Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

Abstract

This paper addresses-and proposes an answer to-the question of who should be accountable for planning, managing, and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations (SROs). The U.S. government's existing approach provides no clear answer. Responsibilities for SROs are divided among several agencies, chiefly the Department of State (State), the Department of Defense (Defense), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). As a result, lines of responsibility or accountability are not well-defined. The lack of an established SRO management system forced the U.S. government to respond to challenges in Iraq through a series of ad hoc agencies that oversaw stabilization and reconstruction activities with-unsurprisingly- generally unsatisfactory outcomes. This paper suggests a new and comprehensive solution, comprising a collection of targeted operational reforms and the creation of an integrated management office-the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO)-that would be accountable for planning and executing SROs.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 01, 2010
Accession Number
ADA515368

Entities

Organizations

  • Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of Defense
  • Department Of State
  • Governments
  • Humanitarian Assistance
  • Information Systems
  • Interagency Coordination
  • International Organizations
  • Law
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military Science
  • National Security
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Public Administration
  • United States
  • United States Government

Readers

  • Defense Acquisition Program Management
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.