

U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Doctrine: A Failure to Address the Specifics of Authoritarian Regime Transition

**A Monograph
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Abstract

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE: A FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE SPECIFICS OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TRANSITION by LTC James A. Frick, U.S. Army, 49 pages.

The evolving U.S. stabilization, reconstruction and development doctrine displays the tenets necessary to stabilize a state following conflict; however, this doctrine remains insufficient for insuring long-term stability. To adequately guide stability operations U.S. doctrine must address transitions from authoritarian regimes. The logic of the current doctrine manifests a commitment to democracy but fails to realize that the factors considered as sources of conflict are often the basis for maintaining support and stability in authoritarian regimes. Consequently, deposing an authoritarian regime requires a greater attention to governance rather than democratization.

The examination of U.S. stability and reconstruction doctrine reveals principle tenets stipulating that a safe and secure environment, establishment of rule of law, social well-being, stable governance and a sustainable economy are necessary to stabilize a post-conflict state. Those tenets have antecedents in Western political philosophy. However, a careful examination of the doctrine reveals no concern for the type of regime that has been overthrown or replaced. Hence, the doctrine provides no guide to the expectations of the people who now have a new government. In other words, how a regime was replaced and how the previous regime governed has a significant impact on how the new regime is perceived.

A close examination of the inherent structural aspects of authoritarian regimes discloses differences the stabilization doctrine does not consider. Authoritarian regimes create a system that depends on certain allegiances and dependencies to retain authority and maintain stability. These regimes purposely create conditions the U.S. considers detrimental to stability to achieve these ends. Authoritarian regimes may be open to Western liberalization only to the point that it does not reduce their authority. These regimes will outwardly appear to be liberalizing and adopting democratic norms to satisfy the international community's concerns but internally the regime will continue to retain authority. When this elaborate system of manipulating the loyalties of societal elites, suppressing opposition and creating dependencies is removed, the government's control is undermined. Competing elites are only familiar with the previous regime's mechanisms of government, and a disgruntled population remains dependent on the new government but now with unrepressed expectations. If the new developing regime is unwilling or unable to reduce surfacing tensions and respond to the growing expectations, instability will follow. It is, therefore, necessary for doctrine to consider a design that emphasizes governance first. This design should balance the need for governmental capacity and legitimacy with societal needs and involvement.

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Introduction

Throughout its history, the U.S. has participated in numerous stability operations all over the world. In many of these operations, neither the government nor the military considered the missions legitimate military functions. This fact may explain the military's reluctance to address these involvements within doctrine until recent years.¹ Academic literature also appears to have done little to address the post-conflict phenomena. Failure to develop a comprehensive understanding of post-conflict reconstruction has led to the development of different solutions after each conflict and a rediscovery of what does and does not work. The difficulties arising out of the involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq have caused many to question the reliance on certain theories of development. As previous involvements have shown, application of military power to enforce security, in and of itself, is not sufficient to provide long-term stability. Economic prosperity has also proven necessary but insufficient for stability because the record shows that some states have failed even though they were prospering economically. Consequently, academic and doctrine writers, alike, are now scrambling to develop theories to explain the conditions prevalent in these states and to provide remedies.

Western thought concerning the formation of government has drifted from establishing good governance to concern for forms of democratic participation. Enlightenment philosophers were concerned with expanding individual liberty in the context of monarchical governance. The paradox they sought to overcome was how to establish order while providing for individual freedoms. Drawing upon these theories, founders of the United States created a federal government of enumerated powers and a system of indirect representation. Isolated by two oceans, the United States concentrated on its own development with limited interludes of external

¹ After the Cold War, the United States and the United Nations had no relevant doctrine for the employment of military and civil assets for nation building. James Dobbins, "Learning the Lessons of Iraq," in *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 220.

involvement. The expansion of free markets, the advent of two world wars and the rise of communism shifted U.S. policy to a focus on global leadership, obligating the United States to participate in world events. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 further elevated the United States as the sole superpower in a unipolar world characterized by weak, fragile, and failing states. Consequently, the United States sought to transfer its political philosophy to the rest of the world as a counter to aggressor powers, rogue regimes, revolution, terrorism, and ethnic, racial, and religious hatred. Since these conditions are often products of oppression and poverty, the logical solution has been to ameliorate adversity by promoting democracy, defending human rights, and fostering economic growth.² Proponents have further argued that promoting democracy has an added benefit, that democratic states do not fight other democratic states.³ The American perspective on liberalization and democratization, however, may be inconsistent with a recipient country's societal norms and regime political survival.

The evolving U.S. stabilization, reconstruction and development doctrine displays the tenets necessary to stabilize a state following conflict; however, this doctrine remains insufficient for insuring long-term stability. To adequately guide stability operations U.S. doctrine must address transitions from authoritarian regimes. The logic of the current doctrine manifests a commitment to democracy but fails to realize that the factors considered as sources of conflict are often the basis for maintaining support and stability in authoritarian regimes. Consequently, deposing an authoritarian regime requires a greater attention to governance rather than democratization.

² Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 208.

³ William J. Clinton, "1994 State Of The Union Address" (speech, House Chamber of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 25 January 1994); George W. Bush, "President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East" (press conference, White House, Washington, D.C., 12 November 2004).

To identify the deficiencies in stabilization and reconstruction doctrine it is first necessary to understand the origins of the doctrine. Such a review suggests the American political philosophy emphasizes methods of liberalization and democratization consistent with “western” state transformation. Articulated into doctrine, this philosophy presupposes that the recipient country’s population and leadership are truly concerned with the ideals of liberty and democracy. An evaluation of doctrinal and academic literature in relation to these origins supports this claim.

The methods applicable to the democratization in the United States and some western countries, however, are not necessarily indicative of what is relevant to other countries. Many, if not a majority, of the stabilization and reconstruction operations occur in countries transitioning from an authoritarian regime. These countries have inherent structural differences the doctrinal model does not consider. It is, therefore, important to next examine the structural aspects of an authoritarian regime to understand how it retains power while maintaining some semblance of stability. The study discerns the resistance such polities present to change that threatens retention of authority. Furthermore, these structural aspects create certain societal conditions that promote authoritarian regime survival. By comparison, doctrinal and academic conflict literature denotes some of these same societal conditions as significantly contributing to instability. Therefore, doctrine prescribes remedies intended to specifically relieve these conditions. Without considering the authoritarian control mechanisms, treatment may amplify previously suppressed tensions or cause new problems to surface. Iraq illustrates how an authoritarian regime’s mechanisms for retaining power created the very conditions doctrine poses are sources for conflict leading to instability. Regardless, Iraq remained stable. Conversely, it was when external actors removed the regime without considering these mechanisms that an opportunity emerged for underlying tensions to surface and new tensions to develop, resulting in an unstable environment.

Instead of simply replacing one type of polity with another and struggling with the consequences of such a dramatic change, efforts should focus on governance transformation that

continues the retention of the capability to maintain order while expanding capacity to address the grievances indicative of the previous regimes coercive measures. Establishing governance first, while easing incrementally into liberal reform and establishing democratic principles, will facilitate a smoother transition during the stabilization of a country.

U.S. Doctrine's Emphasis

U.S. stabilization and reconstruction doctrine manifests a commitment to democracy. It emphasizes methods for liberalizing and democratizing societies in a manner consistent with America's transformation. This logic seeks to remake the rest of the world into the image of Western-style democracy and an American version of capitalism.⁴ The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy promotes democracy as "the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability" and seeks to "extend freedom across the globe by leading international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy."⁵ Conducive to this strategy, the democratic reconstruction framework, epitomized in stabilization doctrine, seeks to construct democratic institutions while simultaneously building state administrative capacity.⁶ It is important to understand that this reconstruction framework is not just an elitist view of how the rest of the world should be, but a logical conception based upon credible theory and application. The logic is flawed because the framework fails to account for polities whose goals are polar opposite of those seeking liberalization and democratization.⁷ Although the security strategy

⁴ David Marquand, "Playground Bully," in *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich (Illinois: Ivan R. Dee Publishing, 2003), 117.

⁵ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2006), 3.

⁶ Marina Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 205.

⁷ Liberalization is the "process of redefining and extending rights" while democratization refers to the "processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles, or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations, or extended to cover issues and institution not previously subject to citizen participation." Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7-8.

denotes the need to understand the fundamental character of a regime, neither the strategy nor doctrine address how or even the requirement to transform an authoritarian system to democracy upon regime replacement.⁸ Prior to examining the consequences of this omission, it is important to trace the genesis of the American political perspective from theory to doctrine outlining its relevancy in its current form. Understanding how theory and world events influenced U.S. policy assists in explaining why U.S. doctrine adheres to the democratic reconstruction framework and is so widely accepted and used in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

Liberalism and Its Origins for the American Perspective

The concept of liberty and the basic freedoms associated with the idea are rooted into notions of Athenian democracy and the Roman Republic. However, the more modern ideas that influenced the American perspective of liberty and government originated from the political philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment. Many western philosophers contributed to the concept of liberalism during this period, but none so much as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu. In *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes asserted that life in the state of nature was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Seeking self-preservation, humankind would devolve into a state of war. Hobbes contended that only a strong central government, deriving legitimacy through the ability to preserve the fundamental human right to life, could resolve this anarchy. Although granting absolute sovereignty to a monarch appears to diverge from liberalism, Hobbes laid the

⁸ Huntington defines transformation as the ruling coalition taking the lead in bringing about democracy through incremental reforms. He defines replacement as occurring when opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy through the overthrow or collapse of an authoritarian regime. In replacement, the institutions, procedures, ideas, and individuals connected with the previous regime are considered tainted and emphasis on a sharp, clean break with the past results leading to a potential vacuum of authority absent during transformation. This vacuum is often characterized by a struggle over distribution of power and the nature of the new regime. During post-conflict operations, if the previous regime and all of its institutions are completely removed, there exists a potential for strife during the organizing and formation of a new polity. Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” *Political Science Quarterly* 124 (November 2009): 35, 42-46, 54-59.

foundations for succeeding liberal philosophy in his belief that the legitimacy of government stemmed from the rights of those governed rather than the divine right of kings.⁹ John Locke, however, disagreed with Hobbes asserting that absolute monarchs could violate an individual's right to self-preservation and prescribed a limited government constrained by a social contract. This social contract was legitimate only if it met the general interest of the governed. He agreed with Hobbes that civil society was necessary to resolve conflict but expanded the concept noting that civil society had a responsibility to protect property. Locke also emphasized the separation of powers, as well as, the separation of church and state.¹⁰ Consequently, American founding fathers such as Jefferson, Madison and Hamilton derived their own political perspectives from the liberal traditions of Hobbes and Locke. These founding fathers further institutionalized their views into the American political perspective through the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.¹¹

Building upon Locke's social contract theories, Jean-Jacques Rousseau devised his own ideas concerning the paradox of the social contract; if freedom was to be safeguarded by law and law presupposes coercion, then law would infringe on individual freedom.¹² Rousseau, therefore, argued for political participation to ensure society instilled its "will" within the social contract of laws.¹³ Francois-Marie Arouet (Voltaire) later surmised that civil liberties should include free trade, freedom of religion, and the right to a fair trial. Drawing upon Locke's premises and his observation concerning the British government, Montesquieu articulated his own theories on the

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 2006 [1992]), 154-156.

¹⁰ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government (10th edition)* (Project Gutenberg, 1690) <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/trgov10h.htm>. (accessed July 25, 2009).

¹¹ Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 153.

¹² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Of the Social Contract*. Book IV, Chapter 1, Paragraph 1 and 2.

¹³ Sheldon Wolin, "Political Theory-Trends and Goals," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills, Volume 12 (New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc., 1968), 324.

balance of power in *The Spirit of Laws*, emphasizing the independent branches of the executive, legislative and judiciary.¹⁴ Participation, free trade, freedom of religion, right to a fair trial, and separation of powers are all part of the American system and promulgated as doctrinal tenets for democratization.

Drawing upon the writings of these individuals, other philosophers began to formulate their own theories, as well. Adam Smith, Richard Cobden and Norman Angell all argued that development of free trade would reduce the likelihood of conflict. Since trade increased interdependence between states then trade also increased the cost of going to war. Presumably, the cost of war would become too great and peace would ensue. These views on trade further influenced the American perspective persuading U.S. policy makers to pursue global economic interdependence to enhance U.S. security interests.

After observing both the American and French Revolutions, Kant began to formulate his own views on politics that subsequently influenced U.S. philosophy. He firmly believed in the idea that men had certain inalienable rights of freedom, equality and self-dependency. Like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Kant believed that social and political relations should be governed and public conflicts settled in a universal matter through law.¹⁵ Laws, which provided equal protection to all citizens, would provide the necessary safeguard to protect individual freedom. He reasoned that it was not only an individual's right but also an obligation to take part in the civil society and the development of law. Fearful that the will of the many would outweigh the rights of individuals, he argued against direct democracy settling instead upon a republican form

¹⁴ Montesquieu influenced many colonial pre-revolution British Americans to include James Madison, through his theories on politics and government. Donald Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought," *American Political Science Review* 78, 1 (March 1984): 189-197.

¹⁵ Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H. S. Reiss (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 41-53.

of government to develop and administer the law.¹⁶ Like Montesquieu, Kant saw the need to separate the powers of legislature, executive and judiciary. Kant also proposed the right to public criticism as an additional check upon the government. These political discussions reinforced the American focus on rule of law, separation of powers, and rights of the media that are now a priority in U.S. stabilization and reconstruction doctrine.

In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant expanded his discussions on politics contemplating how to make this republican state safe from conflicts with other states. He concluded that to prevent interstate conflict required creating a federation of states that maintained relations based upon principles of right.¹⁷ Kant's concept of peace assisted in shaping U.S. President Wilson's views on foreign policy leading to the Democratic Peace Theory. Presidents Clinton and G.W. Bush have since used this theory as their justification for expanding democracy in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of weak and failing states.

In summary, the Age of Enlightenment's political philosophies led to a classical liberal theory that heavily influenced the development of the U.S. system of government and the American political perspective. This perspective has shaped how the United States chose to respond to the rest of the world. The essential element of classical liberal theory was a commitment to basic inalienable rights supported by an equal commitment to the rule of law in order to maintain those rights.¹⁸ The laws should not infringe upon the rights of others, protect

¹⁶ Whether Kant developed this belief based upon the American system of government is not certain, but since he formulated a number of his ideas while studying the American Revolution this appears to be a reasonable inference. Kant's term 'republican' represents the modern form of a parliamentary democracy. Both Madison and Hamilton strongly argue in Federalist Papers No. 39 and 73 that the U.S. Constitution and its proposed system of government were "republican." H.S. Reiss, ed., *Kant: Political Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 25.

¹⁷ "Right is therefore the sum total of those conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom." Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," and "The Metaphysics of Morals," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H. S. Reiss (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 93-133.

¹⁸ The concept is phrased "classical" within academic sources to categorize these theories as pre-20th century.

property and provide equal protection. Classical liberalism's reliance on the rule of law suggested the importance of constitutional limitations on government while the protection of private property was important for free trade.¹⁹

As global governments and economies changed to meet the shifts in social needs, so did the liberal perspective. Thomas H. Green, a proponent for the more modern 'social liberalism', argued that humans were interdependent and needed government that would promote freedom through the provision of healthcare, education and welfare. Where classical liberalism stressed individual rights, social liberalism focuses on group rights. During the turbulent periods of war and depression, American policies both domestic and foreign began to shift to increased governmental controls on the economy and an expansion in services. Today, the U.S. political philosophy encompasses a combination of both perspectives, often stressed differently based upon party affiliation.

The American Political Perspective and Its Conceptualization into Doctrine

Classical liberalism defined the United States political perspective from its beginning. It influenced America's very concept of liberty and provided the theory for the development of a constitutional republic designed to ensure individual rights through a system of representation. As noted in the previous section, some of the United States' founding fathers acknowledge classical liberal theories and further promulgated their political philosophy through the ground breaking documents of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Although the principles of classical liberalism were fused into the American political perspective, the U.S. concerned itself primarily with its own survival and progression of interests during the first century of its existence leading to the expression of these ideals more domestically than abroad. It was not until

¹⁹ William C. McNeil, "Money and Economic Change," in *Columbia History of the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard W. Bulliet (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 284.

the close of the 19th Century that the U.S. began to realize a position of global prominence that allowed it to export the American political perspective.

Domestic views affect policy both at home and abroad. If, for the first hundred years of U.S. existence, all foreign policy sought to preserve U.S. survival and interests, what changed during the 20th Century? First, whether desired or not, national growth and its ever increasing prosperity had caused the U.S. to emerge as a world leader. Its new position of prominence had also brought certain burdens, one of which was an expectation within foreign governments that the U.S. should play a larger role in world events. The second factor urging the U.S. to focus outward was the ever-increasing global interdependence brought about by improvements in technology and the expansion of free markets. Free markets, a principle of classical liberalism, slowly pushed America into the global realm. The two oceans that had provided America its security were becoming less and less an obstacle.

By the end of the 19th Century, the United States had blossomed into a world power. As such, U.S. citizens began to measure their value by the impact they made abroad.²⁰ After the war with Spain in 1899, the U.S. brought the American values of liberty, democracy and justice to newly acquired territories. These small steps in the exportation of the American political perspective later broadened U.S. domestic acceptance of President Wilson's desire to export these values globally to sustain U.S. security.

Influenced by British Prime Minister William Gladstone's classical liberal views, President Wilson blamed WWI on Europe's alliance systems, balance of power concepts, armaments, authoritarian governments, economic competition, and exploitative imperialism. President Wilson believed the U.S. should, therefore, assume leadership on the world stage to

²⁰ Norman A. Graebner, *Foundations of American Foreign Policy: a Realist Appraisal from Franklin to McKinley* (Wilmington: Scholarly resources, 1985), 352.

make the world safe for democracy.²¹ Wilsonianism, also termed Liberal Internationalism, argued that liberal states should form multilateral international structures to pursue liberal objectives such as global free trade, liberal economics and the global emergence of democracy. Walter McDougall posits that, hypothetically, Liberal Internationalism leads to a ‘peace dividend’ assuming that democratic state relations are characterized by non-violence.²² This Democratic Peace Theory is consistent with Kant’s theory in *Perpetual Peace* and Smith’s argument that international interdependence based upon free markets tends to reduce war. Following World War I, President Wilson sought to convince European partners to pursue this philosophy through the League of Nations to little avail. Notwithstanding the failure of the League of Nations, the concept was reborn following World War II in multilateral international institutions such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Promoting democracy had been a central war aim for the Western Allies during WWII. Thus, when the war was won, the victors were obligated to establish pluralist political institutions in the liberated territories. Laurence Whitehead posits that the United States strategy for consolidating its dominance in Western Europe and Japan actualized these war aims.²³ For Britain, efforts in democratization were more a desire to transplant its Westminster model to make decolonization more palatable.

Post WWII, American diplomat George Kennan warned that the Soviet Union would spurn cooperation, cling to conquests in central Europe, and deploy Communists to gain power elsewhere.²⁴ This is where U.S. exceptionalism came to bear in the exportation of its American political philosophy. American political philosophy, which had epitomized classical liberalism,

²¹ McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 123-126.

²² The theory has since made its way into Chapter 1 of the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations*.

²³ Laurence Whitehead, ed., *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (New York: Oxford University Press, September 1996), 12.

²⁴ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (New York: Bantam, 1969 [1970]), 260-264.

began to adopt tenets of social liberalism to counter the effects of war and the spread of Communism. Global Meliorism, a realization of this social perspective, became the socio-economic and political-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place; it encompassed the belief that the United States should help other nations share in the “American dream”.²⁵ Where the Soviet Union pressed for the expansion of communism, the United States pursued democracy and Global Meliorism as solutions to its policies of Liberal Internationalism and Containment. The U.S. applied a more indirect approach of aid, economic concessions, political support or disapproval, and a dense network of military and security ties to democratize 13 countries.²⁶ During these transitions, democratic transformation took place within each state, which appears to have provided a foundation for the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy.

The post WWII success of U.S. democratization efforts and British decolonization provided Western democracies a proven framework for post-conflict democratization.²⁷ This democratic reconstruction model assumed state and democracy building were part of the same process and should be conducted simultaneously.²⁸ The democratic reconstruction model also encapsulated both the classical and social liberalism focus on law, governance, social reform, human rights and economics. Since the model already agreed with the norms of the American perspective and seemed to epitomize the methods of one of the United States’ greatest reconstruction achievements in post WWII Europe, the U.S. adopted the model’s principles into

²⁵ McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 173.

²⁶ Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization*, 3, 10-15.

²⁷ Huntington notes that this “second wave” of democratization led to about 36 countries achieving democratic regimes. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” 31.

²⁸ This model is very invasive, expensive and labor intensive addressing a large number of issues simultaneously. It has been implemented in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor with mixed and inconclusive results. Marina Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States,” *Development and Change* 33, no. 5, (2002): 1001-1023.

doctrine to meet the Afghanistan and Iraq operational requirements for stabilization and reconstruction doctrine.

Democratic Reconstruction Framework for Establishing Stability

Until recently, the United States military viewed its role solely as the nation's guarantor of sovereignty. In responding to stabilization requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. learned that its doctrine was deficient. The President, therefore, published National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). This document prioritized stability operations as a core mission for achieving U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) began to develop organizations and update doctrine in compliance with these directives. Since the military and State Department knew little about civil capacity development, they relied upon United States Agency for International Development (USAID) experience along with lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the combined interagency doctrine now adequately recognizes the need to ameliorate causes for instability. Through the embodiment of the democratic reconstruction model, doctrine adopts the American political perspective for liberalization and democratization in its identification and prescription for conditions conducive to stability. The doctrine does not recognize that transitions from authoritarian regimes to a stable democratic regime have special requirements. Essentially, doctrine applies a one size fits all perspective to stabilization, reconstruction and development.

Much of the current doctrine acknowledges the concept of stabilization and reconstruction without getting into the details of the process. It is, therefore, necessary to review military and appropriate interagency doctrine to determine which doctrine is relevant. The joint publications provide only a superficial review of stability operations. Joint Publication 3-0 *Joint Operations* defines stability operations as measures to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure

reconstruction and humanitarian relief.²⁹ The JP 3-0 further refers to the Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. The directive establishes some specific goals for stability including immediate action to provide security, restore essential services and meet humanitarian needs.³⁰ Joint Publications 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* provides a little more depth in its peace-building chapter. The chapter lists peace-building efforts: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, governance and economic stabilization. The JP 3-07.3 also lists example tasks for each effort but focuses most attention reasonably on security and justice. A review of Army field manuals reveals a little more detail, with some manuals providing definitions for key stability terms. These manuals allude to stability and peace building with varying degrees of focus, mostly agreeing to restore a stable peace by resolving or altering the conditions that prompted the conflict.³¹ Of all military doctrine relevant to stability operations, only Field Manual (FM) 3-07 *Stability Operations* provides a framework for stabilizing a state. The FM 3-07 also consolidates interagency prescriptions for establishing stability into one document.

Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations* is currently the most comprehensive military doctrinal manual on stabilization, reconstruction and development. The manual's framework denotes those tenets DOD understands as necessary for military action. The FM 3-07 specifies that a process of conflict transformation should resolve the root causes of conflict and instability by "building the capacity of local institutions to forge and sustain effective governance, economic development and the rule of law."³² The manual further underlines a strategy to accomplish this.

²⁹ A review of JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*; JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*; JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*; JP 3-57, *Civil-Military OPNs*; and JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, provided a only a cursory examination of stability operations. JP 3-07.3 provided the most detail.

³⁰ DODD 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* (28 November 2005).

³¹ A review of FM 3-0, *Operations*; FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs OPNs*; FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*; FM 3-07, *Stability OPNs*; FM 3-07.31, *Peace OPNs*; FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*; FM 5-0, *Operations Process*, was conducted to determine what Army doctrine provides on establishing stability.

³² FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, (October 2008), 1-6.

This strategy adopts the United States Institute of Peace five end-state conditions: 1) a safe and secure environment; 2) established rule of law; 3) social well-being; 4) stable governance; and 5) a sustainable economy.³³ Rule of law, social well-being and many of the principle tenets for stable governance and a sustainable economy have antecedents in the Western political philosophy previously discussed. Field Manual 3-07 does not prioritize the importance of any of these goals but does indicate interdependence between all five conditions. To achieve these goals, the manual categorizes the JP 3-07.3 peace-building efforts as stability lines of effort and integrates the military's primary stability tasks and subtasks within these lines.³⁴ Although this manual provides a general framework for stabilization, reconstruction and development, its focus remains on what the military should do in the near and intermediate term to stabilize a conflict environment. Consequently, military doctrine does not provide many details for development. The military must, therefore, borrow doctrine from both DOS and USAID to obtain a broader framework for long-term stability.

A review of Department of State (DOS) doctrine finds a list of stability sectors matching the JP 3-07.3 peace building and FM 3-07 stability lines of effort. The DOS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has subdivided these stability sectors into three mission elements (initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainment) and developed a matrix of essential tasks aligned under each of the phases within the specified sectors.³⁵ As with the military stability tasks, the S/CRS division has identified primary tasks (goals) for each corresponding sector. Figure 1 (appendix) encapsulates the discussion in FM 3-07 and the S/CRS Post-Conflict Essential Task list; subtasks from both documents are not depicted, and for the

³³ FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 1-16.

³⁴ These Stability Sector lines of effort are Security; Justice and Reconciliation; Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being; Governance and Participation; and Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure. Ibid., 2-5.

³⁵ DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. *Post-Conflict Essential Tasks* (2005).

purposes of this monograph, are not required. Like military doctrine, DOS doctrine provides objectives and tasks focused more on near and intermediate stabilization and reconstruction. Military and State Department frameworks lack forethought in their country development remedies and do not consider intermediate requirements conducive to achieving the prescribed endstate.

In contrast to the DOS and DOD doctrinal provision of objectives and tasks, USAID doctrine describes an elaborate hierarchy of goals, objectives, and requirements focused on institutional development. USAID lists as two of its core goals the promotion of good governance and the transition to democracy throughout the world. The USAID democracy and governance framework manual states, “good governance encompasses commitment to the rule of law, the public good, transparency and accountability, and effective delivery of public services.”³⁶ It concedes that democracy is not essential for good governance and that bad governance can occur within formal democratic structures, but argues that democracy and good governance together provide the strongest guarantee of security, justice, and economic development.³⁷ In its Fragile States Strategy, USAID contends that instability is associated with ineffective and illegitimate governments. Therefore, remedies should focus on the governing arrangements that lack effectiveness and legitimacy rather than the symptoms associated with fragility.³⁸ With this in mind, USAID developed a planning framework by which it provides objectives to achieve the core goal, “Democracy and Good Governance Strengthened”. The USAID framework consists of interlocking program objectives organized into a hierarchical pattern to specify cause and effect. Subordinate to these program objectives are intermediate results and sub-intermediate results. Arguing that rule of law is paramount to democracy, the first program objective focuses on

³⁶ USAID, *At Freedom’s Frontiers: A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework*, in PD-ACF-999 (December 2005), 3.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁸ USAID, *Fragile States Strategy*, in PD-ACA-999 (January 2005), 3- 5.

strengthening rule of law and respect for human rights. The other program objectives emphasized include more transparent and accountable government institutions, more genuine and competitive processes, and increased development of the politically active civil society.³⁹ While DOD and DOS doctrine focus on stabilization and reconstruction following conflict, USAID doctrine emphasizes development. USAID doctrine, however, does not consider near term security requirements that allow this development to happen. A conglomeration of the three doctrines, therefore, provides a more complete model for post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction and development.

Is Stabilization, Reconstruction and Development Doctrine Valid?

The previous section observed that a combined U.S. interagency doctrine constitutes a more comprehensive framework for stabilization, reconstruction and development. However, the doctrine bases its approach on the American political perspective, post WWII democratization and lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. The doctrine has yet to be tested through completion.⁴⁰ Evaluating the doctrine against academic stabilization and reconstruction literature will provide a test of the doctrine's logic.

Doctrine's focus on securing the environment, establishing rule of law and improving human rights provides a process for treating tensions that may lead to further violence. This focus helps create the conditions to further economic growth, establish essential services and alter perceptions of governmental legitimacy.⁴¹ Without security, investors will not contribute capital; consumers will not go to the markets; infrastructure cannot be maintained; and governmental

³⁹ The 1998 *Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators* provides a thorough framework consisting of each strategic objective (goal) with subsequent program (agency) objectives. Each of these objectives has causal intermediate requirements, sub-intermediate requirements, and associated indicators (Measures of Effectiveness). In June 2009, USAID reprioritized the agency objectives and updated the intermediate requirements. USAID, *DGHA/DG Activities* (June 2009).

⁴⁰ Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged*, 204-206.

⁴¹ Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq," in *Foreign Affairs* (2004).

institutions appear weak and powerless. A majority of the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction academic literature agrees that security and humanitarian relief is the first priority during the early stages following conflict. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) stipulates that security is the “necessary foundation on which progress in other issue areas rests.”⁴² The RAND book on Nation-Building further defines security categories. They are peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reform.⁴³ These categories encapsulate the essential stability tasks and subtasks for civil security and control outlined in Chapter 3 of the FM 3-07 *Stability Operations* manual. The peacekeeping, law enforcement and security sector focuses on the protection of personal and property rights and the development of institutions that are accountable to civil governance and able to enforce public security. The rule of law aspect should be developed in unison with the security sector reform. Rule of law not only provides the system to which law enforcement and citizens should adhere to but also creates the foundation for government accountability and economic growth.⁴⁴ A viable justice system improves human rights conditions by ensuring due process, equality before the law, and judicial checks on executive power. Additionally, effective dispute-resolution mechanisms that protect private property and enforce contracts are critical to the operation of a market economy.⁴⁵ The CSIS post-conflict reconstruction study actually separates rule of law into a separate category of justice and reconciliation matching U.S. doctrine. Ultimately, the early development of a security apparatus not only establishes the necessary element of security, but it provides the necessary mechanism by which the indigenous government will maintain future stability. The establishment

⁴²Scott Feil, “Laying the Foundation: Enhancing Security Capabilities,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), 40.

⁴³ James Dobbins, et al., *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* (Virginia: RAND, 2007), 14.

⁴⁴ Michele Flournoy and Michael Pan, “Dealing with Demons: Enhancing Justice and Reconciliation,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), 89-90.

⁴⁵ Dobbins, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, 73-74.

of a rule of law culture will help to ensure the government remains legitimate in its control of the security apparatus. This evaluation of the doctrine using academic literature seems to endorse the doctrine's early focus on security, human rights enforcement and development of the rule of law.

Doctrine defines a stable government as the endstate of reconstruction. Achieving a stable government presupposes the development of effective governance and adequate civil participation. The RAND study agrees that effective governance is the next priority for development during post-conflict reconstruction and focuses primarily on restoring public services and public administration.⁴⁶ The CSIS research stipulates that civil participation promotes a process that legitimizes the indigenous government while enhancing the government's capacity to provide public goods. The CSIS study further argues that transparency and participation by civil society ensure that governmental programs are effectively channeled to public ends.⁴⁷ Both RAND and CSIS recommendations on governance and civil participation substantiate the doctrinal focus.

Finally, doctrine seeks to establish a sustainable economy by building on those aspects of the economic sector that enable the economy to become self-sustaining. These aspects include physical infrastructure, sound fiscal and economic policy, an effective and predictable regulatory environment, a viable workforce, business development, increased access to capital, and effective management of natural resources.⁴⁸ Economic development requires a good policy environment consisting of a legal regulatory framework that supports basic macroeconomic needs. Central to economic development is the government's capacity to effectively manage natural resources, engage in the private sector, jumpstart international trade and provide basic educational

⁴⁶ RAND places a lesser priority on democratization but stipulates that there is no reason why it cannot be developed as a part of governance, given sufficient resourcing. Dobbins, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, 14.

⁴⁷ Orr, "Governing When Chaos Rules," 60.

⁴⁸ FM 3-07, 1-18.

services.⁴⁹ Consequently, good governance makes a difference to macroeconomic management in monetary and fiscal affairs and provides a stable environment for private economic activities.⁵⁰ As previously mentioned, other factors such as security and rule of law create the conditions that support private sector investment. Such investment allows a mobilization of financial capital that, over time, allows for the building of physical capital, which is conducive to economic growth.⁵¹ During conflict situations, physical capital in the form of infrastructure is either degraded or destroyed; thus, requiring reconstruction to reestablish pre-war capabilities. Additionally, conflict creates a societal brain drain because many of the professionals either leave the country or are killed. Efforts made to replenish human capital serve to improve economic well being. In the short term, foreign aid is essential to meet humanitarian needs and build infrastructure. Private investment, technical innovation, sound macroeconomic conditions, and development of human capital provide long-term economic stability.⁵² Measures to adapt policies that better harness primary commodities or that work toward diversification will also help stabilize the state's economy.⁵³ Academic stabilization, reconstruction and development literature, therefore, appears to validate the doctrinal tenets for establishing a sustainable economy.

Summary

The examination of U.S. stability and reconstruction doctrine reveals tenets stipulating that a safe and secure environment, establishment of rule of law, social well-being, stable

⁴⁹ Johanna M. Forman, "Restoring Hope: Enhancing Social and Economic Well-Being," in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), 74.

⁵⁰ Seonjou Kang, "Post-conflict Economic Development and Sustaining the Peace," in *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, eds. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 229.

⁵¹ Ibid., 224-225.

⁵² Seonjou Kang, "Post-conflict Economic Development and Sustaining the Peace," 227.

⁵³ Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, 134.

governance and a sustainable economy are necessary to stabilize a post-conflict state. Those tenets have antecedents in Western political philosophy. However, a careful examination of the doctrine reveals no concern for the type of regime that has been overthrown or replaced. Hence, the doctrine provides no guide to the expectations of the people who now have a new government. In other words, how a regime was replaced and how the previous regime governed has a significant impact on how the new regime is perceived.

Games Authoritarian Regimes Play

Historically, the western form of democracy has described only a few of the systems of governance. Before there was democracy, many different versions of government reigned under quite stable conditions. The Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy for 2008 surveyed 167 countries finding 31 percent were characterized as authoritarian and another 22 percent as hybrid regimes (semi-authoritarian).⁵⁴ Only 18 percent of the countries evaluated were full democracies with the remainder falling within the flawed democracy category. North Korea, which was rated at the bottom of the list, meets most definitions for a weak state, but the regime remains stable.⁵⁵ What is it that allows some authoritarian governments to remain stable, while transitioning democracies can be fragile and prone to instability? The answer to this question provides insight into how authoritarian regimes stay in power. Furthermore, understanding this phenomenon will assist planners in identifying the resistance such regimes will employ to retain authority as well as some of the traps used to counter liberalization and democratization.

⁵⁴ Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy 2008. The study focused on five categories including electoral process/ pluralism, civil liberties, functioning government, political participation/ culture. Countries falling into the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regime categories encompass approximately 50% of the world's population.

⁵⁵ Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *State Failures and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, 16.

How an Authoritarian Polity Retains Power

An authoritarian regime would appear to be the most unstable form of government. After all, there is a large disparity in distribution of wealth and public goods, with only a small group of elites receiving privileges. Often such a polity is corrupt, extracts a high level of taxes from its subjects, and does little to improve the welfare of the country. Normally, the disenfranchised have little opportunity for personal advancement. Considering that the disenfranchised make up a majority of the population in most cases, and that all these conditions seem to create reason for strife, why does a challenger not rise up and overthrow such an unrepresentative and inefficient government?

A leader of an authoritarian regime builds his coalition from those elements in society that best allow for control of the population and provides special benefits to sustain this coalition's loyalty. Foremost, the leaders in an authoritarian regime will do whatever is necessary to stay in power. They will consider any measure that degrades their prospects for political survival as a threat and will do everything within the regime's capability to deter rivals. This is why most forms of authoritarian regimes oppress their residents and suppress any activity that would allow members to organize against the government.⁵⁶ In most cases, these polities show little concern for and often violate human rights. Such regimes normally form and maintain a ruling coalition that includes those elements of society that have influence over the population, thus negating threats to the incumbent's authority. The control mechanisms may include the military or other security apparatus. Membership in the security apparatus bestows privileges that, in turn, ensure loyalty. Inclusion of such a force within the ruling coalition provides the leadership a tool to suppress and even defeat resistance. Other members of the coalition may include religious figures who are able to assist in the control of residents from an ideological

⁵⁶ Authoritarian systems will engage in the most brutal and extensive oppression of prospective challengers, especially on those who come from within the winning coalition. Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003), 341.

standpoint and economic elites who own economic enterprises or control the agricultural land that employs and feeds the population. Control of educational and media institutions are integral to a leader's power base, as well. The regime leader, therefore, seeks to establish and sustain loyalty within these groups through such methods as the provision of private goods (personal benefits). Consider it a bribe, if you will, but such a divide created in conditions of welfare between the ruling coalition and the rest of the population encourages loyalty to the incumbent. The advantages gained by the ruling coalition members through their support for the leader may far outweigh the alternative. In return, the leader controls those elements that pose a credible threat to his political survival.

The population must, therefore, have the means to organize and the capability for resistance to pose any true threat to the regime. This capability in the form of funds, weapons, and forces must either defeat or outlast the regime's current security apparatus. Otherwise, resistance will only bring the population greater oppression. Considering that the population normally contains the "have not's", resistance requires support by either an external source or a defected member of the ruling coalition. The overthrow of the Shah in Iran is one such example. Initially, the Shah successfully stymied rebellion until he began to isolate the elites within his coalition. More specifically, he enacted land reforms that adversely affected much of the clergy within the country. Despite other oppressive behavior, this move created a respected voice within the opposition as well as a safe haven for mobilization. When the regime utilized the army to repress the population, the military defected.⁵⁷ With the loss of his coalition, the Shah had no way to stay in power.

There is, however, more than the provision of personal benefits or the act of direct coercion keeping coalition members loyal to the leader. Another aspect key to political survival is what Bueno de Mesquita calls the loyalty norm, which considers the size of the ruling coalition in

⁵⁷ Parsa, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions*, 134, 145 and 243.

comparison to the selectorate.⁵⁸ Mesquita poses in his Selectorate Theory that the probability of inclusion into the ruling coalition improves as the size of the coalition increases and the size of the selectorate decreases.⁵⁹ Inversely, a lower ratio of the ruling coalition to selectorate increases the risk of exclusion in any future regime. This risk increases loyalty to the incumbent. Hence, leaders try to choose those who will have the greatest risk for exclusion or create conditions that increase this risk to the ruling coalition. A semi-authoritarian government that maintains a small ruling coalition and extends the right of suffrage to a large percentage of the residents in rigged elections is one example of such conditions. With a larger selectorate from which to draw members of the ruling coalition, the stability of the members' positions decreases and makes them more vulnerable to replacement. Additionally, if a challenger arises from the selectorate, the likelihood of selection of a new ruling coalition from the old is low. There is no guarantee of a position in the new regime as long as the new coalition remains smaller than the selectorate; especially if the new leader views their change of alliance as a liability for future loyalty.⁶⁰ Hence, loyalty to the leadership is greatest under these conditions allowing the leader to reduce the amount of private benefits he provides to the coalition, thus increasing personal gain.

So, what does this mean? An authoritarian regime remains stable through the establishment of structures and institutions that facilitate a loyal coalition and provide the means to coerce others who might threaten the coalition. Quite simply, it achieves this by ensuring the regime's coalition receives enough benefits to keep their support while suppressing any form of

⁵⁸ The defining characteristic of a polity is identification of its members. The selectorate is a set of people who meet a polity's criteria for enfranchisement in a society and thus have a say in the selection of its leaders. The remaining residents are the disenfranchised, which have made up a vast majority of the people throughout history. An important aspect of the selectorate is the opportunity to become part of the ruling coalition. The ruling coalition is a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size that its support provides the leadership with political power over the rest of the selectorate and disenfranchised groups. Traditionally, selection was a function of birthright, special skills or characteristics (ie. religious, military, technical), wealth, gender and age. In a democracy, the selectorate may include all of the adult citizens. Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, 39-51.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 67.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 66.

resistance. Additionally, these regimes create societal dependencies upon the regime that further suppresses opposition. A number of semi-authoritarian countries have shown the ability to adjust how they maintain loyalty, suppress opposition and create dependencies to appear to meet tenets inherent in liberalization and democratization.

Authoritarian leaders may tolerate or even promote liberalization. They do so to relieve existing pressures or to increase support for their regime. However, they do not want to alter their structure of authority, become accountable to their citizenry or subject their claim to rule to elections. Hence, authoritarian leaders will resist any form of liberalization that threatens their authority.⁶¹ Stephen King argues that authoritarian regimes have used the pressures of economic liberalization to jettison their populist social base by redistributing state owned enterprises and land to rent seeking bourgeoisie and landed elites who support the regime.⁶² To achieve market reforms they have used the guise of privatization to sell state owned enterprises and land to those elites close to the regime. These regimes further enticed these groups into their new coalition by selling the property at prices well below the actual value and facilitating such purchases through state bank financing.⁶³ This correlates directly to the premise that authoritarian regimes build their ruling coalition around those who contribute the most to their political survival by granting personal benefits.

King's second contention stipulates that authoritarian regimes have used multiparty structures to appease external pressures for democratization. Through the redistribution and solidification of elite support for their own party and a reduction of opposition party capacity, they have managed to resist external pressures for democratization while presenting the

⁶¹ O'Donnel and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 9-11.

⁶² Stephen J. King, "Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 122, no.3 (Fall 2007): 435-446.

⁶³ Stephen J. King, *Liberalization Against Democracy: The Local Politics of Economic Reform in Tunisia* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2003), 35-37; Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14-21.

appearance of democracy.⁶⁴ Francis Fukuyama adds, “The establishment of formal democracy in such a country masks enormous disparities in wealth, prestige, status, and power, which these elites can use to control the democratic process.”⁶⁵ Since the international community presupposes the existence of an open and somewhat level playing field in power distribution, semi-authoritarian regimes are able to implement this ruse through a multitude of coercive techniques intended to subvert resistance.⁶⁶ Repression is the most blatant form of coercion. However, considering the attempt to maintain an appearance of democratization, these regimes may employ approaches that are more underhanded. Such approaches may include establishing a ‘winner take all’ election system, assuming tactics that ‘divide and rule,’ or depriving the opposition of financing, space to work, and authority.⁶⁷ When external military forces remove an authoritarian regime, new regime leaders may use the previous authoritarian mechanisms for consolidating and retaining authority during liberalization and democratization efforts. After all, new leaders will draw upon their experience of governance rather than the western concepts of democracy.

Doctrinal and academic stabilization and conflict literature specify a number of conditions that cause conflict but none seems to explain how these conditions can exist in stable authoritarian regimes. This literature fails to realize that the factors considered as sources of conflict may actually help maintain an authoritarian regime’s survival.

⁶⁴ Stephen J. King, “Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa,” 459.

⁶⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992 [2006]), 118.

⁶⁶ Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged*, 207.

⁶⁷ Divide and rule tactics may force an opposition party to separate itself from a capability that poses a threat to the regime. Banning association with militias or radicals as a requirement for political participation is one such example. This technique was used to split Sadrist from the Awakening movement from militia groups during Iraqi elections. Additionally, the regime may seek to undermine an opposition party by granting authority to unelected individuals or by saturating the elections with multiple candidates to limit party support. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist, eds., *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 91-118, 143-168; Vickie Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes,” *Comparative Politics* 36 (January 2004): 193-220.

What Doctrine Fails to Consider About Authoritarian Regimes

To illustrate this point, it is necessary to evaluate the United States' framework for determining causes for instability against the previously articulated authoritarian regime's mechanisms for political survival. Regardless of the mixed results stemming from the many attempts at democratizing authoritarian polities, doctrinal and academic literature fail to identify what happens if an authoritarian regime is replaced without accounting for how the previous regime governed. A popular model for successful democratization remains the post WWII reconstruction of Germany and Japan, which has since influenced the development of the previously mentioned democratic reconstruction model and the U.S. doctrinal framework. Although many of the lessons learned from these two cases are worth considering during other exercises in stabilization and reconstruction, people tend to overlook that these countries were highly homogenous in their culture and societal norms, had a developed industrial base, and experienced some form of democracy prior to the war.⁶⁸ This is also true in a number of the South American countries touted for their re-democratization. A number of those countries emerged from an authoritarian regime but had experienced democratic institutions prior to their devolution and subsequent return to democracy.⁶⁹ In contrast, Iraq provides a different example of a polity that displayed all the attributes allowing an authoritarian regime to retain power while maintaining stability. Iraq, since it displayed many of the conditions the U.S. government identifies as causes for instability, also serves as a good specimen to help illustrate that some sources of conflict may actually help support an authoritarian regime's survival. Finally, Iraq's

⁶⁸ Bellin, Eva, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," in *Political Science Quarterly* 119 (Fall 2004): 595-608.

⁶⁹ Redemocratization refers to the restoration of democratic government as traditionally defined in both structural and procedural form. The structural form provides an arena of open, competitive political relationships (ie. political parties and unions) as part of the institutional character of the government. Procedural form is the guaranteed participation of citizens in the country's politics without fear of retribution. Peru (1980), Bolivia (1982), Argentina (1983), Uruguay (1984), Brazil (1985), Guatemala (1985), and Chile (1989) fall under the redemocratization category. George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl, Eds., *Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin America* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1987), 2-3.

Ba'ath regime maintained a tight control over the country ensuring a very stable polity. So why is it that an external force that was able to easily defeat the former regime's means for control found itself initially losing control?

Military doctrine emphasizes the requirement to address root causes for instability without fully identifying or categorizing those causes. The Army *Stability Operations* manual identifies some institutional weaknesses that can threaten the central government and lead to instability: ineffective governance, criminalization of the state, economic failure, external aggression, and internal strife due to disenfranchisement of large sections of the population.⁷⁰ The only other military doctrinal manual that provided any insight into the causes of conflict is the FM 3-0 *Operations*, which addresses a lack of national cohesion and weak or unpopular governments as potential causes of an insurgency. USAID, however, compensates for this lack of analysis in its Conflict Assessment Framework.

The USAID Conflict Assessment process seeks to determine causes of conflict within a state. USAID argues that the “development and humanitarian assistance in post-conflict societies needs to be sensitive to both the initial causes that led to the outbreak of conflict and to the destabilizing forces and vested interests that violence creates.”⁷¹ Although there are a number of conditions that correlate with conflict, they do not, in and of themselves, cause conflict. USAID's study suggests that conflict emerges from conditions that create motive, means and the opportunity. For conflict to occur there must be a combination of conditions representing all three of these causal categories. In which case, an event such as a natural disaster or an economic downturn creates a window of vulnerability. Once a government is vulnerable, then conflict is possible.

⁷⁰ FM 3-07, 1-10.

⁷¹ USAID, *Conducting Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development* (April 2005), 8.

The first causal category includes structural or root causes such as grievances or greed, which provide ‘motive’ for participating in violence. Such motives may include ethnic or religious grievances, poor economic conditions (poverty, unemployment, stagnate/negative growth), competition over natural resources, and destabilizing demographic shifts. Misagh Parsa, in his comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines, suggests that exclusive rule and an economic situation that only benefits a minority generates grievances that provide motive for social revolution.⁷² Another study of civil war found that deep poverty, fractionalized ethnic groups and undemocratic polities are associated with conflict.⁷³ The Collier-Hoeffler Model, however, notes that most proxies for grievances such as inequality, political rights, and ethnic polarization were insufficient for conflict. The C-H Model agrees with USAID’s claim that motive, alone, is insufficient for instability.⁷⁴

Authoritarian regimes often display the conditions that offer a motive. However, these conditions actually help the regime to retain authority vice causing conflict. To maintain loyalty within its coalition, the regime purposely creates a divide between the ruling coalition and the rest of the population. The regime extracts wealth from the state and consolidates it within the coalition, thereby, creating an affinity to the regime. The removal of wealth from the population also denies them the funding to facilitate opposition. By further oppressing the populace, members of the coalition have an incentive to side with the regime, rather than the alternative of falling outside the coalition if they dissent. As long as these members are such that they allow the

⁷² Parsa argues that regimes exhibiting such conditions have a potential for conflict but for large-scale insurgencies to occur the opportunities emerge only when there is a disruption in the balance of power from the division of elites. State intervention in economic and other social matters can serve to exclude major social classes causing a shift in loyalties. Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 19- 25.

⁷³ Based upon studies to understand the causes of civil wars by Henderson and Singer, (2000); Hegre et al, (2001); Collier and Hoeffler, (2002); Reynal-Querol, (2002); and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Seonjou Kang, “Post-conflict Economic Development and Sustaining the Peace,” 220.

⁷⁴ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Nicholas Sambanis, “The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design,” in *Understanding Civil War*, eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005), 17-18.

regime to sustain order and control the population, the population has no recourse but to submit. Additionally, the regime may ensure the population obtains its entire livelihood through the government, making the subject population dependent on the regime. The population is, therefore, less likely to rise up against the ‘hand that feeds them.’

Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq displayed all these characteristics. Saddam rewarded members of the Ba’ath party with land and position and instilled fear within the population by using his security apparatus to harshly oppress any opposition. Furthermore, through the Public Distribution System (PDS) he made the populace dependent on the regime.⁷⁵

Authoritarian regimes like Saddam Hussein’s are just as capable of denying the means for opposition as they are at creating the incentives for opposition. This means for opposition comprises USAID’s second category for conflict. The second category examines whether the individuals or groups with the motive for violence actually have the means to act out against the regime. The USAID framework stipulates that organizational, financial and human resources compose the means for conflict. The actor with motive must have the organizational capacity to sustain the violence. This organizational capacity must provide the ability to create a sense of solidarity and be able to monitor individual members within the group. Ethnic, religious, clans and social groups may perform such a role. The actor must also have access to money, weapons and be able to recruit resistance fighters. The Collier-Hoeffler analysis of quantitative indicators

⁷⁵ In 1996, under the UN’s Oil-for-Food Program, Iraq’s food ration system was expanded to provide the population a basket of basic food items needed to sustain existence. These items included rice, flour, sugar, tea, cooking oil, pulses milk powder and iodized salt. This food basket, now called the Public Distribution System, is distributed through a network of about 45,000 local grocers and other agents, with the food imported from abroad and supplied to the local distribution agents through Iraqi state owned enterprises. There is not currently a social safety net fully developed in Iraq. The Public Distribution System (PDS) is the one stabilizing factor throughout Iraq. It provides the entire population with a vital food basket, on which a large percent of the population of Iraq is dependent. Iraq Strategic Review Board, *National Development Strategy: 2005-2007* (June 30, 2005), 8, [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Iraq-NDS-July14-FINALFINAL\[1\].pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Iraq-NDS-July14-FINALFINAL[1].pdf) (assessed October 14, 2009).

for civil war opportunities and grievances found that dispersed populations and homogeneous societies increase the risk of conflict. Dispersed population and homogeneous societies provide means for organization. In addition, the Collier-Hoeffler study showed the risk of conflict was proportional to a country's population; the larger the population, the larger the capacity for potential recruitment. The Collier-Hoeffler analysis supports USAID's claim that means encompasses the ability to organize, fund, equip and recruit fighters.

As previously discussed, an authoritarian regime builds its coalition from those elites in society who best allow control of the population. A security apparatus combined with the support of religious figures and economic elites provides the regime control over every aspect of the population. If the regime effectively prevents the population from organizing or obtaining weapons, then the population, no matter how large, will pose no threat to the regime.

In Iraq, the regime retained control over every aspect of society. Although the Shia comprised approximately 60 percent of the population, Saddam Hussein suppressed their capability to oppose his authority. The opposition could not organize because they feared the regime's spies, and the army or Hussein's secret police quickly and harshly eliminated any such attempts. Without a means to threaten the regime, neither the Shia population nor the Kurds were able to capitalize on their motive to threaten the regime.

As previously specified, Saddam never gave the opposition an opportunity to resist his authority. This opportunity is USAID's third causal category. A government's legitimacy and effectiveness will either address or exacerbate motives for opposition. If the government is unable to effectively control the society, those with motive now have the opportunity to resist the regime. Governmental institutions may be effective and reduce opportunity for conflict by addressing grievances and creating policy that blocks access to resources. Conversely, governments may

provide opportunity for the opposition to rebel if the regime is ineffective and only able to fuel discontent through repression, lack of representation and corruption.⁷⁶

Robert I. Rotberg, the president of the World Peace Foundation, suggests that states fail “because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants;” such goods being security, rule of law, participation in the political process, healthcare, education and infrastructure.⁷⁷ Moreover, he identifies lack of security and ineffective governance as failed state characteristics. Rotberg clarifies that lack of security includes civil war, failure to control borders and growth in criminal violence. He also notes that ineffective governance consists of degraded essential public goods, flawed institutions, deteriorating or destroyed infrastructure, deteriorating education and health, economic decline, and lost legitimacy.⁷⁸ In 2004, the Center for Strategic and International Studies reviewed post-conflict reconstruction. In the report, Robert Orr argues that civil war, military defeat by an outside source, and intrinsic weakness due to underdevelopment lead to state failure.⁷⁹ Todd Landman argues that a quantitative comparison of many countries revealed state strength and repression significantly affected opportunity for conflict. If a state was too weak to repress opposition, conflict occurred. Subsequent few-country studies also found state strength and repression important but also emphasized rebellious histories, class conflict and coalitions, ideology and external influences.⁸⁰ These authors’ characterizations of the inefficiencies of governance support USAID’s position that illegitimate and ineffective governments provide

⁷⁶ USAID, *Conducting Conflict Assessment*, 25.

⁷⁷ Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *State Failures and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), 1.

⁷⁸ Rotberg, *State Failures and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, 5-9.

⁷⁹ Robert C. Orr, ed., *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), 8.

⁸⁰ Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction 3rd ed.* (London: Routledge, 2008), 157.

opportunity for conflict. However, the authors fail to associate ineffective governance as specifically causing conflict.

The degree of instability seems to rest with the ability of the government to address motive or suppress the means to act upon the motives. The government, if corrupt or unable to provide services, may provoke grievances that instill motive to remove the regime. However, without the means to carry out this motive, the regime suffers no threat. This is why stable authoritarian regimes employ mechanisms to contain, buy-off, or destroy any challenge. USAID characterizes corruption and failure to represent the population as ineffective governance. When it comes to stability, what matters is the ability to establish and maintain order, which is something authoritarian polities are quite capable of considering that this remains essential to their survival. Saddam Hussein's regime proved to be both effective and able to maintain order although his regime created conditions USAID also characterized as motive for instability. When the U.S. led coalition removed the regime without considering Hussein's mechanisms for maintaining control, they created the opportunity for underlying tensions to surface and new tensions to develop, resulting in an unstable environment.

Iraq:

Under Saddam Hussein's authoritarian regime, the state of Iraq was stable. The regime's security apparatus permitted Hussein to control most aspects of his citizens' lives and effectively repress opposition. The government owned most property, infrastructure and businesses and operated a command economy. Only a few elites of the Ba'ath party actually owned land or businesses. In rural areas, agriculture was the primary employer with the government providing subsidies in the form of seed, fertilizer, and electricity.⁸¹ The government also very closely

⁸¹ Iraqi agriculture accounts for 10% of the GDP and 25% of the employments. Information gathered through interviews with Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team Agricultural Expert (Mr. James Bright, USDA) and Minister of Agriculture and Provincial Council employees during field research for

regulated farms managing everything from veterinary assignments to types of crops grown. Most of the produce went back to the government for its use and to be meted out as part of the Public Distribution System (PDS). The state employed a large number of citizens in State Owned Enterprises, the government, civil service jobs and the army. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, Iraq had one of the more advanced education and health care systems in the region. The government was secular in its operation, with Hussein acting as the supreme dictator.

When the U.S. led coalition overthrew Hussein's regime in 2003, the very institutions and structure that the country had been operating under for so long went away almost overnight. No longer were agriculture, state owned enterprises and other businesses subsidized. The new interim government rationed electricity based upon population distributions with little to no consideration given to infrastructure or governmental requirements. Without adequate electricity to operate businesses and other infrastructure, an already decrepit system began to fall apart. Additionally, the unrestrained opening of the borders to imports flooded the market with products making it hard for the Iraqi economy to compete.⁸² Imported appliances also placed a drain on the poorly regulated electrical system adding to the demand on an already insufficient electrical supply. The coalition forces failed to realize the impact of transitioning from a socialist system of government to capitalism nor did they account for how the infrastructure was previously organized and operated. No longer able to make a living in agriculture, many farmers and their families moved to the cities. Additionally, the demobilization of the army left many others unemployed. Baghdad, alone, expanded in population by over 2 million people.⁸³ Baghdad's urban infrastructure, hardly sufficient to support the pre-war population, was woefully inadequate

interagency planning development. *MND-B and PRT-B Baghdad Province Joint Common Plan* (21 June 2008).

⁸² *MND-B and PRT-B Baghdad Province Joint Common Plan*, 4-6, 64-67.

⁸³ Iraq's last official population census occurred in 1997. Post-war estimates on population size in Baghdad based upon surveys, unofficial coalition, and government data collection within the districts.

for the new post-war population increase. Fortunately, the interim coalition government maintained the PDS, which continued to supply Iraqis with their basic needs, thus preventing a humanitarian crisis.

The interim coalition government removed all Ba'ath party members from government and worked to institute a parliamentary democracy drawn from those not affiliated with the Ba'ath party. This, in turn, disenfranchised a large portion of the population, not to mention many of the social and professional elite.⁸⁴ Consequently, de-Ba'athification created a drain in the human capital needed to administer the country. In addition, many citizens, who were repressed under Saddam's regime, used this transition as an opportunity to conduct revenge killings or to take property.⁸⁵ All of these issues, coming together all at the same time, created more than enough grievances to provide what USAID categorizes as 'motive' for resistance.

Tribal and sectarian affiliations provided a basis for disenfranchised Sunni organization. Also providing support to these groups was an underground guerilla network that Saddam had established prior to the coalition force occupation. In addition, the coalition did not consider an Iran supported Shia movement organizing for authority that was also only accustomed to the previous regimes institutions and mechanisms for control. The opposition groups further had a large number of unemployed military age males available for recruitment. With the country awash in weapons and munitions, the opposition groups were easily armed. Stockpiles were located everywhere. Furthermore, external actors provided recruits, funding, weapons and

⁸⁴ In the summer of 2002 Thomas Warrick from the State Department led a think tank made up primarily of Iraqi Diaspora known as the Future of Iraq Project. This group noted that a coalition removal of Ba'athist member job benefits would affect 50 percent of the workforce in key state facilities. Working Group on Transitional Justice in Iraq, *The Future of Iraq Project- Transitional Justice*, ed. Department of State (2003).

⁸⁵ The Future of Iraq Project working group also noted that different groups would take advantage of regime removal. One such group would be those intent on looting, consisting of released criminals, as well as those seeking to use the opportunity to better themselves. Tribal groups would resort to protecting their own whether it involved detainees or those asking for protection within the tribe. Groups concerned with score settling would also arise during this period along with those concerned with ideology changes. Finally, former regime members would seek to discredit the new government. Ibid.

sanctuaries. Underestimating the volatility of the post-war situation, the interim coalition government initially lacked the capability to control the porous borders and provide internal security. Insufficient coalition force size combined with the demobilization of the Iraqi Army further exacerbated the security situation. Initially, coalition forces were unable to deny insurgent groups the means to operate nor were they able to deny sanctuary.⁸⁶ The coalition's inability to enforce order or to address underlying tensions created an 'opportunity' for conflict, which ultimately turned into a full-blown insurgency.

Summary

A close examination of the inherent structural aspects of authoritarian regimes discloses differences the stabilization doctrinal model does not consider. Authoritarian regimes create a system that depends on certain allegiances and dependencies to retain authority and maintain stability. These regimes purposely create conditions the U.S. considers detrimental to stability to achieve these ends. Authoritarian regimes may be open to Western liberalization only to the point that it does not reduce their authority. These regimes will outwardly appear to be liberalizing and adopting democratic norms to satisfy the international community's concerns but internally the regime will continue to retain authority. When this elaborate system of manipulating the loyalties of societal elites, suppressing opposition and creating dependencies is removed, the government's control is undermined. Competing elites are only familiar with the previous regime's mechanisms of government, and a disgruntled population remains dependent on the new government but now with unrepressed expectations. If the new developing regime is unwilling or unable to reduce surfacing tensions and respond to the growing expectations, instability will follow.

⁸⁶ Leonard Binder, et al., "The Crisis of Political Development," in *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, (Princeton University Press, 1971), 63.

Transition Requires a Governance Emphasis

Deposing an authoritarian regime requires attention to governance rather than democratization. Democratization includes building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal constitutional framework for elections.⁸⁷ A World Bank study that addresses civil war suggests that a sensible approach would be to place greater emphasis on reforming political institutions because democratic polities are more effective once the country has reached middle-income levels.⁸⁸ However, the study warns that democratic institutions are extremely unstable in low-income countries dependent on primary commodities. Since many post-conflict countries are low-income, the predicament arises on whether to inculcate democratic institutions from the start or to focus on basic governance and economic growth until the conditions are ripe for democracy to take hold. Unfortunately, the international community has taken a minimalist approach on many occasions. As an exit strategy, donor countries provided aid initially and promoted free and fair elections as their approach to democratization.⁸⁹ However, a free and fair election does not necessarily bring about democracy.⁹⁰ Hence, focusing on developing governance remains a more reliable method for alleviating those tensions that emerge from authoritarian transitions.

The first section of this monograph posited that the American political perspective views the Western approach to liberalization and democratization as valid for transition to democracy. Both the historical legacies of first and second ‘wave’ democratic transitions and academic reconstruction and development literature support this inference. The second section argued, however, that authoritarian regimes build institutions and employ mechanisms to retain authority

⁸⁷ Dobbins, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, 14.

⁸⁸ Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 123.

⁸⁹ Robert C. Orr, “Governing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 61.

⁹⁰ Herman J. Cohen, “Africa and the Superpower-An Agenda for Peace,” in *Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa*, eds. Gunner Sorbo and Peter Vale (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), 176.

and maintain order that may impede the doctrine's framework for democratization. Conversely, when abruptly removing these institutions and mechanisms, instability often erupted. Instead of simply replacing one polity for another, efforts should focus on transforming governance in a manner that retains the capability to maintain order while building capacity to address the grievances. Establishing governance first, while easing incrementally into liberal reform and establishment of democratic principles, will facilitate a smoother transition to democracy.

Incrementally Balancing Governmental Capacity with Liberal Reform

In the current environment, non-Western countries do not necessarily have an affinity for Western liberal principles and may even see them as a threat. Marina Ottaway contends that opening a country up to liberalization undoubtedly allows previously repressed ideas to bubble up; so what actually surfaces depends upon what was there.⁹¹ She goes on to point out that the conditions allowing for the development of democracy in Western countries evolved from a long process of socioeconomic transformation. She provides as one example the rise of the gentry in the seventeenth century as contributing to the democratic evolution of Britain.⁹² Additionally, the United States has spent the last 200 years becoming the democracy it is today. Considering the means used by authoritarian regimes to facilitate a loyal coalition and coerce its population from resisting authority often deny the population social and economic advantages, any change to the status quo may produce new tensions or 'let out' preexisting tensions leading to instability. Liberalization and democratization, therefore, require incremental steps to avoid too many societal changes at once.

Samuel Huntington contends that the prevailing assumption of American policy that economic development and social reform are necessary for political development and stability is

⁹¹ Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged*, 9.

⁹² Ibid., 11.

false. In some cases, economic development and social reform may reduce tensions and encourage change while in other circumstances they may exacerbate tensions and precipitate violence. He argues that political instability and disorder result from “the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change;” social and economic change (urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion) extends political consciousness, multiplies political demands and broadens participation, which tends to undermine traditional political authority and institutions.⁹³ Consequently, governmental capacity to address societal demands must expand equal to or in front of social reform and economic development.

The Selectorate Theory supports Huntington’s premise. The Selectorate Theory explains the fragility of regimes in transition by highlighting the mechanisms by which support was maintained. As expansion of participation increases the size of the ruling coalition, the leader must expand the amount of private goods he provides.⁹⁴ Since authoritarian regimes convert public resources to private goods and these resources are finite, there may not be enough state revenue to compensate each member as the ruling coalition grows. The leader must, therefore, resort to public goods to include more of the coalition. With this decrease in private goods, there is no longer a benefit to being a part of the ruling coalition or a risk to being outside the coalition. Until public goods expand to a certain threshold where the advantages of public goods equal the advantages of the original private goods, the overall welfare for all, to include elites, initially

⁹³ Huntington notes that the instability in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, specifically between 1958-1962, had roots in rapid social change and mobilization, which outpaced governance capacity. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 5-7.

⁹⁴ Private goods are personal benefits a regime does not normally provide to the rest of the population. These benefits may include monetary rewards, positions of authority, and property. In contrast, public goods are benefits available to all the population and may include human capital (education), rule of law (judicial, penal, and police) essential services, political rights, civil liberties, health care and physical capital (i.e. transportation services). Bruce Mesquite de Bueno, *The Logic of Political Survival*, 96-198, 324.

decreases exasperating pre-existing conditions (figure 2).⁹⁵ These changes in the political system further increase societal expectations leading to even more demands on the leader to provide for the general welfare of the society. If the leader does not provide to the citizens' satisfaction, they can switch their support to a challenger with reduced risk. If the challenger is unwilling or incapable of meeting these demands then the citizens may become disillusioned with the idea of democracy opening the door for further conflict or the resurgence of a strongman. Opening up avenues of expression to populations previously repressed creates demands upon the new government that exceeds the new government's capacity. Emphasis on participation thus weakens the government's control and contributes to instability.

Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Governance to Maintain Order

Metaphorically speaking, an authoritarian regime is similar to a pressure cooker. The metal confines of the pan are like the regimes mechanisms of control. The cooker works by adding heat to steam built up in a confined space. If the lid is removed without first reducing the pressure, the contents burst. Similarly, as discussed in the previous section, an authoritarian regime will create tensions within its society that actually facilitate retention of power. If the mechanisms that maintained order are removed along with the authoritarian regime before existing conditions are improved, what is inside will inevitably burst. The addition of any new demands brought about through liberalization will further aggravate the situation. For this reason, the government must retain the capacity to maintain order during the process of liberalization and democratization. However, the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction doctrine fails to recognize that authoritarian regimes purposely create and maintain control over societal tensions to coerce certain loyalties and dependencies within the population. As a result, the doctrine does not

⁹⁵ Bruce Mesquite de Bueno, *The Logic of Political Survival*, 96.

address how to adequately remove or transform these control mechanisms during democratization.

The USAID Fragile States Strategy notes that instability associated with fragile states is a product of ineffective and illegitimate government. Effectiveness is a measure of the capability of the government to provide order, public goods and services; legitimacy is the perception of important segments of society that the government exercises authority reasonably well and in the interests of the nation.⁹⁶ This document clearly identifies the central government as the focus for stability and is reminiscent of President James Madison's injunction in *Federalist, No. 51*, "You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."⁹⁷ Why would the central government ability to control the governed be a primary focus? Max Weber, in his lecture to students at Munich University, theorized that something is "a 'state' if and insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of violence in the enforcement of its order."⁹⁸ Thomas Hobbes also supported a strong central government contending that this was the only way to maintain order within society. How then, can regimes use coercion to control their populations and still be legitimate?

Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* defines why legitimacy is important to stability. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Those who rule through the consent of the governed are described as legitimate while those who rule primarily through coercion are illegitimate.⁹⁹ Legitimacy is, however, relative to popular perception. The consent of the governed may be different based upon cultural perspectives. Western liberal traditions for

⁹⁶ USAID, *Fragile States Strategy* (January 2005), 3.

⁹⁷ This text highlights a priority of governance development even over the checks and balances to be placed on it, a concern that Madison sought to assure citizens concerned with a strong central government. *The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay*, ed. Garry Wills (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 262.

⁹⁸ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (1964), 154.

⁹⁹ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (2006), 1-21.

legitimacy correlate to the maintenance of human rights, being responsive to citizens, exercising effective sovereignty, and abiding by legal restraints.¹⁰⁰ In contrast, some cultures adhere to principles that believe legitimate authority to be a birthright. The concept that perception defines legitimacy may better explain why authoritarian regimes are often stable. Either the populace has, to some degree, accepted the regime as legitimate for various reasons and, therefore, submitted to tighter governmental controls, or the regime's means for enforcing submission is so great the populace has no other choice. Whatever the reason for a former regime's legitimacy, what is clear is that a transitional or new regime must retain the previous regime's effectiveness in providing civil order. Otherwise, the new regime will lose any hope of legitimacy in the eyes of the indigenous population.

Summary

Western methods of liberalization and democratization open up avenues of expression within previously repressed societies. However, liberalization and democratization also create demands upon the new government that may exceed the new regime's capacity. Additionally, removing the previous regime's mechanisms for coercion may lead to the population acting on previously suppressed grievances. Thus, transition from an authoritarian regime must balance governmental capacity and legitimacy with social reform and economic development.

Conclusion

Democracy is not the primary factor in long-term stability, good governance is. There are many examples throughout history where authoritarian governments are stable and democracies are not. Notwithstanding, it is not the intent of this paper to prove democratization as a poor course for the U.S. to follow in stabilizing countries. On the contrary, the idea of democracy, when effective and legitimate, addresses motive, means, and opportunity for instability. However,

¹⁰⁰ FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 1-7.

the American political philosophy articulated into doctrine emphasizes methods of liberalization and democratization consistent with ‘western’ state transformation. The methods applicable to the democratization in the United States and some western countries are not necessarily indicative of what is relevant in authoritarian regimes. These regimes have inherent structural differences the doctrinal model does not consider. The structural aspects that create certain societal conditions, which current doctrine identifies as sources for conflict, allow these regimes to survive and may linger beyond the removal of the authoritarian regimes. This is why doctrine must address the logic of authoritarian political survival when seeking to stabilize and transition such a regime. Instead of simply replacing one polity for another and starting anew, efforts should focus on governance transformation that retains the capability to maintain order while incrementally building capacity to address the grievances resulting from an authoritarian regime’s coercive measures and the expansion in new demands because of liberal reform. Although the difference between a governance and democracy focus is subtle, the difference can affect how designers prioritize and execute stability, reconstruction and development. Although doctrine includes all the tenets necessary for building a stable state, a democratic endstate may be inconsistent with the host nation’s historical, geographical, social, cultural, political and economic identity. It is therefore necessary for interagency doctrine to consider a design that emphasizes governance first. This design should balance the need for governmental capacity and legitimacy with societal needs and participation.

APPENDIX

Figure 1. Consolidated stabilization LOEs (US Institute of Peace Endstate/ OBJs; S/CRS stability sectors, phases, goals; DOD stability primary tasks)





Figure 2. As coalition size increases, leadership must transition from private goods to public. Initially, overall welfare drops then begins to rise as public goods increase. This is potentially an unstable environment until the level of public goods reaches an acceptable level



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