Bidding Behavior in a Multi-attribute First-price Auction

Abstract

This research examines bidding behavior in a sealed bid first price multi-attribute auction environment. The auction environment is designed to allow subjects to bid on multiple attributes, where an attribute is analogous to a component of a compensation package. Preliminary findings in base case experiments reveal that over successive rounds bids converge to subject's reserve price, independent of the number of sellers in a market.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2010
Accession Number
ADA512278

Entities

People

  • Peter M. Williams
  • Tanja F. Blackstone

Organizations

  • Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Algorithms
  • Compensation
  • Composite Materials
  • Convergence
  • Efficiency
  • Experimental Design
  • Human Resources
  • Instructors
  • Labor Markets
  • Military Research
  • Naval Personnel
  • Standards
  • Students
  • Training
  • Universities
  • War Colleges

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  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Naval Personnel Management
  • Operations Research