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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

JOINT SEABASING AND JOINT VISION 2020

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Joint Seabasing and Joint Vision 2020

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Thesis: The United States armed forces and its coalition partners need to embrace and develop Joint Seabasing due to increasingly difficult political relations and a reduced number of friendly facilities in order to successfully fight future wars and fulfill the full spectrum dominance requirements of *Joint Vision 2020*.

Discussion: This study seeks to explore what Seabasing is, while also determining if it would improve the current capabilities of the United States Military. This document also seeks to fully understand the concept of Joint Seabasing as defined by the Joint Integrated Concept and determine whether the capabilities presented meet the requirements of the *Joint Vision 2020* report. Aspects of Seabasing have been utilized by United States Naval forces throughout its history with great success, but the concept has been expanded by the United States Navy to be one leg of a triad of maritime power projection. The concept has been further expanded by the Joint Integrated Concept (JIC) to include all of Department of Defense forces and coalition allies to bring the concept to the forefront of warfighting.

Conclusion: If the United States and its coalition forces would dedicate resources to developing the platforms and capabilities necessary to make the Joint Seabasing a reality they would meet the requirements of the *Joint Vision 2020* report. There is still significant research, development, and execution to be done in order to make the concept a reality. The resources of all of the military services working in concert with one another utilizing the model as outlined in the Joint Integrating Concept can become a reality.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper will discuss the background and utility of Seabasing utilizing historical references and modern day visions. It will also define what innovations, technologies, platforms and capabilities that characterize the Joint Seabasing concept. It will then describe, in detail, the tenets of the Joint Integrated Concept v1.0 for Seabasing and how they improve operability of the warfighter. The paper will then analyze the requirements of the *Joint Vision 2020* document in relation to the capabilities provided by Joint Seabasing. Utilizing this analysis the paper will provide conclusions and recommendations to the United States and Department of Defense.

The nature and complexity of the security environments expected by the United States due to increasingly complex international politics, extremist terrorism and the potential consequences of these actions have caused many friendly nations to change their policy on US military access. These countries have chosen and may continue to limit or disallow US forces access to their territory for in theater basing or air transit access. Military leaders have also realized that in many situations its presence actually hinders the strategic situation and presents security challenges that may threaten operational objectives. The United States, however, still depends on strategic access and the ability to act globally against any threat to national security. As enemy possession of weapons of mass destruction increases, and the availability of overseas bases decreases, it is necessary to reduce the vulnerability of US forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, networked sea bases.¹

The *Joint Vision 2020* document agrees with this possible political environment and mandates that the United States working in conjunction with its coalition partners

will present a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance achieved through interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimension protection.² Joint Seabasing capabilities provide an answer to these issues by increasing access to hostile environments through freedom of movement and action at sea to stage, project and sustain combat power from its resources.³ The United States armed forces and its coalition partners must embrace and develop Joint Seabasing due to increasingly difficult political relations and a reduced number of friendly facilities in order to successfully fight future wars and fulfill the requirements of *Joint Vision 2020*.

As a naval concept Seabasing fulfills stated goals in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* and *The National Defense Strategy* through forward deployed, decisive power projection and joint collaboration throughout maritime services. These attributes are expanded greatly through the Joint Integrated Concept's (JICs) vision of Seabasing and directly support the requirements of *Joint Vision 2020*, especially in the areas of dominant maneuver and focused logistics. The Seabasing concept discussed in this paper is not a revolutionary new Navy and/or Marine Corps tactic or strategy, but a combination of innovations and current capabilities that enable increased military speed, endurance and strike capacity for all services. It is not a location or fortress at sea as described by Mobile Offshore Bases (MOBs), but an operational scheme of maneuver for the Department of Defense to utilize.⁴ It has been described as "a hybrid system of systems consisting of concepts of operations, ships, forces, offensive and defensive weapons, aircraft, communications and logistics" operating in concert through flexible distribution and networked systems.⁵ This concept of Seabasing is not envisioned as a

new or innovative concept of warfighting by its champions within the military structure, but when looked at through a joint lens truly defines innovation. Issacson states that, "innovation is manifested by the development of new warfighting concepts and /or new means of integrating technology."⁶ Joint Seabasing not only calls for, but demands that the military services innovate through expansion of their doctrine, tactics, and training and truly fight together in Joint Areas of Operation. The military services have to break out of their stovepipes and realize the benefits that true interoperability provides. The DOD's Concept of Operations must recognize the JIC Seabasing concept and direct the military services to adhere to the Goldwater-Nichols mandate for joint service.⁷ The DOD must realize Seabasing as more than an integral part of the Seapower 21 triad, but as a joint global asset and direct support for funding of necessary new technology, platforms, doctrine and training.

BACKGROUND

History has demonstrated that Seabasing is a potent ability that can have a dramatic affect on an operation. As early as 1865, joint forces of Union Army, Navy, and Marines defeated the Confederate enemy in decisive fashion from a sea base of over 60 ships delivering 12000 troops to Fort Fisher, near Wilmington, North Carolina.⁸ The sea base used for the assault on Okinawa, Japan during World War II utilized over 1200 ships; over 500,000 soldiers, sailors, Marines and coalition forces; and a supply line that stretched over 4000 nautical miles to Pearl Harbor Hawaii. This was a truly joint venture that succeeded in its design and set the stage for the invasion of the Japanese home islands utilizing all aspects of the United States and coalition military might and revised doctrine specific to the situation.⁹ Both of these operations were momentous in history,

but occurred during different times with different mindsets. The large quantity of ships, supplies, and people utilized as well as the casualties expected during both of these campaigns far outweigh the amount that would be possible today. After years of ongoing war, the United States public will not tolerate excessive budgets, assets, soldiers, loss of lives, or loss valuable equipment.

The Chief of Naval Operations in 2002, Admiral Vern Clark, outlined his vision in *Sea Power 21* of utilizing the sea base as the hub from which Sea Strike and Sea Shield will project dominant offensive power, defensive assurance and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders.¹⁰ The vision in *Sea Power 21* is an extension of the Expeditionary Warfare Concept of Operations that the Navy and Marine Corps have proven over time. Admiral Clark conceptualizes a three pronged approach (Figure 1) to Naval warfare utilizing Sea Shield, Sea Strike and Sea Basing to facilitate maneuver, precision strike, organic defense, and integrated logistics networked via integrated command and control functions (ForceNet) to provide strategic and operational effectiveness.¹¹




Figure 1: Sea Power 21. This picture depicts the three prongs of Sea Power 21; Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing as well as the integrated continuity between them ForceNet. It also depicts the training and education platforms Sea Trial, Sea Warrior, and Sea Enterprise not discussed in this paper.¹²

Sea Strike provides capabilities that enable Joint Force Commanders with a wide range of weapons, from long-range precision strike to direct ground assault. Utilizing information dominance allows U.S. forces to gain the initiative, deny the adversary refuge, and decisively gain the objective. Maneuver from the sea and extended on-station endurance provides full-time coverage of the entire Operating Area. Sea Shield utilizes extended defense networks in order to protect joint forces and allies at sea and ashore. Admiral Clark states that "Sea Basing serves as the foundation from which offensive and defensive fires are projected-making Sea Strike and Sea Shield realities."¹³ ForceNet is the glue that binds the three prongs; Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing; together through networked integrated knowledge and command and control components.¹⁴

The foundation of the Seabasing concept is the existing and future maritime platforms that will be the building blocks of the sea base. The Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) that currently serves the United States Navy consists of 16 ships divided

into three forward deployed maritime pre-positioning ship squadrons (MPSRONs) that can each support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) sized force for up to 30 days. These ships require secure sea ports of debarkation (SPODs) in which to offload their supplies which creates a staging area for supplies and an attractive target for the enemy.¹⁵

The future incarnation of the MPF, MPF(Future), plays a substantial role in the capabilities of Seabasing. These ships will be stationed just as the MPSRONs at strategic locations around the globe, but have several advantages to the current incarnation. The MPF(F) will have the capability of at-sea arrival and assembly of troops, direct support of the assault group, indefinite sea-based sustainment of the forces ashore, and at-sea reconstitution and redeployment of a force. MPF(F) doctrine also eliminates the need for secure ports and airfields allowing the JFC to operate in more austere environments with freedom of movement. The ships become floating warehouses, maintenance and repair facilities, and medical treatment facilities for operations afloat or ashore that can be resupplied infinitely.¹⁶ The envisioned make-up of the MPF(F) consists of sixteen ships of seven types consisting of three LHD/LHA-6s aviation ships, one LHD, three large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships of a modified design, three T-AKE dry-cargo carriers, three mobile landing platforms (new design), two smaller T-AKR ships from the existing maritime pre-positioning squadron, and one High-Speed transport for aviation delivery.¹⁷ The Navy is currently in the process of designing the new MPF(F) shipping necessary to deliver the capabilities; such as selective on-load/off-load, automated inventory management systems, skin-to-skin transfer, and heavy lift cranes that will enable the sea base of the future. (See Fig. 2-4)¹⁸




Figure 2: Heavy lift crane transfer




Figure 3: Skin-to-skin transfer




Figure 4: Vertical lift transfer

SEABASING: JOINT INTEGRATED CONCEPT (JIC) VERSION 1.0

The Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), a document from the Department of Defense written in 2005, details all aspects of Seabasing and how it will interact with, complement, and provide joint military capabilities in the near future. The JIC "defines joint Seabasing, explains its relevance to strategic guidance and joint concepts, lays out assumptions and risks, identifies essential capabilities, defines attributes, and provides guidelines of how joint Seabasing can be executed to support national military objectives."¹⁹ It has the purpose of assessing the potential of the Seabasing concept utilizing projected military capabilities in the years 2015-2025 in relationship to the projected national security threats during that same timeframe. "The Seabasing JIC describes how the presence, closure and assembly, employment, sustainment, reconstitution, and re-employment of operational capabilities at sea, through the sea, and from the sea will enhance stability through engagement, assure access to critical regions and expand maneuver options across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) in 2015-2025."²⁰ The recommendations and conclusions of the JIC are intended to serve as a basis for future capability solutions in all realms of the seabasing construct.²¹

Central Idea

Seabasing is a capability that provides flexibility and speed to commanders during early stages of joint operations with any level of land base access. Utilizing maritime superiority and Seabasing elements, the JFC can close, assemble, employ, and sustain a joint force even from an austere environment. Once established, the sea base provides Command and Control capabilities, support functions, reduces the need for shore-based logistics, and restricts enemy intelligence gathering by locating assets at sea. The backbone of Seabasing is the formation of various sea-going platforms, which provide as much capability required depending on the number and type of platforms integrated into a particular sea base. Throughout an operation, Seabasing provides flexible power projection alternatives to the JFC by properly utilizing five primary lines of operation. The lines of operation are; close: a rapid closure of joint force capabilities to an area of crisis; assemble: seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure sea-based assets; employ: flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives supported from the sea base; sustain: persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore, through transition to decisive combat operations ashore; and reconstitution: the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations.²²





Figure 5. Synopsis of the Central Idea²³

Principles of Seabasing

Seabasing provides options to the JFC that can facilitate favorable action during every phase of various types of operations. Seabasing provides the use of the sea as maneuver space and allows the JFC to leverage forward presence and joint interdependence. The assets provide scalable, responsive joint power projection that also provides protection of joint force operations. Utilizing the MPF(F) assets, Seabasing provides sustained joint force operations from the sea, eliminating the requirement of the “iron mountain” (depicted in figures 6 and 7) ashore and freeing land forces for utilization for tactical operations. Maneuver of the sea also provides expanded access options and reduced dependence on land bases. The combination of these factors create an intelligence nightmare for the adversary and create uncertainty as to the Joint forces disposition and movements.²⁴



Figures 6 and 7. "Iron Mountain" of supplies from World War II²⁵

Application of Concept

Utilizing Seabasing, a Joint Force Commander can establish combat capabilities in theater without escalating a situation, prepare and execute forcible entry, and transition to decisive operations. These actions utilizing combined net-centric forces combine to seize the initiative, achieve combat momentum and lead to sustained combat operations anywhere within the Joint Operating Area. These actions will take place utilizing high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors via air and surface platforms that allow for immediate and sustained reinforcement of troops and constant re-supply of logistics. Current iterations of high-speed vessels have proven successful during a variety of assignments, such as "supporting the war on terror, Operation Iraqi Freedom, disaster relief operations in Indonesia and the US gulf coast, and security cooperation in the Western Pacific."²⁶ These experimental vehicles have developed into the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program, which started out as the Navy-Marine Corps High Speed Connector program and the Army Theater Support Vessel program. These two distinct individual service initiatives combined to produce a unified, integrated,

and cost effective solution to a common problem.²⁷ Leveraging these capabilities will allow the JFC to close the gap between immediate response and rapid response forces in order to move as quickly as possible to decisive operations without an operational pause and seize the objective. The sea base can be scaled to sustain the operation through the latter phases, including transition and reconstruction operations. These same concepts can be applied to Major Combat Operations as well as Humanitarian Aid and Counterinsurgency Operations.²⁸




Figure 8 and 9. Joint High Speed Vessel Concept approved for production by Austal USA in Mobile AL.²⁹

Operational Context

Joint Seabasing increases capabilities for the JFC in the areas of Joint Command and Control (C2), the phases of a Major Combat Operation (MCO) and the Seabasing Lines of Operation. Seabasing gives the JFC the ability to conduct C2 operations afloat, en-route, or ashore during any phase of the operation. Maintaining the primary command element afloat reduces risk and capabilities required ashore. The Joint C2 system provided by the sea base is supported by a common net-centric system that is secure and scalable to meet demanding mission requirements.

During the phases of a Major Combat Operation the JFC will have significant increased capabilities through the resources of Joint Seabasing. During the Deter/Engage phase Seabasing provides flexible methods to deter enemy action, conduct selected operations, conduct demonstrations, Flexible Deterrent Operations (FDOs), and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). The Deter/Engage phase is enhanced by the organic elements of the sea base to close and assemble in a rapid manner. Utilizing immediate response forces in the form of forward deployed naval assets in conjunction with MPF(F) assets provides the JFC the means of "seamless integration of joint maritime, air and land capabilities to support power projection."³⁰ During the Seize the Initiative phase, the speed, joint interoperability, and nature of the sea base affords the JFC many options to utilize joint force capabilities to seize the initiative during any campaign. The sea base also provides the JFC platforms to conduct anti-denial operations, freedom of movement with the JAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Information Operations from the sea, which can help shape and prepare the battle space for forcible entry operations. During Decisive Operations, "Seabasing provides a means for the seamless transition to decisive operations by establishing conditions that allow a closing of the gap between initial entry and follow-on forces, transitioning combat power ashore, and withdrawing and repositioning combat power."³¹ As the decisive operations continue, the sea base provides the JFC to sustain forces in the JOA or utilize other entry points as they are established. Seabasing also affords the JFC the ability to command assigned forces from the security of the sea or transition those

capabilities ashore.³² During the Transition phase the JFC has capabilities that allow for joint forces to conclude operations, reconstitute, and re-deploy forces for follow-on missions within or outside the JOA.³³

Joint Seabasing will allow the JFC increased capabilities to close, assemble, employ, sustain, and reconstitute throughout the JOA. Seabasing allows for immediate response, rapid response and sustainment of follow-on forces within any JAO. Any combination of DOD or Coalition forces will be able to utilize the sea base as a staging and deployment platform in-theater. The sea base will provide the capability for at sea arrival, reception, and assembly of arriving joint forces through sea state 4.³⁴ This future capability will utilize new material handling systems, platform interface capabilities for load transfer, and sea state mitigation. The scalability and modularity of the Sea base allows the JFC to build and package lethal and non-lethal combat forces to any size and description and provide rapid inject through high speed movement via air or surface craft. An advanced logistics capability will allow the JFC to provide for initial and sustained movement of forces throughout the JAO. Capabilities to support closure, assembly, sustainment and reconstitution of follow-on forces will be provided by forward deployed and pre-positioned logistics forces. Distribution from the directly to operational forces negates the need for shore-based logistics. The sea base provides organic capabilities that allow for returning forces to utilize logistical and maintenance resources inherent to the sea base to reconstitute and re-deploy forces and equipment within the same or different JOA.³⁵

Implications for National Security

Due to changing international threats and security issues, the US military is being forced to operate in more austere environments where host nation support is limited or not available. The Joint Seabasing concept discussed here provides abilities with great potential to support the successful organization, projection and sustainment of a full range of joint force capabilities in non-permissive environments where host nation cooperation is uncertain or unattainable.³⁶ In July of 2004, Admiral Vern Clark stated that “we need to think about Seabasing in a very joint construct and what it does for the entire military structure, and we need to figure out how to invest properly, focus our investment stream so we maximize that advantage.”³⁷

JOINT VISION 2020

This Joint Vision document predetermines that by 2020 the services will be fully joint and interoperable on all levels of intellect, operation, organization, doctrine, and technology. It also mandates that every means must be taken to have interoperable functions with coalition forces. The predominant focus of the vision is a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance achieved through interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.³⁸

Strategic Context

The security issues of the United States will continue to grow and become more complex as international relationships evolve and new economic relationships build

around the global economy. The joint force of 2020 must be ready to operate with multinational forces, government agencies, and international organizations. The United States must accept that future enemies will be well equipped and technologically advanced. The United States military must utilize all resources, such as leadership, people, doctrine, and training in order to gain the advantage in the future fight. The United States must expect any adversary to understand our strengths and weaknesses and adapt to any new capabilities that are developed. To meet the challenge of asymmetric threats the joint force must utilize all resources to achieve full spectrum dominance.³⁹

Full Spectrum Dominance

Full Spectrum Dominance is the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations utilizing dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.⁴⁰ This suggests that United States "forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains - space, sea, land, air, and information."⁴¹

Dominant Maneuver

Dominant Maneuver is the ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks. Widely dispersed joint land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces, capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of fires as required for either combat or noncombat operations, will secure advantage across the range of military operations through the application of information, deception, engagement, mobility, and counter-mobility capabilities.⁴²

In 1890, Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan wrote that mobile forces can determine a war's outcome through position and that the sea can become a central position if you control the sea lines of communication. Mahan also believed that maritime forces would need to establish a logistics hub near the operation to succeed; the joint sea base provides answers to both of these issues.⁴³ Seabasing provides the JFC with the strategic ability to plan for and respond to operations anywhere in the world in a timely manner through sea-to-objective maneuver.⁴⁴ The sea is a force multiplier, which can be exploited by the JFC to gain the initiative and maintain control throughout an operation. Utilizing the inherent flexibility of the sea base the commander will have the ability to draw components from forward-deployed ATFs, CVBGs, and MPF assets already in theater to comprise the sea base providing a viable tactical arsenal, as well as a "visible" flexible deterrent option.⁴⁵ Seabasing allows the military to move soldiers to a specific mission anywhere quickly and in force. The sea base concept also utilizes inherent mobility to create uncertainty within the enemy, forcing them into a defensive and reactive posture.⁴⁶ Vice Admiral Moore states that "using the sea as maneuver space, afloat forces are capable of presenting an adversary with a mobile and multidimensional threat that overextends his capabilities and generates exploitable gaps and vulnerabilities."⁴⁷

Precision Engagement

Precision Engagement is the ability of joint forces to locate, survey, discern, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations.⁴⁸

Utilizing the sea provides the JFC with the flexibility to close rapidly on a crisis situation utilizing functionalities inherent within the sea base to assemble forces at sea,

gather and disseminate critical information, employ and sustain combat force if necessary. The sea base will have organic combat striking power through its Sea Strike and Sea Shield assets that provide defense, information collection, command and control, and precision attack capabilities.⁴⁹ The Joint Seabase concept is scalable depending on the scenario and flexible enough to build capabilities if a particular crisis escalates or re-distribute them to other JOAs if required.⁵⁰

Focused Logistics

Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations. This will be made possible through a real-time, web-based information system providing total asset visibility as part of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across Services and support agencies. Through transformational innovations to organizations and processes, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions.⁵¹

The functionality of the MPF(F) squadron and increased capabilities of responsive logistics within the joint forces inherent to the sea base provide the capability to supply the right equipment at the right time for most operations. Utilizing automated material-handling systems, selective offload capabilities, improved ship-to-ship transfer systems, and improved Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) through acquisition of air and surface High Speed Sealift.⁵² The logistics capabilities provided to the JFC would be sufficient to deploy one brigade for joint forcible-entry, sustain two brigades operating ashore indefinitely, reconstitute one brigade from ashore for re-deployment within 10-14 days, and also provide maintenance and medical services to both brigades.⁵³ Utilizing the sea as the main logistics hub allows the JFC to mitigate the "iron mountain" ashore and maintain operational speed and increase maneuver within the JOA.

Full Dimensional Protection

Full Dimensional Protection is the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks. Full dimensional protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and information across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.⁵⁴

Defensive capabilities are derived from the integration of complementary joint capabilities, with strike options of every type planned and executed by the JFC. The sea base that is fully integrated will have assets not organic to the maritime environment such as Special Operations Forces and Air Force unmanned combat vehicles at its disposal for defensive or offensive operations. Although there are no hiding places, there is no forward-staging area more secure and sovereign than a sea base.⁵⁵ As a component of the sea base, ForceNet will integrate sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed defensive and offensive structure for the entire JOA.⁵⁶

Joint Command and Control

Joint Command and Control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (Joint Pub 1-01).⁵⁷

Taking stage on the sea base will afford the JFC the ability to utilize ForceNet and every information collection source within the net. Vast amounts of information will pour in from unmanned vehicles on, over, and under the sea as well as human intelligence allowing the JFC to make critical decisions in a timely manner with the most available options. The mobility, sustainment, and initial fire support from the sea base provides for combined arms operations and the ability to facilitate decisive actions.⁵⁸




Figure 6: Overall Depiction of Joint Operating Area utilizing Seabasing providing Full Spectrum Dominance. Conceptualizes Seapower 21 concept while visualizing Dominant Maneuver, Precision Strike, and Logistics pipeline, and Full Dimension Protection.⁵⁹

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Joint Seabasing, as prescribed in the Joint Integrated Concept version 1.0, provides new or improved capabilities toward each of the tenets of *Joint Vision 2020* than are currently available in today's fighting force. In order to provide Full Spectrum Dominance in a JOA as prescribed in *Joint Vision 2020*, the United States must allocate resources to developing the platforms and doctrine necessary to make Joint Seabasing a reality. In order to accomplish this daunting task, Joint Seabasing must have DOD oversight at the highest levels to insure Joint Force Integration according to statutes of Goldwater-Nichols. The United States military services must realize that joint service is here to stay and that cooperation is the key to success in future wars. Joint Seabasing provides a foundation for responsive and adaptive warfighting that will provide each of the services advantages in future operations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff must work together to provide funding, concept development and refinement, command and control development, network development, platform experimentation and development, training and education, and doctrine development and refinement as a team. If the Joint Chiefs are unable to work out the details of this important venture, the Secretary of Defense must intervene and determine the correct course of action for each service. Ongoing single service programs, such as the US Navy's Sea Power 21, must be given the resources to fully develop Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and ForceNet as enablers to Joint Seabasing. Other programs, such as the JHSV program, can be combined from several services to increase effectiveness and efficiency.

In order to accomplish this program of Joint Seabasing, there must be constant and consistent sharing of information, resources, and developmental tasks throughout the process. There must also be research, development, and utilization of off-the-shelf resources in order to find innovative and effective solutions to the many problems that Joint Seabasing presents to the current military structure. This includes reaching out to the nations coalition partners who may have experience in particular aspects of the program, such as littoral operations capabilities.

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