Preserving Central Intelligence: Assessment and Evaluation in Support of the DCI
Abstract
Once again, reform of the US intelligence establishment is a prime topic of Washington discussion. We have been here before since the Cold War ended, with a dozen or more studies, official and unofficial, focused on intelligence, its roles, and its functions. These efforts notwithstanding, it can be suggested that the end of the Cold War and the major changes which followed in both the operational and technical environments for intelligence did not produce sufficient momentum to overcome the institutional inertia that favored the status quo in the nature and structure of American intelligence. Moreover, neither the significant (though not as dramatic as some would like to claim) budgetary austerity of the 1990s nor the attacks of 11 September 2001 (remarkably at first glance) produced enough shock to prompt major changes. Before we choose to abandon, as some have begun to argue, the office of the Director of Central Intelligence, one of the great and most resilient creations of the National Security Act of 1947, we should at least explore options to strengthen and preserve it. This article will focus on suggestions for correcting two related deficiencies in the intelligence establishment, the absence of an effective internal assessment mechanism in service of the DCI and the absence of an equivalent to the US military's "combatant command" structure, which has proven invaluable to the defense establishment over the past half century.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA515183
Entities
People
- William Nolte
Organizations
- Central Intelligence Agency