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Military Review

2 Turkey and an Army Forward

*Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Warren, U.S. Army Europe, and
Major Michael Morrissey, U.S. Army Europe*

As part of a joint force positioned in central Europe, forward-deployed U.S. Army forces are needed to provide a responsive, flexible deterrent. USAREUR meets the criteria.

11 Operation Airborne Dragon, Northern Iraq

*Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Warren, U.S. Army Europe, and
Major Keith Barclay, U.S. Army Europe*

On 7 April 2003, Task Force 1-63 landed M1A1 tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and a battalion command post with satellite communications at Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq. Much of the Iraqi military capitulated 3 days later.

15 Transforming USAREUR for a Strategy of Preemption

Brian J. Dunn, Ph.D., Research Analyst, Michigan Legislative Service Bureau, Lansing

U.S. Army Europe is not optimally configured to conduct rapid decisive operations to support the U.S. strategy of preemption. The Army needs lighter, more strategically mobile troops in Europe. Dunn proposes a new array of forces for USAREUR that would include the XVII Airborne Corps.

21 Insurgent Groups in Chechnya

Colonel Sergey A. Kulikov, Russia Federation, and Robert R. Love, Translator

Kulikov, a former Russian Special Forces commander, describes the audacity of Chechen insurgents engaging in raids, ambushes, hostage taking, and terrorism in the Russian Federation. By studying insurgents' ploys, a counterinsurgency force can learn how to protect itself while taking the battle to the enemy.

31 Kosovo: Present and Future

Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH

A more democratic civil society is evolving in Kosovo even as it struggles with its socialist past. Major problems to overcome include the economy, privatization of industries, relations among Kosovar Albanians and minority groups, and health care. Over all hangs the continuing uncertainty of whether it will become an independent nation or remain a province of Serbia.

41 Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Kolenda, U.S. Army

Drawing on 19 years of service to the Nation, Kolenda sets forth 10 principles for excellence in leadership. Ranging from the practical to the profound, the principles will help all leaders leave a legacy of excellence in the hearts and minds of soldiers.

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50 Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives

Phillip S. Meilinger, Ph.D., McLean, Virginia

Air-ground cooperation, the interaction of air and ground forces to ensure the synchronization, coordination, and integration of air operations with the joint commander's campaign plan, has been a persistent concern among the services, which need to identify the sources of trouble and highlight instances where coordination has improved joint operations.

59 The Army Vision: The 4th AD in World War II

Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D., Fort Knox, Kentucky

The U.S. Army's 4th Armored Division had remarkable success during World War II. Cameron concludes that the Division embodied many of the qualities the Army is hoping to instill through Transformation, as Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki outlined in 1999.

60 The Army Vision: Excerpts

General Eric K. Shinseki, former Army Chief of Staff

69 America's Army: Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign and Domestic

Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U.S. Army, Retired

While the Army continues Transformation, it must still defend against foreign threats. Doing so calls for new combinations of quick, expeditionary and enduring response.

Review Essays

78 Another Such Victory

Major Michael E. Long, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired, New Port Richey, Florida

While President Harry S. Truman has often been touted as someone to emulate, Arnold A. Offner sees Truman's downside, including the fact that his sheltered vice presidency handicapped him in assuming the role of President.

79 The Wound and the Dream


Major Jeffrey C. Alfier, U.S. Air Force, Retired, Ramstein, Germany

The Wound and the Dream is a meticulous, compelling anthology of poetry that underscores the fascination that the antifascist cause of the Spanish Civil war has long held for American poets.

80 Book Reviews *contemporary readings for the professional*


85 2003 Index

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Turkey and an Army Forward

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Warren

U.S. Army Europe

Major Michael Morrissey

U.S. Army Europe

We are at this moment fighting the first wars of the 21st century. [W]e learned on September 11, 2001, that our Nation is vulnerable to enemies who hide in the caves and shadows and strike in unexpected ways.

— Donald H. Rumsfeld¹

AS PART OF A joint force positioned in central Europe, forward-deployed U.S. Army forces are needed to provide a responsive, flexible deterrent. In “Toward a Future Army,” former U.S. Army Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege explains that a substantial joint and combined force must be able to respond to crises.² The strategic environment demands a forward-deployed, versatile, joint land force. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) meets that criteria with its forward staging bases, sophisticated training areas, comprehensive logistics infrastructure, efficient deployment operations, and versatile units.

The Strategic Environment

While a world dominated by two world powers allowed a measure of certainty and security, a multipolar environment causes uncertainty and complexity. In “Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia,”

Max G. Manwaring says, “Contemporary conflict is not only political but multinational, multiorganizational, multidimensional, and multicultural.”³

Threats to the United States and its allies have proliferated rather than diminished. Terrorist groups, transnational organizations, and regional powers pursue actions that threaten Western culture and interests. Religious, cultural, and ethnic differences continue to fester. In the past decade, as globalization has spread, international pressure and economic necessity have been the cause of numerous U.S. interventions around the world.

The 17 September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* outlines the challenges that were emerging from rogue states and terrorists at that time. Such threats will continue to seek ways to attack where the United States is weakest.⁴ An asymmetric construct is difficult to prepare for and even tougher to predict, so U.S. Armed Forces must be responsive, flexible, and versatile. President George W. Bush has clearly demonstrated that the United States will not withdraw behind its borders. As the strategic environment changes, USAREUR forces that are forward deployed in central Europe are adapting to meet the challenges.

The 1st ID in USAREUR

Since August 1952, USAREUR forces have been on point for the Nation. Recent operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly reveal the value of forward-deployed U.S. forces. Operations in Iraq, Israel, Turkey, the Balkans, and elsewhere, as well as ongoing force-protection missions in the central region, have been resounding successes.

The 1st Infantry Division (ID) is composed of seven brigades and four battalions forward-deployed in Germany as part of USAREUR. The 1st Brigade is stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. Because the 1st Brigade is committed to other war plans, it has not been available to support recent USAREUR contingencies, such as operations in Kosovo.

Established in June 1999, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a NATO-led international force. KFOR is responsible for enforcing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, "On the Situation Relating to Kosovo," by establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo.⁵ In May 2002, the 1st ID's 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) began a 6-month tour of duty in Kosovo. Simultaneously, the 3d BCT prepared to replace the 2d BCT with transfer of authority (TOA) set for November 2002. (See figure 1.)

Although KFOR 4B was a smaller force because of ongoing restructuring, the 1st ID still had over 2,000 soldiers who would deploy in support of Operation Joint Guard. Although KFOR 4B comprised less than 20 percent of the division, it included key division staff personnel needed to round out the Multinational Brigade-East headquarters.

The TOA was a deliberate operation and the 1st ID's main effort. By November, one brigade was deployed, and the other was just beginning reintegration training that would include personnel and

equipment recovery, gunnery, and a combat maneuver training center rotation, all designed to reestablish the 2d BCT's combat readiness.

Meanwhile, V Corps, the 1st ID's higher headquarters, received orders to deploy in support of

Threats to the United States and its allies have proliferated rather than diminished. Terrorist groups, transnational organizations, and regional powers pursue actions that threaten Western culture and interests. . . . An asymmetric construct is difficult to prepare for and even tougher to predict, so U.S. forces must be responsive, flexible, and versatile.

Operation Enduring Freedom. Because the 1st ID was split between the Balkans and the central region, it would not deploy with its parent headquarters. As the division set out to conduct split operations and to supervise the 2d BCT's retraining, it had no idea what loomed ahead.

The mission. Late in October 2002, the 1st ID received a verbal warning order from USAREUR that it would support Operation Enduring Freedom by deploying to Turkey. Initially, the 1st ID's mission was to become the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC mission eventually evolved into the 1st ID becoming a U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) headquarters.

Although initially murky, the mission ultimately became clear; it would set the conditions for the rapid reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the 4th ID in order to open a second front against the Iraqi regime. The 4th ID, known as Task Force (TF) Ironhorse, was a massive organization of 35,000 soldiers; 14,000 tracked and




Figure 1. First Infantry Division pre-operational task organization.

wheeled vehicles; and aircraft. The northern front afforded U.S. Central Command an operational double envelopment and was guaranteed to shorten the war.

After verbally receiving the ARFOR-T (Turkey) mission, the 1st ID staff conducted an estimate of the situation and an in-depth study of Turkey. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (also known as Kemal

Initially, the 1st ID's mission was to become the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC mission eventually evolved into the 1st ID becoming an ARFOR headquarters [responsible for setting] the conditions for the rapid reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of the 4th ID in order to open a second front against the Iraqi regime.

Ataturk) created Turkey from remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey joined the UN in 1945 and became a member of NATO in 1952.⁶ Given Turkey's friendly relationship with the West, it was believed it would support U.S. desires to establish a line of communication (LOC) extending from the Iskenderun sea port of debarkation through Turkey into northern Iraq.

Despite friendly relations with the West, the threat level in Turkey was high because it was home to many groups hostile to the United States or against a war in Iraq. One group, the Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Party/Front, had links to a suicide bombing in Ankara on 20 May 2003.⁷ Other groups, such as the Kurdistan Worker's Party, the Turkish Hizbullah, and transnational groups like the Iraqi Intelligence Service, were also active in Turkey. Also, Al-Qaeda was thought to be monitoring Western activities in the region.

On 6 November 2002, the 1st ID published a warning order for this enormous mission, which normally would have been given to a corps-size headquarters.⁸ An ARFOR headquarters' role is drastically more diverse and expansive than a division is resourced for. Such a mission extends beyond the tactical level of war into the operational realm.

The staff's first task was to identify the ARFOR headquarters' mission. Using Field Manual (FM) 3-91, *Division Operations*, and Joint Publication (JP) 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*, the 1st ID staff identified how the division headquarters would have to reorganize into an ARFOR headquarters.⁹ Already fractured because of the 2d Brigade's supporting mission in Kosovo, the 1st ID

found this to be no easy task; however, once the staff determined the headquarters' organization, they began filling critical shortages internally from subordinate commands. The next step was to build the team and begin training.

Preparation. From 12 to 15 November 2002, the 1st ID exercised its new headquarters organization and configuration in a command post exercise (CPX) as part of the "crawl" stage of the mission. The learning curve was high as the staff wrestled with operational tasks such as movement and maneuver; combat service support and logistics; and force protection. The staff then aggressively addressed each lesson learned. During the first week of December, the ARFOR-T team hosted an ARFOR/joint seminar led by Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Team D, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which focused on the operational level of war.

With the team built and leaders educated, ARFOR-T conducted a second CPX immediately following the seminar. The CPX served as the "walk" stage of the mission and addressed lessons from the first exercise and applied lessons learned from BCTP Team D. Again, the learning curve was steep, but the staff set out to fix the shortfalls.

Simultaneous with the training, the staff continued its enormous planning effort while struggling with the uncertainty of the mission. In mid-December, to facilitate coordination and a synchronized plan, the 1st ID sent key leaders to Fort Hood, Texas, to participate in the 4th ID's deployment and warfighter exercises. By late December, the ARFOR-T task organization was complete. (See figure 2.)

Ambiguity, stemming directly from the inability to confirm or deny numerous assumptions made during ARFOR-T planning, continued. The assumptions included host-nation (HN) security, LOC conditions, medical support, use of U.S. military rotary-wing aircraft, and HN intentions across the border into northern Iraq. Although its units were geographically dispersed throughout Germany, ARFOR-T managed to gather the team for key military decisionmaking planning events and published its operation plan (OPLAN) by 16 December 2002.

Throughout the Christmas holiday, 18 key ARFOR-T staff members were on 24-hour recall to be deployed to Turkey as part of a site-coordination team (reconnaissance). Alerted and then stood down several times, the team endured a roller-coaster ride because of Turkey's bureaucracy, an indicator of things to come.

During the first week of January, ARFOR-T con-




Figure 2. ARFOR-T task organization.

ACE – airspace control element
 ARFOR – Army forces
 ASB – aviation support battalion
 CA – civil affairs
 CSC – combat support company
 FEST – foreign emergency support team
 FET – field effect transistor
 HR – human relations

HSC – headquarters and support company
 LTF – logistics task force
 MC – medical corps
 MMC – materiel management center
 MDM – mobile depot maintenance
 MP – military police
 MSB – main support battalion

NMCB – naval mobile construction battalion
 P – personnel
 ROC – rear operation commander
 SES – staff engineer section
 SG – signal group
 SOCCE – special operations command and control element

ducted a liaison officer's (LNO's) academy taught by local subject matter experts to ensure that the LNOs were properly trained before going to locations such as Coalition Forces Land Component Command, European Command (EUCOM), USAREUR, and Turkey. On 12 January, the site survey team finally received approval to deploy for what was only supposed to be 2 weeks. For some team members, such as the 1st ID G3 and the Division Support Command commander, 2 weeks stretched to 3 months. Because the team consisted primarily of ARFOR-T key leaders and staff, this further burdened an already overtaxed headquarters.

On 16 January 2003, the ARFOR-T staff briefed the OPLAN to its major subordinate commands (MSCs), including all units external to the 1st ID. ARFOR-T then conducted "command pit" training, which resulted in command post (CP) procedures and reporting to train ARFOR-T personnel on operational battle-tracking. The USAREUR campaign plan was published on 30 January 2003. Fortunately, ARFOR and USAREUR planning staffs were in constant contact, conducting parallel planning

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throughout the entire process, which resulted in only minor changes to the ARFOR plan. Unfortunately, the EUCOM OPLAN was not published until 10 February, by which time ARFOR-T was already in execution.

While its equipment from all over Germany and the United States was being railed and loaded on ships destined for Turkey, ARFOR-T conducted a rehearsal of concept (ROC) for all key players. Although challenging to execute given its scope, the ROC was successful; however, because its CP equipment was not available, ARFOR-T could not conduct a third CPX as initially intended. However,

leaders conducted an ARFOR-T leader's seminar to address key topics such as Turkish culture and rules of engagement. ARFOR-T also conducted pre-deployment processing to ensure deploying personnel had critical items such as wills, powers of attorney, and required immunizations.

The ARFOR-T site coordination team took the lead from EUCOM and evolved into a country team

Personnel deployment began in an expeditionary fashion to establish initial-entry capability with 2,200 ARFOR-T site-preparation soldiers. According to the plan, site-preparation soldiers would only be on the ground for up to 7 days before the main body deployed. The main body never arrived. . . . The site-preparation soldiers had to provide their own security. Even battalion commanders and primary staff pulled guard duty.

that coordinated directly with the Turks. The team developed a comprehensive memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the governments of Turkey and the United States. In addition, the team began the leasing process to acquire facilities and space to support seaport, airport, and convoy operations across a 500-mile highway in southeast Turkey to the border with Iraq. Officers and noncommissioned officers, who were comfortable with tactical-level operations but had never been trained on MOU negotiations or real estate acquisition, oversaw this coordination. Although Turkey was a NATO ally, its mire of bureaucracy hindered the site coordination team and slowed operations.

Road to Execution

In mid-February, political rhetoric and strategic pressure increased the likelihood of an intervention in Iraq. UNSCR 1441, "On the Return of Weapons Inspectors to Iraq," directed Iraq to provide an accurate accounting of any weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰ The U.S. and Great Britain deemed Iraq's account unacceptable. War seemed inevitable, and pressure for deployment into Turkey was at the boiling point.

Although the plan called for deployment based on the necessary conditions being set in Turkey, such as a signal architecture and command and control (C2) nodes, strategic pressure won out. Personnel deployment began in an expeditionary fashion to establish initial-entry capability with 2,200 ARFOR-T site-preparation soldiers. According to the plan, site-

preparation soldiers would only be on the ground for up to 7 days before the main body deployed. The main body never arrived.

Living conditions, austere at best, included leased warehouses not designed as living quarters or office space. As with any expeditionary operation, conditions improved through the staggering efforts of U.S. soldiers and civilians. Concurrent to opening the LOC, the small contingent of ARFOR-T soldiers continued to improve living conditions and provide force protection. Because the main body never arrived, the site-preparation soldiers had to provide their own security. Even battalion commanders and primary staff pulled guard duty.

Conceptually, movement across southeastern Turkey was from west to east along an LOC that included 5 different ports of debarkation, 3 convoy support centers, 4 rest stops, 32 checkpoints, and 6 traffic control points along highway E90 to enhance convoy visibility and safety. The entire trip is just less than 700 kilometers (km) and took heavy-equipment transports (HET) over 30 hours of driving time to complete (based on an average of 24-km per hour).

Daily, the ARFOR-T headquarters struggled with the Turkish military for approval of seemingly basic requests such as unrestricted movement of C2, MEDEVAC, maintenance, safety, security, personnel, equipment, and supplies along highway E90. Headquarters had to make significant efforts to gain Turkish understanding and approval of the U.S. plan to pass a mechanized ground force through Turkey. For example, the ARFOR-T commanding general met with the Turkish general staff and Turkish corps commanders to brief them on the concept of operation. Although Turkish military leaders gained an appreciation for and even apparently supported the ARFOR-T plan, their political arm stymied them.

Despite sluggish political activity, ARFOR-T aggressively continued to set conditions for the 4th ID. The force constructed a division tactical assembly area (TAA) north of the Iraqi border near Silopi, Dicle, and Cizre. The TAA was to include an ammunition upload point to support up to 2,000 containers of ammunition and a "fuel bag farm" for two million gallons of diesel.

ARFOR-T personnel negotiated contracts to improve the rail line in southeast Turkey, and as with all ARFOR-T operations, a rehearsal was conducted with ARFOR-T equipment to proof the rail and to ensure it was adequate for the 4th ID. Six ships of ARFOR-T equipment were downloaded at the port of Iskenderun, and 1,200 vehicles, trailers, and containers were moved.



1st ID soldiers in Kirkuk, September 2003.

Despite Turkey's denial of access, ARFOR-T was still responsible for a strategic deception that fixed up to 13 Iraqi divisions in northern Iraq, reducing enemy strength for the V Corps fight. ... In addition, the 1st ID deployed TF 1-63 into northern Iraq and prepared the backup Central Region Immediate Reaction Force and the Southern Region Immediate Reaction Force.

The division conducted rehearsals for every facet of the operation, including a HET movement with the 701st MSB. ARFOR-T prepared to receive the 4th ID by stockpiling enormous amounts of fuel, water, and food. The ARFOR-T plan called for substantial maintenance and recovery capabilities along the entire distance of the approach march to ensure the rapid movement of TF Ironhorse. Finally, subordinate ARFOR-T elements negotiated commercial contracts to support the movement of military equipment.

From the beginning, ARFOR-T set and maintained rigorous force-protection standards that required continuous coordination with the Turkish Jandarma, a paramilitary organization under the control of the minister of interior that was responsible for security in rural areas. In addition, the ARFOR-T forward surgical team, which came from USAREUR, and E/701st MSB, the 1st ID's medical company, set up operations at every ARFOR-T node. They were to support the 4th ID's approach march and the expected combat in northern Iraq. All preparations were accomplished in the face of significant HN bureaucracy that, coming from a NATO ally, perplexed and frustrated

ARFOR-T soldiers and leaders.

During this frenzied activity, the balance of the 14,000 ARFOR-T and 35,000 4th ID troops were in Germany, and the United States awaited approval from Turkey to allow ground troops into the country. ARFOR-T soon discovered that the Turkish government was politically indecisive, as the November 2002 elections and subsequent votes by the Turkish Parliament proved. Turkey was reluctant to support a U.S. attack because Turkey was still in the midst of an economic crisis dating from 2001. Turkey still had unofficial trade ties with Iraq, and it still had its own aspirations for northern Iraq. Also, over 90 percent of Turkey's population openly opposed the war.

On 1 March 2003, the Turkish Parliament initially voted to approve movement of the 4th ID through the country, but within hours the decision was overturned. Weeks passed and the Parliament finally agreed to allow overflight rights only. Eventually, Turkish leaders signaled that approval for a ground force would never come.

Approximately 3 weeks later, the 4th ID received orders to deploy through Kuwait. Still, ARFOR-T persevered and continued to portray a U.S. presence



Major General John Batiste (right) with Major General Walter Pudlowski of the 28th Infantry Division, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, July 2003.

Both General Burwell B. Bell, USAREUR commander, and Major General John Batiste, ARFOR-T commander, used the directed telescope approach to drive operations. They focused on events they deemed critical and emphasized MEDEVAC operations and force protection.

in southeastern Turkey. ARFOR-T's positioning afforded the EUCOM commander flexibility to deal with uncertainty.

Right up until redeployment from Turkey, ARFOR-T planned several potential contingencies. For example, within a 24-hour period, the ARFOR-T staff planned the RSOI of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit; ground support of the 173d Brigade deployed to the Bashur airfield in northern Iraq; and consolidation of internal ARFOR-T assets to conduct a demonstration in northern Iraq.

The ARFOR-T mission alone would be taxing to any division headquarters. However, the 1st ID was not simply responsible for ARFOR-T, it also had its 3d BCT and part of its staff in Kosovo enforcing UNSCR 1244. Further demonstrating the deployability and versatility of USAREUR forces, the 1st ID was also the force provider for the EUCOM/Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR), Immediate Ready Task Force (IRTF) that deployed into northern Iraq as part of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

Task Force 1-63 deployed by air in March as part of the largest airborne armored operation in history and provided much needed mechanized forces in northern Iraq. After TF 1-63 deployed, the 1st ID provided the backup IRTF. On deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade into northern Iraq, the 1st ID also provided the southern region force—a battalion-size task force. Finally, the 1st ID commander, through the rear detachment commander, conducted rear detachment operations, which included the critical mission of force protection across two area support groups (ASGs) (the 98th ASG and the 100th ASG), including six military kasernes.

Keys to Success

Despite Turkey's denial of access, ARFOR-T was still responsible for a strategic deception that fixed up to 13 Iraqi divisions in northern Iraq, reducing enemy strength for the V Corps fight in and around Baghdad. In addition, the 1st ID deployed TF 1-63 into northern Iraq and prepared the backup Central Region Immediate Reaction Force and the Southern Region Immediate Reaction Force. All of this was executed without loss of life or serious injury. Several common threads were key to the successful execution of these missions.

Battle command. According to FM 3-0, *Operations*, and FM 6-0, *Command and Control*, battle command has three components: visualize, describe, and direct.¹¹ While planning ARFOR-T operations in Turkey, the commanding general developed the commander's intent early. The intent included elements of operational design, such as the center of gravity, the end state, and nonlinear operations. In addition, the commanding general specified key tasks required to accomplish the mission. In the OPLAN, he clearly designated decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. He directed the organization through orders, battle update briefs, and by his presence or personal involvement with subordinate commanders.

Since the days of Napoleon, commanders have used what is called the "directed telescope" approach to monitor and ensure operations are executed in accordance with the commander's intent.¹² Both General Burwell B. Bell, USAREUR commander, and Major General John Batiste, ARFOR-T commander, used the directed telescope approach to drive operations. They focused on events they deemed critical and emphasized MEDEVAC operations and force protection. Finally, the 1st ID was able to accomplish its myriad mis-



A soldier from Task Force 1-63 provides security during a raid in Kirkuk, 12 June 2003.

Task Force 1-63 deployed by air in March as part of the largest airborne armored operation in history and provided much needed mechanized forces in northern Iraq. After TF 1-63 deployed, the 1st ID provided the backup IRTF. On deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade into northern Iraq, the 1st ID also provided the southern region force—a battalion-size task force.

sions because the ARFOR-T commander and his staff—

- ▣ Empowered and resourced competent, capable leaders.
- ▣ Established and enforced clear C2.
- ▣ Ensured that systems were in place to track the commander's critical information requirements.
- ▣ Ensured that information-sharing among the staff and subordinate commands was seamless.

Anticipatory planning. Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Preparation*, describes anticipatory planning involving aggressive parallel planning as being absolutely essential in seizing the initiative.¹³ To stay ahead in the uncertain environment of operational planning in support of U.S. Central Command's operations, planners at EUCOM, USAREUR, and ARFOR-T communicated several times a day. Success also required the ARFOR-T commanding general and chief of staff to anticipate events, provide guidance to their staffs, and act decisively when required.

Centralized planning and decentralized execution. Despite the fluid environment that surrounded the planning of ARFOR-T operations and the frustration resulting from Turkish bureaucracy, ARFOR-T operations were focused. Planning was centralized with the command group involved in the entire planning process, including the ARFOR-T wargame that extended over 3 days.

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, describes span of control as the number of subordinate units under a single commander.¹⁴ Although span of control is situation-dependent, commanders can effectively command two to five subordinate units. As the ARFOR-T commander, the 1st ID commanding general commanded 13 units in Turkey, not counting the responsibilities in TF 1-63, the IRTF, the secure reserve force, and the central region force. Because the ARFOR-T commander decentralized operations and empowered his subordinates, he was able to command and control this broad organization.

Information-sharing. To facilitate common understanding and situational awareness, ARFOR-T planners distributed daily planning notes highlighting plans status; the day's significant events; the commander's decisions; the staff's suspenses and

Conceptually, movement across southeastern Turkey was from west to east along an LOC that included 5 different ports of debarkation, 3 convoy support centers, 4 rest stops, 32 checkpoints, and 6 traffic control points along highway E90 to enhance convoy visibility and safety. The entire trip is just less than 700 km and took HETs over 30 hours of driving time to complete.

requirements; and a time line. The planner's notes were sent out on a recurring basis to further information-sharing across MSCs. The staff also hosted weekly working groups such as force protection and planning. Attendees for the working groups included planning representatives from all the staff sections and MSCs. Simultaneously, the staff tracked current operations from the division main command pit each day. Finally, through all stages of the deployment, ARFOR-T maintained a website for information-sharing. Each staff section was authorized an information-management officer with permission to post to the website and to grant permission to other users. All sections were then able to post their information.

Poised and Ready

Trying to look into the future is always problematic. However, as the U.S. Army Vision outlines, "The spectrum of likely operations describes a need

for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. The Army will be responsive and dominant at every point on that spectrum. We will provide to the Nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively."¹⁵

Given the future environment, an agile, adaptive forward-deployed Army presence is imperative. Wass de Czege says, "Time is always a critical commodity at all levels of war, and the enemy is more likely to quit sooner than later if he is also faced with a strong, credible ground close combat threat."¹⁶ U.S. Army forces in Europe provide an overwhelming deterrent to any potential threat to the United States and its allies by providing tremendous capability and flexibility.

As globalization and economics draw the world closer together, the expectation for U.S. intervention to confront threats will increase. To meet and defeat the wide range of threats to Western security, U.S. military presence, forward deployed in Europe, will answer the call, as USAREUR and the 1st ID did in Germany, Kosovo, Turkey, and northern Iraq.

In 2002, Bush stated that the "struggle against global terrorism is different than any war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time."¹⁷ The 1st ID, as part of the USAREUR forward-deployed joint team continues to be poised and ready to meet that challenge. **MR**

NOTES

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3. Max G. Marwaring, "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia," *Parameters* (Winter 1998): 2.

4. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 17 September 2002). See also on-line at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>, accessed on 20 May 2003. The threat is even more volatile when combined with longstanding ethnic and religious divisions. For a detailed essay on this subject, see Michael T. Klare, "Waging Postindustrial Warfare on the Global Battlefield," *Current History* (December 2001): 436.

5. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, "On the Situation Relating to Kosovo," on-line at <www1.umn.edu/humanrts/resolutions/sc99.html>. For more information about the Kosovo Force, see on-line at <www.nato.int/kfor/about.htm>, accessed on 20 May 2003.

6. Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Kemal Atatürk), commander of the Ottoman Empire's 19th Division, defeated the British at Gallipoli in 1915. For more information, see on-line at <www.firstworldwar.com/bio/kemal.htm>. See also "Turkey," *The World Factbook*, on-line at <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tu.html#intr>.

7. Suzan Fraser, "Turkish Café Bombing Kills One," *The Associated Press*, 21

May 2003.

8. The 10th Mountain Division was the ARFOR headquarters in Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. However, the scope of ARFOR-T exceeded previous historical examples in geographical scope and sheer troop strength.

9. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-91, *Division Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 October 2002); U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication (JP) 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 26 February 1993).

10. UNSCR 1441, "On the Return of Weapons Inspectors to Iraq," on-line at <www.1.al-bab.com/arab/docs/iraq/uns1441.htm>. See also <www.un.org/search/>, accessed on 18 May 2003.

11. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 1993); FM 6-0 *Command and Control* (Washington, DC: GPO, DRAG version, February 2002).

12. For a detailed description of "directed telescope," see Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 272.

13. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Preparation* (Washington, DC: GPO, 31 May 1997).

14. FM 3-0, *Operations*.

15. U.S. Army Vision, see on-line at <www.army.mil/vision/index.html>, accessed on 20 May 2003.

16. Wass de Czege.

17. *National Security Strategy*.

Operation Airborne Dragon, Northern Iraq

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U.S. Army Europe

BAYONET 6, this is Dragon 6. I can be rolling to Irbil in 4 hours with tanks and Bradleys. Over.” Lieutenant Colonel Ken Riddle, Commander, 1st Battalion, 63d Armor and Task Force (TF) 1-63 initiated this radio transmission from the Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq to his newly assigned parent unit, the 173d Airborne Regiment on 7 April 2003. The communication marked the beginning of the first expeditionary insertion of a U.S. armored force into combat by air.

Task Force 1-63’s lead elements: an M1A1 tank, an M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, an M113 armored personnel carrier, mortars, and a battalion command post (CP) equipped with satellite communications arrived at Bashur Airfield to support the opening of the northern front in Iraq. With them came scouts, military police (MPs), and a combat service support platoon.

Task Force 1-63’s armor systems were nearly impervious to Iraqi weapons systems. Therefore, it was no surprise that shortly after TF 1-63’s arrival in the Iraqi Theater of operations, enemy divisions in northern Iraq began to disintegrate. Much of the Iraqi military capitulated in the north by 10 April 2003. Following the Iraqi regime’s rapid collapse, TF 1-63 and the remainder of the 173d Airborne Regiment were attached to the 4th Infantry Division (ID) and rapidly transitioned to stability operations near Kirkuk.

This historic, successful airborne insertion is a tribute to the soldiers of TF 1-63 and to U.S. Army Europe’s (USAREUR’s) ability to rapidly organize, deploy, and sustain this force. USAREUR’s strategic forward positioning in Germany was an essential factor in furthering this achievement.

Anticipatory planning and preparation and a forward-based and trained IRTF force located in the mature European theater were the keys to success. [Accomplishing] this operation from an immature theater or from a base in the continental U.S. is unlikely. Doing so would have involved dedicating an inordinate amount of strategic lift and attendant support assets for an indefinite period.

The Airborne Insertion

Task Force 1-63’s successful expeditionary mission began in early September 2002, when USAREUR ordered the 1st ID’s 3d Brigade to provide forces to serve as the NATO-led Kosovo Forces’ Multinational Brigade (East) during rotation 4B. As the brigade prepared to participate in the Kosovo 4B rotation, 1st Battalion, 63d Armor, nicknamed the “Dragon Battalion,” one of 3d Brigade’s organic battalions, remained in Europe to assume the brigade’s rear detachment mission.

In late September 2002, it became clear that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a near certainty, and the 1st Armored Division (AD), the European central region immediate ready task force’s (IRTF’s) designated unit at that time, was assigned to participate in the Iraqi operation. Therefore, the Army ordered TF 1-63 to backfill the 1st AD in the IRTF mission beginning in January 2003. In November and December 2002, TF 1-63 conducted rigorous training to validate its readiness to assume the mission and equipment stocks from the 1st AD.

CENTCOM knew that opening a northern front in Iraq would hasten the Iraqi regime's rapid collapse, protect critical Iraqi oil fields, and protect the Kurdish population from atrocities. [However], because the government of Turkey denied coalition forces permission to move by ground through their country, a credible force could not move by ground into northern Iraq.

Even with TF 1-63's aggressive training plan, the odds seemed to be strongly against TF 1-63's employment anywhere, let alone in Iraq. With its IRTF train-up complete in late January 2003, TF 1-63 shifted its focus to helping the 1st AD rapidly qualify

its M1A1 tank and Bradley crews before they deployed to Iraq. In March 2003, TF 1-63 was completely engaged in training a sister division for combat; then the situation began to change.

Opening the Northern Front

U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) knew that opening a northern front in Iraq would hasten the Iraqi regime's rapid collapse, protect critical Iraqi oil fields, and protect the Kurdish population from atrocities. CENTCOM examined its options. The conventional wisdom was that the enemy's divisions would not capitulate until a credible threat presented itself on a second front in the north. However, the coalition force land component commander (CFLCC) had a problem. Because the government of Turkey denied coalition forces permission to move by ground through their country, a

Operation Airborne Dragon—Time Lines

04 MAR 03 – Turkish parliament fails to achieve a majority vote for allowing U.S. ground forces to transit through Turkey into northern Iraq.

04 MAR 03 – A conference to finalize the force structure and the 173d Airborne Regiment's employment is scheduled in Qatar. The employment concept includes two airborne battalions and the immediate ready task force (IRTF) (-) heavy ready company (HRC), medium ready company (MRC), tactical command and control (C2) force enhancement module (FEM), and the combat service support (CSS) FEM conducting a combination airborne and air-land operation in northern Iraq. The apportioned air sorties to support this operation limit the size of the force considered feasible for initial employment.

11 MAR 03 – Employment is likely as a result of the recent conference in Qatar and the lack of a favorable decision in Turkey. The coalition force land component commander (CFLCC) has submitted a request for forces (including the forces identified in this contingency plan [CONPLAN]) to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and expects approval of the request within 72 hours.

17 MAR 03 – Deployment Order (DEPORD) 195, including all the forces listed in the task organization, is currently with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for approval; an order is expected within the next 24 to 48 hours that will place these

forces at their respective air port of embarkation (APOE) not later than (NLT) 24 MAR 03.

21 MAR 03 – Turkey authorizes overflight of its airspace, but denies the U.S. the use of ground lines of communication through Turkey to open the northern front in Iraq.

28 MAR 03 – The offense into Iraq from the south by CFLCC forces slows down. Iraqi 10th and 11th Divisions did not capitulate as had been predicted.

06 APR 03 – The JCS approve European Command (EUCOM) DEPORD 195, including all forces listed in the task organization, for deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although the exact date for deployment is not set, the estimated arrival date (EAD) for task force (TF) 1-63 is currently 21 April, and the latest arrival date (LAD) is 27 April. These dates were verified with the combined forces special operations component commander's (CFSOCC's) planners as of 61200Z APR 03. The provisional headquarters (HQs) 201/FSB [forward support battalion] (-) has already deployed to northern Iraq and has been detached to the 173d Airborne Regiment. The remainder of this unit will deploy with TF 1-63 from Ramstein Air Base.

7 APR 03 – Lead elements of TF 1-63 land at the Bashur Airfield in Northern Iraq.

10 APR 03 – Much of the Iraqi force capitulates in northern Iraq.

credible force could not move by ground into northern Iraq.

Airborne units solved part of this problem. The 173d Airborne Regiment, part of the European Command's (EUCOM's) Strategic Ready Force, could deploy within 96 hours and was ready to support CENTCOM operations. Employing the 173d Airborne Regiment allowed the combatant CENTCOM to open the northern front. While this solved the problem of entry into the northern theater, it did not sufficiently address the Iraqi armored threat in the north.

Traditionally, the United States has inserted armored forces into a theater by sea or on the ground. With Turkey unavailable, the only other ground entrance to Iraq was through Kuwait, which the 3d ID was still working to open. Another alternative was to attempt to insert an armored force by air. This unique force would need to be tailored with the necessary combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements. CENTCOM looked to EUCOM, the supporting command.

Within EUCOM, USAREUR's forward-based troops provided a ready-made solution. In particular, the IRTF consisted of a heavy tank team and an M113 mechanized infantry team with engineers, scouts, MP, command and control, and CSS assets, ready to deploy with 96 hours notice. The task force was well suited to conduct an expeditionary insertion to support the 173d Airborne Regiment's parachute infantry forces.

In early March, USAREUR and the 1st ID issued a detailed warning order to TF 1-63 with the concept of the operation during early contingency planning. The concept of the operation read: "The focus of this order is to address a contingency to accomplish the purpose of the CFLCC CENTCOM mission to provide a credible force in northern Iraq. To that end, a force capable of providing an offensive mounted tactical assault capability is necessary. In this branch plan, 1 ID (M) [mechanized], provides the IRTF (-) to augment the ground combat power of the 173d Airborne Regiment (-). The IRTF [1-63] will be detached to 173d Airborne Regiment/CFSOCC [combined forces special operations component commander] in Central Region upon alert and deploys from the DPC [deployment processing center, located at Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany] under the control of the 173d Airborne Regiment. In addition, a Forward Support Battalion (FSB) [the 201st FSB (-)] will be attached to 173d Airborne Regiment/CFSOCC in Central Region upon alert, and deploy with the 173d Airborne Regiment from Aviano, Italy."¹

Concurrent with planning at all levels of command, TF 1-63 prepared for alert and employment under

The MMC, which also had communications links to all of the division's warehouses, processed supply requests, transported the supplies, palletized materiel for shipment, and handed the pallets over to the 21st Theater Support Command. . . . Through May 2003, approximately 150 C-17 sorties and 30 C-130 sorties flew into the Iraqi theater.

the following orders: "1 ID (M) MISSION. On order, 1 ID (M) prepares, assists in planning for the employment of, and deploys TF 1-63 and 201 FSB (-) in support of CENTCOM land operations in northern Iraq to support operation plan (OPLAN) 1003V.

"1 ID (M) Commander's Intent. I intend to support the CFSOCC and CENTCOM purpose to

IRTF Final Task Organization

TF 1-63 (IRTF)(-) (Attached to 173d Airborne Regiment on deployment)

B/2-2 IN (-) MRC

1/B/2-2 IN (M113)

3/B/2-2 IN (M113)

TM C/1-63 AR (-) HRC

2/B/2-2 IN (M2)

3/C/1-63 AR (M1)

HHC/1-63 AR (-)

TACTICAL C2 FEM

²SCT/1-63 AR (SCT FEM)

²3/554 MP CO (-) (MP FEM)

³MTR/ 1-63 AR (DEPORD 195 one section each as part of HRC and MRC)

CSS FEM (Maintenance & Support Slice) (-) (DS)

¹Provisional BN/201 FSB (-) (Attached to 173d Airborne Regiment on deployment)

¹DET/HHC/201 FSB

CSS FEM (Maintenance & Support Slice) (-) (DS to TF 1-63 AR)

⁴FSC/173 ABN BDE (DS to 173d Airborne Brigade)

⁴MMT/200 MMC

1. Authority to deploy these forces is under combat service support (CSS) force enhancement module (FEM) in Deployment Order (DEPORD) 195.

2. Authority to deploy is part of command and control (C2) FEM on DEPORD 195 (BPT [be prepared to] DEPLOY).

3. One section each is part of heavy ready company (HRC) and medium ready company (MRC) for DEPORD 195.

4. Organic or assigned to the 173d Airborne Regiment, not part of 1st ID.

provide a credible ground combat threat in northern Iraq. Unified command and control of the deploying forces in the Central Region is decisive to the success of this operation. The following conditions must be met to accomplish this operation: safe deployment, flawless air-load planning, link-up of equipment and personnel at the DPC and with the 173d Airborne Regiment, integration of the provisional 201 FSB (-) into the 173d Airborne Regiment deployment and sustainment plan, and the detachment of a combat ready IRTF (-) and Provisional 201 FSB (-). End state for this operation is the successful integration of the IRTF (-) forces and Provisional 201 FSB (-) under 173d Airborne Regiment command and control.”²

Although the situation changed and evolved over a 30-day period, the original mission and intent remained consistent; it was exactly what USA-REUR had envisioned and resourced the IRTF to accomplish.

Expeditionary Logistics

The U.S. Army is experienced with resupplying a light force by air, but EUCOM and CENTCOM planners had two limitations to overcome before Operation Airborne Dragon could commence: How could they sustain an armored force that would require up to 10,000 gallons of fuel per day? And, how could they provide resupply of bulky repair parts that are difficult to transport into a theater where there is austere logistical support?

USAREUR helped EUCOM and CENTCOM planners overcome these two logistical challenges. The contracted use of commercial carriers from across Europe—and from Turkey in particular—solved the problem of fueling the force. USAREUR and the U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE), both familiar with the region, negotiated line-hauled fuel from Turkish companies into northern Iraq. Special Operations Command coordinated for Kurdish factions inside Iraq to secure the commercial fuel movements into northern Iraq.

The solution for providing repair parts was ingeniously simple. EUCOM and CENTCOM planners took advantage of USAREUR combat divisions’ being based near the Ramstein Air Base aerial port of embarkation (APOE), only 8 hours flying time away from northern Iraq. Therefore, a plan fell into place that called for USAFE to routinely fly TF 1-63’s sustainment stocks, located in their German-based motor pool, into northern Iraq using theater air assets. This lessened dependence on the use of strategic air frames.

Expeditionary Movement

As deployment began, USAFE transported the task force into the area of operations in 30 C-17 sorties. The initial 23 sorties brought in the main combat forces led by the heavier combat vehicles. The final seven brought in CS assets and supplies. Thereafter, daily sustainment sorties arrived from Ramstein.

This operation demonstrated exceptional flexibility in support planning and execution within the divisional structure. To ensure the task force’s timely resupply, the 1st ID established direct links via telephonic and secure and nonsecure Internet protocol routing communications between the 201 FSB (-) forward in Iraq and the 1st ID’s materiel management center (MMC) in Germany.

The MMC, which also had communications links to all of the division’s warehouses, processed supply requests, transported the supplies, palletized materiel for shipment, and handed the pallets over to the 21st Theater Support Command at the Ramstein APOE for air movement to Iraq on tactical sustainment flights. Personnel manned cells at the MMC and the warehouses 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. Through May 2003, approximately 150 C-17 sorties and 30 C-130 sorties flew into the Iraqi theater of operations from Germany to keep TF 1-63 fit to fight.

The process for supplying nonmission-capable parts also illustrates the system’s responsiveness. After receiving a nonmission-capable parts request, the MMC usually had the required parts at the Ramstein APOE within 2 hours—ready for shipment on the next flight. Adding the 201 FSB (-) was important. The FSB solved the complex logistics issues attendant to not having ground lines of communication to resupply heavy forces. The FSB kept the 173d Airborne Regiment and TF 1-63 well supplied and maintained, routinely maintaining a 90 percent operational ready rate.

Anticipatory planning and preparation and a forward-based and trained IRTF force located in the mature European theater were the keys to success during this operation. That the United States could have accomplished this operation from an immature theater or from a base in the continental U.S. is unlikely. Doing so would have involved dedicating an inordinate amount of strategic lift and attendant support assets for an indefinite period, which might have adversely affected the air campaign and the ground scheme of maneuver in Iraq significantly. USAREUR’s rapidly deployable armored forces shortened Operation Iraqi Freedom and saved lives. **MR**

NOTES

1. USAREUR and 1st Infantry Division Warning Order (Airborne Dragon), Concept of Operation.
2. *Ibid.*

Transforming USAREUR for a Strategy of Preemption

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UNITED STATES Army Europe (USAREUR) is not optimally configured to carry out its missions in the 21st century. The developing concept of rapid, decisive operations (RDO) to support the U.S. strategy of preemption requires USAREUR to be far different from the truncated version of V Corps that came into being after the Cold War era ended.

Federal budget deficits raise the question: can the United States afford to pay the cost of transforming the Army to defeat tomorrow's enemies and also maintain the Army's aging but still powerful current force to fight today's foes? The answer might be that the United States has no other choice. Ultimately, the Army must prepare for today *and* tomorrow.¹ The Army cannot afford to ignore the present or the future; to do so is to run the unacceptable risk of being unable to defeat enemies decisively in brief campaigns with low casualties. The Nation needs V Corps. Failure to transform USAREUR into a power-projection force risks the existence of the command and its two divisions.

Does Europe Need V Corps?

America's strong European allies can fend for themselves on the ground, if necessary, given the current security environment.² Why keep a heavy corps in Germany when the Red Army will not be marching west?³ After all, we deemed VII Corps unnecessary to defend Europe after the Persian Gulf war. And, after the Warsaw Pact collapsed, instead of returning to Germany or redeploying to the continental United States (CONUS), VII Corps was disbanded. Many Europeans are reluctant to support

Why keep a heavy corps in Germany when the Red Army will not be marching west? . . . If we do not need V Corps in Germany or in Asia, do we need its two divisions at all? . . . Reducing personnel costs is the easiest way to pay for Transformation and the war against terrorism without hollowing out the current force.

U.S. military missions. (The Germans in particular expressed this reluctance during their September 2002 elections.) This pressure might lead America to "reduce, redeploy, or even withdraw totally" V Corps and the rest of the Army in Europe.⁴

Because the Cold War has all but evaporated, does a secure Europe need V Corps? If not, should we deploy V Corps to Asia? Greater naval and air assets, not two surplus heavy divisions, seem better suited to address Asian security concerns. So, if we do not need V Corps in Germany or in Asia, do we need its two divisions at all?

Eliminating V Corps is a tempting course of action. Reducing personnel costs is the easiest way to pay for Transformation and the war against terrorism without hollowing out the current force.⁵ Transformation envisions precision munitions linked to networks and reductions in Navy aircraft carriers, Air Force wings, and Army divisions.⁶ Since Operation Allied Force in 1999 and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, the Army has come under pressure to downsize because precision firepower is seen as the way forward.

The Army failed to dispatch Task Force (TF) Hawk to Albania in a timely manner during Operation Allied Force and relied on the U.S. Special Operations Command to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan. Even the 3d Infantry Division's spectacular, rapid drive to Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom failed to impress observers with the

Even the 3d Infantry Division's spectacular, rapid drive to Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom failed to impress observers with the power of U.S. Army heavy forces. Too many still view the conventional Army unfavorably and question its relevance. With USAREUR taking the point, the Army must defend its conventional role in RDO and preemption.

power of U.S. Army heavy forces. Too many still view the conventional Army unfavorably and question its relevance.⁷

With USAREUR taking the point, the Army must defend its conventional role in RDO and preemption.⁸ Before the events of 11 September 2001, the Army recognized the value of European forces for power projection.⁹ European forces reduce mobility requirements and costs, warfighting risks, and the time required to deploy to trouble spots in Europe and Southwest Asia.

The war in Afghanistan and its surrounding states extended USAREUR's range of deployment eastward. A new interest in defending West African oil resources extends USAREUR's range of deployment southward along Africa's Atlantic coast. In July 2002, the deputy commander in chief of the U.S. Army European Command (EUCOM) visited Sao Tome and Principe, reportedly to discuss establishing a U.S. naval base there.¹⁰ The two new areas added to USAREUR's range of deployment should increase USAREUR's value.

Unfortunately, Department of Defense officials, who ranked the value of U.S. military forces in Europe, rated the heavy V Corps last in terms of power projection. Army combat forces were deemed less important than Air Force aircraft and personnel, prepositioned equipment, and air bases (the most important).¹¹ The Corps' fate depends on a reshuffling of the deck in response to policies set forth in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.¹² With the need to deploy the Army farther within EUCOM and to the Central Command, V Corps might never rank better than last.

The Right Army for Europe

The real question is, how best can USAREUR contribute to peacetime engagements and warfighting missions? Configured with two heavy divisions, V Corps is designed—as V corps was during the Cold War—to fend off another war in Europe. With the Cold War over, the Army is hard-pressed to provide convincing reasons for V Corps' presence in Germany. (See figure 1.) Flimsy reasons are worse than none and make Army leaders look tradition-bound. The truth is the Army needs lighter, more strategically mobile troops in Europe.

V Corps should be based in CONUS where its heavy forces can more easily move between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The XVIII Airborne Corps should move to Germany to be closer to potential theaters more suitable for lighter forces. A Europe-based XVIII Airborne Corps could assume command of the 1st Infantry Division while returning the 1st Armored Division to CONUS for V Corps and deploying the 101st Airborne Division to Europe.

The XVIII Airborne Corps' 3d Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (reconstituted as a combat regiment) should become part of the CONUS-based V Corps, providing a heavy corps for another counterattack force. The remainder of XVIII Airborne Corps should stay in CONUS. The 82d Airborne Division could rotate a force through Italy to replace the Southern European Task Force's 173d Airborne Brigade, which would also come home.

The 10th Mountain Division would provide another source of infantry for European-theater missions. In time, Stryker brigades could replace

Cold War European Alignment

V Corps (USAREUR)
 1st Armored Division
 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)
XVIII Airborne Corps (CONUS)
 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
 82d Airborne Division
 10th Mountain Division
 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)
 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light)
 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Figure 1.

Information adapted from the Association of the United States Army, *Army 2000-01 Green Book* (October 2000): 223-24, 230.



V Corps should be based in CONUS where its heavy forces can more easily move between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The XVIII Airborne Corps should move to Germany. . . . Basing a large portion of XVIII Airborne Corps and strategically and tactically mobile Stryker brigades in Europe would reduce the distance the corps and the brigades would have to travel to reach crisis spots, saving priceless time.

two of the 1st Infantry Division's heavy brigades. The division's third brigade in CONUS would remain a heavy force, retaining its equipment in Germany. (See figure 2.)

The XVIII Airborne Corps in Europe

Dispatching the XVIII Airborne Corps to Europe and recalling V Corps would benefit the entire Army and strengthen the force for the missions it might carry out in the future.¹³

Preserving warfighting. Deploying anything less than a corps in Europe would create a force with no capacity for decisive, sustained action, and such a force would be correctly perceived as nothing more than a token force. A heavy armor capability (from the 1st Infantry Division) to bolster the corps' light mechanized force and light infantry would be necessary.

Because the power of heavy armor to awe enemies will not soon diminish, the Army should not abandon the capability to hit hard. Pre-positioned materiel for the heavy brigade should suffice as a hedge against a resurgent ground threat to European security. Basing V Corps in CONUS provides another heavy corps uncommitted to any theater, thus enhancing the ability to respond to two major theater wars (MTWs). With III Corps and V Corps

available for the heavy punch, responding to and deterring a second MTW would be easier.

Enhancing presence. A U.S. commitment to Europe in corps strength is still necessary despite the reduced threat level in Europe. The option to withdraw U.S. troops should simply not be part of the debate. A free, friendly, prosperous Europe is vitally

Strategy of Preemption Alignment

XVIII Airborne Corps (USAREUR)

1st Infantry Division (Germany)
101st Airborne Division (Germany)
82d Airborne Division (CONUS)
10th Mountain Division (CONUS)
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (CONUS)

V Corps (CONUS)

1st Armored Division (CONUS)
3d Infantry Division (CONUS)
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (CONUS)

Figure 2.

Information adapted from the Association of the United States Army, *Army 2000-01 Green Book* (October 2000): 223-24, 230.



Elements of the 1st Infantry Division providing security in Kirkuk, Iraq, 18 April 2003.

Deploying anything less than a corps in Europe would create a force with no capacity for decisive, sustained action, and such a force would be correctly perceived as nothing more than a token force. A heavy armor capability (from the 1st Infantry Division) to bolster the corps' light mechanized force and light infantry would be necessary. . . . The U.S. needs a corps in Europe to preserve security by building relationships through military-to-military engagement.

important to America. The contrasting lessons of abandoning Europe after World War I and defending it after World War II argue for continued engagement. That a second world war occurred after the U.S. withdrew from Europe early in the last century speaks volumes.

A robust USAREUR prevents a security vacuum. The European Union could modify or alter trans-Atlantic relations in ways that are not clear today. If the Army withdraws the corps, the Army is unlikely to send the corps back, and even if a clear threat arises, many in America and in Europe would argue that such a move would be "provocative." That USAREUR must remain in Germany is not written in stone, although this might be difficult to grasp after a half century of defending NATO's front line at the Fulda Gap.


Newer NATO states might be eager to host the XVIII Airborne Corps. Given growing German restlessness, moving the bulk of U.S. ground forces out of Germany is not out of the question. The U.S. was concerned enough about German anti-American rhetoric during the September 2002 German elections to move command and control functions and bombers out of Germany to minimize the chance that the U.S. might be hamstrung in a crisis if the German government carried out a "political stunt."¹⁴ Germany's desire to repair relations after the election shows that the U.S. can strengthen trans-Atlantic relations.¹⁵ Removing an irritant to the Ger-

mans without removing U.S. troops from Europe is a possible solution.

Providing engagement. The U.S. needs a corps in Europe to preserve security by building relationships through military-to-military engagement. Heavy forces are somewhat threatening in these missions because they are capable of sustained offensive combat operations. Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles are scary for anyone who remembers what occurred during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Deploying the XVIII Airborne Corps' light infantry elements for exercises in the newly independent states in Russia's "near abroad" would be less threatening, would help build relationships with the new states, and would blunt Russian arguments against U.S. influence.

Stryker brigades and the corps' 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), which is scheduled to become a Stryker brigade, could deploy wheeled vehicles on Europe's road network more easily than could tracked units. Exercises in the NATO states near Russia would reassure these states that they are no less deserving of protection than nations admitted to NATO earlier. The exercises might help dispel the notion that two tiers of NATO countries exist and that only the older tier is important.

Light units would also rebut Russian arguments that portray NATO as a threat to Russia and would help Russia embrace a firmer friendship with the West. Having another uncommitted heavy corps in



USAREUR could be called into action anywhere within a vast area throughout Atlantic Command and adjacent Central Command.

Figure 3.

CONUS might reassure U.S. allies around the globe that they will not be left to fend for themselves if the second MTW occurs on their terrain.

Increasing relevance for real-world missions.

For better or worse, the Balkans will continue to be a concern for USAREUR. Stability operations are a basic mission the Army must undertake even as the Army prepares for diverse warfighting missions. The XVIII Airborne Corps' large infantry component makes the corps more suitable for the long-term challenge of policing the Balkans alongside U.S. allies. The 101st Airborne Division has the resources to successfully conduct a TF Eagle-type deployment as part of a joint response to a small-scale threat.

USAREUR needs a rapid reaction force to bolster Balkans-based forces should they face hostilities. The Army is reducing the number of U.S. troops in the Balkans, but a sudden resurgence of hostility is always possible. A Stryker brigade could be the lead element in a rescue role, providing good firepower and mobility with reasonable protection for the threat level.¹⁶ Other corps light infantry forces could be more easily transported into and within the

theater. Heavy armor is simply not needed in large numbers for European stability operations.

Enabling power projection. American bases in Europe already provide a stepping-stone for CONUS-based forces to use to deploy to trouble spots from Angola to central Asia. The strategy of preemption places a premium on rapidly moving a decisive force to overseas theaters. Technology has made the world smaller, but distance is not irrelevant. The Objective Force's goals are to deploy a brigade in 4 days, a division in 5 days, and 5 divisions in 30 days. Deploying from CONUS, the XVIII Airborne Corps has a long way to travel in a short time to meet the Objective Force's deployment goals. Being closer would be of great value in meeting these time lines and objectives.

The vast region from West Africa through North Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, to Central Asia is a large area of potential crises—and some actual ones—as when, in September 2002, U.S. forces deployed from Germany to Africa's Ivory Coast where a mutiny threatened U.S. citizens' safety. The following four situations require U.S. forces to be able to move in RDO:

Department of Defense officials, who ranked the value of U.S. military forces in Europe, rated the heavy V Corps last in terms of power projection. Army combat forces were deemed less important than Air Force aircraft and personnel [by the DOD], pre-positioned equipment, and air bases (the most important). . . . The truth is the Army needs lighter, more strategically mobile troops in Europe.

□ Ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq against terrorists and regime remnants.

□ Possible preemptive wars against states with weapons of mass destruction.

□ The possible requirement to defend allies suddenly under threat from internal or external enemies.

□ The possible requirement to deploy sizable, lethal Army forces to West Africa to protect oil resources in that region.

Basing a large portion of XVIII Airborne Corps and strategically and tactically mobile Stryker brigades in Europe would reduce the distance the corps and the brigades would have to travel to reach crisis spots, saving priceless time. (See figure 3.) If the corps and the brigades moved farther east into newer NATO states, they would be even closer to major crisis spots. So what if the units are farther from the Pacific Theater? Do we really want them to defend the demilitarized zone against North Korean heavy armor? Except for Korea, the Pacific region is really the U.S. Marine Corps' domain for a rapid response ground force. Except for China, the rest of Asia is not likely to pose a threat that the U.S. Marine Corps cannot initially handle.

In the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. can still respond to crises in a timely fashion with the bulk of the 82d Airborne Division and the 10th Mountain Division. The 173d Airborne Brigade, Stryker brigades, the U.S. Army Rangers, and the Marine Corps would add to the available force pool.

Debate Far From Over

"The Defense Planning Guidance" for 2004 to 2009 sets forth a vision of Transformation that downgrades the importance of conventional Army forces and emphasizes "high-value precision strikes" to disarm an enemy through distant firepower.¹⁷ The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* states clearly that to support preemption, the Nation will "continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results."¹⁸ The problem with this approach is that it could easily be interpreted as meaning ever larger salvos of joint direct-attack munitions delivered by Missouri-based B-2s. Successful precision strikes simply destroy weapons and infrastructure; they leave the enemy rulers' evil intent intact.

Preemption requires troops to march on an enemy capital and carry out regime change. Because USAREUR is the Army command most vulnerable to the argument that its units are no longer relevant, USAREUR must change dramatically. Bolstering USAREUR's utility will rebut most arguments for a smaller Army. For military leaders committed to a full-spectrum military that preserves the role of ground forces, reconfiguring USAREUR is critical. Placing the XVIII Airborne Corps under USAREUR and basing V Corps in CONUS will guarantee visible and valuable Army roles in Europe's defense and in global power projection to support preemption long after the Red Army is a dim memory.

A debate about USAREUR is necessary. Unfortunately, the debate seems to be addressing only one question—does America need V Corps to defend its interests in Europe at all? The real debate should be about what units should make up the Army's future Europe-based corps. Exchanging USAREUR's V Corps with the CONUS-based XVIII Airborne Corps would serve U.S. interests, highlight the Army's role in maintaining European stability, and contribute to the Army's global reach to support the strategy of preemption. **MR**

NOTES

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2. I say this with full awareness of U.S. dominance of Operation Allied Force and knowing that U.S. ground forces would have been the main force had NATO invaded Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, Europe could have done the job if Europe had been willing to suffer the heavier casualties that its inferior (compared to U.S.) capabilities might have caused, either in the air or on the ground.

3. Jim Hoagland, "Fog of Peace," *Washington Post*, 16 August 2001, A25.

4. Hoagland, "Cooling Off After Germany's Election," *Washington Post*, 26 September 2002, A33.

5. Thom Shanker, "Defense Chief May Leave Size of Field Forces Up to Services," *New York Times*, 17 August 2001.

6. Thomas E. Ricks, "Military Cuts Are Implied in New Strategy," *Washington Post*, 25 July 2001, A01.

7. For example, in searching for lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom, the principle of "mass" is questioned in favor of "precision." This clearly questions the role of the Army as being more than spotters for air power. See John G. Morgan and Anthony D. McIvor, "Rethinking the Principles of War," *Proceedings* (October 2003): 35-36.

8. U.S. Joint Forces Command, "A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations," White paper, version 2.0, Norfolk, VA, 25 October 2001; The White House, *The National Security*

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9. General Accounting Office (GAO) 02-99, *Military Readiness: Effects of a U.S. Military Presence in Europe on Mobility Requirements* (Washington, DC: GPO, November 2001), 4.

10. Ellen Knickmeyer, "U.S. Leads Oil Boom in 'Other Gulf,'" *The Associated Press*, 19 September 2002.

11. The appointment of U.S. Marine Corps General James Jones to be NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, highlighted the need to transform USAREUR into a power-projection force. His appointment was reportedly part of President George W. Bush's goal to "shake off Cold War military thinking." See John Chalmers, "Corrected: NATO Makes Marine General Jones Top Soldier," *Reuters*, 19 July 2002.

12. *National Security Strategy*.

13. DOD Report, 247-54.

14. John Fund, "Herr Clinton," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 September 2002.

15. Steven Erlanger, "Rumsfeld Urges NATO To Set Up Strike Force," *New York Times*, 25 September 2002.

16. GAO, *Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 2002), 17.

17. John Headren, "High Tech Strategy Guides Pentagon Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 July 2002.

18. *National Security Strategy*.

Insurgent Groups in Chechnya

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RECENT EVENTS in Russia, the United States, the Middle East, and many other countries highlight a central problem in the war against terrorism. Today's terrorist is neither desperate nor isolated. In Russia, insurgents are well-led, amply financed, and efficiently organized into battalions, companies, platoons, and squads with all essential military occupational specialties from snipers, demolition specialists, rocket-propelled grenade gunners, to combat engineers.

Russia has encountered terrorism and insurgency before—in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989—and is facing them again as Russian federal forces carry out counterterrorism measures in the Chechen Republic. A knowledge of the classic elements of combat as taught in Russian military academies; that is, army and front operations encompassing hundreds of miles of territory, is not as applicable today as it once was, although the knowledge remains important. Increasingly, Russia's military academies emphasize combat actions in local insurgent conflicts, focusing on the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Russia's current experience in the northern Caucasus region.

Insurgents' Methods and Tactics

Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) units are currently working to uphold law and order and to provide public security in the North Caucasus region.² The various types of armed organizations the MVD confronts are usually located in Chechen territory and are commonly referred to as illegal armed formations. Insurgent guerrilla actions, usually raids and ambushes, take place on territory that the enemy knows well.

Insurgencies are nothing new to the MVD. For more than 50 years during the Soviet period, the MVD dealt with hot spots in central Asia, the northern Caucasus, western Ukraine, western Belarus, and the Baltic states. Currently, detachments of 60 to 100

Performing acts of terrorism in a guerrilla war requires special skills, knowledge, and abilities. Insurgents train in weapons, raids, terrorism, field survival, camouflage, and the use of propaganda. The training center trains the insurgents fairly well.

insurgents form locally and become part of larger units under a unified command. Although deployed over a vast area, they operate with a single intent. Although their basic weapon is the rifle, they possess modern heavy weapons, including antiaircraft (AA) missile systems, recoilless rifles, and mortars.

When the first Chechen conflict began in 1994, Russian troops encountered Chechnya's well-organized, standing armed forces equipped with weapons and hardware from virtually all branches of arms. As the conflict developed and their hardware was lost, armed bands switched over to partisan tactics. The insurgents obtain weapons by capturing them from Russian troops in ambushes and raids or by acquiring them illegally through third countries with the help of financial benefactors.

The insurgent groups' structure includes—

- A field commander and one or two deputies who make up his staff (often including former soldiers or trained MVD personnel).

- A bodyguard team that accompanies and protects the commander during combat or when he is in a base camp.

- A reconnaissance team and a network of scouts (the latter usually local civilians who are not part of the detachment).

- Signalmen.
- Special forces.
- Snipers.
- Riflemen.

When insurgents use a combination of explosive devices, they set up one demolition charge on a roadway surface to destroy vehicles, and a second charge (one or more remotely controlled fragmentation mines) above the road at a certain height (on a post, pole, hill, or tree) to destroy the assault force. The insurgents detonate the devices simultaneously or nearly so.

Additional insurgents support the detachment by obtaining food, ammunition, and other necessities. They might also provide liaison, security, or counterintelligence services.

Detachments consist of well-trained fighters, who are usually volunteers, but who are sometimes conscripts. Conscripts are usually inferior to volunteers in training, combat qualities, and mental preparation for combat. Exconvicts released from penal colonies, detention camps, and prisons, and criminals with outstanding arrest warrants are members of these armed bands. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that insurgents commonly use such tactics as robbery, plundering, marauding, and violence.

Chechen detachments are usually regional, with residents of a single village banding together in so-called “self-defense detachments.” Often, residents of a single area form “national militia brigades and regiments.” The detachments fight only in areas from which they are drawn.

When estimating an insurgent group’s composition and numbers, one must also consider its reserves—sympathetic individuals who are outwardly law-abiding citizens with permanent places of residence but who have hidden weapons caches. Former insurgents might also belong to the reserves. During some disarmament programs, they “voluntarily” refused to support the insurgents, laid down their arms, and gained legal status. From time to time, the two reserve groups merge into active detachments to take part in large-scale actions. They also perform intelligence work and spread disinformation.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Chechnya, mercenaries and volunteers from other regions and from abroad joined the insurgents. Because mercenaries are the best-trained and most combat-ready fighters, insurgents often use them in difficult missions that require a high degree of competence, as advisers for detachment commanders, and as instructors at training centers. The insurgents might put them in a separate detachment (or make them the core of a detachment) for combat involving terrorism and special operations.

Although many insurgents have served in the military and received military training, the insurgency

sets up training centers or schools. Performing acts of terrorism in a guerrilla war requires special skills, knowledge, and abilities. Insurgents train in weapons, raids, terrorism, field survival, camouflage, and the use of propaganda. The training centers train the insurgents fairly well. In numerous conflicts, insurgent groups have demonstrated a high degree of effectiveness. A key factor in their success is their use of lessons learned from past partisan warfare.

Armed insurgent groups base their tactics on the following principles:

- Close ties with the local populace.
- Actions by small detachments and teams.
- Knowledge of and the skillful use of terrain, such as laying ambushes at tactically advantageous points.
- Active use of conditions of limited visibility, especially darkness.
- Careful selection of objectives and the development of simple, realistic plans of action.
- Thorough reconnaissance before undertaking actions. (Even when not attacking, the insurgents diligently and attentively monitor the actions of soldiers and police forces.)
- Secret and surprise actions and the use of military cunning.
- Suddenly opening fire at close range and then retreating to safety.
- Using ambushes and fire from unassailable locations in barely maneuverable terrain to cover a retreat and inflict losses.
- Close coordination among detachment personnel during all actions.
- Reliance on the exhaustion of law-enforcement personnel.
- Psychological operations in support of insurgent activities.
- Well-organized security and intelligence.

Expanding the Principles

Maintaining close ties with the local populace is a fundamental principle of insurgency operations. Local citizens provide insurgents with personnel, food, clothing, storage facilities, medical aid, and sometimes direct military help and other services. That is why the separatists try to instill in the locals

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the idea that rebel detachments are defenders of the people and spread lies about vicious acts supposedly committed by the forces of law and order. The insurgents brutally punish anyone in the local population who shows the slightest hint of any loyalty toward the federal forces, even if that means killing the people involved.

The most widespread insurgent technique is the use of small detachments dispersed over a large amount of territory to create the impression of a universal presence. In an address at West Point in 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy said, "War with insurgents, partisans, and bands is a new type of war, new in its intensity and old in its origins, a war that uses infiltration rather than attack, a war where victory is achieved by taxing and exhausting the forces of the opponent rather than by destroying him. It requires new strategy and tactics, specialized forces and new forms of combat."³

The insurgents compel the forces of law and order to operate in small units separated by a considerable distance from one another, which keeps them from taking advantage of mutual fire and communications support. Working in small groups, the rebels can tie down large formations.

The insurgents make full use of darkness, which

provides them with concealment and the element of surprise; causes disorientation and panic among the personnel attacked; disrupts command and control; and ultimately, helps the insurgents achieve success even against numerically stronger forces. Insurgents engage in surprise attacks at night and then withdraw on previously chosen routes. They deliberately point pursuers toward nearby posts and garrisons of other federal troops. When they succeed in doing this, the slightest error in coordination and communications results in the federal forces firing on each other. The insurgents take advantage of darkness to conduct provocations during armistices or when negotiations are underway. The insurgent leaders then usually blame the provocations on third parties or on the forces of law and order.

Exhaustion of the enemy is one of the insurgency's most important goals. Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev said, "We will operate so that not a single occupying soldier will be able to walk freely on Chechen land. Whether he is on the move, in his base camp, sleeping, or eating, he will be in a constant sense of fear."⁴

Another time-honored and increasingly important insurgent principle is to generate psychological support for their activities. The primary goals of the



Colonel General Germadi Trochev's My War

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insurgency's psychological operations are to maintain combat morale among the insurgents, support their authority among the local population, and demoralize the forces of law and order. The insurgents use radio, television, and the press (local and foreign) for these purposes and to disseminate lies or to distort facts.

The insurgents' tactics are active and audacious. They rarely go on the defensive, doing so only in exceptional cases, such as defending base camps or selected built-up areas or when their enemies surround them or threaten their detachments.

Once the forces of law and order have established control over an entire area or most of an area, the insurgents shift to guerrilla warfare, ambushing lines of communications, and attacking small garrisons. The insurgents also use mines, booby traps, and snipers, and they conduct large-scale terrorist actions involving hostage taking.

Rebel commanders rely on the following principles:

- Do not enter into direct combat. Break off from the forces of law and order and take up new, better positions.
- Never remain in contact with the forces of law and order for long. Try to withdraw unnoticed and take up new, advantageous positions or hideouts.
- Attempt large-scale strikes only when sufficient forces are available.
- Use small units to attack individual soldiers, obtain weapons, or repel blows.
- Maintain psychological pressure on the forces of law and order by firing on them regularly.
- Use mortars, self-propelled howitzers, and other heavy weapons when attacking important objectives and fortified positions with significant forces concentrated in small areas, and use concentrated fire from "nomadic" weapons to inflict heavy losses.
- Conduct an organized withdrawal in small groups while deploying ambushes and delivering retaliatory fire if the forces of law and order launch a surprise attack on a broad front.

Insurgent Attacks

Insurgents commonly attack guard posts, regimental command posts, police headquarters, military headquarters, airfields, and warehouses in order to damage, destroy, or capture them. Insurgents perform careful reconnaissance and skillful disinformation before they attack, with the locals assisting in disinformation activities.

The insurgents study the guard systems, communications, obstacles, weapons positions, and approaches to their objectives. They determine defending troops' reinforcement capabilities (composition, movement times, and routes) and always use the element of surprise. About 30 men carry out the attack, and the group is divided into point reconnaissance, guard takedown, a covering team, the main body (the assault force), and sometimes a special diversionary group.

The point reconnaissance team moves toward the objective, noting any recent changes in the guard system and the most advantageous axes for attack and subsequent withdrawal. If the reconnaissance team unexpectedly encounters superior forces, it withdraws laterally from the insurgency's main body, but coordinates this withdrawal with the main body in an attempt to lead the MVD force into a fire sac. Accomplices from the local population sometimes conduct point reconnaissance.

The covering group covertly assumes positions near the objective. They block local rapid-response or reserve forces' potential maneuver routes and the lines of movement of federal forces' reserve elements who are assisting the garrison and sentries. The covering group provides fire support to the main force and then covers the detachment's withdrawal.

Moving behind the covering group, the main assault force uses a surprise attack to capture or destroy the objective. If the assault force cannot hold the objective, or if that was not the goal, the detachment leaves and quickly dissolves into small groups.

The attack on Regimental Command Post (CP) 10 in Chechnya on 20 January 1996 is an example of a typical insurgent attack. As darkness fell, a team of from 10 to 12 insurgents surrounded the CP unnoticed at a distance of 70 to 100 meters. They opened close-range fire from five directions simultaneously, injuring several people, destroying two armored personnel carriers (APCs), knocking out command and control, and disrupting the fire system. In the resulting confusion, security personnel left their posts and withdrew haphazardly to the regimental field site.

On 31 May 1996, a rebel detachment captured a regimental CP near Shuanya. Before they attacked, the insurgents had conducted detailed studies of the daily routines at a number of regimental CPs in the Nozhayt-Yurtov, Kurchaloyev, and Gudermes areas



(Clockwise from upper left):

Shamil Basayev, the mastermind behind most Chechen military operations.

The author's father, General Anatoliy Kulikov of the MVD (*left*), at one time commanded all Russian forces in Chechnya. At right is Colonel General (LTG) Gennadi Trochev, commander of the North Caucasus Military District.

One of several Chechen women Russian forces accused of being snipers.

Chechen guerillas are especially adept at setting urban ambushes.

Radio devices can serve for a common Chechen tactic—remote detonation of explosive devices.



photos from Colonel General Gennadi Trochev's *My War*

Exhaustion of the enemy is one of the insurgency's most important goals. Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev said, "We will operate so that not a single occupying soldier will be able to walk freely on Chechenland. Whether he is on the move, in his base camp, sleeping, or eating, he will be in a constant sense of fear."

of the Chechen Republic. The insurgents chose the least fortified CP, one that was badly situated in a basin between two hills, which enabled the insurgents to surround it. Before dusk they directed intense mortar, guided-rocket antitank, grenade launcher, and rifle fire on the CP for about an hour.

In the first few minutes of the battle the insurgents destroyed an APC and a maintenance-transport vehicle; blew up ammunition stockpiles; and knocked a field radio station off the air. At the same time, the insurgents' covering group mined approach routes, and diversionary groups fired on neighboring military forces. A ZU-23-2 gun crew, which was supposed to be on alert, was on a detail some 70 meters from its weapon and was cut off from it. (The ZU-23-2 is a 23-millimeter, self-propelled, AA gun usable in ground combat.) The CP's defenders used all of their ammunition in undisciplined fire in an unsuccessful attempt to repel the attack.

The insurgents had, in effect, "disarmed" the garrison, capturing 26 men, a BTR-80 APC, a ZIL-131 Russian radio truck, a ZU-23-2 AA gun, an AGS-17 grenade launcher, and all of the defenders' small arms. A later review of the CP's capture indicated that unofficial friendly relations with the local population had helped make the attack successful.

These examples were not isolated incidents. Local residents near the federal sentries' duty stations, while never showing any aggressive intentions, made contact with service personnel; brought them food, cigarettes, and liquor; bought fuel and lubricants; or offered to buy ammunition from them. When the soldiers relaxed their vigilance, the locals agreed to sell them whatever was wanted. At dusk, when the sentry changed, the locals arrived with their "merchandise." When they got close enough to the soldiers to do so, they quickly overpowered and disarmed them. Then they disarmed, captured, or killed the remaining personnel.

In addition to attacking with the goal of destroying or exhausting garrison sentries, the insurgents systematically fired on them. Operating in groups of from 5 to 10, primarily after dark, several insurgent groups aimed at a single objective, with one member of a group drawing fire on himself, after which all the others fired on the answering weapons from other directions. The insurgents also conducted "drive-by" shootings from rapidly moving vehicles.

Snipers

Snipers represent a huge threat to Russian federal forces. In many conflicts with insurgents the effect of sniper actions has been so great that some experts rightly refer to these conflicts as "sniper wars." Insurgent forces equip snipers with special sniper weapons, automatic weapons, and rifles (including sporting rifles) adapted for sniper purposes. The typical sniper is a professional who plans his actions in detail. He selects advantageous and little-noticed positions in attics; corner apartments in upper stories of buildings from where he can fire in several directions; factory smokestacks; tower cranes; and traveling and overhead cranes. Insurgents might also equip sniper positions as hideouts where they can conceal weapons and munitions.

Snipers are skilled at creating the right conditions for killing as many people as possible in a single action. After wounding one soldier, usually in the extremities, the sniper inflicts similar wounds on other soldiers or medics who come to the injured person's aid. The sniper then finishes them all off. Snipers' primary victims are defenseless personnel.

An insurgent group might include one or two snipers (an observer and a shooter) and combat engineers who mine the firing position after withdrawal. After occupying dominant buildings or the lower floors of buildings, the sniper group can fire on the objective, sometimes at random. Under cover of the noise of battle, the sniper can select and destroy the most important targets.

Ambushes

The ambush is the most efficient and frequently used method of insurgent warfare. The most likely spots for ambushes are bridges, confined areas, hidden turns in a road, slopes and crests of hills, large forests, mountain passes, and gorges. The insurgents always choose the location and their equipment carefully. The choice must assure concealment of the ambush's location and guarantee the element of surprise, effective fire from weapons and munitions, and the opportunity for rapid withdrawal.

The insurgents intend ambushes either to impede or to destroy (or capture) the enemy. The type of ambush chosen depends on the combat situation, the correlation of forces, and the terrain. If the purpose is to delay the movement of forces and assets, to alter their direction, or to force a premature deploy-

The first group opens fire on a convoy's flank, initiating the battle, and then withdraws, drawing the convoy's attention toward it. The other groups act in a similar manner, forcing federal forces to repel attacks from several directions or to advance in various directions. In some circumstances, the ambushed force loses control of the situation, including losing its command and control. If that happens, the force is doomed.

ment into combat positions, then the insurgents can use a significantly smaller force than they would need for ambushes to destroy or capture the enemy. While only a few insurgents can detain a company-size or smaller unit for several hours, destroying the unit requires a militant force of comparable size. Depending on the location, the tactical formation, and the method of action, ambushes might be what are called meeting, parallel, or circular.

The meeting ambush. The meeting ambush is usually stationary and set up on the federal force's route of movement. The insurgents' goal is to pin units down or to destroy advance units. Insurgents often use the meeting ambush on small units and the transport assets that follow behind them independently. The guerrillas set up the ambush site well in advance, prepare reserve and false positions, and select withdrawal routes. They often use the meeting ambush in combination with a simultaneous feint on some other objective to cause reserve forces to move toward that objective.

The parallel ambush. Insurgents use the parallel ambush along a convoy's axis of advance. The parallel ambush's objectives are the convoy's secu-

rity force, reconnaissance elements, rear columns, and sometimes the main force. The main body of insurgents disperses along one or both sides of the movement route.

The circular ambush. The most difficult ambush to prepare and execute is the circular ambush. Anticipating the movement of enemy forces and assets, insurgent groups position themselves along the perimeter of a preselected area. The first group opens fire on a convoy's flank, initiating the battle, and then withdraws, drawing the convoy's attention toward it. The other groups act in a similar manner, forcing federal forces to repel attacks from several directions or to advance in various directions. In some circumstances, the ambushed force loses control of the situation, including losing its command and control. If that happens, the force is doomed.

Depending on the mission, forces of 10 to 20 insurgents carry out ambushes, although sometimes ambush forces might exceed 100. They position themselves along several lines. The size of the ambushing detachment varies depending on the goal and the forces available. The detachment might include a fire or strike group; a diversionary group; a



Aftermath of a Chechen insurgent ambush.

Colonel General Gennadi Trochev's My War

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group that impedes the maneuver or withdrawal of federal forces (pins them down); a reserve group; and a group that observes, handles communications, and informs. If the detachment has heavy weapons, the detachment will also have a transport group.

The primary force is the fire or strike group that kills soldiers and destroys equipment. Positioned near the zone of the planned actions, the primary force includes riflemen, a group for capturing prisoners and weapons, and demolitions specialists.

The diversionary group takes a position some distance away from the ambush kill zone. The diversionary group's mission is to draw retaliatory fire from the security force (and sometimes the main force) and to support the strike group's surprise actions. The diversionary group is the first to act. The signal to begin might be a mine explosion or a demolition charge. Positioned along the same axis as the strike group, the diversionary group fires on approaching federal forces from a greater distance and then withdraws. As members of the attacked federal force pursue the diversionary group, they open themselves to a flank attack.

Occupying positions along the presumed axes of the federal force's movement, usually along the only possible axes, the group that impedes the maneuver and withdrawal of the federal force lays out land mines and other obstacles along these axes. If necessary, the reserve group reinforces the strike group or the blocking group. The reserve group's mission is to support the main force's exit from the battle. The group monitors the situation and covers the detachment's flanks and rear.

The group that observes, communicates, and informs does not participate in the battle; its concern is reconnaissance, determining when federal forces will move out from their encampment area and in what direction. The insurgents in this group listen in on conversations over nonsecure radio nets, follow the convoys, and report on their movement to the detachment's main force. Personnel in this group can operate without weapons. They "land" like birds on the convoy's tail and later pass by as though they were just random travelers. The transport group hides out along the detachment's planned lines of withdrawal and stands ready to evacuate the detachment and any prisoners or weapons taken.

In a typical ambush, the insurgents usually allow federal scouts and security elements moving ahead of the convoy to pass by. Using a remotely controlled

blast mine, the insurgents knock out the main force's forward vehicles and then concentrate fire on command vehicles and the center of the convoy.

In one successful rebel action, insurgents ambushed an infantry regiment's logistics convoy near an observation post in Yaryshmarda. The insurgents rigged a remotely controlled blast mine in a road that ran along the western edge of the area's defense. The mine blew up the convoy's lead tank. The insurgents then destroyed the convoy's BMD-1 command vehicle, killing the convoy's commander and forward air controller, and jammed the UHF command frequency to sever the convoy's communications with its base. Firing at the convoy for about 90 minutes at close range from prepared positions, 150 insurgents in two detachments and four combat teams killed most of convoy's personnel and destroyed nearly all of its equipment.

Insurgents often set up active ambushes to kill the greatest possible number of personnel. They plant guides among the local population to steer federal force reconnaissance elements, guards, and small convoys directly to the active ambushes.

Terrorism

Terrorism is one of the most effective weapons in the insurgents' arsenal and includes a broad spectrum of actions. Insurgents sometimes capture federal soldiers or civilians and take unprecedented numbers of hostages, perhaps hundreds. They might blow up facilities and kill high-level officials in the process.

The insurgents design their terrorist actions to have the greatest possible psychological effect, not only on military personnel but also on the civilian population of entire regions. Using surprise, audacity, cunning, resolve, and cruelty, insurgents use the classic terrorist arsenal of raids, hostage taking, blackmail, and threats.

Hostage taking has a special place in the terrorist arsenal. Field commanders and individual rebel groups take hostages to defeat Russian federal forces and to exchange the hostages for captured insurgents. They also take hostages in order to collect ransom. Insurgents do not attempt hostage taking against MVD troops or police who remain cautious and vigilant; set up 360-degree observation; are ready to repel an attack; and do not have unauthorized contacts with the local population. On the other hand, carelessness and self-assurance on the part of com-

Snipers are skilled at creating the right conditions for killing as many people as possible in a single action. After wounding one soldier, usually in the extremities, the sniper inflicts similar wounds on other soldiers or medics who come to the injured person's aid. The sniper then finishes them all off.

manders, soldiers, or police can create the right conditions for hostage taking and even provoke it.

A typical example of hostage taking occurred on 12 December 1994 during an antimilitary rally as Russian troops were leaving Khasavyurt in the Dagestan Republic. A group of insurgents blocked an MVD military convoy, while other insurgents, hidden among the crowd and disguised as women and children, pressed up to the convoy's vehicles. They threatened convoy personnel with weapons and hand grenades and captured 40 service personnel, two APCs, and a ZIL-131 vehicle. The insurgents, all of whom were local residents, had placed heavy vehicles in advance in neighboring streets to close them off and prevent any maneuver by the convoy. A badly chosen route, indecisiveness on the part of commanders and soldiers, and a loss of vigilance and combat alertness were also reasons for the hostage taking.

Hostage taking of federal force service members, police, or small groups usually follows a set pattern. The insurgents select a location for the attack that is far enough away from an MVD or other military unit's position so that no signal of the attack can be picked up and assistance cannot arrive in time. Preferred areas for the attack include marketplaces, coffee houses, food stands, and water sources.

By observing the federal force or other prospective victims over a period of several days, the insurgents determine the number of people in the unit, when they appear, their intentions, and the nature of their actions. The insurgents attack when their targets are in no position to repel them, such as when their hands are busy or when their attention is distracted as when they are in a coffee house or an outdoor market.

Armed with small-caliber weapons and grenades, the insurgents usually attack in a force two to three times greater in size than the number of victims they target. The insurgents operate in two teams, an attack team and a cover and evacuation team, the latter in light vehicles positioned along withdrawal routes.

The insurgents are audacious. They try to get right next to their victims and then use weapons to threaten, intimidate, and demoralize them. Soldiers who do not remain calm or are indecisive quickly lose their ability to resist. Once insurgents take control of the situation, victims who do resist are killed immediately. The insurgents exploit any oversight or

lack of discipline. Personnel who enter into unofficial relationships with the local population frequently become the targets of such actions. Another ruse is for teenagers or young men of about the same age to become acquainted with careless or undisciplined soldiers, invite them to a familiar apartment or house, then, under some harmless pretext, lead them to a different place and take them hostage.

The guerrillas hold their hostages in special, well-guarded camps and field prisons in areas that are hard to access. Insurgents trade the hostages among themselves for work details. Sometimes the insurgents demand ransom from hostages' relatives. The insurgents execute prisoners they cannot exchange for ransom or for the freedom of insurgents that federal forces have captured. The guerrillas videotape these "show" executions, distribute the videos to the local population, and use them to demoralize and frighten federal troops.

Although insurgent groups usually operate near their home bases, they sometimes conduct raids. Typically involving mercenary detachments, the raids use covert movement along planned routes in combination with other attacks and ambushes.

The insurgents use infiltration to concentrate their forces and assets in the area of a large-scale action. Carefully observing Russian checkpoints, they determine in advance which types of cargo the Russians do not inspect and which duty personnel are not vigilant. Unarmed insurgents pretending to be local residents move legally in small groups or individually along several routes and once they pass beyond checkpoints, they convene at staging areas or arms rooms where the insurgents have placed weapons in advance. They usually transport weapons to the staging area on large-capacity vehicles, hiding the weapons inside cargo that is virtually impossible to inspect, such as agricultural products or loose materials. The Chechens also attempt bribery to avoid inspections at federal force checkpoints.

Mines

With virtually no limit to the scope, place, or time of its use, mine warfare is an indispensable part of any insurgent movement. The insurgents use Russian-made mines, including the TM-57 (a pressure-operated blast mine), the TM-62 AT mine, the PMN-2 antipersonnel mine (a blast mine), the OZM-72 (a bounding, fragmentation mine), and the MON-50 or

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MON-100 (a directional fragmentation mine). They also use homemade blast mines and grenades with trip wires.

The insurgents prefer remotely (wire) detonated, handmade blast mines that destroy combat equipment; mines that kill personnel who are mounted on assault vehicles; or combinations of the two. A blast mine consists of one or more types of ammunition (usually artillery rounds) of various calibers; an electrical blasting cap; an extra charge of TNT; and an ignition wire. The insurgents place the mines on a road surface or shoulder (about 2 to 8 meters apart) or even in sewer lines. Sometimes the insurgents place the charge on the ground disguised as a pile of trash or construction materials and cover the charge with scraps of metal or screws, bolts, and other metal objects to increase the destructive effect. The insurgents place demolition charges in destroyed or burned-out vehicles and equipment so that when the charge explodes, the explosion sends out a powerful torrent of fragments, killing personnel in a radius of up to 70 meters. On mountain roads, the insurgents set up explosive devices in treetops or on rocky hillsides.

In built-up, mountainous, or forested areas, insurgents set up improvised explosive devices, using trip wires, such as "spider webs" made from wire from the guidance systems of AT guided rockets, small switches, tree branches, or brush. The height at which the insurgents set the trip wires varies. The web might be horizontal, vertical, or both. The insurgents might also use false wires.

When insurgents use a combination of explosive devices, they set up one demolition charge on a roadway surface to destroy vehicles, and a second charge (one or more remotely controlled fragmentation mines) above the road at a certain height (on a post, pole, hill, or tree) to destroy the assault force. The insurgents detonate the devices simultaneously or nearly so. To determine the exact time of the explosion, the insurgents set up an orientation point (a "sight") composed of several easily visible objects that do not attract attention and that are aligned with the planned target. The demolition man hides about 500 to 1,000 meters from the charge. As soon as the intended target aligns with the orientation markers, that is, is in the "sight," the demolition man detonates the charge.

The insurgents' cunning, inventiveness, and insidiousness are almost without limit. For example, they placed a 5- to 10-kilogram explosive charge on a roadbed and concealed a MON-50 directional fragmentation mine in the lamp of a power pole alongside the road with contact wires running between the power plate and a removable device on the powerline. When the armored target entered the kill zone, the insurgents sent voltage to the electrical blasting cap. The explosion in the roadbed knocked out the armored vehicle and the downward-directed explosion from the fragmentation mine in the light pole simultaneously killed the personnel mounted on the armored vehicle.

Countering an Insurgency

Both Russian forces and insurgents benefit from new combat assets, but the fundamentals on which the insurgents rely in their armed struggle with the forces of law and order remain the principles of guerrilla warfare. A force that fights insurgents must know their tactics well, their strong and weak points, and if necessary, be able to use their own methods against them. Predicting the actions of armed bands is virtually impossible. Therein lies the greatest challenge in doing combat with them. Because no one knows what insurgents will do next, everyone must guard against them and their attacks even while fighting them.

Success for Russia's MVD and internal troops in fighting insurgents in the North Caucasus depends on the following:

- Knowledge of the principles of insurgent and guerrilla warfare.
- Countering insurgents' cunning and insidiousness.
- Using intelligent and correctly selected combat methods.
- A well-organized intelligence effort. **MR**

NOTES

1. This article is the translated text of a speech Colonel Sergey A. Kulikov gave at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in December 2002. Kulikov was an MVD special forces commander during the second Chechen war (1999 to the present) and a liaison officer between the Russian Ministry of Defense Armed Forces and Russia's MVD during the first Chechen war (1994 to 1996).

2. Russia's MVD has its own troops that currently number about 200,000. Russia has used its MVD troops heavily in Chechnya.

3. John F. Kennedy, quoted in Rick Atkinson, *Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point's Class of 1966* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).

4. Publishing information unavailable. Dzhokar Dudayev was the president of the Chechen Republic when the first Chechen war began in 1994. A rocket killed him in April 1996.



Kosovo Present and Future

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THE MAJORITY of Kosovars are of Albanian origin and speak Albanian, a unique language not related to other European languages. Kosovar Serbs speak Serbian, a Slavic language. Kosovar Albanians and Serbs find each other's languages incomprehensible, and because Serbs are increasingly using the Cyrillic alphabet, unreadable as well. Smaller Kosovar ethnic groups such as the Ashkalia, Gorani, and Turks, speak their own languages and either Albanian, Serbian, or both. According to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, "On the Situation Relating to Kosovo" (adopted on 10 June 1999), Kosovo remains a province of Serbia.¹ The Serbian name for the area is Kosovo; the Albanian majority call it Kosova.

Since Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo after the NATO bombing campaign in 1999, the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has administered Kosovo. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), Kosovo's emerging elected government, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) have set forth the following objectives for Kosovo:²

- Consolidation of democratic structures.
- Increased administrative transparency and efficiency.
- Improved education standards.
- Better health quality.
- Economic development.
- Increased employment.
- Pension and social assistance for vulnerable groups.
- Integration of all communities.

UNMIK is currently transferring its responsibilities to the PISG elected in November 2001. [But] one Kosovar Albanian academic observed, "We Kosovars don't know how to handle freedom; we are used to being told what to do. So we are having a lot of trouble adjusting to democracy."

The question of Kosovo's final status—whether it will become an independent nation or remain a province of Serbia—casts a shadow of uncertainty across every effort to achieve these objectives.

Consolidating Democratic Structures

UNMIK is currently transferring its responsibilities to the PISG elected in November 2001. UNMIK expects the PISG to become fully functional by the end of 2003. The PISG has 120 seats: election by popular vote fills 100 seats; 10 seats are reserved for Serb representatives; and 10 seats are for representatives of other minority groups, including Roma, Ashkalia, Turks, Goranis, Egyptians, and Bosniaks. International observers scrutinized Kosovo's elections and judged them to be acceptably free and fair.

One Kosovar Albanian academic observed, "We Kosovars don't know how to handle freedom; we are used to being told what to do. So we are having a lot of trouble adjusting to democracy."³ This is a common problem for citizens of former socialist

countries. While they strive to democratize, they must struggle against increasing corruption and crime, kleptomaniacal leaders and businessmen, rising unemployment, and vanishing social supports.⁴ Author Marina Ottaway points out, "In the Balkans, the Communist regimes have disappeared, but despite much international support, most governments

Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Serbs, and some other minority groups still choose to emphasize their cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical differences. . . . The University of Pristina teaches in Albanian for Albanian students; the University of Mitrovica teaches only in Slavic languages for Serb and other Slavic-speaking students. . . . Neither [university] can guarantee a secure study environment for students of another ethnicity.

are semi-authoritarian, with only Slovenia and—more recently and tentatively—Croatia, moving toward democracy.”⁵ Slovenia has had a decade of independence and peace in which to make this kind of progress. Kosovo is still a province of Serbia, and its conflict ended only 4 years ago.

Kosovo shows some signs of becoming a more democratic civil society, however. The development of local nongovernment organizations (NGOs) is one such sign. In May 2003, 2,331 NGOs operated in Kosovo, of which 1,939 were local NGOs; only 392 were international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs).

INGOs flocked by the hundreds to Kosovo following the conflict, but have been steadily leaving for other priority areas (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sub-Saharan Africa). Local NGOs, often started with help from INGOs, have taken their place. The great increase in the number of NGOs is a positive development.

Former socialist governments did not permit grassroots civil society organizations such as NGOs, much less register and recognize them. Kosovo’s Ministry of Public Services’ Registration Services Division and Civil Status Section now registers NGOs. Registration is voluntary, but a big incentive to register is access to technical assistance. NGOs retain their independence in funding and choice of activities and venues. A shift from emergency humanitarian assistance and relief work to development projects such as gender and youth issues, democratization, sports, and nurturing a civil society has occurred, with many NGOs choosing to focus on multiethnic reconciliation. The Mother Teresa Society and the Kosovo Red Cross continue to provide

humanitarian assistance to returnees and others in need throughout Kosovo.

Transparency and Efficiency

In most postsocialist societies the socialist tendency continues for leaders to make decisions without public scrutiny, much less public involvement. Transparency is a scarce commodity, although political parties, particularly Albanian parties, are active in the electoral process. The majority party in the PISG is the Albanian Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Other Albanian parties are the Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosova. Serb parties include the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Party for Serbs Survival. In their socialist past, Kosovars had little experience forming political groups to raise their voices against government policies, so the creation of legitimate, effective opposition parties has been difficult for them. Kosovar Serb political parties seem to wait for instructions from Belgrade for their participation in the governance of Kosovo.

Friction is increasing within some Albanian parties, and as a result, they fail to speak in harmony, much less with one voice, on major issues. An elected member of the PISG said the lack of transparency within the majority LDK party illustrates the problems in an emerging democracy. “Without inner democracy in the parties, there cannot be democracy in anything else, including general elections.”⁶ As the transition from UNMIK to PISG continues, democracy within the political parties will be an area of great concern. Other former socialist countries’ track records in transparency are mixed to weak. UNMIK’s *Focus Kosovo* reports, “None of the political parties has declared where its money comes from, as the law requires.”⁷ This is not an encouraging sign.

The Transfer Council, whose objective is to transfer the governance of Kosovo from UNMIK to PISG, met for the first time in April 2003. PISG and UNMIK have an equal number of representatives on the council; its co-chairmen are Kosovo’s elected prime minister and the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative (SRSG). As Kosovo government officials gain skill and experience, UNMIK will turn over more functions to them until ultimately UNMIK and its international staff leave.⁸ Kosovars and colleagues in UNMIK and other international organizations differ in their views of how long the transfer process will take and how successful the process will be, but all agree that it must proceed. This transfer process is also influenced by the uncertainty about Kosovo’s final status.

Judging from the comments people made to me and from my own observations, Kosovo police ser-

vices (KPS) provide one bright spot. Confidence in the local police, who are often part of the problem in countries emerging from autocratic rule, is another sign that a civil society is developing. In UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's report on Kosovo to the Security Council on 26 June 2003, he noted that UNMIK had turned over four police stations to the KPS and will turn over eight more before the end of 2003.⁹ This process is continuing.


The KPS is increasingly multiethnic. Although 84 percent of KPS personnel are Kosovar Albanian, 10 percent are Kosovar Serb, 6 percent are non-Serb minorities, and 15 percent are women.¹⁰ I saw many KPS teams of men and women in the streets everywhere; they appear to be taking community policing seriously. I observed them on the street in all of the towns we visited, talking to people, answering questions (including mine), and being quite visible. In some instances, the KPS provides security for minority returnees, which is a positive step, because the KPS is the security unit that will remain after UNMIK and the Kosovo Enforcement Force (KFOR) leave. Without a safe, secure environment, sustainable progress in the development of a civil, politically mature, and economically healthy society cannot occur.

Improved Education Standards

Parallel health and education systems existed in Kosovo for over a decade before NATO intervened in 1999. The Kosovo Serbs ran the public system, using public and municipal facilities and following orders from Belgrade. The Kosovar Albanians ran the private system essentially underground in their homes or in Mother Teresa Society ambulancias or clinics. One young taxi driver told me that most of his elementary and all of his high-school classes took place in private Albanian homes because the government would not allow Kosovar Albanians to teach in government schools. They also banned the Albanian language after Yugoslavia repealed Kosovo's quasiautonomous status in 1989. When I was in Kosovo in 1998, a small Albanian school met in one room in the home of neighbors of the Albanian family with whom I stayed.

Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Serbs, and some other minority groups still choose to emphasize their cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical differences. The educational system must address these challenges. The two universities in Kosovo epitomize the situation. The University of Pristina teaches in Albanian for Albanian students; the University of Mitrovica teaches only in Slavic languages for Serb and other Slavic-speaking students. The University of Mitrovica refuses to recognize the authority of Kosovo's ministry of education, and the ministry re-

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Kosovar civil authorities, various NGO representatives, and KFOR personnel at a groundbreaking ceremony in Gnjilane, Kosovo.

While [former socialist countries] strive to democratize, they must struggle against increasing corruption and crime, kleptomaniacal leaders and businessmen, rising unemployment, and vanishing social supports. . . . Kosovo shows some signs of movement toward a more democratic civil society, however. The development of local NGOs is one such sign. In May 2003, 2,331 NGOs operated in Kosovo, of which 1,939 were local.

fuses to recognize the university. This battle has stalled adoption of the law on higher education, but even if the law is successfully adopted, the challenge of educational systems teaching in different languages and resisting ethnic and linguistic integration will remain. Neither the University of Pristina nor the University of Mitrovica can guarantee a secure study environment for students of another ethnicity.¹¹

The educational system also suffers from corruption. Teachers are so poorly paid that many of the best-educated teachers work as interpreters for international organizations because the salaries are so much better. Students have to pay to register in the universities, regardless of their grades in secondary school. Because the best students often do not have the money to pay the registration fees, the universities admit those with poorer academic records who have the money. Students must also pay "under the

Kosovo Police in Zhegra, 16 June 2002.

US Army

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table" to take their examinations, and paying under the table is a growing industry. As a result, many outside of Kosovo are beginning to question the legitimacy of educational certificates from Kosovo institutions.

Better Health Quality

Completely reliable demographic data are lacking in Kosovo because most of the majority Kosovar Albanian population boycotted the last census, which was held in 1991. Nevertheless, my colleagues in the medical profession are certain that both Kosovars and their health care system are sick. The following excerpt from the article "Condition Stable, Prognosis Uncertain" illustrates just how sick.¹²

"Recent statistics show that one person in four suffers from cardiovascular disease and one in five either from lung or kidney disease. Every second hospital death is because of heart disease, stroke, or cancer. Every eight hours a newborn baby dies in Kosovo, yet many would survive in better conditions.

"With an infant mortality rate (children up to 1 year of age) of 35 per 1,000 (live births) and a newborn death rate of 29 per 1,000, Kosovo ranks lower than anywhere else in Europe, lower even than some

developing countries. Major contributing factors to the poor state of health include postwar-related trauma (25 percent of all Kosovans are still believed to suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder), severe environmental hazards (Pristina is synonymous with pollution), and other old and new public health threats, such as tuberculosis, smoking, alcohol abuse, and HIV/AIDS."¹³

In a health-needs assessment I did for an INGO in Kosovo in 1998, I found that water and sanitation infrastructures were marginal to inadequate in many cities and most rural areas. The situation is even worse now because of damage to facilities during the conflict and the influx of rural people to the cities, which has overloaded already inadequate facilities. In many areas, electric power is intermittent and unpredictable, subsequently

reducing the availability of clean water and sanitary waste management. As a result water-borne illnesses are prevalent.

To address these major health needs, Kosovo's health policy working group, aided by World Health Organization (WHO) consultants, wrote a health policy for Kosovo in January 2001 and submitted it to the PISG for action.¹⁴ The policy emphasizes primary health care (PHC). The entry point to the health system is the PHC physician at one of three types of family health centers: puncta, small outreach units in rural communities staffed by nurses and regularly visited by PHC doctors; family health centers in larger villages staffed by PHC doctors; and family health centers in the main towns of municipalities that provide medical and dental services and emergency care 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Specialists in district hospitals provide secondary care on an in- and outpatient basis. The University of Pristina (UP) Hospital provides all tertiary care. Except for emergencies, lower levels in the system must refer all patients to facilities that can provide a higher level of care; thus, family health centers refer patients to district hospitals, and district hospitals or family health centers refer patients to the UP hospital. A mental health care system is to be de-

veloped. Kosovo's proposed health system is orderly and clean on paper, but this is seldom the case in implementation.

The health policy for Kosovo addresses the need for doctors and hospitals but barely mentions the need for appropriate support personnel. Some would say this need is understood and goes without saying, but I worked in a number of countries' health systems for WHO and for NGOs training trainers of health care support personnel, and I discovered that the reason government health policies do not address the need for appropriate health support personnel is because they ignore these needs. I believe this is the case in Kosovo's health plan as well. Kosovo needs more nurses, lab technicians, therapists, health educators, and other support personnel. No matter how competent the doctors and how wonderfully equipped the hospitals, without adequate and competent support personnel, people suffer and die needlessly.

Kosovo's health policy is ambitious and should provide the population with sound health and medical care—if fully implemented. This is a big “if.” External funding is drying up rapidly. International funding assistance for Kosovo in 2003 is projected to be \$231 million, a 58 percent decrease from 2001.¹⁵ The government's health budget is inadequate. Many doctors are opening private practices, siphoning off patients who can pay for services. Many qualified doctors and other health care personnel have left Kosovo for employment opportunities elsewhere. Many hospital and clinic buildings are old and suffer from war damage and neglect. Even Pristina University Hospital has a limited supply of clean running water and supplies, and the availability of electricity is unreliable.

Kosovo is located in a region that has one of the fastest growing HIV epidemics in the world. In May 2003, according to the Kosovo AIDS Committee (KOSAIDS), the official count of HIV/AIDS was 45 known cases since 1986.¹⁶ The first known case was a man who returned from working in Germany during the 1980s; he infected his wife, and she, their son. After his death, the woman infected a number of men, and the disease spread. Most new cases are the result of sharing needles while injecting drugs. The disease then spreads through sexual activity to users' partners. This pattern is similar to one found throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics. Condom use is not socially well accepted in Kosovo, and therefore, condoms are not readily available or widely used. The Population Services International (PSI) group now working with KOSAIDS is trying to change attitudes toward condom use through social marketing activities. PSI provides HIV/AIDS posters and billboards, which can

be seen throughout the country.

The chairperson of the Kosovo's HIV/AIDS awareness technical group expressed concern that because of multiple risk factors in Kosovo, HIV will spread rapidly unless health officials take serious measures to educate the population about HIV risk factors and prevention. He noted that before the war two or three houses of prostitution existed in the country, but now brothels and roadhouses “are like mushrooms after a rain.”¹⁷

One local NGO official told me that the situation in Kosovo is worse now than before 1999. “Then,” he said, “the two parallel systems [in education and health] worked better for the people than what we have now.”¹⁸

Economic Development

A *Focus Kosovo* summary of the issues facing the Balkans and Eastern Europe states, “There are three dynamics unfolding in the region. These will converge in 2004. The first is the inevitable but painful adjustment to the end of reconstruction aid, which has kept Bosnia and Kosovo afloat in the postconflict period. The second is the deepening employment crisis caused by the collapse of the old socialist industries. For much of the region, economic transition has meant deindustrialization, with only a modest response in the new private sector. The third is the growing disenchantment of citizens with the democratic process itself, which they perceive as unresponsive to their needs and powerless to reverse the social and economic decline.”¹⁹

Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in the Balkans. Various surveys estimate that more than 50 percent of the population is poor, and 12 percent extremely poor.²⁰ Poverty is most prevalent in rural populations, where many people live in damaged housing, in female-headed households, in households where there are large numbers of children, and in households of the unemployed, the disabled, the elderly, and demobilized war veterans.

One of the major problems UNMIK must address is privatization. In the privatization process, the first 6 of Kosovo's 410 socially owned enterprises (SOEs) are for sale to individuals or corporations. It will be at least a year before any of these SOEs will be able to produce enough goods to increase employment significantly and begin exporting. How to get formerly state-owned industrial property and land into competitive production is a major problem many former socialist states face.

International government organizations (IGOs) and INGOs employ a large number of expatriates who reside in Kosovo, especially in Pristina, and they have created a “false economy,” which is affecting the local population in a number of ways. The amount



Albanian doctors at work in the Vitina Health House, Zitinje, Kosovo, 23 February 2003,

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Both Kosovars and their health care system are sick. . . . “Recent statistics show that one person in four suffers from cardiovascular disease and one in five either from lung or kidney disease. Every second hospital death is because of heart disease, stroke, or cancer. . . . With an infant mortality rate of 35 per 1,000 (live births) and a newborn death rate of 29 per 1,000, Kosovo ranks lower than anywhere else in Europe, lower even than some developing countries.”

and types of imported goods have greatly increased to meet the expatriates’ demand. The ratio of imports to exports is 11 to 1.

Rents, taxi fees, and the prices restaurants and other establishments charge their customers have soared because the expatriates are able and willing to pay more for these goods and services. Salaries for Kosovars who work for IGOs and INGOs are several times higher than salaries Kosovars earn working for local governments, organizations, or the private sector. One NGO executive noted, “Now that the international agencies are beginning to downsize, local people who have worked for them and have gained skills are doing everything they can to leave Kosovo to go where they can make a better living. All of the services that have grown to meet the internationals’ demands—housing, restaurants, drivers, imports, and so on—are going to collapse when the internationals leave.”²¹

In the meantime, some economic success stories exist, including auto parts companies and Balkan Rubber, which exports fan belts and conveyor belts to Goodyear. The mushroom export business to Italy

is increasing. Kosovo has abundant coal and mineral resources to mine and export, and Kosovo can use these resources to generate electricity for domestic use and for export to Europe. Kosovo has successfully converted its currency from the German Mark to the Euro rather than to a nonconvertible currency like that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is another potential economic plus.

Agricultural experts say that Kosovo can meet 70 percent of its food requirements through improved agricultural practices, but the high level of imports of food from Macedonia, Albania, and Turkey is undermining Kosovo’s agricultural base and leading to an increasing dependence on imports. Many farmers who came to the cities during the conflict do not want to go back and work the land. They know that Kosovo imports so much food that they can no longer make a living farming.

One UNMIK official pointed out, “Kosovo is a suburb and will always be a suburb. Much of Kosovo’s economy will continue to depend on the money sent home by Kosovar guest workers living

elsewhere in Europe.”²² Because over 50 percent of Kosovo’s population is under 25 years old, Kosovo has a cheap domestic labor force available for work in Western Europe where labor forces are shrinking as the population ages. Kosovo has a powerful Diaspora, especially in Germany and the U.S., which can provide capital for Kosovo’s economic development, but this will not occur until crime and corruption abate.

Smuggling, trafficking, bribery, extortion, theft, money laundering, huge gray and black markets, the failure to collect taxes, import duties, and tariffs, and the growing presence of organized crime are undermining legitimate economic development in Kosovo. Recently a unit of the Italian guardia de finanza (financial inspection unit) came to Kosovo to investigate money-laundering, drug trafficking, and smuggling and to prevent money made from illegal activities from leaving Kosovo for use elsewhere.²³

The rule of law is improving in Kosovo. The local judiciary now deals with 100 percent of civil cases and 97 percent of criminal cases. Of 359 local judges, 4.8 percent are Kosovar Serbs, and 5.4 per-

cent are from other minority groups. Of the 46 local prosecutors, 2 percent are Kosovar Serbs, and 6 percent are from other minorities. Twenty-four percent of the local judiciary are women.²⁴ Another positive step is the development of the trafficking and prostitution investigation unit set up jointly with UNMIK and KPS to deal with trafficking in humans, particularly women.

Much still needs to be done. Recent international community polls show increasing dissatisfaction with the Kosovar government, which plays into the hands of criminal and nationalistic groups for whom a certain amount of chaos is beneficial. This also improves the climate for the substantial gray economy and black market.

Increased Employment

In Kosovo, as in many other formerly socialist countries, the onset of democracy has led to deindustrialization. The collapse of a socialist system in which virtually everyone had a job (such as it was) has increased unemployment. The facilities and equipment at SOEs were obsolete before the conflict and damaged and looted during the conflict, making it difficult for the SOEs to return to production. Many SOEs are derelict at present. For example, in Peja/Pec, former socialist enterprises employed more than 10,000 people in 1990 and now employ only 1,500.²⁵ The SOEs' privatization will help employment in the long run when these enterprises return to production, but meanwhile, an exodus of expatriates is causing Kosovo to lose many service-sector jobs and much of its economic base.

In early 2003, as noted, the Kosovo statistics office put the unemployment rate at 57 percent with even higher rates for rural people, members of minority groups, youth, and women.²⁶ The records of an NGO's prenatal clinic in old Pristina indicate that of the almost 2,000 Muslim women registered, 98.8 percent are unemployed, and 80 percent of their husbands are unemployed as well. Ten percent have had no schooling; 62 percent have had only an elementary school education; 25 percent have had some secondary school education; and only two percent have completed secondary school. Sixty-one percent live in families of 10 or more. Many Kosovars now realize that they must not have children they cannot afford and are seeking contraceptives, many for the first time.

Because industry is still quite limited, the public sector continues to be a major employer. Ninety percent of civil servants in ministries are Kosovar Albanians, 10 percent are from minority groups, and members of minority groups hold only 1.3 percent of management-level positions. Eighty-six percent of municipal workers are Kosovar Albanians, 11 per-

cent are Kosovar Serbs, and 3 percent are non-Serb minorities (Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, Turks, Bosniaks, and Goranis). Forty percent of municipal civil servants are women, but the percent of women who hold management positions is unknown.²⁷

Women make up a large proportion of the unemployed in Kosovo. There are many female-headed households because men are leaving the country for

The chairperson of the Kosovo's HIV/AIDS awareness technical group expressed concern that because of multiple risk factors in Kosovo, HIV will spread rapidly unless health officials take serious measures to educate the population. . . . He noted that before the war two or three houses of prostitution existed in the country, but now brothels and roadhouses "are like mushrooms after a rain."

employment as a result of the conflict. As a result, many INGOs and NGOs are focusing on helping women develop marketable skills. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assists many of these NGOs through the Kosovo Women's Initiative. Other NGOs are focusing on helping farmers improve their agricultural and livestock practices to increase production, generate surpluses they can market, and eventually develop an export capability.

Pension and Social Assistance

One of the most frightening aspects of the transition from socialism to capitalism is the loss of socialist safety nets such as full employment, free health care, and pensions, however small and irregularly paid. For older people, the loss of pensions and health care means the loss of security in retirement. For young people, the lack of social supports is yet another incentive for them to leave Kosovo as soon as they can.

In 2001, UNMIK's pensions policy was "to avoid recreating an old socialist pension system; to create a pension system that covers the whole population; to address the needs of all population groups and to seek a comprehensive solution addressing all ethnic groups."²⁸ Groups eligible for pensions include all persons over 65, whether they contributed to the previous pension system or not; previous recipients of disability and family or survivor pensions; older workers nearing retirement; and even some younger workers.²⁹

UNMIK Press Release 794 (31 July 2002) announced the introduction of the basic pension plan at the level of 28 euros per month.³⁰ The cost of



Serbian residents of Strpce, Kosovo, at a local middle school where 30 jobs with Brown and Root Services were to be offered, 15 August 2001.

Salaries for Kosovars who work for IGOs and INGOs are several times higher than salaries Kosovars earn working for local governments, organizations, or the private sector. One NGO executive noted, "Now that the international agencies are beginning to downsize, local people who have worked for them and have gained skills are doing everything they can to leave Kosovo to go where they can make a better living."

the average consumer basket of goods for subsistence is 52 euros per month.³¹ This shortfall between Kosovo's basic pension plan benefits and the cost of living is a major problem that the authorities must address, particularly given the current rate of inflation. Clearly, Kosovo has a long way to go to meet the needs of its elderly population, a social group whose numbers are increasing because many elderly in the Diaspora are returning home to Kosovo for their final years.

Integration of All Communities

Although the overwhelming majority of Kosovo's population is Albanian, significant communities of Serbs, Roma, Ashkalia, Egyptians, Muslim Slavs (Goranis), Bosniaks, and Turks exist. Many in these ethnic groups have experienced harassment and violations of their human rights since the 1999 conflict, and as a result, many have clustered into monoethnic enclaves where they feel more secure. For Ashkalia, Egyptians, and especially the Roma, discrimination in Europe is nothing new. They look physically different from most of the indigenous population. They stand out, which makes discriminating against them that much easier. Often Kosovars and others lump the three minorities together and refer to them as Gypsies—which is not a complimentary term.

In a January 2003 report on minority returnees to Kosovo, UNHCR noted that "to be safe, digni-

fied and sustainable, the return of members of the Serb, Roma, Ashkaelia, and Egyptian communities can only take place on a voluntary basis and in a gradual manner. The process should allow for careful preparation of the recipient communities including the promotion of tolerance and inter-ethnic dialogue."³²

Because of their experiences and fears, minority peoples often have only limited freedom of movement in Kosovo. For example, on the way to Strpce, I passed a convoy of Serbs with Serbian or Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)—not Kosovo (KS)—license plates on their vehicles. The Ukrainian KFOR was escorting them. The introduction of neutral KS license plates, which do not identify the owner's place of residence and thereby in many cases the owner's ethnicity, has greatly facilitated freedom of movement. KS license plates are legal throughout Europe; however, Serbia has refused to recognize KS plates. Thus many Kosovar Serbs must keep Serbian or old FRY plates on their vehicles all the time or at least when they go into Serbia.

The people with whom I spoke about the future of Kosovo's minorities had quite different views. Some, including members of minority communities, said that all should learn to live together in peace in a multiethnic society. A multiethnic society, enshrined in UNSCR 1244 and the current Special Representative of the Secretary General's priorities as a standard for independence for Kosovo, is the objective of the international community.

Others say the Kosovar Serbs should leave because they do not belong in Kosovo after what the Serbs did to the Kosovar Albanians for so many years. The "Serbian occupation of Kosovo," as Kosovar Albanians refer to the 10 years preceding the overt 1999 conflict, has left an indelible imprint on the majority Kosovar Albanians.

I saw the parallel system functioning when I worked in Kosovo in 1998. Serbs ran all of the official institutions. Kosovar Albanians were afraid to go to such Serb-run facilities as schools, hospitals, universities, law courts, and police stations, and they were generally barred from going to them even if they wanted to. Kosovar Albanians have not forgotten their experiences at the hands of the Serbs. No Kosovar Albanian with whom I talked considers reunification with Serbia a viable proposition. Most internationals with whom I spoke also see reunification as impossible.

An LDK member recently noted that young men in Kosovo's majority Muslim population suffer from high unemployment, poverty, and increasing hopelessness and warned that Islamist fundamentalists could take advantage of these conditions. Areas of high unemployment, poverty, and hopelessness are the breeding grounds not only for crime, but also for radicalism. In this regard, I see some worrisome symptoms that were not apparent in 1998 or 2001: Muslims are building many new mosques, although attendance is scant; more men are wearing full beards, not just mustaches; more women are wearing scarves in public; Saudi Arabia is involved in mosque and hospital construction and the purchase of amplifiers for the Muslim call to prayer; and suspect fundamentalist schools or madrassas are developing.

Kosovo has made essentially no progress in developing a viable economy and will not be able to do so until its final status is decided. In its current state of limbo, Kosovo cannot obtain funding from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank because it is not an independent country. Members of the substantial Kosovo Diaspora in Western Europe and North America who might invest in Kosovo are unwilling to do so because of what might happen to their investment because of Kosovo's current political uncertainties. Many believe that Kosovo could attract such investments and achieve a viable economy if it were independent, but it cannot become viably independent without external investments. Thus, a classic Catch-22 exists.

As one member of the UNHCR staff noted, women are not at the negotiating or planning table despite the fact that women worldwide have demonstrated that they can be key players in peacemaking and peacekeeping. Still, Kosovo requires much more involvement of women in planning and decisionmaking as it goes forward to independence and membership in the European Union (EU). Women can see that critical social needs such as obtaining better schools and health care are objectives of vital importance.³³ These issues are sometimes less of a priority for men. That women must

involve themselves in building a civil society is a fairly new idea in Kosovo, although some Kosovars are receptive to it.

In Annan's report to the UN Security Council on UNMIK in June 2003, he noted, "Unilateral calls from Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Serbs, and from Belgrade for mutually exclusive approaches to

Because over 50 percent of Kosovo's population is under 25 years old, Kosovo has a cheap domestic labor force available for work in Western Europe where labor forces are shrinking. Kosovo has a powerful Diaspora, especially in Germany and the U.S., which can provide capital for Kosovo's economic development, but this will not occur until crime and corruption abate.

Kosovo's future have continued. Such calls do not contribute to reconciliation and interethnic dialogue. On the one hand, the Kosovo Albanian leadership continues to call for an accelerated path toward Kosovo's independence. On the other hand, Belgrade continues to seek co-governance with UNMIK and, in lending acceptance to parallel structures, supports the boycott of UNMIK's policies and programs. Such public positions do not address the practical realities and challenges faced in normalizing the society in Kosovo and providing for the well being of its people. Indeed, they can have a detrimental effect on Kosovo's continued progress forward by entrenching mutually exclusive positions and thus undermining opportunities for dialogue and reconciliation."³⁴ Talks between Pristina and Belgrade continue, but they are not going well; progress, even on such minor issues as license plate recognition, is not being made.

A UNMIK colleague has described the question of Kosovo's final status as follows: "Final status is a can of gasoline with a tight lid, but a lot of people are playing with matches. Bosnia was exhausted by its war, and few there would want to go to war again, but the war in Kosovo was short and many issues remain unresolved. Therefore, more violence in Kosovo is likely, particularly if independence is denied. The Serbs in Kosovo are still holding out for Serbia to save them. It's a fantasy that Belgrade will save them. Serbia has no moral or viable claim to Kosovo. Many Kosovar Albanians fear the return of Kosovar Serbs means also the return of Serbia. They feel that Europe sold Kosovo out before and will do so again."³⁵

Many people with whom I have spoken emphasized the need for the U.S. to take an active role in

Kosovar Albanians have not forgotten their experiences at the hands of the Serbs. No Kosovar Albanian with whom I talked considers reunification with Serbia a viable proposition. . . . Many believe that Kosovo could . . . achieve a viable economy if it were independent, but it cannot become viably independent without external investments. Thus, a classic Catch-22 exists.

shaping Kosovo's future. An LDK member of the Assembly said emphatically, "Kosovo will not accept the EU lead here, only that of the U.S."³⁶ She realizes that the U.S. is preoccupied with the war on terrorism, Iraq, and a peaceful settlement in Palestine, but she believes that U.S. leadership in the transition of Kosovo to independence is essential. She believes Kosovo should wait until the U.S. is ready to take the lead rather than force the issue of independence now.

Kosovo's final boundaries are also an issue. The potential for partition exists, with a portion of the Presevo Valley becoming part of Kosovo in exchange for the mining area north of Mitrovica going to Serbia (which reportedly wants it). But many believe that changes in Kosovo's borders would set a precedent and cause other Balkan states to demand border changes. Attempts to change a number of borders could precipitate a regional war. An LDK assembly member believes Kosovo's and the region's stability depends on maintaining the integrity of independent Kosovo's borders. Concerns about a Greater Albania are unfounded, she believes, since all Balkan states realize that their future is as

part of the EU. She also believes that Montenegro will separate from Serbia in 2006 and seek its independence, which is another reason for Kosovo to seek its independence from Serbia. Again, such a move could open a Balkans' Pandora's box.

Building a Viable Future

All of the peoples of Kosovo have suffered at each other's hands and at the hands of outsiders. The time for revenge is past; the time to unite to build a viable future in Kosovo is at hand. To paraphrase Mahatma Gandhi, if Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs and Kosovo's other ethnic groups continue to take an eye for an eye, soon all in Kosovo will be blind.

Resolving the final status for Kosovo in a peaceful, equitable manner for all Kosovars regardless of their ethnicity might yet turn out to be the critical issue in building and maintaining stability throughout the Balkans. The United States and Europe have a vital interest in a stable Balkans.

KFOR commander General Fabio Mini has said that he believes KFOR will continue in its present form for at least 5 years.³⁷ He said KFOR could hand over its duties one day to troops from Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia-Montenegro, Albania, and Kosovo, operating under a NATO umbrella. He believes that unification of these armed forces could contribute to unification of the fragile Balkans after a decade of bloody ethnic conflicts. NATO officials quickly emphasized that this is Mini's idea and not NATO policy. The idea, however, is novel, and one that could enable the Balkan states to achieve and maintain their own stability. That would be good news indeed for people who have been through so many traumas. **MR**

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Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Kolenda
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OVER THE PAST 19 YEARS, I have been fortunate to have served with and studied under some great officers and non-commissioned officers from whom I have gleaned the following 10 examples of excellence in leadership.

"Those fools at Platoon Headquarters!" the soldier grumbles. Substitute (whatever echelon of command you wish) and still many soldiers will say that their superiors are incompetent, misguided, or just plain dumb. Generally, the farther away the headquarters is geographically and in level of responsibility, the more vociferous are the complaints against it. True incompetents do exist, but most leaders are hard-working folks trying to do the best they can with the resources available to make their units, the Army, and the world a better place. Some policies and decisions are not good, and might even be silly, but where one stands is often determined by where one sits. Decisions at platoon headquarters might be great for the platoon but not so great for 3d Squad. The necessity for (or wisdom of) policies and decisions at one level might not be apparent at another level.

One response is to spew bile and venom at the powers-that-be. Venting one's spleen can be a catharsis. You can appear to have far greater wisdom than those of much higher rank and greater experience and even become a prophet with a circle of devotees. This is the strategy for those who enjoy spitting into the wind. Focusing intellectual and emotional energy on something one cannot influence or control is self-defeating.

A more productive approach is to tend your own garden. Make your squad, platoon, or battalion the best place it can possibly be. Focus your talents and energies on areas you can directly influence and control. Make life better and more meaningful for those around you. Be committed to excellence in every facet of existence. Sometimes I have lousy

Many soldiers will say that their superiors are incompetent, misguided, or just plain dumb. Generally, the farther away the headquarters is geographically and in level of responsibility, the more vociferous are the complaints against it.

When we analyze why an individual or unit failed to accomplish what we wanted, the reason is often unclear expectations and poor guidance. . . . If you work for someone who provides fuzzy expectations, read back for possible correction until you know what the person wants.

neighbors, sometimes a lousy neighborhood. Nevertheless, my garden is mine to tend. How we live our lives in a moral sense is up to each one of us. The same can be said in large measure about our units: the quality of excellence is up to us.

One way of tending your garden is to pick your battles. Beyond our area of control is another area, the area of influence, which we do not control but which we can help shape. Events in the area of influence affect our gardens, but events we control in our gardens can also affect the area of influence.

Sometimes events in our areas of influence have a marginal, but annoying effect in the areas we control. Although there is little reason to stew over these effects, people do so, and eventually become like the little boy who cried wolf. Because of all the noise made making mountains out of molehills, the important issues get lost. When we complain about everything, those around us cannot decide which problems are truly important and which are merely annoying. Eventually, we become the annoyance, and what we regard as the truly important issue gets lost. Fighting everything, like attempting to be strong everywhere tactically, undermines effectiveness. The focus should be on the important battles. Your commander will appreciate that you can make the distinction, and so will your unit. You will also find that you generally “win” when you pick your battles, and so do those around you.

Those who tend their gardens discover that excellence is infectious. People want to be on winning teams, and they want to make their teams winners. Engaging in petty rivalries and jealousies is counterproductive. Do not play such silly games. Focus on excellence and those around you will follow suit. Winners contribute to their surroundings; losers complain about them. Winners are problem solvers; losers are problem identifiers. Be a winner.

If the issue or idea is bigger than your unit and chain of command, and if you have a solution that would contribute to the force as a whole, write an article and make a difference. There is no accountability in merely complaining; not much courage is required. But there is plenty of accountability when you sign your name to a journal article. Professionals respect accountability; they know the power of ideas and solutions. People who want to excel read the insights and ideas of others and use them to make themselves and their gardens better. A good article can make a difference.

Clarify Expectations and Enforce Standards

Clear expectations produce good results. People generally want to do well. When we make expectations clear, people tend to rise to the occasion to meet them. When we analyze why an individual or unit failed to accomplish what we wanted, the reason is often unclear expectations and poor guidance. Few things are more demoralizing than to believe you have done a good job, only to be told that you have completely missed the mark. Articulating expectations and having subordinates read back (the guidance) for possible correction is an excellent way to train someone. If you work for someone who provides fuzzy expectations, read back for possible correction until you know what the person wants.

Incidentally, the read-back technique works wonders in resolving what appear to be ethical dilemmas. For example, a commander once told a

lieutenant to make sure everyone in his platoon had a score on his physical training (PT) card for an upcoming inspection. One soldier did not have a current PT score because he had suffered an injury and had been in a cast for several months. The lieutenant thought the commander was implying that he should submit a fictitious score for the soldier and thus make a false statement on an official document. Even the sleaziest boss would hesitate to say, "I want you to falsify a document," or "Yes, I want you to lie, cheat, and steal." When the lieutenant asked the commander to clarify his statement, the commander told him he certainly did not want any documents falsified.

One of the best ways to clarify expectations is to enforce standards. For a "super trooper" to be treated no differently than a problem soldier is demoralizing. Why exert all that effort if no one cares? Enforcing standards demonstrates that what we say is important and what we do is consistent. Making policies that we do not enforce sends the message that standards are not important.

When enforcing standards, explain why they are important.

If discipline means doing what is right, then education is the critical component of discipline. Education helps promote ownership of Army standards. Soldiers will be far more willing to meet standards when they understand their importance and do not regard them as mere harassment.

Recognizing and rewarding good performance goes a long way toward promoting excellence. Giving people a pat on the back, a thank you, or some public recognition is important. U.S. Army General Bruce Clarke once said, "Morale is a function of knowing what you are doing is important, doing it well, and knowing it is appreciated."¹

Clarifying expectations does not mean handholding or telling people how to do their jobs. Simply express what you want done and why and then unleash your subordinates' creativity to accomplish the mission. How much guidance you give depends on the amount of trust and confidence you have in one another. Knowing what to do is knowing the letter of the law; knowing why you do it is knowing its spirit. Making the what and why clear enables subordinates to take meaningful initiatives, and they might even succeed beyond expectations.

US Army



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Set the Example

The “do as I say, not as I do” style of leadership is demoralizing and can initiate a downward spiral of loss of faith and respect between superior and subordinate. Strive to be the toughest member of the team, the best soldier in the unit, and a moral and ethical example to others. Be able to look at soldiers and say, “Do it just like I do.” You will most likely not be the best in all (or even any) categories of achievement, but soldiers will respect your commitment to excellence.

Leaders who enjoy fun and competition should try the “Gunga Din” competition, which was inspired by Rudyard Kipling’s poem of the same name.² The competition pits the leader and sponsor against everyone else in the unit in a test of skill, endurance, and toughness. One version of the game incorporates running, swimming, and marksmanship; another includes an Army physical fitness test that includes a 4-mile run and a 12-mile foot march in full field uniform with loaded rucksack. Leaders should keep a Gunga Din competition mission-focused and fun but make it a stretching experience. Pushing yourself and the unit to the limits of endurance is important in building perseverance and toughness. The amount of mutual respect and bonding such an exercise promotes is tremendous.

Managers get paid to make decisions, but leaders get paid to make decisions *and* set the example in implementing them. Leaders must be visible, share hardships, and be the best. Being with your soldiers sets a great example and demonstrates that you are a leader who cares.

Celebrate Failure

Sometimes a leader must go to extremes to get rid of zero-defects and risk-averse perceptions. The idea of celebrating failure is a bold, and fairly common, concept in the business world.³ If you do not fail routinely, then you are not pushing the envelope of ideas and technology hard enough. Although several projects might fail, some will succeed, and ideas from failed projects might help improve others. Over the long run, innovation and creativity produce order-of-magnitude breakthroughs in concept, design, and implementation. Fostering innovation, creative problem solving, and risk-taking is critical to maintaining vitality, enthusiasm, and excellence.

Failure is not an option on the battlefield, but it certainly is in training and other operations and programs. In fact, creativity and innovation can result in radical improvements in individual and unit performance; the quality of organizational systems; and warfighting concepts, all of which have obvious relationships to battlefield excellence.

Too often our response when something is not working as well as we would like for it to is to “try harder”; that is, plan a better wargame, improve a maintenance program, get the indirect-fires system under control, or fix “Sergeant’s Time.” “Try harder” is a sure-fire way to get nowhere when people are doing their best under a prevailing paradigm. Instead of asking them to try harder, how about asking them to think differently? Allow people to think in different ways to improve performance, and then unleash them and see what happens. Use ideas from other units, from other professions, and from other fields of study to stimulate creative thought. Doing so is a great way to use a stretching experience to build confidence, expand thinking, and improve the organization.

Creativity and innovation do, however, need focus and direction. We can drown ourselves in good ideas. Hyperactivity generally creates more problems than it solves. Some things are not broken and do not need fixing; others are not broken but could use improvement. Educating people on the difference is important. Look for areas that need improvement, tell people what you want done and why, and then help guide them. The trust and confidence given to others will be rewarded in their enthusiasm, ownership of standards, and excellence. Soldiers will amaze you with their ingenuity, and when they succeed, even partially, praise them in public.

A leader who promotes creativity and change must have the maturity to accept that not all will turn out well. There is no better way to bring improvement to a halt than to punish someone when honest innovation goes awry. Innovation rarely comes from a unit commanded by a screamer.

When a project fails, praise the individual publicly for having the guts to try something new, look for the golden nuggets in the effort that the unit can use, and take the time to see if the effort can be directed onto another vector. Chances are you will see plenty of ways to use the innovations and ideas embedded in the project.

Celebrate failure. Try something new and have the maturity to write off mistakes along the way. The road to excellence is not smooth; it is bumpy and full of high adventure; it is fun, painful, daunting, exciting, and rewarding.

Be Humble

Humility and courage are complementary qualities and admitting mistakes takes courage. Asking for and accepting feedback, especially from subordinates, and listening patiently and thoughtfully to the insights and ideas of others, particularly when they do not agree with yours, is difficult. Few people have earned respect who have not admitted mistakes, accepted feedback, or listened to others.

Screamers and beraters are among the world's most insecure people. They lack confidence, courage, and humility. They use fear to control their subordinates, and while they might be able to manage their

US Army



Managers get paid to make decisions, but leaders get paid to make decisions and set the example in implementing them. Leaders must be visible, share hardships, and be the best. Being with your soldiers sets a great example and demonstrates that you are a leader who cares.

Strive to be the toughest member of the team, the best soldier in the unit, and a moral and ethical example to others. . . . You will most likely not be the best in all (or even any) categories of achievement, but soldiers will respect your commitment to excellence.

subordinates, they will never lead them. The best leaders are humble, and because they are humble, they can bring out the best in others.

Real leaders promote the idea that disagreement does not equal disrespect. The best leaders revel in disagreement because they know that independent thinking is the only way to discover the best solutions to problems. And, independent thinking cannot occur in an environment that demands blind obedience. The magic of exchanging ideas is getting to know what and how other people think. Having faith and confidence in each other's performance in uncertain and ambiguous situations is the key to initiative.

Leaders can promote independent thinking in several ways. They can set up a tactical problem on a map or terrain board and have subordinates work independently on solutions. They can have them read an article and then go out to lunch with them and discuss it. They should challenge their subordinates to take a stand on issues. And, they should not only challenge their subordinates' ideas, they should allow subordinates to challenge theirs.

Leaders should get feedback from subordinates during routine counseling. Often, the most meaningful feedback comes from our subordinates rather than our superiors. But, they will only tell us the full truth if they know we are genuine, if they know disagreement does not equal disrespect, if they see us take action on their feedback, and if they know that what they say is not going to be held against them. Being a leader is not a popularity contest. Feedback is a dialogue among professionals to improve the organization. Leaders should also get feedback in group settings. A selected group should submit in advance what the unit should sustain and what it should improve. The leader should separate the issues into what is not going to change (and why); what cannot be changed (and why); what will change immediately; and what will require long-term effort.

Give feedback on subordinates' feedback. Let them know when you implement one of their ideas, and tell them how the idea has improved the unit. Listening to subordinates and acting on their input strengthens the fabric of mutual trust and respect. A good leader should have the courage and confidence to be humble, listen to others, set the example, and foster healthy disagreement and the exchange of ideas and insights.

Pay It Forward: Be A Mentor

Have you ever tried to pay back a mentor? Have you ever felt helpless in trying to do so? If so, that is because you cannot pay back a mentor, and real mentors would not want you to. What they want you to do is to "pay it forward." They want you to mentor someone else and make a difference in that person's life. That is what mentoring and perpetuating professional excellence is about. The following paragraphs detail some ideas I have picked up from great leaders.

Counsel. Take the time once a month or once a quarter to sit down with subordinates and talk. Do it over lunch or while at PT if you do not like the office setting. Rather than just providing direct feedback, make it a conversation. Reaffirm expectations, areas of focus, and issues from last time. Ask the counseled soldier what he thinks are his strengths and weaknesses, then work together on strategies he can use to sustain and improve his performance. Interject as necessary, ask leading questions, and help the soldier bring up the issues. Write down the strengths, weak-

nesses, and strategies discussed; establish ways to monitor implementation; and use them as a springboard for the next session. This active method of counseling is effective because it gets the counseled person involved in a meaningful way. You should also help with career counseling. Soldiers like to know leaders are working on their behalf, trying to fashion ideas and options that are rewarding and fulfilling for them. At the end of the session, ask the soldier for feedback on how you can improve as a leader, how you can make his job go more smoothly, and how you can help him excel. Write this down, too, and use the next session to monitor your improvement. This technique takes humility but is effective.

Professional development. The unit no doubt has formal professional-development programs, but develop your own informal program. Set a time once a week to go out to lunch and discuss an article or idea of professional relevance. Discuss tactical problems. Use the opportunity to hone the intellect. Exchange ideas, argue, or work together on how to implement solutions. Possessing intellectual depth and courage helps people cope with uncertainty and complexity. Having a professional-development program also shows that you care about leader development and about the people with whom you work.

Mentoring takes time and effort. Because it seems like something that is just nice to do, mentoring often becomes the first thing cut in favor of other meetings, projects, and so forth. If you have only a short-term view of things, such a practice makes sense. But over time, mentoring will help propel the organization to greater heights. Showing someone that you care enough to spend your time demonstrates that he is an important member of the team. Mentoring helps sustain a sense of fulfillment both for the mentored and the mentor. There are few greater joys than to see those you mentor excel.

Show You Care

Caring is important enough to be highlighted by itself. Caring comes in myriad forms, including providing high-quality training, sound equipment, and a good quality of life for soldiers and their families, which are all basic necessities. Mentoring soldiers means getting to know them and their families as people; getting them into schools; and giving them the time and opportunity to go to family events and to take care of their personal needs. This hits closer to home. Demonstrating that you care

US Army



When leaders demonstrate they truly care, bonds of trust and respect grow stronger. Soldiers and their families will have confidence that the leader cares. They will know that if the soldier must go to war, he will be well led and well cared for and not treated as an object to be tossed casually into the cauldron.

A leader who promotes creativity and change must have the maturity to accept that not all will turn out well. There is no better way to bring improvement to a halt than to punish someone when honest innovation goes awry. Innovation rarely comes from a unit commanded by a screamer.

about people as individuals rather than as personnel or “human resources” is absolutely critical.

Most great leaders are good with names. They do not need to read from a three-by-five card to discuss subordinates’ accomplishments at a promotion, award, or farewell. They visit family members in the hospital. They write letters to spouses or parents after subordinates get awards or promotions, explaining why the person is valuable to the unit and the Army. When leaders demonstrate they truly care, bonds of trust and respect grow stronger. Soldiers and their families will have confidence that the leader cares. They will know that if the soldier must go to war, he will be well led and well cared for and not treated as an object to be tossed casually into the cauldron.

Caring takes time and effort, but then, anything worthwhile takes time and effort. Take the time and effort to show others they are valuable members of the team.

Treat People with Respect

Respect begins with the conviction that all members of the human race are created equal despite differences in appearance, aptitudes, and talents. No one group is superior to another. Those who understand this know the absurdity of racism, sexism, and other ideologies and phobias that attempt to reduce certain groups to the status of lower life forms. People who believe in the fundamental equality of all see people for who they are. They see what is inside rather than what is only skin deep. They see great potential in each individual.

Professional respect requires that we recognize and value the unique contribution of every individual in the organization. Certainly some people, given their talents and dedication, contribute more than others less able or less motivated. Leaders must understand the distinction between personal respect and professional respect. People who add more value to the organization deserve and earn more professional respect.

Treating people with respect requires us to tell them when they fail to meet Army standards. Not correcting a mistake or deficiency sends a subtle message that the individual is not worth our time because he is either incapable of meeting standards or not important enough to be bothered with.

Respect goes hand-in-hand with caring. When we show soldiers that we care about them, we demonstrate by our actions that we respect them, and we help them grow personally and professionally. As the German philosopher Goethe once said, “Treat a man as he is and he will remain as he is. Treat him as he can be and should be, and he will become what he can be and should be.”⁴

People want to be treated with respect as human beings and as contributors to the unit. They want to know that their contributions are meaningful and important. When they know they are contributing to the common good, they have a sense of fulfillment.

Be Trustworthy

The foundation of every healthy relationship is trust. Relationships usually fail because of an actual or perceived breach of trust. Just as he earns professional respect, a leader must earn trust. Good leaders are worthy of trust. They possess good character and professional competence. They create meaningful goals that generate excitement, and they

offer coherent plans to meet those goals. They make sound and timely decisions, set the example, uplift those around them to be better, and they care about others and treat them with respect. They do the right thing.

Mutual trust fosters initiative and inculcates a greater sense of responsibility. People who trust one another share a bond of faith and understanding. Leaders who trust their subordinates can loosen the reins and unleash creative energies. Mutual trust in competence, discipline, character, and sound judgment is a requirement for independent initiative.

Trust, which is the foundation of morale, is the first principle of leadership and the emotion that holds an organization together. Trust is the genesis of faith in oneself, one's comrades, one's leaders, and one's unit. The best leaders use the principle of trust to guide their actions and decisions. Trustworthy leaders create high-performing units that have superb morale.

Leave a Legacy of Excellence

Great leaders leave a legacy of excellence for the unit by creating compellingly effective systems and leaving the systems in place when they, themselves, leave. The test of the systems' excellence comes when a leader's successor arrives. If the successor understands the logic and the effectiveness of the systems the previous leader has put in place and keeps those systems in place, the previous leader will have succeeded. Viable systems sustain predictability and balance, and because the best systems do not depend on a leader's personality, units do not need to reinvent the wheel after every transition. A unit with sound systems in place can sustain excellence over a long period.

More important, great leaders leave a legacy in the hearts, minds, and souls of the people they lead. In this regard, there are three types of leaders. There are the nameless, faceless ones we quickly forget because they had little or no effect on us. There are those we remember because they were untrustworthy, treated others without respect, and cared for no one. We remember them because they were so dysfunctional that their negative example is etched in our minds as a model to avoid at all costs. Finally, there are those exceptional leaders we will always remember because of the lifelong positive effect they have had on us. We remember the great examples they set; we remember what they taught us. At a moment's notice, we can recall their faces, names, and the profound effect they had on our lives. They were trustworthy, earned our respect, and genuinely cared about us. Their legacy is the example of excellence that shaped us. They touched our souls. They never asked for anything in return. They embodied what it means to be a leader.

Many leaders get great results, but obtaining great results is not proof of great leadership. We have plenty of people who can get results; they are a dime a dozen. But, for the great leader, great results are merely a byproduct of bringing out the best in others. Such leaders are personal and national treasures. Cultivate them. *MR*

Failure is not an option on the battlefield, but it certainly is in training and other operations and programs. . . . If you do not fail routinely, then you are not pushing the envelope of ideas and technology hard enough. Although several projects might fail, some will succeed, and ideas from failed projects might help improve others.

NOTES

1. General Bruce C. Clarke, quoted in *The Military Quotation Book*, ed. James Charlton (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002), 134.

2. Rudyard Kipling, *Gunga Din and Other Favorite Poems* (New York: Dover Publications), 1990.

3. See John R. Brandt, "Brandt On Leadership—Creativity's True Costs," on-line at <www.industryweek.com/Columns/asp/columns.asp?ColumnId=855>.

4. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, quoted on-line at <<http://gladstone.uoregon.edu/~mlewis/q-goethe.html>>.

Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives

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AIR-GROUND cooperation (AGC) is the interaction of air and ground forces to ensure the synchronization, coordination, and integration of air operations with the joint commander's campaign plan. Current warfare is moving into an era of dramatic political, technological, and doctrinal change, so AGC must keep pace.

Over the years, there have been persistent concerns regarding AGC's effectiveness, responsiveness, and efficiency. Controversies over Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan and special operations forces (SOF) actions in northern Iraq, for example, are simply the latest in a string of such concerns that stretch back to World War II.¹

Ground officers have complained that air support is too often insufficient in both volume and timeliness. Airmen's response is that ground officers have too limited a focus and are uninformed on the nature of air operations. The services need to identify the factors that have most often led to trouble and highlight instances where innovation has improved joint operations.

Factors for Discord

The services' unique characteristics reflect their inherent strengths and limitations. Wise commanders and planners search for the best joint mix and the best concept of operations that will maximize individual components' strengths while masking or minimizing their limitations. Nonetheless, the funda-

mental differences between the services, based on the medium in which they primarily operate, plus decades of cultural traditions and institutional history, give soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines unique perspectives on war.

Service cultures. The services have distinct personalities that shape force structure and doctrine. Their cultural inclinations result from historical experiences that resonate deeply within each service.² For example, in the past, Air Force interest in strategic bombing led to Army perceptions that the Air Force did not take AGC seriously. This doubt was reinforced in Korea and Vietnam where the Air Force was not prepared to conduct effective tactical air operations at the outset of hostilities. Although airmen quickly addressed the problems, concerns remained. Those concerns led to complaints as well as attempts to assign Air Force fighter-bombers directly to ground units and to develop combat helicopters that could provide traditional close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI).

Similarly, the Marine Corps recalls the events that occurred at Guadalcanal, where marines were dependent on Navy gunfire and carrier-based aircraft for fire support. The fear of Japanese air and naval attack caused the aircraft carriers to leave the marines on the beach without fire support. To prevent a recurrence, the Marine Corps eventually formed marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), which were combined arms units designed to work together

Airmen also often see long-range strike as most supportive of the joint force commander's goals. If the intent is to shape the battlefield, then hitting the enemy as far back as possible seems logical. In this view, it is wiser to destroy enemy tanks, trucks, and infantrymen before they close with friendly forces. . . . To the soldier, the immediate battle is of paramount importance, so he would accord CAS the highest priority. Interdiction of enemy reinforcements would be of little importance if friendly forces were overrun in the meantime.

as a single force. The Marine Corps has resisted all attempts to split the MAGTF by assigning its forces—air or ground—to another service.

Perspective. Perspective is another source of contention. The Air Force maintains that an aircraft's ability to strike anywhere within a theater means that air leaders must think in a similarly broad vein. On the other hand, ground commanders' concerns have traditionally been with the area to their front, stretching out to perhaps 30 miles. Although concerned about activities beyond that, their interest is not as immediate. This issue has received increased visibility because a number of the Army's organic fire support weapons now have enhanced range capabilities.³ More important, the rapid move on Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom by U.S. ground forces signaled a dramatic new capability. If ground commanders can shoot deep and move deep quickly, they will be more inclined to think deep.

Battle rhythms. The services' different battle rhythms, operational tempos, and planning cycles are also at issue. In the case of land combat, for example, there exists a phenomenon known as the culminating point, where operations surge forward but then slow down to allow soldiers to regroup, rest, and bring fuel, food, ammunition, and supplies forward. This pause is generally preparatory to another surge, as for example, the 3-day halt outside Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom preparatory to the final drive on the city.

In air operations, a culminating point seldom exists. Instead, airmen generally conduct combat air operations at a high pace for an indefinite period. In Operation Allied Force, NATO air assets, although dependent on political constraints as well as weather, operated at a high and nearly continuous tempo for 78 straight days.

Air and ground operations' planning cycles are dissimilar. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) or the coalition force air component commander (CFACC) develops the air tasking order (ATO) that manages all theater air assets. Although

the JFACC or CFACC updates the ATO daily, planning begins 72 hours in advance of each day's operation. Historically, the ATO has left room for operational flexibility during execution, including the ability to respond to immediate and time-sensitive targets. Flexibility occurs through scheduling sorties that have no designated targets. Aircraft take off and report to a specific area or controller for directions.

Commanders submit routine ground-force requests for air support in advance through tactical air control parties at each ground headquarters from battalion to corps. The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or the coalition force land component commander (CFLCC) prioritizes air requests. Once having consolidated the prioritized air support request, the JFACC develops the ATO.

The JFLCC also has a theaterwide focus, which is reflected in the objectives that he assigns to subordinate units during each phase of an operation. The JFLCC's operations order (OPORD) defines overall land-force objectives, describes the enemy threat, assigns missions, allocates forces to the various corps, and provides guidance applicable to the immediate battle area.

The OPORD-generation process, repeated at each ground-force echelon, has a threat, objective, and task organization peculiar to its mission and geographic sector. Each OPORD's primary components include a scheme of maneuver and a fire support plan plus annexes for other supporting activities. The ground planning staff initiates OPORD components before an operation. Rarely does this occur 72 hours in advance. Often, new OPORDs result from a changing threat; a revised objective or mission statement; or a requirement to move beyond existing sector boundaries. Each new OPORD results in intense, time-sensitive planning activities. Ordinarily, the ground-planning staff can generate a corps OPORD and a nested family of supporting OPORDs in a matter of hours. In short, the respective planning cycles for air (deliberate and orderly) and of ground (episodic and reactive) staffs do not

In air operations, a culminating point seldom exists. Instead, airmen generally conduct combat air operations at a high pace for an indefinite period. . . . The respective planning cycles for air (deliberate and orderly) and of ground (episodic and reactive) staffs do not always synchronize with each other because of the unique nature of their respective operations.

always synchronize with each other because of the unique nature of their respective operations.

Prioritizing air assets. Because of the differences in perspective and rhythms, air and ground officers often disagree regarding air priorities. Airmen see gaining air superiority as the joint force's primary objective, although the services often differ on how best to attain that air superiority. For example, the Air Force wants air superiority gained quickly over the entire theater so it can conduct other air operations simultaneously without threat. Attaining this degree of dominance usually entails an offensive campaign to destroy or neutralize the enemy's air force, his command and control (C2) system, and his ground-based air defenses. The last is important. If enemy air defenses are left intact, some friendly air missions, such as AI, CAS, reconnaissance, and airlift, which are essential to the joint force, can become problematic. The other services do not always see such all-encompassing air superiority as necessary. Soldiers and marines are most concerned with the air above their heads, and sailors are most concerned with the air above their fleet.

Airmen also often see long-range strike as most supportive of the joint force commander's goals. If the intent is to shape the battlefield, then hitting the enemy as far back as possible seems logical. In this view, it is wiser to destroy enemy tanks, trucks, and infantrymen before they close with friendly forces. As a result, AI is often seen as a more effective and, thus, a higher priority mission than is CAS. A common metaphor that airmen use is that of attempting to dam a waterfall; it is far easier to stop it at its source above rather than stand at the bottom with a handful of buckets.⁴ To the soldier, the immediate battle is of paramount importance, so he would accord CAS the highest priority. Interdiction of enemy reinforcements would be of little importance if friendly forces were overrun in the meantime.

In truth, airmen do not see things so starkly. When friendly forces are in danger, commanders divert all air assets to protect them. However, the military

should not use airpower as a substitute for artillery. If organic fire support is available, it should be used. Only if fire support is inadequate should there be a request for airpower. Still, airmen jettison this view when air assets are abundant. For example, in South Vietnam, the Air Force flew nearly 4 million sorties in support of ground forces; over 633,000 were classified as CAS.⁵

Another exception to airmen's belief in the efficacy of AI over CAS concerns the Marine Corps. Before World War II the Marine Corps developed a doctrine of amphibious operations that employed a quick, sharp, unexpected assault against a defended coastline. Because of the emphasis on speed and agility, the Marine Corps did not have the organic firepower (heavy artillery or tanks) necessary to ensure force protection over an extended period. Carrier-based air or naval gunfire would instead provide fire support. All involved expected that such operations would either be over quickly or that soldiers, who came equipped with their own fire support, would replace the marines.

After World War II, marines were not often used as amphibious strike forces. They performed the more traditional role of ground troops, such as at Khe Sanh during the Vietnam war. They used airpower as a substitute for organic fire support assets. This model has both pluses and minuses; Marine Corps air forces are highly responsive and effective, but they are inefficient in dollar terms. The question is has the evolving nature of modern war altered this cost-benefit relationship?

Fratricide and risk. The key area of discord among the services is the issue of fratricide and risk. The issue most directly affects the problems of responsiveness and misunderstanding. Although the services experience differing tempos and cycles, they are alike in sharing a fear of fratricide. Friendly fire is a depressing fact. During World War II, 2 percent of all Army combat deaths were caused by fratricide. In some cases, fratricide was ground-on-ground (57 percent); in others, it was air-on-ground (37 percent) or ground-on-air (6 percent).⁶ The problem has not disappeared. During Operation

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Desert Storm, nearly 25 percent of all U.S. combat casualties were caused by fratricide.⁷ In Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Patriot batteries shot down the first two coalition fixed-wing aircraft lost. Soon after, an Air Force A-10 attacked U.S. marines.

Besides the increased lethality and accuracy of U.S. weapons, battlespace nonlinearity has been a major problem in Afghanistan and Iraq (as it was in Vietnam and Kosovo). Time-honored methods of designating positions by lines on a map are less useful in a nonlinear battlespace. Identification and location problems are more complex because of the increased presence of coalition or indigenous ground forces, with which U.S. forces have had only limited cooperation in the past. An added complication is the increasing prevalence of small, mobile targets.

Related to the issue of fratricide is the growing concern over risk to aircrews. Beginning with Operation Desert Storm, the United States has sustained amazingly light casualties in combat. In the 78-day Operation Allied Force, for example, only two NATO aircraft were shot down, and both pilots were quickly recovered. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, only one aircraft was lost to enemy fire, and the pilot was recovered. Such events have set a high bar for U.S. military operations. In fact, during Operation Allied Force, NATO commander General Wesley K. Clark specifically instructed his CFACC that a prime consideration of the air campaign was to minimize friendly air losses. NATO cohesion was shaky, and he feared that significant aircrew casualties would split the alliance and end the operation.⁸



An A-1E Skyraider attacks Vietcong guerrillas, 1965.

Fratricide and risk have had an increasingly major effect on AGC. The unusually bloodless conflicts of the past 12 years have made political leaders somewhat risk averse. Military commanders have responded by implementing more stringent rules of engagement

(ROE) and tactical procedures.⁹ In some cases this has resulted in elaborate identification methods for friendly ground troops and their precise locations. But, with attempts to limit fratricide come complications. In Afghanistan and Iraq there were “no engagement zones,” “limited engagement zones,” “special engagement zones,” and “special operations areas,” all of which had their own ROE and which were often controlled by different agencies or services that were not necessarily in direct or continual contact with each other.

Another tension within the fratricide and risk issue concerns platforms and ordnance employed. Air ordnance might have several desirable characteristics—speed, accuracy, persistence, lethality, cost, and availability—that dictate what weapons and platforms forces need. But, such flexibility is difficult to achieve. Although a force might need a stealthy platform because of enemy air defenses, F-117s or B-2s might be unavailable. Similarly, although aircraft might contain high-explosive bombs, the target might require cluster bomb units. Attempting to match platforms and ordnance with targets, especially targets of a pop-up nature, is a challenging proposition.¹⁰ As a result, the military is developing the following:

- “Dial-a-yield” and “dial-a-fuze” weapons, which can be set in the cockpit.
- Small diameter bombs.

A number of the Army's organic fire support weapons now have enhanced range capabilities. More important, the rapid move on Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom by U.S. ground forces signaled a dramatic new capability. If ground commanders can shoot deep and move deep quickly, they will be more inclined to think deep.

- Standoff weapons, which could employ both laser and Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance.

- Personal transponders to keep track of friendly forces.

- Improved sensors and data links to both the cockpit and the ground.

In a more general and more important sense, however, the desire to avoid fratricide and risk has meant a dramatically increased need for battlespace awareness. Ground and air forces must be aware of the precise location of friendly forces as well as enemy forces, potential targets, enemy air defense sites, and civilian personnel and facilities. Only by possessing such broad yet detailed intelligence can joint commanders confidently employ force.

New or improved sensors such as unmanned aerial vehicles, satellite imagery, and aerial reconnaissance are addressing the expanding intelligence need. In addition, ground forces can use GPS receivers to determine accurately their own positions—regardless of the terrain or weather—as well as that of the enemy. Ground forces could then pass enemy coordinates directly to strike aircraft.

The cost of developing the requisite sensors, interfaces, and analysts is not the only downside to this enhanced sensor-to-shooter capability. The extra time required to employ such systems is also a factor. Commanders, increasingly mindful of ensuring the accurate, safe employment of force, often take more time to reach a decision than was the case when they had less input to consider.

Old concerns regarding the timeliness of air support—in the past often a function of technological limitations—are now more apt to be the result of an elongated decision cycle occurring at headquarters; it is a human problem. Operations in Afghanistan seemed to confirm this new twist to an old problem.¹¹ Fortunately, the CFACC learned from this experience. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, he established a “time-sensitive target cell” responsible for fast-tracking air responses to key targets.¹² The new cell handled the strikes on 156 crucial targets, including leadership, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorists targets. Through the same process, the force

struck 686 “dynamic” targets, including high-value mobile targets that did not fall into the other categories.¹³

The end result of the fratricide and risk issue, combined with the modern, nonlinear battlespace's nature, was to bring into even sharper focus operations tempo and cycle issues. While airmen are more concerned about carefully planning strikes, the operational situation places enhanced emphasis on fluidity, flexibility, and responsiveness.¹⁴

Catalysts for Change

An examination of AGC's history shows that many changes have occurred technologically, structurally, and doctrinally. Leadership, technology, and wartime experience drives such changes. Sometimes, change occurs only when creative, bureaucratically fearless leaders step forward to impose change on balky services. Imagining Army AirLand Battle Doctrine occurring without Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry is difficult.¹⁵ On the other hand, nameless officers at various schools, doctrine centers, and operational units have also made valuable contributions over the decades, even if they cannot be singled out.

Necessity is indeed the mother of invention. Adaptations to AGC have included, inter alia, the following:

- The use of radio communications between aircraft and ground elements.

- High drag or “parafrag” bombs to allow accurate delivery at low altitudes.

- Radar bombing techniques.

- Increasingly accurate precision guided munitions (PGMs).

- The Joint Tactical Intelligence Data System.

During Operation Desert Storm, coalition aircraft employed infrared sensors to detect Iraqi tanks and other armored vehicles in the desert, which were then “plinked” with laser-guided bombs. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces began “blue force tracking,” which uses a miniature transponder that relies on GPS satellite signals relayed to ground and airborne receivers. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, forces

Using heavy aircraft (B-1, B-2, and B-52) allows a far greater loiter time over the battlespace, which translates into enhanced persistence. . . . [But] ground and air forces must be aware of the precise location of friendly forces as well as enemy forces, potential targets, enemy air defense sites, and civilian personnel and facilities. Only by possessing such broad yet detailed intelligence can joint commanders confidently employ force.

used thermal panels to designate coalition vehicles, and the CFACC established an air component coordination element in seven ground headquarters to facilitate cooperation and to limit misunderstanding between air and ground components.

One does not have to be in war to be creative and adaptable. U.S.

US Air Force



armed services and the joint community have a robust lessons-learned program. Even while an operation is in progress, the military is gathering information on what happened and why; what planning assumptions were valid or invalid; and what weapons and concepts were more or less successful than anticipated. The services conduct rigorous reviews and more important, they use lessons to look ahead. Certainly not all is perfect in such efforts, but the U.S. military has been remarkably willing to examine itself, recognize problems, and effect change. In the aftermath of the Vietnam war, for example, the Air Force fundamentally changed its force structure, doctrine, and leadership and veered from a decades-long affiliation with strategic bombing to a more conventional, tactical and operational-level focus.

Solutions

Joint operations, especially at the tactical level, are extremely complex because of the services' differing weapons, ordnance, C2 structures, doctrines, and perspectives.¹⁶ At times, this can introduce numbing problems, such as the following:

- Ground forces using FM radios that cannot

talk to F-16s overhead because the airmen have only ultra-high frequency or very high frequency radios.

- Special operations forces AC-130 gunships not being in contact with Navy or Marine Corps aircraft operating in the same area.

- Marines on one side of the Tigris not having the correct frequencies to talk

to soldiers on the other side.

- Unmanned aerial vehicles operated by the CIA targeting a facility already scheduled for attack by military aircraft.

These complexities, mixed with intrinsic factors of differing service cultures, perspectives, battle rhythms, and overarching fratricide and risk factors, make for an unusually difficult AGC mission.

Technology. Currently, the services are pursuing a host of initiatives to enhance AGC, including—

- Precision or standoff ordnance.
- Communications gear and intelligence sensors common to all the services, such as Link-16.
- Robotic battle damage assessment systems.
- Automated target recognition systems.
- New aircraft, such as the joint strike fighter.

Some new technologies will be transformational; others will be “merely” evolutionary. Asking whether new technologies will allow the services to perform the same tasks more effectively and efficiently or to perform entirely new tasks is imperative.

For decades, airmen have said that aircraft are not “flying artillery.” The Marine Corps is the exception to believing this. To maintain agility in an

The unusually bloodless conflicts of the past 12 years have made political leaders somewhat risk averse. Military commanders have responded by implementing more stringent ROE and tactical procedures. . . . In Afghanistan and Iraq there were “no engagement zones,” “limited engagement zones,” “special engagement zones,” and “special operations areas,” all of which had their own ROE and which were often controlled by different agencies or services that were not necessarily in direct or continual contact with each other.

amphibious or forced-entry scenario, the Marine Corps has substituted air for artillery and armor. The Air Force response to this model has been to point out its expense and inefficiency. Perhaps it is time to rethink this issue.

Recent new technologies, such as stealth technologies, increasingly accurate PGMs, and stand-off weapons, have greatly reduced the risk associated with CAS missions to airmen as well as to friendly ground forces. Moreover, improved accuracy means the services need fewer weapons to achieve the same effect, which means fewer aircraft will be needed.

Using heavy aircraft (B-1, B-2, and B-52) allows a far greater loiter time over the battlespace, which translates into enhanced persistence. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the B-1 and B-52 spent up to 8 hours orbiting designated sectors while waiting for ground spotters or other intelligence sensors to identify targets of opportunity.

During Operation Desert Storm, airmen also innovated with Push-CAS and kill boxes to enhance the ability to provide responsive air support.¹⁷ Now might be the time to consider aircraft as a substitute for Army artillery in some situations. But, there are tradeoffs. Artillery generally offers greater responsiveness and persistence, while air-delivered ordnance is usually more accurate and lethal. Although air assets can never replace organic fire support assets, examining whether substitution is



An A-10 Warthog provides CAS to ground troops during an operation outside of Kirkuk, Iraq, 24 September 2003.

sometimes possible is worthwhile.

Operational concepts. Jointness is a way of life. The services or functional staffs often plan current military operations, which the components (working together but separately) implement. In other words, CFACC and CFLCC staffs plan an operation; coordinate plans with the other components; and pass them upward to the combatant commander for

approval. The component units conduct their own tactical planning and preparations, coordinating their activities with each other. The services then conduct the operation. The U.S. military has no joint tactical units that contain both air and ground elements, with the notable exception of some SOF units.

Afghanistan saw the unusual situation where the CFACC deployed forward to the theater, but the combatant commander and his staff remained in Florida. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Army General Tommie Franks deployed forward, but to a location different from that of the CFACC. The CFLCC's headquarters was in yet another location.

Separate but equal service and functional staffs, which include some degree of liaison with each other, might be insufficient to keep pace with modern war's frenetic nature. Forming a joint battle staff, which would include the physical presence of the CFACC and the CFLCC and other component and functional commanders under the combatant commander's control, might be feasible. The staff would be truly

Suppose friendly forces are not present, or what if friendly forces are only present in limited numbers? What if the enemy, rather than moving to engage U.S. forces, hides or even moves away from U.S. forces? These situations would require different procedures than those currently established in joint doctrine. The Air Force has, therefore, proposed a new category, GAPS, which is designed to hit enemy forces or facilities using ground spotters (generally SOF teams) or airborne sensors.

joint, thus eliminating the need for liaison elements that might or might not be effective in coordinating joint combat operations. (The air component was not well integrated into planning for Operation Anaconda. Poor coordination caused serious consequences in the battle, which having a single battle staff could have eliminated.)

The unified commands are now experimenting with such units as standing joint task forces, but a recurring problem has been the dearth of qualified personnel to staff them in times of crisis. The Pacific Command and the European Command first addressed this issue, and now the Joint Forces Command has been assigned the problem.

Ground-assisted precision strike (GAPS) is a new concept that looks at AGC through a new lens.¹⁸ In Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, traditional CAS and AI missions have been stretched almost beyond recognition. CAS assumes there are friendly troops in close proximity, which requires detailed coordination between air and ground elements. AI involves destroying or disrupting enemy forces and their supply lines before enemy forces can engage friendly forces.

But suppose friendly forces are not present, or what if friendly forces are only present in limited numbers? What if the enemy, rather than moving to engage U.S. forces, hides or even moves away from U.S. forces? These situations would require different procedures than those currently established



A sergeant with the 4th Air Support Operations Group communicates with an A-10 "Hogdriver" in northern Iraq, 24 September 2003.

in joint doctrine. The Air Force has, therefore, proposed a new category, GAPS, which is designed to hit enemy forces or facilities using ground spotters (generally SOF teams) or airborne sensors. Many such operations were flown in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

GAPS might prove not to be a useful concept and be abandoned. The Army views GAPS with some suspicion and wonders if the Air Force is backing away from a commitment to CAS.¹⁹ Still, there are similarities between GAPS and the battlefield air interdiction (BAI) concept, an idea that the Army and

NATO have supported but that the Air Force did not wholeheartedly accept. Perhaps the issue is just another example of a struggle over control. In BAI, the ground commander would nominate targets in front of the fire support coordination line but not in close proximity to friendly forces. In GAPS, an airman would select the targets (as in AI) and control air assets. If this issue is the real point of contention, it is an unworthy concern. The focus, as always, should be on achieving objectives at the least cost.

Education and training. Over the past decade, the services have made great strides in fostering and implementing joint training and education, which has forced the services to learn more about each other. The Army and Air Force hold warfighting conferences annually as a way of highlighting mutual problems and effecting solutions. Also, the increasing power of the unified commands and their staffs

Now might be the time to consider aircraft as a substitute for Army artillery in some situations. But, there are tradeoffs. Artillery generally offers greater responsiveness and persistence, while air-delivered ordnance is usually more accurate and lethal. Although air assets can never replace organic fire support assets, examining whether substitution is sometimes possible is worthwhile.

places great emphasis on jointness at the warfighting level. This is good. However, more could be done at the tactical level.

A recent General Accounting Office report, critical of AGC joint training, notes that such training is infrequent, unrealistic, and nonstandardized.²⁰ The Air Force chief of staff echoed this concern, noting that too often air and ground units approach joint exercises with service-centric training objectives. CAS is avoided so ground forces can exercise their close combat capabilities.²¹ Perhaps, given the critical stake that all of the services have in its effectiveness, AGC would be an area in which to experiment using joint tactical units. The services must increase and take more seriously exchange and liaison positions. For example, although the Air Force and the Army have designated slots in each other's command and staff echelons, the positions are not always fully manned. Worse, such assignments are not always seen as "career enhancing," which means that individuals are reluctant to work in such joint billets for fear of hurting their promotion opportunities.

All of these concerns call for an increase in joint

exercises and simulations that employ new concepts and, perhaps, new joint tactical units. In the past, the Army and Air Force have generally trained together only during major exercises and actual contingencies. Joint tactical exercises with the Navy and Marine Corps are even less frequent.²² This must change.

Air-ground cooperation, one of the oldest and most important of all joint missions, is one of the few instances (while also being one of the most dangerous) when all of the services should be operating together at the tactical level. Because of decades-old traditions and differing viewpoints, effective cooperation has been a substantial challenge. More important, however, the twin dangers of fratricide and risk have been the root cause of endless troubles and controversies. New technologies and new warfighting concepts offer innovative and possibly transformational ways to solve these chronic problems, beginning with a dramatically heightened battlespace awareness. Warfare itself, and adversaries' clever moves and adaptations, require continued refinement of air and ground abilities, both in the technical and in the creative realm. **MR**

NOTES

1. For the Army view, see MG Franklin L. Hagenbeck, "Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda," *Field Artillery* (September-October 2002): 5-9. For the unofficial Air Force version, see Rebecca Grant, "The Airpower of Anaconda," *Air Force Magazine* (September 2002): 60-68. Regarding northern Iraq, reports coming out of the theater indicate confusion and misunderstanding between SOF in the field and the combined air operations center over attempts to schedule and manage air assets.

2. For a good overview, see Carl H. Builder, *Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

3. The Army's fire support weapons with enhanced range capabilities include the Army Tactical Missile System, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, and attack helicopters.

4. The view that it is easier to stop a problem at its source was codified early in World War II, as seen in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20, *Command and Employment of Air Power* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 21 July 1943), 10-11.

5. Headquarters, AF/XOCCOAB, "USAF Combat Sorties in Southeast Asia" (Washington, DC: GPO, 5 April 1974), chart.

6. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "Fratricide," *CALL Newsletter*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 92-4, appendix D.

7. LCDR William H. Ayers, "Fratricide: Can it be Stopped?" *Global Security Report* (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps University Command and Staff College, 1993). 3. U.S. combat losses have decreased so dramatically in the past two decades that, although incidents of fratricide are few, they constitute a higher percentage of total casualties.

8. GEN Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 183.

9. Rowan Scarborough, "Risk Concerns Hamper Hunt for Taliban," *Washington Times*, 9 December 2002, A1.

10. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, B-1s were generally loaded with twenty-four, 2,000-pound joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), half of which were penetrators. The other half were fuzed for detonation on impact. JDAMs allowed some targeting and employment flexibility, but more could be done.

11. Thomas E. Ricks, "Target Approval Delays Cost Air Force Key Hits," *Washington Post*, 18 November 2001, A1. When intelligence indicated the possible whereabouts of Saddam Hussein during Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition aircraft were able to put bombs on the location within 12 minutes. Obviously, the target's importance generated an unusually rapid response. See also David A. Fulghum, "Bag of Tricks," *Aviation Week*

& Space Technology (21 April 2003): 22.

12. Tom Bowman, "Strike Team Advances Precision, Pace of War," *Baltimore Sun*, 20 April 2003, 1.

13. U.S. Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF)-Prince Sultan Air Base, Assessment and Analysis Division, "Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers" (Shaw Air Force Base, SC: USCENTAF, 30 April 2003). 9. See also on-line at <www.urbanoperations.com/oicentaf.pdf>.

14. Attempts to bring civil charges against U.S. pilots during Operation Desert Storm and in Afghanistan spotlight the dangers surrounding fratricide and collateral damage. Individuals in Belgium have filed charges against Operation Iraqi Freedom commander General Tommy Franks for being responsible for civilian casualties in Iraq. If such efforts gain traction, they can only add to concerns over battlespace awareness, which in turn might elongate the decision cycle.

15. Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988); John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982* (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984).

16. This article specifically does not address the issue of who controls AGC air assets. In the past, this issue has generated more heat than light. By defining it out of the solution set, the focus is more on practical possibilities.

17. Eliot Cohen, ed., *Gulf War Air Power Survey* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), II, 266-93, 301-302. Some have referred to "option lock-in"—the danger of being inflexibly committed to a certain plan of action—simply because the planning cycle is too slow and cumbersome to modify.

18. For background, see LTC Phil M. Haun, "Direct Attack—a Counterland Mission," *Air and Space Power Journal*, XVII (Summer 2003): 9-16.

19. See for example, LTC John M. Jansen, USMC; LCDR Nicholas Dienna, USN; MAJ Todd Bufkin II, USMC; MAJ David I. Oclander, USA; MAJ Thomas D. Tomasso, USA; and MAJ James B. Sisler, USAF, "JCAS in Afghanistan: Fixing the Tower of Babel," *Field Artillery* (March-April 2003): 22-30.

20. General Accounting Office (GAO)-03-505, "Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces" (Washington, DC: GAO, May 2003), 2.

21. Fulghum, 37.

22. GAO-03-505, 10, 17.

The Army Vision:

The 4th AD in World War II

Robert S. Cameron

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THE ARMY FACED new challenges after the Cold War. Bipolar antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States no longer dominated the world's geopolitical climate. Instead, a series of regional crises occurred in the 1990s that increased the frequency of American overseas deployments. While maintaining a powerful presence in Europe and South Korea, the Army also found itself supporting a growing number of contingency operations (CONOPs).¹ Senior military leaders anticipated the continuation of this trend into the 21st century. However, they did not consider the Army's force structure as being well suited for CONOPs. Organizations, training programs, materiel, and doctrine favored conventional, high-intensity combat.

The Army lacked the means to inject a powerful military presence quickly into an emerging trouble spot. Lacking a viable, rapid-response capability, the Army could do little to prevent crisis escalation or to avoid a subsequent large time and force commitment. Moreover, tactical organizations designated for CONOPs needed first to modify unit structures designed for the central European battlefield. Heavy forces offered considerable combat power and survivability at the expense of rapid deployment. Light forces offered rapid deployment with only limited survivability and lethality, especially when confronted by an armored threat. Neither force offered an ideal solution for CONOPs. Ad hoc force packages sufficed only while these missions remained exceptional. As the frequency of CONOPs increased, the Army required a more permanent solution.

4th AD infantrymen
fire at German troops,
27 December 1944.



In October 1999, the Army defined a series of initiatives intended to improve its effectiveness in the operating environment of the future. Collectively known as Transformation, these initiatives aimed at a fundamental redesign of the Army. The innovative application of new technologies to improve operational and strategic effectiveness lay at the core of this effort. Rather than a mix of heavy and light formations, the Army sought a single, high-tech force capable of achieving strategic dominance across the entire spectrum of military operations. In 1999, the Army called this force the Objective Force.

[Today, the Army no longer uses the term Objective Force. The Objective Force is now called the Future Force.]

Fielding the Objective Force required time in which to develop the related technologies, and to complete research and design work. Therefore, the Army also sought a more immediate enhancement of its capabilities through the creation of Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). The IBCTs, designed as rapid deployment units with better survivability and lethality than light force elements, constituted a medium force that bridged the capability gap be-

The Army Vision: Excerpts

General Eric K. Shinseki, former Army Chief of Staff

On 12 October 1999, in "The Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the Nation. . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," a speech given at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army in Washington, D.C., General Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, proposed a Transformation of the Army into a lighter, quicker deploying force, and he described the force's seven major attributes. Excerpts from Shinseki's remarks follow.

Strategic Dominance Across the Entire Spectrum of Operations

The world remains a dangerous place full of authoritarian regimes and criminal interests whose combined influence extend the envelope of human suffering by creating haves and have nots. They foster an environment for extremism and the drive to acquire asymmetric capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. They also fuel an irrepressible human demand for freedom and a greater sharing of the better life. The threats to peace and stability are numerous, complex, oftentimes linked, and sometimes aggravated by natural disaster.

The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. The Army will be responsive and dominant at every point on that spectrum. We will provide to the Nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. The Army's deployment is the surest sign of America's commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on land.

Responsive. Responsiveness has the quality of time, distance, and sustained momentum. Our threat of the use

of force, if it deters miscalculation by adversaries, provides a quality of responsiveness all its own.

Deployable. We will develop the capability to put combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff—in brigade combat teams for both stability and support operations and for warfighting.

Agile. We will attain the mental and physical agility operationally to move forces from stability and support operations to warfighting and back again just as we have demonstrated the tactical warfighting agility to task organize on the move and transition from the defense to the offense and back again.

Versatile. We will design into our organizational structures, forces which will, with minimal adjustment and in minimum time, generate formations which can dominate at any point on the spectrum of operations.

Lethal. The elements of lethal combat power remain fires, maneuver, leadership, and protection. When we deploy, every element in the warfighting formation will be capable of generating combat power and contributing decisively to the fight.

Survivable. We will derive the technology that provides maximum protection to our forces at the individual soldier level whether that soldier is dismounted or mounted. Ground and air platforms will leverage the best combination of low observable, ballistic protection, long-range acquisition and targeting, early attack, and higher first round hit and kill technologies at smaller calibers that are available. We are prepared to venture into harm's way to dominate the expanded battlespace, and we will do what is necessary to protect the force.

Sustainable. We will aggressively reduce our logistics footprint and replenishment demand. This will require us to control the numbers of vehicles we deploy, leverage reachback capabilities, invest in a systems approach to the weapons and equipment we design, and revolutionize the manner in which we transport and sustain our people and materiel.

tween heavy and light formations. [Just as the Objective Force has become the Future Force, the IBCTs have evolved into today's Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Army no longer uses the term Interim Brigade Combat Team.]

The IBCTs and the Objective Force of 1999 served different purposes. The IBCTs addressed a specific, near-term capability; the Objective Force represented the future Army. However, both shared similar organizational and operational characteristics, including the following:²

- ▣ Deployability via airlift into a theater of operations within 4 days.
- ▣ Agility to transition quickly between contingency and warfighting missions.
- ▣ Versatility to reconfigure tactical organizations on short notice.
- ▣ Improved lethality and survivability through leveraging advanced technologies, precision maneuver, fires, and leadership.
- ▣ Sustainability through improved mechanical reliability, reduced logistical requirements, and freedom from the supply lines and the "iron mountain" associated with past combat organizations.
- ▣ The ability to respond to the nation's will in an effective, timely manner.

Collectively, these "ilities" are desirable in any combat organization. They reflect a need for change, inspired as much by the current operating environment as from the lessons learned from the Army's history and heritage of victory. Similar features characterized the World War II armored division and contributed to the 4th Armored Division's (AD's) success near Arracourt in September 1944.

The Army's Response to Blitzkrieg

During World War II, the German blitzkrieg demonstrated a major change in the conduct of warfare. Germany's rapid conquest of much of Europe and large portions of Russia underscored the danger of ignoring this new style of military operations. The U.S. Army reacted by redesigning its force structure, doctrine, materiel, training, and tactical organizations. The Army prepared for an operational environment in which rapid, fluid action over broad

fronts replaced the trench warfare of World War I.

The Army transformed itself into a force capable of winning battles dominated by mobile, combined arms action, not prolonged artillery bombardments and short, carefully orchestrated advances. The transformation required sweeping changes to an

The [1943-pattern] armored division's modularity and flexibility distinguished it from the Army's traditional emphasis on organizational rigidity. . . . The successful employment of the division depended in part on the ability to redistribute these tactical assets frequently in response to battlefield developments.

army accustomed to deliberate operations, a slow operational tempo (OPTEMPO), and separate rather than integrated battlefield functions.

The Army had no equivalent to the German panzer forces that played such a prominent role in the rapid conquest of Europe. The panzer division possessed great mobility and impressive combat power in a unique combined arms organization. The formation's combat power generated the conditions for success, which its mobility permitted it to exploit. Grouped into corps, the panzer divisions proved tactically and operationally decisive.

The U.S. armored division evolved in response to the threat posed by the powerful and highly mobile German formations. By September 1943, the U.S. armored division included three combat commands and 13 battalions (see figure).³ The commands possessed permanent staffs, but they had no fixed troop assignments.

The division commander allocated combat and service elements according to the mission and tactical situation. The combat commands then organized one or more subordinate combined arms task forces (TFs) to accomplish their own missions. The division headquarters and combat commands were each designed to accommodate augmentation; attach and detach combat and service elements; and task organize assigned forces. The combat command structure and a robust communications




Figure 1. Armored division organization, 1943.



Private Kenneth Boyer of the 4th AD atop his 105-mm assault gun-equipped Sherman tank, 26 September 1944.

From the combat command down to platoon level, 4th AD commanders responded to events more quickly and with more aggressiveness than did their German counterparts, enabling many U.S. soldiers to stay alive during lethal, accidental encounters with the enemy in the fog at minimal ranges.

network permitted the division to operate as a collection of TFs, among which the division or combat command could redistribute resources to reinforce success.

The armored division's modularity and flexibility distinguished it from the Army's traditional emphasis on organizational rigidity. The formation included no brigades or regiments. Battalions served as the basic building blocks for the composition of combat commands and task forces. Battalions and their subordinate companies were intended for assignment to any combat command or task force on short notice. Moreover, the successful employment of the division depended in part on the ability to redistribute these tactical assets frequently in response to battlefield developments.

The armored division's unique nature posed significant leadership, organizational, and doctrinal chal-

lenges. To realize the formation's full effectiveness, commanders and staffs needed familiarity with continuous organizational change and combined arms action. Too often, such mastery occurred only after sustained combat exposure. The men of the 4th AD, however, benefited from their formation's role as a test bed for the armored force. The formation experimented with organizational concepts, and it played a central role in the evolution of the combat command concept. These experiences ensured an exceptional familiarity with the principles embedded in the armored division structure adopted in September 1943. Moreover, the 4th AD commander and many of his subordinate officers accompanied the formation throughout its training and into combat. Leadership continuity simplified the application of the new command and organizational principles in a combat environment.


The 4th AD, deployed to Normandy to participate in Operation Cobra, helped shatter German defenses in Brittany, and then drove to the gates of Lorient. Reversing direction, the 4th AD then led the Third Army across France. The 4th AD pursued German forces into Lorraine, and crossed the Meuse River in a coup de main on 31 August 1944. However, Allied formations had outrun their logistical support. A theaterwide fuel shortage ensued, halting the 4th AD until mid-September.

When operations resumed, the 4th AD and its parent XII Corps intended to cross the Moselle River and seize the city of Nancy before advancing to the Saar River. The 80th Infantry Division (ID) and Combat Command A (CCA) of the 4th AD were to envelop the city from the north. The 35th ID and the remainder of the 4th AD would cross to the south, linking up with CCA near Arracourt and the Marne-Rhine Canal. The planned operation would carry the XII Corps into a gap between two German armies.

Infantry elements crossed the Moselle River on 11 September. A German counterattack collapsed when the 4th AD's Combat Command B (CCB) improvised a crossing site, drove through gaps between German units, and sped eastward. CCB reached the Marne-Rhine Canal by 14 September, but resistance and the canal itself delayed further advances. The division commander sensed the loss of momentum and shifted his emphasis northward to CCA. At Dieulouard, the 80th ID crossed the Moselle River but nearly lost its crossing site to a German counterattack. The following morning CCA conducted a passage of lines amid German artillery fire and traffic congestion, advanced into the disputed bridgehead, and assaulted the counterattacking force. The Germans withdrew, and CCA thrust behind the Nancy defenses. Bypassing centers of resistance and overrunning surprised German columns, the command reached Arracourt on the 14th. CCA had penetrated 45 miles in 37 hours.

From 15 to 18 September, the 4th AD consolidated behind Nancy. CCA's position at Arracourt permitted it to block movement into and out of Nancy, making a shambles of German defenses by raiding across supply and communication routes. CCA then helped 4th AD elements south of Nancy cross the Marne-Rhine Canal. CCB moved toward Château-Salins, and the reserve command moved to Luneville. The entire division prepared to continue its drive to the Saar River.

German attacks forced the 4th AD to switch rap-



CCA protected its trains by keeping them close to its lead elements. When its columns moved through German defenses, the trains passed through before the Germans could reestablish a cohesive resistance. Keeping the trains and forward TFs close by provided additional security for the trains.

idly to a mobile defense. German armor struck the division along a south-north axis, starting at Luneville. Facing determined resistance there, the attackers bypassed the town and advanced on Arracourt. Under cover of early morning fog, the Germans repeatedly infiltrated CCA's scattered positions. Many tactical encounters ensued, and at one point, German tanks threatened CCA's command post and trains.

CCA first broke the momentum of the German attacks with aggressive counterattacks, then concentrated its forces, and finally mounted coordinated assaults on key German positions. The Germans were unable to turn initial surprise into tactical benefit. Their attack disintegrated into uncoordinated actions by small groups of tanks. When the fog cleared, U.S. artillery, air support, and combined arms assaults forced a German withdrawal.

Nevertheless, American intelligence reported a major buildup of German forces in the area. The 4th AD cancelled its plans to resume offensive operations. The division's ability to counter German thrusts depended on mobility, but the onset of heavy rains reduced off-road vehicular movement. Moreover, the Arracourt battles had left the combat commands dispersed and overextended. CCA, for example,

held a frontage of over 40 kilometers. The division concentrated, withdrew to more defensible positions, and then conducted a positional defense against repeated German attacks, which accomplished little at considerable cost to the Germans. On 12 October, the 4th AD withdrew to rest.

Responsiveness. The demands of global conflict drove the Army to build multicapable formations for World War II. Expecting to operate

The 4th AD's commander and many of his subordinate officers accompanied the formation throughout its training and into combat. Leadership continuity simplified the application of the new command and organizational principles in a combat environment.

across a broad spectrum of mission types and environments, the Army wanted interchangeable units that commanders could easily integrate into corps or army commands. Standardized organizations promoted responsiveness to mission, operating environment, and command. Conversely, the unique materiel and training requirements of specialized formations necessarily imposed restrictions on their employment and assignment.

In September 1942, the Army abandoned plans to build permanent, specialized corps organizations. Corps commands lost their administrative functions and retained only headquarters staffs and signal units as permanent components. Tactical formations were assigned to them at the army or theater command level, based on the corps' mission. These assignments changed as conditions and the mission dictated. The flexibility of this concept allowed commanders to assign any type of division to a corps headquarters.

The corps structure encouraged a standard division design that facilitated control by a corps commander, regardless of his branch. Since the armored division with its array of organic assets did not simplify corps control, the Army removed assets not necessary for a typical mission set and let the controlling corps headquarters provide augmentation as needed. During operations in France, for example, the 4th AD relied on regular augmentation from its parent XII Corps (see figure). The division no longer required organic capabilities for all possible contingencies. Consequently, the organic tank destroyer, antiaircraft, and supply battalions of the early armored division designs were removed.

Deployability. The Army did not have a 4-day

aerial deployment requirement during World War II. Instead, America's ability to wage a global war depended on a careful balance between available sealift capacity and organizational size. However, early armored division tables of organization and equipment did not reflect deployment constraints. Instead, the formation's size grew to accommodate the armored force's desire to maximize combat power, a result that did not facilitate overseas deployment.

The problem was not limited to the armored force. All combat organizations exhibited a similar tendency to accumulate assets. While perhaps desirable in battle, the trend toward large formations threatened to ensure that they did not reach combat in a timely fashion. To resolve the tension between force design and deployability, the U.S. War Department established the Reduction Board, which was active from November 1942 to June 1943. The Reduction Board's task was to pare the vehicular, equipment, and personnel sizes of all Army formations so that the force levels required in multiple theaters could be met with available transport tonnage. The board clearly gave priority to deployability over organizational perfection. Consequently, the armored division shrank from 390 to 263 tanks and from 14,620 to 10,397 soldiers, but it retained its combat command structure. The cuts produced a manageable configuration with exceptional organizational flexibility.

Versatility. The armored division's mission profile in World War II did not include CONOPs. Nevertheless, it had to reconfigure its combat commands and TFs frequently to fit evolving mission needs and to tailor and optimize combat power for specific tactical environments and operations. The 4th AD normally concentrated its combat power in two combat commands, each controlling between two and four TFs.

During the race across France, the combat commands reconfigured about every 3 days, executing task organization and orders via radio. Task forces usually included a combined arms team able to cope with a variety of potential situations, but circumstances sometimes dictated otherwise. When the Germans attacked the reserve command at Luneville on 18 September, CCA dispatched a tank-infantry TF as reinforcements. The command recalled the TF the following day when the Germans attacked Arracourt. To speed its return, the TF split into two parts—a tank force and an infantry force. The tank force sped ahead to form a new TF with another tank company and immediately attacked German tanks threatening CCA's command post.

Elements of the 4th AD, including an M-18 tank destroyer, cross the Moselle River, 15 March 1945.



US Army

To maintain a high OPTEMPO, the 4th AD needed to change missions rapidly without reorganizing. Radio communications, mission-type orders, and the combat commands enabled the 4th AD to decentralize command and achieve an organizational flexibility that allowed quick transitions from one mission to the next without significant reduction to OPTEMPO.

The decentralized command structure allowed the 4th AD to conduct multiple actions simultaneously. During the fighting at Arracourt, CCA managed tactical engagements in its sector, concentrated the command in a better defensive posture, and simultaneously planned for the resumption of offensive operations to the east. CCB and division headquarters conducted parallel activities. Thus, while the Germans concentrated on inflicting a defeat on the 4th AD, the division was already preparing its next major operation. Such planning expedited the implementation of formal orders to proceed and enabled the division to exploit opportunities as they arose with minimal delay.

Agility. According to the Army's Transformation concept, when IBCTs and Objective Force elements deployed, they were to conduct a broad range of warfighting and stability and support operations. They needed the ability to transition quickly among these missions. The 4th AD's requirements in World War II focused entirely on warfighting. However, by 1940s standards, the 4th AD possessed a broad

mission set that included an array of offensive and defensive actions to exploit the division's unique mix of combat power and mobility.

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At Lorient, the division reversed its axis of advance and pursued the Germans across France into Lorraine. During operations near Nancy and Arracourt, the 4th AD ruptured German defenses,

crossed the Moselle River, and encircled Nancy. The division conducted raids, blocking actions, and probes to capitalize on its initial successes. Although the 4th AD was not oriented doctrinally or psychologically for defensive operations, it conducted a successful mobile defense against German armor at Arracourt before CCA wrested the initiative from

The Army wanted interchangeable units that commanders could easily integrate into corps or army commands. Standardized organizations promoted responsiveness to mission, operating environment, and command. Conversely, the unique materiel and training requirements of specialized formations necessarily imposed restrictions on their employment and assignment.

the Germans through aggressive, rapid counterattacks. From late September until it withdrew from combat in mid-October, the 4th AD defended in place against German attacks.

The flexibility of the combat command structure was critical to the division's successes. For example, CCA had initially prepared to establish a separate bridgehead over the Moselle River, but when the 80th ID crossed at Dieulouard, CCA did not delay operations by securing its own crossing point. Instead, it raced to Dieulouard, passed through the 80th ID's lines, attacked through German defenses, thrust forward to Arracourt, and began exploitations and raids. When a German counterattack forced a change in mission, CCA switched to a mobile defense.

CCB similarly adjusted its plans for crossing the Moselle River in response to tactical developments. When a plan to follow the 35th ID across the river became impractical because of German counterattacks, CCB found an alternate crossing site. Without waiting for bridging equipment to arrive, CCB drove through the Germans, thrust eastward, and established contact with CCA to the rear of Nancy.

Lethality and survivability. Leadership, situational awareness, and organizational flexibility were more important to the 4th AD's lethality and survivability at Arracourt than unit size or combat platforms. The 4th AD's tanks possessed no advantage over the German tanks they encountered, but they were more than adequate when employed at the right place and time.

The Germans had many advantages between 19 and 22 September. CCA was scattered over a broad

frontage, and the departure of detachments to support other operations left the CCA understrength in tanks and tank destroyers just as the Germans concentrated their armor for a decisive blow. The hilly terrain around Arracourt encouraged the use of infiltration tactics at which the Germans excelled, while a heavy morning ground fog negated the American advantage in air and artillery support. Moreover, the German force mix included a number of Panther tanks that were superior to CCA's Sherman tanks.

Nevertheless, the Germans suffered 80 tanks and 22 other vehicles destroyed, 617 soldiers killed, and 171 prisoners taken. CCA lost only 14 medium tanks, 7 light tanks, and 113 wounded and killed soldiers. CCA destroyed about 5 German tanks for every American tank it lost, and CCA killed or captured 8 Germans for every American soldier wounded or lost in combat. CCA remained operational; two German panzer brigades were annihilated.

This success stemmed from the 4th AD's method of operations developed during its race across France. The 4th AD functioned as a collection of combined arms task forces. Tanks led each task force column, with artillery and engineers nearby for immediate fire support and obstacle clearance. Field observers accompanied each battalion headquarters and lead element. Linked with each other and supporting batteries via radio net, every observer could fire any or all available support batteries at once. Liaison officers with forward elements coordinated close air support and identified aerial targets. As they advanced, the task forces relied on a powerful combination of firepower from many ground and aerial sources. The 4th AD routinely dispensed with phase lines, flank security, and rigid control measures. Subordinate commanders took the initiative and exploited opportunities as they arose. Commanders used liaison aircraft to keep in contact with forward elements, which were often separated by considerable distances.

Moving rapidly, the task forces kept the enemy confused about their locations and intent. They routinely destroyed phone lines and communications centers as they advanced. Collectively, these actions permitted the division to operate inside the enemy's decision cycle. Stunned and repeatedly surprised by events, German commanders could only respond to crises over which they had minimal control. Cohesive German resistance collapsed, and the 4th AD advanced to the Meuse River. When fuel shortages finally halted the 4th AD, the Germans marshaled reserves and planned a counteroffensive against the Third Army. However, the sudden double envelop-

US Army



Sherman tanks of the 4th AD cross the Frebnch National Canal near Bayon on 20 September 1944.

The armored division's mission profile in World War II did not include CONOPs. Nevertheless, it had to reconfigure its combat commands and task forces frequently to fit evolving mission needs and to tailor and optimize combat power for specific tactical environments and operations.

ment of Nancy upset these plans and forced the Germans to execute a smaller operation that lacked careful coordination.

Using superior situational awareness, the 4th AD outmaneuvered the Germans and fought in conditions of its own choosing. Each combat command typically employed liaison aircraft and mechanized cavalry troops for route reconnaissance and early warning of enemy positions. Ground and aerial reconnaissance permitted TF columns to bypass enemy forces and avoid deliberate attacks against prepared positions. CCA quickly reached Arracourt, 45 miles behind German lines, with minimal losses. Taking advantage of the element of surprise, CCA overran enemy forces reinforcing Nancy and captured the headquarters charged with that city's defense.

At Arracourt, CCA relied on reconnaissance to coordinate multiple engagements and execute effective counterattacks. A network of observation posts provided early warning of a German attack on 19

and 20 September, despite the fog cover. When the fog dissipated, CCA's reconnaissance units pinpointed the location of the German armor, and American tank-infantry teams with artillery and air support attacked. When the Germans overran CCA's mechanized cavalry screen line on 22 September, they could not exploit their success. CCA's cavalry alerted the command of the attack and entangled the German tanks in a delaying action. When intercepted radio traffic provided details of the German plans, CCA promptly attacked with flanking fires and destroyed an entire company. A hovering liaison plane spotted and helped destroy another infantry column by directing artillery fire onto it.

Despite bad weather and platform inferiority, CCA outmaneuvered and outfought the Germans. The 4th AD had more experience and better training than its opponents, and its flexible, combined arms design enabled it to fight as a team of integrated systems. The Germans employed small groups of tanks

To resolve the tension between force design and deployability, the U.S. War Department established the Reduction Board, which was active from November 1942 to June 1943. The Reduction Board's task was to pare the vehicular, equipment, and personnel sizes of all Army formations so that the force levels required in multiple theaters could be met with available transport tonnage. The board clearly gave priority to deployability over organizational perfection.

with minimal or no support, but CCA employed task forces comprised of tanks, tank destroyers, infantry, and engineers.

From the combat command down to platoon level, 4th AD commanders responded to events more quickly and with more aggressiveness than did their German counterparts, enabling many U.S. soldiers to stay alive during lethal, accidental encounters with the enemy in the fog at minimal ranges. For example, when one platoon of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion stumbled onto a German tank company, the U.S. platoon attacked, despite its technical and numerical inferiority. A prolonged duel ensued in which the Germans lost eight tanks before retreating in confusion. Such aggressiveness surprised the Germans and disrupted the momentum of their attacks. Instead of an armored mass crushing an overextended U.S. force, the German thrust disintegrated.

Sustainability. The 4th AD's dispersed, fast-moving operations across France and into Lorraine precluded reliance on a fixed supply line. The combat commands normally carried sufficient fuel and ammunition for one week of operations, and the division headquarters also routinely allocated medical and maintenance assets to the commands. CCA and CCB thus possessed some self-sufficiency and a limited capability for independent operations. When CCA crossed the Moselle River and thrust toward Arracourt, it severed its link with the supporting 80th ID even though it had yet to make physical contact with the rest of the 4th AD. For several days, CCA remained isolated behind German positions at Nancy. Subsisting on its own supplies, it continued to operate at a high OPTEMPO and scored some of its most important successes, including the capture of the German headquarters controlling Nancy's defenses.

CCA protected its trains by keeping them close to its lead elements. When its columns moved through German defenses, the trains passed through

before the Germans could reestablish a cohesive resistance. Keeping the trains and forward task forces close by provided additional security for the trains. Problems could still arise, nonetheless. On 13 September, CCA's trains became separated from the rest of the command during the drive toward Arracourt. Unable to reestablish contact before nightfall, the trains provided their own security with personnel on hand. More typically, the combat commands carefully coordinated the trains' movements with TF operations and provided security elements when prudent.

The reliability of U.S. vehicles and equipment also aided sustainability. Between the landing at Normandy and the crossing of the Meuse River, the 4th AD's combat vehicles logged over 1,000 miles under their own power, and supply trucks logged nearly 3,000 miles. The division then embarked on a period of rapid operations that climaxed in some of the largest armor engagements that U.S. forces experienced during World War II. Despite the intensity of operations, the 4th AD did not lose significant numbers of tanks to mechanical failure.

The 4th AD: An Objective Force

The Army designed the 4th AD to fight on a European battlefield against a powerful enemy in a conventional, high-intensity conflict, not in CONOPs in undeveloped regions of the world. But the attributes that made the division so highly successful in World War II are similar to those the Army initially envisioned for the IBCTs and the Objective Force in 1999.

The operational environment described for the IBCTs and the Objective Force differed from that of the World War II armored division. The former were able to employ a much more extensive and sophisticated array of technologies. However, the IBCTs and the Objective Force incorporated the best attributes of the 4th AD: responsiveness, deployability, versatility, agility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. In action near Arracourt in 1944, those attributes, together with effective training and decisive leadership, stood the 4th AD in good stead, and they are also the keys to success on tomorrow's battlefield. **MR**

NOTES

1. For purposes of this article, the term "contingency operations" includes the broad range of peace, stability, and enforcement missions; humanitarian relief actions; and intervention in local or regional conflicts involving potential enemies with paramilitary or limited conventional military capabilities.

2. These force attributes were taken from former Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki's "The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," an address given during the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C., 12 October 1999. (See sidebar.)

3. Note that the 2d and 3d ADs did not adopt this organization. They retained a traditional regimental structure and were sometimes dubbed "heavy" armored divisions.

America's Army

Expeditionary and Enduring Foreign and Domestic

Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown

U.S. Army, Retired

AS OF SUMMER 2003, a higher percentage of the total Army appears committed to active combat operations than during any period since World War II.¹ While the Army moves to transform at a forced pace, it still defends against the most certain foreign threat the continental United States (CONUS) has faced since the War of 1812. Change is not new; it is a staple of defense.² However, new combinations of requirements—quick response (expeditionary) and long-term national commitments (enduring)—require unusual solutions both overseas and in CONUS.

Several new challenges facing the Army are implementation requirements that stem from the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*.³ These competing requirements include—

- Preemption of global terrorist attacks.
- Support of domestic homeland security.
- Reconstruction of failed states to eliminate sources of terrorism.
- Evolving landpower for total-spectrum operations that accelerate Transformation across all services.

The result is that America's Army must become more expeditionary—the first with the most—and

We should regard current Transformation processes as a glass half full. Transformation is not going away in the face of other compelling challenges; nor should it. Transformation enables America's Army to stay inside the decision loops of adversaries as part of a larger national effort. Those who believe the pace is too rapid will be disappointed. The pace will not slow. In fact, it will increase.

more enduring—capable of providing long-term domination while rebuilding multiple failed states and defending the homeland.

New National Security Strategy

In June 2002 at West Point, New York, President George W. Bush introduced his principles of response to the threats of global terrorism. He said, "All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a price. We will not leave the safety of America and the peace of the planet at the mercy of a few mad terrorists and tyrants. We will lift this dark threat from our country and from the world."⁴

In two aspects, Bush's statement is a remarkable departure from past national security strategies. First,

while deterrence—then defense—remain essential, particularly for the use of strategic nuclear weapons, strategy is offense-oriented, particularly with respect to countering global terrorism. Landpower must be capable of strategic offensive operations to preempt hostile use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Landpower should also be capable of

The U.S. Army, in a Federal Republic appropriately safeguarding the rights of the citizenry in a democracy, must support state and local governments as they fight terrorists who are willing to die and to kill thousands if not millions of Americans. America's Army must underwrite, hopefully, zero-defect defense of the continent; it must be expeditionary—at home.

effecting regime change in hostile states harboring terrorists supported by WMD with or without coalitions of the willing and with little advance notice.

These concepts are big, new, and quite different from past defensive multilateral military requirements [such as NATO] essentially structured current landpower strategy. Solid action programs, funded by a growing defense budget that dwarfs the combined defense budgets of potential friends and foes alike, back this national policy.

As proven in recent military operations, Bush says what he wants and then does what he says. Declaratory policy becomes quite credible because it has been consistently and effectively converted into action policy.

Opportunities for intervention abound. North Korea, Iran, and Syria have been put on notice after recent midintensity operations to effect regime change in Iraq.⁵ Relocating U.S. forces in South Korea from the demilitarization zone could free those forces for offensive operations to force North Korean regime change in the event of provocation. Offensive U.S. military forces should be present in the Middle East for the near term. Is the next step to effect a presence in Palestine and the Golan Heights to guarantee peace? Or is it to respond to a terrorist coup in Pakistan (nuclear threat) or in Saudi Arabia (global oil supply)? Forces appear about ready to be dispersed globally to enable offensive operations in forward operating bases “designed for the rapid projection of American military power against terrorists, hostile states and other potential adversaries” around the world.⁶ These are, indeed, new potential offensive warfighting readiness challenges for America's Army.

But there are other waves of challenges, such as Transformation and domestic defense. Civil authority over the U.S. military, supported consistently by legislative authority, is explicit in demanding Transformation to enable the offensive. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is making the most sweeping changes to DOD since those mandated in *The National Security Act of 1947*, which created the department.⁷

Providing for landpower support in defense of the homeland is another aspect of *The National Security Strategy* that is challenging. As America's Army, the U.S. Army, in a Federal Republic appropriately safeguarding the rights of the citizenry in a democracy, must support state and local governments as they fight terrorists who are willing to die and to kill thousands if not millions of Americans.

America's Army must underwrite, hopefully, zero-defect defense of the continent; it must be expeditionary—at home. Composed as it is of active forces (Federal, national), U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) (state, regional), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) (Federal, regional), America's Army is superbly designed to support this mandate. Imagining a framework of sharing of responsibilities and authorities more suited to serious defense of the citizenry is difficult.⁸ But it is equally difficult to envision a force that is truly expeditionary—both foreign and domestic—simultaneously.

The Active Army naturally leads when the total Army of Active Component and Reserve Component units is projected globally in offensive or defensive operations under the constitutionally mandated powers of the President as commander-in-chief. In the past, the Active Army has often led federalized forces of the various state ARNGs during periods of domestic disturbance, such as the several Garden Plot operations to restore order in major urban areas in the 1960s. Although these are important precedents for ARNG service, it is unlikely that they apply to current homeland defense requirements.

In each state, the central executive authority responding to terrorist attack is the state governor. The state military force, mandated to provide such support as might be required to state and local first-responders, is the ARNG of each state. Just as U.S. defense is the first and dominant priority of the U.S. Army, homeland defense of each state would be the first and dominant responsibility of a state's Joint National Guard.⁹

As Federal leadership (executive and legislative) provides military and other support to a state under

Baghdad youths stopped by 3d Infantry Division MPs from looting a gas refuel station, 22 April 2003.

US Army



We might ask if landpower would have been more effective in achieving national objectives if a clearly dominant, enduring capability had been provided immediately to augment temporarily effective decisive expeditionary capability. . . . Failing to subsequently provide the enduring force dominant in LIC and SOSO might have made effective regime-building much more difficult—with more serious implications to come.

terrorist attack, it seems likely that those forces would be under the command of the state governor with appropriate authority and responsibility delegated to the state's adjutant general.¹⁰ Not surprisingly, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, appears to "want state adjutants general, under some conditions, to retain control of their activated units, as joint task force commanders, capable of addressing any mission presented, utilizing all the forces available within the state or attached from other sources."¹¹

Joint task force (JTF) command within a state executing homeland defense is clearly an important, and certainly a logical, expanded role for the ARNG, and it is a role that will require the most serious professional leader development. Senior leaders in the ARNG (officers and noncommissioned officers) are clearly up to the task. After all, their demonstrated competence in conducting Partnership for Peace (PfP) operations with former Soviet Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe contributed materially to the eastern expansion of NATO to Russia—a strategic achievement of the first magnitude.

At issue for the ARNG is not the quality of performance, it is the quantity of support required. How much can the Nation expect the ARNG to do? Competence—current or achievable—is not the issue in expanding ARNG commitment to serious homeland defense. The issue is time and the ability of its citizen-soldier leaders to fulfill expanded, enduring, homeland-defense responsibilities. The ARNG must fulfill the homeland-defense role as well as be prepared to respond rapidly in an expeditionary mode to WMD attack. And, the ARNG must perform these roles without a serious degradation of the capability to support overseas offensive and defensive landpower operations that *The National Security Strategy* envisages.

Of course, the ARNG could be enlarged, or the USAR could be expanded to support offensive and homeland defense responsibilities. The USAR could also establish special-purpose, multifunctional units on call to conduct operations in support of ARNG JTFs in states under attack. The USAR could also form additional units prepared to replace priority ARNG units called to JTF duty in their state and,

therefore, no longer be available for overseas preemption or stability operations. Certainly these things are doable, but how large should the offensive-defensive hedge be?¹² The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemic in China is a modest measure of what might occur after serious biological weapon attack in the United States. Current formulations of homeland defense might be too narrow.

Offensive operations to effect regime change might or might not require destruction of the enemy's military, but it certainly will require firm control of the population for as long as is required to embed a new regime. In Germany, Japan, and South Korea, doing so took years, if not decades.

A destructive computer virus that interrupts vital services or a sudden regional power blackout can influence millions in their homes or work environments almost immediately. Sudden, direct attack against the population can override, simultaneously, the protective shield of Nation, state, and local governments.

The complexity of day-to-day American life creates many pressure points for applying disruptive terrorism. Recent examples include the sniper attacks in and around Washington, D.C., and the electrical blackouts in the northeast and upper Midwest. Uncertainty and fear can create remarkable demands for protection. For example, after a missile shot down an Israeli civilian aircraft in Kenya in December 2002, politicians called for ARNG air defense units to be placed at all U.S. airports.

The point is that the U.S. defense establishment is now between a rock and a hard place in reconciling new, nontraditional offensive missions and extraordinary and unpredictable (including irrational but compelling?) homeland defense requirements likely to occur simultaneously. Both scenarios clearly require effective, quick-response (expeditionary) capabilities, whether overseas or at home, fully responsive to public expectations.

The tension between what the public expects and what the military can provide is aggravated by emerging military requirements to bolster various failed regimes in countries that are attractive to terrorist networks. Such regimes have failed because they were never viable (as in Congo and Somalia) or because the U.S. changed their regimes, and we now find ourselves responsible for rebuilding them (as in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and most recently,


Iraq).¹³ Rebuilding takes years, if not decades, and the result is a profoundly enduring presence. The necessary size of an enduring presence is clearly debatable and appears to vary state by state.¹⁴

Bosnia, aided by the European Union and NATO, is a clear, good-news story. Similar PfP operations, stability operations and support operations (SOSO) in Bosnia and in Kosovo have resulted in significant achievements. Such operations supporting substantial joint, interagency, multinational (JIM), and intergovernmental programs, ensure a highly effective and enduring presence. By its actions in the Balkans, the Army has demonstrated solid proficiency in intergovernmental and JIM programs. A firmly institutionalized feedback process ensures that lessons learned are shared and trained across the Army. Unfortunately, this success record has not been matched to date in Afghanistan. The growth in violence from 2002 to 2003 brings ominous recollections of the Vietnam experience.¹⁵

We cannot yet predict the outcome of the regime change in Iraq, but near-term omens are not favorable. Restoring basic services will come in time, as will creating genuine political comity among competing ethnic groups. Low-intensity conflict (LIC) mixed with SOSO will give way to SOSO when there is clear restoration of law and order and basic needs, such as electricity, water, and food. However, military capability, sufficient to cause regime change, decisively employed in a mosaic of land, sea, air, special forces, and the CIA in midintensity conflict (MIC), clearly has not proven to be sufficiently dominant and enduring to enable effective follow-up SOSO on the ground. Nor has such military capability been successful in preventing the development of local insurgent and terrorist groups that will have to be neutralized before there can be substantial state-building. The enemy has a vote. Commendable intergovernmental and JIM practices from the Balkans have not yet been translated throughout Iraq.¹⁶

After the highly effective MIC operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, even the most casual observer can see that the military has been successful in conducting operations that differ significantly from the way operations were conducted in Operation Desert Storm. The long, deliberate buildup to achieving dominant landpower, characteristic of Operation Desert Storm, is gone.

Rumsfeld's recent commentary makes it clear that he aggressively and successfully sought rapid military action backed by sufficient land, sea, air, SOF,



Lieutenant Colonel Jenks Reid of the 1st Armored Division's air defense artillery battalion talks to residents of Airport Village, near Baghdad, about his role in providing security to their village after a ribbon-cutting ceremony celebrating the opening of the refurbished Airport Village Clinic, 18 October 2003.

Past doctrinal concepts of regime-building, such as imposition of constabulary forces, appear inappropriate for the practices of sudden changes in the mosaic that might have been stimulated by competent enemies; that is, requiring rapid changes in force composition and mission so as to continue to dominate local situations. Occupying forces might have to employ rapidly shifting combinations of SOSO, LIC, and MIC to retain the tactical initiative particularly when the stakes include potential use of WMD.

and CIA capabilities applied in a shifting mosaic sufficient to decisively remove Iraq's old regime.¹⁷ This certainly reflects successful Transformation underway. Yet, expeditionary landpower successful for conventional midintensity fighting has proven inadequate for establishing the necessary enduring conditions for SOSO to build a new regime.

Looking back on the campaign from months or years of perspective, we might ask if landpower would have been more effective in achieving national objectives if a clearly dominant, enduring capability had been provided immediately to augment temporarily effective decisive expeditionary capability. As Richard Hart Sinnreich recently commented, "[F]ighting a war quickly and cheaply doesn't guarantee winning it quickly and cheaply."¹⁸ Decisive action certainly precluded destruction of oil fields and might have precluded the generation and employment of WMD in Iraq. Many other highly negative contingencies did not materialize, at least not during the first several months of occupation. Clearly U.S. forces achieved great successes, but the mission

was essentially regime change, WMD or not. Failing to subsequently provide the enduring force dominant in LIC and SOSO might have made effective regime-building much more difficult—with more serious implications to come.

Some implications began to appear by early fall 2003, with continuing terrorist operations against U.S. and British occupying forces. The coalition of the willing appears anemic in providing military force appropriate to assist in effective occupation.

The point is not to apply 20-20 hindsight to criticize a clearly brilliant campaign that was well led and well fought. Rather, it is to suggest that the expeditionary mindset that pervades execution of *The National Security Strategy* and thereby the design of major Army forces for a future military might be fallacious.

Perhaps such a mindset is appropriate for the U.S. Air Force (USAF), the U.S. Navy (USN), the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and certainly for the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), as the USMC's basic rationale. Such a mindset is

essential when there is a fleeting target as envisaged by strategic planners within DOD. Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, says, "If there is a terrorist training camp somewhere and we come to understand that there is something we can do militarily, we don't have a month to do it. . . . We certainly don't have six months to do it. We may only have hours to do it."¹⁹

The Army should certainly be an effective participant in expeditionary operations. However, expeditionary capability has not been the fundamental rationale for America's Army, although it is clearly a useful capability to provide to the President and Secretary of Defense, particularly when unique forced-entry capabilities are required far inland.

The Army exists to control people—holding the bayonet at as many throats as required for as long as required to achieve the U.S. national will, whatever that might require as military, political, economic, and social change might be sought. How long "holding the bayonet" takes is a decision of national civil authority. After other services have gone back to their bases in the United States or overseas, America's Army is expected to, and will, endure in the target state to underwrite America's larger political, social, economic, or military objectives.

Offensive operations to effect regime change might or might not require destruction of the enemy's military, but it certainly will require firm control of the population for as long as is required to embed a new regime. In Germany, Japan, and South Korea, doing so took years, if not decades. Firm control requires a solid, survivable, enduring presence sufficient to overcome the unpleasant uncertainties of occupation. Should that credible presence be provided in survivable, psychologically intimidating Abrams or Bradleys? Is it feasible or desirable to attempt to maintain an intimidating presence in light Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) or Future Combat Systems (FCS), which are potentially vulnerable to future hand-held weapons—top down or bottom up or whatever? The Abrams-Bradley pair clearly is world class—militarily and psychologically dominant. Would a lighter Objective Force, FCS-equipped, be as dominant and survivable?

So, on the one hand, national requirements increase for quick-response expeditionary operations—offensive and defensive. On the other hand, requirements mount for enduring landpower domination as failed states rebuild. Similar requirements rise for homeland defense. Now add Transforma-

tion. The response cannot be either-or; it must be all, and this is the challenge for America's Army at war—expeditionary and enduring, foreign and domestic.

Expeditionary and Enduring Force Design

The issue is not whether America's Army should be equipped with a more readily deployable SBCT or whether it should strive for Objective Forces equipped with FCS. It should, when for national military reasons it is essential to augment the superb expeditionary capabilities of USAF, USN, and particularly, USMC and SOCOM. Certainly this was General Peter K. Schoomaker's emphasis when he addressed the need for a "more 'joint', 'expeditionary' and 'modular'" army.²⁰

The majority of America's Army should be fully equipped with mobile, highly survivable, fully protected firepower capable of fighting and winning under the worst conceivable conditions while also thoroughly intimidating (hopefully, justifiably terrifying) any person or group electing to oppose the objectives of enduring national military commitment.²⁰ Similar logic applies to the full combat, combat support, combat service support suite of materiel. Whatever a commander's personal belief about what is happening in the targeted objective area, and as appropriate and justifiable as his actions might seem, the forcible presence of America's Army should channel his actions to those desired by the Nation, for as long as the Nation elects to dominate the area. The enduring—not expeditionary—mission of the Army is enduring domination.

When future joint forces assemble for network-centric operations, landpower must be able to prevail across a broad spectrum of conflict. Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shenseki outlined his vision of the breadth of required capabilities early in 2000: "The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. *The Army will be responsive and dominant at every point on that spectrum*" [emphasis added].²² There is no reason to believe that those imperatives no longer apply. In fact, recent events reinforce the requirements for full-spectrum readiness.

Now add the additional requirements of *The National Security Strategy*—inter alia regime change created through offensive preemptive operations. Clearly America's Army needs adaptive leaders; organizations; adaptive doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); training; and most of all, superb soldiers. It goes back to the absolute requirements of balanced doctrine, training, leader, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS), each exploiting cascading excellence in America's Army.²³

There is more. We need to ensure that the requisite balanced DTLOMS will support varying mosaics of combat capability composed of land, sea, air, SOF, CIA, and such multinational capabilities as coalitions of the willing or combinations of Federal, state, and local government. Finally, add expectations of uncertain change in complex organizations. In his treatise "The Objective Force in 2005," John Riggs says, "The Objective [Future] Force is composed of *modular, scalable, flexible organizations* for prompt and sustained land operations" [emphasis added].²⁴ So, unpredictable changes in the composition of teams of decisionmakers during operations appear certain at about every echelon.

An ongoing discussion focuses on materiel and specifically the characteristics of the Objective Force-FCS. The debate is predictable and appropriate. After all, FCS will cost billions. But, the most dramatic new challenge to the Army does not come out of that debate, whatever the materiel solutions. The challenge comes with the ripple effects of comparable change in balancing DTLOMS in the face of sustained operations in a continually changing mosaic of expeditionary and enduring, foreign and domestic, national military capabilities mandated by *The National Security Strategy*. This is unprecedented.²⁵

Doctrine. The Objective Force-FCS conceptual framework is comprehensive and thoughtful. Clearly this concept is adapting to the requirements of evolving joint doctrine. In fact, given strong Army paternity in creating doctrine, this is not surprising. It remains to be seen if a decisive capability to end a regime is sufficient to dominate and to create these conditions or whether diplomatic efforts can induce other nations to support us with military capabilities to create those conditions.

Employing highly flexible, varying mosaics of capabilities mandates review of doctrine to ensure that the use of new, perhaps transient, capabilities, such as Delta or CIA operatives or state and local gov-

ernments, is understood and assimilated by leaders and that TTP have been embedded to ensure their effective integration. Past doctrinal concepts of regime-building, such as imposition of constabulary forces, appear inappropriate for the practices of sudden changes in the mosaic that might have been

Is it feasible or desirable to attempt to maintain an intimidating presence in light SBCT or FCS, which are potentially vulnerable to future hand-held weapons—top down or bottom up or whatever? The Abrams-Bradley pair clearly is world class—militarily and psychologically dominant. Would a lighter Objective Force, FCS-equipped, be as dominant and survivable?

stimulated by competent enemies; that is, requiring rapid changes in force composition and mission so as to continue to dominate local situations. Occupying forces might have to employ rapidly shifting combinations of SOSO, LIC, and MIC to retain the tactical initiative, particularly when the stakes include potential use of WMD. The occupying force must possess joint tactical constructs, appropriate to rapid shifts up and down the spectrum of conflict.

Conceptually, it seems likely that the doctrinal expectation should more and more envisage combined arms operations. Mounted combined arms forces are represented by the symbology of red, blue, yellow, and the lightening bolt of the Armor patch. Light forces are combined arms for foot, parachute, helicopter, or air and land mobility. SOF are combined arms that now include the USAF and the USN. Sustaining highly capable combinations of capabilities within these combined arms teams is challenging. Now, the national military vision is a combined arms of the combined arms; that is, having rapidly variable mixes of the entire base of combined arms that can assemble rapidly for decisive, then hopefully, dominant operations. This is not the conventional constabulary, nor is the appropriate conventional, predetermined, domestic, natural-disaster team when the threat is global terrorism.

Another doctrinal implication of shifting mosaics is the need to be prepared to operate across intergovernmental and JIM programs, utilizing joint (USAF, SOCOM); interagency (Department of State, CIA, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency); intergovernmental (Federal, state, local); and multinational (Iraqi, Afghan, NATO) forces. Multinational

operations are particularly challenging because they might require interaction with groups of local leaders across the range of local agencies and governments. Imagine the complexity of operational frameworks 101st Air Assault units faced in governing Mosul, Iraq, while also facing sporadic insurgent operations. What doctrine and TTPs are required to prepare a senior tactical headquarters to assume effective, enduring governmental authorities over millions of people—many friendly, some indifferent, some quite hostile and capable; that is, enduring a Great Depression while staying ready to fight MICs to counter any hostile use of WMD in hours not days? This is not your conventional constabulary.

Leaders. Emerging patterns of operations confirm past expectations of evolving requirements for leaders in America's Army.²⁶ The extraordinary range and rapidity of change in the skills, knowledges, and attributes (SKA) required of leaders confirm the wisdom of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel in focusing on leader self-awareness and adaptability. Now leaders must broaden their service SKA to those intergovernmental and JIM operations require. Bright, motivated leaders, corporal and above, faced by the requirements of current operations, understand this. They learn experientially, as has been demonstrated in recent operations to the great satisfaction and pride of America observing the conventional combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom through the eyes of embedded media.

The challenge is to bring the wealth of experience back to the institution so that profound learning at whatever grade can be translated to higher and lower grades. Bringing distilled wisdom back to the institution will allow knowledge to multiply as it percolates among leaders, much as the insight gained through years of tactical wisdom engendered by the various combat training centers has seeped throughout the Army to be applied in expeditionary and enduring operations—foreign and domestic.

Fortunately, new capabilities, such as the Battle Command Knowledge System, evolve to encourage and, hopefully, accelerate the exchange of data, information, and knowledge, initially within America's Army, then across intergovernmental and JIM missions as it suits national purposes. The Army, already one of America's leading learning organizations, is about to become a premier learning and teaching organization. As this occurs and is translated to intergovernmental and JIM associates, there should be substantial opportunities to expand the coalition of

the willing, which in turn, should generate the capabilities required for enduring domination while protecting rebuilding. There should be comparable opportunities to support homeland defense in expeditionary and in enduring aspects.

Leader development is alive and well. Now the focus migrates to preparing teams of leaders, such as the chain of command, as well as individual leaders. Such a progression should ensure that Army leaders and their units and organizations can exploit their current excellence to stay ahead of the accelerating change mandated by national military leadership, particularly the generation of necessary expeditionary and enduring capabilities.

Training. Current training doctrine and TTP are good and improving.²⁷ A new training challenge comes with increasing reliance on intergovernmental and JIM operations. There is a compelling requirement to create intensive experiential training packages that can be rapidly modified on the ground to train to task, condition, and standard, shared with various intergovernmental and JIM combinations. The first requirement is to train to ensure effective communication, which requires much more than liaison-level understanding. Shared task proficiency is essential, given the pace of operations.

Organizations. Organizations are shaped by the doctrine and TTPs they are to implement. The requirements for modular, scalar organizations, combined with support of the varying mosaics of current operations, put a tough mark on the wall. I advocate an organizational structure of core fighting teams, similar to the Delta Force troop-level organization, with multiples of from four to six leader teams to which additional capabilities could be added and that would be described as SOCOM+ when all of the other services are added.²⁸

This proposal might seem quite revolutionary, but in terms of small unit combined arms teams, it actually approximates post-World War II armored cavalry platoons, which had a scout section, a tank section, an armored infantry squad, a mortar squad, and a platoon headquarters. By thoroughly modernizing (likely including some robotic capabilities), the diversity of capabilities, as represented in old armored cavalry squads, is an organizational precedent for future organizational design.

Now, however, combat power plug-in capabilities need to be built in. Since the operational environment might shift back and forth rapidly from SOSO to LIC and potentially MIC with WMD, the base organization should readily expand or contract to accom-

moderate or release additional capabilities. What would be even more challenging and necessary is providing the same flexibility in order to add inter-governmental and JIM capabilities. Conventional mechanized infantry platoon leaders did that in Kosovo, and they now do it in Iraq, whether the intergovernmental or JIM participant is an Iraqi policeman, contractor repair personnel, or SOCOM/CIA/FBI operatives. Whether we are talking about separate platoon headquarters or a supplemental platoon liaison team or more communications to provide others, we need to revisit the organization of companies or troops and platoons. Similar logic applies for each of the other joint tactical constructs and for the requirements of homeland defense. Such a construct would not be like your father's or grandfather's constabulary once the expeditionary phase of combat operations is over—nor would this be a postmodern military.

Soldiers. Soldiers—competent, confident, disciplined soldier—are the Army's abiding strength. Superb young leaders, as diverse as is America, are endowed with curiosity and initiative to seek a better way to accomplish any task. They have precisely the attributes needed to master unanticipated situations. Innovative, effective recruiting continues. Favorable combat arms midterm reenlistment continues. Lateral-entry (continuum of support), which appears to be coming, will provide more opportunities with which to attract highly competent leaders.²⁸ This is a clear "good news story" that should continue.

Advantaging Transformation

We should regard current Transformation processes as a glass half full. Transformation is not going away in the face of other compelling challenges; nor should it. Transformation enables America's Army to stay inside the decision loops of adversaries as part of a larger national effort. Those who believe the pace is too rapid will be disappointed. The pace will not slow; it will increase. The spectrum of conflict, including the challenges of homeland defense, is just too broad, and the global potential of terrorist and WMD threat too great, to brake the momentum for Transformation. In fact, the pace should quicken. We must address the enduring dominate military force requirements of effective and, therefore, enduring regime change, just as we must address the requirements associated with the clearly attractive flash of expeditionary operations.

The Army has been transforming throughout its history.³⁰ As an institution, the Army thrives on change and does quite well at it. Of particular note is that the Army has accomplished recent change in the midst of a decade of severely constrained resources. Forcing change when every decision is a zero-sum game paid with another canceled program is tough and debilitating. But, it is nothing compared with earlier crises, such as at Valley Forge or during the Army's precipitous decline after two world wars. The Army must transform as it leans into the challenge of addressing enduring domination as thoroughly as it addresses the clearly necessary expeditionary capability—foreign and domestic. *MR*

NOTES

1. Frederick Kagan, "An Army of Lots More Than One," *The Weekly Standard*, 07 July 2003, on-line at <www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=2849&R=77A627BBD>.
2. LTG Frederic J. Brown, "Perpetual Transitions," *Military Review* (November-December 2002): 75-86.
3. The White House, *The National Security Strategy for the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2002).
4. President George W. Bush, Graduation address, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1 June 2002. In this context, "we" means the United States of America.
5. Doug Struck, "U.S. Troops Will Leave Korean DMZ," *Washington Post*, 6 June 2003, A1; Thom Shanker, "Lessons From Iraq Include How to Scare North Korean Leader," on-line at <nytimes.com>, accessed on 12 May 2003; Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Eyes Pressing Uprising in Iran," *Washington Post*, 25 May 2003, A1; Charles Krauthammer, "Syrian Power Play," *Washington Post*, 18 April 2003, A21.
6. Vernon Loeb, "New Bases Reflect Shift in Military," *Washington Post*, 9 June 2003, A1. See also Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, "New Battle Stations," *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 2003): 95-103.
7. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld might be making sweeping changes in DOD, but not without legislative "backfires" as traditional practices change. See Stan Crock, "Rumsfeld vs. Everybody," *Business Week* (16 June 2003): 76-78.
8. For a more expansive discussion of this serendipity, see Brown, "America's Army," *Military Review* (March-April 2002): 3-8.
9. U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force units are about to be organized as joint force headquarters in each state. For more information, see LTG H. Steven Blum, "The Army National Guard—Back to the Future," Association of the United States Army, 3 September 2003, 3.
10. As discussed in Brown, "Transformation Under Attack," *Military Review* (May-June 2002): 15.
11. Jim Sullins, "Merger may make Guard the fast force of old," *Army Times*, 9 June 2003, 54.
12. For additional discussion of dilemmas of hedges, see Brown, "Quality over Quantity and Hedges," *Military Review* (July-August 2002): 64-69.
13. This is not to assert that these areas might present similar challenges. There are vast differences between each, particularly between Afghanistan and Iraq. SOSO priorities adopted uniformly can be absolutely dysfunctional because of great local dissimilarities.

14. Perhaps predictably, Rumsfeld advocates a "light" presence in Iraq. In "Beyond 'Nation-Building,'" *The Washington Post*, 25 September 2003, A33, he says, "We are not in Iraq to engage in nation-building; our mission is to help Iraqis so that they can build their own nation. That is an important distinction."
15. For a sobering assessment of progress in Afghanistan, see "Not a dress rehearsal," *Economist* (14 August 2003): 35-37.
16. This is not a criticism of the performance of America's Army units; the record is yet to be written. However, it appears that some U.S. leaders had unrealistic expectations of success being achieved with limited forces. Saddam Hussein's prepared Plan C interjected LIC into SOSO operations.
17. See Brown, "Transformation Under Attack," 14-15.
18. Richard Hart Sinnreich, "Winning Badly," *Washington Post*, 27 October 2003, A19.
19. Loeb, "US shifting troops to far-flung bases," on-line at <www.dawn.com/2003/06/11/int15.htm>, accessed 23 October 2003.
20. Sean Naylor, "Fast forward," *Army Times*, 6 October 2003, 14.
21. Not to mention the effect on U.S. forces of possessing clearly world-class equipment that in the case of the Abrams, is yet to contribute to a U.S. casualty, an extraordinary contrast with the low survivability of the M4 Sherman tank in Europe in World War II.
22. Secretary of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki, "The Army Vision," *Department of the Army Weekly Summary*, 7 April 2000.
23. As discussed in Brown, "Imperatives for Tomorrow," *Military Review* (September-October 2002): 81 footnote; Brown, "Transformation Under Attack," 12-13.
24. LTG John Riggs, "The Objective Force in 2015," final draft, 12 December 2002, concept summary, 1.
25. Substantial change occurred in the 1980s, including AirLand Battle Doctrine, Big Five (Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk, Patriot), new organizations, intensified leader and soldier development, but these changes were not up against simultaneous changing mosaics of expeditionary and enduring combat operations (such as intergovernmental and JIM operations) and massive change in Army business practices. The discussion of DTLOMS is an extension of that in Brown, "Imperatives for Tomorrow," 81-91.
26. See Brown, "Leaders for America's Army."
27. See Brown, "Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning/Teaching and Team Building," *Military Review* (July-August 2003).
28. See Brown, "Transformation Under Attack," 12-14.
29. See also Brown, "Leaders for America's Army."
30. For one perspective of change, see Brown, "Perpetual Transitions."

MR Review Essay

Another Such Victory

Major Michael E. Long

U.S. Army Reserves, Retired, New Port Richey, Florida

Harry S. Truman, often called the “accidental president,” assumed his duties as commander-in-chief on 12 April 1945 shortly after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Many modern-day presidents, and several prominent historians, refer to Truman’s brusque personality and his “give ‘em hell” attitude as worthy of emulation in the conduct of foreign affairs and national defense.

Arnold A. Offner’s book *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (California, Stanford University Press, 2002) presents a new interpretation of Truman’s Cold War presidency that questions his leadership abilities and job performance. Using recently declassified documents from American, Russian, Korean, and other international government archives, Offner paints a picture of Truman as “parochial and simplistic, showing little ability to comprehend the basis for other nations’ policies, and demonizing the leaders of other nations who would not bend to the will of the United States.”

Offner examines Truman’s background and his entry into politics under the tutelage of “Boss” Tom Pendergast, the leader of Missouri democratic politics for decades. According to Offner, Truman emulated his father’s hard-work ethic and often distanced himself from his peers. Thus, when entering the political arena for the first time under Pendergast, Truman demonstrated a penchant for “deferring to stronger leaders such as Pendergast or to Secretaries of State George C. Marshall or Dean Acheson, whose manner and firm views he found reassuring.”

Offner provides a good assessment of Truman’s World War I military career. While serving in France

with the 129th Field Artillery, 35th Division, Truman was initially “elected” to first lieutenant and eventually rose to the rank of major. He had the respect of his troops and always held that his “whole political career was based on his war service and army associates.” Offner qualifies these remarks by informing the reader of Truman’s racist epithets that popped up from time to time during his private conversations.

Offner also criticizes Truman’s self-deprecating style and mannerisms. Soon after taking office, Truman frequently asked those with whom he met to pray for him. Senator Alben Barkley and assistant presidential press secretary Elben Ayers warned Truman that such comments were “eroding his executive authority.”

Truman’s sheltered vice presidency during the last months of Roosevelt’s life eventually handicapped Truman in assuming the role of president. Offner tells his readers: “Truman did not grasp the difference between Cabinet officers—powerful figures with large constituencies, and staffers whose sole function was to serve the president.” He was clearly insecure in his position and was “excessive[ly] suspicious about government officials and private spokespeople who eventually narrow[ed] the range of views or policy options to be placed before him.”

Truman was operating well beyond his abilities, which is evident during deliberations among his cabinetmembers regarding the use of atomic power and the idea of sharing industrial and scientific information with the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “insisted that urban-industrial America was highly

vulnerable to atomic attack and opposed any accord that would give the other nation, especially the Soviets, access to atomic weapon information.”

Offner gives Truman passing marks for his work in the Middle East, particularly for his work associated with establishing a Jewish homeland. According to Offner, “The president’s actions in this matter were governed by his sense of moral and political commitment, by the advice offered by shrewd White House advisers, and by the fact that the Jews in Palestine were able to seize the moment.”

Perhaps no other controversy in U.S. history has the fireworks associated with it than the conflict between Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. Truman often referred to MacArthur as “Mr. Prima Donna,” “Brass Hat,” “Five-Star MacArthur,” “a supreme egotist who regarded himself as a god.”

In July 1950, the JCS recommended MacArthur, who was nearing 70, as their sole choice for the newly created position of United Nations Commander. Offner relates the story of what happened between MacArthur and Truman at the time Truman was to give a nationwide address on his Far East policy, copies of which had been sent to MacArthur for his comments. MacArthur’s comments arrived with only 15 minutes to spare, which caused Truman to fume.

The rivalry continued and MacArthur was recalled to the United States (relieved of duty) in April 1951. Offner tells of Acheson’s wanting to build some consensus before firing MacArthur to deflect the oncoming political attacks that Truman would undoubtedly receive.

General Omar Bradley wanted to consult the JCS, but he did not have the opportunity to do so. Truman's response was predictable: "MacArthur was a worse double crosser than [General George B.] McClellan," re-

ferring to the unprofessional conduct of McClellan and his stormy relationship with President Abraham Lincoln. Truman added, "There cannot be two policy makers at the head of government."

Offner's book about Truman is provocative and thoroughly researched. He provides detailed notes, an outstanding bibliography, and superb illustrations that highlight Truman's life and presidency. **MR**

The Wound and the Dream

Major Jeffrey C. Alfier

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The fate the world has given me is to struggle to write powerfully enough to draw others into the horror—Bruce Weigl, *The Circle of Hanh* (Grove Press, New York, 2000).

With the publication of *The Wound and the Dream: Sixty Years of American Poetry about the Spanish Civil War* (University of Illinois Press, Champaign, 2002), English professor and cultural historian Cary Nelson presents a meticulous, compelling anthology of poetry that underscores the fascination that the antifascist cause of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) has long held for American poets.

When the Spanish Civil War ended, two groups of poets returned to the undying theme of Spain—Spanish exiles and Americans. Throughout this anthology, Nelson gives readers a sense of "the collective and almost choral nature" of the war's poetry, as well as its "lyrical and rhetorical invention" that gives it its most moving and persuasive expression. Moreover, as he reminds us, the poetry of this war was read on the streets and in the trenches.

Like poems of any tragedy, the best are not the ones gloriously trumpeting broad causes or agendas, instead they are those that reveal poignant particulars of individual lives. For example, in allusion to Clio—the first Muse—and the inevitability of wartime death, James Rorty writes,

*Life takes its final meaning
From chosen death; this stirrup-
cup
History, the ancient, greedy
bitch.*

Describing the lives of children crippled by bombing from Franco's

aircraft, Leslie Ullman speaks to the way—

*Someone dressed them
in lace and gabardine, like
the antique figures. . . .
Their deaths seemed to rise
inside them
like the sleep of the newly-born.*

Yet, in many of the poems, polemic slogans interspersed in the lines disturb the continuity of the verse. Norman Rosten inserts:

MADRID! TOMB! FASCISM!

amid the lines of his poem, *The March*. However, the war's contemporaneous poets could not afford the literary luxury of distance from their subject; theirs was a moral urgency.

There is little to criticize in this enlightening book. Although one criticism might be that Nelson goes a bit far when he asserts that the United States willfully forgot the meaning of the Spanish Civil War. Another criticism is Nelson's lack of a more complete index, and perhaps

the dates when the poets wrote the poems should have been included with the poems themselves, not in the content pages.

These light criticisms aside, Nelson's anthology is a welcome addition to the growing body of poetry resurrected from under the avalanche of high modernism. The book is an excellent companion to earlier anthologies such as *The Penguin Book of Spanish Civil War Verse* by Valentine Cunningham (Penguin Books, New York, 1980), and *Poetry of the Spanish Civil War* by Marilyn Rosenthal (New York University, New York, 1975).

Although many question the motives of the Stalinists and the Iberian Left that composed so much of the antifascist forces, the poetry of the Spanish Civil War—as Nelson conclusively shows—"was one of the indisputable terms in which history burnt its name into the living flesh of its time." Nelson's collection of poems will certainly make historians and poets appreciative of this era. **MR**

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MR Book Reviews

THE FALLACIES OF COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND A NEW DIRECTION, Keith B. Payne, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2001, 225 pages, \$19.95.

Keith B. Payne's book, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction*, argues that the U.S. approach to deterrence is based on flawed assumptions and that it creates a dangerous overconfidence and complacency among policy-makers. Cold War deterrence policy was based on the premise that the Soviet Union would behave in accordance with what the United States perceived as rational. Today, the Cold War framework for deterrence remains unchanged despite the dramatic changes to the international context. Payne exposes the flaws within that framework and offers a more comprehensive and empirical methodology for formulating U.S. deterrence postures.

Payne deconstructs the U.S. faith in Cold War nuclear deterrence and reveals the chilling facts of Soviet war plans that diverged from U.S. expectations. Despite this, the U.S. approach to deterrence in the post-Cold War era continues to rely on the same invalid assumptions of rationality. Policymakers apply this framework indiscriminately to every potential threat regardless of specific contextual considerations. Payne's alternative is to develop a tailored model for every disparate opponent. His approach would be based on developing a thorough understanding of each potential challenger and the factors that influence the decision-making process. He applies his methodology to a Sino-American conflict scenario precipitated by a crisis over Taiwan.

Payne presents a compelling argument for adopting a new approach in deterrence. While deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction remains a fundamental U.S. strategic objective, Payne offers new ways and new applications of means to

achieve those ends. As president of the National Institute for Public Policy, and author of several books on strategic topics, Payne is an experienced strategy and policy analyst. His book is topical and timely as public debate on National Missile Defense continues and as the United States considers how to adapt strategically to an array of threats including global terrorism.

MAJ Joel A. Woodward, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE: Strategic Considerations, James M. Smith, ed., USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, CO, February 2001, 166 pages, price unavailable.

Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations, a collection of four papers on post-Cold War deterrence and strategic defense; nuclear strategy; and regional considerations, is far from exhaustive of all of the dimensions that should come under review. The essayists raise valuable questions and make recommendations. The first paper, "Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New Strategic Force Posture," is a thesis on the reformulation of what constitutes effective deterrence in today's evolving strategic environment. The authors present and develop an argument for a strategic U.S. nuclear deterrence concept to replace the traditional land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) concept. The authors argue that the old ICBM concept was based on punishment, offense, and offensive parity. Their construct embraces both punishment and denial, adding defense to the mix and a multilateral dimension to the determination of effectiveness. Much of their argument is on emerging strategic threats, and it raises several issues about potential complications and strategic considerations.

The other three papers specifically address threats, issues, and

complications involved with Russia, China, and the positions of European allies on a national missile defense concept. For example, "Shrimp or Barracuda? Contemplating a Unified and Nuclear Capable Korea," forecasts "an accelerated soft landing" for Korean unification on negotiated terms between 2015 and 2020. The authors hypothesize that Korea might opt for retaining an independent nuclear capability to ensure national security, present a detailed examination of the implications of such a decision—whether declared or covert—on regional actors and the United States, including special emphasis on the receptivity of theater missile defenses (TMD) or nuclear missile defenses (NMD).

"Implications of Ballistic Missile Defenses for the Security and Stability of Northeast Asia" examines some of the same issues the second paper addresses. However, the essayist's perspective centers directly on regional interest of U.S. TMD and NMD deployment. The conclusion is that a U.S. TMD deployment could well spur China to develop more missile systems.

"The European Union and a Nuclear Security and Defense Policy" examines historic and contemporary pressures and decisions revolving around a European concept of defense divorced from reliance on U.S. conventional or nuclear partnerships. The authors conclude that an independent European nuclear course is unlikely, but a U.S. push for NMD could potentially change that course. As with the two previous papers, the authors recommend a policy of discussion, inclusion, and cooperation in strategic matters of unilateral U.S. action.

It is worth emphasizing that missile defense is only one tool among many in maintaining peace, security, and stability and must be considered within the context of the entire strategic framework, which includes of-

fensive nuclear arms as well as broader diplomatic and security activities such as arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This diversified approach to deterrence is appropriate for the complex, less-predictable world in which we live.

**MAJ Larry Small, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AT HITLER'S SIDE: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant, 1937-1945, Nicolaus von Below, translated by Geoffrey Brooks, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, (1980) 2001, 256 pages, \$29.95.

Three decades after the end of the World War II, Nicolaus von Below recounted his professional career as German Frueher Adolf Hitler's Luftwaffe Aide from 1937 to 1945. *At Hitler's Side: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant, 1937-1945*, originally published in 1980, is here translated into English for the first time. Although most of Von Below's original notes and diaries were destroyed at the end of the war, his recollections are fascinating and interesting to study.

At the time of his original writing, Von Below maintained a high regard for Hitler. While not entirely apologetic for Hitler's actions, he definitely focused his thoughts and recollections on Hitler's less problematic aspects. Initially, Von Below emphasizes Hitler's "sharp logic and extraordinary fine feel for military situations" and his desire to maintain peace. According to Von Below's account, Britain drove Europe to conflict in the immediate prewar years, countering or invalidating Hitler's initiatives to prevent a European conflagration.

Hitler's failings toward the end of the war were not the result of personal faults but, rather, stemmed from his unbearable feeling of abandonment and betrayal after the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt. Von Below glosses over and seldom mentions German atrocities and Hitler's attitudes toward the Jews. In one short section, he denies all knowledge of the deportation and destruction associated with the "final solution." In contrast, entire sections of the book are dedicated to allied "atrocities," such as the Katyn Forest massacre, the attack on Monte

Cassino ("pure vandalism" in Von Below's words), and the Dresden bombing.

This intriguing book should appeal to a wide audience. It certainly presents a different side of World War II German leadership than is generally accepted. True, the reader should take many of Von Below's assertions and commentary with a grain of salt, but regardless of the reader's agreement or disagreement with Von Below's perspective, *At Hitler's Side* is provocative and will definitely spur research and examination.

**MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA,
Hohenfels, Germany**

AN UNCERTAIN TRUMPET: The Evolution of U.S. Army Infantry Doctrine, 1919-1941, Kenneth Finlayson, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2001, 178 pages, \$62.50.

Everyone concerned with the direction of current Army Transformation should read Kenneth Finlayson's small book *An Uncertain Trumpet: The Evolution of U.S. Army Infantry Doctrine, 1919-1941*. Finlayson, a historian with the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, masterfully assesses the evolution of small unit infantry doctrine from World War I through the United States' initial entry into World War II. His discussion of the varying influences of senior officers, who frequently pushed agendas harmful to the fighting effectiveness of the infantry army, and his analysis of the glacial pace of weapons acceptance should serve as cautionary notes for current Transformation efforts. Finlayson's comprehensive grasp of source documents, his understanding of the doctrine-development process, and his clear and engaging writing style make his study of doctrinal change a compelling, fascinating book.

A small disappointment with the book is that its analysis ends with the U.S. entry into World War II. Finlayson implies that infantry doctrine held some responsibility for the early battlefield defeats in North Africa. However, his analysis does not extend to any discussion of those battles or the influence of doctrine on how the U.S. Army actually fought

World War II. Despite this, the book is a superb addition to the story of the U.S. Army in the interwar years.

One might read this book along with William O. Odom's discussion of operations doctrine in *After the Trenches: A Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939* (Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 1999) and David E. Johnson's assessment of weapons and doctrine development in *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army 1917-1945* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998). *Uncertain Trumpet* provides a comprehensive, and possibly prophetic, look at current efforts to maintain the Army's strategic relevance. I highly recommend this book.

**Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.,
Lansing, Kansas**

THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN: State Formation and the Collapse of the International System, Barnett R. Rubin, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2002, 420 pages, \$35.00.

The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and the Collapse of the International System remains the best single source for understanding the collapse of social order, discipline, mores, and structure in that war-torn state. Barnett R. Rubin, perhaps the West's leading non-Afghan authority on Afghanistan, first published this landmark study in 1995. The book's prophetic last sentence states, "If the international community does not find a way to rebuild Afghanistan, a floodtide of weapons, cash, and contraband will escape that state's porous borders and make the world less secure for all." Unfortunately, that prediction came true. Following the events of 11 September 2001, the world's attention finally fixed on Afghanistan. The book is belatedly receiving the attention it deserves.

An excellent account of the history of Afghanistan, Rubin's book emphasizes the period of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) and afterward. When the Soviet Union withdrew from the region and collapsed, the United States also disengaged from the region. Afghanistan had fought a war with a superpower, lost

well over a million citizens, and was left without a legitimate state and national leadership. Its best and brightest citizenry was scattered across the globe. The economy was shattered, and a country that had once exported food could no longer feed itself. What Afghanistan had in abundance was warlords, disease, and poverty.

The United States and other former ardent supporters of the Mujahideen provided charity relief but political neglect. In this failed state, the Taliban movement found ready followers. The Taliban began as a movement to bring peace, disarm warlords, and unite the Pushtun peoples. It eventually ended anarchy but produced a rogue state locked in a brutal, ethnic civil war with the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara peoples.

The Taliban proved to be a fundamentalist, oppressive regime, which sponsored smuggling and narcotics traffic and welcomed the financial support of regional states and organizations, including international terrorists organizations such as al-Qaeda. Soon Al-Qaeda set up training camps and headquarters in Afghanistan and fielded units alongside the Taliban force. The devastation of Afghanistan allowed outlaws and terrorists a safe haven from which to launch global suffering.

The repercussions of events in Afghanistan echo throughout Iran, Central Asia, and South Asia. Until stability comes to this entire region, the threat to international stability remains. Rubin's book provides an excellent indepth background to the country, which will remain a concern for the United States for many years to come. Military professionals will find Rubin's book indispensable in understanding the political and social realities of contemporary Afghanistan.

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired,
Leavenworth, Kansas

THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, 1946-1989, Joseph Trento, Prima Publishing, Roseville, CA, 2001, 432 pages, \$30.00.

Joseph J. Trento's *The Secret History of the CIA, 1946-1989*, attempts to expose alleged ineptitudes and wrongdoing in the CIA. Unfortun-

nately, the book promises much more than it delivers. Also, it makes no direct reference to terrorists attacks, dealing almost entirely with the period from the CIA's founding in 1947 to the 1980s. In fact, the term "terrorism" is absent from the index.

For a supposedly secretive organization, the CIA attracts a great deal of attention. Over the years it has been accused of everything from gross ineptitude and massive corruption to scheming for world domination. The most consistent strain of criticism, however, has been the charge that the CIA is the victim of its own alleged arrogance and ineptitude. This sort of criticism is so common that the CIA's bibliographic website has a special category for accusations, subdivided by time periods. Some criticism is rooted in fact, but much of it has strong elements of fantasy. The arguments appeal chiefly to conspiracy buffs and consist mostly of speculation, hearsay, and circumstantial evidence.

Trento coauthored *Widows: Four American Spies, the Wives They Left Behind, and the KGB'S Crippling of American Intelligence* (Crown Publishers Inc., New York, 1989), with Susan Trento and William Corson. They argue that U.S. intelligence in general and the CIA in particular were no more than playthings in the hands of the Soviet Union's Secret Police and intelligence agency. Trento carries on the same theme in *Secret History*. Once again he presents the thesis that since its inception, the CIA has been a colossal failure, outmaneuvered by its enemies, penetrated by the KGB, and duped at every turn.

Some of the evidence that Trento presents is undoubtedly true, but except for details, none of it is new or startling. For example, the attempt to enlist organized crime in a campaign to assassinate Fidel Castro is well known. One of Trento's few current "revelations" is that President William Clinton used a presidential pardon to save CIA Director John Deutch from a possible jail term.

The centerpiece of Trento's book is a 1985 interview with the legendary former CIA Chief of Counterintelligence James Angleton. As might be

expected, the interview offers little new about Angleton or his work as a counterspy. However, in a series of extensive quotes from Angleton, it provides the clearest and most succinct statement of the book's theme. Disgraced and dying of cancer, the counterspy reportedly said, "I realize now that I have wasted my existence, my professional life. . . . There was no accountability and without accountability everything turned to shit. . . . Fundamentally, the founders of U.S. intelligence [the CIA] were liars. The better you lied and the more you betrayed, the more likely you would be promoted. These people attracted and promoted each other. Outside of their duplicity, the only thing they had in common was a desire for absolute power. . . . [Y]ou had to believe [they] would deservedly end up in hell."

The best that can be said of this book is that it avoids accusing the CIA of actively seeking world domination. For those interested in the CIA and the practice of intelligence, there are many superior books on the subject.

LTC Thomas K. Adams, USA,
Springfield, Virginia

ON WAR AND LEADERSHIP: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf, Owen Connelly, Princeton University Press, NJ, 2002, 347 pages, \$29.95.

In *On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf*, Owen Connelly captures the words of 20 combat commanders and military leaders from the past 250 years, from Frederick the Great and Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and 1st Viscount William Joseph Slim to Lieutenant General Harold Moore and General Norman Schwarzkopf. The book is an excellent anthology of the thoughts and leadership philosophy of 20 "muddy boots leaders" in recent history. Connelly focuses on the common beliefs these men held in terms of leadership and warfighting. The common threads he stresses are the necessity of personal and up-front leadership; taking care of and

understanding soldiers; and the value of improvisation on the battlefield.

Although Connelly uncovers no new or previously unpublished thoughts from these leaders (most are from previously published memoirs and biographies), he does package their views well. Each chapter begins with a synopsis of the man's career and ends with a brief, but well crafted, analysis of the leader.

Connelly has obviously structured this anthology for a diverse audience, and although I feel the book is aimed at civilian leaders (many who might not have studied these leaders), it does have usefulness for military readers. The book is a good place to find material needed for instruction or professional development; the reader can simply thumb through a chapter and pick up validating points or points of discussion for use. The book also raises some thought-provoking questions. "What did this diverse group of leaders have in common?" "What leadership qualities will always remain constant?" "What leaders would I have chosen to capture 'upfront leadership'?" Owen Connelly's book would be an excellent addition to any library.

LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CIVIL WAR ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG: Organization, Equipment, Ammunition, and Tactics, Philip M. Cole, DaCapo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 320 pages, \$35.00.

Although slightly repetitive, awkwardly written, and probably mistitled, Philip M. Cole's much-needed book of 19th-century artillery is ostensibly about artillery at Gettysburg. However, only about 25 pages are actually devoted to the battle; Cole examines the artillery arm for the entire Civil War. Rather than being a dull treatise, *Artillery at Gettysburg: Organization, Equipment, Ammunition, and Tactics* proves to be an engaging book. Cole describes the development, procurement, and organization of each army's artillery branch, noting similarities and differences.

Cole explains the benefits and liabilities of each piece of artillery

used during the Civil War and describes the variety of rifled guns, from cast iron to bronze, as well as a variety of rifled guns including the 2.9-inch Parrot and the exotic Whitworth breechloading rifles used by the Confederacy. Complementing the discussion of the actual cannon, Cole includes chapters on logistics, training, various types of ammunition, and the support structure. His use of photographs, diagrams, and maps are excellent and integrate seamlessly into the text.

One of the most important segments of the book is the organization of the artillery for the both armies. Although each army had a chief of artillery (Confederate General William Pendleton and Union General Henry Hunt), the opposing forces organized their artillery in subtle but different ways. While each army had an artillery reserve, the Confederate Army parceled out its reserve into three infantry corps, which made communication and concentration difficult. The Union Army concentrated its reserve in one solid mass. Hunt was nominally in command of all artillery at Gettysburg even though each corps had its own allocation of batteries. This difference allowed Hunt to rapidly shift batteries around the battlefield to threatened areas.

Hunt wanted to conserve ammunition until General Robert E. Lee began his charge, then devastate the enemy as it crossed the killing ground. Second Corps commander General Winfield Hancock wanted his artillery to respond to Lee's cannonade to keep up the morale of his troops. Hunt was thinking of effectiveness and killing power while Hancock was thinking of morale.

The book has a few minor weaknesses. Cole spends too much time discussing the British Whitworth guns. The Confederates had only two Whitworth guns on the battlefield, and their effectiveness was negligible. Also, Cole's analysis focuses more on the technology, organization, and support of the artillery and less on the actual performance of the artillery during the battle. Despite such flaws, the book is interesting and informative. Not only does it

explain why events unfolded the way they did, it helps explain how they unfolded.

MAJ James Gates, USAF,
Lake Ridge, Virginia

THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, Samuel B. Griffith II, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, (1976), 2002, 725 pages, \$55.00.

The War for American Independence is a reissue of a 1976 book that is well worth a new look. While other classics, such as Robert Middlekauff's *The Glorious Cause: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789* (MacMillan & Co., Ltd., UK, 1971) and Don Higginbotham's *The War of American Independence* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1982), are still the best treatments of the American Revolution, Samuel B. Griffith's study is solid scholarship and a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject.

The War for American Independence is a straightforward chronological narrative with a focus on the political and military aspects of the American Revolution. Griffith does not attempt to present a dominant thesis; instead he provides analyses of several key issues as they appear.

Because Griffith writes extensively about the British side of the struggle, many of his insights focus on British errors. For example, he is critical of the British Government's inability to grasp the political realities of America, and he provides an excellent appraisal of the shortcomings in British strategy during the Saratoga Campaign. Still, Griffith maintains balance in his assessments of both sides and provides praise and criticism.

Griffith's detailed look at the British Government's internal conflicts during the American Revolution describes the events leading to the war. The first three chapters contain extensive, useful descriptions of the British parties, their leaders' personalities, and the shifting governmental policies toward the Colonies. Griffith also includes excellent material on the diplomatic aspects of the struggle in other European courts.

Griffith's familiarity with military

subjects enables him to make insightful critiques of campaign strategies. In addition to his superb analysis of the Saratoga Campaign, he examines other crucial campaigns with a perceptive eye toward tactical and strategic realities. He is properly critical of George Washington's Long Island strategy and the subsequent British inactivity after their victory—a reflection of the hesitation shown by King George's commanders in Boston after Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill. Griffith is willing to find flaws and distribute praise in proper doses, but he does it with a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties faced by leaders on both sides.

The book contains few errors. However, the abrupt ending to the book is disappointing. Griffith ends the narrative with the events that occurred at Yorktown without any explanation of the final diplomatic ending of the war. Given Griffith's superb rendering of the British political side leading to the war, one wishes that he had devoted the same effort to the political activity after Yorktown, which ultimately led to the treaty of Paris. Despite the sudden ending, the book—a valuable contribution to the history of the American Revolution—is well written, fair, and provides great insights.

Curtis S. King, Ph.D.,
Leavenworth, Kansas

PANZERKRIEG: The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions, Peter McCarthy and Mike Syron, Carroll & Graf Publishers, NY, 2002, 307 pages, \$26.00.

The title of this book, *Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions*, brings to mind an epic study tracing the fortunes of Germany's armored forces during World War II. Unfortunately, the final product falls short of such expectations.

Although authors Peter McCarthy and Mike Syron demonstrate youthful exuberance in this endeavor, their efforts never go beyond surface discussion of any key issues or events; it is a study of German armored forces before and during World War II. McCarthy and Syron lay a solid

foundation and devote effort to describing the war's progress, the role of panzertruppen, and parallel technological developments. The book contains appropriate appendixes, which document the evolutionary improvement of tank formations, and excellent photographs, and maps that adequately depict the war.

Panzerkrieg is not a scholarly work, and anyone familiar with World War II and the application of armor will find nothing new here. Too often the authors' narration becomes merely a general history of the war, told at levels above brigade. The authors include a skimpy bibliography, focusing only on the best known of secondary and primary sources, and provide documentation only to direct quotes.

The authors appear biased toward the Wehrmacht and certain leaders within its hierarchy. The reader is constantly reminded of the genius of Hermann Balck, Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, and Erich von Manstein, while Fedor von Bock, Erich von Kleist, and Adolf Hitler can do little right. Heinz von Guderian, of course, appears as the sole savior of the German panzertruppen. While merits exist for these characterizations, McCarthy and Syron provide little analysis about how they arrived at their conclusions. Devoting little energy to the discussion of doctrine, they address most of the significant German wartime technological developments, but they only indirectly consider how German tank divisions, brigades, and groups applied these advances.

The book's positive aspects are that the authors properly balance the war's progression and German technical improvements; the latter of

which occur at advantageous points in the narrative. Notwithstanding the lack of analysis, documentation, or unique theses, the information McCarthy and Syron provide is quite accurate.

The fact that this book is so easy to read might prove problematic to the scholar. For someone who is familiar with the subject or someone who wants to conduct serious research, this book provides little useful insight. *Panzerkrieg* is a well-meaning effort, but falls short on serious scholarship.

MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA,
Hohenfels, Germany

DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY FORCE, Philip P. Everts, Palgrave, NY, 2002, 256 pages, \$68.00.

Peoples of democracies, regardless of cost, will inevitably support wars of survival. Whether the democracy will support a sustained war is another issue. Philip P. Everts, Director of the Institute for International Studies at Leiden University, the Netherlands, provides evidence from European and American public opinion surveys to prove that populations are fickle when casualties are suffered in operations perceived to be either useless or impotent. Everts argues that in wars of survival or in conflicts where success appears evident, people will support government actions.

For Everts, an issue greater than casualty sensitivity is whether modern nation-states, in particular European allies, will sustain any war, regardless of the price or the reason. Using the phrase "the problematique of identity," Everts reasons that the outcome is yet in doubt; populations that have abandoned war as a civilized solution to any problem, regardless of its severity, might not support future wars.


Evert's observations serve a cautionary note for military officers, politicians, and citizens. We are not sure how the global war on terrorism will end, but it is in the realm of possibility that the United States might lose the necessary popular support it needs to win.

Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.
Lansing, Kansas

*To every man upon this earth
Death cometh soon or late;
And how can man die better
Than facing fearful odds
For the ashes of his fathers
And the temples of his gods?*

—Lays of ancient Rome.
Horatius, xxvii.

Military Review Index



Volume LXXXIII □ January-December 2003

Contents

Title Index	85
Author Index	86
Subject Index, Articles	88

TITLE INDEX

	Page	Issue		Page	Issue
Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v. Helicopter Combat, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., and MAJ James H. Adams III, USMC	22	Jan-Feb	Civilian and Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Operations, Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH.	32	Mar-Apr
Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives, Phillip S. Meilinger, Ph.D.	50	Nov-Dec	"Come as You Are" Warfare: The Bataan Example, MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; MAJ Joseph K. Edwards, USA; and MAJ Terrence G. Popravak, USAF: ALMANAC	84	Mar-Apr
Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar: Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY	89	Mar-Apr	Command Post "Turf," LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA: LETTERS	87	Jan-Feb
Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN	26	Jul-Aug	DARPA'S Future Combat System Command and Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA; LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles, Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA	79	May-Jun
America's Army: Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign and Domestic, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret.	69	Nov-Dec	Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking, LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army	20	Sep-Oct
Another Such Victory, MAJ Michael A. Long, USAR, Ret.: REVIEW ESSAY	77	Nov-Dec	Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B. Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA	33	May-Jun
The Army and Embedded Media, LTC Tammy L. Miracle, USA	41	Sep-Oct	Developing the Professional Army Officer: Implications for Organizational Leaders, LTC Craig Bullis, USA, Ret.	57	May-Jun
The Army Officer as Servant, MAJ Suzanne Nielsen, USA	15	Jan-Feb	Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—a Challenge for the Urban Warrior, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., and LTC Geoffrey Demarest, USA, Ret.	32	Sep-Oct
The Army Officer as Warfighter, MAJ Paul Yingling, USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA	9	Jan-Feb	Distance Learning: First CAS3 Class Outcomes, COL Walter R. Schumm, USAR, Ret., and LTC David E. Turek, USAR, Ret.	66	Sep-Oct
The Army Vision: Excerpts, GEN Eric K. Shinseki, USA, former Army Chief of Staff	60	Nov-Dec	DOCC—Personnel Recovery, CW5 John D. Wallace, USA: LETTERS	95	May-Jun
The Army Vision: The 4th AD in World War II, Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D.	59	Nov-Dec	Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, COL Clinton J. Ancker III, USA, Ret., and LTC Michael D. Burke, USA, Ret.	18	Jul-Aug
The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer, LTG G.A. Crocker, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS	50	Jan-Feb	Effects-Based Decisions and Actions, MG James M. Dubik, USA	33	Jan-Feb
The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move, LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret., with MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA	2	Jul-Aug	A Fiasco, Don Loughlin: LETTERS	86	Jan-Feb
C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA	42	May-Jun	Fighting Child Soldiers, Peter Warren Singer, Ph.D.	26	May-Jun
The Case for a Joint Military Decisionmaking Process, COL Joseph Anderson, USA, and COL Nathan K. Slate, USA	11	Sep-Oct			

Hamas, Understanding the Organization, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY	65 Jul-Aug	Political Decapitation, Serge Walder, University of Helsinki	15 May-Jun
A Historical Aside, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA	46 Jan-Feb	Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy, LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA	46 Jul-Aug
Insurgent Groups in Chechnya, COL Sergey A. Kulikov, Russian Federation, and Robert R. Love, trans.	21 Nov-Dec	Precision Launch Rocket System: A Proposal for the Future of the Field Artillery, MAJ Michael J. Forsyth, USA: INSIGHTS	82 Mar-Apr
Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis, USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN	21 May-Jun	Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice, © Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D.	12 Mar-Apr
Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting, LTC Mark Jones, USA, and LTC Wes Rehorn, USA ...	3 May-Jun	Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance, BG John M. Custer, USA	3 Mar-Apr
Integrating Women into the Combat Force, Hillel Adler, Tel Aviv University: LETTERS	95 Mar-Apr	Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA	38 Jul-Aug
Is Hope the Only Method? COL Christopher R. Paparone, USA	47 May-Jun	Robert E. Lee: Three Views, MAJ James Gates, USA: REVIEW ESSAY	61 Jan-Feb
Insurgent Groups in Chechnya, COL Sergey A. Kulikov, Russian Federation, and Robert R. Love, trans.	21 Nov-Dec	The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY	59 Jan-Feb
Kosovo: Present and Future, Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH.	31 Nov-Dec	Searching for Heroes, MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF: REVIEW ESSAY	71 Sep-Oct
Leaders for America's Army, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret.	68 May-Jun	SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield, COL Mike L. Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green, USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF	8 May-Jun
Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment, COL Peter J. Varljen, USA	72 Mar-Apr	Strategy Revisited, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA	42 Jan-Feb
Learning from Sun Tzu, CH (COL) Douglas M. McCready, USAR: INSIGHTS	85 May-Jun	Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA	2 Sep-Oct
The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution of Armed Helicopters in Vietnam, CDR David G. Tyler, USNR	32 Jul-Aug	Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead, LTC Christopher D. Kolenda, USA	41 Nov-Dec
Magic, Lee Allen, Athena Press: LETTERS	86 Jan-Feb	Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning and Team Building, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret.	54 Jul-Aug
Maritime and Expeditionary Dominance: Great Britain's Legacy to 21st-Century Strategy, CDR John Trost Kuehn, USN	51 Sep-Oct	Transforming Leader Development Through Lifelong Learning, LTC Robert D. Schwartzman, USA, Ret. ..	63 May-Jun
Mentoring: Building a Legacy, COL Jack D. Kem, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS	62 Jul-Aug	Transforming USAREUR for a Strategy of Preemption, © Brian J. Dunn	15 Nov-Dec
Military Commissions: Past and Future, LTC Jody Prescott, USA, and MAJ Joanne Eldridge, USAR	42 Mar-Apr	The 24th Infantry Regiment: The "Deuce-Four" in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret.	56 Sep-Oct
Military Decisionmaking in the First Russian Peacekeeping Separate Airborne Brigade, MAJ Donald R. Baker, USA	46 Sep-Oct	Turkey and an Army Forward, LTC Patrick Warren, USAREUR, and MAJ Michael Morrissey, USAREUR ..	2 Nov-Dec
The New DOCC, GEN Burwell B. Bell, USA; MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; COL Nathan K. Slate, USA; and LTC David D. Haught, USA	37 Jan-Feb	Understanding Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction, LTC Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., USA	61 Mar-Apr
No Place in the Fighting Force, COL Cecil B. Currey, USAR, Ret.: LETTERS	96 Mar-Apr	The Victory Disease, MAJ Timothy M. Karcher, USA ...	9 Jul-Aug
Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical Decisionmaking, MAJ Charles A. Pfaff, USA	66 Mar-Apr	What Defines "Definitive"? LTC Anthony H. LeTissier, MBE, Ret.: LETTERS ..	87 Jan-Feb
Officership: The Professional Practice, COL Don M. Snider, USA, Ret.	3 Jan-Feb	Winning War a World Away, COL Jerry Johnson, USA, and LTC James O. Kievit, USA, Ret.	24 Mar-Apr
Operation Airborne Dragon, Northern Iraq, LTC Patrick Warren, USAREUR, and MAJ Keith Barclay, USAREUR	11 Nov-Dec	Women and Tailhook, LTC Robert P. Kingsbury, USAR, Ret.: LETTERS	95 Mar-Apr
The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar, COL Patrick D. Allen, USAR, and LTC Chris C. Demchak, USAR	52 Mar-Apr	The Wound and the Dream, MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Ret.: REVIEW ESSAY	78 Nov-Dec
		The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: ALMANAC	52 Jan-Feb
		The Yom Kippur War: Memoirs of Egyptian Generals: REVIEW ESSAY	55 Jan-Feb

AUTHOR INDEX

	Page	Issue		Page	Issue
Aboul-Enein, LCDR Youssef H., USN, Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar: Memoirs: REVIEW ESSAY	89	Mar-Apr	_____, The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings: ALMANAC	52	Jan-Feb
_____, Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood	26	Jul-Aug	_____, The Yom Kippur War: Memoirs of Egyptian Generals: REVIEW ESSAY	55	Jan-Feb
_____, Hamas, Understanding the Organization: REVIEW ESSAY	65	Jul-Aug	Adams III, MAJ James H., USMC, and LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v. Helicopter Combat	22	Jan-Feb
_____, The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom: REVIEW ESSAY	59	Jan-Feb	Adler, Hillel, Tel Aviv University, Integrating Women into the Combat Force: LETTERS	95	Mar-Apr

- Albrecht, MAJ James J., USAF;
MAJ Joseph K. Edwards, USA; and MAJ Terrence
G. Popravak, USAF, "Come as You Are" Warfare:
The Bataan Example: ALMANAC **84 Mar-Apr**
- Alfieri, MAJ Jeffrey C., USAF, Ret.,
The Wound and the Dream: REVIEW ESSAY **78 Nov-Dec**
- Allen, Lee, Athena Press, Magic: LETTERS **86 Jan-Feb**
- Allen, COL Patrick D., USAR, and LTC Chris C. Demchak,
USAR, The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar **52 Mar-Apr**
- Ancker III, COL Clinton J., USA, Ret., and
LTC Michael D. Burke, USA, Ret.,
Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare **18 Jul-Aug**
- Anderson, COL Joseph, USA, and COL Nathan K.
Slate, USA, The Case for a Joint Military
Decisionmaking Process **11 Sep-Oct**
- Archer, Sarah E., RN, DrPH., Civilian and Military
Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Operations **32 Mar-Apr**
_____, Kosovo: Present and Future **31 Nov-Dec**
- Baker, MAJ Donald R., USA, Military Decisionmaking
in the First Russian Peacekeeping Separate
Airborne Brigade **46 Sep-Oct**
- Barclay, MAJ Keith, USAREUR, and
LTC Patrick Warren, USAREUR,
Operation Airborne Dragon, Northern Iraq **11 Nov-Dec**
- Bell, GEN Burwell B., USA; MG Guy M. Bourn, USA;
COL Nathan K. Slate, USA; and
LTC David D. Haught, USA, The New DOCC **37 Jan-Feb**
- Biggs, LTC Bradley, USA, Ret., The 24th Infantry
Regiment: The "Duce-Four" in Korea **56 Sep-Oct**
- Bourn, MG Guy M., USA; GEN Burwell B. Bell,
USA; COL Nathan K. Slate, USA; and LTC David
D. Haught, USA, The New DOCC **37 Jan-Feb**
- Braganca, MAJ Eric, USAF; COL Mike L. Findlay,
USA; and LTC Robert Green, USA, SOF
on the Contemporary Battlefield **8 May-Jun**
- Brown, LTG Frederic J., USA, Ret., America's Army:
Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign and Domestic **69 Nov-Dec**
_____, Leaders for America's Army **68 May-Jun**
_____, Three Revolutions: From Training to
Learning and Team Building **54 Jul-Aug**
- Brown, COL Robert B., USA, and CSM Carlton E.
Dedrich, USA, Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers **33 May-Jun**
- Bullis, LTC Craig, USA, Ret.,
Developing the Professional Army Officer:
Implications for Organizational Leaders **57 May-Jun**
- Burke, LTC Michael D., USA, Ret., and
COL Clinton J. Ancker III, USA, Ret.,
Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare **18 Jul-Aug**
- Cameron, Robert S., Ph.D., The Army Vision:
The 4th AD in World War II **59 Nov-Dec**
- Cassidy, MAJ Robert M., USA, Renaissance of
the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight **38 Jul-Aug**
- Cranford, LTC Ted C., USA; LTC Jack Gumbert II,
USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles, Jr., USA, Ret.; and
LTC David S. Redding, USA, DARPA's
Future Combat System Command and Control **79 May-Jun**
- Crocker, LTG G.A., USA, Ret., The Battalion and
Brigade Executive Officer: INSIGHTS **50 Jan-Feb**
- Currey, COL Cecil B., USAR, Ret., No Place in
the Fighting Force: LETTERS **96 Mar-Apr**
- Custer, BG John M., USA, Reach:
Leveraging Time and Distance **3 Mar-Apr**
- Dedrich, CSM Carlton E., USA, and COL Robert B.
Brown, USA, Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers ... **33 May-Jun**
- Demarest, LTC Geoffrey, USA, Ret., and LTC Lester
W. Grau, USA, Ret., Diehard Buildings: Control
Architecture—a challenge for the Urban Warrior **32 Sep-Oct**
- Demchak, LTC Chris C., USAR, and COL Patrick D.
Allen, USAR, The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar **52 Mar-Apr**
- Dubik, MG James M., USA,
Effects-Based Decisions and Actions **33 Jan-Feb**
- Dunivan, CPT Jim, USA, Surrendering the Initiative?
C2 on the Digitized Battlefield **2 Sep-Oct**
- Dunn, Brian J., © Transforming USAREUR for
a Strategy of Preemption **15 Nov-Dec**
- Edwards, MAJ Joseph K., USA;
MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; and MAJ Terrence
G. Popravak, USAF, "Come as You Are"
Warfare: The Bataan Example: ALMANAC **84 Mar-Apr**
- Eldridge, MAJ Joanne, USAR, and LTC Jody Prescott,
USA, Military Commissions: Past and Future **42 Mar-Apr**
- Erickson, LTC Edward J., USA, Ret., with
MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, The Battle of Taji
and Battle Command on the Move **2 Jul-Aug**
- Findlay, COL Mike L., USA; LTC Robert Green, USA;
and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF, SOF on the
Contemporary Battlefield **8 May-Jun**
- Forsyth, MAJ Michael J., USA, Precision Launch
Rocket System: A Proposal for the Future of the
Field Artillery: INSIGHTS **82 Mar-Apr**
- Gates, MAJ James, USA, Robert E. Lee: Three Views:
REVIEW ESSAY **61 Jan-Feb**
- Grau, LTC Lester W., USA, Ret., and MAJ James H.
Adams III, USMC, Air Defense with an Attitude:
Helicopter v. Helicopter Combat **22 Jan-Feb**
_____, and LTC Geoffrey Demarest, USA, Ret.,
Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—
a Challenge for the Urban Warrior **32 Sep-Oct**
- Green, LTC Robert, USA; COL Mike L. Findlay, USA;
and MAJ Eric Braganca, SOF on the
Contemporary Battlefield **8 May-Jun**
- Gumbert II, LTC Jack, USA; LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Thomas B. Lyles, Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David
S. Redding, USA, DARPA's Future Combat System
Command and Control **79 May-Jun**
- Gyllensporre, LTC Dennis T., Swedish Army,
Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking **20 Sep-Oct**
- Haught, LTC David D., USA; GEN Burwell B. Bell,
USA; MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; and COL Nathan
K. Slate, USA, The New DOCC **37 Jan-Feb**
- Johnson, COL Jerry, USA, and LTC James O. Kievit,
USA, Ret., Winning War a World Away **24 Mar-Apr**
- Jones, LTC Mark, USA, and LTC Wes Rehorn, USA,
Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting **3 May-Jun**
- Karcher, MAJ Timothy M., USA, The Victory Disease ... **9 Jul-Aug**
- Kem, COL Jack D., USA, Ret., Mentoring:
Building a Legacy: INSIGHTS **62 Jul-Aug**
- Kievit, LTC James O., USA, Ret., and COL Jerry
Johnson, USA, Winning War a World Away **24 Mar-Apr**
- Kingsbury, LTC Robert P., USAR, Ret.,
Women and Tailhook: LETTERS **95 Mar-Apr**
- Kolenda, LTC Christopher D., USA,
Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead **41 Nov-Dec**
- Kuehn, CDR John Trost, USN, Maritime and
Expeditionary Dominance: Great Britain's Legacy
to 21st-Century Strategy **51 Sep-Oct**
- Kulikov, COL Sergey A., Russian Federation, and
Robert R. Love, trans., Insurgent Groups in Chechnya ... **21 Nov-Dec**
- Lackey, Scott W., Ph.D.,
© Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice **12 Mar-Apr**
- Lacquement, Jr., LTC Richard A., USA, Understanding
Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction **61 Mar-Apr**
- LeTissier, LTC Anthony H., MBE, Ret.,
What Defines "Definitive"? LETTERS **87 Jan-Feb**
- Long, MAJ Michael A., USAR, Ret.,
Another Such Victory: REVIEW ESSAY **77 Nov-Dec**
- Loughlin, Don, A Fiasco: LETTERS **87 Jan-Feb**

Love, Robert R., trans., and COL Sergey A. Kulikov, Russian Federation, Insurgent Groups in Chechnya ...	21 Nov-Dec	Robbins, LCDR Glenn F., USN, and CDR Ronald Reis, USN, Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into Conventional Army Doctrine	21 May-Jun
Lyles, LTC Thomas B., Jr., USA, Ret.; LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA; and LTC David S. Redding, USA, DARPA's Future Combat System Command and Control	79 May-Jun	Schumm, COL Walter R., USAR, Ret., and LTC David E. Turek, USAR, Ret., Distance Learning: First CAS3 Class Outcomes	66 Sep-Oct
McCready, CH (COL) Douglas M., USAR, Learning from Sun Tzu: INSIGHTS	85 May-Jun	Schwartzman, LTC Robert D., USA, Ret., Transforming Leader Development Through Lifelong Learning	63 May-Jun
Meilinger, Phillip S., Ph.D., Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives	50 Nov-Dec	Shinseki, GEN Eric K., former Army Chief of Staff, The Army Vision: Excerpts	60 Nov-Dec
Miracle, LTC Tammy L., USA, The Army and Embedded Media	41 Sep-Oct	Singer, Peter Warren, Ph.D., Fighting Child Soldiers ...	26 May-Jun
Morrissey, MAJ Michael, USAREUR, and LTC Patrick Warren, USAREUR, Turkey and an Army Forward	2 Nov-Dec	Slate, COL Nathan K., USA, and COL Joseph Anderson, USA, The Case for a Joint Military Decisionmaking Process	11 Sep-Oct
Nagl, MAJ John, USA, and MAJ Paul Yingling, USA, The Army Officer as Warfighter	9 Jan-Feb	____; GEN Burwell B. Bell, USA; MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; and LTC David D. Haught, USA, The New DOCC	37 Jan-Feb
Nielsen, MAJ Suzanne, USA, The Army Officer as Servant	15 Jan-Feb	Snider, COL Don M., USA, Ret., Officership: The Professional Practice	3 Jan-Feb
Odierno, MG Raymond T., USA, and LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret., The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move	2 Jul-Aug	Toomey, LTC Christopher J., USA, C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams	42 May-Jun
Paparone, COL Christopher R., USA, Is Hope the Only Method?	47 May-Jun	____, Command Post "Turf": LETTERS	87 Jan-Feb
Pfaff, MAJ Charles A., USA, Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical Decisionmaking	66 Mar-Apr	Turek, LTC David E., USAR, Ret., and COL Walter R. Schumm, USAR, Ret., Distance Learning: First CAS3 Class Outcomes	66 Sep-Oct
Popravak, MAJ Terrence G., USAF; MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; and MAJ Joseph K. Edwards, USA, "Come as You Are" Warfare: The Bataan Example: ALMANAC	84 Mar-Apr	Tyler, CDR David G., USNR, The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution of Armed Helicopters in Vietnam	32 Jul-Aug
Prescott, LTC Jody, USA, and MAJ Joanne Eldridge, USAR, Military Commissions: Past and Future	42 Mar-Apr	Varljen, COL Peter J., USA, Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment	72 Mar-Apr
Redding, LTC David S., USA; LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA; LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; and LTC Thomas B. Lyles, Jr., USA, DARPA's Future Combat System Command and Control	79 May-Jun	Walder, Serge, University of Helsinki, Political Decapitation	15 May-Jun
Reese, LTC Timothy R., USA, Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy	46 Jul-Aug	Wallace, CW5 John D., USA, DOCC—Personnel Recovery: LETTERS	95 May-Jun
Rehorn, LTC Wes, USA, and LTC Mark Jones, USA, Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting	3 May-Jun	Warren, LTC Patrick, USAREUR, and MAJ Keith Barclay, USAREUR, Operation Airborne Dragon, Northern Iraq	11 Nov-Dec
Reinhold, MAJ Herman, USAF, Searching for Heroes: REVIEW ESSAY	71 Sep-Oct	____, and MAJ Michael Morrissey, USAREUR, Turkey and an Army Forward	2 Nov-Dec
Reis, CDR Ronald, USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN, Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into Conventional Army Doctrine	21 May-Jun	Wilson III, MAJ Isaiah, USA, Strategy Revisited	42 Jan-Feb
		____, A Historical Aside	46 Jan-Feb
		Yingling, MAJ Paul, USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA, The Army Officer as Warfighter	9 Jan-Feb

SUBJECT INDEX

	Page	Issue		Page	Issue
Afghanistan. See also Middle East			Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives, Phillip S. Meilinger, Ph.D.	50 Nov-Dec	
Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis, USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN	21 May-Jun		America's Army: Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign and Domestic, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret.	69 Nov-Dec	
Air Defense			Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis, USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN	21 May-Jun	
Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v. Helicopter Combat, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., and MAJ James H. Adams III, USMC	22 Jan-Feb		DOCC—Personnel Recovery, CW5 John D. Wallace, USA: LETTERS	95 May-Jun	
Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis, USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN	21 May-Jun		The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution of Armed Helicopters in Vietnam, CDR David G. Tyler, USNR	32 Jul-Aug	
Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA	38 Jul-Aug		Political Decapitation, Serge Walder, University of Helsinki	15 May-Jun	
Air-Ground Operations			Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy, LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA	46 Jul-Aug	
Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives, Phillip S. Meilinger, Ph.D.	50 Nov-Dec		Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA	38 Jul-Aug	
Air Operations			SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield, COL Mike Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green, USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF	8 May-Jun	
Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v. Helicopter Combat, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., and MAJ James H. Adams III, USMC	22 Jan-Feb				

Algeria

- Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar:
Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN: REVIEW ESSAY 89 Mar-Apr

Army Education. See Training

Army Knowledge

- Leaders for America's Army,
LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. 68 May-Jun
- Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical
Decisionmaking, MAJ Charles A. Pfaff, USA 66 Mar-Apr
- Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice,
© Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D. 12 Mar-Apr
- Understanding Professional Expertise and
Jurisdiction, LTC Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., USA 61 Mar-Apr

Army Transformation. See Transformation

Army Vision

- The Army Vision: Excerpts,
GEN Eric K. Shinseki, USA 60 Nov-Dec
- The Army Vision: The 4th AD in World War II,
Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D. 59 Nov-Dec

Asia

- "Come as You Are" Warfare: The Bataan Example,
MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; MAJ Joseph K. Edwards,
USA; and MAJ Terrence G. Popravak,
USAF: ALMANAC 84 Mar-Apr
- Integrating Women into the Combat Force,
Hillel Adler, Tel Aviv University: LETTERS 95 Mar-Apr
- The 24th Infantry Regiment: The "Deuce-Four"
in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret. 56 Sep-Oct

Asymmetric Warfare

- Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar:
Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN: REVIEW ESSAY 89 Mar-Apr
- "Come as You Are" Warfare: The Bataan Example,
MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; MAJ Joseph K.
Edwards, USA; and MAJ Terrence G. Popravak,
USAF: ALMANAC 84 Mar-Apr
- Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army 20 Sep-Oct
- Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare,
COL Clinton J. Ancker III, USA, Ret., and
LTC Michael D. Burke, USA, Ret. 18 Jul-Aug
- The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution
of Armed Helicopters in Vietnam,
CDR David G. Tyler, USNR 32 Jul-Aug
- Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy,
LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA 46 Jul-Aug
- Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the
Close Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA 38 Jul-Aug
- SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield,
COL Mike Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green, USA;
and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF 8 May-Jun

Bataan

- "Come as You Are" Warfare: The Bataan Example,
MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; MAJ Joseph K.
Edwards, USA; and MAJ Terrence G. Popravak,
USAF: ALMANAC 84 Mar-Apr

Battle Command

- Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives,
Phillip S. Meilinger, Ph.D. 50 Nov-Dec
- The Army Officer as Warfighter, MAJ Paul Yingling,
USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA 9 Jan-Feb
- The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer,
LTG G.A. Crocker, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS 50 Jan-Feb

- The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move,
LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret., with
MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA 2 Jul-Aug
- C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA 42 May-Jun
- The Case for a Joint Military Decisionmaking
Process, COL Joseph Anderson, USA, and
COL Nathan K. Slate, USA 11 Sep-Oct
- Command Post "Turf,"
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA: LETTERS 87 Jan-Feb
- DARPA'S Future Combat System Command and
Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles,
Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA 79 May-Jun
- Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert
B. Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA 33 May-Jun
- Effects-Based Decisions and Actions,
MG James M. Dubik, USA 33 Jan-Feb
- A Historical Aside, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA 46 Jan-Feb
- Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into
Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis,
USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN 21 May-Jun
- Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting,
LTC Mark Jones, USA, and LTC Wes Rehom, USA 3 May-Jun
- The New DOCC, GEN Burwell B. Bell, USA;
MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; COL Nathan K. Slate,
USA; and LTC David D. Haught, USA 37 Jan-Feb
- Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy,
LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA 46 Jul-Aug
- Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance,
BG John M. Custer, USA 3 Mar-Apr
- SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield,
COL Mike L. Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green,
USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF 8 May-Jun
- Strategy Revisited, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA 42 Jan-Feb
- Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized
Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA 2 Sep-Oct
- Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning and
Team Building, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. 54 Jul-Aug
- The 24th Infantry Regiment: The "Deuce-Four"
in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret. 56 Sep-Oct
- Winning War a World Away, COL Jerry Johnson,
USA, and LTC James Kievit, USA, Ret. 24 Mar-Apr

Black Soldiers

- The 24th Infantry Regiment: The "Deuce-Four"
in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret. 56 Sep-Oct

Child Soldiers

- Fighting Child Soldiers, Peter Warren Singer, Ph.D. 26 May-Jun

Civil-Military Operations

- Civilian and Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Operations, Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH. 32 Mar-Apr
- Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—a Challenge
for the Urban Warrior, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA,
Ret., and LTC Geoffrey Demarest, USA, Ret. 32 Sep-Oct
- Fighting Child Soldiers, Peter Warren Singer, Ph.D. 26 May-Jun
- Kosovo: Present and Future,
Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH. 31 Nov-Dec
- Military Decisionmaking in the First Russian
Peacekeeping Separate Airborne Brigade,
MAJ Donald R. Baker, USA 46 Sep-Oct

Close Air Support

- Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v.
Helicopter Combat, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA,
Ret., and MAJ James H. Adams III, USMC 22 Jan-Feb
- Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the
Close Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA 38 Jul-Aug

Combat Power

DARPA'S Future Combat System Command and Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles, Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA 79 May-Jun

Combat Service Support. See Support Operations

Command and Control. See Battle Command

Commander's Intent

The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer,
LTG G.A. Crocker, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS 50 Jan-Feb
Effects-Based Decisions and Actions,
MG James M. Dubik, USA 33 Jan-Feb

Command Post

The Battle of Taji and Battle Command
on the Move, LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret.,
with MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA 2 Jul-Aug
C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA 42 May-Jun
Command Post "Turf,"
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA: LETTERS 87 Jan-Feb
The New DOCC, GEN Burwell B. Bell, USA;
MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; COL Nathan K. Slate,
USA; and LTC David D. Haught, USA 37 Jan-Feb

Communications. See Information Operations; The Media

Counterterrorism. See Terrorism/Counterterrorism

Cyberwar. See Digital Battlefield/Warfare

Deception

Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar:
Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN: REVIEW ESSAY 89 Mar-Apr
Hamas, Understanding the Organization, LCDR
Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY 65 Jul-Aug
Magic, Lee Allen, Athena Press: LETTERS 86 Jan-Feb
The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar, COL Patrick D.
Allen, USAR, and LTC Chris C. Demchak, USAR 52 Mar-Apr
Political Decapitation,
Serge Walder, University of Helsinki 15 May-Jun
The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings,
LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: ALMANAC ... 52 Jan-Feb

Decisionmaking

The Case for a Joint Military Decisionmaking
Process, COL Joseph Anderson, USA, and
COL Nathan K. Slate, USA 11 Sep-Oct
DARPA'S Future Combat System Command
and Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles,
Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA 79 May-Jun
Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army 20 Sep-Oct
Effects-Based Decisions and Actions,
MG James M. Dubik, USA 33 Jan-Feb
A Historical Aside, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA 46 Jan-Feb
Is Hope the Only Method?
COL Christopher R. Pappone, USA 47 May-Jun
Military Decisionmaking in the First Russian
Peacekeeping Separate Airborne Brigade,
MAJ Donald R. Baker, USA 46 Sep-Oct
The New DOCC, GEN Burwell B. Bell, USA;
MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; COL Nathan K. Slate,
USA; and LTC David D. Haught, USA 37 Jan-Feb
Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical
Decisionmaking, MAJ Charles A. Pfaff, USA 66 Mar-Apr
Strategy Revisited, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA 42 Jan-Feb
Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized
Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA 2 Sep-Oct

Deep Operations

DOCC—Personnel Recovery,
CW5 John D. Wallace, USA: LETTERS 95 May-Jun
The New DOCC, GEN Burwell B. Bell, USA;
MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; COL Nathan K. Slate,
USA; and LTC David D. Haught, USA 37 Jan-Feb
Digital Battlefield/Warfare
The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the
Move, LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret.,
with MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA 2 Jul-Aug
C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA 42 May-Jun
DARPA'S Future Combat System Command
and Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles,
Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA 79 May-Jun
Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army 20 Sep-Oct
Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert
B. Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA 33 May-Jun
Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into
Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis,
USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN 21 May-Jun
Leaders for America's Army,
LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. 68 May-Jun
The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution
of Armed Helicopters in Vietnam,
CDR David G. Tyler, USNR 32 Jul-Aug
The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar, COL Patrick D.
Allen, USAR, and LTC Chris C. Demchak, USAR 52 Mar-Apr
Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy,
LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA 46 Jul-Aug
Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice,
© Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D. 12 Mar-Apr
Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance,
BG John M. Custer, USA 3 Mar-Apr
Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized
Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA 2 Sep-Oct
Distance Learning. See Training
Doctrine
The Army Officer as Warfighter,
MAJ Paul Yingling, USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA 9 Jan-Feb
Command Post "Turf,"
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA: LETTERS 87 Jan-Feb
DARPA'S Future Combat System Command and
Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles,
Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA 79 May-Jun
Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare,
COL Clinton J. Ancker III, USA, Ret., and
LTC Michael D. Burke, USA, Ret. 18 Jul-Aug
Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into
Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis,
USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN 21 May-Jun
Leaders for America's Army,
LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. 68 May-Jun
Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical
Decisionmaking, MAJ Charles A. Pfaff, USA 66 Mar-Apr
Mentoring: Building a Legacy,
COL Jack D. Kem, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS 62 Jul-Aug
Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy,
LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA 46 Jul-Aug
Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized
Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA 2 Sep-Oct
Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning and
Team Building, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. 54 Jul-Aug
Egypt
Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar:
Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN: REVIEW ESSAY 89 Mar-Apr

- Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood,
LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN **26 Jul-Aug**
- Hamas, Understanding the Organization, LCDR
Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY **65 Jul-Aug**
- The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings,
LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: ALMANAC ... **52 Jan-Feb**
- The Yom Kippur War: Memoirs of Egyptian Generals,
LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY .. **55 Jan-Feb**

Electronic Warfare. See Digital Battlefield/Warfare

Equipping the Force

- A Fiasco, Don Loughlin: LETTERS **86 Jan-Feb**
- A Historical Aside, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA **46 Jan-Feb**
- Strategy Revisited, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA **42 Jan-Feb**

Ethics

- The Army and Embedded Media,
LTC Tammy L. Miracle, USA **41 Sep-Oct**
- The Army Officer as Servant,
MAJ Suzanne Nielsen, USA **15 Jan-Feb**
- The Army Officer as Warfighter,
MAJ Paul Yingling, USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA **9 Jan-Feb**
- The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer,
LTG G.A. Crocker, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS **50 Jan-Feb**
- Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment,
COL Peter J. Varljen, USA **72 Mar-Apr**
- Military Commissions: Past and Future, LTC Jody
Prescott, USA, and MAJ Joanne Eldridge, USAR **42 Mar-Apr**
- Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical
Decisionmaking, MAJ Charles A. Pfaff, USA **66 Mar-Apr**
- Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead,
MAJ Christopher D. Kolenda, USA **41 Nov-Dec**
- The 24th Infantry Regiment: The “Deuce-Four”
in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret. **56 Sep-Oct**
- Understanding Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction,
LTC Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., USA **61 Mar-Apr**
- The Victory Disease,
MAJ Timothy M. Karcher, USA **9 Jul-Aug**

European History

- Transforming USAREUR for a Strategy
of Preemption, © Brian J. Dunn **15 Nov-Dec**
- The Victory Disease,
MAJ Timothy M. Karcher, USA **9 Jul-Aug**
- The Wound and the Dream, MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier,
USAF, Ret.: REVIEW ESSAY **78 Nov-Dec**

Feedback

- Distance Learning: First CAS3 Class Outcomes,
COL Walter R. Schumm, USAR, Ret.,
and LTC David E. Turek, USAR, Ret. **66 Sep-Oct**
- Transforming Leader Development through Lifelong
Learning, LTC Robert D. Schwartzman, USA, Ret. **63 May-Jun**

Firepower/Fire Support

- Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy,
LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA **46 Jul-Aug**
- Precision Launch Rocket System: A Proposal
for the Future of the Field Artillery,
MAJ Michael J. Forsyth, USA: INSIGHTS **82 Mar-Apr**
- SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield;
COL Mike L. Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green,
USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF **8 May-Jun**

Force Planning

- “Come as You Are” Warfare: The Bataan Example,
MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; MAJ Joseph K.
Edwards, USA; and MAJ Terrence G. Popravak,
USAF: ALMANAC **84 Mar-Apr**
- A Historical Aside, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA **46 Jan-Feb**
- Strategy Revisited, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA **42 Jan-Feb**

Force Projection

- America’s Army: Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign
and Domestic, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **69 Nov-Dec**
- Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance,
BG John M. Custer, USA **3 Mar-Apr**
- Winning War a World Away, COL Jerry Johnson,
USA; and LTC James Kievit, USA, Ret. **24 Mar-Apr**

Future Operations

- DARPA’S Future Combat System Command and
Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles,
Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA **79 May-Jun**
- Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army **20 Sep-Oct**
- Precision Launch Rocket System: A Proposal
for the Future of the Field Artillery,
MAJ Michael J. Forsyth, USA: INSIGHTS **82 Mar-Apr**

Helicopter Warfare. See Air Operations

Human Intelligence. See Intelligence Operations

Humanitarian Operations. See Civil-Military Operations

Information Operations. See also The Media

- C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA **42 May-Jun**
- DARPA’S Future Combat System Command and
Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles,
Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA **79 May-Jun**
- Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army **20 Sep-Oct**
- Effects-Based Decisions and Actions,
MG James M. Dubik, USA **33 Jan-Feb**
- Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting,
LTC Mark Jones, USA, and LTC Wes Rehoh, USA **3 May-Jun**
- Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice,
© Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D. **12 Mar-Apr**
- Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance,
BG John M. Custer, USA **3 Mar-Apr**
- Transforming Leader Development Through Lifelong
Learning, LTC Robert D. Schwartzman, USA, Ret. **63 May-Jun**

Initiative

- Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B.
Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA **33 May-Jun**
- Developing the Professional Army Officer:
Implications for Organizational Leaders,
LTC Craig Bullis, USA, Ret. **57 May-Jun**
- Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized
Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA **2 Sep-Oct**

Intelligence Operations

- Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar:
Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN: REVIEW ESSAY **89 Mar-Apr**
- C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA **42 May-Jun**
- Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—a Challenge
for the Urban Warrior, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA,
Ret., and LTC Geoffrey Demarest, USA, Ret. **32 Sep-Oct**
- Magic, Lee Allen, Athena Press: LETTERS **86 Jan-Feb**
- The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar, COL Patrick D.
Allen, USAR, and LTC Chris C. Demchak, USAR **52 Mar-Apr**
- Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice,
© Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D. **12 Mar-Apr**
- Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance, BG John M.
Custer, USA **3 Mar-Apr**
- The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings,
LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: ALMANAC ... **52 Jan-Feb**

Iraq

- The Army and Embedded Media, LTC Tammy L. Miracle, USA 41 Sep-Oct
- The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move, LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret., with MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA 2 Jul-Aug
- DARPA'S Future Combat System Command and Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA; LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles, Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA 79 May-Jun
- Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B. Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA 33 May-Jun
- Effects-Based Decisions and Actions, MG James M. Dubik, USA 33 Jan-Feb
- Operation Airborne Dragon, Northern Iraq, LTC Patrick Warren, USAREUR, and MAJ Keith Barclay, USAREUR 11 Nov-Dec
- Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA 38 Jul-Aug
- Turkey and an Army Forward, LTC Patrick Warren, USAREUR, and MAJ Michael Morrissey, USAREUR 2 Nov-Dec

Israel

- Integrating Women into the Combat Force, Hillel Adler, Tel Aviv University: LETTERS 95 Mar-Apr
- The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar, COL Patrick D. Allen, USAR, and LTC Chris C. Demchak, USAR 52 Mar-Apr

Japan

- Magic, Lee Allen, Athena Press: LETTERS 86 Jan-Feb
- The 24th Infantry Regiment: The "Deuce-Four" in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret. 56 Sep-Oct

Joint Operations

- The Army and Embedded Media, LTC Tammy L. Miracle, USA 41 Sep-Oct
- The Case for a Joint Military Decisionmaking Process, COL Joseph Anderson, USA, and COL Nathan K. Slate, USA 11 Sep-Oct
- Civilian and Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Operations, Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH. 32 Mar-Apr
- Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking, LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army 20 Sep-Oct
- DOCC—Personnel Recovery, CW5 John D. Wallace, USA: LETTERS 95 May-Jun
- Effects-Based Decisions and Actions, MG James M. Dubik, USA 33 Jan-Feb
- A Historical Aside, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA 46 Jan-Feb
- Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting, LTC Mark Jones, USA, and LTC Wes Rehorn, USA 3 May-Jun
- Kosovo: Present and Future, Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH. 31 Nov-Dec
- Leaders for America's Army, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. 68 May-Jun
- Maritime and Expeditionary Dominance: Great Britain's Legacy to 21st-Century Strategy, CDR John Trost Kuehn, USN 51 Sep-Oct
- Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance, BG John M. Custer, USA 3 Mar-Apr
- SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield, COL Mike L. Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green, USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF 8 May-Jun
- Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis, USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN 21 May-Jun
- Strategy Revisited, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA 42 Jan-Feb
- Winning War a World Away, COL Jerry Johnson, USA; and LTC James Kievit, USA, Ret. 24 Mar-Apr

Korea

- The 24th Infantry Regiment: the "Deuce-Four" in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret. 56 Sep-Oct

- Women and Tailhook, LTC Robert P. Kingsbury, USAR, Ret.: LETTERS 95 Mar-Apr

Kosovo. See Russia

Leader Development/Leadership

- The Army Officer as Servant, MAJ Suzanne Nielsen, USA 15 Jan-Feb
- The Army Officer as Warfighter, MAJ Paul Yingling, USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA 9 Jan-Feb
- The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer, LTG G.A. Crocker, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS 50 Jan-Feb
- Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B. Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA 33 May-Jun
- Developing the Professional Army Officer: Implications for Organizational Leaders, LTC Craig Bullis, USA, Ret. 57 May-Jun
- Leaders for America's Army, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. 68 May-Jun
- Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment, COL Peter J. Varljen, USA 72 Mar-Apr
- Learning from Sun Tzu, CH (COL) Douglas M. McCready, USAR: INSIGHTS 85 May-Jun
- Maritime and Expeditionary Dominance: Great Britain's Legacy to 21st-Century Strategy, CDR John Trost Kuehn, USN 51 Sep-Oct
- Mentoring: Building a Legacy, COL Jack D. Kem, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS 62 Jul-Aug
- Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical Decisionmaking, MAJ Charles A. Pfaff, USA 66 Mar-Apr
- Officership: The Professional Practice, COL Don M. Snider, USA, Ret. 3 Jan-Feb
- Political Decapitation, Serge Walder, University of Helsinki 15 May-Jun
- Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA 2 Sep-Oct
- Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead, LTC Christopher D. Kolenda, USA 27 Nov-Dec
- Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning and Team Building, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. 54 Jul-Aug
- Transforming Leader Development Through Lifelong Learning, LTC Robert D. Schwartzman, USA, Ret. 63 May-Jun
- Understanding Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction, LTC Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., USA 61 Mar-Apr
- Lessons Learned.** See also Training
- The Army and Embedded Media, LTC Tammy L. Miracle, USA 41 Sep-Oct
- The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move, LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret.; with MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA 2 Jul-Aug
- Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B. Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA 33 May-Jun
- Distance Learning: First CAS3 Class Outcomes, COL Walter R. Schumm, USA, Ret., and LTC David E. Turek, USA, Ret. 66 Sep-Oct
- A Fiasco, Don Loughlin: LETTERS 86 Jan-Feb
- Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting, LTC Mark Jones, USA, and LTC Wes Rehorn, USA 3 May-Jun
- Learning from Sun Tzu, CH (COL) Douglas M. McCready, USAR: INSIGHTS 85 May-Jun
- Maritime and Expeditionary Dominance: Great Britain's Legacy to 21st-Century Strategy, CDR John Trost Kuehn, USN 51 Sep-Oct
- The New DOCC, GEN Burwell B. Bell, USA; MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; COL Nathan K. Slate, USA; and LTC David D. Haught, USA 37 Jan-Feb
- Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice, © Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D. 12 Mar-Apr
- SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield, COL Mike L. Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green, USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF 8 May-Jun

- Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning and Team Building, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **54 Jul-Aug**
- Transforming Leader Development Through Lifelong Learning, LTC Robert D. Schwartzman, USA, Ret. **63 May-Jun**
- The 24th Infantry Regiment: The “Deuce-Four” in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret. **56 Sep-Oct**
- Understanding Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction, LTC Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., USA **61 Mar-Apr**

Logistics. See Support Operations

Maneuver

- The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move, LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret., with MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA **2 Jul-Aug**
- Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance, BG John M. Custer, USA **3 Mar-Apr**
- SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield, COL Mike L. Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green, USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF **8 May-Jun**

The Media.

See also Information Operations

- The Army and Embedded Media, LTC Tammy L. Miracle, USA **41 Sep-Oct**

Mentoring. See Leader Development/Leadership

Middle East

- Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar: Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY **89 Mar-Apr**
- Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN **26 Jul-Aug**
- The Army and Embedded Media, LTC Tammy L. Miracle, USA **41 Sep-Oct**
- The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move, LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret., with MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA **2 Jul-Aug**
- Fighting Child Soldiers, Peter Warren Singer, Ph.D. **26 May-Jun**
- Hamas, Understanding the Organization, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY **65 Jul-Aug**
- Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis, USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN **21 May-Jun**
- Integrating Women into the Combat Force, Hillel Adler, Tel Aviv University: LETTERS **95 Mar-Apr**
- The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar, COL Patrick D. Allen, USAR, and LTC Chris C. Demchak, USAR **52 Mar-Apr**
- Political Decapitation, Serge Walder, University of Helsinki **15 May-Jun**
- Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA **38 Jul-Aug**
- The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY **59 Jan-Feb**
- Turkey and an Army Forward, LTC Patrick Warren, USAREUR, and MAJ Michael Morrissey, USAREUR **2 Nov-Dec**
- The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: ALMANAC ... **52 Jan-Feb**

Military History

- Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar: Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY **89 Mar-Apr**
- Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN **26 Jul-Aug**
- America’s Army: Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign and Domestic, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **69 Nov-Dec**
- The Army Officer as Warfighter, MAJ Paul Yingling, USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA **9 Jan-Feb**
- The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move, LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret., with MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA **2 Jul-Aug**
- “Come as You Are” Warfare: The Bataan Example, MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; MAJ Joseph K. Edwards, USA; and MAJ Terrence G. Popravak, USAF: ALMANAC **84 Mar-Apr**

- Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking, LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army **20 Sep-Oct**
- Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, COL Clinton J. Ancker III, USA, Ret., and LTC Michael D. Burke, USA, Ret. **18 Jul-Aug**
- Integrating Carrier-Based Electronic Attack into Conventional Army Doctrine, CDR Ronald Reis, USN, and LCDR Glenn F. Robbins, USN **21 May-Jun**
- Learning from Sun Tzu, CH (COL) Douglas M. McCready, USAR: INSIGHTS **85 May-Jun**
- The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution of Armed Helicopters in Vietnam, CDR David G. Tyler, USNR **32 Jul-Aug**
- Magic, Lee Allen, Athena Press: LETTERS **6 Jan-Feb**
- Maritime and Expeditionary Dominance: Great Britain’s Legacy to 21st-Century Strategy, CDR John Trost Kuehn, USN **51 Sep-Oct**
- Military Commissions: Past and Future, LTC Jody Prescott, USA, and MAJ Joanne Eldridge, USAR **42 Mar-Apr**
- The Palestinian-Israeli Cyberwar, COL Patrick D. Allen, USAR, and LTC Chris C. Demchak, USAR **52 Mar-Apr**
- Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy, LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA **46 Jul-Aug**
- Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA **38 Jul-Aug**
- Robert E. Lee: Three Views, MAJ James Gates, USA: REVIEW ESSAY **61 Jan-Feb**
- Searching for Heroes, MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF: REVIEW ESSAY **71 Sep-Oct**
- The 24th Infantry Regiment: The “Deuce-Four” in Korea, LTC Bradley Biggs, USA, Ret. **56 Sep-Oct**
- The Victory Disease, MAJ Timothy M. Karcher, USA **9 Jul-Aug**
- What Defines “Definitive”? LTC Anthony H. LeTissier, MBE, Ret.: LETTERS ... **87 Jan-Feb**
- The Wound and the Dream, MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Ret.: REVIEW ESSAY **78 Nov-Dec**

Military Operations

- America’s Army: Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign and Domestic, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **69 Nov-Dec**
- Robert E. Lee: Three Views, MAJ James Gates, USA: REVIEW ESSAY **61 Jan-Feb**
- Winning War a World Away, COL Jerry Johnson, USA; and LTC James Kievit, USA, Ret. **24 Mar-Apr**

Military Planning. See Force Planning

Military Poetry

- The Wound and the Dream, MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Ret.: REVIEW ESSAY **78 Nov-Dec**
- Learning from Sun Tzu, CH (COL) Douglas M. McCready, USAR: INSIGHTS **85 May-Jun**

Military Thinking

- Distance Learning: First CAS3 Class Outcomes, COL Walter R. Schumm, USAR, Ret., and LTC David E. Turek, USAR, Ret. **66 Sep-Oct**
- Learning from Sun Tzu, CH (COL) Douglas M. McCready, USAR: INSIGHTS **85 May-Jun**
- Officership: The Professional Practice, COL Don M. Snider, USA, Ret. **3 Jan-Feb**
- Political Decapitation, Serge Walder, University of Helsinki **15 May-Jun**
- Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy, LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA **46 Jul-Aug**
- Precision Launch Rocket System: A Proposal for the Future of Field Artillery, MAJ Michael J. Forsyth, USA: INSIGHTS **82 Mar-Apr**
- Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA **2 Sep-Oct**
- Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead, MAJ Christopher D. Kolenda, USA **41 Nov-Dec**

The Victory Disease, MAJ Timothy M. Karcher, USA **9 Jul-Aug**
 Winning War a World Away, COL Jerry Johnson,
 USA, and LTC James Kievit, USA, Ret. **24 Mar-Apr**

Naval Operations

Maritime and Expeditionary Dominance:
 Great Britain's Legacy to 21st-Century Strategy,
 CDR John Trost Kuehn, USN **51 Sep-Oct**
 Searching for Heroes, MAJ Herman Reinhold,
 USAF: REVIEW ESSAY **71 Sep-Oct**
 Women and Tailhook, LTC Robert P. Kingsbury,
 USAR, Ret.: LETTERS **95 Mar-Apr**

Noncontiguous Battlefield

Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B.
 Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA **33 May-Jun**
 SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield,
 COL Mike L. Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green,
 USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF **8 May-Jun**

Objective Force

Command Post "Turf,"
 LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA: LETTERS **87 Jan-Feb**
 Leaders for America's Army,
 LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **68 May-Jun**
 Winning War a World Away, COL Jerry Johnson,
 USA, and LTC James Kievit, USA, Ret. **24 Mar-Apr**

Officership

The Army Officer as Servant,
 MAJ Suzanne Nielsen, USA **15 Jan-Feb**
 The Army Officer as Warfighter, MAJ Paul Yingling,
 USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA **9 Jan-Feb**
 The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer,
 LTG G.A. Crocker, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS **50 Jan-Feb**
 Command Post "Turf,"
 LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA: LETTERS **87 Jan-Feb**
 Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B.
 Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA **33 May-Jun**
 Developing the Professional Army Officer:
 Implications for Organizational Leaders,
 LTC Craig Bullis, USA, Ret. **57 May-Jun**
 Effects-Based Decisions and Actions,
 MG James M. Dubik, USA **33 Jan-Feb**
 Leaders for America's Army,
 LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **68 May-Jun**
 Mentoring: Building a Legacy,
 COL Jack D. Kem, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS **62 Jul-Aug**
 Military Commissions: Past and Future, LTC Jody
 Prescott, USA, and MAJ Joanne Eldridge, USAR **42 Mar-Apr**
 Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical
 Decisionmaking, MAJ Charles A. Pfaff, USA **66 Mar-Apr**
 Officership: The Professional Practice,
 COL Don M. Snider, USA, Ret. **3 Jan-Feb**
 Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice,
 © Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D. **12 Mar-Apr**
 Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized
 Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA **2 Sep-Oct**
 Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead,
 MAJ Christopher D. Kolenda, USA **27 Nov-Dec**
 Understanding Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction,
 LTC Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., USA **61 Mar-Apr**

Planning. See Force Planning

Psychological Operations

Algerian Defense Minister General Khalid Nezzar:
 Memoirs, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
 USN: REVIEW ESSAY **89 Mar-Apr**
 Fighting Child Soldiers, Peter Warren Singer, Ph.D. **26 May-Jun**

Public Affairs. See Information Operations; The Media

Reach/Reachback

Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice,
 © Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D. **12 Mar-Apr**

Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance,
 BG John M. Custer, USA **3 Mar-Apr**

Reconnaissance

C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
 LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA **42 May-Jun**
 DARPA'S Future Combat System Command and
 Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
 LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles,
 Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA **79 May-Jun**
 Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
 Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
 LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army **20 Sep-Oct**
 Effects-Based Decisions and Actions,
 MG James M. Dubik, USA **33 Jan-Feb**

Russia

Civilian and Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Operations, Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH. **32 Mar-Apr**
 Insurgent Groups in Chechnya, COL Sergey A. Kulikov,
 Russian Federation, and Robert R. Love, trans. **21 Nov-Dec**
 Kosovo: Present and Future,
 Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH. **31 Nov-Dec**
 Military Decisionmaking in the First Russian
 Peacekeeping Separate Airborne Brigade,
 MAJ Donald R. Baker, USA **46 Sep-Oct**

Self-Development

Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B.
 Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA **33 May-Jun**
 Developing the Professional Army Officer:
 Implications for Organizational Leaders,
 LTC Craig Bullis, USA, Ret. **57 May-Jun**
 Distance Learning: First CAS3 Class Outcomes,
 COL Walter R. Schumm, USAR, Ret., and
 LTC David E. Turek, USAR, Ret. **66 Sep-Oct**
 Mentoring: Building a Legacy,
 COL Jack D. Kem, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS **62 Jul-Aug**
 Military Commissions: Past and Future, LTC Jody
 Prescott, USA, and MAJ Joanne Eldridge, USAR **42 Mar-Apr**
 Officership: The Professional Practice,
 COL Don M. Snider, USA, Ret. **3 Jan-Feb**
 Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning and
 Team Building, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **54 Jul-Aug**

Special Operations Force

Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare,
 COL Clinton J. Ancker III, USA, Ret., and
 LTC Michael D. Burke, USA, Ret. **18 Jul-Aug**
 Integrating SOF into Joint Warfighting,
 LTC Mark Jones, USA, and LTC Wes Rehom, USA **3 May-Jun**
 SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield,
 COL Mike L. Findlay, USA; LTC Robert Green,
 USA; and MAJ Eric Braganca, USAF **8 May-Jun**

Spanish Civil War

The Wound and the Dream, MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier,
 USAF, Ret.: REVIEW ESSAY **78 Nov-Dec**

Strategy

Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—a Challenge
 for the Urban Warrior, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA,
 Ret., and LTC Geoffrey Demarest, USA, Ret. **32 Sep-Oct**
 DOCC—Personnel Recovery,
 CW5 John D. Wallace, USA: LETTERS **95 May-Jun**
 Hamas, Understanding the Organization, LCDR
 Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY **65 Jul-Aug**
 Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment,
 COL Peter J. Varljen, USA **72 Mar-Apr**
 Maritime and Expeditionary Dominance:
 Great Britain's Legacy to 21st-Century Strategy,
 CDR John Trost Kuehn, USN **51 Sep-Oct**
 Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy,
 LTC Timothy R. Reese, USA **46 Jul-Aug**

Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close
Fight, MAJ Robert M. Cassidy, USA **38 Jul-Aug**
Robert E. Lee: Three Views, MAJ James Gates, USA:
REVIEW ESSAY **61 Jan-Feb**
Strategy Revisited, MAJ Isaiah Wilson III, USA **42 Jan-Feb**
Surrendering the Initiative? C2 on the Digitized
Battlefield, CPT Jim Dunivan, USA **2 Sep-Oct**

Stryker Brigade

C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA **42 May-Jun**
Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B.
Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA **33 May-Jun**

Support Operations

The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move,
LTC Edward J. Erickson, USA, Ret., with
MG Raymond T. Odierno, USA **2 Jul-Aug**
C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA **42 May-Jun**
“Come as You Are” Warfare: The Bataan Example,
MAJ James J. Albrecht, USAF; MAJ Joseph K.
Edwards, USA; and MAJ Terrence G. Popravak,
USAF: ALMANAC **84 Mar-Apr**
Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—a Challenge
for the Urban Warrior, LTC Lester W. Grau,
USA, Ret., and LTC Geoffrey Demarest, USA, Ret. **32 Sep-Oct**
Organizational Leaders, LTC Craig Bullis, USA, Ret. **57 May-Jun**

Surveillance

C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams,
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA **42 May-Jun**

Tactical Decisionmaking. See Decisionmaking

Tactics

Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army **20 Sep-Oct**
Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare,
COL Clinton J. Ancker III, USA, Ret.,
and LTC Michael D. Burke, USA, Ret. **18 Jul-Aug**
Hamas, Understanding the Organization, LCDR
Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY **65 Jul-Aug**
Insurgent Groups in Chechnya, COL Sergey A. Kulikov,
Russian Federation, and Robert R. Love, trans. **21 Nov-Dec**
The Leverage of Technology: The Evolution of Armed
Helicopters in Vietnam, CDR David G. Tyler, USNR **32 Jul-Aug**
Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close

Teambuilding

Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army **20 Sep-Oct**
Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert
B. Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA **33 May-Jun**
Leaders for America’s Army,
LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **68 May-Jun**
Mentoring: Building a Legacy,
COL Jack D. Kem, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS **62 Jul-Aug**
Ten Ways Great Leaders Lead,
LTC Christopher D. Kolenda, USA **41 Nov-Dec**

Terrorism/Counterterrorism

Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—a Challenge
for the Urban Warrior, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA,
Ret., and LTC Geoffrey Demarest, USA, Ret. **32 Sep-Oct**
Fighting Child Soldiers, Peter Warren Singer, Ph.D. **26 May-Jun**
Insurgent Groups in Chechnya, COL Sergey A. Kulikov,
Russian Federation, and Robert R. Love, trans. **21 Nov-Dec**
Political Decapitation,
Serge Walder, University of Helsinki **15 May-Jun**
Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning and
Team Building, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **54 Jul-Aug**

Training

Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter v. Helicopter
Combat, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Ret., and
MAJ James H. Adams III, USMC **22 Jan-Feb**
The Army Officer as Warfighter,
MAJ Paul Yingling, USA, and MAJ John Nagl, USA **9 Jan-Feb**
Command Post “Turf,”
LTC Christopher J. Toomey, USA: LETTERS **87 Jan-Feb**
DARPA’S Future Combat System Command and
Control, LTC Ted C. Cranford, USA;
LTC Jack Gumbert II, USA; LTC Thomas B. Lyles,
Jr., USA, Ret.; and LTC David S. Redding, USA **79 May-Jun**
Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B.
Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA **33 May-Jun**
Developing the Professional Army Officer:
Implications for Organizational Leaders,
LTC Craig Bullis, USA, Ret. **7 May-Jun**
Distance Learning: First CAS3 Class Outcomes,
COL Walter R. Schumm, USA, Ret., and
LTC David E. Turek, USAR, Ret. **66 Sep-Oct**
Fighting Child Soldiers, Peter Warren Singer, Ph.D. **26 May-Jun**
Is Hope the Only Method?
COL Christopher R. Paparone, USA **47 May-Jun**
Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment,
COL Peter J. Varljen, USA **72 Mar-Apr**
The New DOCC, GEN Burwell B. Bell, USA;
MG Guy M. Bourn, USA; COL Nathan K. Slate,
USA; and LTC David D. Haught, USA **37 Jan-Feb**
Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical
Decisionmaking, MAJ Charles A. Pfaff, USA **66 Mar-Apr**
Putting Knowledge Reachback into Practice,
© Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D. **12 Mar-Apr**
Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning and
Team Building, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **54 Jul-Aug**
Transforming Leader Development Through Lifelong
Learning, LTC Robert D. Schwartzman, USA, Ret. **63 May-Jun**

Transformation

America’s Army: Expeditionary and Enduring—Foreign
and Domestic, LTG Frederic J. Brown, USA, Ret. **69 Nov-Dec**
The Army Vision: The 4th AD in World War II,
Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D. **59 Nov-Dec**
Decision Navigation: Coping with 21st-Century
Challenges in Tactical Decisionmaking,
LTC Dennis T. Gyllensporre, Swedish Army **20 Sep-Oct**
Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers, COL Robert B.
Brown, USA, and CSM Carlton E. Dedrich, USA **33 May-Jun**
A Fiasco, Don Loughlin: LETTERS **86 Jan-Feb**
Is Hope the Only Method?
COL Christopher R. Paparone, USA **47 May-Jun**
Transforming Leader Development through Lifelong
Learning, LTC Robert D. Schwartzman, USA, Ret. **63 May-Jun**
Transforming USAREUR for a Strategy of Preemption,
© Brian J. Dunn, Ph.D. **15 Nov-Dec**

Turkey

Turkey and an Army Forward, LTC Patrick Warren,
USAREUR, and MAJ Michael Morrissey, USAREUR **2 Nov-Dec**

Urban Warfare

Civilian and Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian
Operations, Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH. **32 Mar-Apr**
Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—a Challenge
for the Urban Warrior, LTC Lester W. Grau, USA,
Ret., and LTC Geoffrey Demarest, USA, Ret. **32 Sep-Oct**
Fighting Child Soldiers, Peter Warren Singer, Ph.D. **26 May-Jun**
Insurgent Groups in Chechnya, COL Sergey A. Kulikov,
Russian Federation, and Robert R. Love, trans. **21 Nov-Dec**
Kosovo: Present and Future,
Sarah E. Archer, RN, DrPH. **31 Nov-Dec**

Values

- The Battalion and Brigade Executive Officer,
LTG G.A. Crocker, USA, Ret.: INSIGHTS **50 Jan-Feb**
- Is Hope the Only Method?
COL Christopher R. Paparone, USA **47 May-Jun**
- Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment,
COL Peter J. Varljen, USA **72 Mar-Apr**
- Mentoring: Building a Legacy,
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