The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia
Abstract
On Christmas Day 2009, Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit was very nearly blown up in mid-air by a Nigerian man trained and dispatched by the Yemen-based group al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).1 The incident immediately focused attention on the group, with media speculation centering around whether this regional affiliate of al-Qa'ida posed a graver threat than previously understood and the degree to which Yemen represented a major front in the struggle against terrorism. Lost in the deluge of emerging facts about the Christmas Day plot, however, was the fact that the group that claimed responsibility for it "original" AQAP, but a second incarnation, quite distinct from the earlier organization. This represented a subtle but significant victory for the group's strategic-communications effort. After all, it had chosen to call itself AQAP precisely to create an illusion of continuity. The original AQAP, based in Saudi Arabia, had essentially ceased to exist in 2006, after its campaign of violence against the Saudi state ended in failure and defeat. So far, the Yemen-based militants who represent the second iteration of AQAP have succeeded in obscuring - or at least minimizing - that history. Yet an understanding of the failure of the Saudi AQAP is vital, as it may hold crucially relevant lessons for the effort to combat the Yemeni heirs to the AQAP mantle.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 25, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA515098
Entities
People
- Thomas Hegghammer
Organizations
- United States Military Academy