Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas
Abstract
Although it has been part of the Army's doctrine since 1982, the concept that warfare has three broad levels -- military strategy, operational art, and tactics -- has yet to be fully understood. The material written to explain what operational art really means has become a minor cottage industry. Why then yet another article on the subject? Simply because there is not available a clear explanation of how the Army's view of the three levels of war applies to the so-called real world. Preventing a repetition of the confusing and disjointed command relationships experienced in Vietnam requires clearly understandable joint doctrine agreeable to all services. FM 100-5 has provided the foundation for that understanding and doctrine by clarifying to some extent the relationship among the levels of war. Now joint doctrine must specify how that relationship fits into the U.S. unified command system. Combined doctrine that takes account of the three levels of war is also sorely needed. NATO's integrated military command system, for example, has yet to secure approved combined doctrine for warfighting in Europe. The Army has come a long way in developing its doctrine since first introducing the operational level of war in 1982. It is up to the joint and combined communities to develop the doctrine necessary to insure unambiguous command relationships at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This article offers some practical suggestions on how operational art can be useful in the United States' unified command system.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA516139
Entities
People
- Clayton R. Newell
- Dwight L. Adams
Organizations
- United States Army War College