Accountability for Information Flow via Explicit Formal Proof
Abstract
Logical techniques have been developed that capture both authorization and information flow requirements in security applications. These logical techniques achieve a significantly higher degree of end-to-end accountability in distributed systems than is currently possible. Furthermore, a case study has shown that these techniques are applicable to security policies that are relevant to the needs of the intelligence community while providing much greater flexibility in security policy specification. A prototype implementation has demonstrated the practicality of the proposed file system architecture. Symantec, the industrial partner in the project, is presently pursuing a significant related business opportunity.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA508600
Entities
People
- Brian Witten
- Frank Pfenning
- Lujo Bauer
- Michael Reiter
- Peter P Lee
Organizations
- Carnegie Mellon University