A Case Against Systematic Operational Design
Abstract
Currently, the U.S. military seems well on the way to repeating its dismal experience with an effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) by adopting major parts of the so-called systemic operational design (SOD) into Army and joint doctrine. This new concept rests on dubious theoretical foundations. Moreover, it clearly failed when it was put into practice by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Lebanon conflict in July 2006. SOD advocates offered several, sometimes conflicting, definitions of what the new concept really is. These definitions also shifted over time as the concept underwent changes in content. For example, in 2006, SOD was described as an intellectual exercise that draws on the creative vision, experience, intuition, and judgment of commanders to provide a framework for the development of detailed operational plans. Proponents sometimes argued that SOD is a precursor to operational planning and at other times that it is not. More recently, some leading proponents went even further by claiming that their concept is actually operational art for the 21st century. In one definition, it is described as an application of systems theory to operational art. In another, it is an attempt to rationalize complexity through systemic logic. SOD is also explained by its leading advocates as a method that uses critical learning of a shared appreciation of systemic logic to form hypotheses relevant to unique and highly complex situations that evade easy or commonsense solutions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA515328
Entities
People
- Milan N. Vego
Organizations
- National Defense University