

Control Roaming Dogs

Governance Operations in Future Conflict

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ABSTRACT

Governance operations are integral to all military campaigns where the establishment of local government over ungoverned or disrupted political space is required to secure an intended strategic endstate. Despite the inseparable role of governance throughout war's history, the United States has been reluctant to embrace a military role for establishing civil government. Aversion is rooted in concerns about military involvement in a fundamentally political activity and the military's unwillingness to divert attention from its combat arms. As a result, governance operations have been treated as tangential post-conflict missions, leaving field commanders ill-prepared for governance and delaying consolidation of political aims.

Governance operations are integral to every phase of war, and their relevance to future conflict is increased by the interplay of globalization, transnational threats, and failing states. Military commanders will continue to serve as provincial governors and city mayors in conflict zones. To meet the emergent security challenge of ungoverned space, this paper proposes a more developed concept of operations for governance. It offers a conceptual framework for improving the ability of military forces to deliver basic public services while simultaneously developing an indigenous capacity for good, democratic governance. Governance operations at the local level set the conditions for national-level projects and the ultimate transition to civil authority. Moreover it identifies governance tasks and competencies, including public management and capacity building, which do not wholly reside within the Department of Defense. Therefore, governance operations require blending expanded interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported by improved social intelligence.

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While the security threats of the 20th century arose from powerful states that embarked on aggressive courses, the key dimensions of the 21st century—globalization and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—mean great dangers may arise in and emanate from relatively weak states and ungoverned areas. The United States and its allies and partners must remain vigilant to those states that lack the capacity to govern activity within their borders.¹

Introduction

Governance operations are integral to all military campaigns where the establishment of local government over ungoverned or disrupted political space is required to secure an intended strategic endstate. Despite the inseparable role of governance throughout war's history, the United States has been reluctant to embrace a military role for establishing civil government. Aversion is rooted in concerns about military involvement in a fundamentally political activity, which seems to threaten the principle of civilian control, and the military's unwillingness to divert attention from its combat arms. As a result, governance operations have been treated as tangential post-conflict missions, leaving field commanders ill-prepared for governance tasks and delaying consolidation of a conflict's political aims.²

Reluctance must give way to reality. Governance operations are integral to most phases of war, and their relevance to future conflict is increased by the interplay of globalization, transnational threats, and failing states. Military commanders will continue to serve as provincial governors and city mayors in conflict zones. To meet the evolving security challenge of ungoverned space, a more developed concept of operations for governance is needed to improve the ability of military forces to deliver basic public services while simultaneously developing an indigenous capacity for good, democratic governance.

Governance operations are the activities of military commanders to provide basic public services while developing an effective, participatory local public management capacity in order

to consolidate operational objectives. Governance operations at the local level set the conditions for national-level projects and the ultimate transition to civil authority. Specifically, governance involves a unique set of public management tasks and competencies that do not wholly reside within the Department of Defense; however, they must be conducted in austere, insecure, uncertain environments that demand military forces. Therefore, governance operations require blending expanded interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported by improved social intelligence.

Back to the Future

Throughout the history of warfare, militaries have assumed the powers of a sovereign governing authority. The United States is no exception. The American Army first established a military government in Mexico, 1847-1848, and gained further experience during the reconstruction of the Confederate States following the Civil War and in the Philippines and Cuba after the Spanish American War. But this experience was not institutionalized, and the Army was not ready to govern in the German Rhineland during World War I. According to a seminal 1920 report by Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for Third Army, “The American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”³ It took another twenty years before the Army would have formal doctrine on military government, Field Manual 27-5, *Military Government*, 1940.

During the interwar period, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) assumed the governance mantle as part of small wars in Latin America, including Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.⁴ The hard-learned lessons of the so-called “Banana Wars” made their way into the highly regarded, but rarely read *Small Wars Manual* of 1940. Chapter 13,

Military Government, provides doctrine and techniques for associated tasks while highlighting the reality that governance operations exist across the spectrum of conflict, including cases “where the inhabitants of the country were not characterized as enemies and where war was neither declared nor contemplated.”⁵ Among other influences, the manual reflects tenets of the emergent body of international law governing “belligerent occupation.”⁶

Armed with experience and doctrine, the military remained reluctant to prepare for the inevitable occupations of friendly and enemy territory in World War II. In fact, the historical record shows that President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s view of military government as “strange and abhorrent” was consistent with General Dwight Eisenhower’s desire to turn responsibility over to civilian authorities as soon as possible.⁷ Nonetheless, deliberate planning for governance operations began in earnest in 1942 with the establishment of a Military Government Division on the Army Staff and the opening of the first School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. Planning accelerated in 1943 when President Roosevelt reluctantly shifted responsibility for occupation from the State Department to the War Department. On the European front, theater planning culminated in December 1944 with the publication of a draft *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*. Genuinely successful occupations of Germany and Japan as well as an expansion of the laws for “belligerent occupation” in the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949, seemed to portend a strong future for military governance operations.

The Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods, however, witnessed a shift in focus from wars of occupation to nuclear war, revolutionary war, and peace operations. Officially, Army Civil Affairs (CA) gained responsibility for governance. In reality, training and doctrine withered while CA prepared for the humanitarian assistance role. Training disappeared entirely, while the guidance shrunk to a few paragraphs in Field Manuals and Joint Doctrine.⁸ As a result,

military commanders performed governance tasks on an ad hoc basis during operations in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Operation Iraqi Freedom offers the most recent and compelling case for renewed attention to governance operations. The ability of military commanders to simultaneously combat insurgents and govern communities after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 is more a testament to their flexibility and problem-solving skills than it is to deliberate planning. CA teams prepared to deliver humanitarian relief were instead opening banks, setting up school boards, and clearing out roaming dogs.⁹ Military commanders governed Iraqi provinces and towns for several weeks before the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and later the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) were established. These initial local efforts, however, were not guided by theater-level policy or doctrine, nor linked to an overall concept of governance for Iraq. Special Forces Major Jim Gavrilis, for example, was only guided by Central Command's mission statement during his administration of a Sunni city and the western portion of the Al Anbar province in March and April 2003. Major Gavrilis also argues that his initial successes were ultimately reversed "because no real guidance ever materialized, and there was no CPA representative at that level to take over once he departed."¹⁰ The limited civil-military planning generated false starts, wasted resources, and ultimately delayed the translation of operational victory into strategic success.¹¹

Ungoverned Space

Governance operations are not confined to wars of occupation. They also emerge from ungoverned political space. As described in *United States National Military Strategy*,

The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many states are unstable, and in some cases, unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation.¹²

Tomorrow's threats breed and prosper in the ungoverned space of failing states where terrorists find sanctuary, humanitarian crises grow, and the illegal trade of drugs, guns and humans flourishes. As result, military operations across the spectrum of conflict, including humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, counterinsurgency, and others, will include a governance component. Among many contemporary examples, the on-going Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, established in October 2002, combines intercepting al Qaeda operatives with operations "designed to strengthen the ability of local governments" to improve social conditions and undercut the spreading influence of Islamic extremism.¹³

Across the security landscape, the problem of ungoverned space is growing. A recent World Bank study of governance in 196 countries cautiously asserted "evidence is suggestive of deterioration, at the very least in key dimensions such as control of corruption, rule of law, political stability and government effectiveness."¹⁴ Further analysis from the Institute for National Security Studies, indicates approximately fifty percent of the 196 countries evaluated by the World Bank qualified as weak, very weak, or failed.¹⁵ Not surprisingly, these states are concentrated in the strategic ghettos of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Of the remaining states, a quarter rated as fair, leaving only about twenty percent of the surveyed countries in the categories of excellent and good.¹⁶ Out of 90-plus failing states, "terrorist groups, as well as insurgent and criminal organizations, are located in the remote parts of more than 20 countries."¹⁷ Over the last twenty years, American military deployments have been with few exceptions to "very weak" or "failed" states.¹⁸ It is an unrelenting trend that carries with it a burden of governance.

Trends in governance also provide clues to the characteristics of the future operating environment. The battlespace for governance operations will be turbulent, creating uncertainty

for planners and commanders due to complexity and rapid change. Complexity refers to the number of battlespace features that are relevant to a governance line of operation.¹⁹ Battlespace clutter is increased for governance operations since they most often occur in messy urban terrain with its associated decaying infrastructure, impotent public service capacity, and wide range of stakeholders with varying motivations. The governance battlespace is also dynamic; features change rapidly over time. Given the inherent political character of governance, allegiances shift, resources dry up, and public support oscillates. Moreover, persistent media scrutiny, pressure to deliver services, and high stakes associated with political transitions elevate uncertainty. While uncertainty cannot be eliminated, it can be mitigated with a clear concept of operations.

Concept of Operations

Governance operations provide public management of disrupted political space, enabling other stabilization tasks such as infrastructure recovery, humanitarian relief, and public security. Governance is a distinct type of operation that builds on past and existing doctrinal concepts. From the World War II era, it draws on the military government experience and doctrine of the Army and Marine Corps. From the post-Cold War period, it draws on service and joint civil affairs doctrine for civil administration and post-conflict reconstruction. Future governance operations will entail activities and competencies that deliver short-term results while developing an enduring local capacity. Finally, governance operations set the conditions and facilitate the transfer of local public authority to another agency or local officials—it wins the peace.

Governance is the capacity to deliver essential public services. It encompasses the institutions and rules for the effective allocation of resources in a target community—it is a political decisionmaking process. Public management is the function of governance at the local level and is considered effective when local governments have the “technical, know-how,

capacity, and financial resources to sustain delivery of public services at levels satisfactory to citizens.”²⁰ Governance is participatory, or democratic, when the political process is competitive, civil society is active, and government institutions are transparent and accountable. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), governance is “good” when a government is able to “maintain social peace, guarantee law and order, promote or create conditions necessary for economic growth, and ensure a minimum level of social security.”²¹

Applying the definitions to the military, governance operations are *the activities of military commanders to provide basic public services while developing an effective, participatory local public management capacity in order to consolidate operational objectives.*²²

In ungoverned situations, communities are primarily concerned with execution—the effective short-term delivery of public services. Due to persistent violence and limited access, the military is often the only potent authority until civil capabilities can be brought to bear or built. At the municipal level, commanders are at once the mayor, city council, magistrate, and city manager.

Practical necessity as well as treaties and customary international law require commanders to provide for public order and the general welfare of the population.²³ This said, there is a necessary distinction between governance operations in friendly versus hostile or occupied territory. The former is more likely to occur pursuant to humanitarian or stabilization missions that enjoy the support of the national government(s) involved and/or with international sanction in the case of collapsed states. In these cases, governance operations will seek to restore the legitimate local governing authority. In hostile or occupied territory, governance operations are guided by international law and subject to the authority of the occupying power. Most likely, the military will work to establish local governance, but will not be empowered to determine the final governing authority.

Increasingly, the strategic endstate of the operation goes beyond *effective* governance to include the added expectation for *good, participatory* government. Therefore, military commanders must also be prepared to initiate and support the civic process for constituting accountable institutions, building government capacity, and ensuring broad participation in reconstruction.²⁴ Commanders reestablish the presence of the state while pursuing the demilitarization of local politics.²⁵ On the socio-economic front, commanders restore or oversee the restoration of basic services and revive economic activity. For example, brigade commanders of the 1st Armored Division governed Baghdad suburbs in 2003-2004 while the Division's Governance Support Team implemented a Baghdad Citizen Advisory Council System in cooperation with the CPA.²⁶ Governance operations that focus only on execution at the expense of developmental work risk the campaign's overall objectives.

Governance operations involve execution and developmental activities, which enable and align other stabilization and reconstruction tasks. During execution, the first governance task is to determine and prioritize the needs of the local community. The needs assessment is a structured process that 1) involves a technical assessment of recovery needs, and 2) a provides "a platform for national and international actors to agree on joint principles, define their commitments and prepare their activities."²⁷ Most importantly, it demands direct involvement from the community. Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lopez, USMC, former military governor of Karbala province, Iraq, and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment commanding officer, highlighted this point in July 2003; "I have many groups telling me what all the problems are: crime, security, unemployment, food. What I'm looking for is leaders in the community who can also help me to solve these problems."²⁸

Translating needs into solutions is the job of public management. Public management encompasses all the activities to develop, implement and enforce the administrative laws, regulations, and policies that guide the delivery of services. The first days and weeks are the most critical to avoiding negative ripple effects. Early governance operations are personnel and resource intensive and may require military units to act in unfamiliar roles. Rapid results to build momentum and demonstrate potency require the ability to quickly distribute resources across multiple communities in an area of operations. Moreover, one of the first acts of the military commander should be a public statement that at a minimum clarifies intentions, jurisdiction, applicability of local laws, the role of indigenous institutions, and penalties for violating ordinances.²⁹ Other pressing implied tasks include the preservation of public records, identification of civil administrators, initiation of media relations, and the opening of financial institutions, markets, hospitals and schools. Over the long term, public management includes budgeting and cost analysis, urban planning, civil service management, and public sector quality control. As capacity is built, the military commander increasingly delegates these tasks to other agencies and local officials.

Speed to transition and consolidation of political aims is facilitated by three interrelated developmental imperatives: decentralize, build capacity, and democratize. The commander has a role in setting these in motion and supporting progress, but is unlikely to see the end results. Decentralization is probably the most politically-charged activity because it involves handing over power from the central to local government along political, financial, and administrative lines.³⁰ The process brings government closer to the problems and its constituents, allowing for tailored solutions while holding officials accountable.³¹ It also carries risk. As witnessed in Iraq as part of a program to extend local participation, the Citizen Advisory Council System

empowered local elites, but also generated corruption and conflict over scarce resources.³² Marine Corps military governors were dealing with similar problems before the CPA initiated its governance programs. Within the first two weeks of July 2003, the first post-war Iraqi governors of Karbala and Najaf were ousted for misappropriation of funds and kidnapping.³³ Striking the right balance between a controlled, yet slow process and early success is the greatest challenge. Of course, decentralization is only meaningful if the central government has capacity to transfer. In failing states—Somalia and Haiti—the government is impotent at the federal and local levels.

The long haul of decentralization is complemented by building local capacity and expanding participation. In addition to linking resources with training, capacity is built by expanding revenue-generating authority and engaging local officials and citizen groups in policymaking. The latter buttresses democratization at the local level, which seeks to increase transparency, accountability, and responsiveness by: 1) creating opportunities for citizen participation; 2) establishing a legal basis for local government associations; 3) opening public meetings, records, and information to the media and citizens; 4) strengthening media relations; 5) expanding the net of participation to include women and minorities within a cultural context; and 6) promoting partnerships among local government, civil society, the private sector, and other groups.³⁴ Developing effective, good, participatory local governance enables progress in other stabilization and reconstruction areas. In turn, garbage removal, clean water, and public security strengthen governance; it is a reinforcing cycle the military initiates and sustains.

Preparing for Governance

The governance experience the United States is currently gaining in Iraq and Afghanistan can serve as a foundation for future operations in ungoverned space. Preparing the force requires initiative in three areas. First, governance competencies must be developed in the right

organizations for the right tasks. Second, skills sets must be integrated through improved civil-military planning. Finally, increased emphasis must be placed on social intelligence.

Developing Competencies

Proficiency in governance operations requires the military to update past programs and the civilian sector to adapt existing expertise to a new battlespace. For the military, the way forward begins with recognizing the central role of governance in consolidating objectives. It continues with emphasis on leadership. The commander is sovereign under law and by necessity until transition.³⁵ Former Central Command commander, General Anthony Zinni, clarifies:

On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; on the other hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to build an economy, restructure the infrastructure, and build the political system. And there's some poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with nongovernmental organizations and political wannabes running around, with factions and a culture he doesn't understand.³⁶

In addition to problem-solving skills, commanders need a deep understanding of the local battlespace, insight to working with civilian organizations, and basic public management knowledge. Minimal areas of expertise include those described earlier with emphasis on the exercise of military law, supervision of local officials, collection and expenditure of revenues, and preservation of personal and property rights.³⁷ Know-how should be combined with practice in solving municipal problems as part of professional education and staff training programs. Most importantly, the commander must provide a clear statement of intent to guide street-level decisionmaking and the alignment of other stabilization and reconstruction tasks.

Concentrate all the expertise of governance in the commander is neither desirable nor feasible. Functional responsibility for advising the commander and running governance programs has traditionally belonged to and should remain with CA; however, changes in structure, numbers, and training must be addressed. Regarding structure, ninety-six percent of

Army and one hundred percent of Marine CA personnel are in reserve units.³⁸ One implication of the limited activation period for reservists is the rapid exhaustion of a specialty that is required well beyond its two-year commitment.³⁹ Additional CA active or reserve units should be created to meet the pressing and growing demand.

Governance training should also be revived. Reflecting the peace operations focus of the 1990s, CA training in preparation for Iraqi Freedom focused primarily on humanitarian relief. Training programs are already being adapted; however, it is not clear that they are taking full advantage of the curriculum from the WWII-era School of Military Government, the doctrine and techniques captured in the *Handbook for Military Government* or *Small Wars Manual*, and the lessons of past experience. In addition to general governance training, each CA unit should recruit and develop a core cadre with public management (city/county managers, municipal administrators, public utility managers) expertise. Finally, CA units must participate in service, joint, and interagency exercises.

Over-reliance on CA units can be avoided by leveraging complementary skills among functional specialties that enjoy greater numbers such as engineers, judge advocates, comptrollers and medical personnel. Moreover, the need to significantly expand military CA can be offset in part by developing an expeditionary civilian capacity. Among United States agencies, USAID offers a repository of expertise that can be tailored for governance operations. Specifically, a decade's worth of expertise in the Office for Democracy and Governance (DG) should be matched with the flexibility of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).⁴⁰ Prior to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, DG worked primarily in transitional countries with a secure, receptive programming environment.⁴¹ In addition to relying primarily on private sector contractors with minimal conflict zone experience, DG effectiveness is hindered by a

cumbersome and unresponsive spending authority.⁴² Nonetheless, DG knows governance development and has established relationships with core private sector organizations with in-demand governance skills.⁴³

Enter OTI. This USAID office is specifically chartered to deliver quick results in dynamic situations, including post-conflict reconstruction. In addition to a “culture of risk-taking, political orientation, and swift response,” OTI has a unique budgeting authority that allows immediate spending through rapid, competitive contracting and direct grants to local organizations.⁴⁴ The future for USAID lies in finding the right balance between an organic, expeditionary governance capacity and a pool of readily available contracting expertise that can be integrated with military operations. Even with organizational change, civilian capability in the first days and weeks is likely to be constrained by the security situation. This reality, as well as the mix of civil-military expertise, supports a military emphasis on execution during initial intervention complemented by a civilian focus on development over the long-term.

Civil-military Planning

Integrated civil-military planning is required to link civilian expertise with the military’s capacity for early action in ungoverned space.⁴⁵ Progress is underway at the national level. Within Defense, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations has jurisdiction for governance policy. Within the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established in July 2004 with a broad mandate from the Secretary of State to “manage resources, planning, and development of policy options to respond to failing, failed, and post-conflict states.”⁴⁶ Its meager thirty-member staff includes officials from USAID, the Central Intelligence Agency, Treasury, the Army Corps of Engineers, and Joint Forces Command. Among its ambitions is the ability to “deploy

personnel and resources in an immediate surge response,” suggesting a need to significantly expand its staff.⁴⁷ National-level coordination is essential to coherent policy, clear political objectives, and coordination with a wide range of international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Healthier interagency coordination is an important first step toward improving civil-military planning and execution at the operational level. Next steps include: 1) the deployment of S/CRS teams with governance expertise to regional combatant commands in order to participate in campaign planning; and 2) interagency participation in joint military exercises with a governance component. During execution, experience with Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Governance Support Teams in Iraq validates embedding civilian expertise with CA personnel and military units. When security does not allow embedding, information technology offers a reachback option for CA units to tap subject matter expertise.

Social Intelligence

Pervasive local knowledge, or social intelligence, is a critical enabler for governance. The battlespace is unique for every operation. Social intelligence goes beyond culture to include collection and analysis of socio-economic conditions, political institutions and affiliations, and demographic characteristics. Cultural analysis is gaining prominence; however, most current efforts mistake insight to customs for actionable intelligence. Instead, culture should be operationalized to address the underlying value system enacted as behavioral norms. Not eating with your left hand is a custom; loyalty to one’s family over personal needs is a value.⁴⁸ Political analysis looks at the tradition of local governance as well as the web of relevant stakeholders. A community’s history with local governance, including the degree of decentralization, extent of participation, and existing capacity, are all prerequisites to planning.

An analysis of the individuals and organizations with a stake in the outcome helps commanders navigate the complex social network of relationships that exert influence on the development process and endstate. Demographic and socio-economic analysis addresses the changing composition of the population in relationship to relevant identity-based characteristics (religion, ethnicity, age) and human security concerns (unemployment, healthcare, education). Finally, social intelligence must be scalable from the theater to the neighborhood.

Conclusion

Governance operations reconcile political ends with civil-military means.⁴⁹ The dark dynamics of globalization are eroding state sovereignty and expanding the terrain of ungoverned space. The United States military is obliged to forge a capability for governance in order to consolidate political aims across the emergent security landscape. To this end, a concept of governance operations is offered that focuses on delivering basic public services and building local capacity in anticipation of transition to a civil administration. Preparing the force begins with the commander and continues by reviving and updating governance expertise in Civil Affairs and creating a complementary civilian expeditionary capacity. Most importantly, the new mix of competencies must be integrated through coherent, street-smart civil-military campaign planning.

¹ United States, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1 March 2005), 1.

² Nadia Schadlow, the first to articulate the concept of “governance operations,” argues in “War and the Art of Governance,” *Parameters*, Autumn 2003, 85, “governance operations are the operational link needed to consolidate a state’s final political aims in war.”

³ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in The Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: United States Army Center for Military History, 1990), 3.

⁴ For a history of US military involvement in these small wars, see Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), and Ivan Musicant, *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990).

⁵ United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual 1940* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 2004), Chapter 13, Section 1, 1.

⁶ The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention, 18 October 1907, requires the occupying power to “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, eds., *The Laws of War* (New York: Random House, 1994), 232.

⁷ Schadow, 88. For the most complete compilation of World War II primary sources on military government, see Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, eds., *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1964).

⁸ Army Field Manual 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 14 February 2000, has two pages on “civil administration.” Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, 20 February 2003, and Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine on Civil-Military Operations*, 8 February 2001, offer only a few paragraphs each. For an excellent history of occupation-related doctrine, see Wally Z. Walters, “The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany may Inform Operations Against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,” US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 9 April 2002, available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/walters.pdf> as of 20 November 2004.

⁹ William Booth, “Ad-libbing Iraq’s Infrastructure,” *Washington Post*, 21 May 2003, A01.

¹⁰ Personal Interview, Washington, DC, 11 February 2005.

¹¹ For an accounting of the interagency planning process for Iraqi Freedom, see James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” *Atlantic Monthly*, January/February 2004. Interview with Edwin F. Connerley, Democracy Officer, Julie Werbel, Senior Democracy Fellow, and Pat A. Fn-Piere, Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, Washington, DC, 14 October 2004.

¹² *The National Defense Strategy*, 3.

¹³ Powell, 54.

¹⁴ Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 20 June 2003), 32. The trend was reconfirmed by Kaufmann in “Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World,” *Global Competitiveness Report 2004/2005* (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2004), 84; “Revisiting the long-term trend evidence...we find that, overall, this stagnating trend does not appear to have been reversed over the past year.” In addition to these four dimensions of governance, states were also evaluated in the areas of “voice and accountability” and “regularity quality.”

¹⁵ Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, *Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority*, Occasional Paper 57 (USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, September 2004), 55

¹⁶ Shultz, 55.

¹⁷ Shultz, 8.

¹⁸ Shultz, 58.

¹⁹ Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the joint force in time and space in relation to the adversary.

²⁰ USAID, “Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance Programming Handbook,” Technical Publication Series, Center for Democracy and Governance, Washington, DC, May 2000, 12.

²¹ USAID, “Decentralization,” 12.

²² Major Gavrilis introduces a related idea he terms “operational follow-through,” and says “that it is critical for military commanders to be able to transition rapidly from combat operations to civil administration. The speed and depth of operational follow-through on the part of the military in most cases will exponentially increase the success of civilian stability and reconstruction efforts later.” Personal Interview, Washington, DC, 11 February 2005.

²³ Joint Pub 3-57, I-19.

²⁴ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), “Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” Washington, DC, January 2003, 13.

²⁵ Major Gavrilis suggests that “we have to help show them the details of democracy” at the local levels. In his view, “it may be the military commander that is in the best position to do so, and in many cases the military commander may be the only one to do so.” Linda Robinson, “Ready or Not,” *U.S. News and World Report*, 14 February 2005.

²⁶ According to Scott Callwell, 1st Armored Division Civil-Military Affairs Officer, the Divisions’ Governance Support Team worked with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to establish 88 neighborhood

and 9 district advisory councils for the city of Baghdad. Personal interview, 25 October 2004, Arlington, VA. See also, CPA, *The Baghdad Citizen Advisory Council Handbook*, 3rd Edition, 7 November 2003.

²⁷ Uwe Kievelitz, Thomas Schaef, Manuela Leonhardt, Herwig Hahn, and Sonja Vorwerk, "Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations," Joint United Nations Development Group, United Nations Development Program and World Bank Guide, available at: <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/PoliciesandToolsPost-ConflictNeedsAssessmentPracticalGuidetoMultilateralNeedsAssessmentsinPost-ConflictSituations> as of 24 November 2004.

²⁸ Benjamin R. Kibbe, "Political freedom flourishes in Iraq," 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, available at <http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/0/2c1bda5d39c42ee685256d6f00529fb6?OpenDocument> as of 10 November 2004.

²⁹ These minimum requirements are outlined in the *Small Wars Manual*, 13-9, and echoed in the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944, 145.

³⁰ The political dimension involves the transfer of political authority to the local level through the establishment or reestablishment of elected local government, electoral reform, political party reform, authorization of participatory processes, and other reforms. The financial dimension refers to the shifting of financial power to the local level. It involves increasing or reducing conditions on the inter-governmental transfer of resources and giving jurisdictions greater authority to generate their own revenue. The administrative involves the full or partial transfer of an array of functional responsibilities to the local level, such as health care service, the operation of schools, the management of service personnel, the building and maintenance of roads, and garbage collection. USAID, "Decentralization," 7.

³¹ USAID, "Decentralization," 5.

³² According to Major Scott Callwell, corruption was a persistent problem at the neighborhood level where he primarily worked, leading commanders to dismiss many officials in consultation with the Coalition Provisional Authority. To fight against it, the *Citizen Advisory Council Handbook* outlines specific prohibitions as well as penalties, 18. Personal Interview, Arlington, VA, 25 Oct 2004.

³³ "Picked Governor of Karbala Resigns," *New York Times*, 8 July 2003.

³⁴ USAID, "Decentralization," 36-39.

³⁵ Per the *Small Wars Manual*, "Military government may be said to be exercised by the military commander, under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress. The President cannot, of course, personally administer all the details, so he is regarded as having delegated to the commander of the occupying forces the requisite authority. Such commander may legally do whatever the President might do if he were personally present," 13-5.

³⁶ General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Retired), remarks at the US Naval Institute and Marine Corps Association, 4 September 2003, available at <http://www.usni.org/Seminars/Forum/03/forum03zinni.htm> as of 20 November 2004.

³⁷ *Small Wars Manual*, 13-8, 13-13.

³⁸ Marine units include the 3rd Civil Affairs Group (CAG) at Camp Pendleton, California, under Marine Forces Pacific and the 4th CAG aboard Naval Station Anacostia in Washington, D.C., under Marine Forces Atlantic. The only active duty Army unit is the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) with six companies. There are four reserve CA commands, seven reserve CA brigades, and 24 reserve CA battalions.

³⁹ In Iraq, this has proven less problematic for the Army than the Marines. With only two sixty-plus person units, the 3rd and the 4th CAGs had served a full two-year activation period by 2003. See After Action Report by Lieutenant Colonel O.R. Lovejoy, MAFORPAC G-3, 31 October 2003.

⁴⁰ Both DG and OTI are both offices in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance.

⁴¹ "USAID implements democracy and governance activities in nearly 80 country and regional programs that help nations develop and consolidate effective, authoritative, and legitimate democratic governance. The highest funding allocations have recently been directed to Serbia, Indonesia, Egypt, Gaza and the West Bank, Ukraine, Russia, Haiti, Nigeria, and Armenia." USAID Congressional Budget Justification 2004, Program Highlights, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/highlights.html> as of 23 November 2004.

⁴² Interview with Edwin F. Connerley, Democracy Officer, Julie Werbel, Senior Democracy Fellow, and Pat A. Fn-Piere, Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, Washington, DC, 14 October 2004. Interview with K. Scott Hubli, Senior Advisor for Governance Programs, and Jim Delia-Giacoma, Senior Advisor for Citizen Participation, National Democratic Institute, Washington, DC, 18 August 2004.

⁴³ Existing and potential partners include the National Democratic Institute, Research Triangle Institute, Chemonics, Management Systems International, and the International City/County Management Association. For example, the International City/County Management Association sent 9 staff members to Iraq, June 2003-March 2004, to provide training, technical assistance, and policy analysis in the areas of city management, public administration, utilities management, public finance, and others. Phone interview with Carol Bartle, Program Manager, 23 September 2004.

⁴⁴ USAID, About OTI, available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/index.html as of 26 November 2004. Budget authority: "For necessary expenses for international disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance pursuant to section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, \$50,000,000, to remain available until expended, to support transition to democracy and to long-term development of countries in crisis: Provided, That such support may include assistance to develop, strengthen, or preserve democratic institutions and processes, revitalize basic infrastructure, and foster the peaceful resolution of conflict: Provided further, That the United States Agency for International Development shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations at least 5 days prior to beginning a new program of assistance."

⁴⁵ Appendix A includes a list of eight core propositions that should guide all civil-military planning for governance operations.

⁴⁶ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, US Department of State (S/CRS), Slide Show Presented at Joint CSIS-Woodrow Wilson Center Event, 20 October 2004, Washington, DC, Slide #6.

⁴⁷ S/CRS, Slide #8.

⁴⁸ Margaret K. Nydell, *Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Westerners* (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1987), 17.

⁴⁹ This core idea is applied to all stabilization and reconstruction tasks, but is particularly relevant to governance. For further discussion, see Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2004), 19.

APPENDIX: Core Propositions

The following immutable propositions, derived from lessons learned over the last century, should guide civil-military planning for governance operations:

- 1) Clear, consistent policy guidance is the handmaiden of governance—effective coordination requires a coherent endstate and clear commander’s intent;
- 2) Unity of purpose must not be violated, and it is achieved through clear command channels—centralize policy, decentralize execution;
- 3) Governance operations are not a distinct post-conflict phase—plan as a concurrent operation during all phases of a conflict;
- 4) It is an indirect approach—govern through what exists to the extent possible by retaining political subdivisions, legitimate local laws, and non-criminal officials;
- 5) Enduring, sustainable effects must be balanced against short-term gains to demonstrate potency and mitigate conflict or severe deprivation—act with precision quickly and balance restraint with overmatching power;¹
- 6) MOOTW principles (objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) are not sufficient—incorporate the following:
 - *Participation* through clearly defined direct or indirect means;
 - Clear legal frameworks and procedures for the *fair allocation* of resources;
 - *Transparent* procedures and decisions to gain legitimacy, undermine disinformation, and create climate of accountability; and
 - *Responsiveness* to public needs, including rapid initial success to gain support;
- 7) Effective governance achieves congruence, or fit, among other lines of operations—integrate the elements of power, reconcile divergent interests, and align competencies with requirements; and
- 8) The goal of transition to a civil public authority is achieved in stages—establish interim conditions with realistic measures of effectiveness to guide decisionmaking and minimize disruption at transition.

Abiding by these propositions facilitates the integration civil-military competencies in the field and links distributed actions at the local level with a theater-level concept of the political endstate.

¹ Adopted from a draft working paper of the Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command, “Stability Operations: Joint Operating Concept,” Version 1.03, 5 March 2004.

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