations in range, scope, and effectiveness of political conduct; which impact the pursuit of different political theory may have for the use of military means to secure energy supply in the future, is part of the research laid out in this monograph. This section will examine current German security policy instruments addressing the challenges laid out in the previous section. By taking into account German national foreign policy with special regard to securing energy supplies, NATO's approach to energy security, and EU energy policy, representing the key areas anchoring German foreign and security policy will be addressed. Due to the limited scope of this monograph and their limited involvement in energy security, the other international organizations Germany does engage in will be omitted.

Professor John Duffield from Georgia State University uses the phenomenon of "national security culture"⁵¹ to describe the core of German foreign and security policy. According to

⁵¹ James S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 23-24.

Duffield, German society as whole and German political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to national security policy.⁵² This set of beliefs however, is subject to changes throughout time. In the mid-1980s the German political scientist Hans-Peter Schwarz argued, that the evolved German national security culture yielded a foreign policy of “dependency, solidarity in alliances, need for harmony, multilateralism, moralization, de-legitimization of power politics, and a forgotten reason of state.”⁵³

While these synonyms for weakness can on one hand be explained in the political context of the large pacifistic demonstrations in Germany at that time, they on the other hand can also be regarded as a misinterpretation of advanced political seniority. Germany’s negative Nazi dictatorship experiences, as well as the far more positive post-war experiences of creating one of the world’s most stable democracies and prosperous economies, and the ensuing German integration back into Europe via multinational organizations all served to create the distinctive and widely shared values that are Germany’s national security culture.⁵⁴ “These experiences were deeply internalized and became accepted by a substantial majority of the population and have been passed on to subsequent generations through both formal education and informal socialization processes. Germany’s experiences in the 20th century shaped its national security culture by changing the way in which Germans view their own country’s status and proper place in the world, by dramatically redefining the German national identity, and by generating strong and relatively clear feelings in Germany for anti-militarism and multilateralism.”⁵⁵

⁵² Ibid, 61.

⁵³ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die gezähmten Deutschen – von der Machtversessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit*, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1985).

⁵⁴ Kevin L. Hill, “Re-Inventing German Foreign-and Security Policy: A struggle to be understood” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 18.

⁵⁵ Hill, 18.

The same attitude is also expressed in the latest Defense White Paper that defines German security policy multilateral in character and Germany being committed to active multilateralism. “No state in the world nowadays is able to ensure its security on its own. Germany therefore safeguards its security interests primarily in the international and supranational institutions and plays an active role in shaping their policies.”⁵⁶ Therefore, German foreign and security policy cannot be described without squaring the circle of German foreign policy being national and European foreign policy at the same time. The same paradox applies to the policy field of energy security, which as general matter of national concern is still in touch with European concerns. It is for those reasons that German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier addressed its global context in 2006 by stating: “Global security in the twenty-first century will be indispensable be linked to energy security.”⁵⁷

However, this situation is not new to Germany. In general, Germany has always depended on the import of energy resources, but only in times of supply shortages, the importance of an adequate fuel supply came to public attention and made its way into national security publications. Examples include the German situation in the mid-1970s and in 2006/2008 comprising several similarities. The 1973 OPEC oil embargo hit Germany’s economy hard in 1974. Consequently, the strategic importance of energy supply for Germany’s security situation found its expression in the succeeding Defense White Paper in 1975/1976. It defined that the economic stability of the Federal Republic of Germany – a prerequisite to external security –

⁵⁶ Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, “*White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*,” (Berlin: 2006), 21-22.

⁵⁷ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Russia, *Europe and the World – prospects on cooperation on global security issues*, Munich Conference on Security Policy Munich, February 5, 2006, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_2008=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=175& (accessed October 5, 2008).

depends upon the economic development of her partners in trade, upon open export markets, and upon an adequate supply of energy and raw materials.⁵⁸

This strategic fact has not changed for Germany since these days. What did change are the speed, connectivity and Germany's dependencies in global markets. In the 2006 Defense White Paper, Germany addressed her will to accept the challenges created by this change, and to engage actively in shaping it in accordance with her responsibilities and interests. "German security policy is driven by the values set forth in its Basic Law and by the goal of safeguarding the interests of our country."⁵⁹ To achieve these goals, Germany established a comprehensive concept of security. In the German understanding, security cannot be guaranteed by the efforts of any one nation or by armed forces alone. "Instead, it requires an all-encompassing approach that can only be developed in networked security structures and within the context of a comprehensive national and global security philosophy."⁶⁰ Both her memberships in North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union serve these goals. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to be the cornerstone of Germany's future security and defense policy. The European Union stands for political stability, security, and prosperity in Germany as well as its other member states.⁶¹ Political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. is right, when he described Germany's development along lines predicted by political idealism: Democratic and deeply enmeshed with its Western neighbors.⁶²

⁵⁸ Federal Republic of Germany, The Federal Minister of Defense on behalf of the Federal Government, "*White Paper 1975/1976: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces*," (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1976), 3.

⁵⁹ Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, "White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr," (Berlin: 2006), 21.

⁶⁰ Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, "White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr - Summary," (Berlin: 2006), 4.

⁶¹ Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, "*White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*," (Berlin: 2006), 7.

⁶² Nye, Jr., 258.

Germany's foreign policy is one of peace and stability. During the East-West conflict of the last century, Germany contributed to the Helsinki process by building confidence between the adversaries and reducing tensions through dialogue. This approach remains relevant in defusing the potential for conflict over energy supplies. In the aftermath of the gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine in early 2006, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier sought to ease the situation and to reemphasize the German non-confrontational approach. "Even if competition increases in the future, we must not allow energy to become the currency of power in international relations. That is the goal of German foreign and security policy in the field of energy."⁶³ He continued by expressing his expectations of a system of cooperative energy security that must promote dialogue among energy producers, consumers, transit states, and the private sector. In Steinmeier's opinion, even exporters have a stake in constant and secure demand and smooth transit.⁶⁴ This statement also underlines the clear contrast between the German, and more generally European, and the Russian conduct of real-politics. While Germany seeks to overcome former habits of power politics and to build the world on laws and institutions, Russia remains the traditional power of the nineteenth century claiming and enforcing influence in a geostrategic sense. Europe seeks to overcome the idea of a nation-state to solve its problems. For Russia, the answer is its restoration.⁶⁵ Based on this understanding, Russia empowered by the possession of large deposits of fossil fuels and the resulting fiscal freedom willing to stretch Germany's political patience to its limits, must continuously be considered as a realistic potential future threat. The latest natural gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine resulting in natural gas shortages among 15 of the 27 EU members might indicate, as far as Russia's role is concerned,

⁶³ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "Energy security – Avoiding conflict over fuel", *International Herald Tribune* (New York, March 23, 2006), http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/2006/060323-BM_energy_IHT.html (accessed July 17, 2008).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Robert Kagan, "Geschichte die nicht enden will: Wer bestimmt die künftige Weltordnung: Die Demokratie oder ihre Feinde?" *IP Internationale Politik* (Juli/August 2008): 41.

exactly that. That not only values but also interest might cause a German military engagement in the future⁶⁶ is a recurrent theme of the 2006 White Paper. Having set out the framework of German national security policy, the specific NATO and EU attitudes on energy security will be discussed next.

After the Warsaw Pact's break-up, NATO has persistently been discussing its future role due to diverting goals of some of its member states. As a first step towards consolidation, the North Atlantic Council in April 1999 adopted NATO's existing Strategic Concept in Washington D.C. The document outlines the Allies' perception of the international security environment and states that the disruption of vital resources could influence Alliance security interests. After the 2006 Russian-Ukraine natural gas dispute, NATO enhanced its attention for energy security. Recently, at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Allies noted a report on NATO's role in energy security⁶⁷, which outlined options for further activities. The key areas identified are information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical infrastructure. Some of the diplomatic efforts had already become reality through collaborative efforts with non-member countries. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Partnership for Peace program provide a stage for cooperation on energy security with energy producer and transit countries. By consultations with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Georgia, NATO reaches out in the Caucasus region by diplomatic means. Among the members of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Algeria and Tunisia are major oil and natural gas producing countries while Morocco serves as an important transit country.

⁶⁶ "The Federal Government will therefore continue in future to examine in each individual case what German values and interests require the operational involvement of the Bundeswehr." Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, "White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr," (Berlin: 2006), 22.

⁶⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bucharest Summit Declaration, Press Release (2008)049, April 3, 2008. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-49e.html#energy> (accessed July 9, 2008).

Algeria's concurrent membership in the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF)⁶⁸ provides an additional diplomatic tool with regard to Russia that is a member of GECF, too.

These efforts clearly indicate that equal to the national German approach, NATO's approach to secure energy supply is not foremost a military one. However, many draw a less optimistic picture on NATO's role in the subject. Besides summit declarations, there is a lot of diplomatic struggle about the Alliance's future role in energy security⁶⁹ and about whether NATO should get involved in raw material security at all. Political Realists request that NATO should use both its status as intergovernmental organizations as well as its comparative advantage over other international organizations – its military capabilities.⁷⁰ To the contrary, political Idealist stress the importance of dialogue, cooperation, and partnership. As far as the military organization of NATO is concerned, civil consequence management and military monitoring missions are put to the forefront.⁷¹

While NATO agreements in any regard depend on the approvals by national executives of its member states, Germany and 26 other European Union member states have transferred legislative and executive authority to EU institutions in many areas of politics. However, the term Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is somehow misleading, as final legal and political responsibility for EU foreign and security policy matters remains in national responsibility. Following the failure of its diplomatic efforts to broker peace between the warring parties in former Yugoslavia, the EU in 1999 established a specific European security and defense policy (ESDP) which is part of the overall framework of the CFSP. Under the ESDP, European military

⁶⁸ <http://www.gecforum.org> (accessed November 12, 2008).

⁶⁹ Brooks Tigner, "Allies Struggle to Define Energy Security," *DefenseNews* (March 5, 2007), 39.

⁷⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Should NATO play a major role in energy security?" *NATO Review*, Spring 2007. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue1/english/debate.html> (accessed July 31, 2008).

⁷¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Energy Security, a new NATO issue?" Video Interview with Thierry Legendre, Policy Advisor in the office of the NATO Secretary General, Brussels: January 16, 2008. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080116b.html> (accessed July 31, 2008).

or police forces can be sent to conflict areas to carry out crisis management, humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and even peacemaking operations.⁷² Since then, both successful EU military operations and struggles to achieve a unanimous vote required for key decisions occurred. By the end of 2003, energy security became an element of the EU's 'European Security Strategy'⁷³ and thereby of CFSP. A June 2006 EU Commission and High Representative common paper calls for an 'External Energy Policy' conducted in a spirit of solidarity by the EU member states and specifies certain principals of European foreign policy in order to enhance the external security of energy supplies.⁷⁴ This paper does not only enhance the weight of the political argument on the international stage but adds value according to the liberal principals of political theory. In addition, the paper puts European energy security policy in a geographic context. It determines the EU's area of interest by naming North and continental Africa, the Caucasus, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia, the Middle East and the Gulf, as well as Latin America. The number of security related incidents and former or ongoing military engagements in these areas, some of which were lead by the EU, indicate the military dimension of the topic.

On the one hand, the European Union, according to Mark Leonard, the Executive director of the European Council on Foreign Relations⁷⁵, does not strive for hegemony. In his view, the European Union counters the idea of balance of power and its need to limit continuously any aspirations for hegemony by force, by the idea of a network that rules out any kind of hegemony from the start.⁷⁶ In the field of energy security, the Energy Community South East Europe Treaty

⁷² European Union, European Commission, *The EU in the world: The foreign policy of the European Union*, Brussels, June 2007, 12.

⁷³ European Union, *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, December 12, 2003.

⁷⁴ The Council of the European Union, *An External Policy To Serve Europe's Energy Interests: Paper from Commission/SG/HR for the European Council*, 9971/06, May 30, 2006, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st09971.en06.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2008).

⁷⁵ www.ecfr.eu (accessed January 12, 2009).

⁷⁶ Gunther Hauser, "Energiesicherheit in Europa," <http://members.magnet.at/sich.politik/Energiesicherheit%20in%20Europa.doc.pdf> (accessed October 4, 2008).

(ECSEE)⁷⁷ established in 2005 is one example of this policy. However, to achieve its goals, EU besides the elements of soft power in its political portfolio will need the variety of financial and military options to sustain its diplomatic efforts to ensure common energy security in the future.

In many energy-exporting countries, energy resources and infrastructure are either state-owned or under close control of national governments. Therefore, European governments often are the appropriate counterpart for negotiations with suppliers and transit countries on the diplomatic level. Granting financial guarantees for cost intensive pipeline projects is another way how European national governments are involved in energy business. It can be assumed, that most energy-importing countries share these roles with generally similar interests. There is therefore a link between energy security and a common external energy policy. EU member states are growing aware of this situation but still show a great deal of reluctance to transfer any power to the European Commission. The defense of national interests still prevails. Energy security is still seen to play a central role for national sovereignty.⁷⁸ However, it needs to be questioned whether energy policy can remain the domain of European nation states alone while the European Union is only tasked with aspects of the internal market. Dealing effectively with real and rising dependencies requires more than any single state in Europe can deliver.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ The ECSEE Treaty establishing the Energy Community was signed in Athens on 25 October 2005 and entered into force on 1 July 2006. The treaty aims at establishing a single regulatory framework for trading energy across southeast Europe and the EU on same terms.

⁷⁸ Clémence Marcelis, Andreas Maurer, "Perspectives for the European Union's External Energy Policy: Discourse, Ideas, and Interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France," *SWP Working Paper*, Berlin, September 15, 2006, http://swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.pp?asset_id=3302 (accessed July 20, 2008).

⁷⁹ Marco Overhaus, "Editorial," *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 20 (2007): 6.

The German Popular Attitude

Previous sections of this monograph have discussed in detail the current situation and theoretical framework for the military aspects of German energy security politics. However, the question remains how to balance the competition between the previously described interests shaped politics and the values of political liberalism inherent in German politics. As shown, the overall pacifist political culture is the foundation the daily political conduct builds on. A closer look at the German popular opinion assists in analyzing the underlying causality in detail and help to answer the question how post-materialist theory applies to the German popular attitude.

When German administrations decide to send Germany's armed forces, the Bundeswehr, abroad they operate in an environment different from that in many other countries. Germany's role in the first half of the 20th century and the following decades of limited sovereignty and restricted deployments of military means created conditions that in parts still apply today. In Germany, by constitution the parliament and not the political executive legitimizes the deployment of the military. Since Germany gained full sovereignty in 1990, it took several sentences from the constitutional court to establish an adopted framework for political conduct in this regard. In addition, over forty years of prosperity and anticipated foreign political stability without any Bundeswehr deployment abroad⁸⁰ created a very specific popular attitude towards military expeditions. Furthermore, factors influencing public discourse on ends, ways and means of German defense and security policy concurrently hamper its evaluation. The assessment of public surveys on security policy issues in Germany is rather difficult. Low levels of knowledge paired with low levels of concern by the population lead to difficulties in an empirical assessment

⁸⁰ Between 1956 and 1990, the Bundeswehr deployed abroad only with very limited assets for disaster response operations, humanitarian assistance operations and in the context of standing NATO forces.

of the public opinion.⁸¹ However, the Bundeswehr Social Science Institute (SOWI)⁸² is annually tasked to conduct a public survey on several foreign and security policy related issues.

In recent years, the findings showed generally similar results. Overall, in Germany a pacifistic attitude towards military power projection in general prevails. Additionally, the German population in general hardly pays any interest in security policy issues paired with low levels of knowledge in related areas. However, this stand changes with regard to government reasoning for military intervention.⁸³ The survey shows clear and distinct preferences in the field of foreign and security policy, which then transfer into different attitudes towards different types of military missions.⁸⁴ The gap between low knowledge and low personal involvement on one side but clearly articulated preferences on the other side raises questions about the reliability of the articulated public opinion for strategic political conduct. Three aspects can describe this gap.

First, the terminology used in the survey makes a difference. In recent years, the growing number of German military deployments abroad led to increased discussions whether Germany should articulate its security policy goals and interests more specifically. In the SOWI survey, the percentage of people rejecting the necessity of a more intense public discussion rose, when the used term changed from ‘policy goals’ to ‘national interests.’⁸⁵ It can be assumed, that the term ‘national interests’ carries more emotional response than the term ‘goals.’ With regard to political theory, the term ‘national interest’ does not originate in a liberal or constructivist worldview and

⁸¹ Thomas Bulmahn, Rüdiger Fiebig, and Wolfgang Sender, *Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2006 des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr*, Forschungsbericht 84 (Straussberg: 2008), 121.

⁸² Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr (SOWI), Straussberg

⁸³ Bulmahn, Fiebig, and Sender, 35.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁸⁵ Bulmahn, Fiebig, and Sender, 50.

therefore must be seen here as another indicator of the pacifist nature of the public German foreign policy orientation.

Second, low public interest and level of knowledge on foreign- and security policy topics bear concerns in themselves. In general, a politically knowledgeable population is a normative prerequisite for legitimacy of political actions. It also includes the danger to misunderstand public opinions on current issues at hand when they are either solely built on underlying principal beliefs or are highly influenced by the short-term contexts.⁸⁶ When photographs of German soldiers in Afghanistan posing with human skulls appeared in the press in 2006 the overall popular agreement with the German contribution to the NATO ISAF mission dropped from 64% in 2005 to 53%, just to increase to 60% again in 2007.⁸⁷

Finally, the SOWI study describes the direct dependence between the individual perception of security in a broader sense and the attitude towards governmental actions in the field of foreign and security policy. Among several other factors, the individual perception of personal and common economic well being increases the acceptance of Germany as a more active international player.⁸⁸ In other words, Germans change their reasoning for their stand towards German foreign and security policy depending on their perceived economic situation. When they anticipate their personal economic situation as being good, they lean towards supporting a more active international German engagement in peacekeeping, nation building, or humanitarian missions. This part of the SOWI findings matches with the findings of Post-materialist theory; when materialistic desires are satisfied, people reorient their goals towards non-materialistic higher values, including military engagements, as far as they perceive the nature of the operation

⁸⁶ Ibid., 46.

⁸⁷ Ruediger Fiebig, Dr. Thomas Bulman, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitischs Meinungsklima in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Erste Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2007 des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr (Strausberg: 2008), 15.

⁸⁸ Bulmahn, Fiebig, and Sender, 57.

to be overall peaceful. However, in a situation when Germans perceive their social-economic situation to be more insecure or even threatening, their preferences where the government should engage with priority shifts away from foreign and security policy towards areas of domestic politics.

Taking a closer look at the security policy goals the German population wants to pursue shows broad agreement on all goals offered in the SOWI survey. The most preferred goals are genuine national security interests: Protection from war and terrorism, preservation of liberty, democracy, and justice for the German people, and the preservation of the integrity of the German national territory. All these goals gain approval rates beyond 95 per cent. Next in the ranking appears a group of more materialistically defined goals: Securing Germany's energy and raw material supply and preserving Germany's prosperity. The approval rates of other highly liberal policy goals, like contributing to a global increase in respect for human rights, contributing to increase the international respect for the law of nations, or to fight against poverty and underdevelopment in the world gain high approval rates but are clearly outranked.⁸⁹ Conclusively, the German people strive for truly realistic security interests within their foreign policy goals but prefer non-military means for their realization.

In order to apply rules deriving from post-materialist theory correctly, it is now necessary to prove the existence of at least some post-materialist tendencies among the German population. As has been previously explained, post-materialist claim that societies, under certain circumstances, shift from materialist to post-materialist societies. Based on standardized surveys, the post-materialist index according to Inglehart can be determined. According to a 2008 Standard Eurobarometer survey on European values,⁹⁰ the German post-materialist index

⁸⁹ Bulmahn, Fiebig, and Sender, 52.

⁹⁰ European Union, European Commission, Eurobarometer 69.1 Values of Europeans, February-March 2008, ZA No. 4743, 69. <http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/eurobarometer/standard-eb/study-overview/eurobarometer-691-za-4743-feb-mar-2008/> (accessed January 21, 2009)

identified 26 per cent of the population to be materialists, 59 per cent to be in a mixed group, and 15 per cent to be post-materialists. These figures mean that German society, as a whole has not yet shifted to post-materialism, as problems that are more fundamental remain important. However, a political variable within the survey is in two ways a significant discriminator. For the post-materialism scale because of differences as regards future goals, and for this monograph due to implication on popular opinion towards military engagements. Respondents on the right of the political spectrum are far more likely to belong to the materialist while respondents on the left of the political spectrum appear more often in the post-materialist category.⁹¹ The general observation, that people oriented towards the left of the political spectrum are more likely to reject military deployment in general supports the above finding.

How German popular opinion would develop in a situation where a foreign aggressive cause for the perceived personal economic suffering can clearly be determined remains unanswered. The two former findings of a perceived unfavorable personal economic situation resulting in an increased rejection of international military engagement (SOWI) and the increased acceptance of hard power in times of material needs as rooted in the mental model of post-materialist theory, clearly present significant contradictory trends. The contemporary discussion on when to use the military as a means of foreign policy can be understood as an indicator for struggling with these discrepancies in the German population. The former realistic understanding, that clearly defined interests as driving factors enable the pursuit of national values, is what Germany is currently struggling with.

The reasons for this struggle are plenty. As an example might serve what post-materialists commonly describe as growing emphasis on individual freedom and rejection of

⁹¹ European Union, European Commission, Eurobarometer 69.1 Values of Europeans, February-March 2008, ZA No. 4743, 68.

bureaucratic authority.⁹² In Germany, this results in the diminishing representative character of elected parties. In the context of military deployments, people seek peace and are more adverse to the military option. At the very least, they require a humanitarian label on every deployment of the military. This behavior follows an internationally observable trend of a growing necessity to occupy the international moral high ground in any given conflict. The remaining friction is the distance between popular, value-loaded expectations and real interests. Will popular expectations on righteousness and absence of violence prevail, when the assumed causal chain of energy providers acting more rigid, resulting in restricted access to energy resources, resulting in higher prices, and affecting the material needs of the individual becomes reality?

To overcome this culture, Germany as a whole needs another enlightenment. Expressed in a constructivist approach this means, the people probably need to reconsider the foundations of their perceptions, particularly in a security environment where any adversary seeks to exploit this German state of public disequilibrium by targeting the seam between values and security interest.⁹³ As all energy crises of the past feed into German popular perception today, another area of more restricted access to energy and growing materialistic needs by the population is not going to make a difference. Consequently, the anticipated moral obligation in people's opinion will continuously shape the reasoning for political decisions incorporating the Bundeswehr and in contrary to post-materialist theories' findings, the German emphasis on a value informed Defense and Security policy will prevail.

In this context, the extraordinary public attention following remarks of German Federal President Horst Köhler expressing his expectations of Germany also pursuing national interests in

⁹² Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 78.

⁹³ Joseph Henrotin and Tanguy Struye de Sweilande, *Ontological Cultural Asymmetry and the Relevance of Grand Strategies*, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, (Winter 2004), Vol. 7, No. 2, 1-25. http://www.jmss.org/2004/winter/articles/henrotin_struye.pdf (accessed 12/2/2008)

Africa⁹⁴ is rooted. One can clearly see the linkage between public perception expressed in the public outcry and the publicly rarely expressed but necessary strive for national interests. Similar observations can be made with regard to Germany's contribution to the ISAF mission. Besides all public reasoning on nation-building and improving living conditions, Germany's current contribution to ISAF does serve German national interests: To strengthen the Alliance, which from the German perspective also bears value in itself, to guarantee German international influence, and to vitalize the national defense industry in order to maintain strategic capabilities are just some to be mentioned here. None of them can currently be discussed publicly in the ongoing discussions on continuation of the ISAF mission, because the popular reaction is unpredictable.

Having to make decisions for military deployments against strongly articulated public opinions in the future, would have consequences for the mission itself. As Herzinger points out, the Bundeswehr would be tasked far below its capabilities if risk adversity and the prevention of casualties that could not be reasoned in Germany become the dominating narrative. A government, regardless to the political party, fearing the public response would paralyze the military over time.⁹⁵ Policymakers will lose the strategic overview, because their liberal take on international politics among democracies defines out of existence the very phenomena that are at the core of strategy: the concerns about the relative distribution of power among the great powers.⁹⁶ According to Layne, the German public perception is twofold dangerous. It assumes sufficient compliance to democratic principles by energy exporting autocracies, which is at least

⁹⁴ Horst Köhler, "Afrika ist für uns alle wichtig! [Africa is important to all of us] Die IP im Gespräch mit Bundespräsident Horst Köhler," *IP Internationale Politik* (April 2006): 19.

⁹⁵ Richard Herzinger, "Es fehlt eine Gesamtstrategie: Der Afghanistan-Einsatz wird noch lange dauern," *Die Welt*, October 17, 2008. <http://debatte.welt.de/kommentare/94031/in+afghanistan+fehlt+eine+gesamtstrategie> (accessed October 17, 2008).

⁹⁶ Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The myth of the democratic peace," *International Security* 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994): 49.

questionable, but at the same time applies liberal democratic principles of peace and cooperation in dealing with them, that according to Layne do not have the desired effects.

Conclusions and Outlook

Market forces in a globalized world appear to be the real players in international energy supply. However, economic conduct depends on basic enabling conditions that allow these institutions and processes to operate. Given the fact that markets do not function optimally everywhere, and that many fuel suppliers are fully or partially state-owned companies, diplomatic efforts are gaining more weight. Energy security as an integral part of national security policy cannot stay outside security policy considerations. In this regard, governments also have a share and a vital interest in all means to enable these processes. Foreign and security policy, including the military as an element of political intervention, provide the physical security that make trade, and transit possible.

Based on these thoughts, the military aspect of energy supply security finds its representation in both the German foreign policy, and the German White Paper on Security Policy. Germany after the 2006 and 2008 Russian-Ukrainian natural gas crises finally has realized her vulnerability based on dependency. However, military action in order to restore liberal markets bear the risk of unpredictable and undesired secondary effects. Consequently, the German Comprehensive and Proactive Concept of Security regards military intervention as a means of last resort. With regard to the effects created simply by the existence of military capabilities however, any nation should never rule out the possibility and the articulated will to seriously make use of their full potential. This concluding section seeks to summarize the possible implications of a value and/or interest informed energy security policy in the German national security context. It also addresses the conflict between real necessities as faced by

politicians and diverging public expectations. The later, as previously shown, is primarily an issue of public perceptions.

As has been stressed numerous times in this monograph, the German population in general is very peaceful, almost pacifistic in their foreign policy attitude. According to the sociologist Max Weber, power is probability of allegiance.⁹⁷ In this sense, vulnerability gains a new dimension on the domestic stage. A potential enemy possessing the knowledge of the German mind and knowing German cognitive vulnerabilities better than the Germans do themselves represents a very different threat than German foreign and security policy is designed to repel. A struggle about political culture and perceptions will not be won on the battlefield, but on the field of images, rhetoric and the changing public opinions. “Simply stated, perception is the new battlefield and the mind is the weapon.”⁹⁸ These principles do also apply in the international race for fossil fuels. Consequently, understanding the role of the military in energy supply security solely as what can physically be achieved is a step too short. Important is how the presence of military capabilities and the political will to consider this option among others is perceived. In this light, the contemporary hardly recognizable German discussion on prerequisites for the deployment of forces is weakening the German position in the international system. A military force readily trained and equipped at hand, a wide range of options for their deployment, and the expressed and widely shared will to consider this option results in a position of strength, even when plans are rarely executed. Openly discussed risk adversity and the early and rigorous exclusion of all military means from the political conduct will result into the contrary.

⁹⁷ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundrisse der verstehenden Soziologie* (1922), <http://textlog.de/7312.html> (accessed November 12, 2008).

⁹⁸ Joseph Henrotin and Tanguy Struye de Sweilande, *Ontological Cultural Asymmetry and the Relevance of Grand Strategies*, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, (Winter 2004), Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 1-25. http://www.jmss.org/2004/winter/articles/henrotin_struye.pdf (accessed 12/2/2008)

However, the current German situation can be described as in a state of disequilibrium. On one hand, promoting values to guarantee interests has been a successful underlying principle of German foreign and security policy for a long time. On the other hand, Germany's dependency on the import of natural resources to sustain its economic power has always defined a major point of interest. This interest, as recently proven, will be challenged more often when fossil fuels diminish. Public opinion is equally indifferent due to low overall interest in the topic. German politicians will well observe whether the electorate values affordable energy prices and freedom to spend energy according to individual needs higher than the rejection of conflict, power politics and military actions. The slow adaptation of German security policy towards a broad spectrum of means available at hand is currently on shaky ground. Every incident in the context of energy security as well as the ongoing deployments of the Bundeswehr has an immediate influence on the way ahead. Following the general tendency in partly post-materialist societies, grand strategy and national interests in Germany are no longer publicly discussed and therefore left to individual interpretations by individual groups of the population. This monograph discussed in detail the current situation and theoretical framework for the military aspects of German energy security politics and takes the position that the German people need to reconsider the foundations of their perceptions in times of limited access to energy supplies.

Today, the interests of political and economic entities and values of the population merge in the conduct of today's foreign policy. With regard to the military, stabilization operations, civil-military cooperation, nation building to promote liberal politics and liberal markets, and humanitarian assistance all meet, when selectively conducted, the prevailing interests and the desire of the German population to do good. In this situation, there is hardly room for the means of real-politics. As described earlier, the conflict between public expectations and practical necessities as faced by politicians is firstly an issue of perception. Germany, due to her limited military capacities, will always have to pick the multinational mission, which it is willing to support. "To change the situation it requires necessarily controversial public discourse prior to the

political decision. If public discourse does not take place, this situation of mutually reinforcing factors hampering open discourse bears the risk of political decisions dominantly dictated more by popular concerns than by reasonable national interests.

Initial resulting consequences can already be observed. In autumn 2008, considerations in Germany included the deployment of naval forces to secure maritime supply lines off the East-African coast. In general, very low friendly casualty rates characterize maritime security operations conducted by technologically advanced forces. Furthermore, during naval operations at sea media coverage can almost completely be controlled by purely geographic conditions and without being suspected of any kind of censorship. This characteristic provides a certain degree of influence on how the operation is publicly anticipated back home. Consequently, the public discussion in Germany centered on legal and tactical details, but hardly challenged the overall participation. To the contrary, discussions on land operations as German Army's continued contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan are highly controversial. These observations lead to the assumption, that the issue at stake is not the will of power projection in general, but about the risk of casualties and the visibility of success or failure. If this trend prevails, Germany's future military capabilities will develop in favor of less visible means of military power projection in space, in the air and at sea.

Another question to answer is how German popular opinion would develop in a situation where an aggressive foreign cause for the perceived personal economic suffering can clearly be determined. Based on either political theory or public survey data, the monograph developed two rather contradictory findings. The first that a perceived unfavorable personal economic situation results in an increased rejection of international military engagement is a specific behavioral phenomenon by large parts of the German people. The other, of an increased acceptance of hard power means in times of material needs, is rooted in the mental model of post-materialist theory. Based on the previous discussion on how German popular perception grows, one can expect the German emphasis on a value informed defense and security policy to prevail even when access to

energy becomes more restricted and materialistic needs gain more attention by the population again.

A different, more favorable explanation of the German situation presented here however would turn the argument 180 degrees. Whether Germany, in accordance with stratagems of Far Eastern scholars, fakes political weakness intentionally to deny the adversary knowledge about her position of strength, while seeking to exploit his goals and weaknesses herself, must be left to further research.

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