SDI and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Abstract
On 23 March 1983, President Reagan announced his intention to launch "an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history." The effort he referred to is the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also referred to as Star Wars by some in the news media and those who generally oppose the program. SDI is a research program designed to examine the possibility of effective strategic defenses against ballistic missiles based on new technologies such as directed-energy weapons, super computers, and tracking/detection systems. Response to the President's SDI proposal has run the full spectrum from unquestioned endorsement to outright rejection. Few subjects have stirred more or wider debate seven years into the Reagan presidency, and the attention is clearly deserved. The technical, political, and strategic implications are immense; and if SDI were to meet President Reagan's vision, the course of human history could indeed be changed as the nuclear superpowers could deal with each other based on mutual security, in lieu of the existing situation where fear of nuclear confrontation continues to cast an ominous shadow. Technical experts, politicians, strategists, and academicians of all persuasions have written extensively about SDI. My intent in this essay is not to repeat the technical assessments, political arguments, or learned opinions. Rather, I intend to pose the Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory as a model of the extraordinarily complex strategic issues involved in SDI; address the nuclear weapons background leading to the Prisoner's Dilemma; assess the alternatives associated with deployment of SDI; and draw conclusions with regard to the prospects for the success of SDI.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA516143
Entities
People
- David P. Kirby
Organizations
- United States Army War College