De Gaulle's Concept of a Mobile, Professional Army: Genesis of French Defeat?

Abstract

In the 1930's, the military and political leaders of France rejected De Gaulle's plan for the creation of a professional army with a separate armored corps. As a result of her failure to accept the potential of a strong armored force manned by professional soldiers, France entered World War II with a non-professional, citizen-soldier army trained primarily as a defensive force. French reliance on the nation in arms concept, the citizen-soldier, and the strategy of defense-the "Maginot Line complex"-contributed significantly to quick defeat of the French army in 1940. The French experience, related here, may have particular relevance for us defense planners who are now coping with the military, political, and social problems of today's professional army.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1974
Accession Number
ADA509926

Entities

People

  • Robert A. Doughty

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Armored Vehicles
  • Civil War
  • Doctrine
  • Employment
  • First World War
  • Law
  • Military Training
  • Militia
  • National Security
  • Second World War
  • Social Problems
  • Students
  • Training
  • United States
  • War
  • Warfare
  • Weapons

Readers

  • International Relations and European Studies
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design