

Transforming the Army Division in an Era of Persistent Conflict

A Monograph

by

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
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
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
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Abstract

TRANSFORMING THE ARMY DIVISION IN AN ERA OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT by MAJ Jennifer A. Munro, U.S. Army, 71 pages.

In this era of persistent conflict, America needs an Army that is agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptable. In fact, the U.S. Army has been calling for this type of force structure since the end of the Cold War. By making the brigade combat team the primary tactical unit, and focal point of ground forces, the Army is undergoing its most significant change in over 50 years. In spite of the transformation efforts from 1999 through 2007, the Army remains ill prepared to face an era of persistent conflict. The Army struggles with how to employ its forces in today's complex environment because of structure.

When the Army transformed to a brigade centric force, ground forces gained the tactical capabilities and flexibility promised. What the Army lost was the role and purpose of the division. Administrative, training, and expeditionary tasks executed by divisions throughout history identified shortcomings in divisional structure and encouraged change. Divisional structures flexible enough to synchronize subordinate elements and maximize adaptive behavior will be required in the era of persistent conflict.

Unlike its roles in administration and training, the division is unfamiliar with the expeditionary requirements the current environment implies. The staff must be able to plan for contingencies across the full-spectrum of operations and synchronize the efforts of joint, interagency, and multi-national partners. Additionally, the division staff must maintain a perspective that allows them to become a catalyst for adaptation. Divesting the division of its many assets is the first step in ensuring the staff is able to focus on analysis and situational understanding in an ever-changing environment. The era of persistent conflict promises to require more adaptive behavior than demanded of divisions in previous eras.

Due to the stability needed in administration and training, but the flexibility needed for expeditionary deployment, the roles cannot be accomplished by the same staff. The division staff must be organized to readily absorb and integrate change. They must be as flexible as their subordinate structures. The modular division must transform to an appropriately sized and resourced joint organization. An expeditionary joint task force headquarters and staff that represent their modular components, synchronize assets, and exhibit adaptive behavior will lead the Army through the challenges of persistent conflict.

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Introduction

We will confront highly adaptive and intelligent adversaries who will exploit technology, information, and cultural differences to threaten U.S. interests. Operations in the future will be executed in complex environments and will range from peace engagement, to counterinsurgency, to major combat operations. This era of persistent conflict will result in high demand for Army forces and capabilities.¹

In this era of persistent conflict, America needs an Army that is agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptable. In fact, the U.S. Army has been calling for this type of force structure since the end of the Cold War. By making the brigade combat team (BCT) the primary tactical unit, and focal point of ground forces, the Army is undergoing its most significant change in over 50 years. How this change will meet the needs of the current and future environment remains to be seen.²

The “Brigade Revolution,” where the Army transformed their force to a brigade centric structure, was touted as a drastic change affecting policy, training, doctrine, culture, and personnel in addition to organization. Since General Shinseki’s announcement of the Interim Brigade Combat Team in 1999, little has changed in ten years. Sweeping organizational modifications were made, divisional assets pushed down to BCTs, new technologies and platforms introduced, training and doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare developed. Yet, there was no revolution. Invading Iraq in 2003 looked surprisingly similar to the Gulf War in 1991. American

¹Department of the Army, *2008 Army Posture Statement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 26 February 2008).

²Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008). Agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptable are not a direct quote from any document. Rather, they are the author’s summary of what is presented in the *2008 Army Posture Statement* and the 2008 publication of Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. Definitions of these four criteria are described later in this paper.

commanders in Baghdad in 2004 described frustration with pacification efforts in much the same manner as their predecessors in the Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam. The active force, stretched by years of continual combat action, complained about the complications and inadequacies of mobilizing Army Reserve and National Guard troops in 2005 and 2006. Reports by units in Iraq and Afghanistan readdressed some of the same problems faced by units mobilizing for World War II. It is questionable whether transformation has occurred.

Transformation miraculously alters the appearance and nature of something. BCTs have increased capabilities but little depth within their structures to command and control their numerous assets. Divisions are left with only their headquarters, but those have not changed much. Corps and armies remain the same. Transformation has not been a transformation at all, and the problems transformation sought to solve continue to harass the Department of Defense. The Army remains plagued with a shortage of personnel to accomplish their mission, troops who are stretched to the breaking point, two on-going conflicts at least one of which has lost popular support, and a force structure that is neither effective nor efficient.³

In order to be effective, the Army must be able to achieve its missions successfully. The *2008 Army Modernization Strategy* calls for a two-prong approach toward achieving that goal: restoring balance and achieving full-spectrum dominance. According to the strategy, the Army seeks to restore balance through three imperatives: prepare, reset, and transform. Previous modernization and transformation strategies included discussions of redesigning the force

³See *2001 to 2008 Army Posture Statements* and *2001 to 2008 Army Campaign Plans/Army Modernization Plans* for the Army's official perspective on these issues. Comparisons to former conflicts are available in many forms but can be referenced in the works by Greenfield, Birtle, Huchthausen, and McGrath from the Bibliography.

structure to better apply technology and doctrinal innovation. Of the four elements of modernization to deliver needed capabilities to the Army, none includes a comprehensive look at unit structure.⁴ In spite of the transformation efforts from 1999 through 2007, the Army remains ill prepared to face an era of persistent conflict. The reason for its ineptness is not technology. Instead, the Army struggles with how to employ its forces in today's complex environment because of structure. When the Army transformed to a brigade centric force, ground forces gained the tactical capabilities and flexibility promised. What the Army lost was the role and purpose of the division.

This paper discusses the contemporary environment for the purpose of defining and discovering the division's role post-transformation. While each of the topics considered continue to foster debate in military communities, it is not possible to present them comprehensively here. Instead, this paper takes the era of persistent conflict as a valid assumption regarding the current and near future environment. What the era of persistent conflict implies for the execution of missions at the division level is evaluated. The brigade will remain the tactical focus of the Army-- at least for the near future. Fundamental concepts behind a brigade-centric army include that a complex strategic environment will require multiple small force deployments, that lower level tactical units can adapt more quickly than organizations under hierarchal control, and that different missions require different force structures. Joint and interagency organizations are

⁴The four elements of the *2008 Army Modernization Strategy* are: rapidly field the best new equipment to the current force; upgrade and modernize existing systems within modular formations to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they need; incorporate new technologies derived from future combat systems research and development as they become available; and field future combat systems brigade combat teams. Department of the Army, *2008 Army Modernization Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 25 July 2008), 10.

becoming more prevalent throughout the government and the era of persistent conflict will require continued coordination.

Therefore, the Army must develop a structure to prepare and employ BCTs against a variety of threats by executing the range of full-spectrum operations. Ground forces must be agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptable. In order to evaluate transformation on these criteria, definitions are in order. According to Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, agility is the ability to move and adjust quickly and easily. Generally, agility is used to describe how well forces can deploy into a theater of operations and assume their mission. In order to be an expeditionary Army “capable of deploying rapidly into any operational environment, conducting operations with modular forces anywhere in the world, and sustaining operations as long as necessary to accomplish the mission,” units must be agile.⁵ Yet, agility is not enough. As the continuous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, sustaining that tempo comes at a cost. A balanced Army is one in which the sustainable supply of forces meets or exceeds the nation’s demand. Balance also means that forces have the time and resources to train and prepare for the full-spectrum of operations anticipated in an era of persistent conflict. Balance provides predictability for soldiers and families, but more importantly, strategic depth for the nation.⁶ Agility and balance prepare soldiers and units for worldwide contingencies. Synchronization and adaptation ensure units can execute those missions successfully.

⁵Department of the Army, *2008 Army Posture Statement*, 4.

⁶Department of the Army, *2008 Modernization Strategy*, 7.

Synchronization is defined as “the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.”⁷ Synchronized units are inherently coordinated across the military services to achieve their objectives effectively. They “operate as members of joint, interagency, and multinational teams.”⁸ While the *Goldwater-Nichols Defense Act of 1986* created structures to encourage synchronization, they occurred at much higher levels than the BCT. At the tactical level, synchronization is still a struggle based on command structures and interoperability issues. The era of persistent conflict indicates, however, that synchronization will be required to employ the effects of the military and nation successfully.⁹ Adaptation, like synchronization, is necessary for effective military operations. Every military force, regardless of era, has encountered unanticipated situations or circumstances. Increased technology, sensors, and superior intelligence will not change this fact of warfare. In fact, every opponent seeks to exploit opportunities for which his adversary is unprepared. Surprise has been a principle of war since ancient times. Adaptation helps a military force overcome the unexpected; it is the ability to change to the circumstances. The Army’s Field Manual, *Operations* stated, “Today’s operational environment requires Army forces to continuously evaluate and adapt their

⁷ FM 3-0, *Operations*, uses the Joint Publication 2-0 definition for synchronization.

⁸ Department of the Army, *2008 Army Posture Statement*, 4.

⁹ The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Act established joint synchronization requirements at the Geographic Combatant Command level, about four echelons of hierarchy above the tactical level. *Lessons Learned Observations from 82nd Airborne Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom (FOUO)*. Available from the Center for Army Lessons Learned. This report, among others, discussed problems with synchronization with other services, to include interagency and multinational partners. Interoperability will not be discussed in this paper, but is a significant constraint to synchronization that is being considered as part of modernization efforts.

tactics to ensure that they are appropriate.”¹⁰ Nearly every military document in the past two decades used adapt to describe tactics, personnel, or units in conjunction with their response to the environment. In light of the era of persistent conflict, where the future environment and adversary are less known and ill-defined, adaptive characteristics of Army units become increasingly important.

The four characteristics of agility, balance, synchronization, and adaptability are critical for success in the era of persistent conflict. None are new to the military. Each has proven vital under certain circumstances, and those circumstances converge in today’s current environment. Maintaining a focus on these four characteristics while transforming Army structures will produce a future force ready for the challenges ahead.

Transformation of the Army, as initiated in 1999, introduced the concept of building a force that was strategically responsive and dominant along the entire spectrum of operations. Modularity and modernization have eclipsed the term transformation in current Army statements. The absence of the term indicates that the transformation intended has either occurred and the Army has moved on to another phase of growth or that transformation was cast aside in favor of other concepts. In fact, neither is true. The intent of transformation has not been realized, important aspects of transformation are critical to the future success of the expeditionary Army, and many of those aspects of transformation are no longer incorporated in the current modernization plan of the Modular Force. To achieve the agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptive force required to meet the needs of the nation, the Army should look beyond the BCTs of

¹⁰Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-3.

the Modular Force. Echelons above brigade have a long history of providing the necessary administrative and operational control to support tactical engagements. Success in the era of persistent conflict will depend on appropriate application of those echelons.

An Era of Persistent Conflict

When Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Army Chief of Staff General George Casey submitted the *2008 Army Posture Statement* to Congress, the idea of persistent conflict was not new. General Casey had been talking about persistent conflict since he took the post of Army Chief of Staff, and since April 2007 he has worked to make it popular. General Casey's term is a result of years of analysis and debate. It includes more than his direct definition of persistent conflict as a "period of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who are increasingly willing to use violence to accomplish their political and ideological objectives." Persistent conflict inherently includes the exacerbating effects of globalization, technology, and extremism. It means maintaining U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan while preparing the Army to meet unforeseen challenges across a broad spectrum of operations.¹¹

Persistent conflict, as a concept, however, did not begin with General Casey. For over 20 years, since the end of the Cold war, military and civilian practitioners have written about the

¹¹See articles and speeches from General Casey and other senior Army leaders in 2007 and 2008. Some examples are: Elizabeth M. Lorge, "Chief Sees Future of 'Persistent Conflict,'" 9 October 2007, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/10/09/5516-chief-sees-future-of-persistent-conflict/> (accessed March 6, 2009); Jim Garamone, "Casey Says Army Must Be Prepared for 'Persistent Conflict,'" *American Forces Press Service* (11 May 2007), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/05/mil-070511-afps01.htm> (accessed March 6, 2009); General George Casey Jr. "Meeting the Challenges of Persistent Conflict in the 21st Century," Commencement Speech at Georgetown University, April 2008, <http://explore.georgetown.edu/news/?ID=33558> (accessed March 9, 2009). The direct quote comes from this speech, during which he also describes the other factors which contribute to persistent conflict.

changing environment and how armed conflict will manifest itself in the developing future. The Army and U.S. Marine Corps introduced Fourth Generation Warfare in 1989 as the end of the nation-state monopoly on organized violence. In the initial article, the authors foretold a future of asymmetrical warfare where non-state actors would employ technology, ideology, and sophisticated psychological operations against an ill-prepared U.S. military. A subsequent flurry of articles and books debated the need to modify military forces to combat terrorism, insurgencies, and ideologies. The military began to think about how to transform into a technology-based force that would leverage superior intelligence against the enemy.¹²

Military leaders eventually realized that there was reason for debate. Americans were amazed at the rapid victory achieved in the Gulf War and technological dominance seemed an obvious answer. While technology was clearly an asset to employ, its success in all the anticipated environments became uncertain. Understanding the complexity of the global environment grew in importance after September 11, 2001. As the Army deployed forces into Afghanistan, people

¹²William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989): 22-26. Additional perspectives on Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) can be found in a variety of books, articles and monographs. The following resources are a few of the most commonly read and referenced: Colonel Thomas X Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006). Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Fourth Generation Warfare and Other Myths" (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2005). William S. Lind; Major John F. Schmitt, USMCR; and Colonel Gary I. Wilson, USMCR, "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look," *Marine Corps Gazette* 78, no. 12 (December 1994): 34-37. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette* 78, no. 9 (September 1994): 35-44. David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, *Networkcentric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999).

began to wonder if Fourth Generation Warfare had arrived.¹³ When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 and defeated the Republic Guard using conventional military might, some professionals heralded the success as just another reason to maintain a predominantly conventional focused force. Once the insurgency grew into an unwieldy opponent in Iraq, the debate between conventional and counterinsurgency focus grew even stronger. Military and civilian leaders encouraged their officers to relook warfare and consider non-military ideas for dealing with conflict and the 21st century environment.¹⁴

Among the resulting ideas from the military's examination of the 21st century environment was an appreciation for uncertainty. Even before 2001, and based on the peace operations and humanitarian efforts executed in the 1990s, the Army described a need to transform into a more versatile force capable of full-spectrum operations. Soldiers were going to need a greater skill set. Initially, the Army seemed able to describe what those skills might be and focused on information dominance, perfect intelligence, and instantaneous communications. In 1998, the Honorable Togo D. West, Jr. and General Dennis J. Reimer presented an Army posture statement to Congress which stated "tomorrow's adversaries will no doubt be similar to those we

¹³Colonel Thomas X Hammes. *The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006). Fourth Generation Warfare is most readily associated with Hammes. His book and associated articles are widely read and discussed in military and defense communities.

¹⁴A number of the books listed became required reading at the military's leadership schools to invigorate the debate and broaden officer's perspectives on military operations. Leaders were encouraged to read these as professional development even when not required. Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor, 2000). Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the 21st Century* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 2005). Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996). Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 2004). Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 44-76. Essays and books by Francis Fukuyama and Paul Kennedy were also widely encouraged. Many officers participated in the intellectual debate through service journal articles and monographs.

face today” and explained that “America’s 21st century Army will be a capabilities-based, technologically enhanced, power projection force capable of providing the nation with full spectrum dominance.” In 2000 and still along similar lines, the posture statement announced that the military community has “identified operational concepts and patterns of operation to guide the development of information based warfighting capabilities” in order to defeat the combination of regional instabilities and transnational challenges that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union. Beginning in the *2002 Army Posture Statement*, however, the Army no longer seemed able to describe the adversary or be certain that information-based skills alone would facilitate full-spectrum operations. The environment in which the Army must operate was described as uncertain, elusive, and unpredictable. Each annual *Army Posture Statement* since 2002 has used similar language to describe the strategic situation.¹⁵

In addition to the ambiguous descriptions of military operations (full-spectrum) and the uncertainty of the environmental context, Army posture statements also began referring to adversaries differently. The tone of the *2004 Army Posture Statement* was different from previous years, whose focus had been combat systems and integrating technology to win wars and preserve the peace. Instead, 2004 was the year of the Warrior Ethos and a resurgence of focus on the American Soldier. Likewise, the adversaries were recognized as thinking, adaptable foes capable of leveraging emerging technologies against the United States. Subsequent statements used even stronger language to define the adversary: unconventional, asymmetric, determined,

¹⁵The full-spectrum operations transformation vision was unveiled in 1999. See *1997 to 2008 Army Posture Statements* for comparison in environmental and force capability descriptions. The quotes used in this section come from the executive summary or strategic environment portions near the beginning of each statement. Each posture statement is listed in the Bibliography at the end of this monograph. Statements 2001-2008 are available hardcopy at the Combined Arms Research Library. Statements from 1997 through 2008 are also available online at http://www.army.mil/aps/aps_arc.htm.

elusive, adaptive, disruptive, transnational, dispersed, irregular, catastrophic, and unprecedented.¹⁶

Starting with the *National Security Strategy* in 2004 and echoed by the *National Military Strategy* for 2004 and the *2005 Army Posture Statement*, the traditional threat paradigm was deemed “no longer sufficient” and the security environment graphic below was developed to describe the challenges.




Figure 1. 21st Century Security Environment:
An Era of Uncertainty and Unpredictability¹⁷

¹⁶See 2004 to 2008 Army Posture Statements.

¹⁷Figure on the left: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, *Our Army at War--Relevant and Ready . . . Today and Tomorrow*. 2005 Posture Statement of the United States Army February 2005, 1; Figure on the right: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. *A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*. 2007 Posture Statement of the United

While the validity or utility of this chart is arguable, its development marked a distinction from previous public statements about the perceived threats of the future. Government and military leaders published an admission that the character of the enemy was adaptive, changing, and of real concern. In particular, the concern was that U.S. forces were not capable of fully anticipating or preventing the threat. The first figure, on the left, identified traditional challenges as the least likely and least dangerous adversaries for the United States. Instead, catastrophic challenges involving weapons of mass destruction were identified as the most likely and to which the U.S. would be most vulnerable. Over the next two years, the graphic was referred to and used to describe the security environment. By the *2007 Army Posture Statement*, however, the lower/higher axes were eliminated, and all four options were considered equally threatening. The ability to predict the likelihood of any option was suspiciously absent from official documents.

Unpredictable adversaries within the era of persistent conflict created a two-fold problem for the Army. First, without knowing what type of enemy they will face, the Army struggled to develop a force adequately sized and appropriately trained and equipped to meet the foe. Second, the enemy engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to provide the expected answers regarding how to defeat other threats in the future. As a result, the debate continued about whether to train

States Army February 2007, 1. The initial source for these figures is difficult to discern. While the 2007 Posture Statement cites the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* as its source, the first figure was published in the *2005 Army Posture Statement*, the description of the four quadrants was published in the *2005 National Defense Strategy* and referenced in the *2005 National Military Strategy*. The *2006 QDR* does not use the same graphic, but identified the need to shift toward irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. The quadrant descriptions are based on those published in 2005. I could not find the figure nor the description published in a national document prior to 2005. It is not available nor described in the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*.

soldiers for traditional conflicts and allocate money to major combat weapons systems or to prepare the force for counterinsurgency, nation building, and peace operations. According to on-going operations and the forecasted security environment, all those capabilities were necessary. Unfortunately, the resources and time required to establish and maintain such a force would be daunting and require full-mobilization of the nation towards those efforts. Instead, the Army had to find a way to develop a force that could meet the demands of an era of persistent conflict while realizing efficiencies and accepting risk where appropriate. It was not the first time.

Institutional Evolution of the Division

Throughout America's history, the country has regularly evaluated and reorganized the military to meet defense requirements. Implications of the current strategic environment on the Army's force and the conditions that precipitated the Brigade Revolution are best understood as part of the larger history of Army transformation. Since the onset of modern warfare, western nations have relied on the division as a primary unit of tactical execution.¹⁸ Administrative, training, and expeditionary tasks executed by divisions throughout history help relate characteristics to the environment. Balancing these roles within the context of the time has always been a challenge and remains one today.

¹⁸Robert M. Epstein, *Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 11. Epstein defined modern war through a list of characteristics. Modern war has: a strategic plan that integrates theaters of operation; uses the full mobilization of the resources of the state; and has operational campaigns designed to achieve strategic objectives. Furthermore, the operational campaigns reveal symmetrically organized armies into subordinate headquarters who enjoy both decentralized command and common operational methods, and whose cumulative tactical effects lead to ultimate victory or failure.

The division was originally developed in the French army to make the growing size of the Army more manageable. Marshal of France Maurice de Saxe introduced the concept of legions by 1740, and then Marshal Victor-Francois de Broglie incorporated divisions in 1760 in order to expedite the deployment of large formations on the battlefield. Delineating the army into divisions allowed commanders to identify easily which portions to move, supply, and order into combat. A division became the smallest army echelon that contained all the assets necessary to conduct sustained combat operations. Until General Pierre de Bourcet developed the general staff at the division level in the 1780s, however, the division was primarily a tactical unit whose missions were dictated by the army's staff.¹⁹

Upon development of the general staff, the division began to coordinate its own efforts and visualize the battlefield more effectively. The general staff processed information for the commander and allowed him greater understanding than ever before. Through the use of mission orders which provided purpose and direction, division commanders had the latitude to conduct operations as they saw fit, within the confines of the battlefield parameters provided. Divisions remained a tactical unit executing only a portion of a much larger operational scheme. The European experience filtered to the United States and was incorporated into the Army's Regulations in 1821. Despite the nation's prerogative to disband field armies, corps, divisions, and brigades following the American Civil War, Army Regulation continued to cite the division as the

¹⁹Three works were used to provide this summary. Epstein's work provides an excellent and in depth discussion of the evolution of divisions in the Napoleonic period and their role in the evolution of operational art. Schneider's article is a useful summary and it references Quimby's book. Only the most basic elements of the discussion are included here to highlight the importance of divisions as a command and control measure. Schneider, "The Loose Marble," 88; Quimby, *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare*, 94-96, 175; and Epstein, *Napoleon's Last Victory*.

centerpiece of the active army organization. Prior to 1900 however, the corps was the lowest level unit at which combined arms coordination occurred.²⁰

Based on the agreed upon need to train combined arms tactics in case of war, the Army staff proposed permanent divisions with substantial organic assets in 1905. Focused on the primary mission of defending the U.S. on its own soil and with little anticipation of a war overseas, the Army designed the division to be robust enough to be self-sufficient and small enough to maneuver across the confined road networks of early 20th century America. The division replaced the Corps as the lowest level unit capable of combined arms and sustainment in the field.²¹ As the nation struggled to mobilize men for World War I, the War Department decided to make some minor adjustments to the structure of the division. The size of the division, once again was reconsidered. In the 19th century divisions held approximately 30,000 men, but the advent of the machine gun allowed increased firepower with fewer troops and American divisions were formally introduced at 19,850 strong but their sizes fluctuated until 1917. After a multitude of studies and debates between 1914 and 1917, the infantry division settled in at 27,120 personnel. The headquarters included 164 individuals to coordinate both tactical and administrative efforts. Referred to as the “square division,” the structure that went to Europe was supposed to allow

²⁰ John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998). Wilson’s comprehensive history of divisions and brigades is a wealth of knowledge and resources. His research in chapter one is summarized here as it relates to the central role of the division in the developing U.S. Army.

²¹ Wilson, 8. In Chapter 2, Wilson provides the history of divisions from their beginnings as a combined arms unit until their baptism in WWI (discussed in Chapter 3). Major James A. Logan described the division in *Field Service Regulation 1914* as “A self-contained unit made up of all necessary arms and services, and complete in itself with every requirement for independent action incident to its operations.”

coordination between the combat arms, provide sustained firepower, and absorb losses before losing combat capability.²²

Early lessons from World War I revealed that firepower, supply, and command and control were critical characteristics for divisions. Major General John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I, restructured the division staff during the war. Five functional staff sections: personnel, intelligence, operations, supply and training each coordinated the activities within its realm. The sections reported to the chief of staff, relieving the commander of routine details. At the end of the war, rapid transition to occupation duties and immediate demobilization of many units prevented organizational planning for future mobilization. Despite the Army's concern over being caught unprepared, again, for war overseas, divisions shrunk to skeletal organizations. The nation simply did not provide the funding necessary to maintain the authorized personnel, regular or reserve. Furthermore, the lessons about combined arms training were lost and divisions were again dispersed across the country. After much consideration, but not enough practical exercise, the Army adopted the triangular division. Structured to improve mobility and command and control, the triangular division structure featured a smaller organization by reducing the size of subordinate elements, removing the brigade command echelons, and eliminating some of the support units.²³

²²Wilson, 47-57. The debates included issues about span of control, necessary supporting units, sizes of engineer and field artillery organizations, and maneuverability.

²³Wilson, 117-137. The triangular division was structured around three combat teams. The corps absorbed some support services such as medical, traffic control, road maintenance and motorized repair in order to enhance the mobility of the division on the front line. The division consisted of 9,057 personnel, with 110 in the headquarters staff.

Until this point, both infantry and cavalry divisions went through similar structural changes and the Army adjusted their structures in tandem. After conducting training in 1940 with infantry, cavalry, and mechanized (or armored) units, the Army decided on varied structures. By the end of 1942, the United States had developed varied structures for cavalry, airborne, motorized, armored, and infantry divisions with a common attempt to increase firepower and standardize subordinate elements.²⁴ Throughout the war the various divisions adjusted to their particular situations, adaptability was key to their success. Availability of replacements, both manpower and equipment, greatly influenced their evolving structures. New divisions were assembled with the best available components and put into action. By the end of the war, the Army staff knew another assessment of the division's structure was needed.

Among the considerations for the Army's structure weighing on the Army staff was the advent of atomic weapons. However, the Army staff determined that the nature of ground warfare was largely unchanged by the possible employment of nuclear weapons, and made few significant changes to divisional structures. The modifications that did occur incorporated the lessons of World War II by adding those units to the organization that were habitually associated for combat. Additionally, the revised structures made the various types of divisions more similar and clarified the chain command.²⁵

One notable exception was the development of the U.S. Constabulary units designed for occupation operations in Europe. The combat divisions that achieved victory in Europe were not equipped for the requirements of occupation and reconstruction. U.S. combat divisions were

²⁴Wilson,172.

²⁵Ibid., 207-224.

inactivated in accordance with the overall military policy at the time and the resulting chaos encouraged the U.S. European Command to develop the U.S. Constabulary. The headquarters of the Constabulary emerged out of VI Corps. Commanded by Major General Ernest N. Harmon in 1947 the U.S. Constabulary consisted of 34,526 personnel distributed among a headquarters, supporting elements, and three subordinate brigades. Fourth Armored Division converted into three robust brigade headquarters with a total of 27 subordinate squadrons after augmentation from the First Armored Division. The organization resembled a division, but had additional special staff sections, increased support units, and was sized more like a corps. As the mission developed, the unit structures evolved to meet the operational needs in Europe.²⁶ Additional divisions struggled with the requirements in Korea and Japan following the war. At the same time, the Army at home struggled to reorganize both the active army structures and the reserve component.

Divisions that deployed to Korea retained the triangular structure adopted for World War II. Few changes were made to the units within, but increased weapons technology allowed for a 68 percent increase in firepower with a mere 20 percent increase in personnel. The Army remained focused on delivering combat power through massed fires and it was not until after the Korean War that air power became the primary way to deliver that impact. A committee from the Infantry School took on the task of revising the divisions in 1952. Three goals drove the committee's decisions: eliminate support personnel; increase the effective use of firepower; simplify the organization and improve control. The designs offered only minor changes. In 1954 the Army Chief

²⁶Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Irzyk, "Mobility, Vigilance, Justice: A Saga of the Constabulary," *Military Review* (March 1947), http://www.geocities.com/usconstabulary/MilRev_Mar1947.html#Constabulary%20University (accessed March 8, 2009). Additional information regarding the Constabulary can be found in these sources: James M. Snyder, *The Establishment and Operations of the U.S. Constabulary* (Frankfurt, German: Historical Sub-Section, G-3, U.S. Constabulary, 1947), 52-59; Ernest N. Harmon, "U.S. Constabulary," *Armored Cavalry Journal* 55 (September-October 1946): 16.

of Staff demanded more extensive studies and tests. His goals, in addition to those of 1952, were to make divisions more flexible and less vulnerable to atomic attack through dispersion and mobility. Efforts to reduce the size of divisions resulted in negligible improvements and instead revealed inadequacies for sustained operations during simulated tests. Concurrently, the Army War College designed a future division concept based around five small, self-sufficient battle groups in a study referred to as PENTANA (Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army During the Period 1960-1970). Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor approved a proposal that incorporated elements of both the Atomic Field Army and the PENTANA studies, and the “pentomic” division was born.²⁷

General Taylor anticipated the need for divisions capable of executing large conventional wars or reacting to smaller threats on a potential nuclear battlefield. However, President John F. Kennedy’s policy of flexible response required tailorable units for a variety of environments. The main arguments against the pentomic division centered around the battle groups being too large. Their size and diversity prohibited successful control of the unit during training or operations. Many combat situations proposed were not well matched by the size of the pentomic battle group. For example, the tasks required a combat footprint smaller than two battle groups but larger than one or required only part of a battle group in one location and part in another location.

²⁷A. J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), 65-70. Bacevich provides a thorough discussion of the Pentomic division structures, the studies which led to their design, and the political contexts of the era. Three major tests were conducted at the time: Atomic Field Army (ATFA), Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army During the Period 1960-1970 (PENTANA), and the Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division (ROCID). The pentomic division was tested by the 101st Airborne Division, General Taylor’s former command.

Additionally, transporting and sustaining the large pentomic division was extremely difficult. In order to answer the anticipated threats, a better solution was required.²⁸

The Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) study of 1961 took practical environmental and tactical factors into account and designed a base organization for a division. The base included the staff, support, engineers, military police, reconnaissance, aviation, artillery, and nine maneuver battalions. Maneuver units, infantry, armor, mechanized, or airborne battalions were aligned into three brigades, each with an appropriate composition according to the mission, environment, and situation. Variable structures and sizes of units were necessary for the types of missions endured. ROAD divisions made those possible through interchangeable battalions. Flexible enough to implement air mobility and deliver successful large scale attacks in Vietnam; most divisions struggled to control units in small enough structures to defeat enemy guerilla activity. In addition, units within the ROAD divisions had difficulty coordinating assets such as airpower and fires at echelons above division. Growing mechanization, increased technology, and the evolution of aviation caused the Army to study other options.²⁹

Operational Art, AirLand Battle, and the Army of Excellence structures resulted from the Army's preoccupation with getting past the failures of Vietnam. By explaining Vietnam as an anomaly incongruent with the current Soviet threat, the Army wrote doctrine about the war they could understand, a war about firepower and maneuver, a war they knew they could practice to

²⁸Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era*, 65-70.

²⁹Richard W. Kedzior, *Evolution and Endurance: The U.S. Army Division in the Twentieth Century* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000), 29-33. See also John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 295-298.

win. Although necessary after Vietnam to rebuild discipline within the Army, the prescriptive nature of doctrine quelled the innovation that had been a hallmark of the American soldier throughout the Army's history. Checklists and standardized evaluation became cornerstones of the Army's education and training.³⁰ Manuals focused on lengthy descriptions of tactics at the battalion and brigade levels and the corps returned as the structural centerpiece of the Army.³¹ Initiated in 1978, and bolstered by Israel's experience in the 1973 Yom Kippur War against a Soviet style adversary, the Division 86 Study sought to develop a division that combined all aspects of firepower and focused on heavy forces. In contrast, Infantry Division 86 was a study to develop a light organization for contingency operations outside the anticipated heavy armor conflict in Europe. Limited by force strength requirements, Army planners worked to downsize both the heavy and light divisions under consideration. The Army of Excellence designs were finally approved in November 1983 and included heavy divisions of 16,000 to 17,000 soldiers while the

³⁰Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: Operational Art and the US Army," Chapter in *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*. McKercher, B.J.C. and Michael A. Hennessy, eds., *Military History Symposium of the Royal Military College of Canada*, 1996. The doctrine itself was prescriptive, but the revolution that occurred in training was even more relevant. Doctrine was considered the handbook to be followed to the letter. Training evaluations were formulated not on successful outcomes, but on the adherence to doctrine. Tactical discipline became paramount over improvisation.

³¹FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1976, 1982, 1986 and subsequent publication in 1993 list brigades and divisions as tactical units. The corps is also a tactical unit, and the unit at which combined arms occurs, but may be called upon to coordinate operations. This reversion ignores the experiences of divisions as operational headquarters in the Philippines, Vietnam, Panama, and Haiti. In contrast, the earlier 1941 publication of FM 100-5 describes the division as "the basis of organization of the field forces. It is the basic large unit of which corps (except armored and cavalry) and armies are formed. It is the smallest unit that is composed of all the essential ground arms and services and which can conduct, by its own means, operations of general importance. It can strike or penetrate effectively, maneuver readily, and absorb reinforcing units easily. It can act alone or as part of a higher unit." 253, para 1043. <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/FM-100-5-15.html> (accessed February 6, 2009).

light divisions were 10,000 men strong.³² Initial reactions to the new structures were positive. The heavy corps-centric structure linked well with AirLand Battle doctrine. The experiences of the Iran hostage crisis, the British action in the Falkland Islands, and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada reinforced the need for light contingency forces. However, a debate ensued regarding the need to combine heavy and light forces. In most anticipated operational areas, potential adversaries were adding armor and increasingly heavy equipment to their arsenals. Stemming from the dissent about heavy and light forces, options of how to employ varied forces came to the forefront. Antagonists began to question the roles of brigades, divisions, and corps.³³

The Army of Excellence did not last long as the idealized structure. Dissolution of the Soviet Union provided an additional and significant reason to reconsider the future environment and the Army force structure concept. Analysis of U.S. operations in the 1991 Gulf War spurred additional changes. Lessons from contingency operations such as Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in Panama, and Restore Hope in Somalia needed to be integrated into a new Army structure as well. The *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* and subsequent efforts to enhance joint capabilities while competing with the other services for funding and resources also had an effect on Army organizational decisions.³⁴

³²John L. Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army* (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United States Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 42-57.

³³*Ibid.*, 111-123.

³⁴Ronald H. Cole, "Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1998-1999): 57-65. Cole's article offers a good description of these three joint operations and provides insightful context of the time for military and civilian decision makers. See also John J. McGrath, *The Brigade: A History* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 93-105 for conditions which prompted the Force XXI study.

The Force XXI design project began in 1994 with the goal of designing the force to lead the Army into the 21st century. Force XXI organizations would fully embrace digitization, the concept that units would be digitally connected and operate under a common picture of the battlefield in real time. Roughly the same size as the Army of Excellence division, the prototype division included 15,820 personnel. The division structure incorporated reconnaissance assets into a fixed brigade organization and separated logistics elements from the brigades into an independent divisional support command. As an interim and experimental concept, the Force XXI division (4th Infantry Division) tested digitization through a series of simulated warfighting scenarios. Meanwhile and to varying degrees, the rest of the Army adopted the BCT concept, combining infantry and armor battalions, plus habitually associated enablers such as engineers and reconnaissance into a team that trained together for combat. Resource constraints, technological limitations, and unanswered questions about how well commanders and staffs could synthesize the digital feeds they received, caused the Army to develop a more immediate structure to answer the call of the nation. The number of contingency operations had not slowed and the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki wanted to ensure the Army was prepared.³⁵

In October 1999, General Shinseki presented a new transformation vision for the Army called the Objective Force. The concept described how advanced technologies would provide units the “lethality and survivability needed to deliver full spectrum dominance, the versatility to change patterns of operation faster than the enemy can respond, and the agility to adjust to

³⁵GlobalSecurity.org, *Force XXI*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/force-xxi.htm> (accessed February 11, 2009).

enemy changes of operation faster than he can exploit them.”³⁶ Integrating communications and intelligence systems would allow commanders to have and share constant and accurate situational dominance. Business models and organizational theory in the 1990s encouraged streamlining management structures, encouraging efficiency, and reducing redundancy. Communication technology provided an opportunity for the Army to implement some efficiency theories of its own. Through information superiority the Army staff envisioned the ability to increase commanders’ span of control and eliminate the challenge of distance on the battlefield. The Objective Force concept transformed the Army structure over time, but no immediate changes were made to existing divisions.³⁷

Although divisional structures were not modified directly, several organizational changes occurred. The first change was the activation of two active component / reserve component division headquarters. These units were divisional headquarters manned by active duty personnel, but with subordinate units from the Army National Guard. Never before had active duty and nonmobilized reserve soldiers served under the same headquarters. Secondly, training support divisions, a new organization, which combined the active duty readiness groups with the Army Reserve exercise divisions, were stood up. Both of these modifications were designed to enable reserve forces to mobilize more quickly, and with better integration into the active force. The third

³⁶Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, U.S. Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force, (2001/2), iv and General Eric K. Shinseki, “Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon,” Speech presented at the 45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, http://www.lewis.army.mil/transformation/media_coverage/ (accessed 17 September 2003).

³⁷Douglas A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 1997). This popular book taught many junior officers about proposed American military structures and helped popularize the idea to flatten the Army’s hierarchy. Corporate organizations were implementing similar ideas by leveraging information sharing technology and just-in-time logistics.

change was the introduction of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), a highly mobile, self-sufficient force for worldwide deployment. The concept was implemented by two divisional brigades located separately from their parent divisions. In 1999, the Stryker vehicle conceived for this new brigade team was not yet in production. However, the idea that brigades would become self-sufficient and operate independently from the division was already readily accepted. The Army's attempt to develop a deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, sustainable Objective Force was embraced by all components of the Army.³⁸

By the time the first Stryker vehicles were arriving at Fort Lewis, Washington, in June 2002, the Objective Force concept had faltered. The digital and networked platforms (known as Future Combat Systems) central to the concept were behind schedule and were not delivering the expected results in preliminary testing. The concept of brigades as independent structures, however, was hugely successful. Experience in Panama and the 1991 Gulf War showed brigades to be flexible tactical headquarters. Due to operational and training experience coupled with downsizing and stationing concerns in the 1990s, brigades were organized with their combined arms and supporting elements. Although few separate brigades existed in the active component, nearly every divisional brigade was organized as a BCT by virtue of its components.³⁹ In January 2003, planners received guidance from Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White to conduct an echelon study to evaluate three things. First, ensure the focus of operations is at the unit of action level (brigade). Second, eliminate echelons since the power of information technology allows the Army to push functions down to the lowest level. Third, develop organizations keeping in mind

³⁸John J. McGrath. *The Brigade: A History*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Strategic Studies Institute Press, 2004), 103-108.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 93-126.

that every level above brigade is likely to be a joint headquarters. The March-April 2003 war with Iraq demonstrated the flexibility of the BCT to fight independent battles or combine with other elements for larger operations under the direction of a division headquarters. By May 2003 simulations indicated that removing an echelon failed to provide readiness or availability of appropriate forces to achieve effective command and control of ground forces in combat operations.⁴⁰

General Peter J. Schoomaker took over as Chief of Staff of the Army in August 2003. He challenged planners to create a modular, brigade-based Army that was more responsive to commanders' needs, better employed Joint capabilities, facilitates force packaging and rapid deployment, and fought as self-contained units in non-linear, non-contiguous battlespaces. As part of adjusting the vision from the objective force to the modular force, the Chief encouraged planners to include ideas and combat enablers that enhanced operations in the immediate environment as soon as they were available.⁴¹

The idea to flatten the organization by removing an echelon of the hierarchy was still part of the concept. Brigades were considered the Unit of Action (UA) and two echelons of Units of Employment (UE) were designed to be higher headquarters. The UE concept was originally developed to prevent planners from being constrained by existing structures when developing

⁴⁰Mr. Fred Svedarsky, Interview by author, February 11, 2009, Fort Leavenworth, KS. In addition to discussion with Mr. Svedarsky, he provided a powerpoint brief that outlined the planning history of the Modular Army. The brief was presented to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on 22 February 2008 as part of a decision brief regarding the latest divisional concept (version 8.1).

⁴¹Svedarsky, Interview by author.

new ones.⁴² These Units of Employment (UEs) were to be capable of command and control for Army, joint, and multi-national forces. Guidance from General Schoomaker in February 2004 included: escape from traditional branch and general staffs, do not over-structure, focus on function, and disassociate the home station operations center from the UE headquarters. During 2005, General Schoomaker told planners to discard the UE concept because the new structures were not effective in removing an echelon of command. Instead, planners reverted to modifying division, corps, and theater army structures to meet the needs of the Modular Force.⁴³

Since 2005, units deploying under the modular concept reported shortfalls when transitioning to a joint task force and struggled to meet mission requirements under the proposed design. Again, General Schoomaker encouraged units to creatively redesign their structures to meet the needs in Afghanistan and Iraq. Conditions and circumstances in deployed environments were changing faster than planners and simulations could anticipate. Division commanders and their staffs developed ad hoc structures based on the most current modular design combined with the reality of the personnel and equipment available. Once in theater, divisions reorganized their staffs and units to accomplish their mission. Increasing joint capabilities and incorporating functional cells in addition to transitioning modular structures created divisions larger than the approved designs and much greater than the concepts originally conceived in 1999.⁴⁴

⁴²UA or Unit of Action was articulated by planners as the brigade. Two levels of UE or Unit of Employment were designed for use in the modular army structure. UEx and UEy were used by planners to prevent assumptions about what echelons the future structures would replace: division, corps, army.

⁴³Svedarsky. Interview by author. Information about the brigade combat teams, to include specific discussion of the Iraq war can be found in McGrath, *The Brigade: A History*, 105-113.

⁴⁴Center for Army Lessons Learned, "3ID Reorganization." PowerPoint brief on lessons learned provided to the TRADOC Commander, 21 November 2005. See also initial impressions reports and lessons

Historical Summary

The history of the division structure is important to current organizational considerations for two reasons. Historical evolution reveals changes in the roles of the division and predicts the characteristics of the future force. Since the beginning of nationally organized and funded armies, divisions have served in three capacities: administrative, training, and expeditionary. When armies spent long periods of time deployed in foreign lands without the ease and benefits of immediate communication, administration at the division level was critical. Technological advances in communication and digitization reduced the need for large administrative staffs to deploy with soldiers. Some example administrative tasks, which can now be performed digitally from anywhere include pay, procurement of supplies, transcription, and record keeping. Alternatively, technological advances required increases in information systems personnel. Maintaining administrative technical support personnel outside the division is critical to preventing unintended staff growth. As the requirements to support administrative tasks changed over time, the Army was able to separate administration from other tasks and focus divisional structures on increasing combat capabilities.

One of the hurdles to increasing combat capabilities was ensuring the soldiers were adequately trained. History shows that technological advances improved more than administrative capabilities. Combat capabilities were improved through weapons systems, communications platforms, and protective equipment, for example. Critical to using these advances on the

learned documents from 10th Mountain Division 2002, 82nd Airborne Division 2003, 25th Infantry Division 2007, and 1st Cavalry Division 2007. These documents are considered For Official Use Only and not available to the general public. Specific numbers and data could not be used in this paper. They are available to defense personnel with appropriate credentials on the Center for Army Lessons Learned website <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/ll-links.asp>.

battlefield, however, was training. Divisional structures changed over time to incorporate evolutions in training. As combined arms doctrine became integral to success on the battlefield, divisional structures changed to allow the necessary training to occur. Downsizing of the Army during interwar periods made planners consider training for the reserve forces and how to best prepare active and reserve units to operate together during times of war.

Administrative and training tasks support the division's third role as an expeditionary headquarters. Expeditionary units are those elements designed for military operations abroad. Historical evolution of the division indicates that deployability was consistently a factor in structural considerations. Developing a structure that could deploy quickly and maneuver easily, but be lethal and survivable in combat was a consistent goal. Additionally, a headquarters that could effectively control subordinate elements in the anticipated environments was important. As smaller units, battalions and brigades, increased lethality and capabilities on the battlefield, the division role increasingly shifted from detailed command to mission command. Synchronizing subordinate elements and managing the increased information available through technologically enhanced sensors became critical tasks for the expeditionary division.

Technology, anticipated threats, and national policies for the military drove changes in all three roles for the division. As administrative roles could be absorbed by other organizations, training requirements became more complicated. Ensuring proficiency in the variety of skills necessary to execute full-spectrum operations with technically specialized units became the reality for division commanders. Creating a staff ready to train those specialty units, plan with diverse capabilities, and maintain an operational picture for the commander during expeditionary missions became the challenge for organizational planners.

The second reason to review the evolution of the division is to reveal the characteristics of the future force. Past experiences may predict future circumstances in which certain traits could prove effective. Current assessments state that an era of persistent conflict requires developing an agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptive force. Previous structures, which enhanced these characteristics, may assist in the development of future structures. Likewise, identifying structures, which hindered these characteristics may help prevent similar obstacles in the future.

Whereas firepower and mobility drove the structures of early divisions and through World War II, agility became more important following the development of atomic weapons and national defense policies, which included flexible response. Large units became too difficult to deploy for smaller missions. Smaller units were more agile and could be consolidated for larger missions easier than larger units could be broken apart. Small units needed appropriate assets to sustain themselves and provide adequate coordination. Technological advances in weaponry, sensors, and communication allowed small units to disperse across a greater area. However, these small units required additional personnel to operate the advanced systems. Greater distances, increased capabilities, and instantaneous communication also changed the implications for command and control. Agility continues to be a compromise between size, capability and rapid deployment.

Historically, strategic depth had been achieved through conscription. Reorganizing the reserve and National Guard forces to more readily accept contingency missions and support the active force in times of war increased balance. Integrating the different components provided flexibility for the commander and more predictability for the citizen soldier. In current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the force has become rotational. Preparing units and managing expectations are different for expeditionary force requirements. Balance also refers to the size and capability of the force compared to perceived need and national policies. Divisions

demonstrate balance when they maximize the effects of their force for a given mission. When smaller elements can achieve the desired result, the remaining elements are available for missions elsewhere. Making divisions combined arms elements, developing independent brigades, structuring BCTs, and developing different structures for heavy, light, and airborne divisions are all examples of increasing balance.

In the past, synchronization often referred to incorporating reserve forces as well as the other services into Army operations. As forces have become smaller and more specialized, synchronization has become more critical. Highlighted by contingency operations in the 1980s and 1990s, synchronization allowed for efficient use of limited forces, but more critically, ensured the best asset possible was deployed for a particular mission. As the number of contingency operations continue, synchronization will remain critical. Divisions who can synchronize their assets and missions with other organizations and agencies will greatly multiply their environmental effects. Without synchronization, future divisions would need to grow to unmanageable sizes to integrate all the capabilities available. Instead, using synchronization, specialty assets can remain independent and flexible to support multiple units in different locations and circumstances around the globe.

Finally, adaptive units can adjust to changes in the environment. Like the units in World War II who developed their own structures based on equipment and personnel available, units who adapt to their circumstances help identify potential organizational changes. Modularity and the brigade centric structure are results of successful trials in adaptation. Successful adaptive behavior by brigades in Panama and the 1991 Gulf War helped drive organizational changes which were tested in the 2003 war with Iraq. Divisions are still evolving their adaptive behavior to meet the needs of the modular army and the era of persistent conflict. Appropriate staffs to provide the

necessary training and expeditionary oversight are still under consideration. Since the conditions and circumstances of any unit are continuously changing, the unit must also constantly adapt. As modular divisions train and deploy, adaptive behavior will help develop new and effective staff structures. Divisional structures flexible enough to maximize adaptive behavior will be required in the era of persistent conflict.

Four characteristics: agility, balance, synchronization, and adaptability will be required of the future force. A brigade centric modular army incorporates many of the best practices realized during past eras. Transforming the division to fulfill its roles in administrative, training, and expeditionary tasks as part of the modular army is necessary. The division structure has two components, the subordinate brigades and separate units plus the organic staff. Much consideration has gone into the structuring of the division's components. Now, planners must address the shortcomings of the traditional divisional staff structure in light of modular subordinate elements.

Inadequacies of the Modular Division

Preparing for the complex environment of an era of persistent conflict requires structures that allow the Army to train for success and deploy quickly to any environment. Upon arrival, ground forces must embark upon their mission and creatively evolve faster than their opponent in order to achieve success. Units must be agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptive. While the BCTs under transformation have made significant strides in these areas, divisions have historically been the structures that help bridge tactical engagements to the theater objectives. Divisions have also been the structures that ensure soldiers are trained for combat and prepared to deploy. Under the Modular Force structure, BCTs are touted as self-sustaining units, but in actuality they still need assistance from a higher headquarters. Traditionally, assistance has been linked to three

roles provided by the division: administrative, training, and expeditionary. Administrative and training roles remain largely the same in the modular army concept. Brigade combat teams gained assets to facilitate the administrative requirements necessary as self-contained units, but divisions retained most of their assets to accomplish their own internal needs. Under modularity, the BCT is a fully-functional combined arms team, which is the same configuration under which units trained during the Army of Excellence era. The division facilitates coordination for training and integration of augmenting units to the BCT. Additionally, the division provides evaluation of exercises and acts as the higher headquarters for synchronization toward larger objectives.

The main purpose of the modular force is to defeat the nation's foes in the current and future security environment. Unlike its roles in administration and training, the division is unfamiliar with the expeditionary requirements the current environment implies. The era of persistent conflict predicts numerous and frequent worldwide contingency operations requiring expeditionary full-spectrum operations. Success depends on a division headquarters ready to synchronize joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts in a campaign of operations executed tactically by modular units. The modular division headquarters is not prepared to execute its expeditionary role in the future environment where they are responsible for ensuring the synchronization and adaptation of the force. Recent reports indicate problems exist with current structures. Historical examples highlight divisional structures that have evolved to improve effectiveness in other unforecasted conditions. The following three sections discuss aspects of the division's expeditionary role in an era of persistent conflict.

Staff Synchronization in a Joint, Interagency, & Multinational Environment

During the 1980s and 1990s, the doctrine of divisions were designed to re-instill discipline into the post-Vietnam Army. The division operations manual described in great detail the plans

and actions to take in the offense and defense. It reminded staffs how to proceed through the mission orders process by carefully dissecting the information received from higher headquarters and appropriately coordinating the activities of the division to achieve the desired effect. Examples in doctrine rarely strayed from classic offense or defense scenarios. Although the military, using its divisions as their primary coordination headquarters, conducted complex stability operations in Europe, Japan, China, the Philippines, Panama, and other locations worldwide, the manuals neglected these operations as part of the division's mission and considered them diversions from primary tasks. In addition to numerous independent campaigns such as Panama, however, stability tasks occurred at the conclusion of combat operations in every theater occupied by a division.⁴⁵ Finally, with the release of Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, in February 2008, the Army recognized stability as a primary mission alongside offense and defense. This new manual espoused that divisions were not fixed formations and should reconfigure according to the requirements of the mission. However, the manual focused on the structure of the division in terms of its warfighting elements, with scarce mention of the headquarters structure. The two example division structures in the manual differ only in the number and types of subordinate brigades, all of which are army components. The examples do not address how disparate organizations may require different staffs, or how non-Army elements would integrate into the organization.⁴⁶ *Operations* fails to explain how the division staff might require different structures based on the mission and the subordinate elements necessary to achieve that mission. Transformation to an appropriate division must start with an appropriate division staff.

⁴⁵James Jay Carafano, "Principles for Stability Operations and State-Building," *Heritage Lectures*. (Clarksville, TN: The Heritage Foundation, February 13, 2008), 1-6. www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1067.cfm

⁴⁶Department of the Army, FM 3-0: *Operations*, C-5,6.

Although FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, and FM 3-0, *Operations*, indicated that division headquarters will not normally be designated as a joint task force (JTF), divisions were regularly designated as such in recent circumstances.⁴⁷ From civil disturbance operations in California to emergency preparedness in the Washington, D.C. area, National Guard divisions have taken on the role of a joint task force headquarters in unprecedented numbers. History has shown that active army divisions take on the responsibility for a joint task force too. The 10th Mountain Division served as a JTF in Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan. In fact, every division headquarters deployed to Afghanistan since 2003 has served in a JTF role and configuration. Iraq, too, has seen divisions considered multinational entities with a staff structure more like a JTF than a basic division. Under the modular force structure discussions, Secretary of the Army Thomas White provided guidance that the headquarters echelons above brigade will likely be joint in all future operations.⁴⁸ If previous contingencies operations provide an indication for the future, joint headquarters at the division level will occur regularly in an era of persistent conflict.

A staff that can build the plan for a stability mission is different from the one solely concerned with offense and defense. In the era of persistent conflict, however, the staff must be able to plan for contingencies across the full-spectrum of operations and synchronize the efforts of joint, interagency, and multi-national partners as well. The 2009 draft *Division Operations* manual states that “the division conducts full-spectrum tactical and operational-level operations

⁴⁷Department of the Army. FM 71-100, *Division Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996). FM 3-91, *Division Operations*, Initial Draft, January 5, 2009. As of May 2009, the most current version of *Division Operations* is the 1996 version of FM 71-100. The newest version of this manual is under revision by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate. It has not been released in any form yet, but the author received an advance copy of the working draft. The new manual incorporates modularity and will be titled FM 3-91, *Division Operations*.

⁴⁸Svedarsky, Interview by author.

and may serve as a Joint Task Force or Joint Force Land Component headquarters in a smaller-scale contingency,” however, the proposed modular structure does not prepare the staff for this responsibility. A robust organization of nearly 900 personnel, the proposed division staff “needs no augmentation from subordinate army units,” but includes no organic joint capacity.⁴⁹ Separate battalions, specialized units, and interagency components of any contingency operation would also have to provide liaison and planning officers to the staff as needed. In an environment where units with specialties, such as civil affairs, psychological operations, construction engineers, interrogators, or explosive ordnance disposal, are likely to be critical and integral to mission success, a huge division organization that must then integrate them into an existing structure does not meet the intent of transformation.

According to FM 3-0, *Operations*, in future operations the division must be equally prepared to conduct offense, defense, and stability operations. It also stated that the organic joint and liaison capabilities are critical to its flexibility. The basic division staff structure was developed for a doctrine that included only offense and defense as the primary missions. With the admission of a third primary mission, stability, the basic division staff structure must transform. The basic structure must be capable of readily operating in a joint, multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental environment. Only by integrating these elements into the division structure will it be capable of achieving synchronization.

While the division was modified under transformation, few real changes were made to the structure that has been in place since World War II. Traditional staffs were renamed by their function instead of their shorthand number, for example, the G5 became the plans cell and the G4

⁴⁹Combined Arms Center. FM 3-91, *Division Operations*, Initial Draft, January 5, 2009.

was titled sustainment, but how they functioned and who was assigned changed very little. Yet, recent reports indicated that this basic structure was wholly inadequate to meet the requirements of the mission in Afghanistan or Iraq. The divisions that deployed changed their structures and by the end of their deployments articulated lessons learned about how to organize better. In addition to modifications to the divisional structure, other organizations such as provincial reconstruction teams, military training teams, and infrastructure coordination elements were developed to provide the capacity for mission areas the division was unprepared to perform.

Initially fielded in Afghanistan in 2003, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are one model for integrating military, diplomatic, economic, and informational agencies. These senior level teams synchronize the policies and activities of units and organizations of multiple nations to achieve common goals. Colonel Michael Hochwart, Germany Army, a military commander of a PRT in Afghanistan, believed it was an excellent structure to use as a framework for integrating interagency efforts into operational campaigns. Instead of a purely military command to control operations, a PRT style structure encouraged early transition to diplomatic efforts and did not hinder conventional military actions. Instead of relying on traditional division structures, a transformational structure was developed to synchronize the expeditionary capability necessary to meet mission requirements.⁵⁰

Another example is found in the unconventional operations executed during the Vietnam War. Consolidating the counterinsurgency efforts with pacification activities, the U.S. in Vietnam established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support (CORDS) program. In 1965, this

⁵⁰Michael Hochwart, Colonel, German Army, Commander, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Afghanistan, 2007. Interview by author, February 11, 2009, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

program faced many of the same challenges found in current operations: parochialism, jealousy about budgets, concern over promotion potential, and vying for authority. In the end, the military dominated the staff and advocated safety and security as a primary component of pacification. Through integrated efforts with the Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and South Vietnam's domestic security apparatus, CORDS made significant strides in displacing the insurgency. It is another model of civilian agencies and military units overcoming their differences to achieve synchronized operations to achieve campaign objectives.⁵¹

Based on historical precedent and current policy, the U.S. military should be prepared to conduct the full range of military operations outlined in joint doctrine: military engagement, security operation, and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; and major operations and campaigns. The military should likewise be prepared for the integration of interagency and multinational partners into contingency operations. Without real transformation of the division structure to incorporate necessary assets from other-than-Army communities, the division is ill-prepared to perform its expeditionary role of synchronization.⁵²

Division Headquarters as a Adaptation Catalyst

Doctrinally, the Army division is the headquarters responsible for planning and executing battles and major operations in a particular geographical area. A division connects tactical events

⁵¹Andrew J. Birtle's two volume set on *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine* provides a comprehensive review of operations and doctrine from the American Revolution through 1976. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support later became Civil Operations and Rural Support. Both PRTs and CORDS are used as models of integrating civilian and military efforts in the FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (2006) doctrine.

⁵²President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address in January 2009 and subsequent policies indicate continued contingency operations worldwide; See JP 3-0: *Joint Operations*, I-13 for a description of joint military operations.

to larger strategic objectives. Subordinate commanders are provided the information and latitude needed to achieve their objectives. Units engaged in direct contact with an adversary recognize changes in the environment and adapt quickly. They use the guidance from their division to work toward a goal that allows the environment to be influenced in a direction consistent with the strategic goals. This concept is a tenant of current American doctrine called mission command. Mission command requires the division commander to remain focused on the level that allows him to evaluate the systems affecting success, as opposed to the specific incidents. When a tactical commander has soldiers in contact with the enemy, his focus is survival and accomplishing the mission task. Ensuring the task is still relevant, integrating new tactics or resources, and preparing the unit for the next mission requires a broader perspective. That broader perspective is the division's responsibility.⁵³

The draft FM 3-91, *Division Operations* manual explained that modular brigades became the foundation of the land force as a result of transformation. Divisions retained the responsibility to coordinate the efforts of brigades within their area of operations, to oversee the conduct of major operations, and shape the environment for subordinate brigades. The draft manual cautioned, "This works well only if the division commander maintains perspective on the overall division situation, and avoids being drawn into the conduct of subordinate unit engagements."⁵⁴ In

⁵³Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 1-17. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish missions. The role of the division is not described in *FM 3-0: Operations* (2008). The manual only states: "Divisions are the Army's primary tactical warfighting headquarters. Their principal task is directing subordinate brigade operations."

⁵⁴Combined Arms Center. FM 3-91, *Division Operations*, Initial Draft.

addition to synchronizing the efforts of subordinate elements, the division must retain an appropriate perspective. With the proper perspective, the division can become a catalyst for adaptation. Tactical units will often develop creative solutions to tactical problems. Division staffs should capture innovations and determine their applicability in other circumstances, leading to greater success toward mission objectives. Particularly necessary in the ever-changing current security environment, the modular division must embrace their role in adaptation. Acting as an adaptation catalyst is the second expeditionary function the modular division must perform.

World War II and Vietnam offer opportunities to reveal lessons regarding adaptation and divisional structure. World War II is appropriate because of the unfamiliarity divisions had with new subordinate structures and tactics. Vietnam is important because of the unexpected operating environment which posed numerous challenges for the division. Both are relevant to the current situation for divisions in the modular army. The interwar army divisions that transformed to enter World War II faced numerous difficult challenges. New organizational structures, personnel turbulence, equipment shortages, and integration of non-divisional units into training and operations were just a few. Yet, American troops adapted to conditions, technologies, and enemy actions for which they were ill-prepared, at best. From the hedgerows to tank--infantry communication and from patrol groups to bath and laundry, divisions developed ways to adapt to their situation. Commanders at the division level leveraged their unique position close enough to the fight to understand and removed enough for reflection. From that

perspective, they drove not just local innovation, but adaptations to the force that were realized across the Army.⁵⁵

More recently, division staffs in Vietnam realized their role in adaptation. The 9th Infantry Division staff in Vietnam engaged in systematic analysis to improve their combat effectiveness. While combat engagements appropriately occupied the time of subordinate units, the division staff gathered intelligence and statistical data. They didn't compile the data into graphs and charts to explain their success, but rather to identify leverage points. Finding opportunities to improve effectiveness was critical because resources were scarce and training time was limited. The division staff realized that in their unique operating environment, their assets were better used assessing the overall situation than trying to control multiple tactical engagements at which subordinate commanders were more than capable.⁵⁶

Reducing manpower losses due to disease was just one way the staff leveraged their analysis to improve effectiveness and morale. They increased combat power by reducing the level of "acceptable" losses from immersion foot, fungi, and infection. Compiling data, identifying critical activities and timeframes, conferring with medical experts, and implementing experiments resulted in a sizeable increase in combat ready soldiers. When coupled with other manpower redistribution efforts, the division increased the number of combat soldiers available to engage the enemy on any given day by 350 percent. To maximize the effectiveness of the personnel, the

⁵⁵Peter Mansoor's study of World War II divisions reveals one example after another of creative solutions to tactical problems. Local innovations are made to impact the Army through development and dissemination by the division. *The GI Offensive in Europe* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

⁵⁶Julian J. Ewell and Ira A. Jr. Hunt, *Sharpening the Combat Edge* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974).

division staff discovered through analysis of enemy engagements versus sniper activities in 1969 that the Viet Cong were killed more efficiently by aimed rifle fire. Through training, experimentation and diligent after action reporting, the staff developed the “15 second war” concept. Soldiers trained to make quick, accurate shots at the enemy before the enemy could return fire. Individually, the Viet Cong were poor marksmen. The units who employed the 15 second war killed more enemy, preserved their own soldiers, and conserved ammunition. They were more effective and more efficient.⁵⁷

While these effects were implemented at the company level and below, the analysis occurred at the division staff. Rather than simply gather data and file it away, the division staff “zeroed in on weak points with considerable intensity and we insisted on rapid results.” They tried to prevent simply optimizing the current operation. Instead, they sought creative solutions to realize their goals, not just improve their activities. What the staff came to understand was that sometimes a solution had little to do with the actual operation at hand. Complexity within the operation allowed them to finesse a problem from an obtuse angle, testing theories and evaluating responses. For example, booby trap casualties were reduced by increasing nighttime raids. Airmobile reconnaissance became less effective in finding the enemy because of their success in finding the enemy. The enemy had adapted, the airmobile operations had to as well. Ground patrols began to find the enemy and air assets delivered the blow. The division had the perspective, cohesive staff, and resources to conduct analysis. Leaders then chose to implement those activities appropriate to their unit’s circumstances. Gathering and evaluating data led to

⁵⁷Ewell and Hunt. Chapter II talks about the specifics of their personnel management process, a summary is found on page 43. The “15 second war” is described on pages 123-127.

relevant improvements not only in tactical operations, but administrative, logistical, and pacification efforts as well.⁵⁸

In the rapidly changing environment of Vietnam, where American unit integrity suffered from the individual replacement system, at least one division staff recognized its role in adaptation. Through applying systematic intelligence gathering and iterative learning by experimentation, the division was able to improve the effectiveness of its subordinate units. Current operations and projected future contingencies will involve complex situations as well. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* stated that “the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly--the better learning organization--usually wins.”⁵⁹ In an era of persistent conflict many contingencies will resemble, if not be defined by, counterinsurgency operations. Adaptive behavior will be the key to success there.⁶⁰ While much of the adaptive activities will occur at the tactical level, the division must enhance the learning, not prohibit it.

Division staffs that do not enhance adaptation and do not provide synchronization of joint, interagency and multinational partners, risk becoming a burden rather than a multiplier. For the same reasons that corporate organizations sought to flatten their structures in the 1990s, the hierarchy in the Army can become more of a liability than a strength. For divisions to provide

⁵⁸Ewell and Hunt, 94-95 and 163 refer the reader to the supporting data within the chapters. Quote is found on page 163.

⁵⁹Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), ix.

⁶⁰David Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964). Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005). Both Galula and O'Neill discuss adaptive behavior at length in their books. It is a characteristic of successful insurgencies and a requirement for successful counterinsurgency forces.

added value in the era of persistent conflict, they must ensure their effect on all operations adds to, not detracts from, the conduct of the campaign.

The Division Staff's Own Adaptive Behavior as an Expeditionary HQ

While division staffs have a significant role in identifying and propagating adaptation at tactical levels, the example of the 9th Infantry Division also touched on another important aspect of adaptation. The division staff must be adaptive itself. This is the third expeditionary role a modular division must perform. As an expeditionary headquarters responsible for planning an endless number of full-spectrum operations, the staff must be able to analyze, assess, and develop innovative campaigns to achieve objectives which support the strategic goals. Among the hindrances to operating adaptively is the size of the division staff.

Staffs have grown increasingly large and cumbersome. Their size produced an administrative requirement to maintain them, prevented communication and collaboration among departments, and encouraged busyness at the expense of productivity. Division staffs from 1943 to 2008 increased in size by over 400 percent.⁶¹ Although some increases may have been warranted by digitization and increased capabilities previously held at higher levels, most of the increases were not in these areas. Furthermore, staffs routinely recommended additional personnel to coordinate activities for which they felt unprepared (police training, civil works projects, cultural advisor teams, and local governance, for example). Few instances were annotated in unit reviews where members of subordinate staffs and organizations became regular

⁶¹An infantry division in 1943 consisted of 14,253 personnel with 149 in the headquarters; an armor division had 309 in the headquarters with an additional 99 in the combat command company. (Wilson, 183-186). The modular division in 2008 proposed a headquarters of over 850 personnel. (CADD, Division Design 8.1)

advisors to division staffs while remaining in their primary position. Instead, liaison officers or additional staff positions were created to include that expertise within the division staff. As a result, division staffs have grown even larger during their deployments to Iraq. The increase would be tolerated and even welcomed if their outputs were commensurate, but that was not the case.⁶²

Instead of increased productivity, the large division staffs in Iraq produced diminishing returns. Mission orders tended to be lengthy and late, violating doctrinal guidance.⁶³ Subordinate units continually noted their frustration with multiple situation reports requested by higher, yet balked at the lack of situational awareness they were provided by the division staff. Division staff officers were notoriously busy with reports and graphs, particularly those required by their higher headquarters, but lacked a comprehensive understanding of their area of operations. Often, the assistant division commanders traveled throughout the division's area to gain an understanding of the environment that the staff simply could not provide. Reconstruction efforts, particularly the full complement of activities by the BCTs, civil affairs, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, interagency, nongovernmental organizations, and host nation, were one example. Meanwhile, the staffs grew

⁶²For example, the 25th Infantry Division increased a staff section by 27 people during their deployment in 2007. Exact numbers and specifics can be found in the Initial Impressions Report held at the Center for Army Lessons Learned. CALL IIR 25ID and 1CD 2007 (FOUO), 84-85. These documents are considered For Official Use Only and not available to the general public. Specific numbers and data could not be used in this paper. They are available to defense personnel with appropriate credentials on the Center for Army Lessons Learned website <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/ll-links.asp>.

⁶³According to FM 6-0, *Mission Command*, mission orders should be issued to subordinate commanders with short, simple, and clear commander's intent. The orders should provide the subordinate unit maximum time to prepare and execute and should not prescribe the actions to be taken.

in size, accepting additional liaison officers and special cells that required increased billeting, office space, and support, but continued to have problems understanding the expanse of their areas.⁶⁴

In addition to their increased administrative needs, division staffs seemed to create work for themselves to justify their personnel. New data requirements and reports were generated to keep staff officers busy. Admittedly, the new staff officers were there because a gap in knowledge was revealed. The staff officer could provide that experience or advice. However, often, that advice was a result of the officer's experience in a subordinate unit. Once his daily interaction with the subordinate unit's activities was severed, he simply became a division staff officer who had to contact a subordinate for a summary of information. His personal advice and experience in that area became far less applicable to current operations and situational understanding. Instead, he would use his experience to generate reports that required data from the subordinate unit, then request them to complete it. Forced to trade his lack of current perspective for the unit's time, the staff officer did not even know whether or not the topics of the report were still relevant. On the other hand, the units rarely had time to discern why he was asking for the information requested. The result was excess data and laborious report preparation with diminished situational understanding and perspective over time.⁶⁵

⁶⁴A list of unit reports is provided in the biography. Most of the reports are For Official Use Only. Some reports or portions are Unclassified, Confidential, or Secret. The information provided in this paper lacks the data, unit names, and operational specifics contained in those reports. Instead, the author has provided a summary of trends and impressions. The reader can review the reports through the on line Center for Army Lessons Learned website <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/ll-links.asp>.

⁶⁵Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Storr, "The Command of British Land Forces in Iraq, March to May 2003" (Monograph, Pewsey, United Kingdom: Directorate General of Development and Doctrine, British Army, May 2004). An insightful report, whose author reviewed hundreds of unit reports and interviews, provided an analysis of British staffs and the similar struggles of the American staffs. Lieutenant Colonel

Division staffs were not only hindered by their lack of interaction with subordinate units, but by their lack of interaction with adjacent departments. The bloated size of division staffs prevented regular collaboration between various cells, agencies, and departments represented. While the very purpose of including the disparate groups was to increase understanding for the commander and enable the staff to plan and coordinate more comprehensively, the actual effect was less successful. Some members of the staff were unaware of entire departments within the staff and sought expertise from outside organizations and subordinate units instead. The weekly schedule of meetings for the division staff was a dizzying spreadsheet unreadable to any common observer. Very few of the meetings provided a forum for members of various groups to consider possible efficiencies, developing problems, or emerging practices in the area of operation. Without collaboration between the staff sections, synergy on the staff was infrequent. The staff could not express itself in a timely and innovative manner because they could neither grasp the overall situation nor productively dialogue together.⁶⁶

Portions of the staff had a superior understanding of a particular area. For example, the intelligence sections of every division provided superior understanding of terrorist networks within their subordinate units' footprints. Several divisions described the appreciation their civil military sections had for the interactions of political leaders at local and regional levels. Fewer organizations noted an understanding of how political, military, and criminal organizations

Storr concluded that the staffs are too large and suffer from rank inflation. He showed that the staffs planned excessively and did not provide the direction needed by subordinate units.

⁶⁶Storr's analysis for the British Army (referenced above) and this author's review of unit reports reveal a desire and ability to adapt on the part of individuals and sections, but a division structure prohibitive to transformational learning for the overall organization. In addition to the unit reports, the author's experience in Iraq July 2006 to July 2007 with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Mosul provided some insight into the division and brigade staffs serving during that time.

influenced one another within their area of operation. None said they were able to effectively integrate reconstruction into a plan that achieved objectives agreed upon by military and civil leaders at local, regional, and national levels. At individual or section level desire and ability to adapt existed, but the division structure was prohibitive to transformational learning for the overall organization. Coordination with affiliated agencies, organizations, and units was difficult because of the size of the staff. What one section realized from an outside element was difficult to share effectively with other staff sections.⁶⁷

In an era of persistent conflict, one of the struggles transformation tries to resolve is the ability to surge appropriate military assets quickly but efficiently. Military forces are expensive to maintain in an active status. When those forces are not needed to meet immediate defense objectives, they are cost prohibitive. Transformation seeks to improve the Army's ability to provide forces tailored to the tasks required in any environment worldwide. Forces from the active, reserve, and national guard components as well as the joint, civilian, and interagency communities are cited in the *2008 Army Posture Statement* as necessary to meet future commitments. Looking to historical precedents regarding adaptive structures, one example was the Army's transformation from the peace time, garrison Army of the interwar years to the robust force required for World War II. While the environment has changed, the situation at the time required innovative thinking and careful analysis. Many lessons can be learned from the processes executed then and the understanding of hierarchal organizations that was revealed. Recent unit

⁶⁷Storr's analysis for the British Army (referenced above) and this author's review of unit reports reveal a desire and ability to adapt on the part of individuals and sections, but a division structure prohibitive to transformational learning for the overall organization. In addition to the unit reports, the author's experience in Iraq July 2006 to July 2007 with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Mosul provided some insight into the division and brigade staffs serving during that time.

reports echo the very same problems annotated in General McNair's reviews from that time period.

Following World War I, the War Department anticipated the need for a general headquarters to fulfill a role in any future war similar to that of the American Expeditionary Force of 1917-1918. As reorganized in 1921, the War Department General Staff included a separate group of staff officers to prepare for an expeditionary mission in case of war. Called the War Plans Division, it was responsible to draw up strategic plans and deploy to the field as the nucleus of a general headquarters upon mobilization of the Army. During the preparation for World War II, the nucleus of the General Headquarters (GHQ) was reorganized as a headquarters between the War Department and the four armies of the United States. The GHQ was responsible for training the Army. By incorporating strategic plans for war with new ideas for structure and training, the GHQ worked with subordinate units to prepare them for war.⁶⁸

Until 1941, the GHQ organization consisted of fewer than 21 officers. General McNair, the commander of GHQ, demanded innovation, speed, and efficiency from his staff. As the officer in charge of transforming the Army into organizations capable of success in World War II, General McNair ensured his officers participated in training with subordinate corps and division units. Based on his experience, observations, and analysis, he led the doctrinal debate to streamline Army units by reducing units to the minimum effective size by careful evaluation of combat tasks. "Invariably commanders seek more and tend always to make their unit self-contained. It was such proclivities that brought about the present wasteful and unwieldy organization. Commanders do

⁶⁸Kent Roberts Greenfield and Robert R. Palmer, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 5-25.

not consider the larger picture. . . . The big question . . . for decision is not what it would be nice to have in the way of a complete and perfect organization, but what is the very minimum organization which can fight effectively.” Any task that was not required in combat on a daily basis should be relegated to another unit. Flexibility, speed, and lethality were maximized. Staffs and supporting elements were minimized so as not to become burdens themselves.⁶⁹

General McNair constantly reminded his planners that staff personnel could easily become a self-generating administrative quagmire. Instead of increasing staff officers at the division level, McNair rotated officers from subordinate headquarters (battalion and brigade) to fulfill duties only occasionally needed. He stressed verbal orders and elbow grease in lieu of lengthy reports and forms. Specialization and parochialism led to excesses and divergent priorities. Effects were cumulative, making a significant impact at the division level and creating catastrophic waste Army-wide. At a time when personnel shortages were critical and combat divisions were being filled and trained as rapidly as possible, McNair’s ideas resounded with practicality and purpose.⁷⁰

In his letter of recommended revisions to the tactical organization of the Army, General McNair said that staffs “are to be provided solely for combat needs. Operations cannot possibly be

⁶⁹Memo of General McNair for G-3 WD, June 3, 1943, sub: Reduced Inf Div. 322/2 (Divs). Found in Greenfield, Kent Roberts, and Robert R. Palmer, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 315. Information regarding GHQ found in Chapter 1, 5-25.

⁷⁰Kent Roberts Greenfield and Robert R. Palmer. *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*. (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947). The second section by Palmer, “Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat,” Chapters I-III provide an excellent perspective of McNair’s thoughts and how they were received throughout the Army. It is well documented with original memos, letters, documents, and reports.

swift and effective if staffs are large and clumsy. Lack of staff training and fitness cannot be compensated for by increasing size.” What McNair saw occur at the General Headquarters level, he knew was unacceptable to repeat at the division. The General Headquarters (GHQ) was originally designed to develop the plans for the transitioning the Army from a small peace time garrison to a robust organization ready for war in the Pacific, North Africa, and Europe. The GHQ was incredibly effective and innovative as a training headquarters, raising the number of ready active troops from less than 300,000 to over 1.3 million in just 14 months. As the GHQ assumed their role as the nucleus of an expeditionary general headquarters, their training role did not diminish. Increased personnel were needed to cover the duties associated with 24 hour operations and theater campaign management. The GHQ staff grew from 29 officers / 64 enlisted to 76 officers / 178 enlisted in just six months. Four months later, the numbers doubled again to 137 officers and 327 enlisted personnel. Larger numbers increased the administrative burdens such as office space, living quarters, and messing. More importantly, the size of the organization forced rigid divisions of labor and formality that reduced innovation and agility. A two-fold debate ensued over trying to find additional officers to supplement the GHQ and reducing the responsibilities of the organization. Eventually, the operational portion of the GHQ’s mission was transferred back to the War Department and the General McNair remained responsible for training and organization.⁷¹

⁷¹ AGF Letter on Revised Organization of General McNair for Commanding Generals, 21 July 1943, sub: Orientation with Reference to Revised Organization. 320.2/603I (R). Found in Greenfield, Kent Roberts, and Robert R. Palmer, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 374-382. Additional background information regarding the GHQ found on pp. 10,

Despite the fact that the GHQ was originally conceived as the nucleus of a general headquarters for planning and subsequent expeditionary deployment, it became a robust headquarters for training the Army for war. General McNair was well suited for this role and passionate about transforming the Army. In part because of the emergent inefficiencies and reduced flexibility he saw occur at the GHQ when the organization tried to conduct administration, training, and operational roles simultaneously, General McNair was adamant about keeping division level staffs focused on their combat mission. By War Department directive and under General McNair's direction, a committee called The Reduction Board reviewed every unit organization over an eight month period in 1942 and 1943. The Reduction Board sought to cut equipment and personnel from units while maintaining capabilities. Even the lowest echelon units were found guilty of waste and redundancy, but General McNair's teams found extensive inefficiencies at the divisions. The Board recommended that organizations prevent assigning single duties or compartmentalizing tasks in order to avoid duplication. While no offensive weapons were removed from units, administration, security, and supply elements were reevaluated to find efficiencies. No luxuries were afforded, not only on the basis of cost, but in order to spur commanders to conduct combat operations and devise effective measures to end operations successfully.⁷²

While there are inherent differences between the situation in World War II and the contemporary era of persistent conflict, some similarities are apparent as well. During General McNair's era, the conflict had a perceived end in sight. In the current era, balancing forces for

⁷²Kent Roberts Greenfield and Robert R. Palmer. *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*. (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 24 for GHQ numbers, 299 for a summary of The Reduction Board's purpose and findings.

continued operations is more important. Minimizing staffs to the smallest acceptable size, developing efficiencies, and discovering innovative ways to accomplish tasks, however, are methods to balance individuals between numerous competing requirements. General McNair's ideas about the synergy of staffs and the requirement to prepare all components for a wartime mission while ensuring expeditionary headquarters were available for rapid deployment were repeated in the Army's vision for transformation. The Army needed a force that was adaptive and synergistic at every level to meet the needs of the future environment. Transformation and the modular brigade offered opportunities to realize those goals through scalable units and headquarters. Regardless of the specific techniques employed, achieving adaptive behavior as an expeditionary headquarters is a critical component of the division's role in the Modular Force.

Conclusion

Military planners agree that the future global situation is difficult to predict. In December 2008, the Joint Forces Command published the *Joint Operating Environment*, a study of global trends to inform the defense establishment of the challenges facing planners and decision makers through 2030. The realities of warfare in the future environment are predictable only in their diverse and changing manifestations. "This assessment acknowledges the blending of regular and irregular forms of warfare. It has also identified a convergence between some terrorist organizations and transnational crime. Some have postulated a further blurring of these various modes of conflict and challenges to governance as part of the future operating environment." Military planners will have to prepare for these conditions as they develop the future force.

Planners must ensure the structure meets the needs of the nation in the context of a complex and unpredictable environment.⁷³

Development of the modular force was an answer to the future environment. By employing elements tailored and scaled to a contingency, the Army sought to prepare for a variety of threats, operations, and locations. The modular forces that execute these contingencies needed to be agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptable. Establishing an army centered around self-contained BCTs was an effective start. Brigade combat teams are agile. Their relatively small size allows ready deployment by a variety of means and their increased assets provide diverse mission capabilities. The concept built upon previous Army experiences of employing brigades and regiments of varying structures in past conflicts. While debate continues about the specific assets needed at the brigade and how flexible that internal structure should be, it has proven effective not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but throughout historical contingency examples. Modular forces prepare the Army for the future in terms of agility.⁷⁴

⁷³United States Joint Forces Command. *Joint Operating Environment 2008*. (Norfolk, VA.), 45; <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf>.

⁷⁴The best sources for divergent opinions about modularity structure at the brigade combat team are the unit reports compiled by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. In particular, the reports from 82nd Airborne Division and those divisions whose BCTs were transformed just prior to deployment offer contrasting views to the expectations of the *Army Posture Statement* and *Army Modernization Plan*. For an overview of some of the other discussions regarding modularity look at *Military Review* articles 2005-current. Some examples are: Stephen L Melton, "Why Small Brigade Combat Teams Undermine Modularity," *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 58-63, and Robert B Brown. "The Agile Leader Mind-set: Leveraging the Power of Modularity in Iraq," *Military Review* 87, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 32-45. For discussions of contingency operations, see Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine* and Huchthausen, Peter. *America's Splendid Little Wars*. New York: Viking Penguin, 2003.

In addition to agility, the modular brigade increases balance in the future force. In the era of persistent conflict strategic flexibility allows the Army to meet and defeat adversaries with properly trained forces as often as necessary. Since brigades are smaller than divisions and yet capable of performing many of the same functions as the former Army of Excellence divisions, modular brigades conserve manpower. Combined arms, with all supporting assets, and mission specific training can be executed by the BCT. Under modularity, the appropriate brigades or other separate units are scaled for the mission. Having a division headquarters plan and supervise the contingency no longer implies the deployment of a particular complement of subordinate elements. In fact, modularity also incorporates sister service (Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) elements as welcome and necessary in division size contingency organizations. By applying only the minimum forces needed to conduct contingency operations, the modular brigade can allow the Army to accomplish more with a lesser end strength than would have been required in previous eras. Balance is achieved through better, trained forces and a greater pool of all services and all components from which to comprise full-spectrum operations forces.

Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provide an ongoing opportunity to analyze the success of the Modular Force structures. Military operations have been a resounding success at the tactical level. In spite of significant negative incidents such as the Abu Ghraib scandal and violations of conduct by individual soldiers or leaders, most engagements with the local populace are beneficial interactions. Numerous Al Qaeda, Taliban, extremist leaders, and criminals have been killed, captured, or made ineffective due to the actions of military and security forces. Police and military training developed jobs and capabilities across the regions. Infrastructure projects increased clean water, transportation, education, and medical care in desolate and devastated areas. Time and again, the media described the positive actions taken by individual personnel to improve the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Divisions play a critical role and must identify,

describe, and oversee the plan that will achieve the goals in the theater. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, divisions have struggled to provide the synchronization and adaptation as effectively as needed to advance the mission toward successful completion.

Synchronization and adaptation are just as critical as agility and balance to the success of the Modular Force in an era of persistent conflict. Synchronizing the efforts of diverse and semi-independent assets in a theater is no small task. In current and future operations, synchronization means coordination of all the services. Since the *Goldwater-Nichols Defense Act of 1986*, military operations have become increasingly joint. Contingency operations have become increasingly interagency, two of the geographic combatant commands boast their interagency integration. Additionally, in accordance with the *National Security Strategy*, the U.S. will “work with others to diffuse regional conflicts” and “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism.” The United States will seek multi-national solutions to combat emerging crises. The military must be prepared to execute joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national operations in any theater contingency. In 2003 Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, made it clear to planners that they expected a division to fulfill an expeditionary role as a joint task force. In Afghanistan and Iraq divisions act as multi-national military headquarters and provincial reconstruction teams are interagency, intergovernmental organizations coordinating economic and informational efforts. In any contingency or combat operation, the division of the Modular Force must be prepared to provide synchronization for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national forces.

Along with synchronization, responsibility for adaptation lies at the division level. Historical examples indicate that when faced with an unpredictable adversary or unexpected circumstance, some tactical units will discover techniques or procedures to adapt. Divisions can

provide the analysis and perspective to evaluate those tactical innovations and disseminate them to other forces as appropriate. When innovations improve tactical activities to the extent that they should become part of doctrine, divisions must encourage the change for the betterment of the force. How to maintain a perspective commensurate with the complex organizational and environmental responsibilities of a division in the Modular Force requires careful consideration. Divesting the division of its many assets is the first step in ensuring the staff is able to focus on analysis and situational understanding in an ever-changing environment. The era of persistent conflict promises to require more adaptive behavior than demanded of divisions in previous eras. Current divisional structures, however, do not encourage transformation to more adaptive, learning organizations. The Modular Force is postured to allow for adaptive behavior in both tactical units and headquarters organizations. Transformation has not been completed to realize those adaptations. Instead, divisions continue to develop new and/or ad hoc structures when their formal organizations fail to meet their needs.

Future operations will include contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. The Modular Force must be capable of employing ground troops in support of peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and/or major combat operations. Modularity is a distinct advantage over the fixed structures of previous eras, particularly when faced with the diverse missions outlined in current doctrine and policy. Complexity in the contemporary operational environment coupled with the spectrum of conflict to be engaged, requires the Army to relook echelon structures above brigade in the Modular Force. The current division structure does not take advantage of the tactical flexibility provided the brigade commanders. Under modularity, the division has the opportunity to serve the BCTs as a headquarters that provides not just oversight, but analysis and adaptation with a perspective the brigade cannot attain on its own. Identical division organizations with structures very similar to

the Army of Excellence are inadequate to provide layers of critical examination and synthesis required in the era of persistent conflict.

An Army that is simultaneously agile, balanced, synchronized and adaptive is not likely to spring from the current structures. Since 1999 the Army has sought a combination of structures to counter the unpredictable environment of the 21st Century. A brigade centric army whose forces can be tailored to the mission is the first successful step. The next step is developing an expeditionary headquarters to provide synchronization of efforts and continuous adaptive learning for the force. In an era of unprecedented complexity and conflict, the Army needs a division structure with more flexibility than ever before.

Recommendations

The evolving strategic environment will continue to place steady demands on the Army long after we conclude operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. We can expect future foes to be innovative and adaptive, and fully adept at exploiting a globalized world to their advantage. The implication for the Army is that we must continuously and aggressively modernize our capabilities to ensure we remain a dominant force, capable of operating in complex environments across the full spectrum of conflict.⁷⁵

Under the Modular Force, the primary tactical unit is the brigade. Like the Army of Excellence, divisions remain the echelon responsible for command and control of subordinate brigades. Unlike the Army of Excellence, the modular division is unconstrained by a fixed organization of organic forces.⁷⁶ Modularity increases flexibility within Army structures necessary

⁷⁵Department of the Army. *2008 Army Modernization Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, July 2008), 7.

⁷⁶Teleford E. Crisco. "The Modular Force: Division Operations," *Military Review* 86, no. 1 (January/February 2006): 95-100.

to accomplish expeditionary full-spectrum operations. The division staff however, is a fixed organization and current division designs strive to make the division staffs alike across the Army. Conducting the administration and training necessary to prepare modular units requires different structures than those necessary to deploy the forces into contingency or major combat operations. The Modular Force division staff should represent the modular force determined appropriate for the mission. Until the structure is determined for the mission, the necessary staff components must remain flexible, not fixed. Structures in place to ensure an agile and balanced force must give way to allow synchronized joint headquarters that are able to adapt to adversaries in any environment. Developing the right modular structures will impact all three of the division's roles: administrative, training, and expeditionary. Due to the stability needed in administration and training, but the flexibility needed for expeditionary deployment, the roles cannot be accomplished by the same staff.

Administrative Requirements for the Future Force

Administrative requirements at the division level take various forms. They include the life support activities for soldiers and their families, training facilities, and associated installation resources. Administration of pay, personnel actions, and other military specific actions are also required. With the integration of various Department of Defense employees, military components, interagency partners, and contracted employees administrative tasks are more complicated. Division staffs are not prepared for the diverse tasks necessary to achieve efficiency at administrative processes. Division staffs and the modular units subordinate to divisions will benefit from the transformation at Army levels and higher regarding administrative needs.

Administrative actions are largely coordinated by elements outside the division headquarters. Prior to the advent of the Installation Management Agency in 2002, the 184 Army

installations were managed semi-independently by the 15 major commands. Corps and divisions within each command were responsible for installations designated to them. Aligned with Army Transformation and in an effort to achieve better services for Army families while increasing efficiencies, Installation Management Command (IMCOM) took on most administrative functions in 2006. IMCOM's mission is "to provide the Army the installation capabilities and services to support expeditionary operations in a time of persistent conflict, and to provide a quality of life for Soldiers and Families commensurate with their service." The advantages to this plan are a reduction in redundancy for administrative functions and better interoperability among installations.⁷⁷

Efficiencies can be realized in administrative areas by combining efforts across the joint and interagency communities. Some examples already in place are transportation offices whose offices are regionally oriented and handle the household goods for all military and Department of Defense civilian employees in their footprint. Army National Guard and Army Reserve headquarters have begun to combine efforts in some regions to facilitate deployment and training activities in their states. Although difficult to accomplish, synchronized efforts in administrative activities will help balance the modular force and prepare it for deployment.

⁷⁷IMCOM mission statement <http://www.imcom.army.mil/site/about/mission.asp> (accessed April 2, 2009).




Figure 2. The United States Army Command Structure

Source: United States Army Command Structure of Major Subordinate Commands.
<http://www.army.mil/info/organization/> (accessed April 17, 2009).

The current Army command structure depicted above indicates the difficult structure associated with an organization as large as the Department of the Army. It also reveals the segregated nature of the Army's structures in accomplishing administrative tasks. Department of Defense services and components remain largely compartmentalized regarding administrative tasks. While some strides have been made in joint regulations, such as the Joint Federal Travel Regulation, many regulations and certainly the implementation and interpretation of regulations remain localized. U.S. Army Enterprise Task Force, which falls under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), is currently researching ways to increase efficiencies in the areas of installations, units, personnel, and administrative activities.⁷⁸ Significant further study is necessary

⁷⁸Jacqueline M. Hammes, "Army Enterprise Developing Through Process Improvement," *Army News Service*, May 21, 2008.

not only at the Department of the Army level, but at the Department of Defense in order to fully integrate the components envisioned in a truly synchronized approach to administrative activities. Administrative needs provided from outside the divisional structure will ensure that regardless of the modular units deploying, training, or transforming, the personnel and their families will receive quality and timely administrative support.

The Division's Role in Training

In addition to a role in transforming administrative activities, TRADOC is integral to preparing the modular force for full-spectrum operations. Together, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and TRADOC recruit, train, equip, and prepare Army personnel for conflicts and contingencies worldwide. Among the many challenges facing the Army in the era of persistent conflict are training considerations. Some commanders argue that training must focus on counterinsurgency and other irregular warfare that the force currently faces and is likely to continue for the near future. Other commanders disagree, stating that while current counterinsurgency tactics and techniques must be taught to units deploying, training must also include high intensity conflict scenarios.⁷⁹ Across the full-spectrum of operations, the division can only train those units for which it is responsible. Under the new modular structures, exactly who

⁷⁹TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) recruits, trains and educates the Army's Soldiers; develops leaders; supports training in units; develops doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the future Army. TRADOC is the architect of the Army and "thinks for the Army" to meet the demands of a nation at war while simultaneously anticipating solutions to the challenges of tomorrow. More information available online at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/> US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) trains, mobilizes, deploys, sustains, transforms, and reconstitutes conventional forces--providing relevant and ready land power to Combatant Commanders worldwide in defense of the Nation both at home and abroad. More information available online at <http://www.forscom.army.mil/> See COL Hawkins' monograph on training for more references and a discussion on the facets of training the modular force. Jerome K. Hawkins. *Training Balance: Full Spectrum Operations for 21st Century Challenges* (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2008).

that includes is often difficult to discern. The lack of organic, fixed structures brings into question the division's role in training.

Continuous deployments, integration of Army Reserve and National Guard units, and additions of Army civilian and interagency teams to the force all complicate the training process. Since modularity, a division commander no longer knows which units will deploy as part of his team. The menu of options is limited only by coordination and preparation. Likewise, since the era of persistent conflict, a division commander can no longer train for only a few types of missions. He must prepare his staff and his subordinates for the full-spectrum of operations. However, this may be preparing our divisions for failure, for the adage goes: when you try to prepare for everything, you will be prepared for nothing.

Under modularity, the solution is to separate training from deployment. Once identified for a contingency operation or deployment to a combat environment, every commander should be provided the opportunity to prepare his team through collective training. Prior to that identification, however, training should focus on a set of tasks and skills particular to the type of brigade. The strength of the modular Army is in its diverse specialties and self-sufficient BCTs. Training should be focused at that level as well. The division should enable training at the brigade and below, integrating components, interagency enablers, and sister services. Since the components of the division will depend on the mission assumed, the division staff must train for a variety of missions internally as well. Advances in simulations make it possible for the staff to train for their role as a headquarters in a multitude of scenarios and with greater realism than ever before.

While perhaps the most significant role for the current division structure, the scope of this paper does not provide an opportunity to explore training scenarios and challenges more

completely. Additional research is needed once the structure and role of the current division is determined. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) already has a number of experiments in progress. The Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) within TRADOC is specifically tasked to synchronize the capabilities of the modular force with sister services and the interagency. For example, the Army Evaluation Task Force that helps evolve and adapt new technologies to current combat scenarios is just one component of the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC).⁸⁰ As a result of the recent deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, training support brigades have undergone considerable change and development. Their structure and relationship with both TRADOC and FORSCOM to provide relevant training to a variety of units is a good model from which to start. Other relevant sources for experimental progress include sister services, such as the United States Marine Corps, coalition partners such as Australia and Israel, and interagency programs like the training conducted by the United States Agency for International Development.⁸¹

Ongoing training experimentation within TRADOC and FORSCOM will result in techniques and programs to assist division commanders in training. Conducting realistic training should remain the focus of brigades and below in the modular force. By preparing specialty units for the

⁸⁰Army Capabilities Integration Center website at <http://www.arcic.army.mil/index.htm> (accessed April 2, 2009). According to their website, ARCIC is the Army's leader in the identification, design, development, and synchronization of capabilities into the Army current Modular Force and the future Modular Force, bringing together all the Army agencies as well as Joint, Multinational and other DoD agencies to manage rapid change. The ARCIC supports TRADOC in providing adaptive Soldiers, leaders and units by contributing to the development of doctrine, TTPs, and the collective training experience.

⁸¹The research and ongoing programs regarding training are vast. Every issue of military journals have articles regarding new techniques for training and ideas within every service for enhancing training opportunities with partner nations and organizations to achieve a whole of government approach in a multinational forum.

tasks that make them unique, and ensuring all soldiers are trained in basic skills, the modular force can capitalize on the flexibility which defines it. Collective training executed by identified, deploying teams must be realistic and contingency based. Modularity makes it difficult to define to the training role for the division, but it poses an even more provocative question about deploying as an expeditionary headquarters.

An Expeditionary Role for the Echelon Above Brigade

Flexibility is the hallmark of the brigade centric modular army. The division was specifically designed as a headquarters only element so that the subordinate elements could be tailored to maximize capabilities within the joint force in any contingency operation. Divisions must be prepared to act as joint headquarters. The diagram below depicts the concept of the flexible modular division structure.




Figure 3. Dynamic Task Organization

Source: Telford E Crisco, Jr. "The Modular Force: Division Operations," *Military Review* 86, no. 1 (January/February 2006): 95-100.

While the modular division components are ready to perform within a joint task force (JTF) or joint forces, land component command (JFLCC), the modular division headquarters still needs augmentation to accept these roles. In fact, the problem which has not been resolved, is how a static, organic Army staff can be equally prepared, even after augmentation, for such diverse operations. In previous division structures, the division staff relied on augmentation from subordinate units to complement an organic staff nucleus. Under modularity and in response to commander's desires, the division no longer requires personnel from subordinate brigades to supplement the staff. Only augmentation to transition to a joint headquarters is needed. Yet, according to new doctrine, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and comments by the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army in 2004 and 2005, every division should anticipate being a joint headquarters when deployed.⁸² Modular divisions should have modular, flexible, adaptive staffs.

Upon divesting the division of its assets, the division's role to coordinate and integrate tactics on the battlefield was questioned. Fort Stewart's Third Infantry Division was the first to complete modular transformation and deploy to Iraq. Their lessons learned revealed subordinate unit frustration over duplication of efforts and micromanagement. While appreciative of the added capabilities within the BCT, the brigade staffs indicated their struggle to coordinate diverse joint and interagency efforts within their sectors. Division staff members described similar problems. Neither level of staff felt adequately sized, structured, or prepared to effectively tackle

⁸²These examples are discussed earlier in this paper, pp. 27-33.

their mission in Iraq. Brigades and separate battalions voiced concern that the lack of assets at division prevented the staff from maintaining an appropriate perspective.⁸³

Perspective is not a problem in other tactical organizations that have modular subordinate structures and embrace mission command. Divisions may be struggling with their modularity because they are not practiced in their new role. Additionally, they are not organized for their new role. Whereas previously, division staffs were experts at everything their subordinates could do, modularity, jointness, and interagency cooperation bring enablers to the division at which the staff are not proficient. This ineptness should not lead to an immediate tactical dilemma, but it may hinder the staff in their perspective as they try to understand the new capabilities, integrate them into the overall division plan, and maximize adaptation. The division staff must be organized to readily absorb and integrate change. They must be as flexible as their subordinate structures.

Structured differently from conventional divisional forces, the special operations community has held the primary mission for irregular warfare. Since their inception, special operations forces have operated in complex, ambiguous environments requiring cooperation with a multitude of agencies, organizations, and populations. Their organization relies on these networked interactions and their personnel are trained to thrive in those situations. As a result, special operations were the first U.S. forces involved in both conflicts through their unique role in combating terrorism. The structure of their division level headquarters equivalent indicates some

⁸³ 3ID, 1CD, 4ID, and 10th Mountain have completed transformation to the brigade centric structure. See Transformation slide show and CADD documents for the timeline and more information. Combined Arms Center documents regarding lessons learned for transformation, Iraq, and Afghanistan are largely For Official Use Only documents and specifics cannot be printed here. These documents are readily available online to military personnel at www.call.army.mil. CALL Newsletter 08-36, *3ID Transformation*, September 2008.

of the reasons for their successful integration with a multi-faceted force in a complex environment.

Instead of a standing operational headquarters, the special operations forces (SOF) build a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) for a specific mission or to control special operations forces in a specific theater of operations. The size and composition of the JSOTF is completely dependent on the mission and may include any combination of joint SOF and non-SOF elements as well as interagency and multinational partners. While the JSOTF exercises command and control over subordinate units, the JSOTF staff's primary missions are to ensure resources are allocated properly throughout the theater to accomplish the overall commander's mission through planning, coordination, and synchronization of efforts. The role is not very different from that of the division. It is helpful to consider the division from this divergent perspective though, to appreciate the importance of mission command and coordination in the modular force. The special forces community, tailored to function in ambiguous environments, is an experiment in adaptive systems. It is one example to look to for answers on how to design a structure for complex problems and situations.⁸⁴

An expeditionary headquarters for the modular division should not be a standing headquarters. Instead, when an expeditionary headquarters is needed for a contingency operation, a joint planning team should identify the necessary subordinate unit components. Based on the preponderance of those types of units, the expeditionary headquarters should be built modularly. Although further research is needed to practice this type of organization, based

⁸⁴U.S. Special Operations Command. *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual* (Hurlburt Field, FL: The Joint Special Operations University Press, August 2008).

on the experiences of divisions and corps in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Special Operations Forces, precedents exist. Tailoring the expeditionary headquarters from the divisions and other organizations whose units will be part of the modular package will accomplish several positive effects. First, the headquarters can be right-sized with the appropriate personnel, maximizing capabilities while minimizing size. Second, the headquarters can encompass joint and interagency capabilities without additional augmentation of “outsiders” to an otherwise standing organization. Augmentees added to a standing organization are difficult to integrate and may be overlooked during planning and synchronization efforts. If the headquarters is inherently comprised of groups from different organizations, integration is forced to occur early. Third, by enhancing the staff with members of the specialty communities and organizations as integral members instead of liaisons, those capabilities can be better woven into all the planning and operations. Developing the expeditionary headquarters tailored to the mission is the best way to maximize the modular force.

The expeditionary force headquarters concept already has a start in the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) which stood up in October 2008. Although inadequate in its current form, lacking assets, resources, and training, the JECC is the right idea. It provides an effective expeditionary alternative to conventional land component headquarters and has shown potential in the earthquake disaster relief mission in Pakistan and training exercises performed at the Joint Readiness Training Center. One of the major shortcomings is interagency capability and expertise. Continued experimentation is necessary to coordinate their efforts with existing commands and develop models that work. Most importantly, though, in order to remain truly expeditionary, the organization must resist the temptation to standardize their deployment packages or develop a “base” staff. Every mission requirement should be built from scratch, based on the tasks and

situation. Becoming proficient at designing appropriate headquarters configurations requires practicing this process through simulation and deployment.⁸⁵

Summary

Continuous aggressive modernization of our capabilities is not just about technology. It is also about the other elements of DOTMLPF: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. The recommendations in this paper relate specifically to organization. An organizational structure for the modular division should maximize the capabilities of the component parts and allows additional strengths to emerge.

A fixed division staff organization is an unacceptable formation for a modular army designed to be highly flexible. An agile, balanced, synchronized, and adaptive division structure would instead have three components. First, administrative responsibilities would be completely assumed by the Installation Management Command. A whole of government approach and enterprise concepts would maximize efficiencies while providing quality services to Department of Defense and interagency employees. Second, training must become a synchronized effort between TRADOC and FORSCOM with emphasis on increasing specialized technical tasks while maintaining basic soldier skills. Staffs must train on synchronization and adaptive behaviors to prepare them for integration with varied components and enablers. Meanwhile, subordinate commanders must remain focused on combat skills, full-spectrum operations, and challenging training scenarios. Third, expeditionary headquarters must be inherently modular and tailored, like their subordinates, for the mission required. Joint, interagency, and multinational individuals

⁸⁵ Author's notes from a briefing by COL Todd Ebel, Chief of Staff, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command on January 28, 2009 at School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

must be part of the staff. By constructing a staff representative of the expeditionary force, the staff is capable of synchronizing its subordinate components and leading adaptive behavior.

Transformation to modular brigades provided the Army agility and balance.

Synchronization and adaptability must be finalized through transformation to modular divisions. In an era of persistent conflict, the expeditionary role of the division will be constantly changing and frequently required. The Army must realize that traditional division structures are insufficient for the future security environment, but the modular division can transform to an appropriately sized and resourced joint organization. An expeditionary joint task force headquarters and staff who represent their modular components, synchronize assets, and exhibit adaptive behavior will lead the Army through the challenges of persistent conflict.

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