Greece and Oman: Successful Anglo/American Counterinsurgencies Viewed from Current American Counterinsurgency Doctrine
Abstract
The events of September 11, 2001, catapulted America's military into two wars, and the possibility of others is looming on the horizon. The type of warfare the U.S. military is conducting is far different from what it trained for during the last quarter of a century. Because the enemy and the environment in which the fighting takes place are different from before, the expectations placed upon the U.S. military have changed as well. To guide its actions, the Army, in concert with the Marine Corps, has created a new counterinsurgency doctrine that is set forth in FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency." Although counterinsurgency is new to today's military, this type of conflict is not novel. The United States, Great Britain, and numerous other countries have fought counterinsurgencies in the past. This monograph analyzes two successful counterinsurgency efforts of the past: the United States in Greece from 1947 to 1949, and Great Britain in Oman from 1964 to 1975. These counterinsurgencies are viewed through the lens of the principles, paradoxes, and imperatives advocated in FM 3-24.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 12, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA513085
Entities
People
- Cloyd A. Smith Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College