The United States Improvised Explosive Device Fight: Technical Shortcomings and the Value of Strategy
Abstract
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are synonymous with U.S. casualties as they remain the number one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. Specifically, they have caused over 60% of all combat casualties in Iraq. When Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) commenced in March 2003, the IED was not a threat to U.S. ground forces. However, by the summer of 2004, the IED threat in Iraq was credible, prevalent, and lethal. Five years later in 2008, the IED has become a part of U.S. military vernacular. The preponderance of the U.S. military response to the IED threat involves technical solutions at the tactical level of war, specifically, enhanced vehicle armor, detonation jamming equipment, and route clearance devices. Yet the insurgency in Iraq has proven itself capable of adapting IEDs that remain prevalent and lethal. Because technical solutions at the tactical level will never defeat IEDs, the United States must focus on strategic solutions to defeating IEDs. The units that attack networks, target civilian populations, and foster an environment of IED intolerance will achieve victory over the IED, and the units that build trust and confidence amongst the civilian population will receive credible intelligence reports of IED operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 20, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA509727
Entities
People
- Joseph M. Garaux
Organizations
- Marine Corps University