Afghanistan: The Path to Victory

Abstract

The focal point of the war on terror has shifted from Baghdad to Kabul, from Mesopotamia to the Hindu Kush. It is in the United States' national interest to pursue a balanced counterinsurgency and state-building policy in Afghanistan. This policy -- neither cheap nor quick -- should be focused on the defeat of hardcore Taliban and its associated movements, which include al Qaeda, and the simultaneous creation of a capable and effective state in Afghanistan. There are no quick-fix or silver-bullet solutions to the problem. To accomplish this policy, we will have to pick up the pace and creativity of our efforts. We -- the United States and its coalition partners -- must do this with all deliberate speed and in close coordination with our efforts to support Pakistan. The urgency of strategic reform stems from one key fact of life: we are in serious (but not grave) trouble in Afghanistan. Violence is up, and despite a doubling of U.S. forces and the recreation of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, security incidents have increased more than ten-fold since 2004. Last year, a provincial capital was attacked, and rumors of Taliban shadow governments in many provinces abound. President Hamid Karzai's approval rating has slipped -- by the most favorable estimates to around 50 percent. Inefficiency and corruption are rampant. Urged on by reports of collateral damage and civilian casualties, Afghans who rate U.S. performance as "good" or better have slipped to only a third of the population. Some suggest that we should just focus on what is important for us, counterterrorism, and not worry about state-building. In the world of academic theory, this might be possible -- but in reality, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, reconstruction, stabilization, and state-building in Afghanistan are all strands in the same rope. In the end, if we do not help to create a stable, decent Afghan state, our counterterrorism efforts will be required there perpetually.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jul 01, 2009
Accession Number
ADA515373

Entities

People

  • Joseph J. Collins

Organizations

  • National War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Autonomy
  • C4I
  • Counter IED
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Afghanistan
  • Command And Control
  • Commerce
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Economic Development
  • Governments
  • National Governments
  • National Security
  • Nato
  • Recreation
  • Security
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • Three Dimensional
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.