Counter Piracy: A Repeated Game with Asymmetric Information
Abstract
This thesis presents a model of a counter-piracy operation, where a task force has one operational asset (a destroyer) and one reconnaissance asset (an unmanned aerial vehicle) to reduce piracy in a large region. The region is divided into small areas, and each day the pirates operate in one area to hijack commercial vessels to collect ransoms. The information is asymmetric to the two players. The pirates know which area is more profitable, but the task force does not. The task force can use the operational asset to prevent piracy, and the reconnaissance asset to collect information on the profitability of each area. The pirates want to maximize their income over a thirty-day period, while the task force wants to minimize it. The numerical experiments quantify the value of the operational asset and the reconnaissance asset in this counter-piracy operation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA508889
Entities
People
- Christopher D. Marsh
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School