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A Requirement for a National Intelligence Support Team in Direct Support of Special Operations Forces Task Groups in Multinational Operations

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Approved: 

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Executive Summary

Title: A Requirement for a National Intelligence Support Team in Direct Support of Special Operations Forces Task Groups in Multinational Operations

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Thesis: The lack of intelligence cooperation between coalition forces causes severe problems for effective employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in multinational operations. Intelligence cooperation has proven difficult even within an alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Not only does the lack of cooperation increase the risk for units involved, more importantly, it hampers effective mission accomplishment. Thus, a robust National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) in direct support of national SOF contributions, authorized to share intelligence within the coalition's SOF structure, provides a viable solution to minimize this problem.

Discussion: NATO has changed its focus from defending Western Europe to facing irregular threats in out of area operations. The use of SOF in conflict areas like Kosovo and Afghanistan has proved to be a success. Based on these experiences, there is an increased demand on the NATO member nations to develop additional SOF capabilities. After the NATO Riga Summit in 2006, the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative was launched, and NATO established a US led NATO SOF Coordination Centre (NSCC) in Mons, Belgium. The NSCC has focused on lessons learned from deployments, as well as separate studies of NATO SOF, and identified a requirement for better interoperability within NATO SOF. However, the responsibility of the individual NATO nation to provide its SOF with intelligence enablers has not been emphasized. In the contemporary world with irregular threats and counterinsurgency campaigns, tailored intelligence support is a critical requirement to mission success. SOF are consumers of intelligence in all phases of an operation. The sensitive nature of intelligence, combined with the importance of intelligence to succeed in special operations, can be overcome by providing sufficient national intelligence support to the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) commander. Through the national NIST support, the SOTG commander can address the limitations regarding intelligence sharing prior to, during, and after deployments to multinational operations.

Conclusion: Sufficient intelligence support is one of the critical requirements for a SOF TG to succeed in multinational operations. This intelligence support has to be tailored to specific missions and capabilities of the SOTG. Thus, it must be identified, organized and trained together with the SOTG prior to deployment. The required intelligence support should take the form of a NIST that allows the deployed SOF unit access to national intelligence systems. Furthermore, the NIST must be authorized to share intelligence within the SOF structure. Thus, the NIST will be the connection between the SOTG, the national intelligence services, as well as other nations' inter agencies representatives in theater. A NIST in direct support of the tactical SOTG commander should be a demand to the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) in the force generation process for NATO SOF.

Preface

This paper aims to describe how smaller NATO member nations can improve their capabilities to minimize some of the challenges related to intelligence in multinational operations. I have been privileged to serve with The Norwegian Army Special Operations Command (NORASOC) Task Group (TG) during several deployments in both Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2008. Throughout this period, lessons learned have been implemented and reflecting the TG's preparations for each deployment. The most significant improvement has been achieved through a continuous development of the intelligence support. This development was done in close concert with the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS). The improved intelligence support of the Norwegian SOTG set the stage for positive effects in the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. The Norwegian Model for organizing intelligence support to its Special Forces is an example on how a smaller NATO nation can minimize the challenges of intelligence in multinational operations.

Thanks to the support and patience of my wife and children, I have had the opportunity to deploy in the past and study, reflect and write this last year at the USMC CSC. Furthermore, I will thank everybody who has contributed to this paper; the faculty of the USMC CSC; in particular, LtCol Lunde and my mentors Dr Wineman and LtCol Burton. Furthermore Rachel and Andrea at the library were always helpful. Magne and his staff in NSCC, Kai and Eric in the NIST, and Frode and Trond in NORASOC TG all read and commented on my drafts. Lars Joergen was on-line and my reach-back in Norway. Torgeir, currently in Carlisle Barracks, was the one who always had time to work for the best results for NORASOC, I really appreciated being on his team.

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Introduction

Beginning with the crisis in the Balkans in the mid 1990s, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have participated in several multinational operations overseas. Overseas operations have taken place with an unexpectedly high deployment rate that would have been unlikely before the collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO SOF units have had success in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The normal organization of SOF in NATO operations has been that NATO member nation Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs) are assigned to the Commander Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) or equivalent. Thus, the CJFSOCC normally has multiple, national SOTGs assigned. The successful use of SOF has led to an increased focus within NATO on interoperability and further development of these forces. At the NATO Riga Summit in 2006, the NATO Special Operations Forces Initiative (NSTI) was launched, and soon after NATO established a US led NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre (NSCC) in Mons, Belgium.

The NSCC is a center responsible for advising and coordinating the different NATO members' SOF communities in order to achieve increased interoperability within the NATO SOF community. The NSCC has conducted several studies on the training and organization of SOF within NATO. These studies have also identified the importance of providing intelligence support to the CJFSOCC. There has, however, been limited focus on tactical intelligence support to a SOTG and how to organize the support for a SOTG in multinational operations. Standardized organization, capabilities, and intelligence sharing

protocols required to support a SOTG with sufficient intelligence support, have to be developed by the NATO SOF nations to meet the mission requirements.

The use of SOF in multinational operations has also unveiled some of the shortfalls within NATO. Shortfalls as command and control integration, interoperability of communications, and information sharing have been addressed, but no complete solutions have been provided.[1] The challenges of intelligence sharing have been specifically identified within NATO, but limited focus has been given to smaller NATO member-nations' responsibility to improve their own intelligence capabilities and intelligence organization.

"Intelligence and the means to get it – a centrally-managed, experienced, and well organized intelligence architecture – is fundamental to counterinsurgency warfare."[2] The US has established a concept in which a Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander is supported by a US National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). This US NIST facilitates the intelligence flow among all strategic intelligence organizations and the JTF commander. In the contemporary world and ongoing fight against irregular forces, one of the critical capabilities in support of a SOTG in a multinational operation, is the ability to develop and sustain a sufficient intelligence organization. Like the US NIST concept, each NATO member nation should provide its deployed SOF with intelligence support tailored to the mission.

The lack of intelligence cooperation among coalition forces causes severe problems for effective employment of SOF in multinational operations. The intelligence cooperation has proven difficult even within an alliance like NATO. Not only does this lack of cooperation increase the risk for units involved, it also hampers effective mission

accomplishment. Thus, a robust NIST in direct support of national SOF contributions, authorized by the National Intelligence Service to share intelligence within the coalition's SOF structure, provides a viable solution to minimize this problem.

The National Intelligence Support Team – a Brief History

The idea of supporting tactical units with national level intelligence agency support is not new. During the Vietnam War, the US Phoenix program pushed intelligence resources down to the tactical levels of a military organization.[3] The Phoenix program, however, was controversial, mainly because of its secrecy which resulted in speculations on the program's actual goals.[4] However, the idea of utilizing national intelligence agencies on a tactical level is valid today. The focus of this intelligence support is to fight low intensity conflicts or insurgencies more effectively.

The intelligence community faced new challenges in the aftermath of the Cold War. In the 1990s, low intensity conflicts in countries like Somalia and Haiti soon replaced the traditional focus for the US and its allies. The need to synchronize and improve the intelligence support for the US forces in the Balkans resulted in establishment of the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) concept.[5]

In the contemporary world, the US and its NATO allies and partner nations are involved in counterinsurgency operations in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Counterinsurgency campaigns require robust intelligence support; "to be successful, counterinsurgent forces must be heavily weighed with intelligence support."[6] The US NIST concept is established to support the JTF commander with sufficient intelligence support by giving the commander access to the resources of national level intelligence agencies. "First and most frequently, the NIST provides 'reach-back' to national

Intelligence Communities agencies and a thorough knowledge of each agency's resources and capabilities that normally do not exist at the JTF level."[7]

The focus of the NIST described above is to support the Joint Task Force Commander, assuming that the US leads the coalition. The intelligence capability the US NIST brings to the table when it deploys in support of a JTF commander is the same sort of intelligence capability the SOTG commander needs from his home nation's intelligence capabilities to be able to conduct full spectrum Special Operations.

The role of SOF and missions

> *If the only "teeth" in Afghanistan were the few hundred SOF personnel and aviators who initially engaged the Taliban and al Qaeda, then the tooth-to-tail ratio was minuscule. Tens of thousands of US personnel flew reconnaissance, ran ships, moved logistics, processed intelligence, and moved information to support those few hundred troops at the sharp end. However, precisely because of that intricate and massive support structure, the few hundred troops on the ground were able to topple the Taliban regime in a few months with almost no US casualties.*[8]

According to NATO definitions, SOF, in principle, conducts three types of operations: Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA) and Military Assistance (MA). In addition, Hostage Rescue Operations (HRO) could be added, but in the context of this paper, HRO is treated as a DA-operation. All of these mission types require extensive intelligence support, as SOF normally is limited in numbers and with a high demand for precision in their operations.

Special Reconnaissance (SR) is the mission type in which the main purpose is to collect information of potential high intelligence value. Special Forces will do this by applying a wide range of capabilities. These capabilities vary from the traditional covert observation posts (OPs) to collecting information amongst the people using HUMINT techniques. Common to the use of different techniques is that the information gathered is

considered of potential significant value, since its collection requires the use of SOF. SOF will rely heavily on background information during the planning process before forces are deployed on the ground. Furthermore, once the information gathering is ongoing, SOF will continuously require an updated picture of the current situation within the area of operation. Finally, the information gathered requires analysis. Only once the information has gone through a complete intelligence cycle, to include planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, and dissemination to the consumer, will the results appear. When a nation deploys its SOF units, it should inherently deploy sufficient, strategic-level intelligence support. Thus, even small SOF teams, like a six men patrol, rely on a properly manned intelligence support structure to be effective.

The use of SOF in direct action (DA) missions is aimed at targeting significant objectives. SOF has the ability to perform a covert infiltration, hit a high value target with surgical precision, exploit the scene, and exfiltrate the target area without holding the ground for a long period of time. In the planning process for such an operation, the intelligence part of the mission meets its most challenging demands. In the contemporary operational environment, one of the SOF missions is to support the targeting process with kinetic capabilities. To ensure such target operations are successful, the intelligence support needs to be integrated in all phases of the operation, from the targeting process, throughout the planning and execution phase, and finally in the exploitation of the results from targeting a specific objective. In a direct action in the form of a HRO, the intelligence requirements only multiply as there will be friendly personnel kept against their will in the target area.

Military Assistance (MA) in NATO is a collective term for all the other missions SOF should be prepared and capable of conducting. These vary from civilian affairs activity, training of indigenous forces, through security operations and liaison missions. All these types of missions require an updated intelligence picture before execution. These MA missions will, in addition to their primary objective, provide more information to the intelligence cycle.

Within a CJFSOCC, each SOTG should have the required capabilities to conduct full spectrum Special Operations. One critical capability to execute Special Operations missions is sufficient intelligence support. In the planning phase, the execution phase, as well as in the exploitation and analyzing phase of an operation, the intelligence support has to be sufficient and robust to ensure mission success.

Organization of SOF and Mission Requirements within a Multinational Operation

NATO defines special operations as:

> *military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve political, military, psychological and economic objectives. Politico-military considerations may require clandestine, covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations.*[9]

The NATO definition underlines the strategic importance of SOF by addressing the objectives (political, military, psychological and economic) of special operations. David Kilcullen notes the importance of the strategic aspect of special operations when he compares the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to today's SOF.[10] SOF is a strategic asset to most nations, but this strategic focus is a challenge in itself in multinational operations. The individual nation will seek to protect some of its strategic

capabilities, to include intelligence collection capabilities. Because of the sensitivity of both SOF capabilities and intelligence, there is an inherent conflict of the "need to share" versus the "need to know" principle of intelligence. To overcome some of the challenges of information and intelligence sharing, strategic level enablers need to be deployed with a mandate to minimize implications of the no-foreign sharing limitations.

When NATO establishes a Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC), it is done by designating a Framework Nation (FN). The FN is capable of providing the framework of the command and control structure for operational control of all SOF in a designated theatre of operations. This CJFSOCC will be a combined organization filled with staff personnel from other participating nations. The troop contribution nations (TCN) will then provide SOTGs under the command of a CJFSOCC. The CJFSOCC establishes a J-structure, to include a J-2 structure responsible for the intelligence within the CJFSOCC. The main focus for the CJFSOCC J-2 is to provide the Component Commander with updated intelligence. One particular challenge within this organization is the need of tactical intelligence support to the SOTGs. Each national SOTG under CJFSOCC command needs *additional* intelligence support in order to operate effectively.

The SOTG will normally have its own G/S-2 intelligence section, but this section of the SOTG will only have limited access to its own nation's strategic intelligence products. The intelligence requirements within each SOTG, and the sum of all these requirements will be more than a CJFSOCC is designed to support. This is clearly demonstrated in counterinsurgency operations, e.g. the ongoing ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The targeting process, the intelligence sharing issues, and the demand for

actionable, tactical intelligence are examples of challenging intelligence requirements. The consequences of acting on information which has not been processed through the intelligence cycle could undermine the overall objective of a counterinsurgency operation, and could diminish the credibility of the multinational force.

NATO does not have a complete intelligence organization, because the organization lacks its own intelligence collection capabilities. Consequently the Alliance relies on its member-nations for information collection.[11] According to a NSCC study of NATO SOF, it is stated that a FN should have the capability to "develop operational intelligence, and integrate SOF intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) platforms, sensors, and human intelligence (HUMINT) into theatre-level collection plans."[12] In the same study it is stated that each Troop Contribution Nation (TCN) should "provide C2 and intelligence to deployed elements."[13] These statements indicate how a NATO SOF organization relies on its member nations to provide the framework of the operational intelligence architecture. The focus within a CJFSOCC is on management and handling of intelligence collected by the SOF organization's own collection assets. Thus, each TCN needs to rely on its own intelligence support, as well as support from higher headquarters (led by the FN) to integrate available information in the overall intelligence picture. Furthermore, a recent study of the friction in the intelligence process within ISAF, which was conducted by a King's College student in London, concluded that multinational intelligence had low priority from TCNs, especially assignments of experienced intelligence personnel to the ongoing mission.[14]

The structural arrangements and changes in NATO cannot overcome the fact that NATO does not have its complete intelligence agency and suffers from lack of experienced intelligence personnel in the deployed headquarters. The human factor in the intelligence cycle should not be underestimated. Intelligence work is not only a science, but also an art. It is a human endeavor, and the quality of intelligence products is a result of the precise analysis based on available data and information. The qualifications of the people within the organization contribute significantly to the quality of these analyses. Because a SOTG relies on accurate and timely intelligence, and can not accept insufficient intelligence support, the personnel who make up the intelligence support have to be trained and familiar with the supported organization.

One way TCNs can ensure that their SOTGs receive tailored intelligence support, is by establishing their NISTs. The NIST could also provide qualified intelligence-liaisons to adjacent units and headquarters. To be able to do this, and at the same time deliver quality intelligence products to the CJFSOCC, SOTGs must rely on support from their own national intelligence services. However, within NATO SOF, the requirement for deploying a NIST in support of a SOTG has not been specifically addressed. As long as the need for robust, national intelligence support to SOTGs is not addressed by NATO, TCNs will continue to deploy their SOTGs to NATO operations without sufficient intelligence support.

Intelligence Structures in a Combined, Joint Special Operations Task Force

> *The internal intelligence capabilities of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) units, and the interface of SOF with the larger intelligence structure, are a critical aspect of success in the overall campaign.*[15]

There are three basic ways to organize intelligence within a multinational force. The focus in this study is on NATO led operations like ISAF and KFOR, but the main principles are valid for other multinational operations, as well.[16] The first option, as described in Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, is to organize the intelligence support through a multinational intelligence center. In NATO this is a J/G-2 led organization of coalition partners. The intelligence center will often be located in close vicinity of each nation's National Intelligence Cell (NIC).[17] A NIC is a forward deployed intelligence cell, normally dealing with information at the operational to strategic level of war. A second option could be through a reach-back system from the SOTG's NIST to each nation's intelligence service ("reach-back" could be described as the ability for forward-deployed units to refer specific intelligence-oriented questions to homeland-based agencies for support).[18] The main difference between the NIC and the NIST is that the NIST only focuses on direct support to the SOTG commander, and is tailored for this mission. The NIC, however, is the national intelligence service forward representatives at the JTF-level, and will normally not be in direct support of a tactical commander. A third option for organizing intelligence support could be to use bilateral arrangements where two or more nations share intelligence through established agreements or organizations.

In reality, in a multinational operation, all the three options of organizing intelligence support will eventually coexist both in time and space. In a military organization unity of command is an important principle. Organizing intelligence through various national organizations does not seem to be in accordance with this principle. However, in a multinational organization, this method of organizing the intelligence architecture is very hard to avoid. Thus, the multinational task force should be able to

create unity of effort for the intelligence organization. If this unity of effort is achieved, the strength of the somewhat fragmented intelligence architecture could be utilized to achieve more than a unilateral organization. From an intelligence perspective, there are both strengths and weaknesses in the way a multinational task force is organized.

The in-theatre, multinational intelligence centers will always have limitations due to the sensitivity of each nation's intelligence collection capabilities. Sensitive intelligence issues will be handled through national channels, e.g. through a NIC with a reach-back capability. Therefore, full intelligence sharing in a multinational intelligence centre is unrealistic. SOF information gathering will use methods and procedures that are unconventional, and each nation will take measures to protect its own capabilities and sources. The information and intelligence being provided to a multinational intelligence centre are sanitized and will not reflect all aspects of the gathered information. Each coalition nation will provide personnel to the J-2 structure in the intelligence center; these personnel, however, will not have the authorization to release national classified information. In a military organization with a clear and concise command structure, the J/G-2 staff will be the hub for all intelligence related matters. In the multinational intelligence architecture, the J/G-2 section has to focus on the coordinating and facilitating of the intelligence efforts of the different nations' TGs. The organizational structure promotes multiple analyses of the same information and could result in different perspectives and supplement the final conclusion. By ensuring unity of effort, the multinational force will benefit from the national intelligence organizations.

A SOTG should be supported directly to the tactical level by its National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). However, today very few nations have established

such an organization in direct support of the tactical SOTG commander. The NIST could be the nation's forward deployed intelligence agency in direct support of the tactical SOTG commander. The troop to task ratio of intelligence personnel in a multinational operation will increase compared to unilateral operations, reflecting the nation's unique equipment and communications means, as well as no-foreign sharing limitations.[19]

Ideally, a NIST should consist of single source and multisource analysts, and should be capable of proper information management. In addition the NIST should have a reach-back capability to ensure sufficient support from its national intelligence service. The reach-back capability to the national intelligence service provides additional capacity to the forward deployed NIST. In 2001, General James N. Mattis (USMC), had limitations on number of personnel in his TF 58 in Afghanistan, but through a reach-back capability he was able to overcome the need for more forward deployed intelligence personnel, by having additional analysts "on-line."[20] In a study of the future of Canadian SOF, Doctor J. Paul de B. Taillon concludes that SOF requires "an integrated intelligence support unit able to reach back to all source intelligence…capable of fusing these sources into coherent, timely and actionable intelligence."[21]

The NIST should be in direct support of the TG commander and therefore not a fully integrated part of a nation's TG. Through a NIST, the TG commander can be supported in theatre without having to deal with the most sensitive parts of intelligence matters within his own SOF organization; the NIST will be responsible for this. At the same time, the SOTG commander benefits from the expertise provided by experienced intelligence officers from the respective nations intelligence services. The NIST should,

however, work in close coordination with the G/S-2 of the task force and thereby ensure unity of effort in accordance with CJFSOCC guidance to the SOTG.

Furthermore, the NIST should be responsible for drawing up the intelligence architecture in theatre, as well as handling of bilateral agreements on behalf of the national intelligence service. A SOTG requires this type of support that is normally provided to the overall in-theatre commander. The US will doctrinally provide a NIST to the Joint Force Commander, and the SOTG commander in a multinational operation requires much of the same intelligence support.[22] A coalition partner SOTG commander needs this support down to the TG level from the nation's own intelligence agency. Establishing a NIST or equivalent organization would provide the SOTG commander with the required intelligence support and enable the SOTG to conduct full spectrum special operations.

A third option to organize intelligence in multinational operations is through robust bilateral agreements. The US, British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand "five eyes community" was established more than 60 years ago and is the oldest, established intelligence coalition (New Zealand was excluded from the community in the mid-80s).[23] However, in a multinational, coalition operation there will probably be several such agreements between nations. Due to sensitivity, such bilateral agreements are handled through the national intelligence services. In theatre, the NIC could provide continuity in managing bilateral agreements; however, when a NIST is deployed it has to have a close cooperation with the NIC and other nations' intelligence services. The SOTG commander needs to benefit from such bilateral agreements through a robust in-theatre support from his own country's national intelligence service. This intelligence

support could provide the SOTG commander with access to information and intelligence shared through bilateral arrangements. The SOTG commander relies on an interconnection between the SOTG and the intelligence communities which are present in-theatre in a multinational operation. This interconnection can be established by the NIST in order to support the SOTG commander with intelligence from multiple sources. The CJFSOCC will also benefit from this, because each national SOTG will draw benefits from their own intelligence service and their relationship with other nations' intelligence communities. Established, sensitive intelligence relationships between nations can be coordinated through a NIST in theatre, thus supporting the SOTG commander with intelligence which would be difficult to access through the CJFSOCC chain of command.

The NIST in Direct Support to a SOTG Commander

A SOTG commander is normally under Operational Control (OPCON) of the CJFSOCC commander. Only a few nations are capable of establishing a CJFSOCC. Normally, the commander of a CJFSOCC, as well as the FN of the CJFSOCC, will be established by one of the larger TCNs. The US and the United Kingdom have the capability to be the FN, while several of the smaller NATO member nations do not have the same capability. The coalition SOTG commander reports and receives his missions through the CJFSOCC chain of command, however, the SOTGs can receive additional intelligence support through their national channels.

The SOTG is normally organized with an intelligence section led by the S/G-2. In addition it should have a NIST in direct support. The NIST is the enabler for all intelligence related matters which do not fall in under the multinational chain of

command. The NIST ensures that all aspects of national level intelligence support are handled correctly. Furthermore, the NIST is the enabler and the connecting point for national level intelligence sharing in a multinational environment. The NIST and the SOTG G/S-2 section work closely together. Through the G/S-2 section, the NIST will be in charge of supporting the SOTG commander with Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products, the targeting process, the handling of intelligence agreements (bilateral or multilateral), providing liaison-personnel to other inter-agencies, and providing a reach-back to the nation's own intelligence service. The mission for the NIST should be direct support to the ongoing TG operations. National tasks other than this main focus should be handled through a NIC to avoid any further confusion within the CJFSOCC and national intelligence architectures.



Fig 1: Example on Command Relationship within a CJFSOCC and the NISTs

The capabilities of the NIST should include single source and all source analysts within all intelligence disciplines, to include Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT), and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). Even if the TG does not have all these collection capabilities within its structure, it should provide analysts within all disciplines. Mission essential

information in theatre could be provided, and with insufficient analysis capabilities, the information could be misinterpreted. To a SOTG it is essential to ensure that the intelligence picture is as correct and updated as possible.

Each TCN should realize the requirements to support its SOTGs with sufficient intelligence. Like SOF, a NIST in direct support, takes time to build. The four truths for SOF are also valid for a specialized organization like the NIST. These truths are: humans are more important than hardware, SOF cannot be mass produced, quality is better than quantity, and competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. The more unknown fifth truth says "most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance."[24] The establishment of a NIST capability requires pre-deployment training, to include integrated training for the SOTG and the NIST. One of the challenges to national intelligence communities will be to dedicate personnel and equipment to support SOTGs. Eventually, the realization of a NIST concept comes down to a question of a nation's ability to build up, train, and sustain the NIST.

The Human Factor in the Intelligence Architecture

After 9/11 there has been an increased focus on the need to improve the intelligence support from the strategic level down to the tactical level. After the NATO Riga Summit in 2006, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General James L. Jones, stated that "emerging threats are best countered through a dynamic intelligence organization that can react and transform as quickly as the threats emerge."[25] In the same statement he also said that "modern military operations require more SOF than ever before."[26] The intelligence community, as well as the SOF community, relies heavily on its personnel. It is the personnel that make the difference within the different

organizations, because "in intelligence, facts do not speak for themselves."[27] To overcome some of the inherent Clausewitzian friction in the intelligence process, the personnel within the organization is the oil that makes the process smooth. Throughout the SOF communities the focus has traditionally been on the quality of its personnel and not on quantity. The challenges described by SACEUR need to be countered by realizing that the process of strengthening the intelligence, as well as the SOF communities, is not only a question of technological and organizational solutions, but also a matter of providing qualified personnel in the different positions. As General James Cartwright, USMC, Commander, US Strategic Command is quoted in JP 2-0 regarding intelligence sharing in multinational operations; "...it's not a technical issue any more. It's really more about culture and the 'need to share' rather then the 'need to know.'" [28]

The NIST, in support of a SOTG, needs to establish a close working relationship to gain the trust of its SOF partners. On the tactical level, the relationship between the consumer and the producer of intelligence should be built on trust and confidence. Manning a NIST in support of SOF requires time for establishing this close relationship between the SOTG commander and the NIST, as "a high degree of rapport between the leader and his intelligence advisors is very important, for without a good relationship; the effectiveness of the intelligence community will diminish considerably, regardless of how good its work is."[29] Therefore, the establishment of a NIST must start as early as possible, preferably even before any deployment is scheduled. Pre-deployment training is a minimum requirement to build mutual relations between the personnel in the SOTG and the NIST.

The Norwegian Model – a Small Nation's Way to Organize Intelligence Support

As part of the Norwegian Army Special Operations Command (NORASOC) SOTG, the author was deployed to Afghanistan several times in the period of 2002 until 2008, both under US command in Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as under NATO command in ISAF. During this period, the NORASOC SOTG continuously developed the way to organize intelligence support based on specific lessons learned. This development was conducted in close concert with the Norwegian National Intelligence Service. The focus of intelligence support to the SOF community in Norway was driven mainly by the need to strengthen the capabilities to conduct full spectrum special operations in the current campaign in Afghanistan. The secondary effect of this development was new standards on how to organize a Norwegian SOTG to achieve success and positive effects in multinational operations

The Norwegian Intelligence Service confirmed in August 2005 that it supported Norwegian Task Forces in the Balkans, as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an openhearted and rare interview on Norwegian news, the Chief of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, Major General Torgeir Hagen explained how the focus during the Cold War had been on the potential strategic threat from the Soviet Union. In the contemporary world, however, the Service found itself in support to Norwegian Forces deployed in multinational operations. The Intelligence Service collects strategic information, as well as supports deployed tactical commanders with information and intelligence. Norwegian tactical commanders interviewed in the same reportage, confirmed that this support was vital throughout their deployment in multinational operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Norway, as a smaller NATO nation, does not have the capability to establish and sustain the framework of a CJFSOCC. However, Norway has contributed with SOTGs within a CJFSOCC or equivalent multinational SOF organization, both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. While the Norwegian SOF community has learned and implemented lessons learned through the deployments overseas, the main development within the community has been intelligence related. The Norwegian SOF community, and the Norwegian Intelligence Service, has established a comprehensive working relationship. The overall purpose of this relationship is to give the SOTG commander intelligence support tailored to the mission through a NIST in direct support to the SOTG commander. The NIST ensures that the intelligence products within the SOTG holds the standards required for conducting full spectrum special operations. The quality of the intelligence products processed through the NIST also benefits the CJFSOCC organization, as the SOTG forwards these products in to the CJFSOCC intelligence cycle. Within the ISAF SOF community, this way of organizing the intelligence from a small NATO member nation's perspective has caught attention amongst other SOTGs.[30]

The requirement to go through pre-deployment training is one important lesson learned from the NIST support to Norwegian SOF. Through such training, the potential human friction on operations has been minimized. The pre deployment training has been conducted both as small unit training and up to the level where the whole organization has been deployed on larger exercises.

Conclusion

In the development of NATO SOF, the NSCC has conducted in depth studies of the capabilities required for SOF organizations. The latest study was issued on 4

December 2008 and is a summary of what needs to be done to improve the coordination within NATO SOF communities. However, to ensure a CJFSOCC or equivalent SOF organization utilizes its different national SOTGs to full spectrum operations, the intelligence side needs to be improved as well. As there is no short cut to create SOF when crises arise,[31] there is no short cut to ensure the enablers are tailored to the SOF missions. Therefore, the development of national SOF capabilities needs to include the development of enablers, with the intelligence support structure as one of the important elements.

Special Operation Forces are consumers of intelligence[32] and the support structure of a SOTG needs to reflect this. There is no perfect intelligence organization, at least not within an Alliance like NATO. This is a fact NATO and the SOF community has to acknowledge. Instead of trying to establish a perfect organization, it should accept the different nations' need to protect some of their intelligence secrets and organize the intelligence architecture to meet the contradictory demands of 'protecting' and 'sharing.' Thus, a sufficient intelligence support team to a SOTG has to come from each TCN's own intelligence services. A commander of a CJFSOCC will benefit from each different SOTG's intelligence support as long as the organization is able to establish unity of effort in the overall intelligence architecture.

A NIST is one possible solution to overcome some of the challenges of intelligence support to a SOTG. Sufficient and tailored intelligence support is vital to a SOTG, and a NIST or equivalent organization should be a demand from NATO to its SOF TCNs in the force generation process. The NIST should be in direct support to the SOTG commander, but not a part of the CJFSOCC. The NIST, if trained, manned, and

used properly could be the linkage between the nation's own intelligence services and other nations' services. In this way it will ensure that information is handled according to its sensitivity and some of the intelligence sharing issues in multinational operations could be overcome.

Furthermore, the NIST could assist the CJFSOCC with additional analysis capabilities. In the targeting process the actual targets could be analyzed within the executive SOTG. The additional analysts working in the NIST will relieve the CJFSOCC intelligence section from some of the most demanding tasks, as well as ensure that all available and relevant information reaches the SOTG.

Finally, only through a robust intelligence support section, the nations' SOF units could be utilized to a full extent. A NIST manned with qualified personnel will ensure that the information collected from a nation's SOTG will be processed and disseminated thoroughly.

Through the NSCC, NATO is prioritizing the development of its member nations SOF. Simultaneously, NATO is deploying its SOF to operations overseas. This focus on NATO SOF, as well as real life experiences from multinational operations, has unveiled some shortfalls within the organization. Realizing that SOF takes time to build, because of the demands for quality, changes within the SOF community need to have a long-term perspective. This time-perspective makes the guidance provided by NATO documents important, and therefore, the need for nations to establish a sufficient and tailored intelligence support to its SOTG has to be addressed.

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