

# The DOD Role in African Policy

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Africa's role in US national security policy has fluctuated between episodic importance in times of East-West tensions to relative unimportance since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Crises in Liberia and Somalia, and the domestically important issue of South African governance, are rare instances of US attention being focused on the region.

Economic development, political reform, and conflict resolution are the focus of congressional interest and dominate discussion of US African policy. These largely humanitarian interests overshadow strategic security interests. Unfolding global and regional events, however, portend an increase in Africa's importance to US national security interests and warrant greater Department of Defense (DOD) participation both in the region and in the policy debate.

This article examines the current African policy environment and its effects on US strategic and humanitarian interests. The article also suggests a strategy whereby DOD might contribute markedly to US humanitarian policy initiatives while furthering US strategic security interests. DOD should play a major role in Africa policy formulation for several reasons: the contributions of current DOD programs, the likelihood of future peace enforcement missions, and Africa's strategic importance to the United States.

## *The Importance of Africa to the United States*

Africa's importance to US strategic security interests is more pronounced than is popularly believed. US relations with Africa affect the principles of forward presence, power projection, reconstitution, and maritime superiority contained in the *National Military Strategy*.<sup>1</sup> With the draw-down of American forces overseas, US security will increasingly depend upon the ability of the Department of Defense to project power. To do so, the United States must have base and overflight access agreements, staging areas, and naval retrofitting facilities in distant points of the globe. Recent events in the Middle East, moreover, call into question the continued use of Saudi Arabia

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as a staging area for US Central Command forces and suggest that Africa's strategic importance to the United States may be increasing.

In addition to its use as a staging and basing area, Africa provides some 20 percent of US petroleum imports. An additional 40 percent reaches the United States via the strategic and easily interdicted Southern Cape route, a vital sea line of communication.<sup>2</sup> Given the unsuccessful efforts of the Bush Administration to produce an energy strategy that reduced consumption of cheap imported oil, and given the vulnerability of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf to the saber-rattling of a rejuvenated, belligerent, and perhaps nuclear Iran, African oil may become more important in the near term.<sup>3</sup> Finally, in an era of increased economic competition among the mineral have-not industrial powers of Europe, the Pacific Rim nations, and the United States, access to and continued uninterrupted production of African strategic minerals will remain essential to economies seeking to expand and gain market share in the interdependent global economy.

With the Cold War behind us, the United States now faces a global economic war for market share and national economic vitality. We face an era likely marked by unpredictable regional conflicts that will severely test DOD's ability to project power to distant points of the globe. The United States needs access to Africa if we are to meet these challenges. If political support for strategic interests is weak, then DOD should maintain its ties to African militaries by increasing those peacetime roles that support what Congress currently defines as the dominant US interests on the continent—democratic reform, economic development, conflict resolution, military downsizing, and environmental sustainability. DOD should ensure that Congress remains aware of DOD's unique capabilities in these areas and show how limited but sustained resources can support strategic objectives in the region.

The United States and the Department of Defense would benefit substantially from continued military-to-military contacts regardless of their form or the types of programs executed. Africa is no different from the rest of the world in having military forces; military forces there are arguably more influential, however, in determining the behavior of their governments than are those in countries in the developed world. African military forces should

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be carefully integrated into the US African strategy through increased funding for military-to-military contacts. If democratization is to succeed, African militaries must understand and support a reduction in both their size and their ability to influence domestic events. The Department of Defense has a unique ability to facilitate this process and should be included regularly in policy formulation. Two key documents explain why.

Both the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* stress the importance of security interests and objectives directly influenced by African events. These documents recognized the end of the Cold War and a future marked by economic competition, regional conflict, and democratic reform. The documents established the following US national security strategy objectives for the 1990s:

- Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.
- Undertake humanitarian assistance in the midst of civil war and anarchy.
- Foster open and democratic systems that secure human rights and respect for every citizen.
- Ensure that no hostile power is able to dominate or control a region critical to our interests.
- Avoid conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and violence.
- Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights.<sup>4</sup>

These objectives make it clear that humanitarian and security interests are interrelated. They are synergistic and should be treated as such by Congress and DOD in formulating US African policy. However, such is currently not the case.

The Clinton Administration policy toward Africa appears substantially different from policies little more than a year old in that it emphasizes humanitarian interests over strategic security interests. American foreign policy toward Africa has long included the tenets of economic development and the promotion of democracy. However, the simultaneous need to counter the spread of Soviet influence and to maintain access to strategic minerals and key bases oftentimes overshadowed them. Today the primary tenets of democratic reform and economic development remain, but they are accompanied as dominant US interests only by conflict resolution. The need to counter the spread of Soviet influence has ended, and with it the perceived importance of maintaining access to bases and mineral and petroleum resources.

### *Access to Strategic Bases and Minerals*

The demise of the Soviet Union suddenly and dramatically ended the bipolar competition on the African continent and called into question Africa's strategic importance. For example, the strategic importance of US basing and

access agreements seemingly was reduced. In the Cold War milieu there was an easily articulated need for a US capability to project power into the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and the South Atlantic. We required key installations, overflight agreements, and prepositioning points to meet this strategic objective. The United States has access agreements with Djibouti, Kenya, Senegal, the Seychelles, Liberia, and Gambia, and during the Cold War supported the Angolan rebels from Zaire.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Africa was looked upon as a key geostrategic location from which to stage operations into the Middle East because it was considered politically unacceptable to preposition equipment and supplies in the Middle East or to land US forces on Middle Eastern soil.

The Gulf War established the precedent of basing forces in or operating forces from the Middle East, and current policy depends upon stable or reliable access continuing into the near term. Thus, the Horn and East Africa—where locations such as Berbera, Somalia, were used to preposition petroleum stocks, and the port of Mombasa, Kenya, was useful for naval retrofitting—were of little significance in the Gulf War, and may now appear to have decreased in geostrategic value. Planners and policy analysts citing the example of “the last war” and the absence of a global Soviet threat have been quick to dismiss the importance of maintaining African basing and access agreements. This may be a shortsighted view of US strategic requirements.

Recent events in the Middle East are particularly disturbing. Iran’s purchase of submarines and reported attempts to purchase nuclear warheads from foreign-currency-starved Russia and Kazakhstan are altering the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Iran is aggressively pursuing a central role in the Middle East security architecture. It has underscored its determination by establishing exclusive control over the strategically situated oil-producing island of Abu Musa, and by challenging the Gulf Cooperation Council’s efforts to recruit Syria and Egypt into the council’s security structure.<sup>6</sup> Intimidated by fundamentalist and assertive Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have refused US requests to preposition heavy equipment for US brigades on their soil. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also rebuffed the US Central Command’s request to establish a formal headquarters on the Arabian peninsula.<sup>7</sup>

The foregoing events have profound implications. The US use of Middle East bases is increasingly suspect at a time when a powerful Persian Gulf state, diametrically opposed to the US Middle East role, is arming itself with weapons of mass destruction and initiating the same behavior, seizure of land, that precipitated the recent Gulf War. As former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s remarks in the 1992 *Annual Report to the President and Congress* make clear,

Access to facilities in the nations of sub-Saharan Africa made an important contribution to the Coalition effort during Operation Desert Storm, both for the United States and for the other Coalition forces. Such access would have been even more important had the conflict been prolonged.<sup>8</sup>

In an era of reduced forward deployment, the United States needs base access; the increasingly important requirement to project power in order to influence regional events depends upon it. However, to sustain its own economy and produce the weapons and equipment necessary for power projection, the United States must have access to Africa's strategic minerals.

The United States viewed access to these minerals as a major geopolitical interest during the Cold War. The Soviet Union also saw Africa's minerals as a strategic issue, but with a twist. As former Soviet President Brezhnev is often quoted as saying, for the mineral-rich Soviets, a major geopolitical objective was to deny the United States access to the "treasure house" of strategic minerals found in southern Africa.<sup>9</sup> The presence of Soviet and Cuban forces in the Marxist regimes of Angola and Mozambique underscored this potential strategy of denial and did pose a potential threat to mineral production in South Africa and Zaire. In 1978, for example, Angolan rebels, with Soviet support, launched the short-lived invasion of Zaire's copper- and cobalt-producing Shaba province from Angola.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Cold War-related threat to US access to these minerals has waned, but the US need for them has not. They remain critically important to US industry, weapons production, and military reconstitution. African deposits of cobalt, chromium, platinum, and manganese are essential to the US production of automobiles, tanks, and fighter aircraft. Except for small quantities of platinum, the United States does not produce these minerals indigenously; neither do its chief competitors for world market share: Japan, the Pacific Rim, and the European Community. The major non-African reserves of these minerals are found in the fragile former Soviet states. Economic competition for these imported minerals and the need to maintain secure access to them should continue to influence US strategic thinking about Africa.

This particular threat is difficult to see or to plan for because the stagnant world economy has delayed potentially acrimonious competition among industrial giants. The Japanese, however, recognize the importance of these minerals to their industrial strategy and are establishing joint ventures with mineral-producing countries to ensure sources of supply. The United States should similarly take policy action to protect these sources. Access to these minerals otherwise may soon be lost because of long-term contracts with our competitors or political or economic problems in the handful of mineral-producing countries.

Political instability or economic collapse threatens Africa's major mineral-producing countries. Approximately 75 percent of world cobalt production comes from Zaire and Zambia. It is no understatement to say that Zaire is in economic and political chaos; Zambia's destitute economy brought down long-term President Kenneth Kaunda and threatens the struggling government of Frederick Chiluba. Uncertainty in these countries drove cobalt

prices on the stock market upward from \$11 a pound in 1991 to \$35 a pound in 1992.<sup>10</sup> South Africa, beset by black-on-black violence, killings, and general strikes, accounts for 82 percent of the world's chromium reserve base, 75 percent of the manganese reserve base, and 90 percent of the platinum reserve base; it also largely controls the export of cobalt and copper from Zaire and Zambia.<sup>11</sup> The long-sought change from white to multi-ethnic rule is now imminent; despite its desirability, it will occur in a milieu of violence and mistrust that calls into question the continued availability of these essential South African mineral supplies.

Access to southern African minerals is arguably less secure today than at the height of the Cold War, yet their importance to the US economy and the defense industrial base remains high. Policymakers seem to be paying little heed, however, partly because their attention has been focused on the humanitarian interests left unattended during the Cold War. In addition, there is a longer-term focus in US policy on seeing in place democratic governments that would serve as a more solid foundation for economic development and reliable trade partnerships.

### ***Dominance of Humanitarian Interests***

While our strategic interests may be substantially reduced from their Cold War preeminence, US interests in economic development, democratization, and conflict resolution are not. These humanitarian interests are guiding US policy toward Africa. All three are reflected in the 1991 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which seeks: "A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish."<sup>12</sup> Freed from the need to pursue policies that traded off democracy and human rights against the often more-important interest of controlling the spread of Soviet influence, the United States and, in particular, the Congress are moving aggressively to ensure that human rights, democracy, and economic development guide US policy in the future.

Poverty remains the chief cause of political instability. The legitimacy of any government, particularly that of a democratically elected government, often turns upon its ability to provide for the economic well-being of its people. Two thirds of the world's lowest-income countries are in Africa, where the per capita income averages less than \$200 per person, the population growth rate exceeds three percent, and market prices for the continent's commodity exports are low.<sup>13</sup> In sub-Saharan Africa, nearly half the people live in poverty.

Most African countries have pursued inefficient and often counter-productive economic policies since their independence. Many African countries experimented with socialism; still others witnessed the abuse of political power for economic gain by long-term or lifetime presidents. Africa's total debt is over \$250 billion, with annual interest payments requiring almost

one-third of the African countries' export earnings.<sup>14</sup> It is not an exaggeration to say that Africa's economic situation is dire.

The winds of democratic change that have swept across Eastern Europe have been felt by African elites. The concept of multiparty democracy has spread across the continent and is of particular interest in countries such as South Africa, Kenya, and Zaire, long bastions of single-party or minority rule. It is likely that democratic forces will have to struggle mightily to surmount the multi-ethnic composition of states created by colonial fiat. Nevertheless, foreign lenders and many influential observers in Congress and in European governments who have watched single-party states pursue counterproductive economic policies in the past believe that multiparty democracy is the best hope for Africa's long-term political stability. If democracy is indeed the political system best suited to cultural diversity, then it should flourish in Africa. The United States should therefore strengthen programs, such as security assistance, that can enhance political stability while encouraging economic development.

### ***Conflict Resolution***

Conflict resolution, in which DOD's participation is essential for success, is another major area of interest to the United States in Africa. Chronic conflicts in Africa resulted from the combination of the Cold War and the colonial boundaries that included multiple ethnic groups within the same artificial country. The United States experienced initial success in conflict resolution by cooperating with the Soviet Union on the Angolan conflict. The success of this American foreign policy initiative, termed Constructive Engagement, was tied to solving the Angolan conundrum and bringing independence and democratic rule to Namibia. Beyond US-Soviet cooperative efforts, the United States has been actively involved in seeking solutions to conflicts in other countries, such as in Liberia and in post-Mengistu Ethiopia.

Other regional conflicts abound and beg for resolution. Somalia, the Sudan, and Mozambique are debilitated by civil war, and Angola, Uganda, and Ethiopia still struggle with the aftermath of conflict. Solving most of these conflicts will require the downsizing, demobilizing, and retraining of sizable military forces. Because conflict will continue, conflict resolution may be expected to remain a major US interest in the future, and one in which DOD should have an active role, particularly in the area of demobilization.

During the Cold War, security assistance frequently determined the form and political orientation (East or West) of African governments; African military assistance and armies tended to be disproportionately large and accounted for dysfunctionally sizable portions of government budgets. As a result, Congress is scrutinizing and often criticizing military-to-military ties and DOD spending in African countries. Senator Alan Cranston represented

the perspective of this critical element of Congress when he wrote: "We must be very careful to ensure that the aid we offer does not reinforce this trend by feeding the virus of militarism."<sup>15</sup>

The United States and Europe are seeking to discourage African spending on heavy military equipment and to encourage demobilization. This is a sound objective that should not mean eliminating US security assistance programs, which can be used to manage the demobilization process and provide a model of military subordination to civilian authority.

Another important issue, frequently subsumed under economic and political interests, is the environment. Environmental factors are increasingly recognized for their contribution to political instability and poverty. Africa's burgeoning population exacerbates the need for energy and cultivated land, promotes overgrazing and deforestation, and places suffocating demands on an already overburdened social infrastructure.

Once a net food exporter, the continent is now unable to feed itself. When the land can no longer sustain the people, they are forced to migrate, often across national borders. Millions of refugees now erode the ability of their host countries to manage their own already-strained economies and maintain control over their own territories. The growing population is also encroaching upon the habitat of Africa's unique wildlife. This encroachment, in addition to regionally specific and problematic poaching of certain wildlife species, has greatly reduced much of Africa's population of such animals as the elephant and the rhino, economically important to Africa's tourism industry.<sup>16</sup> Environmental degradation contributes to political instability and places additional strains on an already fragile economic system.

### *Opportunities for Solutions*

The key to maximizing US interests in Africa lies in synergy, in using all US assets to maintain stability. The Defense Department can do much to support the US humanitarian objectives in Africa, and by successfully promoting these objectives the United States serves its strategic security interests as well. As former Secretary of Defense Cheney noted, "Failure by the Western nations to promote stability in Africa could result in disruption in the production or distribution of strategically important resources [minerals and oil] and could reduce access to facilities important to regional contingencies."<sup>17</sup>

Given the fact that militaries in the developing world play a considerable role in the governance of their countries and in regime longevity, DOD involvement would seem to be a natural way to encourage democracy and political stability in Africa. To do so, however, DOD needs to maintain its ties with the African militaries, which is increasingly difficult to do as US security assistance budgets decline worldwide, particularly in Africa. The US military has a potentially important role to play in facilitating democratiza-

tion, economic development, and conflict resolution. Promoting awareness in Congress of the value of the military in supporting US interests could result in increased funding for DOD African programs. In any event, DOD should put its *own* resources into maintaining these ties because they benefit US strategic interests.

### *Humanitarian Interests*

One approach of the Bush Administration was to send Special Forces teams and other specialized units to Africa to conduct small-unit tactical or medical training. Reserve and National Guard units have also performed significant work with the military forces of developing countries, and their medical and engineering unit capabilities lend themselves to the support of environmental and nation-assistance programs.

As the history of Nigeria demonstrates, when governments make the transition to multiparty democracy, they may have to cut military spending to ameliorate their almost inevitable economic problems, and their military forces may rebel. Continued DOD involvement with the militaries of such countries, however, can dampen such a reaction. The Defense Department can provide a role model of military support to civilian government and through military-to-military communication may even be able to forestall military takeovers of democratically elected governments.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the Expanded IMET program, for example, support the democratization process remarkably well. Approximately 500 African officers and noncommissioned officers annually receive US military education. This education exposes them to the American system of democracy and to civil-military relations that emphasize the role of a nonpolitical military professional and the principle of civilian governance. Congress initiated the Expanded IMET program to address judicial systems, military codes of conduct, international human rights standards, and the management of military systems and budgets. Expanded IMET also provides formal training in these subjects to civil as well as military officials at a time when African militaries are being pressured to downsize, to give up political power, or to accept a greater role for civilian, multiparty forms of democratic government.<sup>18</sup>

As good as the IMET program is, it could be improved. A block of democracy and human rights instruction should be added to every IMET course from the infantry officer advanced course to the most basic motor vehicle maintenance course. This would make clear to Congress the value of the basic IMET program to humanitarian interests, as well as better inculcate these values at a time when IMET faces an approximate 50-percent cut by Congress. Increased contact with the US military makes good sense.

US military programs also can facilitate economic development and environmental sustainability. The US Military Civic Action program provides

funding and construction equipment for local militaries to maintain economically important road networks or to build irrigation schemes, bridges and dams, and small hospitals. Such projects promote much-needed economic development, health, and national integration. They make the population of frontier areas feel more a part of the country and enhance the legitimacy of the civilian government. Other donor countries sometimes support these projects and extend the value of the DOD programs. The United States has cooperated with Portugal, France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom on joint civic action projects relating to health and the environment in countries as diverse as Djibouti, Malawi, Ghana, Niger, and Botswana. More significantly, the DOD Coastal Security Program has promoted regional cooperation among West African states in managing fisheries and controlling foreign distant-water trawler fleets that aggressively plundered African waters.

These nonlethal forms of assistance are not directly related to combat missions, yet they promote communication between US forces and the host government's military. Such cooperative relationships on economic and environmental issues serve two important purposes. First, they encourage the military to contribute in nontraditional ways to the improvement of their own country. This is of great potential benefit to governments with very limited resources seeking to demonstrate their concern for a multi-ethnic population. Second, this century's cyclical history of global conflict, and particularly recent events in the Persian Gulf, indicate that strategic US military interests on the African continent may increase in the future. If they do, the good will of the African militaries will be an important asset in accomplishing US strategic objectives, such as providing forward combat equipment storage points, access to ports and bases, and overflight clearance.

The Department of Defense also should promote the fact that its security assistance program has made significant contributions to such African environmental issues as biodiversity, conservation, and fisheries and wildlife management, and it should seek further funding for these missions. Emphasizing DOD's role in facilitating environmental improvement could secure increased support from Congress and from the increasingly influential environmental community.

Indeed, funding from the environmentally conscious Congress already helps to maintain the withering security assistance program. In FY 1991, for example, Congress earmarked \$15 million for DOD environmental, biodiversity, and conservation projects in Africa. This money supported antipoaching efforts, reestablished game parks, and purchased patrol boats, aircraft, and other equipment used by coastal security forces to prevent overfishing in exclusive economic zones. Irrigation schemes, which allowed fertile but dry land to be brought into cultivation, and game park revitalization were also included. So successful was the program that Congress earmarked

an additional \$15 million in FY 93 for African biodiversity and conservation projects. US military involvement in such projects benefits the recipient country in economic as well as environmental ways. Such efforts further the African interests and objectives of both DOD and the Congress.

Additional humanitarian roles that the US military must be prepared to play in Africa in the near term include the rescue of Americans and other Western nationals endangered as a result of violence associated with political transition and, quite possibly, the breakup of African countries into smaller states. In addition, the chronic internal conflicts of Mozambique, Liberia, and southern Sudan may result in calls for the use of US combat forces for humanitarian interests, replicating our experience in Somalia. For such operations, base access, overflight clearances, and logistical support of security assistance partners are invaluable.

### *Conflict Resolution*

The US military may be required to send peacekeeping and cease-fire verification forces to the continent to support conflict resolution processes. However, DOD should steadfastly discourage unilateral peace-enforcement roles. Although these may offer a quick, temporary solution to a problem of foreign policy inattention (as in Somalia) such roles rarely involve vital US interests. They offer little in the form of long-term conflict resolution or continued popular support in the United States. African solutions must be found for African problems. In the recent Liberian conflict and overthrow of the Doe regime, a regional military force from *African* countries constituted the peace enforcement group. Although the group's success has so far been mixed, the United States was thus able to be a facilitator and not a direct participant in the on-the-ground peace-enforcement efforts. The United States is also backing Organization of African Unity (OAU) efforts to facilitate the conflict resolution process in Rwanda. These basically African efforts have the potential for creating lasting peace and represent precedents that should be reinforced. The United States should assume peace enforcement missions only in support of coalition-based UN initiatives or, in the future, those of the OAU.

One requirement of conflict resolution is the demobilization and downsizing of often inordinately large military forces. This process is critical to the success of efforts to establish the new multiparty democratic governments. Thus far, DOD has been asked to contribute little in this area; it has the potential to do far more. The US military could take advantage of existing humanitarian and security assistance programs to construct demobilization camps, establish health care and training facilities, dispose of weapons, and provide basic skills education that would facilitate the reintroduction of former soldiers to civilian society. Such a program would complement State Department and Administration initiatives in Rwanda and Angola, and in Uganda, where the government is seeking to reduce its army by some 40,000 men.

### *Strategic Interests*

While it is important for DOD to support humanitarian interests, it is essential that DOD proactively point out to Congress and the policymaking community the importance of supporting strategic security issues. Two national security interests that DOD should encourage despite their current lack of popular support are strategic terrain and access to minerals. At the geo-strategic level, DOD should encourage both Congress and the Department of State to define and recognize the importance of strategic terrain. Although this is a medium- to long-term interest, military strategists cannot lose sight of the importance of chokepoints, lines of communication, and distant bases from which to project power to the extreme corners of the globe. (See Figure 1.) As a nation that depends upon free and open sea lanes and a powerful blue-water navy for its raw materials imports and economic vitality, the United States must always concern itself with choke points and access to ports where major retrofitting and fueling can occur. While at this time there may not be an international adversary willing or able to threaten the United States by taking advantage of Africa's strategic position, the rapid changes in the world's international political equation in the last five years should be ample evidence that such a potential exists. The vulnerability of resource imports to political variables and the will of countries that control choke points was demonstrated by the refusal of South Africa (and others) to allow Japanese plutonium imports to pass through territorial waters.<sup>19</sup> Nor should we forget




Figure 1. Strategic interests in Africa.

the sudden spike in the Sudan's geopolitical importance that occurred during the Gulf War when it was thought that Iraqi Scuds were in that country for possible use against neighboring Egypt.<sup>20</sup>

For all these reasons, and others like them, the Department of Defense should insist on geostrategic variables being included in the decision process for US policy and interests toward Africa, regardless of whether a current crisis exists to provide easy justification. If DOD fails to champion this cause, there will be no champion.

Also at the strategic level, the Department of Defense should certainly concern itself with continued mineral production and access to strategic minerals and petroleum. The United States cannot reach surge capacities during a mobilization without continued access to sizable quantities of African minerals. US domestic deposits could not make up for a shortfall should access to these sources of supply be lost, a particularly salient fact given the Department of Defense plan to sell down the National Defense Stockpile from its \$8 billion level to an ineffectual level of approximately \$400 million.<sup>21</sup> Of the more than 50 African countries, only a handful are directly involved in the production of strategic and critical minerals. These producing countries should be on a short list of African countries that are of special interest to the United States above and beyond humanitarian concerns. DOD should insist upon factoring-in mineral production capacities as a contributing element in the maintenance of US industrial base productivity and surge capacity. Such inclusion would seem a minor investment and good judgment considering the economic competition that is predicted by the United States' own *National Security Strategy*.

### ***Conclusions and Recommendations***

- The DOD strategy toward Africa should recognize current congressional and Administration emphasis on humanitarian interests, but should not fail to advocate the importance of geostrategic issues. Moderate funding of existing DOD programs can lend meaningful support to salient US interests in Africa: democratic reform, economic development, environmental sustainability, conflict resolution, and military downsizing, thus reducing the likelihood of other Somalias while enhancing US geostrategic interests.

- DOD should proactively seek congressional and Administration support by proposing humanitarian initiatives, which could result in additional funding for security assistance programs. Moreover, such proposals would demonstrate to the new Congress the peacetime value of the military, and would help to sustain military-to-military contacts that would otherwise be lost as Congress reduces security assistance programs that are oriented on the combat arms.

- The Somalia operation will cost the United States at least \$830 million, to be paid by DOD.<sup>22</sup> Somalia set a precedent for using large numbers of US troops for humanitarian reasons in mid-intensity conflicts. The result-

ing financial—and roles and missions—costs to DOD are substantial. It is far wiser and much cheaper to head off these events before they occur in such likely places as Liberia, Western Sahara, Mozambique and southern Sudan. Therefore, DOD should adapt in the following ways:

- ◆ Recognize that humanitarian missions, such as relief operations, may be forced upon DOD by media coverage and public pressure, and be seen as a new element of US foreign policy.

- ◆ Aggressively participate in the shaping of foreign policy initiatives to insure that the use of military forces is not considered without meaningful input from DOD.

- ◆ Use security assistance, National Guard and Reserve training, and nation assistance programs to support political stability and maintain influence that can dissuade intemperate African military behavior and help to secure important base and overflight access agreements.

- ◆ Increase DOD funding of relevant programs and insure that the administration of these programs by the combatant commanders (CINCs) closely supports the foreign policy initiatives of DOD, the State Department, Congress, and the Administration.

- ◆ The main source of expertise to design and manage these programs, and to maintain communication and understanding with influential Third World militaries, is the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. For the program to survive, it must be managed as a functional area, like the Army Acquisition Corps. Former battalion commanders with a brief stint in language school cannot provide the understanding of foreign cultures that insures clear communication between military governments and the United States.<sup>23</sup>

- In an era of scarcity, the DOD strategy toward Africa must be focused and discriminate. Beyond humanitarian concerns, a relative few African countries are of strategic interest to DOD. Therefore, DOD should concentrate its efforts upon countries that influence minerals and petroleum production, bases, sea lines of communication, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: South Africa, Kenya, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. By doing so, DOD will dramatically enhance the *National Military Strategy* foundations of forward presence, power projection, reconstitution, and maritime superiority.

- DOD cannot take a short-term view of crisis management or disregard the importance of Africa to the defense industrial base, upon which operational readiness depends. The cyclical nature of world conflict rewards those who recognize a region's strategic potential. Given Africa's desperate economic condition and the absence of Cold War benefactors, US influence with African countries of strategic importance could be developed at little cost. DOD should, therefore, support peacetime engagement roles for its forces and focus their participation upon countries of strategic importance.

## NOTES

1. Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy 1992* (Washington: DOD, 1992), p. 5. See also the President's *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: The White House, 1993).
2. Department of Energy, *Petroleum Supply Monthly* (July 1990), p. 67.
3. In a scenario alarmingly similar to events leading up to the Gulf War, Iran is pressuring Saudi Arabia (which alone supplies 25 percent of US oil imports and is OPEC's largest producer) to cut its oil production in order to tighten the market and drive up oil prices. Iran needs higher oil revenues to pay for its \$10 billion arms buildup and is being forced by the low oil prices to overproduce and exceed its OPEC quotas. See, for example, "Iran: The New Red Alert in the Persian Gulf," *Business Week*, 26 October 1992, p. 53; and "OPEC Chief Aims to Stem the Oil Flow," *Sunday Patriot News* (Harrisburg, Pa.), 26 September 1993, p. A16.
4. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1993 and 1991 editions.
5. Letter to the Honorable Paul Simon, US Senate, from James L. Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of Defense, 27 August 1992.
6. "Iran and the A-Bomb: Fear Despite Denials," *The New York Times*, 13 April 1993, p. C18; "Egypt and Algeria Assail Iran For Backing Rebels," *The Washington Post*, 8 April 1993, p. A31; "Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role," *The Washington Post*, 12 October 1992, p. A25. See also, "Nuclear Warheads for Iran," *The Washington Post*, 12 October 1992, p. A23; "Cruise Missiles Boost Iran's Grip on Gulf," *The Washington Times*, 11 May 1993, p. 7; and "Iran's Weapons Spree," *The Washington Times*, 24 October 1992, p. C3.
7. "Strategic Plans Giving Way to Mideast Arms Flow," *The Washington Post*, 4 October 1992, p. A24.
8. Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: GPO, February 1992), p. 16.
9. Alton D. Slay, *The Air Force Systems Command Statement on Defense Industrial Base Issues* (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1980).
10. Various interviews at US Embassy, Kinshasa, Zaire, and Geccamines Headquarters, Lubumbashi, Zaire, July 1984. Interview with Kim Shedd, Cobalt Commodity Specialist, US Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C., 2 September 1992. The mining industry, economy, and most government control in Zaire have now collapsed. See for example, "Government Adopts Emergency Measures," Kinshasa Tele-Zaire television network, 18 May 1993, FBIS-AFR-93-095.
11. US Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Commodity Summaries* (Washington: US Bureau of Mines, 1991).
12. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1991, p. 4.
13. The World Bank, *World Development Report 1992* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 30, 306; see also Marguerite Michaels, "Retreat From Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (No. 1, 1993), 95; and "Remembering Africa," *The Economist*, 31 August 1991, p. 33. Note: The World Bank establishes the poverty line at a per capita income level of \$370 in 1985 dollars, which converts to a per capita income level of \$420 for 1990.
14. The World Bank, *African Development Indicators* (Washington: World Bank, 1992), p. 159; see also, "Plus ça change," *New Statesman and Society*, 14 June 1991, pp. 18-20.
15. Senator Allen Cranston, prepared statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Congress, Senate, *U.S. Security Issues in Africa*, 102d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: GPO, 1992).
16. Jane Perlez, "Attacks in Kenya Drain Hard Money," *The New York Times*, 1 March 1992, p. A7.
17. Cheney, p. 16.
18. Testimony of James Woods, Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Africa), before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, 7 May 1992.
19. "Japan's Plan to Ship Plutonium Has Big and Little Lands Roaring," *The New York Times*, 5 October 1992, p. A1.
20. "Sudan Strengthens Forces as Fighting is Stepped Up," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 May 1992, p. 806.
21. John D. Morgan, Chief Staff Officer, US Bureau of Mines, "The Defense Industrial Base and Stockpiles," report prepared for Joint AIME/ASM Meeting on National Defense Stockpile Issues, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va., 27 May 1993. See also: Bob Davis, "Pentagon's Plan to Sell Off Chunks of Nation's Strategic-Materials Stockpile Draws Heavy Fire," *The Wall Street Journal*, 6 August 1991, p. A18. See also William J. Crowe, Jr., "Strategic Supplies Depend on U.S. Industries," *The Washington Post*, 19 December 1991, p. 20; and "Needy Pentagon Puts Stockpile of Goodies For Sale," *Patriot News* (Harrisburg, Pa.), 10 August 1992, p. A3.
22. Eric Schmitt, "USA Today Undercuts Competition in Somalia," *The New York Times*, 1 March 1993, p. B8; see also Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Job in Somalia is Growing in Cost," *The New York Times*, 17 January 1993, p. A7.
23. The Army's most experienced FAOs are being eliminated by the Army's current force reduction policies, leaving DOD and the United States vulnerable to a lack of understanding of regional political-military events during a period when regional conflict will dominate US foreign policy.