

**MEDVEDEV'S PLAN:
GIVING RUSSIA A VOICE BUT NOT A VETO
IN A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM**

Richard J. Krickus

December 2009

Visit our website for other free publication
downloads

<http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>

[To rate this publication click here.](#)

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE DEC 2009		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Medvedev's Plan: Giving Russia a Voice But Not a veto in a New European Security System				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5244				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 121	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*, at the Publishing button.

Early stages of this monograph were supported by a grant from the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report may also be ordered from our homepage. SSI's homepage address is: *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/*.

ISBN 1-58487-419-8

FOREWORD

In the summer of 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev urged the West to join Moscow in creating a new European security system. The existing one no longer provided stability on the Continent; indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) eastward expansion had created a new rancorous fault line between the West and Russia. Before Medvedev's Plan became the subject of serious discourse, the August War in Georgia erupted, and Russia's aggression was cited as evidence that any notion of security cooperation with Moscow was a fantasy.

By the fall, however, the war was cited as a compelling reason for engaging Russia since it made little sense to isolate the largest country in Europe from any meaningful security agenda. What is more, President Barack Obama proclaimed that finding a follow-up for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was vital to U.S. security to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and fissile material to rogue states and terrorist cells that might employ them against an American city. A successful outcome to the START negotiations would help reconcile other outstanding flashpoints of conflict between the West and Russia: the American anti-missile system in Eastern Europe; the issue of NATO enlargement; and resurrecting conflict management mechanisms in what Russia called its "near abroad," and Europe labeled its "troubled neighborhood." Cooperation on other vital security issues also would be advanced: energy security, climate change, and the creation of a new global economic regime.

It is against this backdrop that Medvedev's proposal has been revisited and, while some Western analysts deem the conflicting interests and value gap that separate the West from Russia overwhelming, others argue that the time has come to engage Russia in seeking a common security agenda in Europe. That said, the most compelling question confronting those who favor a security partnership with Russia is: How to give Russia a voice but not a veto in a new European security system?

In this monograph, Dr. Richard Krickus addresses this question and provides some provocative recommendations. Most specifically, he proposes that the time has come to provide Russia with a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) and agrees that those who argue against it remain mired in a Cold War mindset that is out of sync with today's strategic realities. Ultimately, a campaign to include Russia in NATO may fail but at the very least, the endeavor deserves serious consideration he believes. He also provides compelling reasons why U.S. defense analysts must consider several future outcomes for Russia. In addition to being the only state that is capable of devastating the United States in a nuclear exchange, most of the world's population and resources exist on the borders of its massive territory. Its future then, will shape the global strategic environment for decades to come.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD J. KRICKUS is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Mary Washington and had held the Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University. Previously he co-founded The National Center For Urban Ethnic Affairs in Washington, DC, and in the early 1970's began conducting research on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' "nationalities question." In this connection, he began to write about popular unrest among the people of Lithuania. In 1990, Sajudis, the Lithuanian popular front movement, invited him to serve as an international monitor for the first democratic election conducted in Soviet Lithuania. Dr. Krickus has offered testimony at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and has lectured at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute, the Polish Foreign Ministry, the European Commission, and other domestic and foreign venues on the Soviet Union/Russia, the Baltic countries, NATO and Kaliningrad. He has published widely on these issues for academic and policy-oriented journals as well as various newspapers, including *The Washington Post*, *The Chicago Sun Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, and *The Wall Street Journal Europe*. For 8 years Dr. Krickus wrote a column on world affairs for *Lietuvos Rytas*, Lithuania's leading national daily. He has appeared as a commentator on Soviet-Russian affairs on U.S. radio and television on numerous occasions. He is the author of a number of books, including *Pursuing The American Dream*, *The Superpowers In Crisis*, *Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion And The Break-Up Of The Soviet Empire*, *The Kaliningrad Question*, and *Iron Troikas: The New Threat From The East*. Dr. Krickus holds a B.A. in government from the College of William and Mary,

an M.A. in international affairs from the University of Massachusetts, and a Ph.D. in comparative politics from Georgetown University.

SUMMARY

How do we give Russia a voice but not a veto in crafting a new European security system? This question has preoccupied analysts in Brussels, Moscow, and Washington ever since Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proclaimed that the existing one was deeply flawed. Vladimir Putin's protégé observed last summer that the American "unipolar moment" upon which it rested was over. The United States could no longer dominate the international agenda nor could NATO do the same thing in Europe.

The purpose of this monograph is to provide insight into the problems and prospects of the United States and Europe creating a new security relationship with Russia—one that can enhance the national security of all three of them. It will be comprised of three parts. First, it will address several compelling questions: What is the Russian case for a new security system? What are the arguments in opposition to it? And why, in spite of profound reservations about cooperation with Moscow, are Western statesmen prepared to consider it? In this connection, the factors that prevented a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the West will provide a framework for our analysis: in sum, the triangular relationship between deterrence, arms control, and conflict management.

Second, points of conflict between the Western alliance on the one hand and Russia on the other will be assessed: for example, friction associated with NATO, its eastward enlargement in particular; a U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe; the future of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and of most urgent significance the need to

reconfigure the strategic nuclear balance between Washington and Moscow by providing a new START.

Third, conclusions and recommendations will be provided that have a bearing on how the United States should respond to Medvedev's proposal and other issues associated with efforts to integrate Russia into the Western security system. A number of issues that will determine whether this campaign succeeds or fails will be assessed. For example, much has been said about a value gap that separates the West and Russia but little about differences within the Trans-Atlantic alliance and the European Union that will have a profound impact upon the prospects for security cooperation among the three partners. This assessment will provide insight into the compelling question: How to provide Russia with a voice but not a veto in crafting a new Trans-Atlantic security system? In this connection, the answer will involve a step-by-step process that rests upon renegotiating the START which expires at the end of this year. It also will investigate an initiative that borders on the unthinkable for most American defense analysts: providing Russia with a MAP for NATO membership.

This recommendation represents a minority view, but there is mounting support for it as it is apparent that the time has come to think beyond the Cold War worldview that has restrained bold new thinking about the West's relationship with Russia. The wars in the Greater Middle East, of course, now preoccupy American strategists, but they cannot lose sight of the following observations: Russia is the only country capable of devastating the United States in a nuclear attack; major American security priorities cannot be achieved without its cooperation; and most of the world's people and resources exist in and around

its territory. Changes that occur within it will have profound consequences for American global military planning, and they deserve our close attention.

**MEDVEDEV'S PLAN:
GIVING RUSSIA A VOICE BUT NOT A VETO
IN A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM**

INTRODUCTION

How do we give Russia a voice but not a veto in crafting a new European security system? This question has preoccupied analysts on both sides of the Atlantic ever since Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proclaimed that the existing one was deeply flawed and had to be replaced. Vladimir Putin's protégé observed in a series of speeches last summer that the American "unipolar moment" upon which it rested was over, and the United States could no longer dominate the international agenda.¹ At the same time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a relic of the Cold War and incapable of addressing existing and anticipated flash points of conflict on the Continent. How could the existing security system function when it excluded Russia—the largest country in Europe—and surrounded it with a curtain of steel on its western frontier?

Medvedev's proposal—some called it a doctrine—was favorably received on both sides of the Atlantic, albeit with reservations and active opposition in some quarters.² The prospects for such cooperation were abruptly placed in a deep-freeze after the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008. Within days Russian troops overwhelmed the American-trained Georgian forces, expelling them from the break-away South Ossetian enclave, and pushing the overmatched defenders into the Georgian heartland. At one point it appeared that the Russians were about to occupy Tbilisi and depose Mikhail Saakashvili, the Georgian

president, from power. Putin reviled the man and said that under no circumstances would he negotiate with him. Georgia started the war and after its “peacekeepers” were killed, Russia had no option but to safeguard its embattled troops. The Georgian side had committed thousands of civilian atrocities through indiscriminate air and artillery attacks upon South Ossetia’s capital, Tskhinvali.³

Even after Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President—who was occupying the European Union (EU) revolving executive—signed a ceasefire agreement with Medvedev, there was no quick Russian exit from Georgia. Not only did the Russian army take its time leaving the country, it continued to destroy civilian installations and infrastructure that had nothing to do with Georgia’s military. In a massive public diplomacy campaign, Moscow asserted that the Georgians had killed tens of thousands of people and had engaged in brutal atrocities. Since these claims were excessive, the Kremlin undermined other charges that they were leveling against Saakashvilli; namely, that he had started the war.

The George W. Bush administration condemned Russia’s military actions but added that it had warned Saakashvilli against a forceful seizure of South Ossetia even though it legally belonged to Georgia, and Russian “peacekeepers” had no right under international law to remain there or in Abkhazia—a second enclave whose residents wished to be independent of Georgian rule. The Western reaction to the war, however, became muted when reports surfaced that, while Moscow had tricked Saakashvilli into his intemperate action and used it as a pretext to invade Georgia, there was mounting evidence that Georgia, and not Russia, started the war. Indeed, Saakashvilli later conceded this

point after Georgia's former Ambassador to Russia, Erosi Kitsmarishvili, made this claim in public.⁴ This led to further probes into Saakashvili's rule, and the results were not favorable to him. Among other things, his credentials as a democrat had been sullied by his use of force in 2007 to silence political critics within Georgia, while his government had neutralized independent news outlets. As Western opinion turned against him, a number of American and European observers concluded that it would be reckless to invite Georgia into NATO and run the risk of a military confrontation with Russia.

Nonetheless, opponents of Medvedev's proposal cited the Five Day War as evidence that any security partnership with Moscow was a fantasy. On the contrary, the time had come to reconsider Russia as a military threat to European peace. In wake of Russia's brutal actions in Georgia, this was the conclusion of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General John Craddock, who rejected the notion that "after the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact no borders were under threat in Europe and Eurasia. I think that assumption has proven false." He added that the Five Day War and Russian disruption of gas supplies early in 2009 "... suggests their [Russia's] overall intent may be to weaken European solidarity and systematically reduce U.S. influence."⁵

This view was popular among the so-called states of New Europe, that is, the former Soviet Republics and satellites in Eastern Europe. They had been complaining for some time that Russia had been exploiting its energy wealth to compromise their sovereignty.⁶ For them, an effort to engage Russia as a security partner was a dangerous and incomprehensible notion. In Western (or Old) Europe, by contrast, the focus was

upon finding ways to reconcile Russian concerns about what Moscow called its “near abroad,” that is, the former Soviet entities that now belonged to NATO and the EU as well as those like Georgia and Ukraine that were being actively courted by the West. Officials in Brussels spoke of the territory they occupied as “Europe’s troubled neighborhood” and, given its close ties to Moscow, it was risky to meddle in the affairs of the people living there.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin had concluded there was no hope of engaging the Bush administration in discussions of common security. Ever since President Bush terminated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, officials in Moscow deemed that goal a dead end. Therefore they looked hopefully for a new administration in Washington. Since Senator John McCain had indicated that he would take a tough line with Moscow they welcomed the election of Barack Obama.⁷ The Democratic candidate pledged that, if elected, he would reengage Russia, especially in the vital area of strategic arms control.

A month after the new administration entered office, Vice-President Joseph Biden traveled to Munich and announced that the Obama administration was prepared to push the “reset” button with Russia. Then in April, President Obama met with his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, at the G-20 economic summit in London, United Kingdom (UK). In a joint-statement, they proclaimed:

“. . . the era when our countries viewed each other as enemies is long over, and recognizing our many common interests, we today established a substantive agenda for Russia and the United States to be developed over the coming months and years. We are resolved to work together to strengthen strategic stability,

international security, and jointly meet contemporary global challenges, while also addressing disagreements openly and honestly in a spirit of mutual respect and acknowledgment of each other's perspective."⁸

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that would expire in December was highlighted along with related efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would be reconsidered in 2010. Other security issues designated as part of the American-Russian agenda were the war in Afghanistan and the dispute over the deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. In the final draft of their communiqué, the two presidents concluded: "We the leaders of Russia and the United States are ready to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in relations between our countries."⁹

Obama had a compelling reason to reengage Russia; for unquestionably he had been warned by his security team his first day in office that the greatest threat to the United States was a rogue regime gaining access to a nuclear weapon or a terrorist cell securing nuclear material. Either way, tens of thousands of Americans could be killed in a single strike. His Russian counterpart had to consider the plausibility of a similar threat, so both had powerful incentives to cooperate. Moreover, since Russia and the United States together possessed 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, they were in a unique position to check their spread along with fissile material. By securing the strategic nuclear balance that prevailed throughout the Cold War, Washington and Moscow could provide a framework to deny enemy fanatics the opportunity to subject them to such an unthinkable outcome.

But there were many barriers to a security partnership. In addition to a climate of distrust and mutual suspicion that characterized American-Russian relations during the Bush years, plus the Five Day War, there were flash points of conflict that could sabotage this undertaking. In Europe, they included NATO enlargement toward Russia, the U.S. anti-missile system in Europe, and conflict over the fate of the countries in the near-abroad that were linked to the existing arms limitation and crisis prevention regimes; that is, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) arrangements.

Still, maintaining a balance in the American-Russian nuclear strategic relationship was of overriding interest to both Washington and Moscow. Consequently, the expiration of START that had codified the relationship ever since it was signed in 1991 had taken center stage. It would expire by the end of 2009 and, if no replacement was found for it, the prospect of a new strategic nuclear arms race could not be foreclosed.

Proponents of a new European security system look hopefully toward START for another reason. If the nuclear super-powers found a replacement for the treaty, it was anticipated that a new environment of harmony would materialize and advance efforts to reconcile differences over National Missile Defense (NMD), NATO enlargement, and other issues that were linked to the creation of a new European security system. Conversely, an abortive START initiative would foster an environment in which security cooperation between the West and Russia was highly unlikely.

The purpose of this monograph is to provide insight into the problems and prospects of America

and Europe creating a new security relationship with Russia—one that can enhance the national security of all three of them. In the process it may be possible to find the answer to the question, How do we give Russia a voice but not a veto in crafting a new European security system? It will be comprised of three parts:

- First, it will address several compelling questions: What is the Russian case for a new security system? What are the arguments in opposition to it? And why, in spite of profound reservations about cooperation with Moscow, are Western leaders prepared to consider it? In this connection, the factors that prevented a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the West will provide a framework for our analysis: in sum, the triangular relationship between deterrence, arms control, and conflict management.
- Second, points of conflict between the Western alliance on the one hand and Russia on the other will be assessed: for example, friction associated with NATO, its eastward enlargement in particular; a U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe; the future of CFE and OSCE; and a bid to recalibrate the strategic nuclear balance between Washington and Moscow through a START follow-up agreement.
- Third, conclusions and recommendations will be provided that have a bearing on how the United States should respond to Medvedev's proposal and other issues associated with efforts to integrate Russia into the Western security system. A number of issues determining whether the campaign succeeds will be evaluated. For example, much has been said about a value gap that separates the West and Russia but little

about differences within the Trans-Atlantic alliance and the EU that will have a profound impact upon the prospects for security cooperation among the three partners.

It is against this backdrop that this monograph will provide insight into the compelling question: How to provide Russia with a voice but not a veto in crafting a new European security system? The answer will involve a step-by-step process that rests upon a successful outcome to the START negotiations. It will also require a bold new approach to a security partnership between the West and Russia. Toward this end, it will investigate an initiative that borders on the unthinkable for most American defense analysts: providing Russia with a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO membership.

Addressing all of the matters cited above is a daunting undertaking, but the Cold War provides us with a framework to consider them, namely, a nuclear holocaust was avoided as a consequence of three interrelated circumstances:

1. Achieving a stable military balance through deterrence. Perhaps the single most important reason why a nuclear holocaust was avoided was the conviction that neither side could attack the other without risking a lethal retaliatory “second strike” in return. This was the basis for the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and a stunning example of counterintuitive logic: The security of the superpowers was based upon their vulnerability to a nuclear attack. Some strategists on both sides rejected MAD and argued that it was insane to adhere to it. For example, Richard Pipes, who served in Reagan’s National Security Council as the administration’s Russian

expert, wrote in what would become a leading neo-conservative organ, *Commentary*, that the Soviet military did not accept the logic of MAD. On the contrary, they believed that a nuclear war could be fought and won. This meant that the United States had to adopt the same posture and take this observation to its logical conclusion to achieve a condition of nuclear dominance or absolute security.¹⁰ Clearly there were some in the Kremlin who rejected MAD, but Mikhail Gorbachev was not one of them. Nor, in the final analysis, did Ronald Reagan see nuclear weapons as useful instruments of war as he indicated in his second 4 years in office. He felt so strongly about this matter that at his meeting with Gorbachev at Reykjavik in October 1986, he was prepared to discuss the destruction of all nuclear weapons. Indeed, as Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott have observed, Reagan saw MAD as a “suicide pact”; he was an abolitionist when it came to nuclear weapons. “Americans who voted for Reagan in 1980 had little idea that on this issue they were electing a radical, a heretic, an idealist, a romantic, a nuclear abolitionist.”¹¹ While the debate over the wisdom of MAD still persists, the record suggests that it did foreclose a nuclear disaster during the Cold War. As we will observe below, this issue is upper-most in the minds of Russian strategists for they have good reason to conclude that the United States not only enjoys a huge conventional military advantage over them, but a plausible argument can be made that trend lines indicate that the United States is also moving ahead of them in strategic nuclear capabilities. That projection may be challenged, but there is no doubt that the Kremlin leadership deems it plausible and it does not serve U.S. interests to leave them with that unsettling thought.

2. Creating an environment of trust was accomplished through a series of arms control agreements during the Cold War. They placed limits on both nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and rested on the notion that there was no such thing as absolute security. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the winter of 1979 foreclosed further progress on this front. But in 1987, President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, ended a dispute over the Soviet deployment of intermediate-ranged SS-20s by outlawing all weapons of this nature with the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF). This breakthrough provided the basis for the signing of START and other efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as exemplified by the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative. In 2002, the younger Bush signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) and took other measures with Russia to address the problems of nuclear proliferation even though the Kremlin deemed them inadequate. Proponents of reengaging the Russians on these matters therefore can cite all of the above as evidence that a security partnership between the West and Russia is not a doomed undertaking. Today, of course, the major arms control objective of Washington and Moscow is to find a replacement for START. The roadblocks to an agreement are many, but to date both sides have been meeting on a consistent basis and the negotiations have been characterized as positive and serious. A successful outcome to the talks will make it easier to address other flash-points of conflict in Europe, but should it fail, it could foster a climate of enmity that would further exacerbate them.

3. A third component of the regime that prevented a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was the

successful management of crises that could spawn a nuclear showdown. The Berlin Crisis of the early 1960s and the even more dangerous Cuban Missile Crisis were successfully managed. The ability to manage such crises was critical since few defense analysts believed a nuclear war would start with a strike from the blue. Instead, they were convinced that one could erupt as a result of an accident, miscalculation, or some unforeseen circumstance in the Third World. For example, allies or puppets of both sides would engage in conflict such as the 1973 October War between the Arabs and Israel and result in a nuclear showdown between the West and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Today, disputes over NATO enlargement and the deployment of a U.S. missile system in Eastern Europe could sabotage efforts to create a common security regime; so could new fighting between Georgia and Russia. At the same time, how both sides reach agreements on the future of CFE and OSCE will have a bearing on their capacity to achieve security cooperation. They represent the only political-military agreements that include both NATO and all of the former Warsaw Pact members, and in their absence it may be impossible to avoid a clash between NATO and Russia in this troubled neighborhood populated by countries suffering from economic and political upheaval—namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine. It is apparent that a new crisis management regime is required in Europe, and it is the thesis of this monograph that this objective will not be accomplished short of giving Russia a voice in a new European Security System (ESS). Indeed, it will also be proposed that the best way to achieve that objective is to offer Russia a NATO Membership Action Plan.

MEDVEDEV PROPOSAL

What are the prospects for a new security relationship between the West and Russia in Europe? Medvedev's proposal and President Obama's pledge to press the reset button with Russia has prompted a vast outpouring of publications to answer this question.¹² Toward this end, a trinity of critical questions has been addressed: What case does Russia make for Medvedev's initiative? What arguments have surfaced in the West in opposition to it? And what should be the Western reaction to Medvedev's proposal?

On February 10, 2007, in a gathering of world leaders, journalists, and foreign policy analysts at Munich, Germany, Russian President Vladimir Putin raised eyebrows when he forthrightly proclaimed that Russia would no longer tolerate American domination of a unipolar world where it reigned as "sovereign." The American hegemon had abused its powers globally and was "plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts."¹³ Up to this point, he and his Kremlin associates had issued similar words but primarily within Russia. So why did he make them before such a prominent gathering that guaranteed they would be covered by the global media? The answer was threefold: First, Bush's War in Iraq and the troubled occupation of that country had overstretched America's military and diminished its moral authority among the international community. Second, in the last years of Putin's presidency, Russia experienced a financial windfall through the sale of its abundant natural gas and petroleum wealth. Third, like his Soviet predecessors, the former KGB operative controlled the Russian state without viable political opposition but, unlike them, he enjoyed unparalleled popularity

among the Russian people. With a solid political base and a surging hydrocarbon economy, Putin was prepared to tell the world that “Russia is back!”

Putin’s accession to the presidency in 2000 provided Russia with new confidence as the young and resolute ex-KGB agent took over and brought members of the security community – the Siloviki – with him into the Kremlin. Nonetheless, they anxiously anticipated the George W. Bush presidency, for soon after occupying the White House, Bush scrapped the 1972 ABM Treaty – one of the major treaties negotiated during the Golden Age of arms control. At the same time, a chilling signal was sent to Russia that the neo-conservatives who were filling important positions in the Bush administration had rejected arms control as a U.S. priority and instead embraced the notion of “absolute security.” In sum, from Moscow’s vantage point they rejected MAD doctrine in favor of a posture of nuclear dominance. The younger Bush excised the ABM Treaty to make way for a national missile defense system, and this move was consistent with the quest for what appeared to be an American drive for absolute security – a goal that his predecessors had deemed impossible.

As a consequence of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the Russians reasoned that the Bush administration might henceforth concede that even the all-powerful American leviathan needed friends to defeat its jihadist enemies. The global terrorist threat clearly demonstrated that only a multilateral solution to it made any sense. Besides, Putin was the first world leader to offer his condolences to Bush and to provide U.S. access to former Soviet bases in Central Asia, while Moscow used its influence with friends in Afghanistan to help the American special forces defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda jihadists in less than a month of combat.

It was only after Bush snubbed Russia and his French and German allies, and launched a preemptive war against Iraq, that Putin became a vocal critic of America's war on terrorism. His military commanders also were stunned by Bush's justification for the war, especially when all of the reasons why it was deemed legitimate failed to materialize. Here was compelling evidence that the Americans were exploiting unrivalled military prowess to achieve their major foreign policy priorities. Even if the radicals in the White House had no intention of launching a preemptive first strike against Russia – in no small part because they could not take the risk that it was incapable of responding with a second, albeit diminished, strike – Bush and his team of hawkish unilateralists could promote their bellicose geo-political agenda, and no one could prevent them from doing so.

Bush also implemented plans first adopted by the Clinton administration to advance NATO up to the very borders of Russia. This was in violation of the elder Bush's pledge to Moscow not to deploy Western military assets on the territory of the new member states. Russians therefore asked: If the Cold War was over and with it the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, what was NATO's purpose? The answer they found was a disturbing one, for it rested on the conviction that the West was trying to surround Russia with a "curtain of steel." This would happen in 2004 after the Baltic States were included in a second round of enlargement. To make matters worse, the Balts refused to abide by revisions in the CFE treaty that were adopted in 1999 at Istanbul. Like the United States, they contended that Moscow was in violation of CFE when it refused to withdraw its peacekeepers from Georgia and Moldova. Here again, the West was adhering to

a set of double standards at Russia's expense because NATO now possessed a gray zone that did not comply with CFE.

Meanwhile, the Americans encouraged Georgia and Ukraine, through their "colored revolutions," to join NATO, and set about achieving closer relations with the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia, providing the Kremlin further cause for alarm. In addition to their lust for the region's energy assets, the Americans hoped to secure military bases in the area. Here was additional proof that the United States was intent upon the military encirclement of Russia. Most alarming of all was the conclusion that Washington was set upon achieving regime change in Russia itself.

In this connection, Moscow portrayed the OSCE — that sent monitors to evaluate elections in former Soviet entities — as a Trojan horse, a weapon the Americans wielded in the hope of promoting regime change in Russia. This was the rationale for Putin closing down nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were funded by Western organizations, presumably the same ones that had helped elect pro-Western governments in Georgia and Ukraine.

Many independent Russian commentators, like Dmitry Trenin, who often rejected Kremlin policies, found much to agree with this prognosis. In conclusion, Russia no longer wished to be part of the West, but it was a mistake to confuse it with the USSR of yesterday. There was no messianic ideology driving Russia's moves, and it would cooperate with the West on some matters like fighting terrorism. In spite of its resurgence, Russia was not likely "to become a second Soviet Union . . . not a revanchist and imperialist aggressor bent on reabsorbing its former provinces. . . . Russia may not be pro-Western, but neither is it anti-Western." The West

must calm down and adopt a pragmatic “issue-based” approach to Moscow.¹⁴

Trenin made these observations 2 years before the August War, but he proved prescient when he predicted that Western-Russian relations were likely to get worse before they improved. Among other things, he noted that Kosovo’s independence—giving the Muslim Albanians an independent state at the expense of a pro-Russian Slavic country, Serbia—would serve as a template for Russia’s approach to conflict in Georgia and Moldova. It was in line with this narrative that Putin delivered caustic anti-American remarks in Munich in February 2007. What is more, the West under American leadership had humiliated Russia while ignoring its legitimate concerns about foreign troops approaching its borders.

In May, Dmitry Medvedev was elected Russia’s president, and from the outset some Russian-watchers pondered whether he would adopt a softer approach to the West. Others rejected that notion as wishful thinking. After all, Medvedev was a long-time aide to Putin, and his adopting a less confrontational approach to the United States was a ruse. He merely was playing the good cop to his predecessor’s adopting the tough cop role. Still, Medvedev’s talk about reasserting the rule of law in Russia and other liberal policies forced Western observers to recall that Putin’s 2007 Munich speech was not merely dripping with anti-American venom. It had provided a second major message that was all but ignored by critics when it first surfaced: That is, Putin welcomed the opportunity to work with the United States to reduce nuclear weapons. Specifically, he urged both sides to adhere to the NPT scheduled to be reviewed in 2010. He went on to cite weapons in space (Star Wars) as a threat to the peace and said, “Plans

to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defense system to Europe cannot help but disturb us.” Putin added to his list of concerns the CFE as revised in 1999. He then turned his attention to NATO enlargement. “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”¹⁵ In remarks following his speech, he indicated that Russia might withdraw from both the CFE and the INF agreements since both had outlived their usefulness; the West was exploiting the first at Russia’s expense, and unnamed neighboring countries were doing the same thing as they deployed their own intermediate-ranged missiles.

After he replaced Putin as Russia’s president, Medvedev joined his Prime Minister in declaring that the American unipolar moment was over. The post-Soviet years when the Americans could dictate to the world were history in no small part because Bush’s invasion and occupation of Iraq had proven to be a colossal disaster. In addition to the 4,000 plus deaths suffered in the fighting, some economists estimated the Iraq War (and the unfinished war in Afghanistan) would cost the American taxpayer something in the neighborhood of three trillion dollars.¹⁶ Bogged down in Iraq, and facing another disaster in Afghanistan, the American military did not have the capacity to honor the threats that the Bush administration and its neo-conservative cheerleaders persisted in making—consequently, the Mullahs in Iran who were being threatened by Washington for their quest to develop a nuclear arsenal, greeted such saber-rattling with a yawn.

In his Berlin speech, Medvedev spoke about an opportunity “to build up genuine cooperation between Russia, the EU and North America as the three branches of European civilization.”¹⁷ In an October 8, 2008, address at the World Policy Conference in Evian, France, he said that the Georgian crisis demonstrated “that the international security system based on unipolarity no longer works.”¹⁸ In its “desire to consolidate its global rule,”¹⁹ Washington promoted an independent Kosovo, scrapped the ABM treaty, and prepared to deploy a missile system in Eastern Europe. Talk about Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership was a further provocation. Nonetheless, “we are open to cooperation. And we intend to cooperate responsibly and pragmatically.”²⁰ The damage done to such cooperation by the August War was not fatal or irreversible. Yet clearly the August events demonstrated that NATO was incapable of serving as Europe’s security infrastructure for it failed to prevent the Russian-Georgian War. An alternative Euro-Atlantic system had to be inclusive and without zones of influence. Toward this end, he provided five guiding principles which included abiding by the rule of law, rejecting the use of force to settle disputes, and other generalities that no one would reject. What was missing was a roadmap that demonstrated how a new security system for Europe could be established.²¹

While Medvedev’s proposal was eviscerated by many Western foreign policy analysts, others perceived it in a more favorable light. Michael Mandelbaum, for example, cited NATO enlargement as a provocation that Moscow could not tolerate, and it exemplified a major shortcoming of the West’s approach to Russia in the post-Soviet period—ignoring Moscow’s legitimate concerns. He noted with special emphasis

that the Americans and Europeans forgot a compelling historical lesson: If defeated countries are not integrated into the post-war security system, they may eventually undermine it. For example, after Napoleon's defeat early in the 19th century, the monarchs of Europe provided a place for France in the post-war environment. The United States, by welcoming Germany and Japan into the West's security embrace after World War II did the same thing. But note that by failing to integrate a defeated Germany into Europe after World War I, that blunder led to the ascendancy of Adolph Hitler and the most devastating war in human history.

In preventing a future conflict in Europe, Mandelbaum has advocated the West give serious consideration to Medvedev's proposal and find a place for Russia in NATO. For many of his colleagues, that is thinking about the unthinkable, but perhaps that impulse is based upon conditions associated with the Cold War that no longer pertain to today's security environment.²²

The case for maintaining the existing European security architecture which excludes Russia can be provided in a few words. Under Putin, Russia is on a journey into the past—one that is reminiscent of the Soviet Empire. Putin's autocratic rule clashes with his claim of Russia wanting to become a normal European country with a democratic polity, a vibrant civil society, and a thriving free market. Putin's exploitation of Russia's energy assets as a geo-political weapon clashes with his assertion that he seeks harmonious relations with his neighbors. There is no doubt that some in Russia, who prefers modernization to empire, eagerly welcome all of these things, but unfortunately they are not in charge.

Janusz Bugajski, in his *Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism*, contends that Putin's return to an imperialist path has placed at risk countries that once belonged to the Soviet Empire. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have faded into the mist of history, but the imperial impulse resonates in the hearts and minds of the Kremlin leadership. Bugajski cites six broad strategic goals that are in line with the Kremlin's hegemonic ambitions in this region: expanding Russia's foreign policy reach into the former Soviet space; securing monopolistic control over the countries occupying that space; compelling the countries of Eastern Europe to become politically dependent upon Russia; preventing the West from gaining influence over that space; using "Eastern Europe as a springboard for rebuilding a larger sphere of predominant influence and great power status; and promoting Russia's global geo-strategic objectives while eliminating U.S. unipolarity."²³

The *Economist's* Edward Lucas agrees that New Europe represents a central front in the struggle between the West and Russia, and Putin's imperial ambitions explain why the New Europeans are vulnerable to Moscow's machinations. Lucas argues also that there is a value gap between Russia and the West that represents a huge barrier to cooperation. With the appointment of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister in 1999, the Kremlin leadership returned to autocratic rule, what Lucas refers to as "The New Tsarism."²⁴

Former members of the KGB have achieved near total political power in the Kremlin, and there is reason to believe that Putin and his associates provoked the Second Chechen War to accomplish this objective. There is one party rule in Russia, and critics who openly challenge the government are intimidated into silence, arrested, exiled, and in some cases killed. Putin

has further consolidated centralized control of Russia's pseudo federal system by denying governors in 89 regions the legitimacy of free elections.

While Putin has tolerated independent printed publications, he has secured near total control of TV – the most important source of political information for most Russians. At the same time, he has put the business oligarchs on notice that if they fail to cooperate with the Kremlin, they, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former owner of Yukos, could find themselves in prison. He also has made things difficult for NGOs in Russia citing open or presumably hidden funding to support his claim that foreign entities are behind so-called Russian efforts to create a civil society.

Lucas's claims, and those of like-minded colleagues, are not merely the ranting of unrepentant Cold Warriors, for some Russian commentators have added their voices in explaining why it is foolhardy to believe that the Kremlin leadership is truly serious about security cooperation with the West. Accusations that the Europeans and Americans have isolated Russia while encircling it with a military curtain ignore evidence of Russia's self-isolation. Lilya Shevtsova writes in reference to the war in Georgia,

The events this August confirm the simple truth that Russian foreign policy is really an instrument deployed to accomplish objectives of the domestic political agenda. Since the powers that be seem patently unable to consolidate society by any means and excuses save for existence of an enemy, it means that they will certainly find a scapegoat even if NATO stops being available in this capacity for any reason.²⁵

In short, for many observers of Russia, the overriding truth is that it is a revisionist power that does not

seek accommodation with its neighbors, only domination over them. To expect the Kremlin leadership to behave otherwise simply is not part of its DNA.

Notwithstanding such legitimate reservations, some American statesmen have responded favorably to Medvedev's proposal even if they may not agree with him about the contents of a new security system. "We believe that the fundamental interests of the United States, Europe, and Russia are more aligned today – or can be made so – even in the wake of the Georgia crisis, than at any point in recent history. We must not waste that opportunity."²⁶ These are the words of two prominent American statesmen, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz. Both were former Secretaries of State and, along with retired Democratic Senator Sam Nunn and one-time Clinton Defense Secretary William Perry, they have staunchly lobbied for ridding the world of nuclear weapons. This objective cannot be achieved without Russia's help and the same holds for crushing the Taliban in Afghanistan, and denying the Iranians a nuclear weapons arsenal.

Kissinger and Schultz note that after the August War there were calls to chastise Moscow but "isolating Russia is not a sustainable long-term policy. It is neither feasible nor desirable to isolate a country adjoining Europe, Asia and the Middle East and possessing a stockpile of nuclear weapons comparable to that of the United States."²⁷ All of these observations are in keeping with the perspective of the Obama administration, and that explains why there has been a surge in bilateral discussions between officials in Washington and Moscow.

Medvedev's proposal has been favorably received in Old Europe, especially in Berlin and Paris by Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicholas Sarkozy respectively. Like their Russian counterparts, they

have had reservations about the wisdom of providing NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. While claiming they favor membership for both countries, they led the fight at the spring 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, to deny them Membership Action Plans. Yes, the door remains open to both countries, but they would not cross the threshold at this time.²⁸

Of course, while some Europeans were alarmed by the Five Day War and interpreted the gas dispute between Moscow and Kiev as cause to urgently seek alternatives to Russia's energy exports, others cited both events as evidence that Europe must more closely work with Russia on all fronts. At the same time, there was no prospect that Europe can find a replacement for Russia's natural gas any time soon even if efforts were underway to do so.

Likewise the global economic crisis—for which the United States has to take major responsibility—has enhanced the case of those who argue that in today's world only multilateral solutions can resolve global problems. Yes, a value gap separates Russia from its Western partners, but the economic crisis clearly demonstrates that common interests are the basis for the relations between the United States, Europe, and Russia, not arguments over their domestic affairs. After all, Washington has ignored human rights violations and autocracy among its allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for years, so why not give Russia a pass as well—it is in our vital security interest to do so.

Proponents of a new security system for Europe, however, cannot ignore one compelling reservation: Medvedev's proposal lacks substance. His remarks to date represent a vague statement of principles absent concrete proposals about what the security system would look like.²⁹

A second compelling problem for those in the West favoring efforts along these lines is exemplified by the question: How do we give Russia a voice in a European security affairs but not a veto? As indicated at the outset, this volume will attempt to provide an answer to this question by assessing the points of conflict between the West and Russia in the context of Europe. In doing so, all avenues will be explored including the possibility of providing Russia with a MAP for NATO membership.

One thing is apparent at this point: Progress on these matters will all turn on the success or failure of Washington and Moscow to find a follow-up to START.

START

The last significant U.S.-Russian arms control treaty was the 2002 Moscow Treaty or the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT). But “Without START, . . . SORT will lose the verification and counting provisions that had made this short and streamlined treaty somewhat meaningful.”³⁰ Prevailing safeguards tethered to START then will terminate if that treaty is allowed to expire in December 2009.

Subsequently, a new nuclear arms race could ensue, and efforts to address a host of security issues in Europe would be placed in a deep-freeze. What is more, this abortive effort to address the scourge of nuclear weapons would occur at a time when Iran is striving to build a nuclear weapons arsenal, presumably with the intention of placing nuclear munitions on its solid-fueled ICBMs; at a time when North Korea is both expanding its nuclear arsenal and its capacity to deliver nuclear-tipped warheads; at a time when control of Pakistan’s substantial nuclear arsenal

remains in question; and at a time when the availability of unregulated fissile material is making it feasible for rogue states to acquire nuclear weapons and terrorist organizations to secure nuclear grade weapons material. Under these circumstances, the specter of an American city being devastated by a nuclear bomb or device would surge.

Before turning to the issues involved in the ongoing START negotiations, a few words of background are in order. The elder Bush and Gorbachev signed START I in 1991 and, under it neither side could have more than 1,600 delivery systems (ground launched inter-continental missiles and those carried by submarines and bombers) and no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads. According to Russian sources, the day it was signed, the Soviet Union had 10,271 strategic nuclear warheads carried on 2,500 launchers. The respective figures for the United States were 10,563 and 2,246.³¹ Note that these figures are estimates, and those of us who operate in an open environment can only rely upon them for guidance. That said, there does not appear to be a dispute over their accuracy.

The treaty became operative in 1994. Seven years later, "Russia said it now had 1,136 vehicles and 5,518 warheads, and the U.S. 1,237 vehicles and 5,948 warheads."³² START II was signed in 1993, but the treaty was never ratified.³³ Among other things, it would have prohibited the deployment of Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Soon after their introduction, both sides deemed them to be destabilizing, and therefore it made sense to remove them from the nuclear equation. There simply was no way that defensive systems—given daunting technological problems and enormous costs—could prevent an offensive strike armed with MIRVs from

devastating a country under a wholesale nuclear attack. Under these circumstances, MAD was subverted.

In contrast to his father, however, George W. Bush displayed wariness toward arms control and cancelled the 1972 ABM Treaty in December 2001. Russia retaliated by withdrawing from START II. But Bush did move the nuclear arms control agenda forward in 2002 with SORT. "Although it has set a ceiling of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads for each side, it has not stipulated the number of vehicles and warheads per vehicle—each side is free to decide on the make-up of its nuclear forces. The treaty did not provide control mechanisms either—instead, both sides limited themselves to a reference to START and to calling an implementation commission meeting twice a year."³⁴

In short, without START, SORT would expire as well, and for the first time in 15 years the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia would not be framed by a single agreement.³⁵ Alexei Arbatov writes: "This situation is largely the result of the destructive policy pursued by the USA, especially by the Republican Administration over the last eight years."³⁶ While it is common practice for Russian commentators to blame the Americans for a host of unfortunate circumstances, the record appears to support his assessment of events, for the Bush administration displayed a cavalier attitude toward arms control during its second term in office.

Bush and his closest advisers were likewise dismissive of the strategic nuclear balance that rested on MAD. He quipped at one point that the United States would replace "mutual assured destruction with mutual cooperation."³⁷ From Moscow's perspective, this meant that the United States would go for a position of nuclear dominance and henceforth dictate to Moscow the terms of the strategic nuclear balance.

American defense analysts have conceded that there is a basis for Russian claims to this effect. One writing in the last year of the Bush-43 administration observed, "The dominant motif of U.S. defense policy, to some extent under President Clinton, but strongly articulated in the Bush administration, is the refusal to accept any kind of deterrence upon its capabilities for a global strike."³⁸

In the Russian reading of the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), one finds the basis for the linkage between Bush's withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and the U.S. drive for absolute security. According to press reports, this classified document stressed three interrelated parts of the strategic U.S. nuclear arsenal:

- Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (and the addition of conventional munitions) to deter or preempt rogue nations and movements that threatened the United States with WMD. Note: Special attention was placed on the development of conventional munitions that could, in effect, replicate the power of small nuclear munitions, and this asset is the basis for Moscow's assertion that they cannot be ignored in negotiating START.
- The adoption of a national missile defense system that would prevent rogue states like Iran or North Korea from raining rockets on the United States.
- Lastly, a wholesale upgrading of the U.S. national security infrastructure.

The Union of Concerned Scientists said that the NPR undermined efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and concluded, "U.S. nonproliferation goals can be accomplished only if the United States

demonstrated by its own actions and policies that it has reached the firm conclusion that nuclear weapons bring with them greater dangers than security benefits and that it intends to move expeditiously toward a non-nuclear world altogether with the other nuclear weapons states.”³⁹ An even more explosive claim was made several years later when two American analysts concluded that the United States had the capacity to launch a first strike against Russia without fear of being devastated by a returning second strike.⁴⁰

Before becoming president, Bush indicated that he would withdraw from the ABM Treaty; but 9/11, and the global war on terrorism, provided an additional pretext to scrap it and make a fundamental shift in U.S. defense strategy. Henceforth national missile defense would be a critical component of U.S. security doctrine, and this focus would feed fears in Moscow that the United States was securing a first-strike capability. The Kremlin noted with emphasis that the American missile complex in Eastern Europe would represent the third and final leg of the global U.S. system. The other two were in Alaska and California.

Bush’s refusal to acknowledge Moscow’s concerns about NMD underscored its conviction that the Americans no longer took Russia seriously and would treat it with contempt. Presumably this explained why Bush did not take active measures to pursue agreements on arms control that he made with Putin at Sochi in April 2008. In the Declaration at the seaside resort, “They reiterated their intention to carry out further reduction in strategic offensive arms, they pledged to continue development of a legally binding post-START arrangement, and they restated their commitment to Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which calls for eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons.”⁴¹

Meanwhile, Russian arms control experts like Arbatov wrote in the summer of 2008 that after years of inaction on these matters, Russia was ill-prepared to negotiate them with the Americans. There had been a “departure of qualified civil and military specialists from the ministries and agencies”⁴² and an absence of “a community of diplomats, military professionals, scientists and defense industry representatives who share a collective experience of cooperation” in dealing with strategic arms control issues.⁴³

At her confirmation hearing, Obama’s choice for Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, observed that arms control experts must be returned to Foggy Bottom to achieve one of the administration’s priorities—negotiating a new round of arms control agreements with Russia.⁴⁴ They found little work under the previous administration even though they might have wanted to do more. It is noteworthy, however, that the individuals who have played an aggressive role in pressing for arms control initiatives in the United States are not identified by party affiliation but more by age, that is, by individuals who were active in government during the Cold War—an era that has been labeled the Golden Age of arms control. For them the bomb represented a compelling existential threat. Their younger colleagues, by contrast, have been preoccupied with the global war on terrorism and are disinclined to pay much attention to the Russian Question.

Today, Russian authorities remain wary of Obama as many believe that he has not shed the hubris of his counterparts and, in spite of his congenial words, the Kremlin remains cautious in their dealings with him. Tough talk on the part of his Secretary of State and Vice-President regarding Russia has been cited by

them as a reason why they remained skeptical about his intentions in the run-up to the Moscow Summit in July.

Contrary to some dark predictions, the Summit was a success. After years of drift and a gathering storm of enmity, the world's two superpowers were once again talking seriously about their strategic nuclear relationship. In light of the inactivity of the recent past and uncertainty about the future, there is a risk that their significance may be exaggerated, but in addition to favorable words about START negotiations, several other hard-security agreements were adopted: an accord on American-Russian military cooperation; allowing the U.S.-NATO forces to cross Russian territory to resupply their troops in Afghanistan with lethal weapons; a commitment to conduct a joint-assessment of defensive and offensive systems; and the creation of a missile-launch detection center.

Two notable interrelated points of conflict, however, were not resolved. Russia did not commit itself to working with the United States to impose heavy new penalties upon Iran. Indeed, in the various meetings and press conferences that were conducted, Iran did not receive a great deal of attention. Also, Obama did not announce that the American anti-missile project in Eastern Europe had been cancelled. He did placate his Russian host's concern about NMD by asserting that the issue of the anti-missile project in the Czech Republic and Poland was under internal review, and he agreed to discuss the relationship between defensive and offensive systems. Realizing that Obama faced stiff political pressure at home if it appeared that he had crumbled on this issue in the face of pressure from Moscow, the Russian leadership wisely did not make much of this matter.

In his Moscow press conferences and public addresses, President Obama made a concerted effort to address Russian claims that Washington has been going out of its way to humiliate Russia and to diminish its importance in world affairs. He did not receive the exuberant rock-star reception that he enjoyed elsewhere, but Russia's leaders and people appreciated his gestures of good will. His trip demonstrated that Washington was conceding before the world that Russia mattered! Several weeks after the Summit, Interfax published a poll indicating that 54 percent of the Russian people thought that Obama's visit meant better Russian-American relations.⁴⁵

While the START deliberations have been conducted behind closed doors, the major points of contention are not secret. They include the following:

- "Moscow does not want to accept anything less than legally binding agreements in the area of military-political relations."⁴⁶ Bush balked at the idea because among other things that would allow the Senate to have a voice in the matter that he deemed a preserve of the president, but it appears that the Obama administration will accept a law-based document.
- A thornier issue is Moscow's desire to tie the new treaty to a parallel agreement on ballistic missile defenses and weapons in space.⁴⁷ American arms controllers are convinced that efforts to renegotiate START will be placed at risk by including outside elements in the talks. Still, some commentators in Moscow indicated that if the United States deployed the missile defense system in Eastern Europe, START was dead.⁴⁸

- SORT calls for the reduction but not the destruction of warheads. The Russians want them destroyed and not merely placed in storage as the Americans prefer. What the Russians call up-load potential, then, is a major concern to them; i.e., taking them out of storage and placing them on launchers. Conversely, defense analysts in Washington see them as insurance against a third party threatening the United States.
- Moscow has expressed deep concern about American conventional weapons capable of hitting a target with pin-point accuracy and deadly force. Russia does not have a similar capability and wants the weapons in question to be counted along with nuclear warheads. For the United States, they offer a non-nuclear option since they can destroy deeply embedded terrorist bases. In this instance, think Iran.
- Perhaps the most serious point of discord involves the dispute over a reduction in delivery vehicles. At the Moscow Summit, Russian officials demanded deep cuts in American bombers and ground and sea-based rockets and mentioned a total of 600. As of January 2009, Russia possessed 800 delivery systems and the United States possessed 1,200 launchers. The American negotiators favored the higher number.⁴⁹
- Russian analysts remain concerned about the question of how many and what kind of warheads are placed upon the launchers and how the requirement of transparency is determined.
- Finally, officials in Moscow have stated categorically that they cannot accept an American

proposal that strategic nuclear weapons for both sides be reduced to 1,000. This number would subject Russia's declining nuclear forces to an American first-strike.⁵⁰

Opposition to START has been muted in American defense circles, but some critics fear that the new accord will undermine the U.S. nuclear strike force. For example, Peter Hussey, a consultant to the National Defense University (NDU), rejects the idea that we can end our nuclear triad and rest easy if there is a dramatic reduction in strategic U.S. nuclear warheads. "The synergy between intercontinental ballistic and submarine-launched ballistic missiles is what gives deterrence its strength and viability. . . ." Should the United States eliminate either of the ICBM systems, both North Korea and Iran "will thank the United States for its thoughtlessness and continue their nuclear programs."⁵¹ There is no evidence that China or Russia would stand-down a single one of its nuclear-armed rockets should the United States follow this path.

The START follow-up negotiations have energized those who oppose the very idea of the United States resetting political-military relations with Russia, but it appears that they do not have the heft to abort it.⁵² In light of the slow pace at which the Senate operates, however, and the efforts on the part of some lawmakers to exploit the ratification process for their own parochial political gains, the deadline of December 5 may not be met. Senator Richard Lugar has warned Obama that if he does not submit a treaty to the Senate by September 2009, it probably will not be ratified by the deadline.⁵³ Also if on the eve of the START deadline the economy remains mired in low productivity, high rates

of unemployment, a phlegmatic stock market, widespread unhappiness with his health plan, and a soaring deficit with few signs of improvement, Obama's popularity may nose-dive.

It would appear that the White House can depend upon its 60-vote margin in the Senate—with support from some Republicans—to get a treaty through that body. The U.S. Senate approved the Moscow Treaty, SORT, by a margin of 95 to 0, and even if the START follow-up treaty will not pass by such a wide margin, it is likely to be ratified. Note, only 25 percent of the American people have indicated that they oppose arms control negotiations with Russia.⁵⁴ Also while some of Obama's political opponents are prepared to adopt a slash and burn effort to curtail his domestic policies, many of them will be reluctant to do so when a matter of national security is concerned.

On the Russian side, one can assume that the Putin-Medvedev duo will provide the political clout necessary to bring about a replacement treaty. Still, failure to reconcile differences over missile defenses and space weapons or the status of powerful precision-guided conventional weapons could become a vexing point of discord between Washington and Moscow. Also some incident in Europe's troubled neighborhood could bring front and center the reality that the Americans enjoy an unrivalled advantage in conventional forces, and it would be foolhardy for Russia to reduce its nuclear assets. There is no question that given the massive U.S. advantage in conventional forces, it benefits every time the number of nuclear weapons are scrapped. Members of the Russian military have been making this case for some time even though the counterclaim can be made that Russia will be hurt more by a START failure than Washington. It simply does not have the resources to match the United States in a nuclear arms race.⁵⁵

Critics on both sides who warn of military risks, however, have a weak case. Even at the level of 1,000—about 700 nuclear weapons less than the figure that is being used in the START negotiations—both sides will possess more than enough fire-power to sustain the American-Russian nuclear balance and the capacity to devastate any country that is insane enough to direct a nuclear strike against them. At Moscow, the number mentioned was only a little less than 1,700, and while the talks have been conducted under close wraps, it appears that both sides are comfortable with it. Of course, the negotiators may threaten to walk away from the talks to enhance their bargaining position, but in the final analysis neither side can allow the START negotiations to fail. That outcome would set in motion a fire-storm of rancorous claims and counter-claims that would make any attempt to cooperate on security matters nearly impossible. Still that does not mean that, given the vagaries of the human condition, a successful outcome to the START negotiations is a certainty.

One thing is certain, with a successful outcome to START, efforts to achieve progress on reconciling differences over other contentious issues in Europe will be given a strong boost.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

With the end of the Cold War, NATO pursued two conflicting goals: to consolidate the zone of democracy that had appeared in Eastern Europe, and to develop a new security relationship with Russia. The Kremlin saw them as mutually exclusive, since the first entailed NATO enlargement without Russia, while its accomplishment negated the second goal, Russian integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Also, as

Dmitry Trenin has indicated, there never was a serious effort on the West's part to provide Russia with a voice in a post-Cold War security regime.⁵⁶

In 1997, the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was created in an effort to placate Boris Yeltsin's concern about further eastward enlargement without a Russian input. But Moscow deemed it inadequate, a ploy to deny Russia a real voice in security decisionmaking. Yeltsin took an on-again-off-again approach to the prospect of membership in NATO, but some European commentators proposed that Russia deserved a greater role in European security affairs.

Timothy Garton Ash, the English journalist/scholar, wrote in *The New York Times* in the summer of 2001: "President George W. Bush has been bold in his design for a Europe whole and free. Now he needs to be bolder still."⁵⁷ Ash, who had been a champion of Solidarity and supported Baltic membership in NATO, urged the U.S. president to go further. "When Mr. Bush meets Vladimir Putin today, he should express clearly that his vision includes a future in which a democratic Russia is eventually embraced as part of NATO."⁵⁸

Several weeks after 9/11, Tony Blair proposed that the PJC be replaced by a new security entity, The Russia-North Atlantic Council (NRC). A week later, during a 2-day visit to Moscow, NATO's General Secretary, George Robertson, discussed the new appendage with Putin, remarking that it had the support of the American, British, Canadian, and Italian leadership.⁵⁹ In their discussions, Putin and Robertson focused on cooperation in three areas: terrorism, arms control—including nuclear proliferation—and peacekeeping. Robertson responded to expressions of alarm among European and American analysts that Russia would enjoy a veto over NATO decisions by proclaiming that

no such deal was in the works. NATO would enlarge eastward in spite of Putin's reservations. At the same time, Igor Ivanov, Russia's foreign minister, remarked: "What is at issue is not full fledged participation or membership in NATO but going in a new direction, a new quality which is in line with the times."⁶⁰

Since its inception, the NRC has received mixed reviews from the Kremlin. Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's Ambassador to NATO, has said, "The strategic task of the NRC is to serve as the major structure for developing cooperation between Russia and NATO. But the NRC failed last year [2008] to fulfill all these tasks."⁶¹ Yet Rogozin stated that "Russia's foremost foreign policy goal" is "a strategic partnership with the West." Indeed, he has predicted that the August War will be perceived by historians as a positive turning point in relations between Russia and the West. To those who assert that Russia's actions in Georgia demonstrate its aggressiveness, the tart-tongued Ambassador responded that all his country wanted was "the return of Russia to its rightful position on the world stage."⁶²

He also advised the Europeans that, "It is time for Europe to stop acting like an occupied continent and start displaying its own political will."⁶³ It is words of this nature that have convinced many Western observers that Medvedev's proposal is merely a device to drive a wedge between America and Europe. Russian commentators deny that it is a devious effort to split the West; rather Medvedev's critique of NATO wrests on the following propositions:

- NATO has been a destabilizing force in Europe creating a new line of enmity between its members and Russia.
- Its eastern enlargement has encircled Russia with a curtain of steel and its New European

members are represented by countries where large numbers of people harbor aggressive intentions towards it.

- NATO is a relic of the Cold War and a hollow shell. It is all form without substance, as the mounting predictions of disaster in Afghanistan suggests.
- Since Russia has been excluded from NATO, it must be replaced by a more inclusive common security regime, and in the meantime any effort to include Georgia and Ukraine in the alliance must be halted.

How well do these claims stand up under scrutiny? First, in spite of Kremlin disclaimers, expanding the zone of democracy in Eastern Europe through NATO has been a plus for everyone living in the region. For the first time in centuries, a war between its major powers, such as France versus Germany, is unthinkable. Likewise, divisions within and between nations have been resolved; specifically, ethnic and territorial claims have been superseded by the security that is associated with NATO membership. Poles are not asking for a change in their boundaries with Germany nor is the reverse true, while Hungary and Romania are not clashing over the heavily Hungarian area of Transylvania that is under Bucharest's rule.

Second, there has not been a significant deployment of NATO troops to the new member states of Eastern Europe and the curtain of steel metaphor is baseless. After enduring centuries of Czarist rule and brutal Soviet oppression in the 20th century, the New Europeans joined NATO in search of a safe harbor. Against this legacy, is it any wonder that they feared the intentions of their giant neighbor to the East? Since

they had no idea what the future would bring Russia, it would have defied human nature for them not to anticipate worse case scenarios—a resurgent bellicose Russia or one that disintegrated into a failed state.

Room must be made for any European state that wishes to enter NATO and meets its requirements—assuming, of course, that the alliance members are capable and willing to defend it if attacked. The Russians no more have the right to demand special privileges at the expense of their Baltic neighbors than the French do to maintain special privileges in their former North African or Sub-Saharan colonies. Colonial peoples have the right to choose their destiny wherever they may reside, and it is unconscionable to deny them what is a fundamental principle of international law. One would think that the French and Germans who have complained about Washington’s dismissing their concerns, would not do the same thing in addressing the New European’s fears about a revanchist Russia.

Likewise, Russia faces serious internal security problems and threats to its south and east in an arc of instability, while its western frontiers are occupied by small democratic countries that neither have the means nor the will to threaten it. It is simply untrue that Russia is less secure today because of NATO enlargement. Would Putin and Medvedev rather have several unstable countries—similar to those in the North Caucasus—embroiled in violence on Russia’s borders? The egos of the imperial-minded may be bruised by eastward enlargement, but progressives who hope that Russia may eventually become a modern democratic (normal European) society cite the democracies on their western frontier as evidence that the quest for pluralism is not beyond their grasp.

While the Russian critique of NATO fails on the first two claims, there is reason to find merit in the second set of charges regarding its viability and the price of excluding Russia from important decisions that are made within NATO. Russian commentators cite the failure of NATO to prevent the Five Day War as evidence that it is dysfunctional. But an even stronger case to this effect can be made in looking at its out-of-area operations in Afghanistan. The war there is beyond the purview of this monograph, but the prospects that Washington and its allies in Europe will ultimately have a falling out over the mission there suggests one of NATO's most serious problems: conflicting American and European assessments of Afghanistan. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Europeans rallied around the United States, and Article 5 of the NATO Charter was invoked to prevent further attacks. This was the first time the mutual defense guarantee had ever been put in place, and defenders of the alliance could cite it as evidence that NATO had a vital role to play in the post-Cold War world.

Alliance solidarity took a hit, however, when, in contrast to the UK, the two other major European military powers, France and Germany, denied Bush the UN's legal backing to invade Iraq. After their warnings that the invasion was a reckless undertaking proved to be prescient, European public opinion reflected growing doubts about American leadership. The long-held view that "the Americans may abuse their awesome power on occasion, but in the end they always do the right thing," was undermined by reports that surfaced early in 2004 that U.S. personnel in Iraq were committing acts of torture in violation of the Geneva Accords.⁶⁴

From the perspective of European public opinion and many leaders on the Continent, American triumphalism was the basis for George W. Bush's foreign policy blunders in the Greater Middle East. They, in turn, reaffirmed concerns in Europe about Washington's penchant for NATO out of area operations. Reports that the war in Afghanistan is not going well has enhanced the influence of those in Europe who think in these terms. Such sentiments have been bolstered by mounting NATO casualties and the recent fraudulent presidential election.

Obama's speeches during his April visit to Europe were greeted with unrestrained enthusiasm, but when urging the deployment of more European troops to fight the terrorists in Afghanistan, he received a cool reception. His audiences were exceedingly uneasy when he said that he would deploy roughly an additional 21,000 American combat troops to Afghanistan. They interpreted this escalation as an indication that the new White House residents, like their predecessors, remained enamored with armed conflict as a major response to international problems.

When Obama was elected president, there were almost an equal number of American and NATO-member troops fighting in Afghanistan—about 30,000 troops each. After entering the White House, Obama took measures to enlarge the U.S. combat force so that by the end of the year, it would be doubled. In several speeches in Europe during his April visit he explained why this was necessary, but he was summarily snubbed by the allies. They offered 5,000 troops, not all of them assigned to combat operations, while two-thirds would return home after the elections in Afghanistan were conducted. This raised eye-brows among foreign policy experts, but most ordinary

Americans, preoccupied with their own economic security, seemingly ignored the slight. This has changed as Defense Secretary Robert Gates' prediction has come true – namely, as combat operations surge in Afghanistan and allied casualties increase, support for the war will decline.⁶⁵ Many Americans have expressed their anger that, while the Europeans roasted the Bush administration for fighting the wrong war in Iraq before the right one was completed in Afghanistan, many European countries have refused to contribute their fair share to the fight against jihadist terrorism. Whatever happened to NATO's invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history? Has it been proscribed?

At the same time, those in Europe, who claim that Afghanistan is America's problem, have cited mounting casualties as proof positive that out-of-area operations go beyond NATO's mandate. (Note: Proportionately more Brits and Canadians have died in Afghanistan than Americans.) What has been deemed a bogus presidential election in Afghanistan has hardly helped Obama's case for greater European troop deployments in that country. Bogged-down in Afghanistan, NATO's capacity to meet its primary goal to safeguard European security will decline and lend credence to Medvedev's claim that NATO has become an outmoded remnant of a by-gone era.

But what about the Kremlin's two-fold warning that: (a) it has been a grave blunder for the West to exclude Russia from the alliance's decisionmaking, and (b) by providing membership for Georgia and Ukraine, any hope of Russia joining Europe and the United States in security cooperation will be foreclosed?

The first part of this warning from Moscow has already been addressed. In short, the West's refusal to give Russia a voice in vital European security affairs

was a grave error as exemplified by mounting tensions between the West and Russia that resulted in the Five Day War. A companion to this view is the European complaint that in discussions of hard security matters with Moscow, Washington should not monopolize the conversation. In spite of the Georgian War, many Europeans do not believe that Russia represents an existential threat to them, and they are looking for ways to arrange bilateral deals with it. Dominique David, the executive director of the French Institute of International Relations, has observed: "Only the Europeans can establish and organize the necessary dialogue with Russia. To this end they must agree to speak with a single voice. And it must be their own."⁶⁶ The Obama administration then has real cause to worry that the allies will proclaim support for NATO rhetorically but in fact will seek bilateral agreements with Moscow on a host of different issues, including security ones. Some in Washington claim that it is precisely this mindset that leads many Americans to fear—like the New Europeans—that Medvedev's Plan is a Trojan horse embedded in the Western Alliance.

But what about claims that NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine represent a threat to Russia? The Western response is that they do not have a factual basis. Much like the Balts and Poles, the Georgians and Ukrainians have cause to fear Moscow's designs on their sovereignty. Russia's pressure has exacerbated political discord within both countries, and it, in turn, has been cited as cause for denying Georgia and Ukraine membership in NATO. Many in Kiev and Tbilisi argue that the domestic turmoil that they have experienced has been promulgated by members of the Russian security services. What is more, had Ukraine and Georgia been embedded in NATO, what has been

characterized by critics as the reckless behavior of their leadership might never have materialized. Had Georgia and Ukraine been provided membership, they would have put their own internal political house in order. In short, the MAP process is a cleansing one.

There may be some justification for these remarks, but many American and European commentators cite serious problems in both Ukraine and Georgia that represent a barrier to their membership. Doubts about the courts and legal system and widespread corruption and the capacity of organized crime to infiltrate both governments prevail in the West. They must be dealt with before membership is offered. Moreover, existing fractious behavior between Moscow on the one hand and Tbilisi and Kiev on the other are capable of undermining cooperation between NATO and Russia.

In May 2009, while Moscow and Washington were exchanging unpleasant charges over the wisdom of NATO conducting military exercises in Georgia, the government in Tbilisi reported that it aborted a military coup and plot to kill President Mikhail Saakashvili. The inference was that Russia was behind both efforts; but Moscow depicted the charge as mad and said that Saakashvili was trying to deflect attention from growing opposition to his rule at home. It would appear that many Western sources were of the same opinion. This is the conclusion of a *Stratfor.com* report that depicted the mutiny at the Mukhrovani Base as a power play on the president's part—a ploy, in short, to achieve two objectives: to cut-short opposition street demonstrations that called for Saakashvili's ouster; and to settle scores with military leaders who, among other things, opposed his invasion of South Ossetia.⁶⁷

Growing reservations about Saakashvili's rule have diminished his image in Washington and in Europe—including in some New European countries

that have rallied to Tbilisi's defense.⁶⁸ It would appear, therefore, that Georgia will not be offered the opportunity to join NATO any time soon to no small degree because Saakashvili is considered to be a loose cannon by American, French, and German leaders. It is in this sense that the crisis associated with Georgian NATO membership has been managed. For how long that will be the case is another matter.

Meanwhile, the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian energy dispute has strained relations between Kiev and Moscow. Escalating friction between Moscow and Kiev is potentially of huge significance, and one day could result in a military clash between Russian and Ukrainian units. Many among the Kremlin elite claim that the Ukraine, or at least portions of it—the heavily populated eastern portion of the country and the Crimea—belong to Russia; the flaky Nikita Khrushchev had no right to give it to Ukraine as a gift in the 1950s. Putin informed George W. Bush: “Ukraine is not a real country.”⁶⁹ By this, he meant that Ukraine has been an integral part of Russia for a thousand years and even if one ignores this long linkage between Russia and Ukraine, many ethnic Russians live in Ukraine.

Political turmoil within Ukraine complicates matters further as the pro-Western officials in Kiev are at odds over the future course of their country in general and its relations with Moscow in particular. Divisions among democratic elements in Ukraine suggest that their dispute could weaken them and strengthen those in Kiev who prefer a pro-Russian orientation. Two of the major players in the Orange Revolution, President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, have been feuding over ways to engage Russia, and the political upheaval associated with their rivalry diminishes a NATO invitation in the near

term. Also, many Ukrainians have reservations about a NATO connection, while others clearly prefer close relations with Moscow. It is noteworthy that many Ukrainians hold positive views of Russia.⁷⁰

Still, Ukrainian and Russian authorities face some daunting areas of discord in the military realm. A worrisome issue involves the future of the Russian Black Sea Fleet that is located in the Crimea—where most residents are Russian. It will come to a head in several years when the treaty covering Russian naval bases there expires. Also, Moscow has lashed out at the authorities in Kiev for providing Saakashvilli's forces with weapons, while the Ukrainians in turn assert that Russia violated international law by allowing its Black Sea fleet to engage in military operations against Georgia.

Of larger geo-political significance, prominent Russian leaders like Moscow's Mayor Yuri Luzhkov claim that the Crimea belongs to Russia, and like-minded commentators in Russia not only say the same thing, they favor providing Ukrainians with Russian passports in anticipation of the region reverting to Russian sovereignty. Ukrainian officials in turn charge that Moscow is waging an ideological crusade against their country.⁷¹

Even if Moscow and Kiev reconcile their differences in the short term, over the long haul they are likely to remain in confrontation over the price of gas sales to Ukraine and Kiev's disrupting it through the control of pipelines that transport gas to Europe. Of course, these commercial disagreements represent a fig leaf for the real source of enmity—NATO membership. All of these factors portend potential serious political upheaval and possibly violent confrontations in a country whose size and population approximates that

of France. Tensions between Kiev and Moscow clearly place at risk efforts on the part of the West and Russia to cooperate on sensitive military-political issues.

At the December 2008 summit, the NATO foreign ministers once again denied Georgia a Membership Action Plan and instead created a Georgia Commission to help that country prepare for ultimate membership. They did the same with Ukraine. Whatever the cover story, these actions sent a clear message to the governments in Tbilisi and Kiev—you will not be offered membership for some time.

The Obama administration continues to offer Georgia aid, including some military assistance, and Vice-President Biden, in his trip to Georgia and Ukraine, pledged U.S. support for their drive for full democracy, but simultaneously lectured them on doing more along those lines. Also it is noteworthy that American analysts who clashed with their European counterparts over the wisdom of invading Iraq agree with them that neither Georgia nor Ukraine is ready to enter NATO at this time. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution is a Liberal Hawk who favored the invasion of Iraq, but he has observed: ". . . the net effect of premature NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine is to make war more likely." Therefore he urges the Obama administration not to provoke Moscow by pressing for their immediate membership. This provocation will preclude the West and Russia from addressing critical security problems.⁷² O'Hanlon's comments find an appreciative audience in Europe where the leaders in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Greece will veto any move to include Georgia and Ukraine in the alliance.

That said, some Western analysts believe that by denying both countries a MAP, Russia is being rewarded for invading Georgia, and the West's weak response to Moscow's military actions in that country

will encourage hardliners in the Kremlin to take even tougher measures in the future. It was no accident that the Russian military conducted exercises on its border with Georgia at the very same time that President Obama met with Medvedev in Moscow to discuss American-Russian relations.⁷³

While the Kremlin and its opponents in Europe continue to level charges at one another that have a bearing on Medvedev's proposal, one thing is certain: There is no prospect that the alliance members are contemplating NATO's replacement. There has been a surge in anxious discussions of NATO, but the discourse largely focuses upon two things. First is the reforms required to make NATO relevant to the post-9/11 world. Here there is cautious optimism about achieving this objective, e.g., with France's rejoining NATO's command structure, its president's favoring a more robust military alliance, and adjustments in force structures to address terrorism and to fight cyberspace wars.

A second major focus is upon providing the EU with a more robust military capability and finding ways to promote greater cooperation between it and NATO. It is with both objectives in mind that the Trans-Atlantic alliance can be made relevant to the West's current military challenges.⁷⁴

In truth, neither development should be overestimated, and Russian commentators seem to acknowledge that it is imprudent to propose that NATO be scrapped for an unknown entity. To do so would set-off alarm bells in Western capitals. For the time being, the Kremlin can take comfort in the fact that Medvedev's idea about new security cooperation has been favorably received in many of them. Acceptance of his argument in many Western circles that Russia

should have a greater voice in European security affairs is a sufficient victory for him at this point in time.

Furthermore, in addition to Western scholars like Mandelbaum, statesmen like Joschka Fisher have taken this proposal to its logical conclusion: Russian membership in NATO.⁷⁵ Since many in Washington deem the former German foreign minister something of a maverick, his view on this matter has not been seconded by most of his American counterparts. Still, the idea is not a new one, for James Baker, the elder Bush's secretary of state, wrote after 9/11,

The affirmative case for Russian eligibility for NATO membership is fairly straightforward and easy to make. The alliance has at least two implicit and at least five explicit criteria for admission. The first implicit requirement is that candidates are a member of the Atlantic community – this is to say, the West. The second is that the candidate share important security concerns with the other members. Russia surely qualifies on both counts.⁷⁶

He added, however, that its membership was unthinkable since Russia did not share common values with NATO's members.⁷⁷ This, it would appear, represents conventional wisdom on the part of most members of the American foreign policy community today. As this monograph has and will demonstrate, however, NATO membership for Russia appears to be a vehicle that is gaining traction.

THE U.S. MISSILE SITE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Ever since President Ronald Reagan celebrated the merits of his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s, Moscow has associated ballistic-missile defense

systems with a premeditated campaign to undermine the MAD doctrine. A quick look-back provides important insights into why the Russians have made so much of the U.S. missile shield in Eastern Europe.

Soon after the Soviets placed multiple warheads on their massive SS-9s, it was apparent that no anti-missile system could protect soft targets like cities. Offensive nuclear weapons could always overwhelm defenses and impose unacceptable damage on the country under attack. It was easier to deploy a fleet of MIRVed ICBMs than to blunt them through a missile defense system. To avoid an even more dangerous arms race, the nuclear superpowers signed the May 1972 SALT I Treaty. The ABM Treaty was incorporated within it, and at the outset provided for two sites and then only one after a 1974 revision.⁷⁸

After Soviet nuclear strategists accepted the argument that a viable ABM system would place MAD at risk, they greeted with alarm Reagan's 1983 announcement that the United States would explore the feasibility of an ABM defense. A year later, the SDI was adopted which stunned the Russians because the only logic that they saw behind it was the drive to achieve a U.S. first strike capability. What is more, Reagan's threat to roll back the Iron Curtain was a dangerous marriage of capability and intent that they could not ignore. SDI faded as costs and technological problems soared, and, with the USSR's collapse, fears attending a massive Soviet attack subsided. Funding for the program remained in the budget, but the focus henceforth was about Theater Missile Defense.

Upon gaining control of the Congress in 1994, the Republicans pressed forward, but, fearing a violation of the ABM agreement, Clinton did not move energetically to deploy a missile shield. During the 2000 presidential

campaign, George W. Bush said he favored it, and the Russians took note that one of its most active and articulate advocates, Donald Rumsfeld, was appointed Bush's Secretary of Defense. After 9/11, the urgency to protect the country grew, and Vice-President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice warned that the next terrorist attack might be exemplified by a mushroom cloud. On December 13, 2001, the President announced the United States would withdraw from the treaty, and the Missile Defense Agency was established. The new layered system would intercept missiles in all phases – lift-off, mid-course, and terminal. Its purpose was to protect America and its allies against a limited nuclear attack by a rogue regime – presumably, North Korea or in the near future, Iran.

President Bush proclaimed that he welcomed Russia's support for the program and indicated that the United States would keep Moscow advised of its progress. In signing SORT, both sides promised to engage in transparency and information sharing that had a bearing on the American NMD. Similar promises were made in signing other agreements and efforts – such as the NRC – to promote confidence in this endeavor.

The Russian side interpreted that pledge against the 2002 NPR. "The fact that the NPR was only partially declassified must have unshackled the imagination of GRU analysts. . . . The emphasis on precision strikes combined with enhanced intelligence against mobile targets must have left the Russians wondering about the survivability of Russia's mobile SS-25 and SS-27 (Topol-M) ICBMs," and this would force "them to think about the survivability of their country's silo-based ICBMs and command and control facilities."⁷⁹

Prior to Bush's election, several individuals who would secure high level posts in his administration – Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz – would press for a full blown missile defense system via the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century. At the same time, leading members of the Department of Defense (DoD) derided arms control per se; for example, Douglas Feith, the third in command at Bush's Pentagon, informed Yuriy Baluyevskiy, the First Deputy of the Russian General Staff that "We're not looking to create arms control-style negotiations or agreements."⁸⁰

Russian analysts knew that Feith's boss, Wolfowitz, was the master-mind behind a document that surfaced in the administration of the older Bush. With the demise of the Soviet Empire, James Mann wrote: "The search for a new post-cold war rationale for American military power culminated a few months later in one of the most significant foreign policy documents of the past half century. It set forth a new vision for a world dominated by a lone American superpower, actively working to make sure that no rival or group of rivals would ever emerge." The document written by Wolfowitz's assistant, Zalmay Khalilzad, leaked out of the Pentagon in draft form. After it had become public, the embarrassed administration ordered it rewritten. Mann observed its essence would be adopted by Bush-43.⁸¹ It is against this backdrop that Russian concern about the United States building an NMD to achieve nuclear dominance must be assessed.

U.S. analysts are too modest in dismissing Russian concerns about an American technological breakthrough in a NMD campaign. Russian analysts, by contrast, cannot afford to assess U.S. capabilities in what they may see as a cavalier dismissal of American

know-how. In addition to the vast resources available to the U.S. side, it also has the capacity to secure the help of gifted and well-financed European and Japanese colleagues. In a word, Russian defense analysts would be derelict in ignoring the full U.S. potential in any area regarding nuclear weapons.

Fyodor Lukyanov has observed that U.S. “. . . missile-defense elements planned for Poland and the Czech Republic are the third phase” of a global system. “There are serious doubts that this is technologically possible, but this could change in the future. And if it does, the strategic balance in the world would shift dramatically because it would remove the basic principle that has ensured stability in the past—the threat of mutually assured destruction.”⁸²

Also, two American observers, George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, claimed that the Eastern European shield would effectively blunt an ICBM attack against the United States. Consequently, “It is difficult to see why a well-informed Russian analyst would not find such a potential situation alarming.”⁸³ This was a minority view among American officials who argued that they have shared evidence with their Russian counterparts that indicated that the Eastern European project did not threaten Russia. Consequently, why were their colleagues in Moscow so troubled?

Pavel Felgengauer, an independent Russian defense analyst who is a bitter critic of the Kremlin, explains why they feel this way. Russian military observers are puzzled by the logic behind the American system since it rests on the notion of a direct intercept of an oncoming missile. That is, “A solid metal warhead is directed to strike and pulverize an attacking ballistic target on collision course.” But,

The Russian military believes that the “direct intercept” concept that they abandoned during the Cold War is still technically impossible. The military tells its political masters that the American direct intercept concept or “bullet hitting bullet” is a hoax and cannot work in the real world. It is assumed that the missiles in Poland will, in fact, be nuclear-tipped and intended for a surprise attack to annihilate the Russian political and military leadership in their workplaces in Moscow, effectively incapacitating Russia before a mass of other U.S. nuclear missiles from more distant locations comes crashing in to destroy a helpless Russia.⁸⁴

The Kremlin concluded long before the 2008 presidential election that to talk with the Bush administration about arms control matters was a hopeless enterprise. If President Bush was serious about arms control, why would he scrap one of the most significant arms control agreements, the ABM Treaty? Just weeks before President Bush retired to Texas, John Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, sought to assuage Moscow’s fears about the missile system by offering Russian officers access to it on a constant basis and by adopting a policy of transparency on all matters germane to its operation. His Russian counterparts did not budge and continued to oppose the deployment, not primarily because they feared the United States was prepared to launch a first strike against them, rather because it would provide the Americans with modern military assets that could in the short term force the Kremlin to accept humiliating geo-political concessions and in the long term enhance—with a technological break-through— an American first-strike.⁸⁵

There was cause to believe, however, that the missile shield in Eastern Europe would never be deployed. When running for the presidency, Obama registered

reservations about its capabilities, while observing that the threat of an Iranian missile strike was not existential. What is more, critics of its deployment made the following arguments against it:

- The system is massively expensive and in light of America's daunting economic crisis, its cost takes on new significance. Since President Reagan delivered his Star Wars speech, it has been estimated that \$120 billion has been spent on missile defense, and since 2002 the bill has amounted to \$56 billion, with an additional \$50 billion in the works.⁸⁶ Under existing circumstances, it may be difficult for Congress to provide these funds. It has proven unworkable, and there is as yet no evidence that it will provide the protection for which it was designed.⁸⁷
- No rogue state will launch a missile against the United States – that borders on national suicide. At the same time, terrorists do not possess ICBMs, and the means of delivery they could deploy – a nuclear device of some kind in a suitcase – cannot be stopped by any anti-missile system.
- Insofar as Iran's ability to strike the United States or one of its allies is concerned, analysts like MIT's Theodore Postol estimate that in spite of its having a solid-fueled-two-staged Sejil rocket, it will be many years before it can place a nuclear warhead on it that can be used against Europe or the United States.
- Finally, as indicated above, Postol and an associate claim that the U.S. system in Eastern Europe could be effective against a Russian ICBM strike against the United States.⁸⁸

Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, after meeting with his Russian counterpart in November 2008, said, "Deployment of a missile defense system would bring nothing to security in Europe . . . it would complicate things, and would make them move backward."⁸⁹ Many Europeans endorsed his analysis, not to mention that public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic opposed the system. Even while the Bush administration was pushing for its deployment, there were doubts about it being endorsed by their respective legislatures. Recall also that the leaders in Eastern Europe favored the system because in their eyes it bolstered the U.S. pledge to defend them, so if other means were taken to accomplish that objective, their ardor for the system would cool.

The Kremlin anticipated an Obama victory hoping that it might strike a deal with him on NMD, but the day after he was elected president, Medvedev committed a serious faux pas when he threatened to deploy missiles in Russia's western most Oblast, Kaliningrad, to counter the planned American anti-missile complex in the Czech Republic and Poland.⁹⁰ By threatening Obama, Medvedev was subverting the hope of the international community that, with a new American president, the United States might once again act like a responsible superpower. His advisors should have reminded him that most inhabitants of the world, unlike most Americans and Russians, were people of color who have chafed under European colonial rule for centuries. Therefore, they were enthralled that the world's most powerful country elected a black man president, and they saw Obama's success as a victory for themselves as well.

Medvedev quickly retreated when he realized that he had committed a huge blunder. Rather than

encourage Obama to reverse Bush's decision to deploy an anti-missile complex in Eastern Europe, his threat encouraged Obama to do just the opposite, lest he be accused of weakness at home. Medvedev's remarks were especially gratuitous when it was clear that the American president-elect had profound reservations about the prudence of deploying a system that had not been proven to work against a threat that had not as yet materialized.⁹¹

As the deadline for a START follow-up approached, Moscow insisted that no cooperative Russian-Western security system was possible if the United States did not: (a) scrap the missile shield in Eastern Europe, or (b) ask Russia to join Washington in the enterprise. American pundits meanwhile observed that Obama would not announce a change in U.S. policy regarding the missile defense system in Europe as long as Russia showed no sign of blocking the Mullahs' march toward a nuclear arsenal. Soon after Obama entered the White House, the *New York Times* reported that he wrote a letter to Medvedev proposing that if Russia helped curb Iran in its quest for nuclear weapons, the United States would halt deployment of the missile system in Eastern Europe. The White House claimed that never happened.⁹²

The Kremlin insisted that it did not welcome Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, but it would not join the United States in aggressive efforts to prevent that outcome. Russia stood alongside China in refusing to subject Iran to the pressure required to force it to comply with UN resolutions demanding it halt its nuclear weapons program.

American Kremlin-watchers cited the following observations to account for Russia's duplicity:

- It does not view the threat as a near-term problem and welcomes U.S. frustration in not checking Iran's nuclear ambitions.
- It has extensive and profitable commercial relations with Iran and does not want to halt them, especially in face of the current global economic meltdown. Among other things, it has helped build a nonmilitary nuclear installation in Bushehr, while it has considered selling ground-to-air S-300 missiles to Iran.⁹³
- Russia believes it is in its vital strategic interest to have good relations with the most powerful state in the Gulf Region, and they enhance the Kremlin's efforts to court its own 20-million Muslim population.

Meanwhile, key members of President Obama's foreign policy team warned Tehran that if it proceeded with its nuclear weapons program, the United States would not take the military option off the table. Iran treated such threats with derision:

- Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is overstretched and clearly does not want to engage in a third war, especially with a country that has a population of 70 million.
- Short of attacking Iran with nuclear weapons, the United States does not have the capability to destroy its myriad and widely dispersed nuclear installations via air strikes.
- A conventional ground assault is impossible since the United States does not have the resources to launch one, and, besides, any kind of military action against Iran would be accomplished at great risk: a surge in fighting in Iraq via insurgents close to Tehran; or,

Iran's preventing shipping from carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to global customers; or, measures taken to compromise the U.S. effort in Afghanistan.

An Israeli strike may represent a military option, but, barring the use of nuclear weapons, it would only momentarily halt Iranian nuclear operations. At the same time, even if the United States did not condone it, Washington would be blamed by the Muslim world for being complicit in it. Any hope that the Obama administration would reach out to one billion plus Muslims then would be dealt a lethal blow, not to mention the resulting firestorm of upheaval that would be set loose throughout the Persian Gulf and beyond. This would be the case even though Sunni leaders wish to deny Tehran nuclear weapons, because the United States cannot overlook a compelling observation: The Sunni ruling elites' view of this matter may not reflect that of the "Muslim street."

The United States then had two options in meeting Iran's nuclear threat. The first involved a diplomatic campaign. Obama entered office knowing that the diplomatic option was lost in the spring of 2003 when the Bush administration failed to engage Iran in serious negotiations. The Iranians indicated that they were prepared to talk about a broad range of issues that were points of friction between both countries ever since they halted diplomatic ties in 1979. Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, "favored a positive response to the Iranians." But they were overruled by Vice-President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld who proclaimed: "We don't speak to evil."⁹⁴

President Obama attempted to resume serious talks with Tehran after he was elected, but his efforts were greeted with contempt. For example, on the Iranian New Year he sent congratulations to both Iran's leaders and people, but to no effect. Then the bogus election in Iran, and widespread public expressions of discontent associated with it along with the brutal oppression of Iranian protestors, prompted even his supporters to reject talks with the reactionary Mullahs in Tehran.

The second option, getting Moscow to press the Iranians to comply with UN resolutions in their drive for nuclear weapons, did not produce results either. For the reasons mentioned above, the Kremlin did not believe that it was in Russia's interest to press Iran on this matter.

Meanwhile, some influential voices in Moscow began to express optimism about reaching an accommodation with Obama on the missile shield in Eastern Europe. The views of Sergey Rogov are noteworthy. As director of the Institute for the United States and Canada, he is well placed to characterize Russian thinking on this matter. He has noted with optimism that the Obama administration has eliminated certain components of a global missile program. Furthermore, his analysis has prompted him to conclude that the U.S. NMD project will not "include a space-based component." At the same time, growing economic constraints serve as a rationale for the Americans not endorsing an expensive missile defense system.

As a consequence, Rogov chides the Russian mass media for exaggerating the U.S. program. "Again and again they propagandize the nonexistent achievements of 'Star Wars,' which has long ceased to exist." In conclusion, he sees Washington and Moscow reconciling their differences over NMD.⁹⁵

This optimism has found purchase on the American side. Defense Secretary Gates in his testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee—just weeks before his president was to meet with his Russian counterpart in Moscow—said: Prime Minister Putin “basically dismissed the idea that the Iranians would have a missile that would have the range to reach much of Western Europe and much of Russia before 2020 or so. And he showed me a map that his intelligence guys had prepared. I told him he needed a new intelligence service.” Gates continued: “The fact of the matter is, the Russians have come back to us and acknowledged that we were right in terms of the nearness of the Iranian missile threat, and that they had been wrong. And so my hope is we can build on that.”⁹⁶

On September 17, the U.S. Government announced that the American missile project in Eastern Europe had been scrapped in favor of a new system that would be deployed first at sea and later in the air and on land with the explicit purpose of meeting the threat of short and intermediate range Iranian missiles. Gates, who had previously endorsed the missile site in Eastern Europe, explained why he had changed his mind. That system had been designed to deal with the threat of Iranian ICBMs, but intelligence reports indicated that they represented a long-term threat. The United States had to deal with the near-term threat of Iranian short and intermediate range missiles that were soon to be operational. What is more, under Bush’s program, the United States could not achieve protection until 2017, but under the new one, its first phase would be completed by 2011. At that time, “. . . we will deploy proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missile weapons that are growing in capability in the areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe.” This Aegis system, Gates stressed, works!⁹⁷

President Obama's critics charged that he had adopted this option under pressure from Russia. He responded, "Russia had always been paranoid about this [the system in Eastern Europe], but George Bush was right. This wasn't a threat to them." He added, "If the byproduct of it is that the Russians feel a little less paranoid and are now willing to work more effectively with us to deal with threats like ballistic missiles from Iran or nuclear development in Iran, you know, then, that's a bonus."⁹⁸

Obama's Republican opponents charged that the decision compromised U.S. security, but in fact the Pentagon was happy about the decision. It was no secret that the Bush project was ill-conceived and of no value to U.S. security. The initial response from Russia also was positive but limited: Putin characterized it as a brave gesture on Obama's part, while officials in Moscow said that Russia would not deploy its Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. But there was no indication that the Russian government was prepared to provide Washington with what it wanted most of all: categorical support for harsh measures to force Tehran to halt its drive for nuclear weapons. But then on September 23, as Medvedev was prepared to attend the UN meeting in New York, he hinted that Russia might join the United States in this campaign when he said: "Sanctions are seldom productive, but they are sometimes inevitable."⁹⁹

In conclusion, as is true of NATO enlargement, reconciling differences over NMD are essential if the Americans, Europeans, and Russians are to successfully develop a common European security system.

CFE, OSCE, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN A "TROUBLED NEIGHBORHOOD"

The 5 days of fighting between Georgia and Russia last year is proof-positive that modern Europe can still be stricken by war. It also underscores the alarming prospect of a military confrontation between American and European forces on the one hand and Russian fighters on the other. That clearly is a remote prospect, but it cannot be discounted. It is with this specter in mind that the capacity of existing arms limitation and crisis prevention regimes such as CFE and OSCE must be assessed. Medvedev claims they are dysfunctional and must be replaced.

What Moscow has called its near abroad but recently labels the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and officials in Brussels designate as Europe's "troubled neighborhood" is the focal point of concern. The countries involved are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine; all are closely entangled with Russia or rife with internal problems that promote instability in the region. Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example, have clashed over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian enclave embedded within Azerbaijan. Many people in Moldova have favored unification with their ethnic cousins in Romania—a move opposed by the Kremlin—while the Moldovans have been in conflict with Moscow over the fate of the Russians who got stranded in the enclave of Transnistria.¹⁰⁰

The West has rejected the pretense that all of them are in Russia's sphere of influence and has insisted that their citizens, and not outsiders, should determine their security preferences. Brussels, in turn, has engaged them through its Eastern Partnership Program to

promote economic and political practices and values that prevail in Europe, although some in Old Europe are wary of engaging countries that are in Russia's backyard.

The Kremlin cites EU meddling and American efforts to arm Georgia and court Ukraine as evidence that Russia's vested interests in the area are at risk. It also deems CFE and OSCE as working in favor of the West's interest. Medvedev's case for a new European security system, however, rests on the observation that they are dysfunctional and must be replaced.

In response, he has called for "Helsinki Two" to manage conflict in this area. It is noteworthy that the Helsinki Accords of 1975 were established at a time when the United States was in a weakened condition, and its leaders were chastened by their failed venture in Vietnam. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Moscow today looks upon it with such favor. Andrei Gromyko, the somber Soviet Foreign Minister, had lobbied for an East-West accord for years with the following purposes in mind:

- To secure the legitimacy of Europe's post-World War II borders. The Kremlin in particular wanted the West to endorse the USSR's control of territory that it acquired with Nazi Germany's crushing defeat.
- To reduce conflict by resolving any doubts about the sovereignty of the states in question and to foreclose revanchist claims that could lead to a military clash between East and West.
- To promote and safeguard the human rights of all Europeans. Moscow had to include human rights provisions in Basket III of the accords to placate the democracies, but in the opinion of many Western critics, it had no intention of honoring them.

Like the Soviet inhabitants of the Kremlin in 1975, those working in it today want to find a way to end border and sovereignty disputes in the post-Soviet space. In this instance, to create a new Euro-wide agreement in the hope of halting NATO and EU enlargement at the expense of territory that Moscow sees within its sphere of influence. That is why many Western observers reject Medvedev's call for a new European Security Pact.

It is rumored that at his breakfast meeting with Obama at the Moscow Summit, Putin characterized what we have called Europe's troubled neighborhood as Russia's sphere of influence. The American President responded that every country has the right to choose its own security system.¹⁰¹

At the University of Helsinki on April 20, 2009, Medvedev reiterated his call for a conference that would facilitate "multifaceted cooperation among the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the United States of America."¹⁰² This comprehensive mutual security system would reconcile problems that neither NATO nor the CIS, the EU, or the Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) had successfully addressed.

It could be held under the auspices of the OSCE, but Medvedev reiterated his reservations about that organization since it only focused "on solving partial, sometimes even peripheral security issues."¹⁰³ Moreover, it has been exploited by the West to apply democratic standards on Russia that are not always met in the United States and Europe. Among other things, Moscow could cite charges coming from within the American military that claimed human rights violations were condoned at the highest levels of the Bush administration.¹⁰⁴

In the case of a new Helsinki gathering, Medvedev acknowledged that "Such a meeting cannot take place simply by snapping ones fingers . . .," and the process leading up to a new security system would be a long and difficult one.¹⁰⁵ There was the ancillary problem of it producing high expectations that could not be quickly met. As an aside, he said that Russia had reduced its armed forces in Kaliningrad; a gesture, one might assume, to downplay the intemperate threat that he directed at Obama the day after the new American president was elected. Medvedev also observed that "we would welcome the Alliance's decision to abandon plans to further strengthen the military capabilities of the Baltic countries."¹⁰⁶ The inference here was that Russia had legitimate cause to take military actions to counter those being contemplated by NATO. Of course, the audience knew that while the West deemed the fate of the Balts sealed by their joint membership in the EU and NATO, Moscow still saw them as part of the "near abroad." Also, like their Baltic neighbors, many Finns cited Russia's involvement in the Five Day War as evidence of its revisionist proclivities. Some therefore concluded that Finland should seek the safety of NATO membership.

Medvedev added that, "Work on the treaty can also facilitate another important task, namely the process of moving towards a world without nuclear weapons."¹⁰⁷ This, no doubt, was an attempt to convince his audience that he was on the same page as the immensely popular American president, who created a buzz days earlier with his Prague speech calling for nuclear disarmament.

In celebrating the Helsinki Final Act, however, Medvedev ignored Basket III. It focused on Human Rights and gave rise to Helsinki Watch Groups

throughout the USSR that contributed to the Soviet Empire's demise. In many parts of that empire, the Accords provided the framework for Popular Front Movements—for example, in the Baltic Republics as well as Russia—that mobilized grass roots resistance to Kremlin rule. American critics that had predicted the Kremlin would not honor Basket III did not anticipate that it would encourage human rights movements in communist Europe. This conclusion had to be reassessed after Jimmy Carter made human rights an important element in U.S. foreign policy as did dissidents in the USSR who adroitly exploited Basket III to advance their campaign to reduce the oppressive practices of the Soviet *nomenklatura*. Indeed, the Soviet Empire was brought down because of internal factors not pressure from the outside.¹⁰⁸

Today, of course, officials in the Kremlin ignore issues like democracy and human rights because Russia's performance on these matters leaves—to put it mildly—much to be desired. The same holds true of Russian commentators who are unaffiliated with their government.¹⁰⁹

Here again it should be restated that while one can make a powerful case for addressing Medvedev's proposal from an agnostic realist perspective, concern about the absence of democracy and the rule of law there may result in the Kremlin finding merit to the old nostrum: Beware what you ask for!

Russian officials stress security measures, but they cannot silence commentators in the West that press them on democracy and human rights. As one German observer has noted: "Revitalizing the OSCE as a security policy actor without jeopardizing its human dimension will be difficult in view of the Russian position."¹¹⁰ She also pinpoints the motives behind Medvedev's

proposal; i.e., “weakening the role of NATO within European security policy.”¹¹¹ Both factors taken together provide opponents of Medvedev’s proposal with ammunition to shoot it down.

Still, she indicates this does not foreclose a debate over a new security system. “In addition to a revitalization of the OSCE in terms of security policy, an enhancement of institutionalized cooperation between Moscow and Brussels would be a major step forward for European security.”¹¹² In this connection, the debate over the future of OSCE clearly will be tied to the role that the EU can play in promoting conflict management in Europe. In sum, issues linked to Europe’s troubled neighborhood may best be addressed by the EU rather than NATO or the United States.

EU peacekeepers and European civilian personnel can play a pivotal role in working with Russia to reduce tensions in this troubled neighborhood. Such cooperation should be part of a larger effort to develop an EU approach to a range of agreements between Brussels and Moscow. A big question mark here, however, is can the EU demonstrate a greater unity of purpose in its relations with Russia than has been true up to this point? Friction between Old and New Europe over how to approach Russia has proven to be a major obstacle to a common European approach to Moscow on a host of matters. The dispute over energy is beyond the scope of this monograph, but Europe’s approach to it is a case in point. Many observers of the EU have complained that rather than adopt a common unified position, bilateral agreements between the several states and Russia have prevailed.¹¹³

At the same time Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson note that Brussels has done little to address the many varied problems of the states in the region

through its Eastern Neighborhood project. "While the EU frustrates neighbourhood governments with its bureaucracy, Russia offers straightforward benefits such as visa-free travel and cheap energy."¹¹⁴

It is noteworthy, however, that while they claim that Russia hopes "to rebuild its sphere of influence and to undermine the sovereignty of the eastern neighborhood states. . . .,"¹¹⁵ they endorse Medvedev's plan. In their view, "The EU should support cooperation with Russia in the neighborhood where possible: it should, for example, publicly back President Medvedev's proposals for discussions on 'new European security architecture,' first floated in June 2008."¹¹⁶

That same proposal, however, has been greeted with alarm and suspicion in New Europe where leaders deem the Germans and Italians too accommodating to Russia's aggressive behavior. Also, as Vygaudas Usackas, Lithuania's foreign minister, has observed, "The West has no grand strategy but Russia does."¹¹⁷ His fear that the chess masters in Moscow will outmaneuver the Americans and Europeans in the process of seeking security cooperation throughout New Europe.

For the welfare of the European project, and as a necessary requirement for a unified approach to Russia, the British, French, and Germans in particular must acknowledge and address the fissures separating Old and New Europe—dangerous points of discord that appear to be growing in magnitude. The success of the Euro-skeptics in the recent elections to the European parliament provides further incentive for the EU to address growing fissures between the two components of Europe.

For its part, the Obama administration must address fears abroad in New Europe that American-

Russian reconciliation suggests another Yalta is in the works. In a run-up to the July Moscow Summit, Obama received a letter from several iconic leaders from Eastern Europe—including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa—that expressed concerns about a reset of American-Russian relations. They said they welcomed them but warned against his making concessions to Moscow at their expense. “Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back on as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th century agenda with 21st century tactics and methods.”¹¹⁸ They observed, “Today the concern is, for example, that the United States and the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for a ‘Concert of Powers’ to replace the continent's existing, value-based security structure.”¹¹⁹

The second institutional arrangement that includes all of the former Warsaw Pact countries and those in NATO is the CFE. NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations regarding a conventional arms control agreement began with the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) in 1973, but they did not get anywhere until the 1990 CFE Treaty. Signed in November, it set equal limits on main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters in several flank zones that covered territory running from the Atlantic to the Urals. Its purpose was to promote regional stability by placing limits on conventional weapons there and consequently promote trust on the part of all who signed it.

NATO has characterized CFE as the cornerstone of European security and holds that if relevant changes are made to update it, CFE can continue to do so.

It has reduced an arms race in Europe, increased transparency, enhanced conventional deterrence, and in the final analysis has resulted in the destruction of thousands of pieces of equipment.

Acknowledging the post-Cold War period necessitated revisions, all 30 CFE states in 1996 agreed to a review conference with the purpose in mind of reappraising the flank map. Many of Russia's complaints were addressed in 1999 when major changes were adopted at Istanbul. The adapted treaty replaced the bloc and zone weapons limits with national and territorial arms ceilings. They would be lowered, but actual deployments were already below allowed limits and Russia was permitted more ACVs in its Northern and Southern flanks than called for in the original treaty.

Some American analysts still believe that it is an important and relevant agreement and can be updated to meet the challenges of today's world. To date, 4,000 on-site visits have been conducted; vast amounts of data have been collected; 58,000 pieces of equipment have been destroyed, and limits for five major weapons remain in place, along with requirements to announce troop movements.¹²⁰ Some say the treaty did more to promote crisis prevention than did actual reductions: for example, it helped assuage concerns about German reunification by providing for the transfer of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe in an open fashion. In 1995, under CFE provisions, Russian concerns about the ultimate goal of U.S. troop movements in the Balkans were reduced because Moscow had the opportunity to inspect them. Finally, it is no small thing that CFE provides for predictability and transparency in the troubled neighborhood of Europe.

To avoid the treaty's total collapse, NATO proposed in March 2008 to have its members ratify the process while Russia honored its commitments and withdrew troops from several restricted areas. Once the adapted treaty was in place, Russia's complaints would be met. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would ratify it, and NATO would address Moscow's concerns about the three flank zones—the Baltic States, Turkey, and Norway—where it has problems under the CFE guidelines. Proponents of CFE had warned that without them, Europe's security would be undermined and new lines of division would be drawn.

Critics of CFE argue that it is a relic of the Cold War and no longer has a place in the existing environment. What is more, Vladimir Socor observes that Russia has not honored its obligations under CFE for years, while at the same time getting the West to accept its ongoing breaches. During the Chechen wars in the 1990s, Russia was granted a temporary exemption from CFE restrictions in the Northern Caucasus. Moscow also has violated the treaty in Transnistria and Armenian-controlled areas of Azerbaijan with the deployment of heavy weapons and with disregard for verification procedures. It has illegally maintained troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.¹²¹

The Russian perspective on CFE has also been less than positive, and that explains why Putin formally withdrew from it in 2007. For years, Russia complained about flank limitations in Northwest Russia and the Caucasus and claimed the treaty placed Russia in a position of inferiority. More recently, it has observed that equipment limitations that were assigned to Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) countries now are allotted to those associated with NATO. Therefore Sergey Kislyak, Russia's ambassador to the United States,

contends that there is an imbalance in conventional assets. For example, none of the Baltic countries have signed the adaptive treaty and can do anything they want in the areas of weapons deployments—this is unfair. What is more, Kislak says that Russia has lived up to all of the provisions of the adapted treaty including the removal of all treaty limited equipment (TLE) from Moldova. And while it has removed its bases from Georgia, the Georgians have not lived up to the treaty.¹²²

America's European allies were stunned in August 2008 when Russian forces crossed into Georgia. As a consequence, the cavalier attitude toward CFE was replaced by the thought that conventional war on the continent was not beyond the realm of possibility. Defense analysts, therefore, had to ask whether they were prepared to deal with that disturbing possibility.

A group of experts from America, Europe, and Russia under the auspices of the East-West Institute have released a report about CFE that concludes: "The treaty . . . remains a useful instrument for strengthening confidence in Europe. It is vitally necessary and beneficial to all parties involved to preserve the benefits of the CFE treaty."¹²³ Also, "Russia and the United States have been working more than a year on a project of a 'package deal' for solving problems related to revival of conventional arms control regimes in Europe. This process should be radically accelerated."¹²⁴

Some of the experts, however, conclude that the CFE Treaty has outlived its usefulness.¹²⁵ And perhaps the time has come for a moratorium on this matter. Does it make any sense to talk about restoring CFE as long as the crises in Georgia and Ukraine are boiling? The same holds true for the frozen crises in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. Is it logical

to resurrect this treaty and cover the same area that was originally covered? How can the West go along with a new CFE if the Russians do not leave Moldova? And also, how can Russia truly abide by a revision of CFE when it faces mounting violence throughout the North Caucasus? Before efforts to revitalize CFE move forward, all of these points of friction must be resolved.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Government must help establish a new framework for security cooperation in Europe that includes Russia. It is a pathway to stability on the Continent and will advance America's vital global priorities: among other things, combating terrorism, and curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorist cells. It will promote cooperation in other vital areas that are beyond the purview of this monograph: energy security, climate change, a new global economic regime, the stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and encouraging North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons in compliance with international resolutions.

That said, a pivotal question remains unanswered: How to provide Russia with a voice but not a veto in a new European security system? In contrast to Medvedev's proposal, this monograph has evaluated the relevant details bearing on the prospects of extensive West-Russian security cooperation. It concludes that the most likely pathway to success is not a Grand Summit along the lines of a 19th century Concert of Europe that appeared in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. It is rather a step-by-step

approach that rests on the conviction that a successful outcome to the START negotiations will produce a thaw in West-Russian relations and inspire confidence to reconcile differences over critical points of friction. Toward this end, the time has come to think beyond Cold War stereotypes and provide Russia with a NATO Membership Action Plan.

START.

In considering the U.S. position on reaffirming a strategic nuclear balance with Russia, the following are recommended:

- A concerted effort must be made to reach an agreement by the December 2009 deadline. It is true that START can be extended, but it is uncertain what the future will hold, so the two governments should move with alacrity to find a solution by the expiration date.
- Issues that are extraneous to START like NMD and space weapons should not be part of the negotiations because if they are, efforts to reach an agreement may be prolonged or even result in failure.
- The United States should accept Russia's preference for a law-based treaty and not a political arrangement. This is the position of Republican Senator Richard Lugar, one of the authentic nuclear arms experts in Congress, and it appears to be one that the Obama administration can live with.
- START verification procedures should be adopted albeit in a less complicated form. There appears to be little disagreement on this matter, although the Russian side has indicated that it

has concerns about the meaning of transparency.

- Ambassador Linton Brooks, a leading expert on START, has observed that the United States should not tangle with Russia over the matter of conventional strategic forces, but simply count them.¹²⁶ If Washington did so, one of the Russians' major areas of opposition would be taken off the table.

There are other outstanding issues that must be resolved, such as the number of delivery systems to be counted and differences over whether or not nuclear arms should be placed in storage or destroyed. Most observers believe they will be resolved, given the fact that a reaffirmation of the American-Russian strategic nuclear balance is in the vital interest of both sides. Also, measures to reduce the hair-trigger status of existing American and Russian nuclear systems must be adopted as soon as possible, and both sides must work toward the elimination of MIRVs in their arsenals.

Finally, the United States and Europe must address Moscow's concerns that neighbors outside of Europe are gaining an edge in intermediate-ranged missiles at Russia's expense, and it may be necessary to give the INF Treaty another look. But Russia, in turn, must join the United States in dramatically reducing the tactical nuclear weapons that both sides possess: in Russia's case, about 2,000 to 3,000 deployed weapons, while the United States has 1,000 of them in this configuration. Each side has many more in storage. One of the major roadblocks to the reduction of these weapons is that Moscow deems them insurance since its conventional capability has declined dramatically in the aftermath

of the USSR's demise. Another one is Russia's assertion that it will not reduce its tactical nuclear arsenal as long as the Americans do not withdraw their tactical nukes from Europe. The bottom line then is that both countries must place these weapons on the agenda when they meet in 2010 in Washington to discuss the future of their respective nuclear forces.¹²⁷

If the START negotiations are a success, there will be a surge in trust that may provide pathways to cooperation on other existing points of discord between Russia and the West.

The U.S. Missile Site in Eastern Europe.

It is premature to assume that American-Russian differences over a Europe missile shield have disappeared with Obama's scrapping of Bush's project in Eastern Europe. On September 23, he announced that U.S. intelligence, in league with its British and French colleagues, had uncovered a secret Iranian uranium enrichment site outside of Qom. That gave new urgency to the campaign to address the Iran Question. Earlier that week in anticipation of that revelation, the Iranians had sent a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency informing it of the installation, but said that it had nothing to do with nuclear weapons. American journalists first reported that the Russians were angry that they had been blindsided by their Iranian friends, and that Moscow was prepared to join the Americans, British, French and Germans in taking harsh measures against Tehran.¹²⁸

But in a matter of hours Russian foreign minister Lavrov made a u-turn and scolded Russia's partners for not sharing the information with Moscow beforehand. The notion that the Kremlin would join

the West in taking tough measures against Iran then was reconsidered. The October 1 meeting that took place between Iranian officials and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany has left uncertainty in its wake. Only time will tell whether or not Tehran will ultimately halt its drive for nuclear weapons.

The prospect of East-West cooperating on a missile defense system as suggested by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also remains in doubt.¹²⁹ In spite of this murky situation, and assuming Moscow accepts Obama's Aegis-based missile shield project, the issue of meeting the challenge of Iran's ICBMs remains to be addressed. Toward this end, the United States should welcome Russia's support in creating a missile defense system that protects all parties concerned from a rogue ICBM threat.

- Russia has gifted scientists and technicians that have achieved a solid record of space accomplishments. In recent years, American astronauts have relied heavily upon the Russian space station to conduct their work. The United States should explore the prospect of exploiting the Russian radars at Gabara in Russia and Armavir in Azerbaijan to develop an anti-ballistic missile system that protects America and Europe.
- Cooperation on this front would go a long way in reducing fears in Russia about America's developing an anti-missile system at its expense.
- Once Russia found that the Western nations were genuinely interested in such cooperation, it would be under mounting pressure to work with the international community in halting Tehran's drive for a nuclear arsenal.

- Should Russia reject participation, that move would provide new clarity to questions about the prospects of cooperating with Moscow on mutual security concerns.

Finally, the Obama administration must convince the New Europeans that reconciliation of the NMD dispute with Russia will not detract from their security. It does not presage a replay of Yalta, but instead promotes harmony between the West and Russia; that effort is in the vital national interest of all parties concerned. That said, Ann Applebaum blames the Obama administration for not adequately forewarning the New Europeans that it was renouncing the missile site in Eastern Europe. There was not strong support for the system in either the Czech Republic or Poland, but Washington's abrupt turn-about fed fears in both countries that the United States and Russia had cut a deal with little regard for their opinion.¹³⁰ In short, the new team in Washington was demonstrating the same kind of disregard for its European allies that was characteristic of the Bush administration. Clearly, the Obama administration must keep in mind that the concerns that the New Europeans express about their large neighbor to the East have a basis in fact and cannot be blithely ignored by Washington.

Europe's "Troubled Neighborhood": CFE and OSCE.

The CFE has diminished in effectiveness since the USSR's demise: the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the enlargement of NATO, the Five Day War, and disputes over energy and the economic and political crises that afflict the former Soviet states. To talk

about its resurrection then appears to be a walk in the dark. Perhaps over time more light will be shed on the myriad areas of confusion that are associated with CFE. A successful follow-up to START may be helpful since it promotes greater trust on all sides. Nonetheless, ongoing tensions between Russia and Georgia and friction between Moscow and Kiev, not to mention the upheaval that exists in the other countries that are part of the EU's Eastern Partnership program will serve as barriers to its resurrection. Still the U.S. Government and its allied partners, in conjunction with Russia, must work toward a conventional forces agreement that provides the kind of transparency and sharing of information that was a hallmark of CFE for years.

Russia has demonstrated its unhappiness with OSCE by expelling its personnel from the breakaway Georgian enclave of South Ossetia in violation of the September 7-8, 2008, agreement with the EU. In opposition to all of the other OSCE countries (56 in all), it has recognized Abkhazia as independent of Georgian sovereignty and has vetoed further UN operations in Abkhazia.

Nonetheless, given the existing tensions, the United States should encourage the EU, the UN, OSCE, and all parties concerned in the Georgian-Russian crisis "to take immediate measures to conclude legally binding agreements on nonuse of force between sides of the conflict; to exclude provocative military actions, and to resolve on a compromise basis the problem of monitoring the security and military situation."¹³¹

At the same time, "As NATO expansion into the region seems to be on the back-burner, the EU should step up its role in the region's many actual and potential security crises."¹³² Under Sweden's EU presidency, one

can expect Stockholm to press for greater interaction between it and Europe's troubled neighborhood. Brussels should do so while seeking closer cooperation with Russia on a host of fronts that NATO is poorly designed to handle because they largely are diplomatic and political in nature. In line with this thinking, Germany has proposed that Russia be included in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood Project. For its part, Washington should welcome any effort that the EU embarks upon to work closely with Moscow. Many in the Kremlin favor this relationship since the U.S.-NATO combination signifies hard power, while the EU is seen in terms of soft power.

To a significant degree, whether or not the EU develops a common unified approach to Russia depends largely upon one country—Germany. American defense analysts do not spend much time thinking about Germany, but they should if they want to seriously study Europe's future. The Germans enjoy a special relationship with the Russians, and many observers believe that if its political leaders and industrial chiefs decided to adopt a common rather than a bilateral approach to relations with Russia, the EU's efforts to confront Moscow as a unified entity would be given a stiff shot in the arm. Ever since the energy shut-down early in 2009, however, the EU has been in a quandary on this matter.¹³³

Meanwhile, the German government and business elite—the latter through the East Commission of German Business—have become even more assertive in developing closer commercial ties with Russia. In addition to Germany's dependence upon Russian energy, Russia has become an expanding market for German exports. This development has gained added significance in light of the current economic crisis

that has hurt Germany as well as other European countries.

On July 16, at Munich, President Medvedev and Chancellor Merkel conducted their biannual talks to find ways to do even more profitable business, including “a credit of 500 million Euros to finance Russian purchases, mainly of German industrial installations and machinery.”¹³⁴ This special relationship has the capacity to advance or hamper a common EU approach to Russia. The same could be said for NATO and efforts to cement security cooperation between Moscow and the democracies.

But Washington must first press the reset button to improve relations with Berlin that have been sullied over differences associated with Iraq and Afghanistan, the proper response to the global economic crisis, as well as conflicting views regarding relations with Moscow. To promote more harmonious relations with the largest and richest country in Europe, the United States should develop a special working group with Germany to resolve—or at least mollify—outstanding differences between both countries. Washington, in short, must acknowledge that it must reengage Berlin at the same time that it resumes relations with Moscow.

A common Western approach to relations with Russia, of course, has been hampered by a profound value gap that divides the Europeans and Americans. Ironically, historians may one day observe that it was a rancorous struggle over universal health care in the United States that underscored the fact that the American and European models of democracy and social and economic justice are at odds in many pertinent areas. Europeans cannot fathom that the Americans still have not acknowledged that universal health care is a basic

human right, while they abhor the U.S. gun culture and cannot understand how prominent political leaders in the world's most scientifically advanced society can ignore the existential threat of global warming.

Meanwhile, a significant proportion of the American public characterizes the Europeans and their collectivist practices in similar unfavorable terms. It is the view through this prism of conflicting worldviews that has hampered the Americans and Europeans in their quest to find common ground on security matters now that the communist menace no longer provides them with a common threat around which to rally.

Another barrier to a uniform approach to Russia is the growing and ominous division between Old and New Europe regarding relations with Moscow. The Old Europeans dismiss the recalcitrance of the Poles, Balts *et al.* toward Russia as reason not to pay attention to their complaints that the EU has been caving into Moscow's demands. The latter, in turn, despair that their colleagues in Old Europe do not fathom that Russia has exploited its energy assets to compromise their very sovereignty. Moreover, they find it alarming that their French and Germans neighbors have so quickly dismissed Russian aggression in Georgia and have ignored their concern about Medvedev's observation that a vital element of Russian defense doctrine is to protect Russians who live in the near abroad. And when Moscow takes active measures to compromise the Ukrainian government, they deem that gross interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring democracy as cause for alarm. From the perspective of NATO's most recent members, then, it is not the time to promote more extensive cooperation with Moscow.

It is with these observations in mind that Old and New Europe will respond to Medvedev's security

proposal from conflicting perspectives. The EU countries must find a way to reconcile their differences on these important matters and confront Russia in a resolute united front. That effort will be complicated by growing divisions within the EU and the rise of Euro-skeptics that challenge the viability of the European Project. Washington therefore should employ its influence to help bring about reconciliation between the warring factions in the EU. It may be limited, but failure to do so will encourage those in Moscow who believe that Russia should drive a wedge between the Americans and Europeans and between the Old and New Europeans. Under these circumstances, a new cold war could materialize.

NATO Enlargement.

In considering the prospects for a new European Security System, the future of NATO must be the central focus of interest. Every country in Europe that wishes to join NATO—including Russia—should be given the opportunity to do so, assuming they meet the qualifications of membership. Indeed, through NATO we may find an answer to the question: How do we give Russia a voice and not a veto in European security affairs? Ever since Medvedev proclaimed last summer that it was time to craft a post-9-11 security architecture for Europe, this question has become a hot topic of debate. As yet, no one has answered it. It is obvious that the NATO-Russian Council does not offer one; something far more comprehensive and substantial is required.

At the same time, nothing that Medvedev has mentioned provides an answer. Clearly a Grand Summit along the lines of the 19th century Concert

of Europe that materialized in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars is out of the question. But there is a simple solution to the problem: Offer Russia a NATO MAP that is especially designed for it. It is obvious that Russia has the capacity to meet one of the MAPs most consequential goals: enhancing the alliance's ability to project its power. In short, unlike some countries that gained membership in the first and second round of enlargement, Russia has the means to be a security producer and not a security consumer. An intimate relationship between Russia and the democracies may surge in importance, moreover, should NATO fail to prevent a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. That outcome could have a decidedly negative impact upon stability in the vital energy-rich Central Asian region, and it would provide a powerful incentive for NATO-Russian security cooperation there.

Not very long ago most Western analysts would consider a MAP for Russia unthinkable, but that is no longer the case as support for it is mounting. It is by no means overwhelming, but a range of prominent Western analysts and statesmen have endorsed the idea: In addition to scholars like Ash, Mandelbaum, Anders, and Kupchan, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is in this camp—albeit with some reservations—and so is former German Foreign Minister Joscha Fisher.

Fisher argues the time has come for Russia to be integrated into a European security system, but notes that Putin is sadly mistaken if he believes that goal will be accomplished with a rollback of NATO. Since NATO is indispensable for the vast majority of Europeans and for America, that option is out. What Russia should do instead is to work for NATO membership; Fisher observes that “such a bold step would transform NATO. But it would transform Russia even more.”¹³⁵

NATO has the capacity to provide a venue for collective security and power-sharing, while at the same time resolving flash points of potential conflict in Europe's eastern neighborhood. Russia embedded in NATO would provide a framework to address all the other points of discord that have been the focus of this monograph—reconciling differences over missile defense and finding a replacement for, or the restoration of, CFE and OSCE. Membership would reduce Moscow's ardor for confrontation with Georgia. Indeed, Russia's and Georgia's memberships could represent a package deal.

Since Georgia has already been moving through the process, it would be expected to find a home in NATO before Russia did, but the promise of membership for Moscow might dampen its concerns about Georgia in NATO. Much the same could be said for Ukraine entering the alliance.

In considering NATO membership for Russia, the following observations are in order:

- Given Russia's size and complexity plus obvious barriers to membership, it will be some time before the process is completed. As things stand today, it is difficult to argue that it measures up to the democratic and human rights principles that are requirements for membership.¹³⁶ But that should not prevent the process from beginning because, even if incomplete, it could produce some positive results. As indicated, there are compelling reasons to work with Russia in finding ways to stabilize Europe and assist NATO in its out of area operations. By allowing both lethal and nonlethal material to be transported through its territory to Afghanistan, Russia is providing a concrete example of how

it can enhance NATO security objectives, while saving it tens of millions of dollars and a safer route for resupply. Of course, Russia has real cause to fear a Taliban victory in Afghanistan since that outcome would cause trouble for its Central Asia neighbors and indirectly for itself as well.

- As part of a step-by-step process in meeting MAP requirements, Russia will have to remove its troops from areas where they were not stationed before the Five Day War, and EU peacekeepers and OSCE civilian monitors will replace or join them. Moscow also must resume relations with whoever is the legal authority in the Georgian government.
- Similar efforts will be undertaken to reduce tensions between Moscow and Kiev, and with the prospect of Russia in NATO, opinion in Ukraine may dramatically shift in favor of its membership as well. At the same time, as Russia complies with MAP requirements and tensions subside, that outcome may have a positive effect upon the political situation within Ukraine—that is, help to stabilize the situation there. (One could anticipate the same bonus in Georgia.)
- With Russia on its way into NATO, the activities of CFE and OSCE may be assumed within the MAP process.
- With the EU playing a leading role but with the cooperation of NATO, measures will be undertaken to reconcile EU-Russian differences over the future of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Moldova.
- In the final stages of the process, steps will be taken to determine how NATO and Russian

forces may be placed under a common command structure, how they can develop a common strategic doctrine, and how they might resolve the problem of the interoperability of weapons.

Arranging for Russia to join NATO will be a difficult enterprise, and much preparation will be involved before the multitude of complex issues associated with it are resolved. Among other things, the New Europeans may block membership for their large Eastern neighbor. In this connection, they can cite the mounting tensions between Kiev and Moscow that were punctuated in the summer by President Medvedev's public denouncement of the Ukrainian government, claiming that it had adopted anti-Russian policies. Other Russian commentators reaffirmed the charge that members of the Ukrainian military had fought along side of the Georgians in the Five Day War and urged the Kremlin to endorse the separatist claims of Russians in the Crimea. Consequently, Washington will have a daunting job selling the MAP proposal to them.¹³⁷

The matter of a Russian veto will come up; conceivably it can be resolved by creating a voting system in NATO that rests on majority (weighted) voting. Russia, in short, will not have a veto, but the same will hold true for the other members. Without question, the issue of how other major powers may respond to this new alliance, such as China and India, must be addressed. And, of course, there will be serious concerns expressed among Western publics about an Article Five guarantee to Russia when it confronts so many threats to its security from within and outside of the country.

Even if the NATO members reach a consensus, the Russian leadership may brusquely reject the offer, asserting that it is too big to share the same privileges, for example, as tiny Estonia. Moreover, it enjoys a unique position in the world: Its awesome nuclear arsenal comes to mind along with its strategic location and veto in the UN Security Council. The Russian military establishment will take the lead in opposing membership along with those hardliners who are entrenched in the Kremlin. All indications are that the present Kremlin leadership will say “thank you, but no thank you.”¹³⁸ That said, the following cannot be forgotten.

Late in 1991, Boris Yeltsin “stunned a NATO meeting by sending a letter with this unilateral declaration. ‘Today we are raising a question of Russia’s membership in NATO’.”¹³⁹ What is more, in his first interview with a foreign journalists in March 2000, Putin said, “We believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO, but only if Russia is regarded as an equal partner.”¹⁴⁰ Later Putin changed his mind, presumably because he concluded that the West was not prepared to deal with Russia as an equal.

Here again, if the Kremlin rejects the offer, it will be difficult to complain that it has been denied a real voice in European security affairs. NATO membership will give Russia a louder voice in them than any other option under consideration. Also, Kremlin strategists cannot deny that closer cooperation with the West will enhance Russia’s security, while further isolation will produce just the opposite outcome. Economic logic, geography, and shared cultural and ethnic bonds are in keeping with this conclusion, as well as recent dramatic changes in global affairs. Without dismissing Russia’s commercial and other ties to the countries to its south

and east, the recent economic shock has forced the Kremlin leadership to acknowledge that it cannot hope to achieve economic prosperity unless it diversifies its economy and, among other things, that means relying upon Europe for capital and technological know-how. Russia must acknowledge that NATO is really the only game in town when it comes to an existing security institution that can stabilize Europe. The CIS clearly cannot be relied upon to safeguard Russia's security interests. In Paul Gobles' words: "The economic crisis in the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states may finally lead to the complete collapse of the Commonwealth of Independent States because, in the absence of agreement on a common plan of action, the number of conflicts among its members is growing. . . ." ¹⁴¹ It is noteworthy that none of the USSR's former republics have recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Indeed, the Five Day War has made Russia's neighbors feel uneasy, and they have been looking toward the EU and NATO with a new sense of urgency. Not too long ago, Russian-watchers deemed it only a matter of time before Belarus' Alexander Lukashenko embraced his large neighbor in a union arrangement. But of late, the last dictator in Europe has been earnestly courting a close association with the West, and at times has been decidedly cool in his dealings with Moscow. In June, a U.S. congressional delegation met with him, and in August, Philip Gordon, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, did as well, demonstrating that a more harmonious relationship between Washington and Minsk may be in the offing. Equally disturbing to Moscow is that while it has been conventional wisdom for years that Armenia will always look to Russia to protect it against its Turkish and Azerbaijani neighbors, the Armenian

government awarded Georgia's Saakashvilli with a Medal of Honor. When the CIS states snub a close association with the men in the Kremlin, Moscow must seek other ways to restore Russian power, and NATO may help in that quest. The unipolar American moment may be history, but so is the Russian imperial project.

During the long-MAP period, Russia can resolve difficulties that it has with its Far Eastern Neighbors that are linked to its NATO membership. Furthermore, that status will enhance its stature among all of its neighbors so that it has a stronger hand to play when it faces stiff pressure to make humiliating concessions to Beijing. Forward-looking Russian strategists cannot ignore the daunting prospect that, unless Russia fully engages the West, it may suffer territorial losses, much as the USSR did – for example, in its Far Eastern Territories. Whatever Moscow's relations with China, its national security community cannot ignore Beijing's potential for challenging Russia for influence in the Far East. This holds true even if some Western analysts may be engaging in fanciful thinking when they envisage a Sino-Russian war. Still Russia cannot rest easy as the Chinese economy surges ahead of its own. Unless Russia diversifies its economy, it will become, in the piquant words of Moscow University's Nikolai Svanidze, "a cheap Chinese gas station."¹⁴²

Kremlin supporters note that Putin's and Medvedev's popularity remains high, but many ordinary Russians have begun to complain about their government's inability to provide them with economic stability. According to a 2008-09 survey of the Levada Center, the numbers of Russians who say, yes, Russia is on the right track, have slipped from 59 percent to 41 percent. With mounting economic bad news, the chorus of opposition to the status quo is growing, and

the Kremlin now faces a fork in the road. One path is to dismiss the West, while the other is to take the road to greater integration with it.¹⁴³

In face of real efforts at cooperation on the West's part, the Russian people will ultimately find the claims of the hardliners that the West is the enemy inconsistent with existing facts on the ground. Finding ways to cooperate with Russia will also indicate to those living under the existing autocracy—but who desire democracy—that the West has not forgotten them. Finally, in meeting MAP requirements, the Kremlin will ultimately be required to reduce the barriers to pluralism that presently exists in Russia if it wants to enter NATO as a full-blown member.

But what about the Western reaction to a MAP for Russia, in particular, concern about the persistence of wholesale anti-democratic practices? It would be foolhardy not to acknowledge the ability of the value-gap to hamper cooperation with Russia, but the West, including the United States, has not allowed China's sullied human rights record and contempt for democracy to halt cooperation with Beijing. In this connection, President Ronald Reagan demonstrated that Washington can press an opponent—in this instance the Soviet Union—on its dismal human rights record, while at the same time finding areas of cooperation with it. One might deem that practice as hypocritical, but in the final analysis it was good for the American and Soviet people and the world at large.

The United States must remain resolute in honoring its fundamental values. However, in the Hobbesian world of international politics, it is a mistake to adopt rigid positions that clash with the compulsion of vital interests. Yes, a world of democracies is preferable to the international system that exists today, but

America's vital interests cannot be safeguarded without the assistance of other major global powers, including those that do not subscribe to our democratic ideals. There is a consensus in Brussels and Washington that something must be done to find a new security balance in Europe. That will not happen if Russia is denied a role in this enterprise.

In conclusion, the U.S. defense community must consider the following three outcomes in assessing the problems and prospects of security cooperation with Russia:

- The first outcome takes two paths: The successful negotiation of the follow-up to START promotes a climate of trust that eventually leads to the reconciliation of other issues that divide the West and Russia—that is, NMD, NATO enlargement, and finding replacements for CFE and OSCE. This clearly is the best-case scenario, but it is unlikely to happen in one fell swoop. A companion outcome is that after the Americans and Russians succeed in finding a replacement for START, other avenues of cooperation will open up, such as cooperation on NMD. A MAP membership for Russia may be assessed against this second pathway to cooperation.
- A starker outcome involves the failure to achieve a successful follow-up to START that leaves all of the outstanding points of conflict between the West and Russia unresolved or even a greater source of contention than presently is the case. Some in New Europe fear that in contrast to the West, the Kremlin leaders are master chess players and have mapped out a grand strategy that will result in a favorable outcome for Russia at the expense of the democracies. But there is

reason, instead, to fear that Russia has no grand strategy that is based upon reality – rather what serves that purpose suffers from a disconnect between reality and fanciful thinking. If this debilitating condition persists, the outcome may be dangerous for the Russian people and their neighbors as well.

- The worst case scenario that some commentators in the West and Russia deem plausible is Russia's failure to sustain political stability and economic prosperity, leading to its losing control of much of its territory, if not a total collapse of power. Here the template is the demise of the USSR. What we see is not only a Russia that finds it impossible to develop a meaningful security partnership with the West, much less accept a MAP, but one that is approaching a failed-state condition of anarchy or serious governmental dysfunction that results in Russia losing *de facto*, if not *de jure*, much of its territory.

It behooves the U.S. defense community, then, to consider future force structures, weapon systems procurement, and strategy and tactics with these three outcomes in mind. The wars in the Greater Middle East, of course, now preoccupy American strategists, but they cannot lose sight of the following observation: Russia is a country with a nuclear strike force that approaches that of the United States, and most of the world's population and resources exist in and around its territory. Changes that occur within it will have profound consequences for American global military planning, and they deserve our close attention.

ENDNOTES

1. Dmitry Medvedev kicked-off his campaign with an address in Germany. For example, see his Berlin Address, June 6, 2008, President's Office, Moscow, Russia. On October 8, 2008, he provided additional comments in a speech in France. See his "Speech At The World Policy Conference," Evian, France, President's Office, Moscow. The term "unipolar moment" is associated with the work of Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *The National Interest*, Winter 2002/03, pp. 5-17.

2. During 2008, prominent American statesmen were writing op-eds in major American newspapers that supported U.S.-Russian cooperation on vital security matters. Also, think tanks like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in conjunction with the French Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, were conducting studies that explored the prospects for strategic cooperation between Europe, the United States, and Russia. Other research institutions on both sides of the Atlantic were conducting similar research projects. For a comprehensive assessment of Medvedev's proposal, see Marcel H. Van Herpen, "Medvedev's Proposal For A Pan-European Security Pact," Cicero Working Paper WP 08-03, October 2008. He points out that "The idea of a Eurasian security conference is, in itself, plausible if we take into account the important geopolitical shifts that have taken place the last 20 years. But the West should first remain united." (See p. 9.) Also see Marcin Kaczmarek, "The Russian Proposal for a New European Security System," CES Commentary, October 11, 2008, Centre for Eastern Studies. He writes that in addition to halting NATO enlargement, Russia's ". . . long-term objectives are to loosen trans-Atlantic ties, incapacitate NATO, and grant Moscow a de facto right to veto decisions concerning European security." p. 1.

3. The Georgian War was cited by many commentators as evidence that a new cold war had begun. For example, see Claire Bigg, "Georgia Woes Could Send Ripple Through Other Frozen Conflicts," RFE/RL, August 27, 2008; Edward Lucas, "Do not let Russia 'Finlandise' Western Europe," *The Financial Times*, October 9, 2008; and remarks of Valdas Adamkus, "Why Europe Must Keep Its Word," November 11, 2008, Embassy of Lithuania,

Arlington, VA. For an analysis sympathetic to Russia's actions in Georgia, see Mark Almond, "Plucky little Georgia? No, the Cold War Reading Won't Wash: It is Crudely Simplistic to Cast Russia as the Sole Villain in the Clashes over South Ossetia. The West Would Be Wise to Stay Out," *The Guardian*, August 8, 2008. He accuses both Saakashvili and his Georgian political opponents of having mafia links.

4. Wendell Steavenson, "Marching Through Georgia," *The New Yorker*, December 15, 2008, pp. 64-73.

5. John Vinocur, "The Disorder of Conferring With Russia," *New York Times*, March 30, 2009.

6. See Anita Urban, "Russian Energy and Foreign Policy: Beyond the Former Soviet Union," address at U.S.-Baltic Foundation, November 11, 2008. See also this writer's monograph *Iron Troikas: The New Threat From The East*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2006. It shows how Moscow has exploited its energy assets in the East Baltic Sea region to compromise the democratic institutions and sovereignty of Poland and the three Baltic countries. Also consult Keith C. Smith, "Corruption Not Dependency Is The Risk To Western Europe From Russian Energy Trade," Washington, DC: Center For Strategic and International Studies, 2008.

7. See John McCain, "We Are All Georgians," *Wall Street Journal*, August 14, 2008.

8. "Text of U.S.-Russian Statement on Nuclear Arms," London, UK, White House Press Office, April 1, 2009, p. 1.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

10. Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, July 1977, pp. 21-34.

11. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At The Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the Cold War*, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1993, p. 113.

12. The first intense assault on the prevailing European security system, however, began with Vladimir Putin's well-publicized remarks in Munich in 2007. See "Putin's Prepared Remarks at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy," February 10, 2007, Munich, Germany, President's Office, Moscow, Russia, p. 3. (Hereafter "Putin's Prepared Remarks.")

13. Of course, Putin's brash remarks as indicated were perceived in a simple one-dimensional manner: Namely, the focus was upon his acid rhetoric while his words about welcoming an arms control agreement were ignored.

14. Dmitry Trenin, "Russia Leaves the West," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2006, p. 89.

15. "Putin's Prepared Remarks."

16. Linda J. Bimes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "The War Will Cost Us \$3 Trillion and Much More," May 9, 2008, available from *Washingtonpost.com*.

17. Dmitry Medvedev, "Berlin Address," June 6, 2008, President's Office, Moscow, Russia.

18. See Dmitry Medvedev's "Remarks at World Policy Conference," Evian, France, available from the President of Russia Official Web Portal, p. 2.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. Russian officials said that a more detailed proposal would follow, but as of the date of this publication, they have not appeared.

22. Michael Mandelbaum, "Address by Michael Mandelbaum at Kennan Institute," Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, October 17, 2008, p. 1.

23. Janusz Bugajski, *Cold Peace*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004, pp. 219-220.

24. Edward Lucas, *The New Cold War*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 6.

25. Lilya Shevtsova, "End Of Era: Antithesis To Gorbachev," *Vedomosti*, No. 175, September 17, 2008.

26. Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, "Building on Common Ground With Russia," *Washington Post*, October 8, 2008.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, "La securite, notre mission commune" ("Our Common Security Mission"), *Le Monde*, March 5, 2009.

29. According to Dmitry Trenin " . . . I would not describe this as a proposal but as an idea." Also, "Even the word structure may not be appropriate. When I think about what a security compact for the Euro-Atlantic region could look like, I think more in terms of networks, arrangements, understandings, and less in terms of specific structures, treaties." Transcripts, "A Common European Security Space," Carnegie Europe, March 9, 2009, pp. 3-4.

30. Alexei Arbatov, "The New Start Begins," May 21, 2009, available from *Russia Today.com*.

31. "Reducing Nuclear Threat: Necessary Conditions," *RIA Novosti*, February 6, 2009, p. 2.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. Alexei Arbatov, "Russia and the United States-Time to End the Strategic Deadlock," Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2008, p. 1.

35. "Reducing Nuclear Threat: Necessary Conditions."

36. Arbatov, "Russia and the United States."

37. George W. Bush, "Remarks by President on National Missile Defense," December 13, 2001. Meanwhile, members of the administration point out that it signed SORT which reduced a larger number of nuclear weapons than any other agreement. Stephan Rademaker, who formerly served in the administration as an arms control specialist, made these remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 17, 2009 conference, "Towards the G8 Summit in Italy."

38. Stephen J. Blank, *Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration?* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009, p. 112.

39. Stephen Young and Lisbeth Gronlund, "A Review of the 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review," Union of Concerned Scientists Working Paper, May 14, 2002.

40. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2006, pp. 42-54. Their claim, however, was disputed by other analysts. See, for example, the responses in the September/October 2006 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 149-154.

41. U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration, Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 7, 2008.

42. See Alexei Arbatov and Rose Goetmoeller, "New Presidents New Agreements? U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control," Arms Control Association Online, July 8, 2008, p. 1.

43. *Ibid.*

44. Confirmation Hearings, Hillary Clinton, U.S. Senate, CSPAN, January 13, 2009.

45. Interfax, "Most Russians Think Obama's Visit Means Better Relations," July 22, 2009.

46. Arbatov, "Russia and the United States."

47. *Ibid.*

48. See, for example, Michael Bohm, "Finished from the START," June 11, 2009, available from *The MoscowTimes.com*. Bohm predicted that the July summit in Moscow would fail because Obama cannot give up the U.S. missile system as Moscow demands, and the Kremlin will not agree to a START follow-up without this concession.

49. Philip P. Pan, "In Moscow, Obama to Focus on Arms Control," *Washington Post*, July 6, 2009.

50. Arbatov and Gottemoeller, pp. 4-5.

51. Peter Huessy "Letter to the Editor," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2009, pp. 171-202.

52. Here is a sample of opposition to START: Jon Kyl and Richard Perle, "Our Decaying Nuclear Deterrent," *Wall Street Journal*, June 30, 2009; Charles Krauthammer, "Plumage— But at A Price," *Washington Post*, July 10, 2009; Phillip Taubman, "Obama's Big Missile Test," *New York Times*, July 9, 2009.

53. Taubman sees strong opposition to Obama's flirtation with nuclear disarmament on the part of powerful members of the American military and their friends in the defense community— public and private. "The view in these quarters is that the weapons cuts Mr. Obama envisions— deeper than the modest goals set in Moscow this week— would dangerously undermine the power of America's arsenal to deter attacks against the United States and its allies. Sentiment also favors building a new generation of warheads, a step Mr. Obama has rejected." Taubman believes that Obama's ability to influence the outcome of the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review will be important indicator of his control of the U.S. nuclear agenda.

54. John Isaacs and Kingston Reif, "Will the Senate Support New Nuclear Arms Reductions?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 23, 2009.

55. See "Role of Nuclear Arms in Russia's National Security Effort Set to Fall-General," Interfax-Avn, May 20, 2009. General

Anatoly Kulikov says that Russia cannot hope to match the United States in this capacity. Arbatov and Gottemoeler address the complicated issue of shrinking U.S-Russian nuclear arsenals in the following terms:

The Russian triad has been shrinking and, regardless of any treaty will have no more than 1,800-2,000 warheads by 2012, of which about 70 percent will be deployed on obsolete delivery systems or launchers with an extended service life. Under an enhanced SORT, by 2012 Russia could have a more modern force with about 300 ICBMs (700 warheads), along with eight to nine submarines (600 warheads) and 50 bombers with 400 air-launched cruise missiles. As an option, Russia could make the transition to a more economically rational dyads that would include the same force structure at sea and 350 ICBMs (1,100 warheads) on land. In this case the bombers would be removed completely from the strategic nuclear arsenal and converted for regional missions.

Employing the same 1,700 warhead limit, the U.S. forces by 2011 "might include submarines with 336 Trident-2 missiles and approximately 1000 warheads (3 per missile); 300 ICBMs of the Minuteman III type, with one warhead per missile; and about 400 cruise missile warheads on 40 bombers." One could argue then that the U.S. might have a more difficult time sorting out its triad to comply with the lower figure.

See Arbatov and Gottemoeler, pp. 4-5.

56. Dmitry Trenin, "Russia Leaves the West," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, p. 89.

57. See Timothy Garton Ash, "Russia's Eventual Place in NATO," *New York Times*, July 22, 2001.

58. *Ibid.*

59. Richard J. Krickus, *Russia in NATO: Thinking about the Unthinkable*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 2002, p. 8.

60. *Ibid.*

61. Dmitry Rogozin, "How NATO Could Improve Its Relations with Russia," *Europe's World*, Spring 2009, p. 45.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

63. *Ibid.*

64. For a recent discussion of the Bush administration's constitutional and legal abuses and the Obama White House's reluctance to revisit them, see Carrie Johnson and Joby Warrick, "Bush Anti-Terror Policies Get Reluctant Revisit," *The Washington Post*, July 13, 2009.

65. Ahto Lobjakas, "U.S. Stamps Authority on NATO's Afghanistan Strategy," RFE/RL, June 12, 2009.

66. Dominique David, "Europe, between Folly and Russia," *Le Monde*, September 2008.

67. "Georgia A 'Coup' and Saakashvilli's Power Play," May 5, 2009, available from *Stratfor.com*.

68. Not for attribution comment of diplomat in the Baltic Sea region, spring 2009.

69. Clifford J. Levy, "Russian and Ukraine in Intensifying Standoff," *New York Times*, August 28, 2009.

70. Taras Kuzio, however, observes that this is "a reflection of media pluralism and the lack of state directed propaganda against Russia" – noting just the opposite state of affairs in Russia. See his "Russia's Ideological Crusade Against Ukraine," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, June 12, 2009.

71. "Moscow Mayor Saves Money for Crimea," *Kommersant*.online, July 2, 2008.

72. Michael O'Hanlon, "Don't Rush Georgia and Ukraine Into NATO," *Washington Times*, December 2, 2008.

73. See Pavel Felgengauer, "Russian Military Chief Accuses Georgia of Preparing Aggression," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 6, Issue 117, June 18, 2009. According to Felgengauer, Russian strategic objectives were threefold:

- "Regime change and the forceful demilitarization of Georgia, fully dismantling and disarming the regime-loyal Georgian army, border guards and special police forces.
- Establishing a secure land corridor linking Russia to its strategically important military base in Armenia.
- Transforming Georgia into a loose confederation of its many semi-independent regions with their regional king-pins, with a weak central government and without any national military-security forces. Russian military forces will be permanently stationed within the Georgian confederation, ensuring influence, control of energy supply corridors to the Caspian and Central Asia, and ending the country's aspirations to join NATO."

74. Citing the December 2008 EU report on European strategy, Simon Serfaty observes that the Americans and Europeans now have a more balanced view of their mutual strengths and weaknesses. But there is a significant clash of views about cooperation with the United States when opinion of elites are contrasted with ordinary Europeans. Three-fourths of EU leaders and members of the European Parliament assert that U.S. leadership is desirable, but the percentage for their publics represents a mere 36 percent. See his "An Opportune Moment for a Shared Euro-Atlantic Security Strategy," Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2009, pp. 1-2.

75. Joschka Fischer, "Finding Russia's Place in Europe," *guardian.co.uk*, January 11, 2000.

76. Krickus, *Russia in NATO*, p. 23.

77. *Ibid.*

78. For an introduction to the issue of nuclear weapons and arms control during the Cold War, see *Living with Nuclear Weapons*, Cambridge, MA: The Harvard Study Groups, 1983.

79. This statement of the Naval Postgraduate School's Mikhail Tsypkin was cited in Stephen J. Blank, *Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration?* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009, p. 115.

80. "Special Briefing on the Visit by First Deputy of the Russian General Staff General-Colonel Yuriy Nikolayevich Baluyevskiy," United States Department of Defense, January 2002.

81. James Mann, *Rise Of The Vulcans*, New York: Penguin Books, 2004, p.199.

82. Fyodor Lukyanov, "The Real Issue Isn't a Shield in Central Europe," *Moscow Times*, November 19, 2008.

83. Quoted in Greg Bruno, "National Missile Defense System: A Status Report," New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March 18, 2009, p. 1.

84. Pavel Felgengauer, "Little Room For Compromise over Missile Defense," Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, December 11, 2008.

85. "Special Briefing on Bilateral Strategic Security Dialogue Talks," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, December 17, 2008.

86. Bruno, p. 1.

87. *Ibid.* John Isaacs, the Executive Director of the Center For Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, says, "There is no current U.S. missile defense system that can neutralize a ballistic missile threat that employs even simple decoys."

88. See W. Pal Dishu, "Discussion Forum on Missile Proliferations and Missile Defense," a report published by the EastWest Institute, June 5, 2009, in which excerpts from Postol's remarks are included.

89. Associated Press, "Sarkozy Says U.S. Missile Shield Won't Help Security," November 14, 2008. But then in Washington, the French president seemed to back-track when he said, "Every country is sovereign to decide whether it hosts an anti-missile shield or not." Renata Goldirov, "France 'Overstepped Mandate' on Missile Shield Moratorium," November 17, 2008, available from *euobserver.com*.

90. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty online, "Russian President Lashes Out At U.S. In First National Address," November 5, 2008.

91. At the same time, both Russian and Western defense analysts have characterized the Iskander missile that would be deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast as possessing "more bark than bite." First, it could not reach the Czech Republic, and, second, it could not destroy the American missiles that were to be deployed in Poland in hardened silos. There were also questions about how many Iskanders the Russian military possessed and their state of readiness. Here was evidence that Medvedev still was not secure in his job, or that there were elements in the Russian power-structure—the military and civilian hard-liners in particular—who wanted no part of a security partnership with the West. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty online, "Military Expert Says Russian Missiles More Bark Than Bite," November 6, 2008.

92. Bruno, p. 2.

93. Richard Weitz, "Global Insights: Russia, Iran and Washington Battle Over S-300s," March 10, 2009, p. 3, available from *World Policy Review.com*.

94. In a must read book on the triangular Israeli-Iranian-U.S. relationship, Trita Parsi writes that days prior to President Bush's appearance on the USS *Abraham Lincoln* proclaiming the end of the Iraq War, "Tehran felt it had to make one last attempt at reaching out to the United States. Figuring that the regimes very existence was at stake, the Iranians put everything on the table—Hezbollah; the Israeli-Palestinians conflict; including Hamas and Islamic Jihad; and Iran's nuclear program." Flynt Leverett, the senior director for Middle East Security Affairs at NSC, said that "The Iranians acknowledged that WMD and support for terror

were serious causes of concern for us, and they were willing to negotiate." But in the final analysis, the Bush administration rejected Iran's "Grand Bargain." See Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 243, 248.

95. For a detailed discussion of NMD from the Russian perspective, see Sergey Rogov, "Obama is Formulating a New American Strategy: A Priority of the US Missile Defense Program will be Development of a Regional Missile Defense System," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, June 5, 2009.

96. *Ibid.*

97. Robert M. Gates, "A Better Missile Defense for Safer Europe," *New York Times*, September 20, 2009.

98. *Ibid.*

99. Ben Feller, "Obama Missile Defense Decision Not About Russia," Associated Press, September 20, 2009.

100. For a lively and insightful discussion of this region, see Janusz Bugajski, *Cold Peace*, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.

101. Vladimir Socor, "U.S. Foreign Policy Tested over Georgia," Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, July 15, 2009.

102. President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, "Speech at Helsinki University and Answers to Questions from Audience," April 20, 2009, p. 1.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 3. OSCE replaced the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). See The Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (VDOC99), Vienna, Germany: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1999. In contrast to similar Cooperative and Security Building Measures (CSBN), it provided for wider constraints on military activities, enhanced transparency through site visits, and further cooperation between military forces. See

"On-Site Inspections Operations: The Vienna Document, 17," Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, August 2004.

104. Members of the American foreign policy community would rather forget about the abuses in question, but until they concede them and hold those responsible accountable, their foreign colleagues may question their integrity.

105. Medvedev, "Speech at Helsinki."

106. *Ibid.*

107. *Ibid.*

108. For a discussion of how human rights contributed to the rise of the Sajudis popular front movement in Lithuania, see Richard J. Krickus, *Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion And The Break-Up Of The Soviet Empire*, Washington, DC: Brasseys, 1997.

109. Consider, for example, the comments of Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian pundit, whose work finds its way into many Western media outlets. "Europe again needs a basic agreement on a conceptual framework which like the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 would include different baskets," including one that deals with democracy. For a Russian commentator to bring up the issue of democracy, of course, is a bit touchy. See his, "Europe Needs a New Security Architecture," *Russian Analytical Digest*, Vol. 55, No. 9, February 2009, p. 2.

110. Margarete Klein, "Russia's Plan for a New Pan-European Security Regime: A Serious Proposal or an Attempt at Division?" *Russian Analytical Digest*, Vol. 55, No. 9, February 2009, p. 7.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

112. *Ibid.*

113. See Keith C. Smith, the former American ambassador to Lithuania who has been closely tracking EU-Russian energy relations, laments, "Unfortunately, the European Commission has up to now failed to build an effective common EU-wide energy policy that would counter Moscow's use of oil and gas

exports as a foreign policy instrument." See his, "Russian Energy Dependency And The Conflicting Interests Of Old And New Europe," Washington, DC: Center For Strategic and International Studies, May 12, 2009, p. 2.

114. Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, "The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood," Berlin, Germany: European Council on Foreign Relations, p. 2.

115. *Ibid.*

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

117. These comments were made on April 29, 2009, at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. The author of this monograph, along with the Georgian and Lithuanian foreign ministers and the director of Radio Free Europe, served on a roundtable on "The Future of NATO."

118. See "An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe," July 17, 2009. A number of leaders from the region signed it, and it was hand carried to Washington by one of the letter's authors.

119. *Ibid.*

120. For a discussion of CFE, see Jeffrey D. McCausland, "The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism," Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, February 15, 1998; and "The Potential of the CFE Treaty to Stabilize Security Relations of States Parties in a Regional Context," Berlin, Germany, Seminar on Arms Control, September 29-October 1, 2008.

121. See Vladimir Socor, "CFE Treaty Dead and Buried in Georgia," Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 5, No. 202, October 22, 2008.

122. "An Interview with Russian Ambassador, Sergey Kislyak." Arms Control Association, December 2008.

123. See EastWest Institute, "Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision Three Paths," Brussels-Moscow-New York, June 23, 2009, p. 11.

124. *Ibid.*

125. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

126. See remarks of Linton Brooks at Conference of Arms Control Association, "Next Steps in U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions: The START Follow-On Negotiations and Beyond," April 27, 2009, p. 8.

127. For an assessment of tactical nuclear weapons, see Simon Saradzhyan, "Tactical Nukes: A Strategic Asset or Future Liability?" available from www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/current-affairs/security-watch/detail/?ing=en&id=103631, August 10, 2009.

128. See Glenn Kessler, "For Obama, Focus Shifts From Engagement To Pursuit of Concerted, Tough Measures"; and Karen De Young and Michael D. Shear, "Britain, France Join in Demanding That Tehran Allow Inspections; Ahmadinejad Disputes Charge," *Washington Post*, September 26, 2009.

129. "NATO's Rasmussen Makes Warm Overture to Russia," Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, September 18, 2009.

130. Ann Applebaum, "Letting Europe Drift," *Washington Post*, September 22, 2009. Applebaum has firsthand knowledge about this matter since she is married to Poland's foreign minister, Radek Sikorski.

131. International Crisis Group Policy Briefing, "Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous", June 22, 2009.

132. EastWest Institute Report, p. 5.

133. On May 21-22, 2009, EU officials met with their Russian counterparts in Khabarovsk to reconcile their energy relations, but the meeting did not produce results. This outcome clearly enhanced the position of those in Europe who have been urging the EU to look for energy sources other than those from Russia.

This vitally important matter is not a focus of this monograph, but it is clear that energy cooperation between the EU and Russia serves the interest of both sides. Should they develop a fair and equitable energy-security relationship, it would go a long way in providing European support for security cooperation with Moscow. For a discussion of the EU-Russian dispute over energy, see Stefan Meister, "Crisis in Russia-EU energy relationship," *DGAPaktuell*, No. 4, June 2009. Conversely, failure to do so would certainly promote an atmosphere in which security cooperation was made more difficult. For a discussion of how the United States and the EU can cooperate in developing an eastern policy, see Kai-Olaf Lang, "Toward A Transatlantic Eastern Policy? The U.S., The EU, And The 'In-Between States'," *AicgsPolicyReport*, July 2009.

134. Vladimir Socor, "Russia-Germany: An Asymmetric Strategic Partnership," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, July 24, 2009.

135. Joschka Fischer, "Finding Russia's Place in Europe," *guardian.com*, January 11, 2009.

136. There is a bitter dispute over whether or not the West should ignore the value gap between it and Russia and focus instead on shared interests. In an opinion editorial, four prominent Russian democrats reject the notion "that the worsening of Russian-American relations was mainly caused by Washington's insistence on 'tying policies to values.' The result, some American 'realists' argue, is that the United States needs to build a new relationship with Russia based on 'common interests and common threats.'" They point out that by ignoring internal developments in Russia, there can be no effective way to engage it, and they cite Strobe Talbot who has observed that the West, "should create conditions that will over time, convince the Russians that their post-Marxist, post-Soviet, Hobbesian experiment is, in fact, unrealistic. It simply won't work." See Lev Gudkov, Igor Klyamkin, Georgy Satarov, and Lilia Shevtsova, "False Choices for Russia," *Washington Post*, June 9, 2009.

137. Levy.

138. See Andrew Meier, "Let Russia Join NATO," *Los Angeles Times*, August 20, 2008.

139. *Ibid.*

140. *Ibid.*

141. Paul Goble, "Economic Crisis Threatens to Kill off the CIS," *Window on Eurasia*, June 25, 2009.

142. Leon Aron, "Samizdat in the 21st Century," *Foreign Policy*, July/ August 2009, p. 131.

143. *Ibid.* Aron outlined the case for seeing Russia's future in a very dim light and other commentators so inclined cite the surge in militant activity throughout the North Caucasus region as evidence of an oncoming third war in Chechnya. In this connection, between June and August of 2009, 436 people were killed in such fighting in comparison to 150 during that same period in 2008. Also see Ellen Barry, "Echoes of a Grim Past: Chechnya and Its Neighbors Suffer a Relapse," *New York Times*, August 30, 2009.