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8 April 1966

Turkey, CENTO vs. NATO Mutually Supporting or a Conflict of Interest?

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Trkey, CENTO vs. NATO
Mutually Supporting or a Conflict of Interest?

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8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

A bellicose Soviet post-World War II policy caused Turkey to seek an increasingly strong alignment with the West. Although somewhat belatedly accepted into NATO, she became the West's champion in the Middle East as demonstrated by her leadership in organizing the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Arab rejection of the Western backed regional defense concept against Russian encroachment from the north caused the Pact to eventuate into a "northern tier" grouping of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan along with Great Britain into what is known now as the CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO).

By virtue of these two postwar alliances, Turkey found herself acknowledged as a part of two separate regions. In that she is so identified, she has responsibilities to each. These efforts can be mutually supporting or they can be counterproductive.

The logical initial step in determining which alternative has obtained is to analyze the statutory provisions of each arrangement. The NATO charter is oriented on resisting "armed aggression," whereas the CENTO document emphasizes the generalized objective of regional "peace and security." The principal conclusion gained from analyzing the governing statutes is one which requires that Turkey recognize the primacy of NATO over CENTO.

Adopting as a premise the legal ascendancy of NATO over CENTO, the second step is one of evaluating how Turkey and her CENTO partners have met the comparatively vague objectives of their association. The implementation measures are fundamentally two, i.e., separate bilateral agreements between the United States and each of the regional CENTO countries, and the establishment of an organizational structure.

The most significant CENTO progress has been in the economic realm. Cooperation achieved portends long range benefits for the region with Turkey receiving particular benefits because of her geographical position as the western anchor of the "tier." An economically stronger Turkey is a stronger member of NATO.

Progress in the military area has been hampered by the lack of an integrated command structure and thus has been primarily one of contingency planning. Nevertheless, the CENTO countries pose a deterrent to Soviet incursions into the Middle East--principally because of their U.S. bilateral ties. As such they shield the oil producing regions of the Middle East and guard against Soviet flanking moves through Africa against western Europe.

Built in checks and balances in the CENTO organizational machinery provide for protection of a member country's national interests. Turkish leadership has shown continued alertness to any CENTO activities that would derogate her NATO responsibilities.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the United States has by formalized treaty obliged itself to military commitments for mutual defense to some 42 nations of the world. The predilection for establishing these associations has been facetiously identified as a foreign policy of "pactomania." More sober judgment, however, concludes that it is a policy of assumed responsibility in encouraging the mutual desire of peace loving nations in the world to contain the ominous expansionist ideology of totalitarian communism.

By virtue of achieving major power status, the United States has been in a position to share its vast resources with other nations who have shown the same resolute attitude in stemming the threat to the free world environment of honor, justice, and human dignity. While we have evolved through varying strategies of containing the threat, the possession of the "nuclear umbrella" has without doubt been the deciding factor in saving our allies from what would have been their demise if the power politics of several generations ago prevailed today.

Although we sometimes feel that our resources are overly stretched to live up to our commitments, what about the other nations with whom we have associated? In arranging these alliances, we have in several instances committed a lesser endowed country

to two separate but adjacent regional security alliances. In that these arrangements were concluded under two separate circumstances, could not our efforts have been overzealous and put an ally in an ambivalent situation where the differing obligations worked at cross purposes? On the other hand, has our overview been so precise that these alliances work in concert and thus mutually support each other? A case in point is that of Turkey, who, although a latecomer to NATO in 1952, was a founding member of CENTO in 1955. On the one hand, she is committed to an alliance with the United States and the other NATO members of the Western world. On the other, she is associated with Great Britain and two developing nations along the "northern tier" of the Middle East in a pact supported by the U.S.

In his thought provoking book, NATO in the 1960's, Alastair Buchan adopted as a premise for his study the assumption that "the world is unlikely to reach a stage of detente and stability which will make it possible for Western powers to dispense with NATO in the discernible future. . . ." ¹ Despite President deGaulle's misgivings, Western leaders appear to give complete support to this assumption as a cornerstone of their respective national policies. CENTO, on the other hand, receives scant public notice outside its own region, although it continues to enjoy the support of its big power participants--the United Kingdom and the United

¹Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960's, p. 4.

States. The following extract is not an uncommon evaluation:

". . . CENTO's demise is now taking place. . . . Only the formal act of burial has yet to come. . . ."2 If there is any substance in this latter evaluation, it would appear that any effort devoted by Turkey to CENTO would detract from her ability to contribute to NATO unless compensating benefits were being realized. Thus, the purpose of this study is to seek an answer to the question: Does Turkey find herself with a conflict of interest problem concerning her dual allegiance to the alliances, or do they mutually support each other?

My interest in this subject was generated as a result of an assignment to Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, Izmir, Turkey, during the period August 1960-February 1963. During this time, my principal duties were Special Weapons Officer in the G3 Section, chief of a specially constituted nationally and internationally staffed combined strategic planning group, G2 Air, and Secretary of the General Staff. The variety of assignments permitted a first hand observation of regional problems--military, political, social, and economic. More important, it was an opportunity to gain an appreciation of how officers of the six nations represented in the headquarters perceived these problems.

²Chalmers M. Roberts, "CENTO Pact Devised Against Russia Failed to Anticipate Present Conflict," Washington Post, 9 Sep. 1963, p. A25.

CHAPTER 2

TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO NATO AND CENTO

In order to gain a better understanding of a particular country's obligations and relationship to a multinational arrangement, an examination of the chronology of events leading to the accession is beneficial. In so doing, the motivation and/or rationalization for joining are of key interest. The position these agreements have in influencing a nation's foreign policy depend as much on how they are perceived as what they actually say. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to survey briefly the events and circumstances leading up to Turkey's joining NATO and CENTO.

TO NATO

Although alternately courted and pressured by the warring factions of World War II, Turkey managed to maintain a nominally neutral position. However, Turkish leadership was farsighted enough to realize that she would have to alter this position if she were to have a voice in the postwar era. Consequently, she made a token declaration of war against Germany and Japan in February 1945. In so doing, she qualified for attendance at the San Francisco meeting founding the United Nations.¹

¹George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 15.

Paradoxically, in less than a month, this decision was followed by the first in a series of events that has since colored Turkey's foreign policy moves. In March, Russia repudiated the Turkish-Soviet neutrality treaty of 1925.² This marked the end of one of the few non-crisis periods in Russo-Turkish relations. Stalin showed that he shared the historical concern of the Russians for warm water access to the Mediterranean Sea. Despite his insistence at Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam, Western leaders successfully evaded coming to grips with this most annoying problem.³ The Soviet ambitions to the south were made more specific in a series of notes dispatched to the Turkish government in August 1946. These notes demanded that the future regulations of the regime of the Straits be limited to Black Sea Powers--the Soviet Union, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Rumania--and that the Dardanelles be secured by joint Turkish-Russian defenses.⁴ Turkish leaders, seeing how "joint" actions had affected their Balkan neighbors, rejected these demands with surprising firmness.⁵ They did, however, express a willingness for an international conference to update the Montreaux Convention of 1936, which had given Turkey the right to control the Straits, while still guaranteeing their international

²Ibid., p. 6.

³J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, pp. 195-197.

⁴"Russian Note Asks Share in Defense of Turkish Straits," New York Times, 13 Aug. 1946, p. 1.

⁵Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II, p. 97.

use.⁶ The Soviet response to this was a stepped up propaganda campaign. Soviet intransigence was likewise shown in Iran in 1945 when troops stationed there during the war were withdrawn only after United Nations efforts, backed up by United States pressure, forced the issue. This move in conjunction with a particularly virulent propaganda campaign emphasizing Soviet claims to several of Turkey's eastern border provinces very definitely pointed out Turkey's position as a target of Soviet expansionism and/or influence.

Great Britain's inability to continue in her pre-war role as the guardian of the Middle East, the ominous nature of the USSR position in the Greek civil war, and the Soviet pressures against Turkey resulted in the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The military and economic support it offered marked the importance attached to Turkey's position as part of the Western world. By becoming a member of the Council of Europe in 1949, Turkey fully identified herself with the West.⁷

Despite this orientation, Turkey's entry into NATO was delayed nearly three years after its organization in 1949. Turkey's application for membership in 1950 was met by a compromise invitation. She accepted the offer "to be associated with planning work

⁶"Turkey Rejects Demand of Russia in Straits," New York Times, 24 Aug. 1946, p. 3.

⁷Lansing Warren, "Council of Europe Adds Three Members," New York Times, 4 Aug. 1949, p. 1.

of the North Atlantic Treaty organization with regard to Mediterranean defense."⁸ Turkey's responsiveness in supporting the United Nations effort to thwart Communist aggression in Korea and the good account made by her forces did much to raise her esteem in the eyes of the West. Consequently, the renewed claim for membership of May 1951 was favorably received by the NATO Council of Deputies in October 1951 despite the fear that "a common front with Soviet Russia and Bulgaria might aggravate tensions."⁹ Turkey officially became a member of NATO on 18 February 1952,¹⁰ when the Turkish National Assembly ratified the NATO treaty. The basic NATO Treaty and the Protocol of Accession are in Annexes A and B, respectively. Immediately following NATO approval, the USSR attempted to influence national ratification by adopting the line that Turkey's physical separation from the other countries made her a suspect member of the alliance. In their view, the acceptance by NATO was contingent on the use of Turkish territory for aggressive aims.¹¹

THE MIDDLE EAST GAINS ATTENTION

Concurrently with these actions to get into NATO, Turkey found herself in the midst of an abortive attempt at Middle East defense combination. In 1951 Turkey and Egypt were invited as the only

⁸Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. VIII, 1950-52, p. 10985.

⁹Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years, 1944-1954, pp. 39-40.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Keesings, op. cit., p. 11853.

Middle East members of a proposed Allied Middle East Command. Sponsoring the proposal were Britain, France, and the United States. Since the British-Egyptian Suez Canal Pact of 1936 was up for renewal, the proposed organization was looked upon as a means of retaining the Suez defense facilities for Western use.¹² The already strong nationalistic sentiment in Egypt against continued British influence ended up in Turkey being the recipient of as strong a propaganda barrage as already received from Russia because of her Western affiliations.

The first indication of what was eventually to become CENTO appeared as a result of a 1953 trip made to the Middle East and South Asia by John Foster Dulles. As the newly appointed Secretary of State, his stated purpose was "to show friendliness and to develop an understanding." In a nationwide radio and television speech on 1 June, he presented a concept of foreign policy that differed from the Truman administration policy only in method. In essence, he concluded that (1) the United States' position among the Arab nations was suspect because of British and French associations, (2) the "northern tier" nations in the Middle East were more concerned with the threat of communism because of nearness to the Soviet Union, and (3) a collective security system should "grow from within" rather than being "imposed from without" and "is a future rather than immediate possibility."¹³ The speech

¹²Ibid.

¹³John Foster Dulles, "Report on the Near East," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28, 15 Jun. 1953, pp. 831-835.

was in amplification of earlier press conference comments in New Delhi in which he emphasized the high cost of individual country defense establishments and therefore recommended a "more reliable and cheaper" collective defense system.¹⁴

In that Secretary Dulles had articulated a Middle Eastern policy of the new administration and that the position of ascendancy of the United States in the postwar era was now recognized, the following period developed into one of active diplomatic discussion and negotiation.

In April of the following year (1954), Turkey, who had been singled out by Secretary Dulles for her Western association and for her support of the United Nations, negotiated an Agreement for Friendly Cooperation with Pakistan, a natural Moslem ally. In the area of defense, the pact provided for mutually supporting efforts in (1) exchange of information, (2) production of arms and ammunition, and (3) investigation of actions in the face of an unprovoked outside attack.¹⁵

BAGHDAD PACT TO CENTO

The next positive move was made by Nuri es Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister. His failure to get Egyptian concurrence on a reorganized Arab League strengthened by Western assistance confirmed

¹⁴"Dulles Says Soviets Must End 3 Issues to Warrant Talks," New York Times, 23 May 1953, p. 1.

¹⁵United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 211, 1955, No. 2858, p. 264.

Secretary Dulles' prophetic observations on Arab suspicions of the West. Despite this rebuff, he eagerly accepted the invitation of Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey to negotiate a separate bilateral agreement with them. Signed on 24 February 1955, it became known as the "Baghdad Pact."¹⁶ With the exception of minor procedural changes for accession, this remains the governing statute of the Treaty Organization. The charter is included in Annex C.

Article 5 of the Pact provided for additional accessions by any member of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace of the region. Great Britain convinced the two contracting parties that she met these qualifications despite her loss of preeminence in the area, and on 5 April 1955 acceded to the Pact.¹⁷ In view of her already formalized association with Turkey, Pakistan became the fourth member of the Pact on 23 September 1955.¹⁸ In light of the Article 6 stipulation requiring a four nation membership for operation, it had now met the organizational requirement.

Although the original bilateral pact now met its statutory criterion for a permanent organization, it was far removed from the regional organization needed to meet the intended objectives. Only Iraq among the Arab countries was a member. The lack of

¹⁶British Central Office of Information, The Central Treaty Organization, No. R4304, Aug. 1959, p. 5.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 7.

geographical continuity along the northern tier jeopardized any mutual supporting actions that might be directed toward counter-acting external aggression from the north. Thus, it was completely essential that Iran, who had the longest common border with the Soviet Union, also become a member.

Iran, although traditionally favoring the neutral course in international politics, had already been a target of Soviet pressure since the end of the war. An added element of insecurity was the result of internal ferment in the early part of the decade. A strong nationalistic tide caused the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the subsequent stagnation of the internal economy. The residue of anti-British feeling which persisted complicated her concurrence with any agreement to which Britain was a party. An inconsistent United States policy towards Iran, despite her influence in countering Soviet pressure, made the Iranians feel uneasy about the United States support. Since Iran's participation in the pact was so critical, Turkey took the lead in gaining her adherence. After a visit to the Shah by President Bayar of Turkey, Iran followed through by officially joining the pact on 3 November 1955.¹⁹

This completed the round of membership accessions to what was hoped to be a regional grouping having a similar potential of discouraging Soviet aggression to the south as NATO was to the west.

¹⁹Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. X, 1955-56, p. 14485.

It was only a year and a half later when the organization demonstrated its viability by continuing to exist despite the forced withdrawal of one of its founding members. Iraq, as the only member from the Arab countries, had been the target of a vindictive propaganda campaign by her Arab contemporaries starting as early as the discussion phases of the Pact. Nuri es Said successfully persisted in the face of criticism while still retaining ties to the Arab Bloc. However, the British-French invasion of Suez in the fall of 1956 so catalysed Arab nationalism in Iraq that an unexpected revolution in July 1958, led by Brigadier General Abdul Karen Kassem, eliminated any further inclination for cooperation with the West. Iraq formerly withdrew from the Pact on 24 March 1959. Her "neutralism" did not conform to the "military and aggressive" nature of the Pact.²⁰

Although the Iraqi action would seemingly doom an organization which had idealistically hoped for some measure of Arab support, a timely United States declaration of encouragement at a previously scheduled ministerial council meeting salvaged it from a complete state of disrepair. Although the Pact was conceived by Secretary Dulles, the United States has never become a member, but has continued to give it overt support to include formal association with most of its key operating elements. What appears to be an inconsistent position was explained as early as 1956 by the

²⁰British Central Office of Information, The Central Treaty Organization, No. 4304, p. 8.

Honorable Loy Henderson, then Deputy Undersecretary of State. He indicated that U.S. failure to join was based on a desire "to remain on good terms with all the countries in this region."²¹ Subsequent to the Iraqi action, the nonpertinent "Baghdad Pact" designation was discarded in favor of the more appropriate "Central Treaty Organization."²²

²¹Sam Pope Brewer, "U.S. Disappoints Baghdad Allies," New York Times, 17 Apr. 1956, p. 1.

²²CENTO, The Story of the Central Treaty Organization, 1959, p. 8.

CHAPTER 3

STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF NATO AND CENTO CHARTERS

As developed in the preceding chapter, Turkey became a member of two regional security organizations in the relatively short period of four years. Furthermore, she has maintained this dual association for over a decade. In that she is a respected member of the community of nations, her actions are judged not only from the viewpoint of her national interest but also in the degree of responsibility shown her international commitments. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the provisions of the NATO and CENTO charters in order to determine her responsibilities as a member nation of each.

UNITED NATIONS "REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS"

Although both treaties acknowledge the responsibilities of their collective bodies to the United Nations, they pointedly do not reference that section of the United Nations Charter dealing specifically with "Regional Arrangements." (Chapter VIII, Articles 52 and 53.)¹ Article 52 permits:

. . . the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their

¹For easy reference, extracts from the United Nations Charter are contained in Annex D.

activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 53 provides for use by the Security Council of "such regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority. . . ." It further states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. . . ." ²

The NATO and CENTO Treaties (Annexes A and C), on the other hand, make pointed reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51, although not a part of the "Regional Arrangements" chapter, acknowledges "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. . . ." The only qualification to this inherent right is the requirement for reporting immediately to the Security Council the measures taken against an armed attack. ³

Although all but one of the signatories to both treaties are United Nations members, the statutory provisions of the regional charters indicate a lack of confidence in the Security Council's ability to apply enforcement action when faced with situations where regional action is appropriate. It is a thoroughly reasonable conclusion for a collective body oriented on resisting Communist aggression in view of the Soviet Union's consistent use of the veto in the Security Council. One may conclude that even

²Annex D, p. 74.

³Ibid., p. 73.

though the time and circumstances were different when the two organizations were chartered, their views of the corrective action needed to solve the problem had not changed.

NATO CHARTER

An analysis of the detailed provisions of the two treaties results in conclusions reflecting the circumstances existing at the time they were written. The NATO treaty--even though a cooperative agreement between 15 nations (12 initial signatories and three subsequent accessions)--is the more detailed and specific of the two. One can attribute this to two influences (1) a more definable threat and (2) greater assurance and/or appreciation of the attitudes or internal influences within the member countries, or those likely to join.

In the 1948-1949 time frame, Western European thinking, which had already been tuned to the "armed attack" terminology of the Brussels Pact,⁴ was further alarmed by Soviet irresponsibility shown during the Berlin Blockade (June 1948-May 1949). Consequently, the NATO Charter is similarly oriented on an "armed attack." For example, Article 3 stresses the development and maintenance of "individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. . . ." Article 5 emphasizes individual and collective responsibility in the event of "armed attack," and Article 6 defines the area of

⁴United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 19, 1948, p. 57.

"armed attack" in which Article 5 would be implemented. Furthermore, Article 9 requires the establishment of a defense committee to "recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. . . ."5

Reflecting the political maturity of Western Europe, the NATO charter is not limited to that of a military alliance but also shows specific concern for action in other areas. Article 2 stresses efforts toward "strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well being. . . ." It also enjoins participation in efforts eliminating conflict in economic policies by encouraging economic collaboration.⁶

CENTO CHARTER

The CENTO charter is considerably more generalized. This is particularly evident in Articles 1 and 2, the operating provisions, when compared with the highly significant Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Even though NATO member commitments after an armed attack are "as it deems necessary . . ." actions, the CENTO document provides even more discretionary action by its members. Any overt cooperation in the face of enemy aggression is that which is implied

⁵The complete text of the NATO treaty is reproduced in Annex A.

⁶Annex A, p. 61.

by interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. As discussed earlier, this only acknowledges the inherent right of collective self-defense.

Since the CENTO Pact originated as a bilateral agreement, its framers were not in a position to be specific.⁷ If they had been, it would have complicated the necessary accession of additional members in order for the Pact to become operative. Consequently, Article 1 goes only so far as to say that the measures needed to provide for regional defense may be the "subject of special agreements . . .," and Article 2 deferred their timing as a determination to be made "as soon as the present pact enters into force. . . ." It is obvious that the matter of future accessions was in the minds of the originators. In deference to Iraq's position as a member of the Arab Bloc, Article 5 provides for accession by "any member state of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with peace and security in the region. . . ." ⁸

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

A question of compatibility of the two treaties is that of the area or region of responsibility of each. Article 6 of the 1949 NATO agreement geographically limited the targets of enemy attack to member territories in Europe, North America, France's

⁷Text of the basic agreement between Turkey and Iraq is reproduced in Annex C.

⁸Annex C, pp. 70-71.

Algerian Departments, and any islands in the Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer. Also included are "occupation forces of any Party in Europe . . ." and "vessels or aircraft . . . of any of the Parties. . . ." ⁹ The Protocol of Accession of Greece and Turkey modified the area to include "the territory of Turkey . . .," since the wording on the basic agreement would have included only Turkish Thrace. Consequently, Anatolia is recognized as a NATO responsibility. As an indication of NATO's new orientation to the south, the Protocol added the Mediterranean Sea as an area in which attacks "on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties . . ." are considered to call for a NATO response. ¹⁰

The CENTO charter makes no effort to be so definitive. Its preamble highlights the individual country's Article 51 responsibilities for the "maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East Region. . . ." Article 5 likewise has the vague reference to "the security and peace in this region. . . ." Article 1 contradicts them both by limiting cooperation to that of security and defense of "the High Contracting Parties. . . ." ¹¹ In resolving this inconsistency, one must evaluate the self-admitted right of individual or collective self-defense as applied to the whole Middle East or just to the signatories of the pact. A liberal interpretation would legally justify the unlikely situation of Turkey

⁹Annex A, p. 62.

¹⁰Annex B, p. 67.

¹¹Annex C, pp. 69-71.

taking action against Ethiopia if Egypt were the object of an armed attack by Ethiopia. This seemingly ridiculous hypothetical example can be even less definitive in view of the widely varying interpretations of what constitutes the Middle East. George Lenczowski, an American authority on the region, divides it into two main regions, the Northern Belt and the Arab Core. He includes Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan in the Northern Belt. The Arab Core is further subdivided into the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan) and the Red Sea Region. The latter includes the many countries of the Arabian Peninsula but only Egypt on the African continent.¹² On the other hand, a South Asian, Professor J. K. Banerji, includes in the Middle East the Moslem fringe of Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), the Middle East Heartland (Egypt and Sudan to the west, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf Protectorates), and the northern countries of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.¹³

In that both pacts have an overlapping area of self-admitted responsibility, there is a chance, however remote, of conflicting planning or taking action in the exercise of these rights. Pragmatically though, it must be considered only an academic point and not one of serious concern providing the two organizations maintain their similar orientations in the East-West conflict.

¹²George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. xxv.

¹³J. K. Banerji, The Middle East in World Politics, p. 1.

Coordination and/or liaison between the two organizations can reconcile this potential duplication of effort into one of mutual support working to the advantage of both.

Since the possibility of inter-pact duplication can be resolved without a serious conflict of interest problem, what statutory provisions preclude the possibility of dual-subordination of any one country, i.e., Turkey, to the two bodies? This point is resolved directly by Article 8 of the NATO treaty and Article 4 of the CENTO treaty. As this is one of the principle points of investigation of this paper, the two articles are quoted in their entirety as follows:

Article 8, NATO Treaty. . . .

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagements in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 4, CENTO Treaty. . . .

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present Pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third state or states. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligations incompatible with the present Pact.

The significance of these two provisions, similar though they be, lay in their relative order of acceptance. Turkey formally acceded to the NATO treaty in February 1952 and signed the Baghdad Pact in February 1955--three years later. Thus, in 1952 she agreed to avoid

conflicting agreements with NATO, and in 1955 declared that the CENTO (then Baghdad Pact) agreements would not detract from her NATO obligations. Consequently, actions subsequent to 1955 had to recognize the primacy of NATO over CENTO.

CHAPTER 4

CENTO'S IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

As concluded in the last chapter, Turkey, by becoming a Baghdad Pact (now CENTO) member, agreed that this action did not or would not contravene her obligations to NATO. The real substance of the Baghdad Pact provisions lay in the subsequent actions to be taken when the "Pact enters into force. . . ." Consequently, the purpose of this chapter will be to examine the special agreements and measures taken by the contracting countries to secure the objectives sought in their mutual alignment.

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES

The only special agreements that became the subject of a formal pact are bilateral agreements signed with the United States. Iraq's sudden about face in her East-West orientation was generally viewed as the first phase in the disintegration of the alliance. The 5th Session of the Pact's Ministerial Council was scheduled to convene two weeks to the day after the revolution in Baghdad. As a symbol of United States concern, Secretary Dulles saw fit to attend in person, whereas the United States had normally been represented by a Deputy or Undersecretary of State at previous meetings. At the London meeting, the Prime Ministers of the four member countries and Secretary Dulles, acting for the United States, signed a declaration reaffirming the need for the Pact as being

"greater than ever." More important, Article 4 of this declaration formally committed the United States to cooperate with the other nations and to "enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation. . . ."¹ Subsequently, on 5 March 1959, three separate bilateral agreements between the Pact's regional countries and the United States were signed in Ankara at the ambassadorial level.² The text of the identical agreements is attached as ANNEX E.

The agreements have special significance in that they commit both the United States and the regional countries to certain actions and responsibilities. In Article I, the United States agrees to "take appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East. . . ." In other words, it was an application of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Article II reaffirms the providing of military and economic assistance to the regional countries. Article III emphasizes the responsibility of the receiving country to use this assistance for its "economic development" and the preservation of its national independence and integrity. Article IV obliges the regional governments to cooperate in preparing and participating in "such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon to be desirable subject to the other applicable provisions . . ." of the agreement. The key point in the

¹Baghdad Pact, Public Record of London Conference Series, Jul. 1958, p. 12.

²Baghdad Pact, United States Signs Bilateral Agreements with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, Mar. 1959, pp. 12-14.

last article is the requirement for mutual agreement. Consequently, there is no obligation for action which might be considered detrimental or in conflict with their individual national interest.

CENTO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

In order to evaluate the compatibility of the CENTO Pact with NATO, it is necessary to have an understanding of the functioning of the organization. This is facilitated by examining its organizational structure, how it evolved, and what have been and are now included in the scope of its activities. Article 6 of the Pact gave only limited recognition to the need for creating some machinery to coordinate the actions of and assist the member nations in fulfilling their treaty obligations. Because of the nature in which the final multinational arrangement evolved from what was originally a bilateral agreement, the only institution approved by statute was a "Permanent Council at Ministerial Level. . . ." Its statutory guidance was to "function within the purposes of this Pact . . ." and to "draw up its own rules of procedure."³ A council composed of individuals of ministerial rank is quite obviously not a working group but rather is a policymaking and approving body. To give it an operational capability, it logically must have an organizational base. The development and structure of the base provides direct insight on how the CENTO organization is perceived by its members.

³Annex C, p. 71.

MINISTERIAL LEVEL

Although the Pact was legally a going organization as of Pakistan's entry on 23 September 1955, its first Ministerial Council did not convene until 21 November 1955,⁴ by which time Iran also had become a member. It has met once or twice a year since, rotating its place of meeting among the member capitals. Normally each country has been represented by either the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister or a senior Cabinet member. Council meetings are devoted to examination and evaluation of reports and recommendations submitted by the organization's subordinate committees. Decisions of the Council require unanimous consent of the participants. Thus, the views of any one country cannot be overridden by a combination of the others. One country can likewise block proposals favored by the majority. To provide for continuous consultation on political and economic questions, the Ministerial Council members have designated their resident ambassadors in Ankara as deputies. Turkish representation at the deputy level is provided by senior representatives from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵ In January 1959 the Council agreed that the Council of Deputies would be chairmaned by the organization's Secretary-General, an international civil servant, and in

⁴British Central Office of Information, The Central Treaty Organization, No. 4304, p. 9.

⁵CENTO, CENTO Makes Progress - The Sixth Year of Proof, p. 6. (Hereafter cited as The Sixth Year of Proof.)

addition to their consultive role, would have the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the Committees.⁶

The CENTO Ministerial Council, having had the benefit of watching the NATO alliance evolve, likewise adopted the committee type organizational structure. The organization chart is appended in Annex F. Each of its subordinate committees has specialized responsibilities paralleling the major problems and/or threats facing the region. Although subordinate elements of these committees have been altered and changed according to priority of interest, the four basic committees--Military, Counter Subversion, Liaison, and Economic--have persisted since the pact's organizing meeting in Baghdad. These four committees make a practice of meeting just prior to the Ministerial Council meetings in order to coordinate actions needing Council approval.

MILITARY

On the military side of the organizational structure, only the Military Committee dates from the beginning. Composed of the senior military men from the member nations, its primary function is one of advice and counsel to the Ministerial Council, although it does give overall planning direction to the other two military elements. Prior to the June 1957 Ministerial Council meeting, the pact's day-to-day military activities were coordinated by the

⁶Baghdad Pact, Public Record of the Karachi Conference Series, Jan. 1959, p. 9.

member countries' military attaches in Baghdad and a special United States team with joint service representation.⁷ Since this arrangement could accomplish little more than liaison, the regional countries proposed a more formalized joint command headed by a senior American officer. The United States, which formally associated with the Military Committee in June 1957, took the position that CENTO's best contribution to the overall military situation would be one of strategic planning. In substantiating this position, the U.S. representative pointed out the region's inadequate communications facilities as being incompatible with the requirements of a joint command.⁸ At their June meeting, the Council approved the formation of a Combined Military Planning Staff (CMPS) as a subordinate element of the Military Committee.⁹ Headed by a Chief of Staff with the rank of major general, its principal tasks are accomplishing joint military studies and developing regional defense plans.¹⁰ In 1959 the importance attached to the Pact's military planning responsibilities was further emphasized by the forming of a Permanent Military Deputies Group (PMDG). Stationed at the Pact's Ankara headquarters, the PMDG is a body of senior military officers, (all lieutenant

⁷Henry R. Lieberman, "Baghdad Nations Vote Arms Staff, U.S. Will Join It," New York Times, 7 Jun. 1957, p. 1.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Baghdad Pact, Public Record of the Ankara Conference Series, Jan. 1958, p. 56.

¹⁰The Sixth Year of Proof, p. 11.

generals) who provide the continuous consultation not offered by the Military Committee. Although separate and apart from the CMPS, they have a review responsibility for plans and studies prepared by the latter.¹¹

Despite the pressure for a strengthening of the Pact's military aspects, the changes that have been made in its organizational structure have come about largely through compromises. For example, at the 1961 Ankara meeting, the Ministerial Council approved a new position of "Commander - Military Staff"--but qualified his authority and functions as those of "the coordination of defense planning among the participating states. . . ."12 The position is as yet unfilled. Again, at the 1962 meeting of the Military Committee, the Pakistan representative suggested the setting up of a NATO type organization with a Supreme Commander. General Lemnitzer and Admiral Mountbatten, in stating a joint U.S.-U.K. position, reemphasized the position taken five years earlier that an extensive command and staff structure was inappropriate because CENTO's military contribution should be one of planning for contingencies.¹³

The CENTO military activities are not limited to planning although that aspect is recognized as its most significant function.

¹¹CENTO, Five Years of CENTO, p. 9.

¹²CENTO, The CENTO Council Meets in Ankara, Apr. 1961, p. 26.

¹³Drew Middleton, "Pakistan Urges CENTO Expansion," New York Times, 27 Apr. 1962, p. 4.

Its contributions toward improving training among the regional forces is recognized by the inclusion of a training branch in the CMPS. Although limited by its authority, it nonetheless has a major coordinating role in the annually planned joint training exercises and maneuvers involving not only regional forces but also those made available on a short term basis by the United Kingdom and the United States.

COUNTER SUBVERSION AND LIAISON

The Counter-Subversion and Liaison Committees provide the CENTO support to those actions directed toward neutralizing the destabilizing activities that have come to be recognized as endemic to the countries and to the peoples of the Middle East. Although the details of the counter subversive actions are of such a sensitive nature that their widespread dissemination or disclosure would compromise their aims, Secretary General Khalatbary, in a press interview on 9 August 1964, stated that "the anti-subversive programs are conducted by individual countries and not by CENTO itself. . . ."¹⁴ To support these activities, the Liaison Committee has the responsibility of facilitating the exchange of information between member countries.

¹⁴CENTO, In Pursuit of Peace and Security, p. 8.

ECONOMIC

Planning responsibilities for other than security activities of the Pact are coordinated and directed by the Economic Committee. Despite the often demonstrated concern of the regional countries for a militarily strengthened organization, they have shown a continued appreciation for the potential benefits to be derived from cooperation in the economic field. In contrast with the West European countries' original task of rebuilding war ravaged economies, the problem in the Middle East has in general been one of accelerating economic progress by modernizing present economic systems, developing raw material resources and by directing continuous effort toward a closer integration of the separate countries' economic systems. The Economic Committee operates with six principal subsidiary elements, whose efforts are coordinated by an executive agency identified as the "Experts of the Economic Committee." Four Subcommittees--Trade, Health, Agriculture, and Communications and Public Works--support activities within their designated functional areas. The subcommittees depend upon a flexible arrangement of working parties, seminars, etc. to handle the details of the economic programs. This subordinate structure alters with change in emphasis and priority assigned to specific areas of activity. In addition to the subcommittees, two other elements directly support the Economic Committee. The Scientific Council facilitates regional scientific cooperation and supervises

the CENTO Institute of Nuclear Science at Tehran.¹⁵ A Working Party on Multilateral Technical Cooperation directs a program which has as its objective the exchange of technical expertise within the region. In order to facilitate economic development, it is directed primarily toward training individuals in other than scientific areas.¹⁶

SECRETARIAT

The chief executive of the organization is the secretary general. In addition to being chairman of the Council of Deputies, he heads up the Secretariat, a body of international civil servants composed of nationals from all participating countries. It is the counterpart of the Military Committee's PMDG and CMPS. Three deputy secretaries-general are separately responsible for Political Affairs and Administration, Economic Affairs, and Public Relations. In addition to the normal supporting functions, the Secretariat also has the responsibility for maintaining liaison with other international organizations.¹⁷

¹⁵The Sixth Year of Proof, p. 7.

¹⁶U.S. Dept of State, A. I. D., CENTO Assistance Program, FY 1967, p. 7., CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁷The Sixth Year of Proof, p. 9.

CHAPTER 5

CENTO ACCOMPLISHMENTS

While the purpose of the last chapter was to discuss the implementing measures taken by CENTO to attain its goals, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss its accomplishments. What it has done not only shows the benefits accruing to individual members and to the region as a whole but, more important, is an indicator for future expectations.

MILITARY

CENTO's military efforts as compared to those of NATO are circumscribed by the different status each has in reference to the military forces of the member countries. The Southern European Command, one of NATO's four major subordinate commands, has all of Turkey's combat divisions and air force units either assigned to it or earmarked for its control in the event of mobilization or war.¹ The Turkish Navy, although under national command, operates with the Greek Navy under Commander, Northeast Mediterranean, an area element of Allied Forces, Mediterranean, another of NATO's major subordinate commands.² The wartime role of the Turkish

¹The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1964-1965, p. 14.

²"The Shield at Thrace," Vigilance-SHAPE, Aug. 1961, p. 6.

military forces are thus quite specifically delineated. Having no control of what are the strongest military forces within the region, CENTO must necessarily limit its military activities to the two remaining regional countries and such forces as are made available by the United Kingdom and the United States. Despite the force limitations and the lack of a formalized command structure, CENTO has conducted a series of major training exercises and maneuvers. Emphasis has been placed on air defense and naval coordination. Having no organization comparable to SHAPE, CENTO has necessarily adopted ad hoc command arrangements for these combined training efforts. For example, Exercise Midlink VI, a naval maneuver in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, was under the overall command of the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Navy. Involved in this 1963 exercise, the largest yet organized by CENTO, were ships from the United States and all CENTO countries but Turkey.³ On the other hand, in April 1964, for Exercise "Delawar," which was an air, land, and sea exercise limited to Iranian and United States forces, another approach was used. Exercise forces were under the control of a specially constituted Iranian-U.S. staff, headed up by an Iranian general. The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to Iran served as deputy commander.⁴ The

³Desomand Wattern, "Pakistan Joins U.S., Britain in CENTO Naval Exercise," NAVY, Vol. 7, 12 Feb. 1964, p. 10.

⁴"Services Will Have 6,800 Men in Iranian Exercise (Delawar)," Army, Navy and Air Force Journal and Register, Vol. 101, 21 Mar. 1964, p. 37.

availability of Turkish base facilities facilitated the strategic deployment of U.S. Army troops since Incirlik Air Base, near Adana, Turkey, was used as the exercise's staging base.⁵

ECONOMIC

Although Secretary Dulles put the principle emphasis on multinational cooperation for security and defense, which in turn was reemphasized by the framers of the Baghdad Pact, the organization's efforts toward these ends have been overshadowed by a growing awareness of its potential contributions to the region's social and economic development. Although continuing to cooperate toward improved security and defense, efforts in these corollary areas have gained increasing stature.

Capital Projects

As discussed earlier, the efforts of the regional countries in 1957 to make the Pact into a formalized integrated command was rebuffed by the United States as being inappropriate because of the region's inadequate communications facilities. Quite significantly, at the January 1958 meeting of the Economic Committee, one of the principal items on the agenda dealt with progress made towards improved regional communications.⁶ Two communications projects

⁵Clay Buckingham, "Exercise Delawar," Air University Review, Vol. 15, Sep.-Oct. 1964, p. 22.

⁶Baghdad Pact, Public Record of the Ankara Conference Series, Jan. 1958, p. 6. (Hereafter cited as Ankara Conference Series.)

were approved and have proven to be the only comprehensive development program completed thus far. They are (1) high frequency radio telephone and telegraph services between the three regional capitals and London and (2) a microwave network linking the three regional capitals. The high frequency system went into service in 1963,⁷ and the microwave system became operational on 9 June 1965.⁸ Both projects were well beyond the financial capacity of the regional countries, so their eventual completion was possible only through British and American financial support. The microwave system proved to be a most ambitious project, for its 3,060-mile length makes it the longest of its kind in the world.⁹

The first capital projects receiving favorable attention by the Economic Committee were those seeking to improve intercountry ground transportation routes. Except for local roads and trails, all three countries were virtually isolated from each other. This condition was obviously incompatible with countries aspiring to collective defense. The only road capable of carrying sustained wheeled vehicular traffic between Turkey and Iran approached to within 20 miles of the Soviet border.¹⁰ The only railroad in this critical area was the line from Tehran through Tabriz into Russia, which

⁷A.A.K. Khalatabary, "The Central Treaty Organization," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 8, Feb.-Mar. 1963, p. 25.

⁸"Chronology of Events, Mid East, 1 June - 31 August 1965," Middle East Journal, Autumn 1965, p. 487.

⁹"CENTO Phone Link in Full Use," New York Times, 10 Jun. 1965, p. 5.

¹⁰Dana Adams Schmidt, "CENTO Mid East Projects Progress," New York Times, 12 Apr. 1965, p. 6.

was developed and maintained as the critical supply route from the Persian Gulf into Russia during World War II. To overcome what is an obvious barrier to cooperation, the Economic Committee assumed responsibility for new road and railway connections between existing facilities in Turkey and Iran. The railway project connects what was the eastern terminus of the Turkish State Railway System in southwest Turkey at Mus to the Iranian system at Suheyan, some 20 miles northwest of Tabriz. Work has been proceeding from both ends, and a gap of only 158 miles remains.¹¹ The road project, which connects Shivelan in extreme southwest Turkey to Zenjan on the Tehran-Tabriz main highway, was completed in 1963.¹² The trace of this route bypasses Lake Riyazeh to the west and south and thus is at all times more than a hundred miles from the Soviet border. To further enhance the road project, the Turkish government has undertaken construction of a new road from Cizre on the Turk-Syrian border to the CENTO road at Shivelan.¹³

Tying in with the railway and road projects are port development projects at the Turkish ports of Trabzon on the Black Sea and Iskenderun on the Mediterranean. Completion of Trabzon project has been largely due to the financial and material resources

¹¹US Dept of State, A.I.D., CENTO ASSISTANCE PROGRAM-1967, p. 21. CONFIDENTIAL. (Hereafter cited as CENTO ASSISTANCE PROGRAM-1967.)

¹²John Beaufort, "Eight Candles Light CENTO's Role," Christian Science Monitor, 25 Feb. 1963, p. 9.

¹³Schmidt, op. cit., p. 6.

supplied by the United Kingdom. The British have likewise agreed to provide the resources needed for modernizing the Iskenderun facilities.¹⁴

Technical Assistance

Although the developmental projects provide the capital improvements that are a requisite for modern concepts of economic cooperation, their full benefit will be realized only if there are common grounds for agreement on their use. In the technical assistance programs, the regional countries have demonstrated an ability and a will to work together and make compromises that would have been unthinkable several decades ago. Although the regional countries make national contributions, the capital projects have been successfully completed primarily because of external assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States. On the other hand, the technical assistance programs have been largely self-help programs, although the external countries provide skills and knowledge not otherwise present in the region.

The most significant technical assistance programs have been those connected with agriculture and related problems. With something in excess of 70 percent of the regional peoples so engaged, this sector of the economy reflects a principal concern of the region's economists. The CENTO agricultural projects, while

¹⁴Khalatbary, op. cit., p. 25.

seemingly insignificant, directly attack the ills of this sector of their economy. To illustrate the point, some aspects of these projects are (1) increasing soil fertility by fertilizer surveys,¹⁵ (2) developing timber production and promoting cooperation in forestry matters by exchanging imports and accomplishing joint field studies,¹⁶ (3) enhancing the area's production and use of grain crops by surveys of pest control measures, production of animal feeds, and grain storage problems,¹⁷ and (4) modernizing the overall agricultural economic sector by studies in agricultural credit, marketing, and cooperatives.¹⁸ CENTO even has its own quasi-agricultural college in the Agriculture Machinery and Soil Conservation Center located in Karaj, Iran.¹⁹ Realizing the corollary importance of animal and livestock production to agriculture, a Veterinary Convention was agreed upon as early as January 1959. Its objective is to prevent the spread of contagious animal diseases. In the same year, the CENTO Institute of Animal Reproduction was established in Karachi for the purpose of developing strains of cattle more adapted to the region.²⁰ In addition to those in its own institutions, CENTO also sponsors many of the agricultural projects being accomplished by the region's universities.²¹

¹⁵Ankara Conference Series, p. 8.

¹⁶Baghdad Pact, Public Record of the Karachi Conference Series, Jan. 1959, p. 15. (Hereafter cited as Karachi Conference Series.)

¹⁷Ankara Conference Series, p. 8.

¹⁸CENTO ASSISTANCE PROGRAM-FY 1967, p. 49.

¹⁹Karachi Conference Series, p. 15.

²⁰Ankara Conference Series, p. 15.

²¹CENTO, Central Treaty Organization, 1965, p. 12.

The projects done under the auspices of the Health Committee have an even more direct impact on the welfare of the people in the region. Areas either investigated in past years or currently underway include the control of malaria, health education, narcotics control, environmental sanitation, the control of contagious diseases, pediatrics training, public health administration, nursing training, trachoma control, and the organization of national health services.²² The Pact's nuclear center, first located in Baghdad and now in Tehran, followed through on President Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" proposal by directing its attention to the use of radio isotopes for medical diagnosis and treatment of disease.²³

The foregoing programs, while not resulting in major scientific breakthroughs, have proved their worth in that they have been a mechanism permitting a mutual discussion of problems and exchange of ideas. Multinational cooperation, even among the more sophisticated and mature nations, is replete with examples of failure to understand each other's viewpoint. For lesser endowed nations, this is an even greater obstacle to cooperation. The opportunities to understand each other's position have not been limited to the many individuals who have participated directly in CENTO activities, but extend to other nationals as well. For example, early agreement was reached on a reduction of press and telegraphic rates, which

²²Ibid., p. 13.

²³Ankara Conference Series, p. 9.

resulted in a 74 percent lowering of rates between Turkey and Iran.²⁴
Intercountry mobility by regional nationals has been enhanced by
CENTO efforts to ease customs formalities, e.g., baggage inspection,
temporary importation of automobiles, and procedures for obtaining
exit and entry visas.²⁵

²⁴Karachi Conference Series, p. 9.

²⁵Ibid., p. 15.

CHAPTER 6

CENTO CONTRIBUTIONS TO WESTERN EUROPE AND TURKEY

MILITARY

CENTO, like NATO, has never been tested for its military credibility or effectiveness. Therefore, it must be evaluated in terms of its potential benefits. It does not offer any significant additional military strength that alters the existing military power relationship of Soviet forces vis-a-vis those of the West. Turkey's ground and air forces are already committed to or earmarked as NATO forces. Its Navy, although under national control, can make its most effective contribution when operationally working as part of the NATO force in the northeast Mediterranean. Pakistan's forces are oriented towards the East, so the only net gain is the Iranian 8-division Army, 4-wing Air Force, and Navy of less than 20 small craft. Of these, the three new squadrons of F-5 aircraft offer the most significant assistance to Western power.¹

Although CENTO military forces do not materially swing the balance according to the usual strength comparison indices, the flank location of CENTO forces necessitates a dispersion of Soviet forces to cover their southern flank. Soviet forces in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan are so far removed from western Russia

¹Turkey, The Statesman's Year Book, 1965-66, p. 1126.

as to virtually eliminate them from serious consideration as reinforcements on that front.

Even though CENTO forces don't add much to the balance of power comparison, the CENTO countries, by virtue of their position, support the West. NATO's concern over her southern flank was demonstrated by the belated inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the alliance. Their resolute attitude, reinforced by U.S. support, retained for the West their strategic position astride the Straits and control of the only suitable ports in the south Balkans. This effectively deterred any further Soviet moves along that avenue of approach. The protocol of their accession specifically named the Mediterranean as an area in which an armed attack against the forces of one member nation would be considered an attack against all. Despite gaining Anatolia with its naturally strong defensive position flanking the Black Sea and the Straits, the NATO flank remained open. The mountains in eastern Turkey are only a part of what is the natural line of defense of the Mediterranean against an attack from the northeast. The Zagros mountains in Iran, which tie into them at the Armenian knot, lay astride the key overland route to Suez--and beyond that, the continent of Africa.² CENTO forces are admittedly not capable of halting a determined thrust toward Africa but can introduce a significant delay if their

²Dankwart A. Rustow, "Defense of the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, Jan. 1956, pp. 275-276.

actions are coordinated with those of the NATO forces. CENTO military planning, as directed by the Military Committee, some members of which also sit on NATO's Military Committee, must have coordination of these actions as one of its principle objectives.

CENTO exercises and maneuvers provide the opportunity for learning invaluable lessons on problems of coordinating the actions of the various national forces. Exercises such as Delawar show the feasibility of deploying some of the United States' strategic reserve forces to the Zagros defense line. Probably more important, they demonstrate to the peoples of the region U.S. and Western appreciation of the key position of the Middle East not only as a land bridge between Western Europe and Asia but also as the land bridge between Asia and Africa.

Whereas the CENTO countries include within their boundaries the most defensible terrain against a Soviet flanking move through Africa against Europe, they likewise offer a base for direct counter-action against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union may choose to concentrate its efforts exclusively against Western Europe, rather than risk a major operation across the rugged mountains and extensive deserts of the Middle East, where supply and support of its forces may prove to be a problem not capable of being solved by its logistics system. Assuming the main effort could be blunted or stalled, the close proximity of the CENTO countries' bases provides a point of departure for direct counterattack by air, sea, and land against the heartland of the Soviet industrial base.

Counterattack operations, e.g., amphibious or airborne landings, launched directly against or into the Soviet Union may result in significant political repercussions. Her less reliable satellites, e.g., Rumania, may seize upon such an occasion as an opportunity to break away from existing arrangements. A fragmenting of the Warsaw Pact would prove less likely if Western military forces were to counterattack through the satellite buffer zone. Unlike the situation on the European land mass, the CENTO countries' land area directly abuts the critical south flank of the U.S.S.R.

MIDDLE EASTERN OIL

Since availability of Middle East oil was one of the principle motivations for organizing the Baghdad Pact, does the CENTO of today, without the oil producing Arab states as members, enhance the assurance of oil availability to Western Europe? With the Middle East economies almost entirely dependent on the oil industry, they must necessarily be as concerned over finding a market for their oil as Western Europe is in receiving it. The Soviet Union, which is aggressively seeking markets for its own oil because of booming production and its inability to keep pace with construction of domestic refining capacity,³ is a competitor to the sellers, i.e., the Middle East, rather than to the buyers, Western Europe. During the formative years of CENTO, the Soviet threat to Middle

³Robert J. Enright, "Worlds Hunger for Oil Absorbs Big Gains in Global Output," Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 63, 27 Dec. 1965, p. 80.

East oil was not the current situation of competitive selling but rather one of gaining hegemony over the region and denying its accessibility to the West. The same threat exists today--selfish though it may be. By subsequently exercising its control it could have effectively stifled the growing industrialization of the recovering European countries, who were rebuilding their economies around the availability of relatively inexpensive Middle Eastern oil.

In January 1957, at the joint Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded as follows to a question regarding the implications of a Communist takeover of the Middle East:

. . . I cannot think of anything more dangerous, because I am sure in those circumstances, Western Europe, the alliances in Western Europe, NATO, would be seriously crippled. I think that there would be a good chance of the Communists taking over Western Europe in time through economic strangulation. In other words, if the Communist controlled the oil of the Middle East, they could in effect control the economy of Europe.⁴

Although the many crises in the Middle East have had the ominous threat of potential Soviet domination, the final evaluation shows that they never gained control of any country although they did gain varying degrees of economic influence. The situation could

⁴US Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, S.J. Res. 19 and H.J. Res. 117, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Jan.-Feb. 1957, p. 408.

very well have been different had Soviet physical power been physically present on a threatened country's boundary. The northern tier of CENTO countries, shallow as the barrier is, precluded this physical presence by which today's influence--principally economic-- could have been today's control. The question is admittedly hypothetical, since there is no way to evaluate accurately what would have been the course of events had the CENTO buffer not existed.

During the first decade of CENTO's existence, the relative importance of Middle East oil has not lessened--in fact, it has increased despite considerable excitement attached to discoveries in Africa and elsewhere. In Secretary Dulles' "orientation" trip, he attached considerable importance to the fact that the region possessed 60 percent of the world's oil reserves. As of the end of 1965, the Middle East countries are credited with 215,360,000,000 of the world's 319,573,000,000 barrels of proven oil reserves.⁵ This amounts to 67.4 percent. The region is likely to retain this unchallenged position as the Middle East oil producing countries have exercised increasing restraint in tapping their resources. Despite having two-thirds of the world's reserves, their 1965 output was 8,240.7 barrels/day compared to the estimated worldwide production of slightly under 30,000 barrels/day.⁶ This is a relative production rate of 27.5 percent.

⁵"World Wide Oil Roundup," Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 63, 27 Dec. 1965, p. 83.

⁶Ibid.

The aftermath of the Suez crisis of 1956 pointed up the weakest link in the oil seller-buyer relationship, i.e., freedom of transit through the Suez Canal and control of the pipelines. Increased shipments of oil from Western Hemisphere countries and readjustment of tanker movements⁷ proved to be adequate emergency measures at that time but cannot compensate as long-range measures in light of the less expensive Middle East products. An alternative pipeline route from Iran through Turkey, built under the auspices of CENTO, can prove of value to both countries as well as give a higher degree of assurance on the availability of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe. The exact alignment of this alternative route would necessarily depend upon detailed engineering feasibility studies but could conceivably also traverse the oil bearing region of central and southeastern Turkey. Construction of pipelines through this area is apparently feasible as Turkiye Petroleri A. O., the Turkish government's petroleum company, has a pipeline project pending from its Batman refinery to Iskenderun.⁸ National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) has nearly completed a new pipeline from the oil producing regions along the Persian Gulf to refineries at Tehran,⁹ which would reduce the length of this alternate line. Iran should treat such a project with favor as it would give her a privileged position in marketing her oil products. This suggested pipeline project fits

⁷Harold Lubell, Middle East Oil Crisis and Western Europe Energy Supplies, p. 20.

⁸"World Wide Oil Roundup," p. 93.

⁹ Ibid., p. 88.

the criteria for a CENTO capital project as both countries would benefit. It can be likened to the already discussed road and railway projects.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO TURKEY

The previous discussion has concentrated on actual or potential contributions of CENTO and/or the CENTO states as a group to Western Europe. Equally pertinent are CENTO's contributions to Turkey as one of its member states. If Turkey as an individual country is strengthened by its CENTO membership, it is a stronger member of NATO and that alliance benefits indirectly.

In that CENTO's most marked achievements have been in the economic field, Turkey has likewise so benefited. The agricultural sector of Turkey's economy will improve as it implements the recommendations and findings resulting from the down-to-earth approach of CENTO's Economic Committee on the common problems faced by agriculture in the region. Improvement of the agricultural sector is a basic strategy for any country in like circumstance moving toward increased industrialization because of its indirect affects on individual welfare. The welfare of its people is more directly enhanced by the CENTO health programs. The beginnings made so far in facilitating interregional trade and cooperation could presage a Middle Eastern Common Market. While such an arrangement could never approach the significance of economic cooperation in Europe under the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A., it would

permit the countries of the region to put priority on those efforts for which they have the most promising human and material resources. Providing real cooperation to these ends were achieved, the success gained could in time enhance the prestige of CENTO to the point where the early emotional prejudices of other Middle Eastern countries would disappear and they too would choose to lend their cooperation.

Undoubtedly the greatest contributors to these ultimate goals of cooperation are the capital projects either completed or under-way. Although all projects were justified on the basis of joint benefit to two or more countries, Turkey has realized advantages vital to her own national interest, which are other than those gained by increased regional contact. The road and railway projects both traverse the highly sensitive mountainous redoubt of Turkey's Kurdish minority. Although Turkey has not had the control problems of her neighbors, these routes will enhance her ability to forestall similar situations. They likewise facilitate development of what heretofore has been an unexploited and only superficially explored area. The region has known chrome, iron, copper, lead, and zinc resources.¹⁰ Since it lies between the rich oil wells of northern Iraq and Turkish developments in the Siirt-Batman area, it could conceivably develop into an oil producing region.

¹⁰Dana Adams Schmidt, "CENTO Mid East Projects Progress," New York Times, 12 Apr. 1965, p. 6.

CENTO development of the Trabzon and Iskenderun ports was principally directed toward more efficient port operations in prospect of increased flow of goods expected from the interior Middle East because of the rail and highway improvements. Turkey reaps special benefits because they facilitate contact with the isolated eastern third of the country. These two ports could well become key logistic facilities supporting Turkish military forces on the eastern and southern fronts. At the very least, use of the improved Trabzon and Iskenderun ports would decrease dependence on the interior rail and highway systems.

The CENTO high frequency communication project has provided a direct link between Ankara and London and has greatly improved Turkey's military communication capability with a major Western capital. If the situation so developed, this could be used as an alternate to the existing NATO communication systems. Channels of the microwave system between the regional capitals can be reserved for military use and thus serve as a backup for the high frequency system for less sensitive military traffic.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, it may be concluded that CENTO mutually supports NATO and western Europe by:

(1) Providing an extension of the best defensive positions against a Soviet attack directed toward the Middle East oil fields, the Suez Canal, and Africa. The United States bilateral agreements with the CENTO nations, agreed upon through the CENTO mechanism, provide a deterrent against such Soviet actions. Soviet leadership cannot be certain that physical incursions to the south will not be met by United States strategic force opposition.

(2) Providing a base for direct counterattack against the critical south flank of the Soviet Union if the Soviets choose to make their primary effort against Western Europe.

(3) Providing a potential alternate means for moving Middle East oil to the eastern Mediterranean if normal routes are interrupted.

(4) Sponsoring economic projects with considerable potential benefit to Turkey's national economy, thus making her a stronger NATO partner. These actions supplement Article 2 of the NATO charter, which recognizes a NATO responsibility for economic development.

Furthermore, the statutory obligations of the CENTO charter and subsequent implementing measures and special agreements have

"built-in" safeguards which avoid putting Turkey in an ambivalent ^{false} position. The primacy of NATO over CENTO is recognized in the basic instruments of each alliance. The London Declaration, which preceded the signing of the bilateral agreements with the United States, emphasized the requirement for mutual agreement regarding defense arrangements. In the CENTO Ministerial Council, unanimous consent is required for Council decisions. This serves as a check on any actions Turkey might see as detrimental to her NATO obligations. Most important, Turkey has been most circumspect in her ^{false} CENTO activities in recognizing the primacy of NATO over CENTO.

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ANNEX A

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so

attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties. [*]

ARTICLE 7

This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

[*] Modified by the Greece-Turkey Protocol

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has

been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the governments of the other signatories.

ANNEX B

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY

London, 22 October 1951

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4 April 1949,
Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,
Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

"For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- i. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- ii. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories of any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of

each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by the Government to the governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

ANNEX C

PACT OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION

February 24, 1955

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of friendship and good neighborhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and His Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognized the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the Nations of the World and in particular the Nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas Article II of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that Treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realized the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims and for that purpose have--agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will cooperate for their security and defense. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

ARTICLE 2

In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation provided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present Pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 3

The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present Pact are not in contradiction with any of international obligations contracted by either of them with any third state or states. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High

Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present Pact.

ARTICLE 5

The Pact shall be open for accession to any member state of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the state concerned is deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding state Party to the present Pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with Article 1, with one or more Parties to the present Pact. The competent authority of any acceding state may determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the Parties concerned.

ARTICLE 6

A Permanent Council at Ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this Pact when at least four Powers become parties to the Pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 7

This Pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the Pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire

to do so, six months before the expiration of any of the above mentioned periods, in which case the Pact remains valid for the other Parties.

ARTICLE 8

This Pact shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

ANNEX D

EXTRACTS FROM UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ON "REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS"

.....

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy states as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

.....

ANNEX E

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Following is the text of identical bilateral agreements of cooperation signed by the United States with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in Ankara on March 5, 1959.

.....
The Government of . . . and the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves at London on July 28, 1958;

Considering that under Article 1 of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, the Parties signatory thereto agreed to co-operate for their security and defence and that, similarly, as stated in the above mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America, in the interest of world peace, agreed to co-operate with the Governments making that Declaration for their security and defence;

Recalling that, in the above-mentioned Declaration, the members of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation making that Declaration affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect;

Considering further that the Government of the United States of America is associated with the work of the major Committees of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955;

Affirming their right to co-operate for their security and defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of . . .;

Recognizing the authorization to furnish assistance granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East; and Considering that similar agreements are being entered into by the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of . . . and . . . respectively, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The Government of . . . is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against . . . the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of . . . at its request.

ARTICLE II. The Government of the United States of America in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and

related laws of the United States of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Government of . . . and the Government of the United States of America, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish to the Government of . . . such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of . . . and the Government of the United States of America, in order to assist the Government of . . . in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.

ARTICLE III. The Government of . . . undertakes to utilize such military and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United States of America in a manner consonant with the aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of . . . and of preserving its national independence and integrity.

ARTICLE IV. The Government of . . . and the Government of the United States of America will co-operate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable subject to the other applicable provisions of this agreement.

ARTICLE V. The provisions of the present agreement do not affect the co-operation between the two Governments as envisaged in other international agreements or arrangements.

ARTICLE VI. This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written notice of the intention of the other Government to terminate the agreement.

Done in duplicate at Ankara, this fifth day of March, 1959.

ANNEX F
CENTO
ORGANIZATION
CHART

