The Kremlin and the Pope
Abstract
The substantial evidence of a direct Bulgarian involvement in the attempt on the Pope's life unearthed by the Italian investigative organs, has given rise to speculations of tacit Soviet approval, if not outright complicity, in what has already been called the "crime of the century." The implications of Soviet involvement, if substantiated, are so profound and disturbing, that many in the West have questioned presumed Soviet motivations. Most Western analysts searching for the likely rationale of Kremlin complicity have focused on the alleged determination of the Pontiff to fly to his homeland and galvanize resistance to the Soviets were they to invade Poland prior to the establishment of martial law in December of 1981. Such a possibility must have been a serious and perhaps in itself sufficient reason for Moscow to wish that a Polish Pope did not exist at the time. It should be recalled that from the Soviet perspective the situation in Poland at the time could not have been considered anything but grim. With the Polish communist party in a state of near collapse and regime authority floundering in the spring of 1981, a direct Soviet suppression of Solidarity may have increasingly looked as the only alternative to Moscow. While this is a plausible motive, focusing on it alone obscures the much broader impact John Paul II's election and policies have had on the Soviet bloc and contributes little to our understanding of the determinants and evolution of Soviet attitudes towards him. A more detailed examination of these is thus likely to provide us with additional clues on why the Bishop of Rome, whose political relevance Stalin once dismissed derisively with "how many divisions does the Pope have," may have come to be perceived as a major threat by the mighty Soviet Union.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1983
- Accession Number
- ADA511764
Entities
People
- Alex Alexiev
Organizations
- RAND Corporation