The Small Wars Manual and Counterinsurgency
Abstract
In December of 2006, the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps published FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. Prior to this neither the Army nor the Marine Corps had published a manual dedicated to counterinsurgency (COIN) in 20 and 25 years respectively. The operational trends the United States military has experienced since the nation entered the Long War in 2001 propelled an effort by both services to create a manual for "leaders and planners at the battalion level and above." While the manual provides soldiers and Marines with a broad scope of planning considerations, the authors missed a tremendous opportunity to reinvigorate the study of small wars and counterinsurgency by neglecting to incorporate the Small Wars Manual into FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. The only mention Counterinsurgency gives to the Small Wars Manual is a listing in the annotated bibliography; sound doctrine provided by the Small Wars Manual does not appear anywhere within the main text of Counterinsurgency. The absence of any meaningful mention of the Small wars Manual is highly disturbing since the work offers timeless and enduring lessons, advice, considerations, and techniques in dealing with insurgents and revolutionaries. The authors should have drawn more material from the United States Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual because, in terms of discussing leadership, training, cultural considerations, and the fluid and dynamic nature of the COIN environment, the Small Wars Manual surpasses Counterinsurgency in both content and context.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA515671
Entities
People
- Rory D. Kent
Organizations
- Marine Corps University