Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan: Is Unity of Effort Good Enough?
Abstract
The conflict in Afghanistan is currently in its eighth year and the United States Government and its NATO/ISAF partners are in the process of rethinking their entire strategy. Eight years of counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, and stabilization operations have thus far resulted in an ever steady increase in the level of violence, an unprecedented resurgence of Taliban control and Al Qaeda operations across the entire country, and has arguably brought the entire US and NATO/ISAF effort to the precipice of mission failure. At the forefront of efforts in Afghanistan are US/OEF and NATO/ISAF Special Operation Forces (SOF). The organizational command and control structure for SOF in Afghanistan is a major shortcoming in SOF effectiveness, and does not follow the Principal of War Unity of Command, and only vaguely supports the idea of Unity of Effort. In spite of the similarity of mission, operational focus and capabilities, within the confines of the theater command and control architecture, US/OEF and NATO/ISAF SOF and their mandates are separate and distinct and essentially operate independently of one another. Arguably the most flexible, dynamic and productive force in Afghanistan, changes to the SOF organizational command and control structure could yield significant results.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 23, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA513950
Entities
People
- Ronald M. Johnson
Organizations
- Naval War College