United States Acquisition Command
Abstract
Over the last 20 years there have been numerous reports on how the acquisition process is broken. The Government Accountability Office recently published a report stating that the "total acquisition cost of DoD's 2007 portfolio of major programs under development or in production has grown by nearly $300 billion over initial estimates. Current programs are also experiencing, on average, a 21-month delay in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter." This is a phenomenon that is affecting the entire DoD, not just one particular Service or Agency. The result has been a loss of faith by Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Services' ability to acquire capabilities. The focus has been on fixing the unwieldy cost overruns, schedule slips, and performance deficits. While several solutions have been offered to resolve these problems, they tend to be point solutions that do not truly address the root causes behind the issue. In an analysis of numerous publications, five root causes came to the foreground as contributing to acquisition failures: requirements discipline, funding uncertainty, optimistic assumptions, frequent management rotation, and industrial base issues. The DoD can no longer afford to do business as usual; the way in which systems are acquired must be transformed. By establishing a functional combatant command (FCC) for acquisitions -- United States Acquisition Command -- the acquisition process will finally be revolutionized in a way that gives acquirers the best possible chance for successful programs. This paper proposes a notional organization and processes for such a command. Additionally, it will provide an argument on how this FCC would resolve many of the current acquisition issues.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA510885
Entities
People
- Jennifer M. Krolikowski
Organizations
- Air Command and Staff College