A District Approach to Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency

Abstract

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with a district level FID/COIN methodology. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level to enhance the security, control, and influence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 2009
Accession Number
ADA514255

Entities

People

  • David S. Clukey

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Electronic Warfare
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Afghanistan Conflict
  • Congress
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Employment
  • Health Services
  • Improvised Explosive Devices
  • Joint Military Activities
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • National Governments
  • National Politics
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Students
  • Terrorists
  • United States Central Command
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.
  • Theoretical Analysis.