

**RENOVATE AND EXPAND
CHAMCHAMAL CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY
CHAMCHAMAL, IRAQ**

SUSTAINMENT ASSESSMENT

**SIGIR PA-09-177
OCTOBER 22, 2009**

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SIGIR

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

October 22, 2009

Chamchamal Correctional Facility

Summary of Report: PA-09-177

Why SIGIR Did this Study

SIGIR is charged to conduct assessments of Iraq reconstruction projects funded with amounts appropriated or made available by the U.S. Congress. SIGIR assessed this project to provide real-time information on relief and reconstruction to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted.

The objective of this sustainment assessment was to determine whether the project is operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish the objective, the assessment team determined whether the project was at full capability or capacity when accepted by the U.S. government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspection.

What SIGIR Recommends

Because action has been taken to make the \$29 million U.S.-funded Chamchamal Correctional Facility operational, the recommendation made to INL in SIGIR's draft report has been eliminated.

In addition, SIGIR received comments on the draft of this report from the USACE GRD, indicating that it concurred with the draft report.

SIGIR lauds the prompt actions taken by INL to encourage the Government of Iraq to begin utilization of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. SIGIR also appreciates the concurrence with the draft report by the USACE GRD. No additional comments on this report are necessary.

What SIGIR Found

On 20 June 2009, SIGIR conducted an on-site assessment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility renovation project in Chamchamal, Iraq, accompanied by a Gulf Region North representative and the provisional warden. The project was funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).

The objective of this \$29 million project was to convert the existing fort at Chamchamal into a modern correctional facility with 2,000 medium-security, dormitory-style adult male prison beds and 1,000 high-security cell-style adult prison beds.

SIGIR identified several minor construction deficiencies: an incomplete building expansion joint system, a tripping hazard outside the kitchen, and no electrical outlets in the refrigeration room. Aside from these minor construction issues, SIGIR concluded that the construction of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility was adequate. The contractor took the extra security precaution of enclosing in a cage the HVAC unit, lighting, and electrical wiring in the high-security cells to ensure that prisoners would not tamper with the equipment or use it as a weapon.

Even though the U.S. government completed construction and transferred this facility to the Iraqi Correctional Service in March 2009, at the time of SIGIR's site visit, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility did not house any prisoners or guards and was not operational. Approximately half of the contractor's one-year warranty for any construction defects had expired without a single prisoner or guard using any of the facilities—sinks, toilets, showers, electrical lights, outlets, etc.—to identify any latent defects. In addition, SIGIR identified significant sustainment issues for the KRG, such as the lack of power, staffing, and an operating budget for the facility.

In September 2009, riots at the Baghdad Central Prison resulted in the facility being "uninhabitable." With INL's encouragement, the Government of Iraq opened the Chamchamal Correctional Facility and by 12 October 2009, there were 2,637 inmates and 240 Iraqi Correctional Officers at the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has allocated 13 billion Iraqi dinars (\$11.1 million) per month to the Iraqi Correctional Service for operation and sustainment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility which is currently being used to provide power and logistical support for the inmates and Iraqi Correctional Officers at the site.



For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at (703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil



SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

October 22, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-
IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING
COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN
DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Report on the Sustainment Assessment of the Renovation and Expansion of
the Chamchamal Correctional Facility, Chamchamal, Iraq
(SIGIR Report Number PA-09-177)

We are providing this report for your information and use. It addresses the SIGIR sustainment assessment of Renovation and Expansion of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility, Chamchamal, Iraq. This assessment was made to provide you and other interested parties with real-time information on a relief and reconstruction project and to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract.

SIGIR's primary concern was that the \$29 million U.S.-funded Chamchamal Correctional Facility had been completed and turned over to the Government of Iraq on 18 March 2009, but was not being used to alleviate overcrowded prison conditions in Iraq. However, during the course of SIGIR's review, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement representatives' liaison efforts with the Government of Iraq to encourage use of the facility were successful, and it was put into use on 19 September 2009. As a result, this report does not contain any recommendations for further action, and no additional comments are necessary.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Brian Flynn via e-mail at brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil or at 240-553-0581, extension 2485. For public affairs queries concerning this report, please contact SIGIR Public Affairs at publicaffairs@sigir.mil or at 703-428-1100.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.", is positioned above the printed name.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SIGIR PA-09-177

October 22, 2009

Renovate and Expand Chamchamal Correctional Facility Chamchamal, Iraq

Synopsis

Introduction. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is assessing projects funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to provide real-time information on relief and reconstruction to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted.

Project Assessment Objective. The objective of this project assessment was to determine whether the project is operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish the objective, SIGIR determined whether the project was at full capability or capacity when accepted by the U.S. government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspection on 20 June 2009. SIGIR conducted this limited scope assessment in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team comprised one engineer/inspector and two auditors/inspectors.

Project Objective. The overall objective of this project was to increase the overall bed count of the Iraqi Corrections Service for the Ministry of Justice by renovating, expanding, and converting an existing fort at Chamchamal into a safe, secure, and humane correctional facility. Specifically, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility will provide approximately 2,000 medium security, dormitory-style adult male prison beds, and 1,000 high-security cell-style adult prison beds to assist in alleviating the existing overcrowded Iraqi prison system. The Kurdistan Regional Government requested assistance in undertaking this project; the U.S. government awarded a contract for approximately \$29 million.

According to project file documentation, the improved security situation throughout Iraq has resulted in the capture of a large number of terrorists and criminals. But the Iraqi penal system does not have a sufficient number of correctional facilities to adequately house the growing number of captured terrorists and criminals. In addition, Iraqi prisons do not meet the human rights standards prescribed by the United Nations.

Conclusions. On 18 March 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region North (GRN) Kirkuk Area Office (KAO) officially turned over the Chamchamal Correctional Facility to the Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS). The contractor, the Commanding General of USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD), and an ICS representative signed a Memorandum for Record stating:

“All work has been inspected, certified and accepted by the US Army Corps of Engineers. Construction of the facilities is complete. No other work is to be performed under this contract unless noted in paragraph 5 below.”

Paragraph 5 identified deficiencies found during the final inspection of the facility by the GRN KAO. The turnover document required the contractor to correct all outstanding

deficiencies by 31 March 2009. According to project file documentation, the contractor corrected all previously identified deficiencies.

Before the site visit, SIGIR reviewed the contractor's design submittals for this project. Overall, the design submittals appeared to contain adequate detail to construct the various buildings and systems for the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. The designs included drawings used for correctional facility construction—civil and site utilities, architectural, electrical, mechanical, plumbing, and structural drawings. The overall site layout showed the general layout of the project site, including the locations of the buildings and parking areas, security fence, and site utilities. The architectural plans identified the location, dimensions, and proposed uses of various spaces within the facility. The architectural plans appeared complete, with detailed information for the individual cells, visitor areas, guard barracks, and ancillary support buildings—including electricity, plumbing, and mechanical. In addition, the contractor gave special consideration to issues such as toilets, showers, and sinks because correctional facility controls require that these items be durable and impossible to disassemble.

Although the contractor's design submittals adequately met the requirements of the contract's Statement of Work (SOW), SIGIR noticed that the SOW did not address the original facility's external expansion joints. Considering that the external walls are exposed to extreme climatic conditions (excessive heat in the summer and snow in the winter), SIGIR's opinion is that external expansion joints should have been part of the contract's SOW.

On 20 June 2009, SIGIR conducted an on-site assessment of the project. Due to the size of the site, complexity of the project, and time limitations (approximately 2 hours on site), SIGIR performed an expedited assessment of the project. The inspection included a representative sample of the completed buildings and systems at the correctional facility. Specifically, SIGIR inspected several medium-security dormitory style cells (50 or fewer prisoners per cell) and individual to four-person high-security cells. A complete review of all work completed was not possible.

Even though the U.S. government completed construction and officially transferred this project to the Iraqi Correctional Service in March 2009, at the time of SIGIR's site visit, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility did not house any prisoners or guards and was not operational. The U.S. government was responsible for the construction of the correctional facility; however, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was responsible for an operational budget to provide for a staff and electrical power to run the facility.

Since the Chamchamal Correctional Facility was not operational at the time of the assessment, SIGIR could conduct only a limited assessment—or no assessment at all—of the building's systems, including:

- potable water distribution
- wastewater conveyance/disposal
- electrical power production and distribution
- voice and data communication
- external security lighting system

SIGIR inspected the following exterior and interior areas of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility:

Exterior Areas

- access road
- perimeter security walls
- guard tower
- access control point
- support facilities, including guard barracks (one), power production area, fuel tanks, potable water well and pump unit, firewater pump unit, supply warehouse, wastewater handling septic tanks system, and associated treatment lagoon
- facilities maintenance shop, fuel supply, and vehicle maintenance areas

Interior Areas

- general prisoner population housing units and high-security cells equipped with personal hygiene units (various sizes and capacities)
- facility exterior and interior walls, ceilings, floors, and roofing systems
- recreational area
- non-perishable food storage warehouse
- kitchen
- perishable food storage/refrigeration area
- medical, psychiatric, and dental clinic with treatment rooms
- administrative offices
- visitation areas
- laundry facility

SIGIR's site visit identified minor construction deficiencies, such as an incomplete building expansion joint system and a tripping hazard outside the kitchen building. In addition, in the refrigeration room, the contractor designed and constructed the room without any electrical outlets. The provisional warden expressed concern that the absence of electrical outlets will nullify the intent of the refrigeration room. The warden stated that perishable food would have to be stored somewhere else or long extension cords would need to be run from another room into the refrigeration room. The warden is concerned that high foot-traffic in this area could increase the potential for the extension cords being unplugged or cut, which could lead to either spoiled food and/or a fire.

Aside from these minor construction issues, SIGIR concluded that the construction of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility was adequate. The contractor took the extra security precaution of enclosing in a cage the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning unit, lighting fixture, and electrical wiring in the high-security cells to prevent prisoners from tampering with the equipment or use it as a weapon. SIGIR determined that this project was constructed adequately for the KRG to sustain the correctional facility for its intended use.

At the time of SIGIR's assessment, U.S. government representatives were concerned about the KRG's inability to provide power, staffing, and an operating budget for this project. Approximately half of the contractor's one-year warranty for any construction defects had expired without a single prisoner or guard using the facilities—sinks, toilets, showers, electric lights and outlets, etc.—to identify latent defects. Representatives of INL stated that the KRG had committed to provide electrical power and an operating budget to run the facility, and additional guards had been identified. INL representatives were optimistic that the Chamchamal Correctional Facility would be operational by October 2009.

Actions that Made the Chamchamal Correctional Facility Operational. In September 2009, a prisoner riot at the Baghdad Central Prison¹ resulted in the death of one prisoner, various injuries to as many as 40 prisoners, and fire damage that left the prison facility “uninhabitable.” The Ministry of Justice decided to temporarily transfer the inmates to other Baghdad correctional facilities, such as Rusafa and Khadamiya.

On 19 September 2009, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) relocated 360 inmates and 10 Iraqi Correctional Officers (ICOs) from the Baghdad Central Prison to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. Over the next week, the MoJ continued to transfer additional inmates to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility to alleviate overcrowding in Baghdad prisons. According to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility provisional warden, as of 12 October 2009, there were 2,637 inmates and 240 ICOs at the Chamchamal Correctional Facility.

According to U.S. government representatives, the U.S. military provided the aircraft to fly the inmates from Baghdad to Sulaymaniyah, and the ICS handled all ground logistical movement to the correctional facility site. The MoJ transferred 240 ICOs on a temporary basis while the ICS vets and trains a group of guards from the Chamchamal town to replace the temporary guards. According to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility provisional warden, 620 guards have been hired for the facility, of which 460 are currently in training. The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has allocated 13 billion Iraqi dinars (\$11.1 million) per month to the ICS for operation and sustainment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility, which is currently being used to provide power and logistical support for the inmates and ICOs at the site.

Recommendation. In the draft report, SIGIR recommended that INL take action to make the \$29 million U.S.-funded Chamchamal Correctional Facility operational. Because the facility is now operational, SIGIR has eliminated this recommendation from the final report.

Management Comments. During SIGIR’s review, INL representatives stated that they were in constant contact with the KRG regarding the operation and sustainment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. Once it became operational, INL representatives provided SIGIR the actual dates and number of inmates and correctional officers transferred to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility.

In addition, SIGIR received comments on the draft of this report from the USACE GRD, indicating that it concurred with the draft report.

Evaluation of Management Comments. SIGIR lauds the prompt actions taken by the INL to encourage the Government of Iraq to begin utilization of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. SIGIR also appreciates the concurrence with the draft report by the USACE GRD. No additional comments on this report are necessary.

¹ Formerly known as the Abu Ghraib Prison.

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Introduction

Objective of the Project Assessment

The objective of this project assessment was to provide real-time relief and reconstruction project information to interested parties to enable appropriate action to be taken, when warranted. Specifically, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) determined whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish this, SIGIR determined if the project was at full capability or capacity when accepted by the U.S. government, when it was transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspection.

SIGIR conducted this limited scope assessment in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team comprised one engineer/inspector and two auditors/inspectors.

Pre-site Assessment Background

Contract, Costs and Payments

On 2 October 2007, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan awarded Contract W91GDW-08-2001, in the amount of \$27,453,400, to a local contractor. The period of performance for this project was 425 calendar days after the Notice to Proceed. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region North District (GRN) issued the full Notice to Proceed on 8 December 2007; consequently, the project was to be completed by 5 February 2009.

This contract had the following seven modifications:

- Modification P00001, dated 15 September 2008, extended the period of performance 11 calendar days at no additional cost to the U.S. government.
- Modification A00001, dated 16 December 2007, was an incentive award for the contractor to complete the project early—\$8,000 per day for up to 100 days (\$800,000 total) increasing the contract cost to \$28,253,400.
- Modification A00002, dated 14 April 2008, added \$80,750 to the overall contract cost (\$28,334,150) to include razor wire to the scope of work to increase security and extended the period of performance to 14 February 2009.
- Modification A00003, dated 31 December 2008, added \$16,000 to the overall contract cost (\$28,350,150) for a badging machine.
- Modification A00004, dated 25 January 2009, added \$1,100,000 to the contract amount (\$29,450,150) to pay a tap fee to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ministry of Electricity, Directorate of Electricity of Sulaymaniyah, to connect the correctional facility to an existing substation.

- Modification A00005, dated 10 February 2009, increased the overall project cost by \$41,000 (to \$29,491,150) for the construction of a laboratory and high-security control center.
- Modification A00006, dated 12 March 2009, descope the contractor's incentive award from Modification A00001 (\$800,000) for a final contract cost of \$28,691,150.

Project Objective

The overall objective of this project was to increase the number of beds of the Iraqi Corrections Service for the Ministry of Justice by renovating, expanding, and converting a fort at Chamchamal into a safe, secure, and humane correctional facility. Specifically, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility will provide approximately 2,000 medium-security, dormitory-style adult male prison beds and 1,000 high-security cell-style adult prison beds to help ease overcrowding in the Iraqi prison system. The KRG requested the U.S. government's assistance in undertaking this project; consequently, the U.S. government awarded a contract of approximately \$29 million to support the project.

According to project file documentation, the improved security situation throughout Iraq has resulted in the capture of a large number of terrorists and criminals. But the Iraqi penal system does not have a sufficient number of correctional facilities to adequately house the growing number of captured terrorists and criminals. In addition, Iraqi prisons do not meet the human rights standards prescribed by the United Nations.

Pre-construction Description

The description of the facility (pre-construction) was based on information obtained from the contract, the USACE project file, and discussions with USACE and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) personnel.

Chamchamal Fort is approximately seven kilometers (km) north of the city of Chamchamal in the northern province of Sulaymaniyah. Chamchamal is a Kurdish city of 142,882 residents,² approximately 40 km northeast of the city of Kirkuk and 60 km west of the province's capital city of Sulaymaniyah (Figure 1). Sulaymaniyah is the second-largest city in the northern region, with 500,000-750,000 inhabitants. Many buildings were destroyed by warfare, and some of the larger buildings are occupied by refugees living in squalor.

² According to an April 2004 report by the Joint Humanitarian Information Center Erbil, the population of Chamchamal comprised 68,855 males and 74,027 females.




Figure 1. Location of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility
(Courtesy of GRN)

Sulaymaniyah is also the capital of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan which controls Iraqi Kurdistan. Since the Kurdish uprising that followed the first Gulf War in 1991, Northern Iraq established independence from the Saddam regime (guarded by U.S. and British air patrols). The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan controls Sulaymaniyah; its rival, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, controls Erbil and Dahuk.

This project required renovating and constructing new facilities at the Chamchamal Fort,³ a 30-year-old military fort that once belonged to the previous regime. However, the fort is also rumored to have once housed women and children rounded up during Saddam Hussein's 1988 terror campaign when Iraqi forces destroyed hundreds of Kurdish villages and killed up to 200,000 people. In 2003, this poorly maintained fort was partially destroyed by Coalition forces, and the remnants were subsequently looted (Site Photos 1 and 2). The entire project site will encompass approximately 20,000 square meters.



Site Photos 1 and 2. Condition of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility prior to renovation and construction
(Photos courtesy of the USACE)

The Hamawand tribe occupied the land. Project file documentation stated that the tribe was “armed all the time and become dangerous” regarding the topic of using “their land.” Project file documentation showed that the land actually belonged to the government and was being used by the Hamawand tribe for farming. The project file concluded that there were no existing households on the project site; therefore, no household families would be physically or economically displaced or relocated as a result of this project.

Statement of Work

The Statement of Work (SOW) required the contractor to design and renovate the fort to increase the number of beds in the Iraqi prison system. The SOW required the contractor to provide approximately 2,000 medium-security dormitory-style adult male prison beds and approximately 1,000 high-security cell-style adult male prison beds.

In addition, the SOW required the construction of multiple support structures, including the following:

- sewage disposal, treatment, and storage
- recreation yards

³ Chamchamal Fort is also referred to as Chamchamal Castle.

- administration and maintenance facilities
- laundry facilities
- medical treatment facilities
- barracks for off-duty corrections officers
- receiving and discharge areas
- security towers
- entry control point
- perimeter fence
- visitor reception
- badging office
- electrical upgrades
- water treatment and storage
- food preparation and storage

Project Design and Specifications

The SOW included requirements for the submission of all designs, design changes, drawings, specifications, manufacturer's submittals, training manuals and training procedures, and quality control procedures. Specifically, the SOW required the contractor to submit 30%, 60%, and 90% design drawings of the overall site and work to be completed.

In addition, the SOW required that all construction and the installation of all equipment conform to the host nation's building codes and be done according to the manufacturer's approved methods and procedures. When Iraqi building codes do not exist or are insufficient to meet the needs of the project, the contractor must use international or U.S. building codes, depending on which code better serves the need. All work performed must conform to the Iraqi General Conditions for Contracting when it does not conflict with the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation. All equipment and finishes must comply with Iraqi building codes and be in accordance with the final designs and submittals. All equipment and systems in the facilities that require certification for operation—boilers, chillers, fire protection, sewer and water treatment—must be certified.

Further, the SOW required the contractor, upon completion of the contract work, to provide three sets of reproducible as-built condition drawings and two sets of electronic as-built condition drawings. Also, the contractor must furnish a minimum of three sets of operations and maintenance manuals on each system; each manual must contain the manufacturer's full name, address, and telephone number(s).

In addition, the SOW called for the contractor, during the design phase, to submit a comprehensive training plan for Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS) personnel to maintain and operate all major equipment. At a minimum, the training must occur at the following times:

- during installation
- six months after completion
- one-year intervals for three years

Water Supply

The SOW identified the maximum number of people at the facility as 3,500 (3,000 inmates and 500 staff), with a daily water consumption rate of 100 liters per person per day. Consequently, the contractor needed to design for the installation of multiple new water wells and water tanks suitable to provide the required amount of

water throughout the entire facility. Underground water (artesian well, depth of 120 meters, and water table of 68 meters) was identified as the source of water for this project. The quality of the water obtained was tested and determined to be suitable for multipurpose usage—human (domestic), industrial, and irrigation.

Wastewater Treatment

The SOW required the contractor to design a sewer delivery and disposal system capable of carrying the capacity of the entire facility. The expected wastewater drained from the facility site was calculated to be 350 cubic meters per day (3,500 x 100 liters). The SOW proposed the use of a lagoon system because it is inexpensive to construct and operate, requires limited power, is easy to operate and maintain, and produces acceptable effluent quality.

According to project file documentation, a significant challenge of this project was that the fort was originally built without any consideration for international codes and was poorly maintained throughout its original service. The SOW required the contractor to completely renovate the facility and also to bring it into compliance with modern electrical, plumbing, and fire safety codes.

The USACE GRN KAO provided SIGIR with the contractor's 30%, 60%, and 90% project design submittals for the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. The designs included drawings used for correctional facility construction—civil and site utilities, architectural, electrical, mechanical, plumbing, and structural drawings. The overall site layout showed the general layout of the project site, including the locations of the buildings and parking areas, security fence, and site utilities (Figure 2). The architectural plans identified the location, dimensions, and proposed uses of various spaces within the facility. The architectural plans appeared complete, with detailed information for the individual cells, visitor areas, guard barracks, and ancillary support buildings, including electricity, plumbing, and mechanical. In addition, the contractor gave special consideration to issues such as toilets, showers, and sinks because correctional facility controls require that these items be durable and impossible to disassemble. Overall, the contractor's designs appeared to contain adequate detail to construct the various buildings and systems for the correctional facility.




Figure 2. General site layout for the Chamchamal Correctional Facility
(Courtesy of USACE)

Site Progress During Construction

Throughout the project's construction, the contractor provided weekly construction reports that documented quality control, including photographs and work activities performed. In addition, the GRN KAO documented construction progress via quality assurance reports and photographs taken during site visits. SIGIR reviewed and subsequently relied on selected photographs to document examples of construction performance before the project was turned over to the ICS on 18 March 2009.


Site Photos 3 and 4 document some of the initial construction work for the project (for example, excavation for the guard barracks building and installation of an on-site concrete batch plant); Site Photos 5 and 6 show the contractor working on interior and exterior plumbing, respectively.



**Site Photo 3. Excavation of guard barracks building
(Courtesy of USACE)**



**Site Photo 4. Installation of on-site batch plant
(Courtesy of USACE)**



**Site Photos 5 and 6. Interior and exterior plumbing work
(Courtesy of USACE)**

Condition at Turnover

GRN Closeout Process Checklist

To establish a consistent transfer of projects to the Iraqi ministries, GRN established a turnover checklist with multiple documents signed by authorized USACE personnel, the contractor, and representatives from the Iraqi ministry accepting the project:

- Memorandum for Record signed by all three parties certifying that the work has been inspected and is accepted in accordance with contract requirements
- receipt of all required documentation (for example, as-built drawings)
- release of claims for the contractor
- contractor performance evaluation

On 18 March 2009, the GRN KAO officially turned over the Chamchamal Correctional Facility project to the ICS. The contractor, USACE Gulf Region Division Commanding General, and an ICS representative signed a Memorandum for Record stating:

“All work has been inspected, certified and accepted by the US Army Corps of Engineers. Construction of the facilities is complete. No other work is to be performed under this contract unless noted in paragraph 5 below.”

Paragraph 5 identified deficiencies that the GRN KAO found during the final inspection of the facility. The turnover document required the contractor to correct all outstanding deficiencies by 31 March 2009. According to project file documentation, the contractor corrected all previously identified deficiencies.

According to GRN KAO representatives, the warranty period for this project expires on 31 March 2010.

Site Assessment

On 20 June 2009, SIGIR performed an on-site assessment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility project, accompanied by a representative of the GRN KAO and the provisional warden⁴ for Chamchamal Correctional Facility. Due to the complexity of the project and time limitations (approximately 2 hours on site), SIGIR performed only an expedited assessment of the project; SIGIR inspected a representative sample of the completed buildings and systems at the correctional facility. Specifically, SIGIR inspected several medium-security dormitory-style cells (50 or fewer prisoners per cell) and individual to 4-person high-security cells. However, a complete review of all work completed was not possible.

At the time of the site assessment, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility was not (and had not been) operational since the project was officially accepted by the ICS on 18 March 2009. Therefore, SIGIR could perform only a limited assessment—or no assessment at all—of the building’s systems, including:

- potable water distribution
- wastewater conveyance/disposal
- electrical power production and distribution
- voice and data communication

⁴ The warden for Fort Suse Federal Prison is also the provisional warden for Chamchamal Correctional Facility until it opens.

- external security lighting system

SIGIR inspected the following exterior and interior areas of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility:

Exterior Areas

- access road
- perimeter security walls
- guard tower
- access control point
- support facilities, including guard barracks (one), power production area, fuel tanks, potable water well and pump unit, firewater pump unit, supply warehouse, wastewater handling septic tanks system, and associated treatment lagoon
- facilities maintenance shop, fuel supply, and vehicle maintenance areas

Interior Areas

- general prisoner population housing units and high-security cells equipped with personal hygiene units (various sizes and capacities)
- facility exterior and interior walls, ceilings, floors, and roofing systems
- recreational area
- non-perishable food storage warehouse
- kitchen
- perishable food storage/refrigeration area
- medical, psychiatric, and dental clinic with treatment rooms
- administrative offices
- visitation areas
- laundry facility

Access Road

After the fort was looted following the activities of Coalition forces in 2003, the area around the fort was primarily used for farming; therefore, no paved or unpaved road connected the highway to Chamchamal with the fort. This project included the installation of a gravel road approximately 2.5 miles from the highway to the correctional facility.

U.S. Army personnel drove SIGIR to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility via the newly constructed gravel road. Although SIGIR did not have the opportunity to fully inspect the road it was travelling on, the road was relatively flat and provided civilian and military vehicles an established path to the facility.

Guard Towers

To provide perimeter security, the SOW required the construction of eight guard/security towers; one guard tower would provide armed, visual, and electronic control over the facility's entry control point. Exterior lights are required to provide 360-degree coverage. In addition, a small detached single-story bathroom with a sink and toilet is available for the guards.

SIGIR inspected the guard tower near the facility's entry control point. The tower is approximately 7.8 meters tall with two exterior lights (Site Photo 7). SIGIR climbed the stairs to the top of the guard tower and confirmed that the four lookout windows provided 360-degree coverage of the surrounding area. The lookout window provided an

unobstructed view of the facility's entry control point. The detached single-story bathroom included a sink and toilet.



Site Photo 7. Guard tower, which provides 360-degree coverage of surrounding areas

Guard Barracks

The SOW required the construction of guard barracks, internal to the secure perimeter, capable of housing up to 330 male and female⁵ off-duty staff at any given time. The contractor designed and constructed two distinct sets of guard barracks—Type A for female guards and Type B for male guards. The contractor designed and constructed 2 Type A and 6 Type B guard barracks buildings to house 60 female guards (30 guards per building) and 288 male guards (48 guards per building).

⁵ The SOW stated that the percentage of female staff would be minimal, but separate barracks were necessary.

SIGIR inspected one Type A and one Type B guard barracks (Site Photo 8). The Type A guard barracks building comprised a bathroom with three toilets, sinks, and showers; six ceiling fans; and eight heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) units. The Type A guard barracks building appeared to be adequately constructed. SIGIR observed a sufficient number of lighting fixtures, electrical outlets, and windows to allow the guards to read at desk-top level. Also, the combination of ceiling fans and HVAC units should be adequate to maintain a cool temperature during the hot summer months.



Site Photo 8. Exterior view of guard barracks building

The Type B guard barracks comprised a building with four separate open-bay sleeping areas and two sets of bathrooms (Figure 3). The sleeping areas allow for 48 individual single beds side by side. Each set of bathrooms has three toilets, sinks, and showers and is situated between the four sleeping areas. Emergency exits provide guards an outlet for escape. Each sleeping area has 2 ceiling fans, 12 electrical outlets, 3 HVAC units, and 5 windows.

The Type B guard barracks building appeared to be adequately constructed. SIGIR observed a sufficient number of lighting fixtures, electrical outlets, and windows to allow the guards to read at desk-top level, and the combination of ceiling fans and HVAC units should be adequate to maintain a cool temperature during the hot summer months (Site Photo 9).





Figure 3. Type B guard barracks floor plan (Courtesy of USACE)



Site Photo 9. Interior view of the Type B guard barracks building room

Supply Warehouse

The SOW required the construction of a 1,858 square meter (m²) warehouse outside the secure facility to provide additional storage space. SIGIR inspected the supply warehouse and found that it had two sections, each with roll-up doors (to allow truck entry) and an office with a toilet, sink, and shower. The supply warehouse had sufficient overhead lighting to allow reading at the floor level. SIGIR noticed that the contractor used quality construction practices and techniques, such as enclosing electrical wiring in metal casings instead of plastic piping (Site Photo 10). In addition, the concrete floor slab of the warehouse appeared level and showed no visible signs of cracking. A significant amount of welding was needed to construct the frame of the warehouse; all of the welds that SIGIR observed appeared to be adequately done.



Site Photo 10. Interior view of supply warehouse facility

General Prisoner Population Housing Units and High-Security Cells

The intent of this correctional facility was to house both medium-security and high-security prisoners. The two-story correctional facility was divided into two types of housing units—open dormitories for medium-security prisoners and traditional cells for high-security prisoners (Figures 4 and 5).




Figure 4 Location of general population cells and high-security cells (Courtesy of USACE)




Figure 5. Enlargements of single, four person, and two person high security cells


Open Dormitory Housing Units

The Chamchamal Correctional Facility planned to use the open dormitory housing units to incarcerate a maximum of 2,000 inmates. The dormitory-style prisoner housing units were designed for 50 or fewer prisoners in an open bay with a minimum allotted space per inmate of 2.25 m². To conserve space, the correctional facility will use bunk beds. This type of housing unit was constructed of masonry and concrete (with steel reinforcements vertically and horizontally) with a gypsum interior finish and concrete floor.

The SOW called for one sink, toilet, and shower for every 10 prisoners. In addition, each dormitory unit had four wall-mounted HVAC units, two exhaust fans, and wall-mounted night lights to provide sufficient light for prisoners to read.

Security considerations required that all openings within the dormitory housing units larger than 15 x 15 centimeters (cm) must have security bars; the bars must be placed on the inmate side of the housing units, with operable windows and handles positioned on the corridor side. All windows must have glass that is tempered and wire-reinforced for added security. In addition, all electrical panels, switches, and outlets must be located outside the dormitory, with the electrical panels in a separate closet.

SIGIR entered the open-bay housing area and bathroom for one dormitory-style housing unit. SIGIR found the unit adequately constructed with the appropriate number of sinks, toilets, and showers as prescribed by the SOW (Site Photos 11 and 12).



Site Photos 11 and 12. Interior views of the open dormitory-style housing units

High-Security Cells

The Chamchamal Correctional Facility planned to employ more traditional prison cells to house approximately 1,000 high-security prisoners. The high-security cells were designed to house one, two, or four prisoners per cell. The SOW outlined specific minimum guidelines for the total living area of each size of cell. The contractor met the SOW requirement by providing the single cells, two-bed cells, and four-bed cells with a total living area of 6.6m², 8.45m², and 13.8m², respectively. Similar to the open dormitory housing units, the two- and four-bed cells use bunk beds to conserve space. This type of housing unit was constructed of masonry and concrete (with steel reinforcements vertically and horizontally) with a gypsum interior finish and concrete floor.

SIGIR entered one single-bed, one two-bed, and one four-bed cell. SIGIR found the cells adequately constructed. Each cell had one sink, toilet, and shower (Site Photo 13). In addition, each cell had one wall-mounted HVAC unit, one exhaust fan, and wall-mounted lighting. The contractor took the extra security precaution of enclosing in a cage the HVAC unit, light, and electrical wiring to prevent prisoners from tampering with the equipment or use it as a weapon (Site Photo 14). Also, the SOW required that all openings within the dormitory housing units larger than 15 x 15cm must have security bars, and the bars must be placed on the inmate side with operable windows and handles positioned on the corridor side. All windows have glass that is tempered and wire-reinforced for added security (Site Photo 15).

The warden is concerned that the cell bars were inside the windows—not outside—especially on the cells that face the facility's exterior. The warden pointed out how easy it would be for prisoners to take a small file and work on the bars. Once the bars have been filed through, a prisoner could break the window and be outside the prison facility. The warden stated that it is impossible for his 400-500 guards to check every bar on every window each day. According to GRN KAO representatives, the SOW required the bars on the inside of the cell windows; therefore, the contractor was in compliance with the design and construction of the prison cells.

All electrical panels, switches, and outlets are located outside of the dormitory, and the electrical panels are in a separate closet. Each prison cell door was made of steel, swung out into the hallway, and had lockable food slots (Site Photo 16).



Site Photo 13. Interior of high-security cell



Site Photo 14. Metal cage protects the HVAC, light, and electrical wiring



Site Photo 15. Security features for prisoner cell windows



Site Photo 16. Steel prison cell door

Food Storage and Preparation

The Chamchamal Correctional Facility was intended to be self sufficient in providing food services for its prisoners and guards. Therefore, the SOW required the design and construction of on-site food storage and preparation areas that would be able to meet the nutritional needs of 3,000 inmates and 500 staff with a 3-day reserve of perishable food. However, the SOW did not call for a traditional dining facility—an enclosed facility with tables and chairs—for the prisoners and guards. Due to the violent nature of some of the high-security risk prisoners, the decision was made to prepare the food in a central location and then deliver it to the inmates in their cells.

To provide enough storage and preparation capacity, the contractor designed and constructed a large (400m²) open-bay food storage warehouse attached to a kitchen, a separate food preparation room, a bakery, a refrigeration area (divided into three equal sized areas by concrete wall partitions), a freezer, and miscellaneous storage rooms (Figure 6). In addition, at the entry point of each food preparation area (kitchen, bakery, etc.), the SOW required a stainless steel sink for hand washing. Further, to provide a bathroom for the food preparation workers, the SOW called for a small room with three toilets and sinks.

The facility was constructed of masonry and concrete (with steel reinforcements vertically and horizontally) with a gypsum interior finish and concrete floor. Security considerations similar to the prisoner housing units led to these requirements:

- All openings exceeding 15 x 15cm must have security bars.
- All windows must be made of tempered and wire-reinforced glass.
- All doors must be made of steel and must be lockable.

SIGIR visited the food storage and preparation areas and found the rooms adequately constructed. The food storage warehouse is a large, open room with plenty of capacity to store non-perishable food (Site Photo 17). The kitchen was furnished with the SOW-required five ovens, five grills, five steam kettles, exhaust hoods, and a stainless steel sink (Site Photo 18). However, SIGIR noted that the refrigeration room did not contain any electrical outlets (Figure 6 and Site Photo 19). The provisional warden expressed concern that the absence of electrical outlets will nullify the intent of the refrigeration room. The warden stated that perishable food will have to be stored somewhere else, or long extension cords will need to be run from another room into this room. The warden is concerned that the high foot-traffic in this area increases the potential for the extension cords being unplugged or cut, which could lead to either spoiled food and/or a potential fire.

Finally, when exiting the food storage and preparation building, SIGIR noticed a metal handle for a subsurface utilities access panel, which posed a significant tripping hazard for prisoners and guards (Site Photo 20).



Site Photo 20. Tripping hazard outside the food storage and preparation building

Visitation Areas

The SOW required two separate visitation areas—one for general population inmates and a smaller visitation area for high-security inmates. The contractor designed and constructed shake-down areas in both visitation areas to allow guards to thoroughly and privately search visitors for contraband items, such as weapons.

SIGIR inspected both visitation areas and found that each was adequately constructed. The general population visitation area is constructed to allow a maximum of 36 inmates to receive visitors at a time; the high-security visitation area allows a maximum of 10 inmates to receive visitors at a time. The general population visitor counter had a security-fence divider with wire-mesh openings, which were continuous and secured to the ceiling with no gaps (Site Photo 21). The significantly smaller, isolated high-security visiting center completely separated visitors and inmates, using plexiglass with a speaker plate (Site Photo 22). The general population security-fence divider and the high-security plexiglass with speaker plate were well constructed and do not present an opportunity for a visitor to pass contraband to a prisoner. An observation point allows guards to monitor the entire visitation area secured from the inmates. The general population and high-security visitation areas are constructed of masonry and concrete with a gypsum interior finish and an exposed finished concrete floor.



Site Photos 21 and 22. Examples of dividers between visitors and general-population prisoners (left) and high-security prisoners (right)


Expansion Joint System

An expansion joint is an assembly designed to safely absorb the heat-induced expansion and contraction of various construction materials, to absorb vibration, and to allow movement caused by ground settlement or earthquakes.

The SOW required expansion and control joints in all new construction. SIGIR identified instances where adequate expansion joints were in place for the floors and walls; however, the parapets⁶ were not protected (Site Photos 23 and 24).

In addition, the SOW did not address the necessity of expansion joints for the existing facility's exterior walls. The original structure was initially constructed with expansion joints; however, over the past 30 years, this material has cracked and/or dissolved. SIGIR observed instances where the facility's pre-existing expansion joints appeared to be inadequate (Site Photos 25 and 26). Considering that these walls are exposed to extreme climatic conditions (excessive heat in the summer and snow in the winter), a well-designed expansion joint system was warranted. Additionally, sealed joints prevent moisture, dust/dirt particles, and insects from entering the living spaces. Consequently, an expansion joint system not only promotes structural safety for the building and also provides a better living environment for the occupants.



⁶ A wall-like barrier at the edge of a roof, terrace, or balcony.



Site Photo 23. Floor and ceiling expansion joints



Site Photo 24. SIGIR checking quality of expansion joint material



Site Photos 25 and 26. Pre-existing external expansion joints

Electrical Power

To meet the power requirements to fully operate the entire facility, the SOW required the connection of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility to the local substation and the installation of two engine generators. In addition to providing the engine generators, the SOW required two 10,000-liter above-ground fuel storage tanks to provide a minimum three-day supply of fuel.

Connecting the correctional facility to the local substation required the installation of towers for the service line. Originally, the SOW required providing the necessary upgrades to the substation for proper distribution; however, a contract modification called for the contractor to pay a \$1.1 million tap fee to the KRG Ministry of Electricity, Directorate of Electricity of Sulaymaniyah, to connect the correctional facility to the substation.

According to the warden, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility currently receives only approximately one hour of electricity per day from the national grid. The warden stated that it takes 3.5 megawatts (MW) of power to operate the entire facility. The Mayor of Chamchamal and the Director General for Electricity in Sulaymaniyah have not been able to upgrade the Chamchamal substation to provide the distribution capacity necessary to operate the correctional facility. In addition, the KRG is reluctant to add only the 3.5 MW of capacity needed to operate the correctional facility when their long-term plan is to add a total of 15 MW to cover both the correctional facility and the increased demand from the town of Chamchamal (which is currently receiving 16 hours of electricity per day).

Until the KRG upgrades the substation and connects it to the correctional facility or constructs a new 15-MW substation that connects to the correctional facility, generator power will be the facilities' only source of power. According to the warden, it will take approximately 600,000 liters of fuel per month to run the Chamchamal Correctional Facility (solely by generators). However, the warden stated that the Iraqi Ministry of Justice does not have sufficient funds to pay for the fuel, especially because the drop in crude oil prices has adversely affected the Government of Iraq's budget.

At the time of the site visit, Chamchamal Correctional Facility was not connected to the local substation and had not received fuel for the generators. Therefore, SIGIR could not determine the contractor's quality of work on the construction of the electrical towers or the installation of the generators.

U.S. Government Efforts

SIGIR discussed the results of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility site visit with INL representatives. Specifically, SIGIR briefed INL representatives that the correctional facility was not operational due to several KRG funding and budgetary issues, such as no operating budget, no power from the national grid or generators to run the facility, and a lack of guards.

INL representatives stated that they were aware of these issues and were speaking with KRG officials regularly in an effort to assist in resolving them. With respect to electrical power for the facility, INL stated the Ministry of Justice had reached an agreement with the KRG Ministry of Electricity to provide electrical power to operate the facility. Two electric meters had been ordered, which were needed to upgrade the local substation. INL representatives also stated that additional guards had been identified for the

correctional facility; however, they were not certain if that included all the guards required (1,200) to operate the facility. Finally, INL representatives said the KRG had promised to fund an operating budget to run the Chamchamal Correctional Facility and were optimistic it would be operational by October 2009.

Actions that Made the Facility Operational

In September 2009, a prisoner riot at the Baghdad Central Prison⁷ resulted in the death of one prisoner, various injuries to as many as 40 prisoners, and fire damage that left the prison facility “uninhabitable.” The Ministry of Justice decided to temporarily transfer the inmates to other Baghdad correctional facilities, such as Rusafa and Khadamiya.

On 19 September 2009, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) relocated 360 inmates and 10 Iraqi Correctional Officers (ICOs) from the Baghdad Central Prison to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. Over the next week, the MoJ continued to transfer additional inmates to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility in order to alleviate overcrowding in Baghdad prisons. According to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility provisional warden, as of 12 October 2009, there are 2,637 inmates and 240 ICOs at the Chamchamal Correctional Facility.

According to U.S. government representatives, the U.S. military provided the aircraft to fly the inmates from Baghdad to Sulaymaniyah,,and the ICS handled all ground logistical movement to the correctional facility site. The MoJ transferred 240 ICOs on a temporary basis while the ICS vets and trains a group of guards from the Chamchamal town to replace the temporary guards. According to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility provisional warden, 620 guards have been hired for the facility, of which 460 are currently in training. The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has allocated 13 billion Iraqi dinars (\$11.1 million) per month to the ICS for operation and sustainment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility which is currently being used to provide power and logistical support for the inmates and ICOs at the site.

Conclusions

On 18 March 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region North (GRN) Kirkuk Area Office (KAO) officially turned over the Chamchamal Correctional Facility to the Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS). The contractor, the Commanding General of USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD), and an ICS representative signed a Memorandum for Record stating:

“All work has been inspected, certified and accepted by the US Army Corps of Engineers. Construction of the facilities is complete. No other work is to be performed under this contract unless noted in paragraph 5 below.”

Paragraph 5 identified deficiencies found during the final inspection of the facility by the GRN KAO. The turnover document required the contractor to correct all outstanding deficiencies by 31 March 2009. According to project file documentation, the contractor corrected all previously identified deficiencies.

Before the site visit, SIGIR reviewed the contractor’s design submittals for this project. Overall, the design submittals appeared to contain adequate detail to construct the various

⁷ Formerly known as the Abu Ghraib Prison.

buildings and systems for the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. The designs included drawings used for correctional facility construction—civil and site utilities, architectural, electrical, mechanical, plumbing, and structural drawings. The overall site layout showed the general layout of the project site, including the locations of the buildings and parking areas, security fence, and site utilities. The architectural plans identified the location, dimensions, and proposed uses of various spaces within the facility. The architectural plans appeared complete, with detailed information for the individual cells, visitor areas, guard barracks, and ancillary support buildings—including electricity, plumbing, and mechanical. In addition, the contractor gave special consideration to issues such as toilets, showers, and sinks because correctional facility controls require that these items be durable and impossible to disassemble.

Although the contractor's design submittals adequately met the requirements of the contract's Statement of Work (SOW), SIGIR noticed that the SOW did not address the original facility's external expansion joints. Considering that the external walls are exposed to extreme climatic conditions (excessive heat in the summer and snow in the winter), SIGIR's opinion is that external expansion joints should have been part of the contract's SOW.

On 20 June 2009, SIGIR conducted an on-site assessment of the project. Due to the size of the site, complexity of the project, and time limitations (approximately 2 hours on site), SIGIR performed an expedited assessment of the project. The inspection included a representative sample of the completed buildings and systems at the correctional facility. Specifically, SIGIR inspected several medium-security dormitory style cells (50 or fewer prisoners per cell) and individual to four-person high-security cells. A complete review of all work completed was not possible.

Even though the U.S. government completed construction and officially transferred this project to the Iraqi Correctional Service in March 2009, at the time of SIGIR's site visit, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility did not house any prisoners or guards and was not operational. The U.S. government was responsible for the construction of the correctional facility; however, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was responsible for an operational budget to provide for a staff and electrical power to run the facility.

Since the Chamchamal Correctional Facility was not operational at the time of the assessment, SIGIR could conduct only a limited assessment—or no assessment at all—of the building's systems, including:

- potable water distribution
- wastewater conveyance/disposal
- electrical power production and distribution
- voice and data communication
- external security lighting system

SIGIR inspected the following exterior and interior areas of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility:

Exterior Areas

- access road
- perimeter security walls
- guard tower
- access control point

- support facilities, including guard barracks (one), power production area, fuel tanks, potable water well and pump unit, firewater pump unit, supply warehouse, wastewater handling septic tanks system, and associated treatment lagoon
- facilities maintenance shop, fuel supply, and vehicle maintenance areas

Interior Areas

- general prisoner population housing units and high-security cells equipped with personal hygiene units (various sizes and capacities)
- facility exterior and interior walls, ceilings, floors, and roofing systems
- recreational area
- non-perishable food storage warehouse
- kitchen
- perishable food storage/refrigeration area
- medical, psychiatric, and dental clinic with treatment rooms
- administrative offices
- visitation areas
- laundry facility

SIGIR's site visit identified minor construction deficiencies, such as an incomplete building expansion joint system and a tripping hazard outside the kitchen building. In addition, in the refrigeration room, the contractor designed and constructed the room without any electrical outlets. The provisional warden expressed concern that the absence of electrical outlets will nullify the intent of the refrigeration room. The warden stated that perishable food would have to be stored somewhere else or long extension cords would need to be run from another room into the refrigeration room. The warden is concerned that high foot-traffic in this area could increase the potential for the extension cords being unplugged or cut, which could lead to either spoiled food and/or a fire.

Aside from these minor construction issues, SIGIR concluded that the construction of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility was adequate. The contractor took the extra security precaution of enclosing in a cage the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning unit, lighting fixture, and electrical wiring in the high-security cells to prevent prisoners from tampering with the equipment or use it as a weapon. SIGIR determined that this project was constructed adequately for the KRG to sustain the correctional facility for its intended use.

At the time of SIGIR's assessment, U.S. government representatives were concerned about the KRG's inability to provide power, staffing, and an operating budget for this project. Approximately half of the contractor's one-year warranty for any construction defects had expired without a single prisoner or guard using the facilities—sinks, toilets, showers, electric lights and outlets, etc.—to identify latent defects. Representatives of INL stated that the KRG had committed to provide electrical power and an operating budget to run the facility, and additional guards had been identified. INL representatives were optimistic that the Chamchamal Correctional Facility would be operational by October 2009.

Actions that Made the Chamchamal Correctional Facility Operational. In September 2009, a prisoner riot at the Baghdad Central Prison⁸ resulted in the death of one prisoner, various injuries to as many as 40 prisoners, and fire damage that left the prison facility "uninhabitable." The Ministry of Justice decided to temporarily transfer the inmates to other Baghdad correctional facilities, such as Rusafa and Khadamiya.

⁸ Formerly known as the Abu Ghraib Prison.

On 19 September 2009, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) relocated 360 inmates and 10 Iraqi Correctional Officers (ICOs) from the Baghdad Central Prison to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. Over the next week, the MoJ continued to transfer additional inmates to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility to alleviate overcrowding conditions in Baghdad prisons. According to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility provisional warden, as of 12 October 2009, there were 2,637 inmates and 240 ICOs at the Chamchamal Correctional Facility.

According to U.S. government representatives, the U.S. military provided the aircraft to fly the inmates from Baghdad to Sulaymaniyah, and the ICS handled all ground logistical movement to the correctional facility site. The MoJ transferred 240 ICOs on a temporary basis while the ICS vets and trains a group of guards from the Chamchamal town to replace the temporary guards. According to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility provisional warden, 620 guards have been hired for the facility, of which 460 are currently in training. The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has allocated 13 billion Iraqi dinars (\$11.1 million) per month to the ICS for operation and sustainment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility which is currently being used to provide power and logistical support for the inmates and ICOs at the site.

Recommendation

In the draft report, SIGIR recommended that INL take action to make the \$29 million U.S.-funded Chamchamal Correctional Facility operational. Because the facility is now operational, SIGIR has eliminated this recommendation from the final report.

Management Comments

During the SIGIR review, INL representatives stated that they were in constant contact with the KRG regarding the operation and sustainment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. Once it became operational, INL representatives provided SIGIR the actual dates and number of inmates and correctional officers transferred to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility.

In addition, SIGIR received comments on the draft of this report from the USACE GRD, indicating that it concurred with the draft report.

Evaluation of Management Comments

SIGIR lauds the prompt actions taken by the INL to encourage the Government of Iraq to begin utilization of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. SIGIR also appreciates the concurrence with the draft report by the USACE GRD. No additional comments on this report are necessary.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

SIGIR performed this project assessment from December 2008 through July 2009 in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team included two auditors/inspectors and one engineer/inspector.

In performing this project assessment, SIGIR:

- Reviewed documentation, including contracts, contract modifications, notice to proceed, Statement of Work, and quality assurance/quality control reports;
- Reviewed the design package (plans) and photographs documenting construction progress;
- Interviewed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region North personnel and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs personnel; and
- Conducted an on-site assessment and documented results at the Chamchamal Correctional Facility project in Chamchamal, Iraq

Scope Limitation. Due to the complexity of the project and time limitations, SIGIR performed an expedited assessment of the project; SIGIR inspected a representative sample of the completed buildings and systems at the correctional facility.

Appendix B. Acronyms

cm	centimeter
GRD	Gulf Region Division
GRN	Gulf Region North
GRN KAO	Gulf Region North Kirkuk Area Office
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
ICO	Iraqi Correctional Officers
ICS	Iraqi Correctional Service
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
KAO	Kirkuk Area Office
km	kilometer
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MW	megawatt
m ²	square meter
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOW	Statement of Work
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Appendix C. Report Distribution

Department of State

Secretary of State

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development

Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction

Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer,
Bureau of Resource Management

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development

Inspector General, Department of State

Department of Defense

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International
Security Affairs

Inspector General, Department of Defense

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency

Department of the Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Commanding General, Gulf Region Division

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Auditor General of the Army

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central

Other Federal Government Organizations

Director, Office of Management and Budget
Comptroller General of the United States
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General, Department of Commerce
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development
President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
President, U.S. Institute of Peace

Congressional Committees

U.S. Senate

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

House Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Appendix D. Project Assessment Team Members

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this report. The principal staff members who contributed to the report were:

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